

C O N F I D E N T I A L

07 February 1984

		CHANGE	CONSEQUENCES
General	General	Expand scope to include all automated information processing systems.	Raises questions of feasibility of managing consolidated effort. Within the Agency, OC is responsible for telecommunications and the automated systems used in support of telecommunications. ODP and OS/ISSG are responsible for the security of the remainder of the automated information processing systems.
2.c, 7b	2, c&d	Adds provision for the Government to formulate strategies and measures for providing protection for "systems which handle nongovernment information the loss of which could adversely affect the national interest or the rights of U.S. persons..." Explicit responsibilities and mechanisms to implement this policy are not provided, but would devolve to Director, NSA.	The propriety of this goal, and its pursuit by a military agency, are legal issues which should be explored by the Attorney General.
4.a(4)	No Ref	Empowers Steering Group to approve consolidated resource program and budget proposals for national telecommunications and information systems security.	Restructures budget review process for these areas, with significant impact on DCI role for NFIP and on department and agency head authorities to set priorities.

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NSC review

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**WARNING NOTICE**  
**INTELLIGENCE SOURCES**  
**OR METHODS INVOLVED**

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## C O N F I D E N T I A L

	CHANGE	CONSEQUENCES	25X1
7.g No Ref	Assigns to Director, NSA the responsibility to "Review annually the systems security program and resources requirements of the departments and agencies of the government, and prepare consolidated National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Program Budget recommendations.	Delegates to NSA the authority to review the Agency program and resource requirements and critique/approve our planning. NSA has requested information from the Agency and the Department of State on our planned	25X1
5.(b)(3)	NTISSC to "approve the sensitive systems security information, techniques and materials to foreign governments or international organizations (except in intelligence activities <u>managed</u> by the Director of Central Intelligence).	ODP recommended that <u>managed</u> be changed to "sponsored" so that the DCI could release material that might be in the Agency's interest even if a project is not under the direct control of the DCI. <u>This was not changed.</u>  This provision superseded the DCI's E.O. 12333 authorities to prescribe policies for and coordinate foreign intelligence relationships (except for DDO operations).	25X1
6 4c	Makes Sec Def Executive Agent for automated systems security as well as for Telecommunications Security. Expands his executive agent role to cover all electronic information, not just "national security" information as before.	Considering the rapid expansion of word processing, makes Sec Def Executive Agent for <u>all</u> Government information processing.	

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7	No Ref Under [ ] the NCSC, chaired by the Asst Sec Def for Communications Command, Control and Intell; was established as a national ComSec framework for the conduct of ComSec activities within the Government. NSA was a voting member of the NCSC and the charter functions of NSA were clearly defined. NSA was a coequal with nine other regular members of the NCSC. With the chairmanship of the NCSC at the Asst Sec Def level NSA could not unduly influence national standards or priorities.	The Director, NSA is designated as the National Manager for Telecommunications and Information Systems Security and is <u>responsible for carrying out the responsibilities of the Sec Def as Executive Agent.</u>  Under the proposed NSDD the Director, NSA will have a predominant role in determining the future of telecommunications and automated information systems utilization within the Government. The designation of Director, NSA as the National Manager for Telecommunications and Information Systems Security should be stricken from the proposed NSDD.	25X1
6,7g	No Ref Empowers Sec Def to "procure for and provide to government agencies, and where appropriate, to private institutions (including Government contractors) and foreign governments, equipment and other materials."	Department and agency heads with delegated authority, would lose the right to procure computers and word processors. Centralized procurement would make it very difficult to meet schedules and individual agencies requirements. NSA will have oversight and budget approval/disapproval authority.	
7.b	No Ref Empowers Director, NSA to develop and approve "all standards, techniques, systems and	Entire Government must use Director, NSA specified standards, techniques, systems and equipment.	

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	equipment related to cryptography, ComSec and trusted computer and automated information systems.	
7.e No Ref	Empowers Director, NSA to perform all Government sponsored R&D for telecommunications and information systems.	Eliminated such roles for CIA (ISSG, OC and ORD), DOE, Bureau of Standards, GSA and others.
7b, 8a 4g	Removes [ ] authority of heads of departments and agencies to organize and conduct their communications security and emanations security activities as they see fit, and vests this responsibility with Director, NSA.	In CIA, for example, this removes OC/COMSEC and OS/ISSG missions.
7.b No Ref	Empowers DIRNSA to conduct liaison with foreign governments and international organizations.	Impacts formal and informal roles of DCI, State Department and Commerce Department in many relationships.
7.d No Ref	Empowers Director, NSA to assess and disseminate information on hostile threats to telecommunications and automated information systems.	Remove analysis missions from CIA and DIA such as technology transfer and Soviet technology.
7.d, 8.c Oblique 3.f	The proposed NSDD is very specific on threat assessments and tasks heads of departments	The exceptions under paragraphs 9a and 10.b are <u>not</u> adequate to resist Director, NSA tasking to

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and agencies to provide any information requested by Director, NSA to determine the vulnerability of telecommunications and automated information systems.


provide sources and methods information necessary to conduct the threat assessment.


9 No Ref

Requires the DCI to coordinate with the Steering Group, NTISSC and the Director, NSA, as appropriate, concerning unique requirements pertaining to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

This is in direct conflict with the statutory authority of the DCI to protect sources and methods information.

12 3.d.e.f

The original  provided for "a permanent interagency group under the chairmanship of Sec State...to review and if necessary to deny real estate acquisitions through lease or purchase by the USSR and other Communist countries that present a potential serious threat to U.S. telecommunications security. All foreign government leased or owned facilities in this country should be evaluated as to their possible use for intercept operations."

The very important mission and function of this interagency group/committee is relegated to an advisory function and will in effect become ineffective. This is a classic example of how the NSDD has strayed far afield of the original objectives 

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The revised NSDD stipulates an interagency policy coordination committee under Sec

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State..."It shall provide policy guidance for implementation by the Office of Foreign Missions... on proposals for foreign real estate acquisitions, by lease or purchase, that present a security threat to U.S. telecommunications and automated information systems or are of counterintelligence interest."

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Also NSC

Date  
**2/9/84**

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)

	Initials	Date
1. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></span>		
2. <b>OS-PPG</b>		
3. <b>GS 03</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></span>		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

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Also NSC

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**REMARKS**

*We will be discussing the attached Point Papers with Ken de Graffenried on Monday 13 Feb 84 in order to let him know the Agency position re the proposed NSOD. His reaction will be passed to the DDCI & we will determine the next step prior to the 17 Feb 84 meeting of reps from outer agencies.*

Also NSC

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances and similar actions.

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5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

\* GPO : 1981 O - 341-529 (120)