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SUBJECT: Study of Soviet US Summits

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 26, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC - Mr. William Martin

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SUBJECT: Study of U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

Attached is a classified study of U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979, prepared by the Office of the Historian. It takes into account comments on an earlier draft completed in July, as well as information developed in the course of personal interviews.

for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Study on U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

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United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of the Historian

Historical Research Project No. 1454

UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS
1972-1979

OCTOBER 1985

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PREFACE

This study is based on official records of the Department of State. Most of these records remain classified at this time. Published memoirs and selected personal interviews provided supplementary information. Information from Presidential records was not available at the time of preparation of this study and is not reflected in it.

The participants listed for each summit meeting include all U.S. and Soviet delegation members named in the final meeting communique together with additional selected names of delegation staff members derived from official records.

A previous study by this Office deals with U.S.-Soviet summit meetings between 1955 and 1967.

The study was prepared by official Department historians Nina J. Noring, David W. Mabon, Ronald D. Landa, Harriet D. Schwar, Nina D. Howland, James E. Miller, and David S. Patterson. It was reviewed by Ms. Noring under the overall direction of Paul Claussen, Chief of the Policy Studies Division.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

October 1985

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UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1972-1979: AN OVERVIEW

Between 1972 and 1979, United States and Soviet leaders held six summit meetings. President Nixon's three summits with Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (Moscow, May 22-30, 1972; Washington, June 18-25, 1973; and Moscow, June 28-July 3, 1974) were of longer duration than the others and included extensive side trips, photo opportunities, and ceremonial aspects. A programmed informality characterized these meetings, with occasions for the two leaders to socialize in a relaxed setting.

President Ford's two summits with Brezhnev (Vladivostok, November 23-24, 1974; and Helsinki, July 30 and August 2, 1975) were arranged in response to specific circumstances--Ford's assumption of the presidency and the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Hence, they were shorter, less ceremonial, involved less socializing, and dealt with fewer issues than the previous three summits.

President Carter's summit with Brezhnev (Vienna, June 15-18, 1979) was more formal in tone than the other summits. There were opportunities for informal conversation between the two leaders at the introductory session, short luncheons and dinners, and an evening at the opera, but none in a casual setting. Most business was conducted in plenary session; Carter and Brezhnev met privately only once. The discussions were substantively wide-ranging, but Brezhnev's failing health limited the length of the sessions.

In all cases, U.S. officials anticipated constructive but limited achievements from the summits. Conscious efforts were made to insure there would be positive results from the meetings that would enhance the President's image as a world leader and build support for his policies. Extensive U.S.-Soviet negotiations preceded all six meetings, not only to set the agenda and negotiate a joint communique, but also to narrow and reconcile differences on substantive issues so that specific agreements could be announced at the summit.

Arms control was the dominant issue discussed at all the summits. Summit consideration supplemented and crystallized rather than replaced ongoing negotiations on this issue. Two SALT treaties and several other agreements and joint statements relating to arms control were completed at the meetings. A limited number of negotiating deadlocks on arms control were

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resolved at the summits. At the 1972 meeting, differences were resolved on several subsidiary issues; in June 1974 a threshold test ban treaty was concluded; and in November 1974 important Soviet concessions were obtained regarding SALT.

Geopolitical issues, particularly the Middle East, were also a central concern at the summits. Discussions served mainly to restate existing positions rather than break new ground. The Soviet Union raised the subject of the People's Republic of China at all of the meetings. This reflected Soviet concern over China's nuclear capability and over the resumption of Sino-American relations.

Summit discussions also focused on trade, cultural and scientific exchange, and other bilateral interests. Numerous agreements on these subjects were signed at the three summits held during the Nixon administration. Certain bilateral questions were raised at the Ford and Carter administration summits, but less emphasis was placed on them and no agreements were signed.

NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT MOSCOW, MAY 22-30, 1972

In 1970 the United States took initiatives which after substantial negotiations eventuated two years later in the first Moscow Summit of May 1972. Both countries had high expectations for this summit and these were largely fulfilled, at least in the short run.

The two principal achievements of the summit were the establishment of a personal relationship between President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and the signature of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I). Some last-minute negotiation on these agreements took place at the summit. Also signed in Moscow were prenegotiated agreements on the Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations, Prevention of Incidents at Sea, Cooperation in Space, Medical Science and Public Health, Environmental Protection, and Science and Technology. Of these, the Agreement on Basic Principles was of great importance to the Soviets, who saw it as a U.S. recognition of their full equality as a superpower.

Discussions at the summit also affected significant developments in Europe and the Middle East, trade expansion, and a lend-lease settlement. In subsequent years some of the roughnesses in the negotiating process before, during, and

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after this summit, particularly as they affected the SALT I agreements and the international grain trade, provided an opening for opponents of detente to criticize its viability.

NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT WASHINGTON, CAMP DAVID, AND SAN CLEMENTE, JUNE 18-25, 1973

The Brezhnev visit to the United States (June 18-25), undertaken more at Soviet initiative than American, took place amidst much fanfare but under the cloud of the Watergate hearings. Preparations were conducted primarily by a special interagency committee under the National Security Council's Senior Review Group, although some details were smoothed out by National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger during a May visit to the Soviet Union. Like Khrushchev's visit in 1959, Brezhnev's was marked by public demonstrations, mainly by Jewish groups critical of restrictive Soviet emigration policies. During the visit ten agreements were signed, the most important of which was an understanding on the prevention of nuclear war. In several private talks with Nixon at Camp David and San Clemente, Brezhnev also emphasized his anxiety over improving U.S.-Chinese ties, and he tried unsuccessfully to draw Nixon and Kissinger into an implied alliance against the Chinese. In their final meeting at San Clemente, Brezhnev also tried to bully Nixon into a secret deal to end the Middle Eastern conflict.

FORD AND BREZHNEV AT VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974

The Vladivostok meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet leader Brezhnev took place only five months after the Moscow summit, primarily because Brezhnev was eager to establish contact with the new U.S. President. The summit was more ad hoc than the three previous ones and focused almost entirely on the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Cyprus, and the Middle East were dealt with briefly but nothing of substance was achieved on any of these issues. Mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) was mentioned only in the prenegotiated joint communiqué. In part because of the groundwork laid by Secretary of State Kissinger during his October trip to Moscow and to Soviet hopes of establishing a constructive relationship with the new U.S. President, a breakthrough on SALT did take place at Vladivostok. The two

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sides reached agreement in principle and the resulting SALT accord provided the basis for the SALT II treaty later signed by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. It met the demands of the U.S. Congress and the Defense Department for equal aggregates and involved significant Soviet concessions, including abandonment of their previous demand that Forward Based Systems (FBS), such as U.S. weapons based in Western Europe, had to be included in the U.S. total. Ford and Kissinger returned home feeling triumphant and claiming that they had put a cap on the arms race. Their hopes were dashed, however, by the subsequent inability of the two sides to agree upon whether such weapons as the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles were to be included in the totals agreed upon at Vladivostok.

FORD AND BREZHNEV AT HELSINKI, JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1975

The 1975 Helsinki summit between President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev took place on July 30 and August 2, 1975, immediately prior to and following the ceremonies closing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The United States gave top priority to two issues:

-- Strengthening cooperation between the great powers
-- Concluding a SALT II agreement

The results of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting were unsatisfactory. No substantive progress was made on SALT although the atmosphere which surrounded meetings of the two leaders was frank and cooperative. Public reaction to the meeting was strongly negative and contributed to the subsequent deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations during the remainder of the Ford administration and weakened the President's political position.

CARTER AND BREZHNEV AT VIENNA, JUNE 15-18, 1979

The only U.S.-Soviet summit conference held during the Carter administration opened in Vienna on June 15, 1979, and continued through June 18, with five plenary meetings as well as a private meeting between President Carter and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. Discussions focused on the following subjects:

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1. Strategic Arms Limitation treaty (SALT II)
2. SALT III and other arms control issues
3. International issues
4. Bilateral and trade issues.

The major achievement at Vienna was the signing of the SALT II Treaty on strategic arms. Other issues were discussed and positions clarified, but little movement toward specific agreements resulted. Subsequently, the Soviet Union reacted negatively to the NATO two-track decision in mid-December 1979 to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe while simultaneously pursuing arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces later that month removed all hopes for progress toward a rapprochement in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter asked the Senate to delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty from further Senate consideration; it has still not been ratified.

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MOSCOW
1972

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Discussions at the summit also affected significant developments in Europe and the Middle East, trade expansion, and a lend-lease settlement. In subsequent years some of the roughnesses in the negotiating process before, during, and after this summit, particularly as they affected the SALT I agreements and the international grain trade, gave an opening for opponents of detente to criticize its viability.

Initiative: U.S. Pressure in a Context of Linkage and Increasing Soviet Receptivity

President Richard Nixon's approach to summit meetings was a blend of two strategies which were in partial conflict. On the one hand he wanted summits to be substantive meetings which would be held only after careful advance preparation and would mark the conclusion of significant agreements of major benefit to the United States; for this reason he resisited both Soviet and domestic suggestions that he open his presidency with a summit. On the other hand, he felt the need to manipulate the prestige and results of summit meetings to his domestic political advantage, a consideration which influenced the timing of his summit initiatives.

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At President Nixon's first meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on February 17, 1969, the Ambassador hinted at the possibility of a summit meeting. The President replied by stressing that a summit should be linked to progress on such issues as the Middle East, Vietnam, and arms talks. Nixon thus put forth at the outset the first of his strategies. The procedure which he enunciated to Dobrynin was followed faithfully during the first year of his presidency. A summit would take place only when enough substantive ground had been broken, and enough concrete progress had been made so that the meeting when held would be assured of success in advance. There was little progress toward détente during 1969, and so when Dobrynin mentioned a summit to Kissinger in January 1970, the latter by his own account "threw cold water on the idea."[1]

In April 1970, Nixon introduced for the first time the second consideration in his approach to summits. The invasion of Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces which Nixon ordered that month brought about a sharp drop in his domestic popularity and in his prestige worldwide. According to Kissinger, Nixon was "tormented by antiwar agitators" and "thought he could paralyze them by a dramatic peace move."[2]

By this time Nixon had already established the practice of placing discussion of the most important issues between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Kissinger-Dobrynin "special channel," bypassing the entire Department of State. Accordingly, it was Kissinger, not Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who probed Dobrynin about Soviet willingness to go to the summit. Over the spring and summer of 1970 Dobrynin stalled, raising various issues--the Middle East, SALT, Southeast Asia, and a conference on European security--progress on which Kissinger regarded as Soviet "prices" for a summit. Kissinger later wrote that "they were playing our game of 1969" and that "only the eternal Soviet eagerness to squeeze one-sided gains from a negotiation saved us" from the "serious difficulties" which he believed would have resulted from a premature summit. The Soviets set such high "prices" that Nixon was not tempted. In June 1970, the Soviets informally proposed, via the SALT delegation then in Vienna, an agreement ostensibly aimed at preventing accidental wars which would in actuality have been directed against China. Nixon promptly rejected this overture.[3]

From 1970 on, Nixon's interest in an eventual summit did not waver, but rather intensified as the election year of 1972 approached. During 1971 a breakthrough in the SALT negotiations and Nixon's opening to China cleared the way for an agreement reached in August to hold a summit in Moscow in late May of 1972.

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In January 1971, Kissinger proposed to Nixon that substantive talks on two important issues should be put into the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel. One was the question of a new agreement on Western access rights to West Berlin, on which formal Four-Power negotiations had been underway for some time. The other was SALT, for which formal bilateral talks alternated between Helsinki and Vienna. Both negotiations would now, therefore, be in dual channels. Kissinger wrote later: "And I proposed linking the Berlin negotiations to progress in SALT; SALT, in turn, we would make depend on Soviet willingness to freeze its offensive buildup. Nixon approved."[4]

The back-channel SALT negotiation lasted for 4 months. The pace of the talks quickened after Dobrynin returned in April from the 24th Congess of the Soviet Communist Party, at which Brezhnev launched an active policy of seeking detente. On May 20, the two countries announced an understanding that an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and an agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic missiles would be concluded simultaneously. Hitherto the Soviets had wished an ABM Treaty to be concluded first. The Administration, reflecting the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), considered the new arrangement to represent considerable Soviet concession, although the chief SALT negotiator, Gerard C. Smith, believed prior negotiation of an ABM Treaty would confer certain advantages. For reasons which are unclear, Kissinger chose not to stress in the talks leading up to the understanding the inclusion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the contemplated arrangement on offensive weapons, an omission which later necessitated considerable additional negotiation.[5]

After conclusion of the May 20 agreement, Kissinger pressed Dobrynin harder on a summit, telling him on June 8 that "we had now been talking about a Summit for 14 months." He demanded an answer by the end of the month. Dobrynin tried, as he had previously that spring, to link the summit to progress on Berlin, but agreed to get instructions.[6] Kissinger was not as desperate as he had intentionally sounded. Unknown to the Soviets, he was already planning to leave July 1 on a trip which would include a secret visit to China to plan a summit which had been agreed upon in May.

Regardless of the Soviet answer to Kissinger's plea, there could be no more discussions in the channel until his return. While in Peking, however, the Chinese agreed the summit would be held in February 1972. This sequence of developments enabled Nixon and Kissinger to maintain correctly that they had been negotiating in good faith toward a Soviet summit, and not rejecting Moscow while wooing Peking. They could still hold summits in the order they preferred: Peking first, Moscow second.

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Nixon publicly revealed Kissinger's trip in San Clemente, where the two consulted before Kissinger's return to Washington. With more cards in his hand, Kissinger told Dobrynin that "we believe we have made an unending series of overtures. The Soviet response has been grudging and petty, especially on the Summit Meeting....Dobrynin in reply was almost beside himself with protestations of goodwill."[7]

Kissinger obviously believed his trip had had the desired effect. He urged Nixon to open personal communication with Brezhnev, but not mention a summit; Nixon followed this plan in a letter to Brezhnev of August 6. Brezhnev's reply invited Nixon to Moscow in the spring of 1972. Later in August Kissinger and Dobrynin set the arrival for May 22. The public announcement was released on October 12, during a visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Since Rogers was not apprised of the secret, Nixon and Kissinger pretended to him that the invitation had been formally extended by Gromyko during his October visit.[8]

Kissinger was well satisfied with the result, writing later that it would have been unfortunate if the Soviets had agreed to an earlier date as the United States would not have been well-prepared.[9]

Arkady N. Shevchenko, a high-level Soviet defector who worked on the Soviet Foreign Office team set up to prepare for the summit, has written that by 1971-1972 the Soviet Union wanted the summit at least as much as the United States, partly because of the U.S. opening to China but also because a new generation of Soviet military leaders understood that SALT treaties could reduce the level of expenditure for strategic armaments and give the Soviet Union a "breathing space" in which it would work to narrow the technological gap. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who participated in the summit as an NSC staffer, notes that Soviet arms expenditures never leveled off, but agrees with Shevchenko (and Kissinger) that the China initiative was of supreme importance in hastening the summit.[10]

Preparations: Dual-Channel Negotiations, a Secret Visit, and the Mining of Haiphong Harbor.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union spent many months in preparation for the summit, and many agreements on major and minor matters alike were worked out in advance. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese offensive of March 1972, and the nature of the U.S. response, made the outcome doubtful until days before the summit took place.

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In January Brezhnev, in a letter to Nixon, outlined items for discussion at the summit. They included the proposed Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CSCE), the situations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and the SALT negotiations. Brezhnev called for "positive decisions" on bilateral trade and economic relations at the summit and proposed prenegotiation of several minor agreements for signature during the meeting. In presenting the letter to Kissinger on January 21, Dobrynin added that the Kremlin was "eager" for trade and SALT agreements to be signed at the summit. Kissinger ducked on the specific question of a trade agreement, but said "we would do our best" to meet the target on SALT.[11]

Secretary of State Rogers tried to take personal charge of summit preparations but Nixon ruled otherwise on March 17 when he pointedly told Dobrynin that Kissinger was in complete charge of the summit and would parcel out assignments on the lesser items to individuals within the bureaucracy. The Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea was worked out almost exclusively by U.S. and Soviet naval officials; the other minor agreements were negotiated on the U.S. side by the appropriate agencies, but with Department of State participation. State also prepared extensive briefing materials on all topics. Yet, as Nixon had already explained in a letter to Brezhnev, big issues such as the Middle East, Vietnam, SALT, and the drafting of the communiqué would remain in the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel.[12]

Of all these issues, SALT was the centerpiece so far as the summit was concerned. While front channel SALT negotiations continued in Vienna and Helsinki, Kissinger and Dobrynin, unknown to at least the U.S. SALT delegation, discussed three issues in the winter and spring of 1972: the number and type of ABM sites each side should have, the duration of the freeze on offensive weapons, and the potential inclusion of SLBMs in the freeze. Their talks on the first item were inconclusive. On the second, the United States wanted a duration of 5 years. Kissinger succeeded by late March in getting the Soviets to move from 18 months to 3 years. With regard to SLBMs, he started with a suggestion that each side be allowed 41 missile submarines, that being the current U.S. total, which was within the estimated range of Soviet boats. New boats could replace old ones.[13] (The U.S. total was not scheduled to rise anyway, since the Navy was advocating a program of qualititative, not quantitative, improvements in SLBMs.)

In February Kissinger agreed to "gear the conversations [on SALT] to an agreement at the summit." Dobrynin, according to Kissinger's memorandum of the meeting, wanted to know why a submarine missile freeze "would not simply be a device for stopping an ongoing Soviet program while giving the United States

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the opportunity to tool up for a new [Trident] submarine program....He thought our program was neatly timed to start right after the expiration date." Shortly thereafter Kissinger started to show flexibility, and in mid-March he raised the possibility of allowing the Soviets more boats if they traded in old land missiles (ICBMs) for SLBMs. Under these circumstances, he offered, "it might go as high as the middle 50s as against our 41." At that point, according to Kissinger:

> "Dobrynin said he could not understand our eagerness to get an agreement which was so unequal. How would we justify a Soviet preponderance in this to our public? I said we would have to explain it on the ground that the Soviets could keep a smaller number deployed at any given number of submarines. Dobrynin said, 'There must be some angle. What is it?' I said there was no angle, but there was serious concern about submarines."[14]

The Department of Defense knew about the idea of land for sea missiles, for Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had endorsed it. There is no evidence, however, that the proposal of unequal numbers was shared this early with any of the Departments any more than it was with the SALT delegation.

From the end of March, the North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam crowded the summit preparations out of the talks in the special channel. For months the Soviets had been urging, in the interest of symmetry and great-power equality, that Kissinger make a "secret" pre-summit visit to Moscow to balance the "secret" pre-summit visit to Peking. In April Nixon finally agreed to this trip, with Vietnam talks primarily in mind. Kissinger was in Moscow from April 20 to 24. Although his written instructions called for discussion in Moscow of both Vietnam and summit preparations, Kissinger received several messages from Nixon while en route and in Moscow not to discuss other issues if the Vietnam talks proved unsatisfactory, which they did.[15]

Kissinger chose to disregard the followup instructions and to discuss SALT and other summit business. Brezhnev met the U.S. desire for a 5-year duration of the missile freeze. He proposed a ceiling of 950 launchers (and 62 submarines) on the Soviet SLBM program with the U.S. numbers to be substantially smaller at 656 and 41. The "baseline" above which old missiles would have to be traded in for the Soviets to reach their ceiling was discussed, but no figure was agreed on. On ABMs Brezhnev repeated a formula then under discussion at Helsinki, which would give each country the right to have two sites--one to protect a missile field and the other to protect its national command authority (NCA).

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Kissinger also reviewed with Brezhnev and Gromyko drafts of the agreement on "Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations", a document of great importance to the Soviets, which implied that the two countries were of equal weight in world affairs and emphasized the need for restraint and calm in the approach to world crises.[16]

Upon Kissinger's return Nixon, despite his anger at Kissinger's behavior, accepted the results of the visit. Kissinger believed the Soviet acceptance of an SLBM freeze was a significant concession, even with unequal numbers, because the Soviets, by his estimates, would have on duty at any one time a far smaller proportion of their total number of boats. Nixon supported this conclusion, and so, after the Navy's request for an accelerated Trident program was met, did Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the JCS. The ABM formula was also acceptable, as the administration had been moving toward it for some time.[17]

Secretary Rogers and Gerard Smith were less satisfied with the SLBM formula. Rogers felt the acceptance of inequality would have a bad psychological effect, given the fact that the United States would be adding its acceptance of inequality of numbers in an area where it was roughly equal to its acceptance of de facto inequality in the freeze on ICBM launchers. Smith thought that "we should try to improve the Soviet offer and only if we did not succeed consider whether or not to refuse it." Otherwise, he believed, the United States "might be better off without an SLBM freeze." Both men were well aware of the U.S. lead in other strategic nuclear capabilities areas not covered by the freeze. Their concern was not that the SLBM proposal was a bad deal, but that it would look bad.[18]

Smith strove for the inclusion of procedural language in the reply to Brezhnev's SLBM proposal which would leave room for maneuver in later negotiation. According to Smith, "the President said 'Bullshit.'" Nixon felt a change in procedural language was irrelevant. The final reply stated that the United States "could agree in principle to the general approach" in Brezhnev's proposals and raised no objections to the suggested SLBM ceilings.[19]

The summit itself, however, appeared to be in jeopardy. Kissinger and Nixon agreed in early May on the need for decisive action to blunt North Vietnam's spring offensive. Kissinger believed intensification of the bombing of North Vietnam would cause a Soviet cancellation of the summit, and proposed that the United States cancel, using the excuse that the Soviets were supplying matériel to North Vietnam, in order to avoid the humiliation of having the Russians cancel it first. Nixon at first inclined to this view, but Secretary of the Treasury John Connally convinced both Nixon and Kissinger not to cancel on the

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ground that if the United States initiated cancellation, it would bear the domestic as well as the international onus for it.[20]

On May 8, Nixon announced resumption of the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong and the mining of Haiphong harbor. Suspense did not last long. On May 11, Nixon met with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, whose response when Nixon mentioned the summit indicated the meeting was still on. According to Shevchenko, the Soviet leaders were so committed by this time to a summit that they never seriously considered cancellation.[21]

By the time Air Force One left for Europe on May 20 it was clear that at least five minor bilateral agreements (all described under "Results") had been fully negotiated and were ready for signature. The ABM Treaty needed minor, and the Interim Agreement, major, additional negotiation. The agenda prepared by the Department of State called for detailed discussion of numerous economic issues: lend-lease settlement, expanded bilateral trade, the possible U.S. grant of MFN (most-favored-nation) treatment to the Soviet Union, U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, and possible U.S. aid in the development of Siberian natural gas. Kissinger had discouraged conclusive negotiation in all these areas because of his predilection for putting economic agreements last in the linkage chain. As he saw it at this time, most economic dealings were pure favors to the Soviets.

Pre-summit talks on Vietnam had, of course, been fruitless, and those on the Middle East inconclusive. Both sides nonetheless expected to discuss these issues in Moscow.

Discussions: Catch As Catch Can

The Course of the Summit. The Presidential party left Washington on May 20 and, after stops in Austria and Poland, arrived in Moscow on the afternoon of May 22. All negotiations were conducted in the capital, but Nixon made side trips to Leningrad (May 27), where he visited a cemetary for war victims, and Kiev (May 29-30). On Sunday the 28th he attended services at a Baptist church and delivered, from the Kremlin, a television address to the Soviet people. Thoughout his visit he received maximum exposure from the Soviet media. The communique was issued on the 29th and on May 30 the White House delgation left Kiev for Teheran, where the Shah received Nixon for a state visit.

The Moscow Milieu. Nixon, Kissinger, Chief of Staff H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and a number of other White House aides were Brezhnev's guests in the Kremlin. The Secretary of State, his staff, and specialists from other agencies were quartered in the then-new Rossiya Hotel, a 5-minute walk away. Accommodations

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thus reflected the subordinate role which the Department had played in the preparations and continued to play during the summit itself. The White House and Department of State teams maintained separate communications centers in their respective quarters. The U.S. Embassy was busy as a communications center during the talks, but the "Moscow White House," as it became known, did not avail itself of the expertise of Ambassador Jacob Beam or invite him to sit in at any but plenary sessions, despite the fact he had been chosen for the post by Nixon personally. Beam's only opportunity to talk with the President was at a wreath-laying ceremony.[22]

The format of the talks was subject to considerable change from day to day. This was partly because the remote relationship between Nixon and Rogers, and Nixon's desire to keep the most important items out of Roger's hands, prevented the U.S. formulation of proposals for a formal agenda, as opposed to an understanding of the topics to be discussed. Rogers sat with Nixon only at the formal plenary sessions, of which there were four, signing ceremonies, and banquets. The Soviets for their part made numerous unpredictable changes of schedule. At one point Kissinger cabled Gerard Smith in Helsinki: "You should understand that we are operating in a situation where we never know from hour to hour with whom we are meeting or what the topic will be." While Kissinger believed that the Soviets intended to throw the U.S. delegation off balance, some of his aides believe that the ragged schedule was caused by Brezhnev's need to consult the Politburo and by the fact that the Soviet elite's work schedule is normally irregular.[23]

Smith's very presence in Helsinki was another complicating factor. Nixon didn't want Smith and the SALT delegation in Moscow because he was determined, by Kissinger's account, that Smith not receive much credit for the SALT treaties. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs:

> "In retrospect it would have been better to have brought both delegations to Moscow and let them continue their work there in synchronization with the summit. Given Nixon's feelings about who should get credit, I doubt that he would have agreed if I had proposed it. We shall never know because I did not put forward the idea, not uninfluenced by vanity and the desire to control the final negotiation."[24]

Since the final negotiations on SALT were largely in Nixon's and Kissinger's hands in Moscow, all decisions had to be relayed to Helsinki for transformation into treaty language, with attendant confusion. Nixon had achieved the curious feat of turning the summit into a back channel negotiation.

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Several problems occurred in the preparation of the conference record. Rogers had strongly advised Nixon to have a U.S. translator at all sessions. Nixon refused, for this would have allowed the Department to receive copies of all talks. There were, however, no translators attached to the White House. Various substitutes were tried, all more or less unsatisfactory. At Nixon's first meeting with Brezhnev, the record was prepared by the only other person present, a Soviet interpreter. The record of at least one SALT discussion between Nixon and Brezhnev suffered when the Russian-speaking NSC rapporteur was drawn into the substance of the discussion.[25]

Varieties of Discussion. The summit talks fell into several different categories. There were only four plenary meetings, interesting for atmospherics, but at which little business was transacted. Nixon was dealing with a triumvirate in which one member, General Secretary Brezhnev, was clearly dominant to the other two, Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Supreme Soviet. Nixon had one meeting alone with Brezhnev, and several at which Kissinger and Gromyko were in attendance. The main subject of Nixon's smaller meetings was SALT. Details of SALT were hammered out in sessions between Kissinger, his staff, Gromyko, and Soviet technical expert Dmitri Smirnov. Kosygin handled most of the economic talks on the Soviet side and met several times with Rogers and Peter Flanigan of the White House Staff. Because the summit was characterized by small group meetings with a variety of principals, the description below is presented topically, not chronologically, except for the opening and closing sessions.

Nixon's First Talk With Brezhnev (May 22). In this afternoon talk Brezhnev told Nixon that it had not been easy for him to continue with the summit despite U.S. action in Vietnam. This remark was to be repeated many times by Soviet leaders in the following week, but this ritual does not seem to have interfered with substantive business. The two men then talked about the need for building a personal relationship. They exchanged jokes about the slowness and technical preoccupations of their bureaucracies. "They would simply bury us in paper," said Brezhnev. Nixon avoided the subject of Vietnam, but agreed to discuss the Middle East during the summit. He agreed in principle to the holding of a CSCE. Toward the close of the session Brezhnev mentioned that he would have to bring Kosygin and Podgorny to many meetings. Nixon reciprocated in spirit when he revealed to Brezhnev that he had not yet told Rogers about the "Basic Principles" agreement; Brezhnev sympathetically arranged to have the draft surfaced in a way which would not embarrass Nixon.[26]

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The First Plenary Session (May 23). At this morning meeting Nixon and Brezhnev agreed to let Kissinger and Gromyko plan each day's agenda, and arranged to sign an agreement each day in order to maximize publicity.

The memorandum of this meeting indicates the tone Nixon wished to set at the summit:

> "The President said that he has a strong belief in our system but at the same time he respects those who believe just as strongly in their system. There must be room in this world for two great nations with different systems to live together and work together. We cannot do this however, by mushy sentimentality or glossing over differences which exist. We can do it only by working out real problems in a concrete fashion, determined to place our common interests above our differences."

Brezhnev in his rejoinder talked of the need for far-reaching decisions worthy of the stature of the two nations.

Nixon referred to his reputation as a cold warrior and pleasantries were exchanged. Later, when Nixon brought up improvement of trade and commercial relations, he linked them to SALT by saying that his reputation would help him get congressional support "for mutually beneficial matters, assuming there is progress in other areas."

Regarding the SALT negotiations, Nixon said they were only a beginning. Nixon and Kosygin agreed that it was best to limit nuclear arms now when no other power was a serious nuclear threat. Nixon observed that "potential great powers" could make advances that would threaten "both the U.S. and the Soviet Union...particularly China and Japan."

Nixon expressed preference for discussing SALT in a small forum, and then "asked" for which day signature of the SALT agreements had been scheduled, implying both that he intended to sign no matter what and that he had either little control over, or little knowledge of, the scheduling.

Nixon again endorsed a CSCE, but said it would have to be held after the U.S. elections and that it should be related to Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. The topic was referred to Rogers and Gromyko.[27]

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Final SALT Negotiations. It seemed clear at the plenary session that both sides had made up their minds to resolve remaining SALT matters in time for signature at the summit. Failure of SALT would have meant failure at the summit. Nonetheless, there was considerable bargaining on several issues. They were of secondary strategic, but great psychological and political importance and were highly technical.

There was only one remaining issue on the ABM Treaty. The United States wanted each side's two sites to be as far apart as possible so that they could not be used for a de facto area defense. At his evening session with Nixon and Kissinger on the 23d, Brezhnev accepted the American proposal of 1,500 kilometers distance, unaware that the two delegations at Helsinki had already compromised on 1,300 kilometers. The 1,300 figure stood.[28]

Completion of the Interim Agreement presented more challenging problems. First there was the U.S. desire to have limits on the size of land-based missile replacements. Already negotiated was a clause saying that the parties undertook not to convert launchers (in this case silos) for "light" ICBMs into launchers for "heavy" ICBMs. The number of "heavy" ICBMs, as well as the total number of silos, would, therefore, be frozen. There was no precise definition of a "heavy" ICBM. At Helsinki and at previous rounds the Soviet delegation had resisted such a definition. Could one be worked out now?

Related, but not identical, was the issue of silo dimensions. The United States had originally wanted the freeze to prohibit such increases. The SALT delegations had reached a compromise prohibiting a "significant" increase in missile size. Could "significant" be further defined?

At the first small meeting on the afternoon of the 23d, Brezhnev astonished Kissinger by implying that he would accept a freeze on any increase in either silo dimension or missile size. During a recess, Kissinger advised Nixon not to accept, despite the fact Brezhnev appeared to have accepted an American negotiating position of some months ago, because not increasing missile volume might prevent the MIRVing of U.S. Minuteman missiles. Instead, Nixon and Kissinger proposed in the following session that the "no significant increase" formula be applied to missiles as well as silos, and that "significant" be defined as over 15 percent. "Brezhnev seemed to go along with that as well," Kissinger later commented. When this news reached Gerard Smith in Helsinki, he consulted his military adviser, who "immediately pointed out that under the proposed formula the United States would have to halt its Minuteman III program...the Moscow

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negotiators were about to stumble into a partial MIRV ban." Smith got word to Kissinger that the proposal, to be acceptable, would need to refer to a 15 percent increase in volume "beyond that of the largest light ICBM currently displayed by either side." The Soviet SS-11 was the largest such missile, and the formula left ample margin for MIRVing Minuteman.[29]

Kissinger believed that Brezhnev and Nixon were both too unaware of the technical side of SALT (as the U.S. SALT delegation in turn, believed Kissinger to be) to negotiate successfully. Later he wrote: "The meeting demonstrated that heads of government should not negotiate complex subjects."[30] He got his chance to conclude the negotiation when Nixon and Brezhnev agreed, after their second session on the 23d, to leave further exploration to Kissinger and Gromyko. This got under way at 1:15 a.m. on the 24th. Gromyko distributed papers which in effect withdrew all the concessions Brezhnev had made--a Politburo meeting had intervened--and returned to the position the delegations had reached at Helsinki: There was no Soviet offer on missile volume, but silo dimensions could not be "significantly" increased--no percentage was mentioned. Over the next 24 hours Kissinger does not appear to have made any attempt to pursue the definition of a "heavy" missile, perhaps reasoning that this would be fruitless. His memoirs are silent on this point. He was aware, however, that the Soviets were planning a new missile, the SS-19, which would not have met the 15 percent increase in volume limitation, but which would fit in a silo only 15 percent larger. (Since silos have both length and width, the actual volume increase under the "15 percent" formula proved to be 32 percent, a consideration Kissinger was not aware of at the time.)[31]

Kissinger continued to hold out for the limitation to 15 percent of increases in silo volume.

The most important SALT issue discussed at the conference was the replacement formula for SLBMs. The Soviet Union wanted 30 missiles on H-class (older nuclear) and 60 on G-class (diesel) submarines not to count toward replacement, but to be in addition to the 950 missile limit Brezhnev had proposed in April. In his discussions with Dobrynin in the special channel just before the summit, Kissinger had argued that the missiles on H and G-class boats should count. While the summit was in progress, Smith cabled from Helsinki that he continued to believe that it was better to exclude SLBMs from the Interim Agreement altogether rather than make a poor deal. Kissinger fought hard for the inclusion of H and G-class boats but felt two considerations were paramount. One was that it was more important to bring about the removal of old land-based missiles under an SLBM replacement formula than to worry too much about missiles on boats which had

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not been deployed within range of the United States for several years. The other was that with no SLBM agreement, the Soviets would be capable of building up to 80 submarines by the end of the freeze rather than the 62 Brezhnev had proposed. (Many analysts have subsequently believed this projection to be too high.)[32]

Matters were further complicated when a news leak on May 24th revealed the basic numbers under consideration for the SLBM Protocol. Kissinger's deputy, Alexander Haig, cabled that Senators Goldwater and Jackson were expressing alarm and that the Joint Chiefs were threatening to stray from the reservation. Kissinger took the news to Nixon, who later described his decision:

> "'The hell with the political consequences,' I said. 'We are going to make an agreement on our terms regardless of the political consequences if the Pentagon won't go along.' I determined not to allow either the Pentagon on the right or the Soviets on the left to drive me away from the position I believed was in the best interests of the country."[33]

After prolonged haggling during at least three meetings held from early on the 24th to early on the 25th, Kissinger won Soviet consent to include the H-class boats in the replacement formula, and then offered to exclude G-class vessels unless the Soviets chose to refit them with more modern missiles. Nixon and Kissinger also agreed not to trade in missiles to build up to the U.S. cap of 710 tubes for the duration of the 5-year freeze.[34]

One last SLBM issue was negotiated--the number of boats and tubes each side would be allowed as a "base line" above which it would have to retire older missiles if it was to build up to its SLBM limit. Kissinger succeeded in getting Smirnov to reduce the Soviet base line from 768 to 740; the United States base line was 656.

In the early morning of the 26th, Kissinger, Gromyko, and Smirnov adjourned. Only the silo dimension and G-class modernization issues prevented full agreement. Kissinger stated there would be no further concessions on the U.S. side. The signing ceremony had been tentatively postponed to Sunday, should agreement be reached.

The next morning, the Soviets accepted the U.S. position on silo dimension and the status of the G-class tubes, but insisted that a signing take place that very evening. Enormous confusion ensued as the SALT delegations worked out a final draft on the way to Moscow. The SALT Agreements were signed right on schedule, but the texts contained errors. Nixon and Brezhnev signed corrected revisions in private the next day.[35]

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European Questions. At the plenary meeting the morning of May 24, Brezhnev made much of Soviet willingness to include the United States "in all matters relating to the European continent...even though the U.S. was not a European nation." This attitude was proof "that the Soviet Union was willing to let the United States defend its own interests in Europe." He then made a lengthy presentation on the desirability of convening the CSCE early.

Nixon emphasized that not only the United States, but several European countries would be preoccupied with elections in 1972. Fencing ensued as to whether CSCE matters could be dealt with apart from or in advance of MBFR, Nixon being determined not to let CSCE overshadow or replace MBFR. The matter was referred to Rogers and Gromyko.

The meeting ended on a jovial note, with Nixon joking that he did not want to irritate such Soviet friends as the Albanians, and Brezhnev protesting that "the USSR heeded the voice of Luxembourg as well."[36]

Rogers, Gromyko, and their aides, including Dobrynin, met in the afternoon of the 25th. Gromyko probed to see whether there was any give in the U.S. position on the convening of the CSCE. Rogers allowed that bilateral consultations might take place during 1972, but vetoed convening even a preliminary conference until after the November elections. Of the Soviet-suggested agenda topics, which included territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, and nonapplication of force, Rogers was lukewarm on "the inviolability of borders," stating that one must ask "which borders." Gromyko assured him they were thinking of a principle, "not with specific application to border disputes."

Rogers presented a number of possible scenarios for coordinating MBFR with the CSCE. All had as a common denominator the linkage of results in MBFR with progress on the Soviet CSCE agenda. The Secretary did agree with Gromyko that while MBFR might be discussed at the CSCE, it was not itself the forum at which the MBFR should be negotiated.[37]

There European matters apparently rested. The communiqué mentioned the CSCE but set no date, saying it should be convened "without undue delay." Kissinger states in his memoirs, "Our strategy was to tie the European Security Conference to talks on troop reductions and both of them to an end of the Vietnam War."[38]

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The Middle East. At a meeting with Gromyko on the afternoon of the 25th, the Foreign Minister told Rogers that unless the United States had new proposals, "a discussion of the Middle East probably would not be necessary." On Friday, the 25th, Kissinger succeeded in getting "the blandest possible" language on the Middle East put in the communiqué. The two sides "reaffirmed their support for a peaceful settlement" in accordance with UN Resolution 242, endorsed the mission of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring, and called for "a military relaxation in the area." It was Kissinger's belief that the blander the communiqué, the more the radical Arab States would become disenchanted with Moscow. This section of the communiqué also comported with Rogers' objectives, for the Secretary did not believe "that any terms we might be able to agree on with Moscow would be acceptable to Israel." On Sunday, the 27th, contrary to what he had told Rogers, Gromyko spent 4 hours with Kissinger, reaching what Kissinger later described as "tentative agreement" on "general working principles" for the Middle East which were to be fleshed out later between himself and Dobrynin, but never were. "Their practical consequence was to confirm the deadlock," Kissinger wrote later. Also germane to the Middle East was the statement of "Basic Principles," signed and published on May 29, which spoke of "presenting situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations" and avoiding conflicts or situations" which would "increase international tensions."[39]

Vietnam. The only notable discussion of Vietnam was staged to appear impromptu. After Nixon's two meetings on SALT with Brezhnev on the 24th, Brezhnev propelled Nixon out of the room and into his limousine. After a high-speed ride to Brezhnev's country dacha, with U.S. Secret Service men and Henry Kissinger bringing up the rear, the General Secretary treated the President to a boat ride.

At a pre-dinner meeting, joviality ended when Nixon remarked that the collateral issue of Vietnam should not mar détente. The three Soviet leaders then took turns lambasting him. Brezhnev, in a bullying tone, spoke of the cruelty of the bombing of the North, and charged that the opening to China was meant to induce the Soviets to intervene with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Kosygin, described by Kissinger as more correct but also more aggressive, predicted U.S. failure, complained about damage to Soviet ships in Haiphong harbor, and described Nguyen Van Thieu as a "mercenary President so-called." When Nixon asked who chose Ho Chi Minh, Kosygin replied: "The entire people."

Podgorny was polite, but "just as tough," Nixon later wrote. When he had finished, it was almost 11 p.m. (dinner had been scheduled for 8 p.m.). Kissinger believed, "We were participants in a charade." The meeting was to make "a transcript to send to Hanoi."

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Nixon, in reply, said that although Moscow had helped reconvene the Paris talks, they had gotten nowhere; that Hanoi, not Washington, had rejected Brezhnev's cease-fire offer; and that 30,000 South Vietnamese civilians had been killed by Soviet equipment in that spring's offensive. He offered to take up Vietnam later in the week. Shortly thereafter the meeting broke up.[40]

In his last private meeting with Nixon on Monday the 29th, Brezhnev offered to send Podgorny to Hanoi if it would be helpful. Nixon assented and undertook not to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong during the visit--as long as Podgorny didn't stay too long. Kissinger commented later that he and Nixon knew in advance the trip would be more of a report to Hanoi on the summit than a sincere mediating attempt, but that there had been no way to refuse the offer.[41]

Overall, Vietnam was a very subsidiary issue at the summit. Kissinger rejected, during sessions held May 27 and 28, Gromyko's attempts to get the United States to endorse a coalition government and to agree to joint language in the communiqué. The final communiqué contained separate statements by each side which rehashed long-held positions on Indochina.[42]

Economic Talks. No economic agreements were reached at the summit, but several items were discussed on which agreement was reached a few months later.

In a conversation with Trade Minister N. S. Patolichev on May 23 following the initial plenary meeting, Rogers continued the linkage theme when he remarked that "if we could get rid of some of the main political problems then we could move to some large deals." Patolichev outlined Soviet terms for a grain deal--$750 million in purchases over 3 years ($200 million the first year) with a credit line of $500 million. The credit terms the Soviets wanted were too liberal for the Department. When Patolichev asked for "more agreeable proposals," Rogers replied: "Our suitcases are empty." Patolichev then claimed the Soviet harvest wasn't as bad as advertised.

The conferees agreed to draft language setting up a Joint Trade Commission, to be included in the communiqué.[43]

There was some mention of outstanding Soviet lend-lease debts to the United States, a subject to which Kosygin and Rogers returned on May 25. Rogers stated the U.S. position: $750 million in principal plus $250 million in interest. Kosygin retorted that the figure was "not realistic" and emphasized that the Soviet loss of MFN treatment (for restoration of which a lend-lease settlement was the American price) had damaged the

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Soviet Union: "U.S. should pay those damages." The Soviet offer was $200 million. Kosygin said it should be discussed with Nixon.[44]

Later that day at a plenary meeting Nixon and Kosygin set the principal at $500 million.[45] Meeting again with Rogers on the 26th, Kosygin objected to interest of more than 2 percent and held out for a 50-year payment schedule, to match that given the British many years previously. Rogers pointed out that Congress would not accept such terms. Kosygin held out grain sales as a bait, but Rogers would not respond. Toward the end of the talk, Kosygin accused Rogers of undercutting the President. Rogers commented that it wasn't necessary to settle during the summit because there was "no rush." Kosygin wanted to go back to Nixon, but this apparently was not done. In a final go-round on lend-lease on the 28th, Kosygin agreed that Rogers could tell the Congress progress had been made, that the lend-lease talks were not deadlocked, and that there would be further discussions. In a contradictory vein, however, Kosygin reserved the right to reopen the question of the principal amount.[46]

Another topic of discussion was U.S. private development of Siberian natural gas. In a talk on the 26th, Kosygin hinted his desire for U.S. Government underwriting. Rogers did not respond, perhaps aware that this idea was far down on Kissinger's linkage list.[47]

The communiqué reflected the discussions, saying the countries were working for a trade agreement which would be negotiated concurrently with a lend-lease settlement.[48]

Final Meetings. At the final private meeting mentioned in the section on Vietnam, the atmosphere was relaxed. Brezhnev also brought up the idea of an agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union on the non-use of atomic weapons against each other. Nixon sidestepped by saying discussion should continue in the special channel; he and Kissinger thought the proposal was bound to bring trouble with NATO and with China. Kissinger wrote:

> "Brezhnev then delicately introduced what may well have been the Kremlin's deepest interest in detente. He hinted that both countries might usefully keep an eye on the nuclear aspirations of Peking. Nixon gave him no encouragement."

At the end of the meeting, Nixon told Brezhnev he had his "commitment that privately or publicly I will take no steps directed against the interests of the Soviet Union." Then he cautioned: "But you should rely on what I say in the private channel."[49]

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The last plenary session, held at midday on May 29, was devoted to generalities about the progress made on all fronts and to a good deal of good-humored banter. Nixon and Brezhnev re-enacted the invitation and acceptance for a return summit in Washington which had already been written into the communiqué (the date was not yet set). The summit then ended with a touch of hyperbole when Nixon suggested that the leaders set as a goal for their next meeting the establishment of peace everywhere in the world."[50]

Results: Substantial Achievement Marred by Considerable Confusion

General Considerations. The 1972 summit presents many contradictions. It benefited from substantial advance planning but suffered from last-minute, helter-skelter decisions. Nixon and the Soviet leaders established a personal relationship but some meetings were acrimonious. Several of the supposed successes of the summit were actually negotiated in advance. The achievements which culminated in the summit gave considerable impetus to détente, but their flaws and the manner of their achievement generated controversy which would later help undermine détente.

One problem faced in evaluating the summit is to disentangle the results of the summit per se from those of the peculiar foreign policy apparatus of the early Nixon administration. If, for instance, there were deficiencies in the SALT treaties, should they be attributed to summit pressures or to the frequent use of the back channel in resolving difficulties for over a year prior to the summit? Conversely, if the back channel had not been in operation, would there have been any SALT agreement at all?

A related question is whether the very expectation of a summit distorted the negotiating process. Gerard Smith commented that once a summit is agreed on, a major negotiation connected with it is unlikely to be concluded before the summit takes place. At the same time, he also noted, it also imposes pressure to reach some kind of agreement, in this case "more pressure on the visitor than on the host, especially as the visitor would face a presidential election 6 months later." Kissinger on the other hand was proud of his role in the conclusion of SALT, pointing out that the time from the initiation of the negotiation to its conclusion was only 2 1/2 years, compared with the 4 years needed for the nonproliferation treaty. The implication was that a deadline could be useful.[51]

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The Highpoint of Détente. Certainly the single most important meaning of this summit meeting was that it marked a period of increased U.S.-Soviet contacts and generally improved relations. Moscow's decision to go ahead with the summit despite the U.S. bombing and minings in North Vietnam was a signal that the Soviet Union would at least temporarily put great power relationships ahead of "wars of liberation." The U.S. opening to China no doubt reinforced this Soviet tendency. Nixon and Brezhnev established considerable personal rapport. Shevchenko states that although the Soviet leaders "never really felt at ease with Nixon" and distrusted him, they did "find in his behavior definite similarities to their own," such as his "natural inclination towards secret arrangements," and "concluded that it might be possible to deal with him in the world of realpolitik."[52]

Nixon and Brezhnev met two times more before Nixon resigned. Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford met twice in the latter's brief administration, so that five meetings were held in 4 years, compared with five in the preceeding 27 years.

The SALT Agreements. In analyzing the impact of the SALT negotiations at the summit, as distinct from the viability of the SALT agreements as a whole, it is clear that:

1) There had been no anticipation before the summit that the Soviets would agree to define a "heavy" missile. Therefore, when the prospect of such a definition initially held out by Brezhnev was withdrawn, there was no net loss.

2) On silo dimensions, Kissinger obtained what he thought was a favorable concession at the time. Any flaw in the expected result was not a result of the summit bargaining process, but of his knowledge of the subject.

3) Concerning the distance between ABM sites, the withdrawal of Brezhnev's "concession" merely put the result back to what had been achieved at Helsinki.

4) SLBM ceilings had been agreed to before the summit. The baseline and the replacement formula had not. The combination of the high Soviet ceiling and the replacement formula concluded at the summit occasioned much criticism from Senator Jackson and other congressional defense specialists. The Soviets were said to be getting a "free ride" because they probably didn't have as many missile submarines as the SLBM launcher baseline assumed and because they could retain the 60 G-class missiles. Kissinger's retort to such criticisms was that the agreement kept the Soviets from building more submarines than they would have otherwise

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during the 5-year freeze period, and that the United States had no plans to deploy new submarines during the same period (the Ohio class would not be ready until 1978).

5) Other greatly criticized aspects of the 1972 SALT agreements were, from the left, that they did not address the MIRV problem, and from the right, that they did not reduce the Soviet advantages in throw weight or total number of launchers. These supposed flaws, however, were in no way related to the summit, growing instead out of the nature of the U.S. defense posture, the Nixon administration's overall approach to arms control, and the negotiating techniques of the two SALT delegations.

Thus, despite the extreme confusion--"the fog of negotiation," as Smith put it--of the Moscow talks, the summit did not fundamentally alter the already emergent nuclear agreements.

The ABM Treaty required ratification, and the Interim Agreement, under the Arms Control Act, needed the approval of both Houses of Congress. The Interim Agreement was accompanied by an amendment introduced by Senator Jackson and co-sponsored by 42 other Senators, which requested "the President to seek a future treaty that...would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."[53] The Jackson amendment was inspired by the fact that the Interim Agreement froze the existing inequality in ICBM launches and allowed the Soviets to obtain a numerical superiority in SLBM launchers. Yet, even Jackson, after exacting his price, voted for both instruments. Another part of his price became apparent in the months that followed: Most of the leading figures in ACDA and the SALT delegation resigned or were transferred to other duties. Smith wrote that "somebody had to hold the bag for criticism of the agreements, and there were only two candidates--the White House or ACDA."[54]

More than 2 years after the summit, two documents connected with it became public in a way which injured the credibility of the arms control process. In June 1972, Dobrynin gave Kissinger an interpretation of the SLBM replacement provisions which would have included G-class boats in the base line. Apparently the Soviets, having second thoughts, had decided they would rather forego the extra SLBMs represented by the G-class tubes than dismantle 60 ICBMs. Nixon and Kissinger held them to the original agreement (also a second-thought turnabout) and an "Interpretation" to this effect was signed by Kissinger and Dobrynin on July 21. Because of the way the interpretation was drafted, however, it would through an oversight have allowed the Soviet Union to retrofit the G-class boats, if it had so chosen (it did not) with an entirely new type of missile without including them in the cap of 950. The "Interpretation" was not made public and was not made known to the SALT delegation.

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The other document was Nixon's letter to Brezhnev of May 28, in which the President stated he had no plans to trade in Titans for new SLBM tubes during the freeze. In effect this meant the United States was frozen at 41 SLBM submarines rather than the 44 specified in the protocol. (The United States had no plans to build three more Poseidon submarines anyway.) This document too was closely held. The fact that Kissinger stated at a congressional hearing on June 15, 1972, that there had been "no secret understandings" made at Moscow on arms control helped to maximize the impact of the Nixon letter when it became public.[55]

When the existence of these two documents was revealed in a newspaper account in June 1974, Senator Jackson argued that at the summit Kissinger had "secretly" given the Soviets a 124 missile advantage--the 54 unbuilt U.S. SLBMs plus the 60 to 70 Soviet G-class tubes. Kissinger was able in subsequent testimony to satisfy most critics,[56] but the legend of a summit sell-out persisted in a way that added momentum to the arguments of skeptics of the arms control process. The manner, more than the matter, of the summit and post-summit back channel SALT negotiations damaged arms control.

The Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In addition to the provisions cited previously, the "Basic Principles" explicitly endorsed "peaceful coexistence" and committed each party not "to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other," "to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations," to continue "efforts to limit armaments," especially "strategic armaments," to expand commercial ties, and to "recognize the sovereign equality of all states." It concluded: "The development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests."

The principal practical impact of this document was on Soviet-Egyptian relations. Kissinger and Middle East specialists believe that the "Basic Principles" and the communiqué's language on the Middle East were of great importance in President Anwar Sadat's decision in the summer of 1972 to expel Soviet advisers from Egypt, a conclusion confirmed by Sadat's own memoirs. The Soviet presence there became a casualty of détente.[57] The "Basic Principles" also caused a brief flurry in the NATO capitals, where some government officials worried that the use of the term "peaceful coexistence" in a formal understanding might weaken the U.S. resolve to defend Western Europe, however much they might regard peaceful coexistence as something to be striven for.

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Podgorny's Visit to Vietnam. Podgorny arrived in Hanoi in mid-June and during his stay the United States did not bomb Hanoi or Haiphong. In a letter to Nixon dated June 21, Brezhnev stated that North Vietnamese leaders were "attentive" to the information Podgorny gave them about the American position as stated during the summit and "spoke of their readiness" to resume the Paris talks. Brezhnev proposed that Nixon suggest a date; according to Kissinger, he had already done so on June 12. Talks resumed on July 13. Podgorny's trip does not appear to have played much of a role in the resumption.

The Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea. Of the "minor" agreements negotiated in preparation for the summit, this one has proven the longest lasting and most useful. It established procedures for the avoidance of incidents involving U.S. and Soviet vessels which might occur in the course of their close surveillance of each other, and for the exchange of information on incidents which did occur. A joint commission established later under the agreement meets once a year to monitor its operation. The navies of both nations have found this agreement to be of great practical value.

Other Minor Agreements. The Agreement on Cooperation in Space provided for the docking of a U.S. and a Soviet spacecraft which took place several years later. The Agreements on Medical Science and Public Health, Environmental Protection, and Science and Technology each provided for exchange of specialists and information, and the planning of joint programs, in their respective fields.

CSCE. The North Atlantic Council held a Ministerial Session in Bonn immediately following the Moscow summit on May 30-31, 1972. In their communiqué, the Ministers noted the imminent signing of the Final Protocol to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (June 3) to which they linked their agreement to initiate "the necessary arrangements for beginning the multilateral preparatory talks."[58] Also in the communiqué was language warning against unilateral force reductions which "would jeopardize the prospects for mutual and balanced force reductions." Parallel MBFR and CSCE talks eventually got under way in Helsinki in late October 1973.

Economic Measures. Soon after the summit, officials from the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Commerce signed in Washington with a Soviet official an agreement providing the Soviet Union with $750 million in credits over 3 years, the same figure which had been on the table in Moscow. Simultaneously, however, the Soviets were buying up at low prices over $1 billion in grain from different U.S. grain companies, soaking up most of

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the American surplus and driving up domestic prices. Even Kissinger admitted that in this matter the "Soviet Union played a cool hand and outwitted us at the summit." He claimed that the administration had no knowledge of the "catastrophic" nature of the Soviet crop failure. Indications to the contrary have been widely publicized. It is probably the case that the administration had considerable knowledge of the Soviet grain problem but not of its full extent or of the extent to which the Soviets would be dependent on American supplies rather than those of other exporters.

Nixon and Kissinger were determined not to let Soviet sharp practice on the grain deal stand in the way of expanded trade relationships now that the Berlin Agreements had been finalized. The United States had gained at Soviet expense in the Middle East, the SALT process was continuing, and the Soviet Union had indicated the limits of its involvement with Hanoi. A lend-lease settlement which Kissinger reached with Brezhnev during a visit to Moscow in September 1972 (for a total of $722 million including interest--even Kissinger noted that "it was not a famous victory") cleared the way for a trade agreement which would grant MFN status to the Soviet Union. In August, however, the Soviets placed an exit tax on Jewish emigrants, and the implementation of the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement signed in Washington on October 18, 1972 became tied, via a series of Congressional maneuvers in which Senator Jackson took the lead, to the removal of the tax and the expansion of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The MFN provisions of the agreement have never gone into effect.[59]

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING AT MOSCOW
MAY 22-30, 1972

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Richard Nixon, President of the United States
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Jacob D. Beam, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council Staff
Winston Lord, National Security Council Staff
William Hyland, National Security Council Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, Director for Soviet Affairs, Department of State
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State

Soviet Union

L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
N.V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers
L.V. Smirnov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
N.F. Baibakov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
N.S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade
V.V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
L.M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
G.M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

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NOTES

1. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979) (hereafter Kissinger I), pp. 112-114, 143-144, 552.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 552-557.

4. Ibid., p. 802; Office of the Historian, RP No. 1035, September 1977, SECRET, pp. 290-350.

5. Kissinger I, pp. 810-822; Gerard C. Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (New York: Doubleday, 1980) (hereafter Smith) pp. 194-198, 222-225; Memoranda by Kissinger of Conversations with Dobrynin, April 23, April 27, May 5 and May 12-13, 1971, and Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, May 20, 1971, all in Department of State, Kissinger files (hereafter DOS Kissinger), Folder April-June 1971. (All TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only) Smith believed the back channel procedure unnecessary because his Soviet counterpart, Vladimir S. Semenov, had in December 1970 already signaled the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate offensive and defensive limitation in parallel. He later wrote that "it is difficult to understand why it took from January to May to reach a consensus along the lines which the Soviets had suggested so clearly in December 1970." (Smith, p. 198).

6. Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon enclosing memorandum by Kissinger of conversation with Dobrynin, June 8 (DOS Kissinger, Folder April-June 1971) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only); Kissinger I, p. 833.

7. Memorandum by Kissinger of conversation held with Dobrynin July 19, 1971, forms enclosure to memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, July 17, 1971 (DOS Kissinger, Folder July-September 1971) (both TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

8. Kissinger I, pp. 833-841.

9. Ibid., p. 835.

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10. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 199-204; Memorandum of Interview with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, September 26, 1985.

11. Letter from Brezhnev to Nixon, January 17, 1971; Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, January 25, 1972; Memorandum by Kissinger of conversation held with Dobrynin January 21, 1972 (DOS Kissinger, Folder January-March 1972) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

12. Memorandum by Kissinger of conversation between Nixon and Dobrynin (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only); Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, February 15, 1972 (both ibid.)

13. Kissinger I, pp. 1128-1129.

14. Memoranda by Kissinger of conversations held with Dobrynin January 28, February 15, and March 10, 1972 (all DOS Kissinger, Folder January-March 1972) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

15. Kissinger I, pp. 1135-1137; 1148.

16. Ibid., 1148-1154. Shevchenko points out that the "Basic Principles" meant much more to the Soviets than to the United States, for the U.S. acceptance of the principle of equality was a "powerful boost to Soviet egos." Breaking with Moscow, p. 206. One source believes that Kissinger and Nixon were forthcoming on this matter in the hope that it might be an avenue to obtaining Soviet help in getting out of Vietnam gracefully. Memorandum of Interview with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, September 26, 1985.

17. Ibid., 1154-1164; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) (hereafter RN), pp. 591-592; Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit books, 1983), pp. 535-539.

18. Smith, pp. 372-373.

19. Ibid., pp. 375-376; Hersh, pp. 539-541; John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, HAW, 1973), pp. 245-247; Note handed to Dobrynin May 1, 1972 forms attachment to memorandum for the record by Haig, same date. (DOS Kissinger, Folder April-June 1972)

20. Kissinger I, pp. 1174-1188; RN, pp. 600-602.

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21. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 212-213.

22. Kissinger I, pp. 1206-1207; Hersh, p. 539.

23. Smith, p. 417; Memoranda of Interview with Peter Rodman and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, September 4 and September 26, 1985, respectively.

24. Kissinger I, p. 1230.

25. Ibid., pp. 1208; 1219-1220.

26. Ibid., pp. 1207-1209; RN, pp. 609-610.

27. Memorandum by W. Krimer of First Plenary Session at 11 a.m., May 23 (Department of State, S/S Files, Lot 74 D 473, Folder 7210810) (hereafter DOS 7210810) (S/NODIS).

28. Ibid., pp. 1221-1222; Smith, p. 412-413.

29. Kissinger I, pp. 1220-1224; Smith, pp. 414-415.

30. Kissinger I, p. 1220.

31. Kissinger I, pp. 1233-1235; Hersh, p. 547.

32. Memorandum by Kissinger of conversation held with Dobrynin May 14 (DOS Kissinger Files, Folder April-June 1972) (TS/Sensitive/Excusively Eyes Only); Smith, p. 420; Kissinger I, pp. 1236-1238; Raymond Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security 1:4, Spring 1977 (3-24), p. 15.

33. Kissinger I, pp. 1232-1233, 1240; RN, p. 615.

34. Letter from Nixon to Brezhnev, May 28, 1972 (text forms attachment to memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 17, 1974, Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, Control 7414085); Smith, p. 428. Though Nixon's letter is dated May 28, it may have been agreed to earlier, since the Interim Agreement was signed on May 26.

35. Kissinger I, pp. 1239-1242.

36. Memorandum by Martin J. Hillenbrand of Plenary Session at 11 a.m. (DOS 7210810) (S/NODIS).

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37. Telegram 5041 from Moscow (Secto 40), May 27, 1972 (DOS 7210810) (S/NODIS).

38. Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 901; Kissinger I, pp. 1249-1250. The linkage to troop reductions is confirmed by the available conference documents; that to the Vietnam War is not.

39. Telegram 5074 from Moscow (Secto 53), May 29, 1972 (DOS 7210810) (C/NODIS), Kissinger I, pp. 1246-1248, 1494; Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 898-899, 902; Office of the Historian, RP No. 976-C, November 1976 (TS/NODIS), pp. 69-70.

40. RN, pp. 612-614; Kissinger I, pp. 1222-1228.

41. Ibid., p. 1251; RN, p. 617.

42. Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 902.

43. Telegram 4935 from Moscow (Secto 15), May 24, 1972 (DOS 7210810) (S/NODIS).

44. Memorandum of conversation by Flanigan, May 25, 1972 (ibid.) (S/NODIS).

45. Memorandum by Flanigan of Plenary Session at 2 p.m. May 25, 1972 (ibid.) (S/NODIS).

46. Telegram 5054 from London (Secto 86), June 1, 1972, and memorandum of conversation held May 28, 1972, by Deane R. Hinton and Lewis W. Bowden (both ibid.) (both S/NODIS).

47. Telegram 1000 from Berlin (Secto 110), June 3, 1972 (ibid.).

48. Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 900.

49. Kissinger I, pp. 1251-1252; RN, p. 617.

50. Memorandum by J. F. Matlock of Final Plenary Session held May 29, 1972, at 12:50 p.m. (S/NODIS).

51. Smith, p. 319; Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 116-117.

52. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 215-216.

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53. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1972, p. 653.

54. Smith, p. 444.

55. Note handed to Kissinger by Dobrynin on June 14, 1972, forms attachment to letter from Haig to Dobrynin, June 15, 1972 (DOS Kissinger, Folder April-June 1972); "Clarification of Interpretation of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement...with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," July 24, 1972 (text forms attachment to memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 17, 1974, Sonnefeldt files, Lot 81 D 286, Control 7414085); U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues, Volume I, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 471.

56. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 1144-1151.

57. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 151; Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 229.

58. Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, eds., American Foreign Relations, 1972: A Documentary Record (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 156-157.

59. Kissinger I, p. 1269-1273; Hersh, pp. 531-535; Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, eds., American Foreign Relations, 1973: A Documentary Record (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 91-93.

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WASHINGTON
1973

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NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT WASHINGTON, CAMP DAVID, AND SAN CLEMENTE, JUNE 18-25, 1973

The Brezhnev visit to the United States (June 18-25), undertaken more at Soviet initiative than American, took place amidst much fanfare but under the cloud of the Watergate hearings. Preparations were conducted primarily by a special interagency committee under the National Security Council's Senior Review Group, although some details were smoothed out by National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger during a May visit to the Soviet Union. Like Khrushchev's visit in 1959, Brezhnev's was marked by public demonstrations, mainly by Jewish groups critical of restrictive Soviet emigration policies. During the visit ten agreements were signed, the most important of which was an understanding on the prevention of nuclear war. In several private talks with Nixon at Camp David and San Clemente, Brezhnev also emphasized his anxiety over improving U.S.-Chinese ties and tried unsuccessfully to draw Nixon and Kissinger into an implied alliance against the Chinese. In their final meeting at San Clemente, Brezhnev also tried to bully Nixon into a secret deal to end the Middle Eastern conflict.

Initiative: Uncertain Aftermath of the 1972 Summit

The final communique of the May 1972 Moscow summit referred to another summit meeting to be held in Washington, but the date was not stipulated. In the fall of 1972 the Soviets evinced little interest in another summit, indicating that in the absence of a nuclear agreement the Soviet Union preferred November 1973 as a date. The United States wanted to postpone the meeting for different reasons: to finish the Year of Europe and further to improve relations with China.[1]

In February 1973, the Soviet Union showed new interest in a meeting. Brezhnev wrote to Nixon using the ploy of rejecting May as the date for a summit (a date never proposed) and offering to push the meeting back to June. In the letter Brezhnev suggested goals for the summit: progress on SALT, the signing of the agreement on nonuse of nuclear weapons, and the signing of accords on trade, science and technology, health, and peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Soviet leader also expressed interest in discussing the Middle East and various European issues.[2]

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Prospects for the summit were complicated by two domestic developments in the United States. The first was the introduction in April 1973 of the Jackson amendment to the Trade Reform Act, by which the grant of most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union would be linked to Jewish emigration. Soviet suspension of the exit tax on emigrants, which the White House belatedly communicated to Senate leaders and Brezhnev's personal assurances in Moscow to a group of visiting Senators, failed to stop introduction of the amendment. The second event was the beginning of the Senate Watergate hearings in May. White House aide John Dean was scheduled to testify on June 18, the day Brezhnev was to arrive in the United States. Under pressure from the Senate leadership, Committee Chairman Sam Ervin postponed Dean's testimony a week, until after Brezhnev's departure.[3]

The summit agenda, and a draft text of the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, were ironed out during the visit of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to the Soviet Union May 6-9. As part of the sounding out of each side's position on the various issues, Kissinger also discussed the issue of Jewish emigration. He gave Brezhnev a list compiled by American Jewish leaders of 1,000 Jews who wanted to leave the Soviet Union and were considered "hardship' cases. Not only did Brezhnev promise to look into these cases, but he indicated that the Soviet Union would try to maintain the annual level of Jewish emigration at about 40,000. The Soviet leader made clear to Kissinger that new U.S. SALT proposals for freezing testing and deployment of MIRV'd missiles, which the Soviet Union had not yet even begun testing but which the United States had been deploying for three years, were unacceptable. On the other hand, the United States opposed the Soviet proposal advanced in the spring of 1973 for a ban on testing and deployment of all new strategic systems. As one writer has observed, "SALT thus remained at a stalemate" and there was little room for maneuver at the summit on the issue of arms control.[4]

The agreement on the prevention of nuclear war had been discussed inconclusively at the Moscow 1972 summit and had been raised again by the Soviets in the fall of that year in the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel and during Gromyko's visit to Washington in October. Nixon and Kissinger, who were never that enthusiastic about the agreement because of the appearence of a Soviet-American "condominium", used it to "keep Brezhnev on the hook" so as to win concessions for the United States in other areas. Responsibility for drafting the agreement was left entirely to Kissinger. Not even the Secretary of State or

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Secretary of Defense knew of the agreement. Kissinger, however, consulted extensively with the British expert on Soviet affairs, Sir Thomas Brimelow, who eventually helped draft the text that was agreed to by Kissinger and Brezhnev in May. For the United States, the advantage of Brimelow's draft was that it removed from the Soviet text implications of the preeminence of Soviet-American relations over U.S. relations with its allies and focused more on the threat of force with any kind of weapon as contrasted to the Soviet emphasis on nuclear weapons.[5]

Preparations: NSC Oversight

In the spring of 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union were in the process of negotiating bilateral agreements in several areas: transportation, oceanography, contacts and exchanges, taxation, peaceful uses of atomic energy, agriculture, and civil aviation. By late May agreed texts for all but the last two had been achieved and it was considered possible that agreement would be reached on those two during the visit.[6]

The President directed the NSC's Senior Review Group headed by Kissinger to oversee preparations for the visit. Within the Senior Review Group framework, an ad hoc interagency committee chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel was established to assist with preparations and coordination. Various working groups were also set up to deal with substantive preparations, administrative and protocol arrangements, press arrangements, security, and communications.[7]

The substantive briefing papers on various issues were condensed into a "basic memorandum" from Kissinger to the President, which reviewed the major issues likely to be discussed and provided the President with talking points on each. In the memorandum Kissinger indicated that Brezhnev had invested much personal prestige in the success of detente and therefore wanted the visit to provide tangible signs of economic benefits to the U.S.S.R. and improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. He was also concerned about the public imagery associated with the visit and, in contrast to how Khrushchev had appeared during his 1959 visit, did not want to be the object of public demonstrations or to play the part of the tourist. Kissinger felt that Brezhnev would be "more confident and self-assured" than he had been at the 1972 summit when he was uncertain about meeting the President and had just gone through a major confrontation in the Politburo over his policies and position. His health was slipping a little and he

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was expected to rely more on Gromyko for details than he had the previous year. Brezhnev was also expected to be "vague or rhetorical" on all issues except the military-related ones--SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), and the nuclear agreement.

China was Brezhnev's great frustration and he had spoken ominously to Kissinger during his visit in May about the Chinese, claiming that the United States would make a mistake in trusting them. He obviously wanted to wean the United States away from the Chinese, but didn't know how to do it. There was little doubt, according to Kissinger, that the Soviet Union had "contemplated military action against the Chinese, but this was an agonizing decision without knowledge of the U.S. course of action." Kissinger foresaw that one of the major post-summit problems would be how to manage the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle, because the Soviet Union would try to convince China and other countries that a Soviet-American condominium was being establshed.

Kissinger did not believe Brezhnev would try to take advantage of Nixon's Watergate troubles:

> If Brezhnev believes that the present situation in the US provides him with unusual opportunities for unilateral gains -- because of our alleged need for a foreign policy 'success' -- this has not been evident in the summit preparations. In all the negotiations on the various agreements to be signed the Soviets have, if anything, yielded on more points than we have.[8]

The Meetings: Fanfare and Modest Expectations

Brezhnev and his party arrived in the United States on June 16. Because of the General Secretary's concern about the effects of jet lag and for reasons of prestige, he rested for two days at Camp David[9] before a formal arrival ceremony was held at the White House on the morning of June 18. The Soviet party also included Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai S. Patolichev, and Minister of Civil Aviation Boris P. Bugayev, among others. During the visit the President and Brezhnev spent 47 hours together--more than 9 hours in private meetings, another 9 hours in formal sessions, and nearly 29 hours at informal gatherings, social functions, and signing ceremonies.[10] Meetings were held in Washington, Camp David, and at San Clemente.

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In addition to formal dinners at the White House and at the Soviet Embassy, Brezhnev met on June 19 with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to whom he made a spirited defense of Soviet emigration policy, and on June 22 with American business leaders. These included Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz, Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent, officers of various business organizations, and representatives of more than 40 banks and companies that were already doing business with the Soviet Union or planned to do so. Later that evening he met at the Soviet Embassy with officials of the Communist Party of the United States.[11]

U. Alexis Johnson, chief U.S. negotiator on SALT who returned to Washington during the summit, found the deference shown to Brezhnev "quite repellent". No friendly chief of state, in his view, had ever received such lavish hospitality. He felt that such extravagant treatment would neither moderate Brezhnev's behavior nor reassure Allied leaders, many of whom Johnson felt were treated cavalierly during their visits to Washington.[12]

The Soviets proposed that the agreements all be signed on June 19, the second day of the visit, but the Department of State objected since it would create the impression the agreements were not the result of the summit but were "part of a public presentation prepared and canned in advance." Moreover, spreading the signing ceremonies over several days would maximize press attention to the agreements.[13] As a result the signing of the nine agreements was spread out over a five-day period from June 19-23.

The first substantive meeting took place on June 18 at the White House immediately after the arrival ceremony on the South Lawn, during which Brezhnev broke ranks with the official party and rushed over to the front row of onlookers "to shake hands like an American politician on the campaign trail." Although the first meeting was supposed to include the two leaders and several of their aides, Nixon and Brezhnev posed alone for photographs and then met privately for an hour with only Soviet translator Victor Sukhodrev present. In later conversations with Dobrynin, Kissinger got the impression that the conversation was general and no agreements were reached, but Sukhodrev never gave Kissinger the record of the conversation as he had promised.[14] Nixon recalled in his memoirs that he and Brezhnev reviewed their general schedule and the agenda for the meetings. Brezhnev, who became very animated during the meeting and several times grabbed Nixon's arm to emphasize a

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point, spoke about the special responsibilities the United States and the Soviet Union had:

> We know that as far as power and influence are concerned, the only two nations in the world that really matter are the Soviet Union and the United States. Anything that we decide between us, other nations in the world will have to follow our lead, even though they may disagree with it.

Nixon reminded Brezhnev that both countries had allies, all of whom were proud nations and "we must never act in such a way that appears to ignore their interests."[15]

The first formal gathering, which lasted nearly 3 hours during the early afternoon on June 18, was also attended by Secretary of State William Rogers, Kissinger, NSC staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Gromyko, Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin, and Sukhodrev. Brezhnev spent much of the meeting summarizing the history of Soviet-American relations. Nixon was not prepared for a long meeting. The briefing paper supplied by Kissinger's staff suggested that he agree on an agenda for the remaining meetings and disabuse Brezhnev of any idea that the United States would accept a condominium arrangement in world affairs.[16]

The second day's talks, on June 19, lasted from the early afternoon until evening and were concluded on board the Presidential yacht Sequoia. On June 20 and 21, the talks were continued at Camp David. According to Nixon, during these initial talks in Washington Brezhnev expressed disappointment at the withholding of Most-Favored-Nation status, but he was careful to blame Congress and not the President for the decision. Although Brezhnev opposed limiting the number of Soviet MIRVed missiles, he did reluctantly agree to set the end of 1974 instead of 1975 as a deadline for reaching a permanent SALT accord. At Camp David there were long sessions on SALT, European security, and MBFR. Perhaps the high point of the summit was Nixon's and Brezhnev's signing on June 22, in a formal ceremony at the White House, of the Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which provided for consultation in situations that posed the threat of nuclear weapons. Both nations renounced the use or threat of force against each other and against the other's allies. According to one of Kissinger's aides, the President and his National Security Adviser felt they had "defanged" the agreement of its potentially harmful language.[17]

The most significant meetings, in Kissinger's view, took place at San Clemente on June 23 and were unscheduled. At

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around noon that day, Nixon and Kissinger met with Brezhnev, with the Soviet translator the only other person present. Brezhnev launched into a tirade about the Chinese, chastising their perfidy and moral degeneracy and implying that Mao Zedong was insane. He then proposed a secret exchange of views on China. Brezhnev said that he did not object to the state of U.S.-Chinese relations, but a Sino-American military understanding would only confuse world public opinion. Nixon was noncommittal on the Chinese, but offered to stay in touch through the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel on any subject Brezhnev might wish to raise. Nixon turned the conversation to Cambodia, arguing that renewed North Vietnamese activity there was a threat to world peace. The President chided Brezhnev by pointing out that many Americans would believe Soviet arms made this threat possible. Brezhnev heatedly denied that any new Soviet military equipment had been shipped to the North Vietnamese and that the Soviet Government, which desired a quick end to the war in Laos and Cambodia, would convey this view to Hanoi. The General Secretary suggested that the Chinese were responsible for circulating falsehoods about who was arming the North Vietnamese and that it was probably the Chinese themselves who were supplying the weapons.[18]

A few hours later, Gromyko took Kissinger aside and expressed concern that Brezhnev had not been explicit enough. Gromyko said he wanted to reaffirm unambiguously that any military agreement between the United States and China would lead to war. Kissinger said that he understood what the Foreign Minister was saying, although Kissinger was non-committal as to contemplated U.S. actions.[19]

The final meeting of the summit occurred at San Clemente late in the evening of June 23 at Brezhnev's insistence. At 10 p.m. the Soviets got Nixon out of bed to meet on an unspecified subject in what Kissinger regarded as "a transparent ploy to catch Nixon off guard and with luck to separate him from his advisers." At the meeting, also attended by Kissinger, Dobrynin, Gromyko, and Sukhodrev, Brezhnev proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately agree to a Middle East settlement based on total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders in exchange for non-belligerency. A final peace treaty would then be worked out between Israel and the Palestinians and would be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. According to Kissinger, this was nothing more than the standard Arab position, which the United States had consistently rejected in the past. Brezhnev said the agreement would be secret and confined only to the people in the room. He proceeded to threaten the President with a Middle Eastern war if Nixon did not accept the Soviet proposal.

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Kissinger felt it was an obvious attempt to exploit Nixon's Watergate difficulties. After an hour and a half of Brezhnev's diatribe, Nixon ended the meeting by stating that the matter was not that simple and that the U.S. Government would submit a counterdraft to the principles put forward by the Soviet Union that spring for resolving the Middle Eastern crisis. The following morning, when Brezhnev bade Nixon farewell, he showed no signs of the bluster of the previous night. His thanks were profuse and he invited the President for another visit to the Soviet Union the following year.[20]

A negative result of the summit was the irritation felt by some U.S. allies when they learned of the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Kissinger had kept the British, French, and West German Governments informed, but only at the very highest level. NATO representatives in Brussels, and ambassadors in Washington of Japan, Israel, Egypt, and other countries were not notified of the agreement until just before it was signed. There ensued a stormy discussion in the NATO Council. Even a special meeting between Kissinger and NATO representatives at San Clemente at the end of June failed to dispel altogether the irritation.[21]

Results: Consolidating or Weakening the Relationship

No one expected the summit to produce "breakthroughs" like the arms limitations agreements concluded in Moscow the previous year. In a press briefing, Kissinger said the United States considered the summit as another step along the road toward a "new and more peaceful system" and suggested that regular meetings would be a positive development: "as these meetings become a regular feature of international life, and as we come to take them more and more for granted, the results will follow paths that will come to seem more and more natural, and we would consider that one of the best signs that a peaceful world is coming into being." Nixon felt that the various bilateral accords continued the process begun in 1972 of "building an interlocking web of relationships to increase the Soviets' stake in stability and cooperation." The President also felt he got to know Brezhnev better. He found the General Secretary "more interesting and impressive" than he had during the 1972 summit and also felt that Brezhnev had gained a far better understanding of the United States and American life than he could have from any briefing books.[22]

There were doubts, however, about the summit's utility. In his memoirs, Kissinger showed little enthusiasm for the centerpiece--the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war--which he said was "marginally useful." He was not sure

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whether it had been worth the effort: "the result was too subtle; the negotiation too secret; the effort too protracted; the necessary explanation to allies and China too complex to have the desired impact." U. Alexis Johnson later wrote that "nothing of substance" emerged from the summit. On SALT, the only progress was that Brezhnev told Kissinger that he would deal with SALT personally and would make a counter-proposal through Dobrynin to Kissinger. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the second Nixon-Brezhnev summit represented "the consolidation of a new phase in the building of a continuing relationship of detente between the two powers."[23]

On the other hand, the domestic atmosphere in which the summit was held may have weakened detente. In his memoirs, Kissinger bemoaned the effect of Watergate on the summit and on the Soviet-American relationship. As a result of the "internal disarray" dramatically demonstrated by Watergate, Soviet leaders began to conclude that Nixon's problems were "terminal". Although this perception probably did not encourage Soviet adventurism, it did make Soviet leaders more willing to ignore adventures by friendly nations. In this sense, the effect of Watergate on the 1973 summit, in Kissinger's view, led directly to the Middle East war later that year.[24]

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING AT WASHINGTON, CAMP DAVID AND SAN CLEMENTE JUNE 18-25, 1973

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council Staff Member

Soviet Union

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee
N.S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade
B.P. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation
G.E. Tsukanov, Assistant to the the General Secretary
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
L.M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
E.I. Chazov, Deputy Minister of Public Health
G.M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
G.A. Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences

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NOTES

[1]Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 282.

[2]Ibid., p. 281.

[3]Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 325-326.

[4]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 271; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 328-330.

[5]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 278-284; draft memorandum of conversation with Helmut Sonnenfeldt by David Mabon (PA/HO) and James Miller (PA/HO), September 26, 1985 (PA/HO Files); Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 336-338.

[6]Memorandum from Stoessel (EUR) to Kissinger, May 30, 1973. (S/S No. 7309961) (S)

[7]Memorandum from Scowcroft to the Acting Secretary of State, May 21, 1973. (S/S No. 7309567) (S)

[8]Memorandum from Kissinger to the President, undated. (S/S No. P770094) (S)

[9]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 289-290.

[10]Statement by Ron Ziegler at Kissinger's news conference, June 25, 1973; in Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, eds., American Foreign Relations, 1973: A Documentary Record (New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1976), p. 269.

[11]U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leonid I. Brezhnev: Pages from His Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp. 230-233.

[12]U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984), p. 593.

[13]Memorandum from Elliot (S/S) to Kissinger, June 15, 1973. (S/S No. 7310919) (S)

[14]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 290.

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[15]Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 878.

[16]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 291.

[17]Nixon, Memoirs, pp. 879-880; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 343; memorandum of conversation with Peter Rodman (S/P) by members of the Office of the Historian (PA/HO), September 6, 1985 (PA/HO Files).

[18]Ibid., pp. 882-883.

[19]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 295.

[20]Ibid., pp. 297-299.

[21]Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 338-340.

[22]Stebbins and Adam, American Foreign Relations, 1973, p. 251; transcript of Kissinger's press conference, June 25, 1973, ibid., p. 273; Nixon, Memoirs, pp. 886-887.

[23]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 285-286; Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 593; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 343.

[24]Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 300.

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NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT MOSCOW, JUNE 27-JULY 3, 1974

President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev met in Moscow in June 1974 only a few weeks before Nixon's resignation, amid growing pressure for his departure from office. Because of his lame-duck status, both sides had low expectations. The atmosphere was generally harmonious, but the substantive achievements were modest.

The agreements signed at the summit included a protocol to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty reducing the number of ABM sites allowed each country from two to one and a treaty banning underground nuclear testing above a certain size or threshold. Most of the agreements had been negotiated in advance, but the final details of the threshold test ban, which was never ratified by the United States, were negotiated at the summit. The two sides were unable to reach an agreement on offensive strategic weapons, but Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko agreed to explore the possibility of a 10-year time frame for a SALT agreement, opening the way for the Vladivostok accord a few months later.

Initiative: Hope of Bolstering Detente

Brezhnev extended the invitation for Nixon's return visit to Moscow during his 1973 visit to the United States, in accordance with their earlier agreement that such meetings should be held on a regular basis.[1] The third summit in 26 months, it was intended to be part of an ongoing series. The Nixon administration expected the annual summit meetings to contribute to the detente process by encouraging both sides to reach agreements on arms control and bilateral cooperation and by providing an opportunity for an exchange of views. They offered personal benefits to Nixon and Brezhnev by dramatizing detente, with which both were closely associated, as well as by enhancing their images as world leaders.

Detente was increasingly coming under political attack from both left and right in the United States. Congressional criticism led by Senator Henry Jackson focused on the 1972 Interim Agreement, which had imposed a 5-year freeze on U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces, and on repressive Soviet domestic policies. A bill to enable the president to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union, as provided in the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement of 1972, had been

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stalled by House amendments barring the extension of MFN status or government-guaranteed export credits to any Communist country limiting freedom of emigration. These restrictions, known collectively as the Jackson-Vanik amendment, threatened the economic benefits which the Soviets had anticipated from detente. The desire to eliminate these restrictions, which the Nixon administration shared with the Soviets, was an important consideration on both sides as they planned for the summit.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko confirmed Brezhnev's invitation during a meeting with Nixon in Washington in February 1974, stating that June would be the most convenient time for Nixon's visit. He urged active preparations to guarantee results no less positive than those of the previous two summits, but neither side insisted that plans for the visit should be contingent on the successful conclusion of any prior negotiations. In March, the visit was scheduled for the last week in June, but it was later postponed by 3 days when Nixon decided on a June trip to the Middle East. Plans for the summit were announced on May 31.[2]

By that time, Nixon's political position was becoming increasingly precarious. His release on April 30 of selected White House transcripts increased rather than diminished pressure for his departure from office, and on May 9, the House Judiciary Committee began closed-session impeachment hearings. Nevertheless, the Soviets, who were apparently convinced that the attacks on Nixon were to some extent veiled attacks on detente, made no attempt to put off the visit. They evidently hoped to bolster detente and derail the Jackson-Vanik amendment. They seem to have anticipated that Nixon would survive, although by the time of the summit, even Moscow could see that impeachment was possible. If they thought Nixon would make one-sided concessions on strategic arms limitations (SALT) at the summit in order to reach an agreement, they were mistaken; his political weakness left him little room for maneuver.

Preparations: No Agreement on SALT

Since both Washington and Moscow wanted a successful summit, both sides endeavored to work out agreements on arms control and other subjects in advance. In his meeting with Nixon in February, Gromyko proposed a list of ten topics for discussion, including several possible subjects for agreements: general U.S.-Soviet relations, SALT, the Middle East, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, Indochina, U.S.-Soviet trade relations, a ban on

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underground nuclear testing, prohibition of measures hostile to the environment, climate, and human health, and new arrangements for scientific and technical cooperation. Nixon added the subject of cooperation on energy, a western preoccupation after the 1973 oil embargo, to the list.[3]

The central issue in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations was, of course, SALT. Washington and Moscow had agreed earlier to conclude a comprehensive SALT agreement in 1974 to replace the Interim Agreement. In the SALT II negotiations in Geneva, the Soviets had proposed a continuation of the freeze on strategic offensive forces, which would have perpetuated their 40 percent advantage in number of missile launchers, while the United States had proposed equal numbers of missile launchers, or equal aggregates. The two sides had quickly reached an impasse, making it evident that a comprehensive agreement could not be concluded before the summit. Both sides recognized, however, that even a limited SALT accord would bolster detente and provide a centerpiece for the summit. The effort to reach such an agreement was the major issue in the high-level U.S.-Soviet talks in preparation for the summit.

The administration was divided as to the proper U.S. objective in the SALT negotiations. The Pentagon, supported by Senator Jackson, wanted an agreement providing for equal aggregates and was especially interested in limits on Soviet throw weight, in which Moscow had the advantage. Kissinger advocated efforts to restrain Soviet use of MIRV technology, in which the United States had the lead. To achieve this, he was prepared to extend the Interim Agreement, thus balancing the Soviet advantage in number of launchers with the U.S. lead in MIRVing its missiles. At a March NSC meeting, when Kissinger reported an indication that Moscow might accept restrictions on MIRVs, Nixon decided to try to obtain such an arrangement at the summit but that the U.S. delegation at Geneva should continue to work toward a comprehensive agreement. The effort to negotiate a summit agreement was thus left in Kissinger's hands.[4]

Kissinger and Brezhnev laid the groundwork for the summit when Kissinger made a 3-day visit to Moscow at the end of March. In almost 20 hours of discussions, they covered the full range of issues contemplated for the summit, including SALT. Brezhnev agreed in principle to a U.S. proposal for a three-year extension of the Interim Agreement with limitations on MIRVed ICBMs and additional limitations on MIRVed heavy ICBMs, but the two sides remained far apart on numbers. Kissinger proposed a 5-3 ratio of MIRVed missiles in favor of the United States. Brezhnev initially proposed equal numbers but after a meeting of the Politburo, he offered 1,100 for the

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United States to 1,000 for the Soviets. Although Kissinger told him this was unacceptable, the Soviet willingness to accept an inferior number of MIRVed missiles suggested that it might be possible to reach an agreement.[5]

Kissinger was receptive to a Brezhnev proposal to reduce the number of ABM sites allowed each country under the 1972 ABM Treaty from two to one. While the Interim Agreement had been controversial in the United States, the ABM Treaty had won almost unanimous Senate approval. The United States had one ABM system, protecting the ICBM field at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and Congress had rejected an administration request for funds to constuct a second system.[6]

Although Kissinger turned down a Brezhnev proposal for a total ban on underground nuclear testing, which the United States had previously rejected because of the difficulty of verification, he was interested when Brezhnev suggested a ban on testing nuclear devices above a certain size, or threshold. Kissinger agreed to explore this possibility but stressed that arrangements for verification and for dealing with peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) would be necessary. He opposed including any proviso in such an agreement for other countries to adhere to it, thus putting pressure on them to do so, noting that it would irritate the French and the Chinese.[7]

Although the discussions were generally friendly and businesslike, there were a few exceptions. Brezhnev resorted to browbeating tactics during a lengthy session on the Middle East. During a discussion of SALT, he raised the subject of Nixon's domestic political problems, referring to "all these attacks on him." Kissinger reacted promptly to this, declaring that his rejection of the Soviet SALT proposal was based on its intrinsic nature and not on domestic political difficulties. At another point Brezhnev tried to use the summit as leverage to press for an early CSCE agreement, but Kissinger replied that the visit was in the mutual interest of both countries and could not be conditional. Brezhnev did not repeat this ploy, and Kissinger concluded from his private exchanges and from the treatment of his visit in the Soviet press that Brezhnev's interest in a Nixon visit was undiminished.[8]

In the next few weeks, U.S.-Soviet negotiations directed at possible summit agreements on a variety of subjects got underway. Technical talks on artificial heart research, urban cooperation and housing technology, and energy were initiated by the relevant U.S. agencies and their Soviet counterparts, while the Embassy in Moscow discussed a Soviet proposal for a new exchange of consulates with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, an interagency working group in Washington examined

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the possibility of an agreement limiting MIRVs, an ABM agreement, and another Brezhnev proposal for denuclearization of the Mediterranean.[9]

Since Kissinger had moved to the State Department along with some of his close associates, the Department's involvement in the summit preparations was greater than in 1972 and 1973. The key negotiations for a SALT agreement were carried on by Kissinger, however; although he was now wearing two hats he played much the same role as he had in preparing for the two previous summits. He continued to meet regularly with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin and intermittently with Gromyko. The "channel" had moved to Foggy Bottom.

In 2 days of talks in Geneva at the end of April, Kissinger and Gromyko discussed a U.S. counterproposal on SALT which had been sent to Moscow earlier through Dobrynin. It provided for an extension of the Interim Agreement until 1980 or 1983, with differing MIRV limits for the United States and for the Soviets, the precise figures depending on whether the agreement was extended for 6 or 9 years. It also called for an increase in the Interim Agreement's limit on U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); this was to provide for the deployment of the Trident, which would be underway by 1983. Gromyko dismissed this as one-sided and argued vigorously against the proposed increase in the U.S. limit on SLBMs. Kissinger replied that the United States was making a considerable concession on MIRVs. Gromyko commented that they understood each other very well; the difficulty was not one of misunderstanding but of differing approaches.[10]

Kissinger and Gromyko made better progress in discussing the proposed ABM and threshold test ban (TTB) agreements. Gromyko gave Kissinger a draft ABM agreement limiting both sides to one ABM site, but Kissinger told him that since the United States would be making a commitment not to defend its capital, it would want either a limit on the agreement's duration or provision for altering the defended site. He and Gromyko agreed to initiate technical discussions on a TTB with a view to reaching a summit agreement in principle. Gromyko thought this would be acceptable although the Soviets still hoped to have a full summit agreement.[11]

The possibility of impeachment proceedings was already casting a shadow over the Moscow visit. At Geneva, Gromyko asked Kissinger about the President's "situation" and raised the subject of impeachment. On May 28, Dobrynin delivered a personal oral message from Brezhnev to Nixon expressing the expectation that their meeting would be an impressive one, with agreements on ABM, TTB, and other subjects, and hinting, with

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characteristic lack of subtlety, that Nixon might gain domestic support through a successful summit. Nixon said Dobrynin should tell Brezhnev that domestic politics would not affect his trip or U.S.-Soviet relations in any way and not to worry about him or his health.[12]

Another U.S. proposal on SALT, designed for discussion at the summit, was given to Dobrynin on June 7. It called for an extension of the Interim Agreement until 1979, with a limit of 1,150 MIRVed missiles for the United States and 750 for the Soviets and a ban on MIRVing heavy ICBMs. The proposal was designed to accommodate U.S. programs through 1979 and to hold Soviet programs to a minimum, especially to prevent the MIRVing of Soviet SS-18 missiles and thus reduce Soviets' throwweight advantage. Although the 3-2 ratio was even more favorable to the United States than Kissinger's earlier proposals, it was veiled by a cosmetic formula designed to make it more palatable to Moscow. The Kissinger aides who had developed the proposal hoped it would provide a basis for negotiation at Moscow.[13]

As the date of the summit approached, however, the extent of disagreement on SALT within the administration came to the surface. Nixon's political decline removed inhibitions on the Pentagon's opposition to extension of the Interim Agreement and aroused fears that he might make a rash SALT agreement at Moscow in a last-ditch attempt to ward off impeachment. These fears rested in part on the distrust which he and Kissinger had engendered over the past few years by holding the SALT negotiations so closely in their own hands. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., wrote later that he thought at the time the objective should be "getting the talks deadlocked or postponed or adjourned until the U.S. Government was in a condition to talk rationally."[14]

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger wrote to Senator Jackson on June 3 backing Jackson's position on SALT, thus, in effect, publicly disassociating himself from the administration's negotiating position. At an NSC meeting on the eve of the summit, he put forward an entirely new proposal for an agreement which would have been even more favorable to the United States than those Moscow had already rejected. Meanwhile, Jackson was holding executive session hearings on arms control issues, and Paul Nitze had resigned from the SALT Delegation in Geneva with a blast at Nixon. In Kissinger's words, Nitze's resignation made it clear that "Nixon had no domestic base for any significant agreement in Moscow regardless of its content."[15]

Technical talks on a possible threshold test ban, which had been going on in Moscow for a month, had not produced

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agreement. The Soviets were pressing for an annual quota on nuclear explosions between an upper and lower threshold, with an upper threshold as high as 750 kilotons. The U.S. side opposed the idea of a quota and thought such a high limit would make an agreement meaningless. Other unresolved issues included the problem of closing the PNE loophole and the technical data which would be exchanged to assist verification. It seemed evident that an agreement in principle was the most that could be accomplished at the summit.[16]

A number of agreements were ready for signature, however, notably the ABM protocol. The Soviets had accepted the U.S. position that each side should have one opportunity to change its choice of ABM site. Agreement on the opening of new consulates had been reached when Moscow accepted the U.S. preference for Kiev rather than Odessa. Bilateral agreements on long-term economic cooperation and for cooperation in the fields of energy, housing, and artificial heart research had also been reached. Two protocols on procedures for implementation of the 1972 SALT agreements, which had been negotiated in the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, had also been designated for signature at the summit, although they were highly technical and would not be made public.[17]

While advance preparations for the summit had focused primarily on SALT and other areas of possible agreement, the Moscow discussions would of course cover a wide range of bilateral and international issues. The Trade Reform Bill was still before the Senate, and the Jackson-Vanik amendment remained an obstacle to passage of the bill in a form which would be acceptable to Moscow and to the Nixon administration. Kissinger was trying to work out a compromise by obtaining Soviet assurances of willingness to permit Jewish emigration which might alleviate congressional concern; he had discussed this with Gromyko at Geneva. The status of MFN and credits was expected to be high on the Soviet list of items for discussion.[18]

Discussion of the Middle East was expected to be a major source of contention. Since the October 1973 war, the United States had negotiated a series of limited disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel and between Syria and Israel. In high-level U.S.-Soviet meetings, the Soviets had complained regularly at their exclusion from these negotiations and had urged the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Nixon and Kissinger had argued that a step-by-step approach was most productive for the time being, but in the hope of preventing Soviet obstruction of the peace process, they had indicated their willingness to reconvene the Geneva Conference at a later date and had reiterated their intention to keep Moscow informed

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of developments. Similar discussion was expected at the summit.[19]

By mid-June, a draft communiqué covering a full range of issues had been negotiated by Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Soviet Minister Yuli M. Vorontsov. The language on offensive arms limitation was left for determination at the summit, as were a number of points on which the two sides disagreed, including the nuclear test ban, Soviet texts on environmental or weather modification and chemical warfare, CSCE, MBFR, the Middle East, and Indochina.[20]

Surveying the Moscow scene 3 weeks before Nixon's visit, Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel concluded that the Soviet leadership remained committed to detente and viewed the upcoming summit as an important step toward solidifying U.S.-Soviet relations. All indications were that the atmosphere would be significantly warmer than in Nixon's 1972 visit. The agreements already reached provided at least a minimal base of achievement to show at the summit, and Soviet negotiating tactics in achieving them had seemed to reflect a desire to signal forthrightness and good will. Nonetheless, although the Soviets still seemed interested in making a breakthrough in SALT or a test ban, Stoessel thought they would pursue those negotiations on their own merit and that they were realistic about the concrete steps which might be possible. If necessary, he thought, they would settle for a summit dominated by atmospherics. They wanted the symbolism of the summit to show an upward progression of U.S.-Soviet relations and to show continuity regardless of circumstances.[21]

Ambassador Dobrynin might have made similar comments about U.S. objectives and expectations as the summit approached. The Nixon administration had invested considerable effort to achieve agreements for signature at the summit but was in no position to make significant concessions on SALT. Under the circumstances, both sides were prepared to settle for symbolism and atmospherics.

Discussions: Harmony for Its Own Sake

Nixon arrived in Moscow on June 27 following a 2-day meeting with NATO leaders in Brussels. He was suffering from phlebitis, but it apparently did not inhibit his activities during the visit. After 2 days in Moscow, the Presidential party flew to the Crimea to spend 2 days at Brezhnev's villa in Oreanda, a suburb of Yalta. The White House had been reluctant to accept the Yalta site because of its associations but had

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finally acceded to Brezhnev's desire to entertain Nixon at his "Casa Pacifica". On July 1, Nixon and Mrs. Nixon flew to Minsk for a ceremonial visit, while Kissinger held further talks with Gromyko in Moscow. Back in Moscow the next day, Nixon attended the final plenary meetings, made a radio and television address to the Soviet people, and hosted a farewell dinner at Spaso House. He left Moscow on July 3.[22]

During Nixon's week in the Soviet Union, he and Brezhnev spent between 8 to 10 hours in plenary sessions and met privately on several occasions. The plenary discussions covered a wide range of issues but reached few conclusions. Those attending included Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, Gromyko, Dobrynin, Kissinger, Stoessel, and several aides on both sides. Brezhnev took the lead on the Soviet side, but Kosygin and Podgorny participated occasionally in the discussion. Brezhnev's interpreter Viktor M. Sukhodrev interpreted. Detailed negotiations on SALT, the test ban treaty, and the communiqué took place in separate sessions between Kissinger and Gromyko.

The Soviets evidently had decided, as Stoessel had predicted, to scale down their expectations and settle for a summit dominated by atmospherics. The mood was generally congenial. There was no recurrance of the meetings at odd hours and attempted browbeating that had characterized the first two Nixon-Brezhnev summits. Since it was apparent that no major breakthrough was possible, Kissinger later observed, "the appearance of harmony became its own objective."[23]

The opening plenary session on June 28 dealt in generalities. Both Nixon and Brezhnev made ritual statements praising detente, stating their determination to make it irreversible, and declaring the value of regular summit meetings in contributing to detente. Brezhnev welcomed Nixon's invitation to visit the United States in 1975 but suggested that they might have separate, briefer meetings, dealing with only one or two issues. While Nixon stressed the importance of his personal relationship with Brezhnev, the Soviet leader was probably thinking of meeting Nixon's successor.[24]

At the afternoon session, Nixon and Brezhnev focused on the question of a nuclear test ban. The discussion took an unexpected turn when Brezhnev and Kosygin revived the old Soviet proposal for a comprehensive test ban, which had not been discussed since Brezhnev's March proposal of a threshold test ban. Nixon, revealing his own preoccupations, related the issue to domestic attacks on detente and portrayed himself as uniquely able to win the American public's support for detente. He and Brezhnev finally turned the issue over to

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Kissinger and Gromyko, who met the following morning and agreed to draft a protocol agreeing in principle to negotiate a ban on underground testing above a specified threshold. This was what the American side had anticipated.[25]

At the plenary session the next morning, Nixon and Brezhnev agreed to a threshold test ban with a threshold of 150 kilotons. Brezhnev made one more effort at a comprehensive test ban, urging that they should set a time limit for reaching such an agreement, but Nixon rejected this also. Brezhnev then suggested that they could resolve the problem of PNEs by inviting observers to witness peaceful explosions. When Kissinger expressed interest in this unprecedented offer, Brezhnev declared that after all it would be possible to reach an agreement. Kissinger questioned whether it would be possible to work out all the details in time to sign an agreement at the summit; from the U.S. perspective, the technical details on verification were of critical importance. At this point, Kosygin appealed blatantly to Nixon's political needs, declaring that an agreement would give him "a very strong position in public opinion." Nixon agreed that the technical experts should make another effort to resolve the outstanding issues.[26]

After receiving Brezhnev's blessing, the Soviet technical experts became more forthcoming, and when Kissinger and Gromyko returned from the Crimea, they resolved the remaining issues and completed a draft treaty. Kissinger rejected a Soviet proposal for an accession clause, which would have put implicit pressure on China, and Gromyko did not press the point. The major problem was to eliminate the PNE loophole. In spite of Brezhnev's offer of on-site inspection, a detailed agreement of this nature could not be reached at the summit. Kissinger pressed for a moratorium on PNEs above the threshold level until the two sides concluded a PNE agreement on PNEs. When Gromyko resisted including this in the treaty, Kissinger agreed to leave it out but told Gromyko the United States would not ratify the treaty until the two sides concluded a PNE agreement.[27]

Nixon and Brezhnev did not discuss the key issue of SALT until 3 days into the summit, reflecting the recognition on both sides that there was little chance of reaching agreement. When they raised the issue at a plenary meeting on June 30 at Oreanda, Kissinger presented the proposal given to Dobrynin on June 7 for an extension of the Interim Agreement until 1979, with limits of 1,150 MIRVed missiles for the United States and 750 for the Soviet Union and a ban on MIRVing heavy ICBMs. Rejecting this, Brezhnev repeated his March counterproposal for limits of 1,100 MIRVed missiles for the United States and 1,000 for the Soviets.[28]

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Brezhnev reiterated the standard Soviet argument against U.S. forward-based systems (FBS) and argued that the United States had the advantage in number of warheads. Assisted by two Soviet generals, he made a detailed presentation (which he had made with Kissinger in March) purporting to show a U.S. first-strike potential of 16,000 warheads, 4,000 more than the Soviets had. The figure was based on "unrealistic assumptions," Kissinger told Brezhnev the next day.[29] It was "exaggerated but not totally absurd," he told British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan when he briefed him on the summit a few days later, a "worst-case analysis" from the perspective of the Soviet military. Kissinger told Callaghan he thought Brezhnev was under pressure from the Soviet military, as shown by the assertiveness of the two generals who "jumped up all the time" to point things out to him.[30]

Nixon and Brezhnev later agreed that Kissinger and Gromyko should make another attempt at reaching agreement while Nixon made his ceremonial visit to Minsk. Brezhnev and Dmitri F. Ustinov, a Politburo member with responsibility for defense industries, met briefly with Kissinger on their return to Moscow. Kissinger made it plain that there was no flexibility in the U.S. negotiating position. Even an agreement with the figures Nixon had offered would "produce an explosion" in the U.S., he told Brezhnev.[31] At a Politburo meeting that afternoon, the Soviets apparently decided to abandon any attempt to reach an agreement. When Kissinger and Gromyko met in a small, restricted session that evening, they quickly reached an impasse. Gromyko told Kissinger that Moscow could not accept an agreement which was not based on the principle of equality; the U.S. figures were "so unrealistic", he said, and the proposed ban on heavy missiles was "not for serious discussion."[32]

Since the appearance of a successful summit was important to both Washington and Moscow, however, both sides wanted the communiqué to indicate progress on SALT. Kissinger suggested they might be able to find a different basis for agreement if the arrangement covered a longer period of time, and Gromyko seized upon this concept, suggesting a 10-year agreement. The idea was apparently discussed and approved at a Politburo meeting the next morning. Gromyko and Kissinger subsequently drafted language for the communiqué stating that the Interim Agreement should be followed by a new agreement covering the period until 1985 and that it should include both quantitative and qualitative limitations, i.e., that it should include restrictions on MIRVs.[33]

The plenary discussions of CSCE and the Middle East were predictable but without acrimony. Brezhnev complained about

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European demands in the CSCE and urged U.S.-Soviet cooperation to achieve an early agreement to be signed at the summit level. Nixon agreed that U.S. and Soviet experts could get together and discuss some of the problems, but he pointed out that Washington could not dictate to its European allies and that it was necessary to consider their sensitivities. Discussion of the Middle East was desultory. Brezhnev stressed the Soviet interest in reconvening the Geneva Conference and desire for consultations but made no effort to pressure Nixon as he had done with Kissinger in March and with Nixon at San Clemente a year earlier.[34]

Other subjects received little attention in the formal sessions. Nixon renewed his earlier commitment to obtain congressional approval of MFN and credits, but Brezhnev touched only indirectly on Soviet concern with the issue. He renewed a proposal he had made to Kissinger in March for a joint ban on nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean, but when Nixon predictably rejected it, he did not try to press the issue. Nixon urged that both sides exercise restraint in supplying arms to their allies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. He touched on U.S. concern for progress in the MBFR talks but neither he nor Brezhnev pursued this subject.[35]

Nixon and Brezhnev had two private meetings in Moscow and a lengthy private conversation at Brezhnev's cabana overlooking the Black Sea at Oreanda. Sukhodrev was the only other person present during these discussions. In addition, they had informal conversations on the plane to the Crimea, in the car during the 64-mile drive between Oreanda and the airport, and during a 2-hour cruise in Brezhnev's yacht on the Black Sea. According to Nixon's memoirs, his private talks with Brezhnev were warmer and more cordial than the formal sessions. They touched on a variety of issues but generally eschewed substantive negotiations. Nixon raised the problem of Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration, a sensitive subject for Moscow, in a private conversation rather than in a formal meeting, urging Brezhnev to make a gesture, if only to pull the rug out from Jackson.[36]

During Nixon's and Brezhnev's private meeting in Oreanda, the Soviet leader made a proposal which was similar to but went even further than his 1972 proposal for a U.S.-Soviet agreement abjuring the use of nuclear weapons. No record of the Oreanda conversation is available except sketchy accounts in the Nixon and Kissinger memoirs, but Brezhnev repeated the proposal to Kissinger a few months later, describing it as a personal idea which he had not discussed with anyone else. He proposed a U.S.-Soviet agreement that in the event of a nuclear attack on either of them or on their allies, they would come to each

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other's assistance. Such an agreement would have been obviously directed at China. Discussing it with Kissinger in October, Brezhnev commented, "So far the only nuclear powers are you, us, your allies, and China, and who knows whose ally it is?"[37]

Brezhnev's purpose in making the proposal may have been to probe the U.S. reaction to the possibility of a Sino-Soviet conflict or perhaps a Soviet preemptive strike on China. Although China was not discussed at the formal meetings in Moscow, and Brezhnev affected unconcern during his conversation with Nixon at Oreanda, Gromyko and Defense Minister Andrey A. Grechko both warned against China in social conversations during the summit. Beijing was following a firmly anti-Soviet policy, having rejected Soviet overtures for a non-aggression pact and a compromise on border issues the previous year, while Sino-American relations continued to improve. Although the Chinese political scene was exceptionally murky in 1974, neither of the two contending factions showed any interest in improving relations with Moscow.[38]

Nixon apparently responded to Brezhnev's proposition with delaying tactics. Brezhnev told Kissinger that Nixon had indicated he considered the proposal a very interesting idea and would give Brezhnev a reply in a couple of months. In his memoirs, Kissinger says Nixon described the proposal to him in Sukhodrev's hearing and instructed him to pursue the idea for inclusion on the agenda at a possible mini-summit later in the year. Although Kissinger writes that he entertained suspicions of Nixon's purposes at the time, Nixon could hardly have agreed to such an arrangement and probably thought he and Kissinger could transform it during subsequent negotiations as they had done with the 1972 proposal. Nonetheless, Brezhnev was apparently sufficiently encouraged to renew the proposal after Nixon had resigned and Gerald Ford had assumed the Presidency.[39]

Results: Keeping Detente Alive

Although both Nixon and Brezhnev acknowledged disappointment that the summit had produced no agreement limiting offensive arms, they put the best face on it, declaring it a success and an important contribution to U.S.-Soviet relations. Nixon declared that the growing network of agreements was "creating new habits of cooperation" and that it gave the Soviets "a positive stake in peace." Moscow endorsed the summit unequivocally as a "major milestone" in U.S.-Soviet relations, suggesting that Brezhnev remained personally committed to detente and still hoped to give the process new momentum.[40]

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The more skeptical treatment of the summit in the U.S. press reflected widespread cynicism about Nixon's motives as well as recognition of the limited nature of the summit agreements. Soviet detention of Jewish activists on the eve of Nixon's visit and censorship of American television news reports on Soviet dissidents during the visit contributed to a sour U.S. view of the proceedings. The Gallup Poll found that Nixon's public standing had declined after the Moscow trip, in contrast with the usual rise in a President's standing after foreign travel.[41]

Nixon's resignation and Ford's assumption of the Presidency on August 9 made the Nixon-Brezhnev discussions at Moscow seem irrelevant. Nevertheless, the tone set at the summit made it clear that both sides were anxious to pursue detente and made the transition from Nixon to Ford an easy one. The Moscow discussions on SALT bore fruit a few months later at Vladivostok when Ford and Brezhnev had the brief summit meeting that Nixon and Brezhnev had discussed tentatively at Moscow. The idea of a 10-year time frame which Kissinger and Gromyko had settled on provided a basis for more productive negotiations, leading to the Vladivostok accord and, eventually, to the SALT II agreement.

The TTB treaty has not been ratified, although the PNE loophole was closed by a U.S.-Soviet treaty signed in May 1976, which banned PNEs over 150 kilotons and provided for on-site inspection. Neither treaty has received Senate approval, in part because of doubts about the verification procedures in the TTB treaty and in part because Ford's successor Jimmy Carter gave priority to the pursuit of a comprehensive test ban.[42]

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING AT MOSCOW
June 27 - July 3, 1974

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Richard Nixon, President of the United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the Soviet Union
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Soviet Union

L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
N.V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers
A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
L.M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
G.M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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NOTES

1. Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiqué, June 24, 1973, Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, pp. 130-134.

2. Memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Gromyko, February 4, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive); memorandum of conversation between Brezhnev and Kissinger, March 27, 1974 (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); ToHAK 353 to Kissinger in Jerusalem, May 30, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

3. Memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Gromyko, February 4, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

4. Minutes of NSC meeting, March 21, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Nodis). For differing perspectives on the SALT negotiations, see Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 1006-1020, and Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 429-432.

5. Memoranda of conversations between Brezhnev and Kissinger, March 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m. and 5:45 p.m., and March 27, 1974 (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); State 069181 (ToSec 130) to Kissinger in Acapulco, April 5, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis/Cherokee)

6. Memoranda of conversations between Brezhnev and Kissinger, March 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m. and 5:45 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis).

7. Memoranda of conversations between Brezhnev and Kissinger, March 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m. and 5:45 p.m., and March 26, 1974, 5:09 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis).

8. Memoranda of conversations between Brezhnev and Kissinger, March 25, 1974, 5:45 p.m. and March 26, 1974, 10:35 a.m. and 5:09 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); State 069181 (ToSec 130) to Kissinger in Acapulco, April 5, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis/Cherokee).

9. Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Jan Lodal to Kissinger, April 9, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

10. Proposal sent to Dobrynin on April 23, 1974 (Kissinger Files) (C); memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, April 29, 1974, 3:00 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis).

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11. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, April 28, 1974 (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis).

12. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, April 29, 1974, 12:20 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); ToHAK 341 to Kissinger, May 29, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

13. Draft agreement given to Dobrynin June 7, 1974, attached to memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and William Hyland to Kissinger, June 6, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive).

14. Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 489. For discussion of the internal conflict over SALT, see ibid., pp. 485-507; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1151-1159; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 1023-1025; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984), pp. 600-601.

15. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1152.

16. Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt, Hyland, and Lodal to Kissinger, June 19, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive); Moscow 9863, June 24, 1974 (Lot 75 D 91) (S/Nodis).

17. ToHAK 115 to Kissinger in Damascus, June 15, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive).

18. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, April 29, 1974, 12:20 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); Moscow 8625, June 6, 1974 (C/Nodis).

19. Memorandum of conversation between Brezhnev and Kissinger, March 26, 1974, 10:35 a.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Gromyko, April 11, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive); memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, April 29, 1974, 10:20 a.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); letter from Brezhnev to Nixon with covering note from Dobrynin to Brent Scowcroft, May 15, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286); briefing memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, undated (Kissinger Files) (S).

20. State 128474 and 128476 (ToSec 273 and 274) to Kissinger in Damascus, June 16, 1974 (S/Nodis).

21. Moscow 8625, June 6, 1974 (C/Nodis).

22. The text of the joint communiqué, Nixon's radio and television address, and Nixon's and Brezhnev's toasts are

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printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 553-578.

23. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1164.

24. Memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Brezhnev, June 28, 1974, 10:45 a.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

25. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1168; Nixon, RN, pp. 1028-1029; memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, June 29, 1974, 9:30 a.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

26. Memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Brezhnev, June 29, 1974, 11:12 a.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

27. Memoranda of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, July 1, 1974, 5:10 p.m. and July 2, 1974, 12:45 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

28. No memorandum of the conversation is available, but other documents make it clear that the proposal presented at the meeting was the proposal given to Dobrynin on June 7, rather than "a variant of the Defense Department's plan", as Kissinger describes it. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1170-1171; Nixon, RN, pp. 1031-1032; memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, July 1, 1974, 9:30 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive); memorandum on SALT from Kissinger to President Gerald Ford, [August 1974] (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only); minutes of NSC meeting, September 14, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

29. Memorandum of conversation between Brezhnev and Kissinger, July 1, 1974, 1:15 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive); minutes of NSC meeting, September 14, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1171.

30. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Callaghan, July 7, 1974 (Kissinger Files) (S).

31. Memorandum of conversation between Brezhnev and Kissinger, July 1, 1974, 1:15 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

32. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, July 1, 1974, 9:30 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

33. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Gromyko, July 1, 1974, 9:30 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive) and July 2, 1974, 12:45 and 6:15 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

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34. Memoranda of conversations between Nixon and Brezhnev, June 29, 1974, 11:12 a.m., and July 2, 1974, 4:25 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

34. Memoranda of conversation between Nixon and Brezhnev, June 28, 1974, 10:45 a.m., June 29, 11:12 a.m., and July 2, 4:25 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

36. Nixon, RN, pp. 1027-1039.

37. Memorandum of conversation between Brezhnev and Kissinger, October 26, 1974, 4:30 p.m., filed with covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Brent Scowcroft, November 8, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only); Nixon, RN, p. 1030; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1173-1174.

38. Nixon, RN, p. 1030; memorandum of conversation between Grechko and Alexander M. Haig, July 2, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (S); INR Research Study No. 3, July 16, 1974; INR Report No. 491, June 17, 1976 (S).

39. Memorandum of conversation between Brezhnev and Kissinger, October 26, 1974, 4:30 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1173-1174.

40. Memorandum of conversation between Nixon and Brezhnev, July 3, 1974, 12:20 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis); Public Papers of the Presidents, 1974, p. 580; memoranda from Hyland to Kissinger, July 29 and August 9, 1974 (S/S Files) (LOU).

41. New York Times, June 22, 1974, p. 1; July 3, 1974, p. 3; July 4, 1974, p. 1; Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Moscow," New Yorker, July 29, 1974, pp. 68-76.

42. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties: Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., July 28, August 3, and September 8 and 15, 1977; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Effects of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on United States National Security Interests: Hearings, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 14, 15, 1978; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 161-165.

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VLADIVOSTOK
1974

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FORD AND BREZHNEV AT VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974

The Vladivostok meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev took place only 5 months after the Moscow summit, primarily because Brezhnev was eager to establish contact with the new U.S. President. The summit was more ad hoc than the three previous ones and focused almost entirely on the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Cyprus, and the Middle East were dealt with briefly but nothing of substance on any of these issues was achieved. Mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) was mentioned only in the prenegotiated joint communiqué. Due in part to the groundwork laid by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his October trip to Moscow and to Soviet hopes of establishing a constructive relationship with the new U.S. President, a breakthrough on SALT did take place at Vladivostok. The two sides reached agreement in principle and the resulting SALT accord provided the basis for the SALT II treaty signed by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. It met the demands of the U.S. Congress and the Defense Department for equal aggregates and involved significant Soviet concessions, including abandonment of their previous demand that Forward Based Systems (FBS), such as U.S. weapons based in Western Europe, had to be included in the U.S. total. Ford and Kissinger returned home feeling triumphant and claiming that they had put a cap on the arms race. Their hopes were dashed, however, by the subsequent inability of the two sides to agree upon whether such weapons as the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles were to be included in the totals agreed upon at Vladivostok.

Initiative: Sizing Up a New President

In early August, following President Richard Nixon's resignation, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the new U.S. President, Gerald Ford, immediately sent letters to their Soviet counterparts pledging that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union would continue unchanged under the new administration. Ford also assured Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that the channels of communication established under Nixon remained open and reaffirmed the former President's invitation to the General Secretary to visit the United States the following year.

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Kissinger, for his part, urged that there be no loss of momentum in the negotiations on SALT, CSCE, and MBFR and indicated his intention to return to Moscow for further negotiations that fall.[1]

Brezhnev's reply suggested that "a working meeting" between the two heads of state before the end of the year, perhaps on neutral ground, would help detente, adding that experience had shown how useful and valuable such personal contacts were. During their June discussions in Moscow, Brezhnev and Nixon had talked about holding an interim summit before the Soviet leader's scheduled visit to the United States in 1975. Moreover, as Kissinger subsequently pointed out to the President, Brezhnev's emphasis on the continuation of personal contact also reflected the Soviet leader's own personal stake in detente.[2]

In advice to Ford at this time, and before the President met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in mid-September, Kissinger indicated his support for an interim "working" summit if there was concrete business for the two leaders to negotiate. Kissinger wished to use the Soviet desire for a summit as a lever to gain Soviet concessions on several outstanding issues.[3]

Ford's agreement to attend a summit meeting at Vladivostok in November, however, was conveyed to the Soviet Union without prior Soviet concessions or assurances that the meeting would produce concrete results. On September 20, Ford and Kissinger discussed the Vladivostok meeting with Gromyko. The three agreed on the importance of making progress on SALT during Kissinger's visit to Moscow in October, so that Ford and Brezhnev could announce "agreement in principle" at Vladivostok and conclude a SALT agreement when Brezhnev visited the United States the following June.[4]

The forthcoming summit meeting at Vladivostok was announced publicly on October 26, Kissinger's last day in Moscow. The British, French, and West German Foreign Offices, notified 6 hours before the public announcement, were told that Washington did not expect any major announcement to result from the summit, which was for the purpose of getting acquainted.[5]

Preparations: Coming Closer Together on SALT

U.S. preparations for the Vladivostok summit between September 20 and November 23 focused primarily on SALT. In briefing the new President following Nixon's resignation, Kissinger warned Ford that a breakdown in SALT would jeopardize detente and the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. He also

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argued that it was misleading to talk about strategic superiority, pointing out that, according to U.S. intelligence projections, at the end of an unrestricted arms race with the Soviet Union both sides would still be essentially in strategic equilibrium. Such an arms race, according to Kissinger, would also mean greatly increased U.S. defense expenditures. The Secretary projected that the Soviets would be more inclined to make concessions now than the previous June, when they were focusing on Nixon's precarious political position. Kissinger, who knew how deep divisions within the U.S. Government had hindered previous SALT negotiations, advised that a new SALT proposal should be sent directly to Brezhnev to circumvent the Soviet bureaucracy.[6]

During the September meeting with Gromyko, Ford warned the Soviet Foreign Minister that lack of progress on SALT would affect the military budget request he would submit in December and noted the desirability of concluding an agreement before the 1976 election. Gromyko responded that his government wanted to find a solution and was prepared to discuss all of this in detail when Kissinger came to Moscow.[7]

On October 9, Kissinger gave Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy F. Dobrynin the new U.S. SALT proposal for discussion during the Secretary's visit to Moscow. This proposal was based on equal aggregates, equality in the total number of strategic missile launchers possessed by each side, as the Defense Department and Congress insisted. It called for a phased reduction in the total number of strategic launchers -- ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), and heavy bombers. The numerical limits of the 1972 SALT agreement would remain in effect until October 1977. Beginning in October 1977, each side would agree to reduce its total number of launchers to no more than 2,350 by 1982 and to 2,200 by the end of 1983. Before 1982, the total number of such launchers could not exceed 2,500 with a sublimit of 300 for modern large ICBMs; by the end of 1983, the sublimit would be 250 for heavy systems including both heavy missiles and heavy bombers. There would also be a limit of 1,320 ICBMs and SLBMs with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). The total deployment of new strategic launchers, including replacement or modernization, would be limited to 175 in any 1 year. Finally, as in the 1972 SALT agreement, building new ICBM silos would be prohibited.[8]

On October 24, Kissinger arrived in Moscow for 3 days of pre-Vladivostok negotiations with Brezhnev which were the most important preparations made for the summit. The first day was devoted primarily to Soviet complaints about U.S. trade

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restrictions and U.S. policy towards CSCE and the Middle East. No solutions were reached but, while defending U.S. policy, Kissinger's tone was reassuring throughout.[9]

The next 2 days of discussions were devoted almost exclusively to SALT. During these meetings, Kissinger painted a bleak picture of a period of unrestrained U.S.-Soviet competition in strategic arms, arguing that at the end of such a race neither side would be decisively ahead. He pointed out that the design of Soviet strategic forces was such that, whatever Soviet intentions, they represented a very grave threat to U.S. land-based forces and that the United States was prepared to do whatever was necessary for its own defense.

After discussing the U.S. proposal of October 9, Brezhnev offered a Soviet counterproposal that the upper limit on strategic launchers be 2,000 for the United States and 2,400 for the Soviet Union. In addition, Gromyko insisted that the Soviet Union had to be compensated in these totals for Forward Based Systems (FBS) and for British and French nuclear weapons. Kissinger responded that it would be quite impossible for the United States to agree to such an inequality in total numbers with no inequality in its favor in other areas such as MIRVs. He suggested that the United States might be willing to agree not to go above 2,200, although it had to have the right to do so. Kissinger also reminded Brezhnev that the United States would have twice as many warheads on one Trident submarine as the combined total of British and French warheads. He warned that the United States would not make a more forthcoming proposal and added that there would be serious consequences in the United States if the U.S. press saw this trip as a failure.[10]

The next day, Brezhnev proposed a total of 2,200 strategic launchers for the United States and 2,400 for the Soviet Union by the end of 1985. Kissinger was able to extract agreement that the 2,200 figure would include only U.S. launchers and not those of its Allies. Brezhnev also proposed that the United States be limited to 10 Trident submarines between 1977 and 1985, with the Soviet Union limited to 10 of the Typhoon class. Brezhnev accepted the U.S. proposal that the prohibition on building new silos continue, although both sides would be free to modernize and improve existing ones. He also accepted the proposed limit of 1,320 MIRVs. Brezhnev insisted, however, that the missiles carried by the proposed U.S. B-1 bomber should have a range of no more than 3,000 kilometers and that each missile be included in the U.S. total. Kissinger told Brezhnev that this counterproposal provided a serious basis for discussion but that it would receive a most unfavorable reception if given to the U.S. bureaucracy in its

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current form. He suggested that points be clarified in private meetings between himself and Dobrynin and that discussions be kept entirely in this channel until after Vladivostok. Brezhnev agreed, on the condition that there would be no fundamentally new proposals, adding that he did not want his first meeting with the President to begin with a dispute. Kissinger promised that there would be no surprises at Vladivostok and that he would do his utmost to make the summit meeting a success.[11]

On his last day in Moscow, Kissinger met privately with Brezhnev, with only State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Gromyko, and an interpreter present. Brezhnev restated a proposal, made secretly to Nixon in June, that each side pledge that in the event of a nuclear attack on either or on the allies of either by any third power it would use military power in support of the other. Brezhnev added that they could even name the third power -- an obvious reference to China. Kissinger's response was noncommittal. He promised to discuss this with Ford, but also pointed out that such a proposal did not make sense if the arms race continued.[12]

On November 13, Kissinger advised Ford that the Soviet counterproposal, received in written form on November 8, provided a basis for constructive negotiations at Vladivostok. He urged Ford to insist upon equal aggregates for political reasons, even though the United States would not even be able to reach the 2,200 level without retaining obsolete systems. He also argued that they should accept no limit on bomber-launched missiles without a corresponding Soviet concession. Kissinger suggested a U.S. counterproposal with a limit of 2,400 on total launchers and 1,320 on MIRVed missiles for the last 2 years of the agreement (1984-1985), with the United States agreeing to stay 200 below the launcher limit (2,200) through 1983 and the Soviets agreeing to stay 200 below the MIRV limit (1,120) during this same period. He also proposed a sublimit of 250 new strategic bombers, 312 new SLBMs on Trident-type submarines (13 ships), and 180 new heavy ICBMs. This would simplify the proposal by eliminating all reference to heavy MIRVs or bomber armaments. Kissinger warned Ford that time would be short at Vladivostok and advised that he not get bogged down in details but concentrate on getting agreement on basic numbers. Ford approved the proposal and Kissinger presented it to Dobrynin the same day. [13]

The following day Kissinger sent Ford, who was due to leave for the Far East on November 17, a briefing book for Vladivostok containing comprehensive background material on major U.S.-Soviet issues which might be raised during the summit. He also forwarded a 25-page memorandum which briefed

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the President on Brezhnev's personality and policies and then laid out the major U.S. objectives for the summit. Kissinger pointed out that, since the Soviet leader had sought this meeting, much of the burden for its success would be on him. The Secretary added, however, that Soviet internal political considerations might limit Brezhnev's ability to bargain and he might not be able to pay too high a price for a SALT agreement. Kissinger emphasized that the main objective at Vladivostok, besides establishing a personal relationship with Brezhnev, was to obtain a SALT agreement, publicly signed by the two leaders, which would settle the question of limits on strategic launchers and MIRVs and, if possible, set sublimits on new SLBMs on Trident-type submarines, new bombers, and new heavy ICBMs.

After noting that there was no set agenda for the Vladivostok talks, Kissinger's memorandum summarized the other major issues which might arise during the summit. On the Middle East, he advised that the President appear willing to consult more frequently with the Soviets and to reconvene the Geneva Conference, without making any actual commitment. The memorandum then reviewed some of the CSCE disputes and proposed that the President promise to work for conclusion of the Conference by the spring of 1975. The memorandum cautioned Ford not to offer or agree to any specific MBFR proposals at Vladivostok because the United States had not worked out such proposals with its Allies. The paper also discussed several other issues, including Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, Environmental and Chemical Warfare, and various bilateral economic issues. On the latter, it was suggested that the President tell Brezhnev of his hope that passage of the Trade Bill would lead to increased U.S.-Soviet trade. Ford was also to point out that the administration had been forced to accept the Jackson-Vanik amendment to attain most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union.[14]

In the meantime, the State Department and the Soviet Embassy negotiated the wording of the joint communiqué to be issued on the last day of the summit. Kissinger's briefing memorandum had explained that the Vladivostok communiqué would be more general than those for previous summits, unless there was agreement on SALT. The draft communiqué, agreed to prior to the summit, reflected the limited anticipations of the two sides. It anticipated no new development on any issue, with the exception of SALT, which was not covered in the presummit draft. Only the Soviet wording on the Cyprus question, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island, caused any controversy and this phrase was omitted from the final communiqué.[15]

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Discussions: A Significant Breakthrough

On November 23, Ford and Kissinger flew from South Korea via Tokyo to Vozdvizhenka airport near Vladivostok, where they met Brezhnev and Gromyko who had come more than 4,000 miles from Moscow by train. In contrast to the previous Nixon-Brezhnev summits, there was little pomp or ceremony at Vladivostok -- partly because of the brevity of the summit and partly because of its location. During the 2-day summit, Ford and Brezhnev spent almost 12 hours in face-to-face discussions. During the evening discussions at the Okeanskaya sanatorium on the first day, the two delegations were relatively large. Ford and Kissinger were accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter J. Stoessel and Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as well as three State Department aides. The Soviet Delegation was somewhat larger (11 in all) and included not only Gromyko, Dobrynin, and the Soviet interpreter Viktor Sukhodrev but also representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On the morning of the second day, Ford, Kissinger, and a Russian-speaking State Department aide, Alexander Akalovsky, met alone with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Dobrynin, and the Soviet interpreter. They were joined by other members of the U.S. Delegation during the afternoon session.

The initial conversations took place during the 1 1/2 hour train ride from the airport to the Okeanskaya Sanatorium, a health resort on the outskirts of Vladivostok. After initial friendly banter, the two sides agreed on the order of discussions: first SALT and then the Middle East. Ford emphasized the importance of reaching agreement on SALT during 1975 so that it would not become an issue in the 1976 election and warned that if another candidate were elected the policy of detente might be undercut.[16]

The first session at the Okeanskaya Sanatorium began at 6:15 that evening and lasted until 12:30 a.m. During this session, which was so productive that the dinner originally scheduled was cancelled, Brezhnev and Gromyko complained that the U.S. position, as reflected in its latest proposal, had stiffened since Kissinger had been in Moscow. Ford replied that Congress and the American people would not accept an agreement with unequal numbers and noted that he had deferred his decision on the defense budget until after the summit. Kissinger pointed out that without an agreement, the United States could continue to MIRV its missiles indefintely. After some haggling over Trident submarines, Brezhnev and Ford agreed that no new silos should be built and that only new ICBMs which fit into existing silos would be permitted.

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After a break, Brezhnev repeated his Moscow proposal that each side be allowed to build 2,400 strategic launchers by 1985, but that the President give the Soviets a letter promising that the United States would actually only build 2,200 during that period. Ford and Kissinger repeated that the American people would not accept less than numerical equivalence and argued that their proposal, which offered offsetting inequalities through 1983 and then equivalence in both launchers and MIRVs by 1985, was one the U.S. Congress and American people would accept. Kissinger also pointed out that the United States would only be able to reach this figure by keeping some obsolete systems and reminded Brezhnev that a Presidential letter would not be binding on Ford's successors. When Brezhnev and Gromyko complained about U.S. FBS, Ford stated that it was his understanding that they had agreed at Moscow not to include FBS in a SALT agreement. Nevertheless, he offered to give up the U.S. nuclear submarine base in Rota, Spain in 1984.

After leaving the room to consult his colleagues in Moscow, Brezhenv returned and suggested to Ford that they agree in principle upon 2,400 launchers and 1,320 MIRVs for each side and that these ceilings could be reached at any time before 1985, thus dropping the interim (1977-1983) period. He pointed out that this meant that the President could tell the American people he had reached an agreement on the basis of full equality for both sides. Kissinger then reminded Brezhnev that the United States had also proposed limiting strategic bombers such as the B-1, Trident-type submarines, and MIRVed heavy missiles. After some further haggling, the two sides agreed to resume discussion of sublimits in the morning.[17]

The second day of negotiations began at Okeanskaya Sanatorium at 10:10 a.m. and lasted nearly 6 hours. Ford began the discussion of sublimits by offering to count any aircraft-carried ballistic missile with a range over 700 kilometers as part of the 2,400 aggregate, i.e., as one launcher. Brezhnev countered that each bomber carrying missiles with a range of up to 600 kilometers should be counted as one launcher, that those carrying missiles with a range from 600 to 3,000 kilometers should be counted according to the number of missiles they carried and that all bomber-carried missiles with a range of over 3,000 kilometers should be banned. Ford expressed serious objections to the last restriction but suggested that, if it were accepted, the Soviet Union should accept a limit of 200 on its MIRVed heavy missiles.

After leaving the room for consultations, Brezhnev returned and proposed that bomber-carried missiles with a range exceeding 600 kilometers count as individual launchers, but

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that there be no limit on their maximum range nor any restrictions on heavy MIRVed missiles. Ford and Kissinger consented to this and the Vladivostok "agreement in principle" on SALT was complete. It was agreed that the U.S. and Soviet SALT Delegations, which had been negotiating in Geneva, should work out the details and that Kissinger would iron out any further difficulties when he returned to the Soviet Union in the spring. The final SALT II Treaty could then be signed when Brezhnev came to the United States in the summer of 1975. The two sides decided to issue a separate statement on SALT in addition to the joint communiqué, explaining that equivalence had been reached but without revealing the figures until the President had a chance to brief congressional leaders.

While Brezhnev and Ford left the room, Kissinger and Gromyko, agreeing that the two leaders would not have time to discuss Cyprus, settled the dispute over the wording on this item in the previously negotiated joint communiqué. After their return, Brezhnev and Ford held a secret meeting, attended only by Kissinger and Scowcroft on the U.S. side and Gromyko, Dobrynin, and A.M. Aleksandrov, Brezhnev's Special Assistant, on the Soviet side. No record of this meeting has been found.

When the full conference reconvened, discussions turned to the Middle East. Brezhnev talked about the need for U.S.-Soviet cooperation and argued that a solution could be found at a reconvened Geneva Conference, adding that the fundamental issue was Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Ford responded that he agreed that there should be U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the Middle East but that the groundwork had to be laid before the Geneva Conference met. He suggested, and Brezhnev agreed, that Kissinger and Dobrynin should exchange ideas as to how to prevent another Middle East war.

The final portion of the summit dealt with CSCE and, very briefly, the Trade Bill. On CSCE, Ford agreed upon March or April as a tentative date for the final stage of the Conference and promised to urge the French and Germans to move on some of the disputed issues. Ford then pointed out that his administration had strongly supported the Trade Bill and declared that he had never authorized the mention of any required number of applications for emigration from the Soviet Union, much less the 60,000 that Senator Jackson had recently proclaimed. Brezhnev responded that no one who wanted to leave was being harassed but also claimed that the total number of applications was far below 60,000. After exchanging mutualcompliments and agreeing that their meeting had been extremely useful and productive, the two leaders and their associates concluded the summit.[18]

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Before leaving Vladivostok, Kissinger briefed waiting reporters on the results of the summit and gave them copies of the previously negotiated joint communiqué and the newly drawn up joint statement on SALT which contained the basic details of the Ford-Brezhnev agreement without the figures. He announced that this marked the breakthrough they had been seeking since 1972 and that it offered a very strong possibility of a signed agreement in 1975. The Secretary declared that they hoped to look back on Vladivostok as a turning point which put a cap on the arms race -- a cap substantially below the capabilities of both sides -- and as the first step in further arms reduction.[19] Kissinger then returned to Tokyo (briefly) that same day and went on to Peking, while Ford flew back to Washington.

Results: Disappointing Aftermath

Back in Washington, in speaking to the press and before the National Security Council, Ford and Kissinger defended the Vladivostok accord as a "cap on the arms race". In support of this contention, they pointed out that the overall total agreed to was below what the Soviet Union already possessed. They emphasized privately that the very lowest U.S. intelligence estimates as to what the Soviets would build in the future without a SALT agreement were considerably above the Vladivostok figures for both MIRVs and strategic launchers. They also maintained that the Soviet Union had made major concessions at Vladivostok and that the United States had gotten a far better agreement than had seemed possible before the summit. Kissinger suggested that this was because Brezhnev had been trying to strengthen detente by getting off in the right direction with a new President who might be in power for the next six years. He argued that such an accord could only have been reached at the summit, noting that the Soviet Delegation at Geneva could never have agreed to equal aggregates with no compensation for FBS. The Secretary also claimed that the United States had a "largely fool-proof" method of verification of the new accord and that such verification was not dependent upon the good faith of either side.[20]

Public and congressional reaction to Vladivostok was mixed. The New York Times criticized the accord for allowing both sides to go ahead with their planned arms build-ups, although it admitted that if the administration's claim that this was the best that could be obtained from the Soviets was true the world might have to make the best of "a bad agreement". Harris polls in December 1974 showed that although 77 percent of those polled favored substantially limiting the

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number of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles, the public was divided 35 to 34 percent on whether or not the Vladivostok accord was a breakthrough. The polls did show, however, that Vladivostok had improved public opinion of Ford's foreign policy.[21]

Senator Henry Jackson criticized the administration for not getting a more substantial reduction to aggregates of 1,700 for both sides and Senator Barry Goldwater complained that the new accord was "just another ploy by the Russians to try to fool some of our detente-happy people."[22] On the other hand, Senator Edward Kennedy (acting for himself and Senators Charles Mathias and Walter Mondale) introduced a Senate resolution which supported the new SALT accord but also urged the President to negotiate further arms limitations and reductions, including lower aggregate and MIRV ceilings than agreed to at Vladivostok.[23]

The administration's hopes for continued progress in U.S.-Soviet relations received their first setback on December 20, when Congress passed the Trade Bill with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and limitations on credits to the Soviet Union. Brezhnev subsequently notified Ford that Moscow refused to accept a trading relationship with the United States based upon these discriminatory restrictions.[24] Nevertheless, subsequent Ford-Brezhnev exchanges indicated that neither leader had wavered in his determination to follow through on Vladivostok and to transform their understanding there into a concrete, signed SALT agreement.[25]

It was not disputes over trade discrimination but rather over some of the "gray" areas of strategic arms limitations not decided at the summit that caused the prospects of a signed SALT agreement in 1975 to dim and finally to disappear altogether. On January 29, 1975, the National Security Council met to discuss instructions to the U.S. SALT Delegation for talks scheduled to begin in Geneva on January 31. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson was advised that his primary objective was to achieve an understanding before Brezhnev's arrival in June. Nevertheless, the NSC, which anticipated potential disputes with the Soviets over verification, cruise missiles, and the Backfire bomber, also told Johnson to be "hard-nosed" on including the Backfire in the Soviet aggregate and warned that cruise missiles might have to be the subject of a separate agreement.[26]

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Primarily over these two issues, the Geneva negotiations were to bog down. No agreement on SALT II was reached during 1975, despite high hopes in both Washington and Moscow. Brezhnev's long-planned visit to Washington in June for another summit had to be postponed, although he and Ford did agree to meet in Helsinki for the final session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in late July.

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING
OKEANSKAYA SANATORIUM, NEAR VLADIVOSTOK
NOVEMBER 23, 1974

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Department of State

Soviet Union

L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
A.F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
G.M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg Sokolov, U.S.A. Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
General Mikhail M. Kozlov, Soviet General Staff
Mr. Makarov, Assistant to Gromyko
Mr. Detinov, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Staff
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

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NOTES

1. Telegram 174035 to Moscow, August 9, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis); Letter from Kissinger to Gromyko, August 9, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (C).

2. Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, August 11, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, August 13, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only); Memorandum of Conversation by Lodal, June 28, 1974, 10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis); Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, August 11, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

3. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, August 14, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Syes Only); Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, n.d., (circa September 19, 1974) (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive).

4. Memorandum of Conversation by Stoessel, September 20, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only). There is no document in the State Department files recording the Ford-Brezhnev agreement to meet at Vladivostok but the meeting had been arranged by the time Gromyko met with Ford on September 20.

5. Memorandum from Eagleburger to Kissinger, October 19, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive).

6. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, August 15, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Lodal to Kissinger, August 15, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only; Minutes of NSC Meeting, September 14, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Nodis).

7. Memorandum of Conversation by Stoessel, September 20, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

8. Note from Kissinger to Dobrynin, October 9, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Lodal and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, October 15, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive).

9. Memorandum of Conversation by Clift, October 24, 1974, 11:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (TS/Nodis/Sensitive); Memorandum of Conversation by Rodman, October 24, 1974, 6:30-9:30 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis).

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10. Memorandum of Conversation by Rodman, October 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m.-1:28 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); Memorandum of Conversation by Clift, October 25, 1974, 7:30-10:00 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Nodis).

11. Memorandum of Conversation by Clift, October 26, 1974, 7:10-10:20 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only). On November 5, Brezhnev wrote Ford, confirming the use of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel to work out the details of a new SALT agreement for their meeting at Vladivostok. Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, November 5, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (U).

12. Memorandum of Conversation by Sonnenfeldt, October 26, 1974, 4:30-6:45 p.m., attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Scowcroft, November 8, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

13. Note from Vorontsov to Sonnenfeldt, November 8, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Lodal, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger, November 8, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only); Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, November 13, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive); U.S. Counterproposal, November 13, 1974 (Kissinger Files)(U).

14. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, n.d., attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, November 14, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only).

15. Letter from Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger, November 16, 1974 (Kissinger Files). (LOU).

16. Memorandum of Conversation by U.S. Rapporteur Alexander Akalovsky, November 23, 1974, 2:30 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis).

17. Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, November 23, 1974, 6:15 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis).

18. Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, November 24, 1974, 10:10 a.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis); Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, November 24, 1974, 2:05 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis).

19. Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXI (July 7-December 30, 1974) pp. 898-905.

20. Transcript of December 3 Backgrounder on the Vladivostok SALT Agreement, attached to Memorandum from Leigh to Anderson, February 27, 1975. (Kissinger Files) (LOU); Minutes of NSC Meeting, December 2, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Nodis).

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21. The New York Times, November 29, 1974; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations copy of Louis Harris and Associates Study # 22436, December 1974. (PA/OAP); Chicago Tribune, December January 17, 1975, attached to Memorandum from Vest to Kissinger, February 6, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (C).

22. Transcript of Bruce Morton Interview of Senator Jackson, CBS Morning News, November 26, 1974, contained in Draft Telegram to Kissinger in Peking, November 26, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (U); Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969-1977 (Boulder, Colorado: 1978) p. 62.

23. Senate Resolution 20, 94th Congress, 1st Session, January 17, 1975, attached to Memorandum from Vest to Kissinger, February 6, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (C).

24. Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, December 25, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, December 26, 1974. (S/S-I, #7425272) (S/Sensitive).

25. Letter from Ford to Brezhnev, January 21, 1975, attached to Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, January 27, 1975 (Lot 81 D 286) (U).

26. Minutes, NSC Meeting, January 29, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive); National Security Decision Memorandum 285, February 6, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

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HELSINKI
1975

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FORD AND BREZHNEV AT HELSINKI, JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1975

The 1975 Helsinki summit between President Ford and Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev took place on July 30 and August 2, 1975, immediately prior to and following the ceremonies closing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The United States gave top priority to two issues:

-- Strengthening cooperation between the great powers
-- Concluding a SALT II agreement

The results of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting were unsatisfactory. No substantive progress was made on SALT although the atmosphere which surrounded meetings of the two leaders was frank and cooperative. Public reaction to the meeting was strongly negative and contributed to the subsequent deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations during the remainder of the Ford administration and weakened the President's political position.

Initiative: Resuscitating Detente

President Ford's decision to attend the Helsinki heads of government meeting and sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was an effort to revitalize the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union he had inherited from the Nixon administration and carried forward at the Vladivostok summit. This policy was under mounting attack in the United States, particularly from within the Republican Party, and appeared to be losing some of its attraction to the Soviet leadership. In December 1974, shortly after the conclusion of the Vladivostok summit, Congress amended the bill granting most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status to the Soviet Union by tying freer emigration from the U.S.S.R. to improved trade relations (the Jackson-Vanik amendment). Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev heatedly protested this "interference" in Soviet internal affairs in a letter to the White House.[1] In February 1975 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko met in Geneva to smooth over differences between the two states over trade, arms control, and the Middle East. The meeting was satisfactory and President Ford subsequently wrote Brezhnev that the United States would look favorably on the Soviet Government's request for a summit meeting which would coincide with the CSCE heads of government gathering.[2]

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Ford's decision to attend the Helsinki meeting was calculated to please both the Soviet Union and U.S. European Allies. The Soviets had been pressing for a conference on European security since 1954 and hoped to utilize such a process to secure Western recognition of the permanence of the boundries the U.S.S.R. had created in Eastern and Central Europe at the end of World War II. By 1974 they were pressing for a summit meeting to crown the CSCE process. The NATO Allies had agreed to the conference only after securing Soviet concessions on the Berlin question and other German issues. The NATO Allies utilized the CSCE to win public Soviet commitments to respect the right to self-determination of other European states and to conform with Western practices on human rights issues. While the Helsinki accords were not treaty commitments, they constituted a useful psychological tool to force better Soviet behavior in Europe. In exchange, the West reaffirmed its de facto recognition of Eastern Europe's existing borders while inserting a clause in the Helsinki document which stressed that border modification could only be the result of peaceful change.[3]

President Ford's decision to attend the Helsinki Conference and meet with Brezhnev was confirmed with the Soviet Union in May and the dates for both the CSCE heads of government meeting and the summit conference were finalized at a July 10 meeting between Kissinger and Gromyko. The decision was publicly announced on July 20, 1975. The President and his policy of detente had in the meantime been embroiled in a series of damaging controversies which climaxed when the White House declined to receive exiled Soviet writer Aleksander Solzhenitsyn on the publicly-stated grounds that such a meeting might damage U.S.-Soviet relations. Announcement of Ford's decision to meet with Brezhnev at Helsinki ignited a new wave of attacks on the policy of detente. Traditional opponents of closer cooperation with the Soviet Union were joined by usual supporters such as The New York Times, which argued that a Presidential appearance at Helsinki would appear to give Western approval to Soviet claims that the Eastern European borders established during and after World War II were sacrosanct.[4]

The Ford administration sought to counter domestic criticism of both the summit and CSCE by pointing out that the United States was participating with 34 other nations in the Helsinki meeting and that the CSCE Final Act was not legally binding. In a meeting with leaders of U.S. ethnic groups of East European origin, Ford reiterated U. S. refusal to grant de jure recognition to the political solution imposed by Soviet

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arms on Eastern Europe between 1940 and 1945. The President stressed that the United States and its NATO Allies had won a useful tool in efforts to improve the lot of the peoples of Eastern Europe by extracting Soviet pledges to respect basic human and political rights.[5]

Preparations: SALT and the Future of Detente

Arms control, particularly the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) Talks, dominated both East-West relations and U.S. preparations for the Helsinki summit. Other issues of importance were: Soviet cooperation with ongoing U.S. efforts to secure withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula as the first step toward a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East; the related issues of trade and freedom of emigration from the Soviet Union; limiting Soviet involvement in Portugal's internal affairs following the April 1974 revolution; implementation of the CSCE Final Act; and revitalization of the stalled Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) Talks.[6]

The Ford administration hoped to sign a SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union in the fall of 1975 during a previously agreed-upon Brezhnev visit to the United States. Gromyko, at a May 10 meeting with Kissinger at Geneva, outlined new Soviet proposals which raised U.S. hopes for a swift solution to outstanding difficulties. On the critical issue of verification of the number of missiles and warheads each side possessed, the Soviets suggested that all missiles that had been tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) should be counted as MIRVed and included in the ceiling of 1320 missiles established by SALT I. The Soviets also proposed that each side should have the right to replace existing MIRV systems at a later date with new MIRV systems on a one-to-one basis and single warhead missiles with new single warhead missiles. The Soviet proposal was close to previous U.S. projects for verification. Linked to the verification proposal, however, was a second Soviet plan which called for limiting cruise missile deployment. The Soviet plan would have limited deployment of mobile cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers to bomber aircraft. It banned ship, submarine, or mobile transporter launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers together with all intercontinental range land-based cruise missiles. The Soviets rejected U.S. efforts to define their recently developed "Backfire" bomber as a strategic weapon, and thus to include it in the strategic arms talks.[7]

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Kissinger advised President Ford that the Soviet proposals represented a significant step toward an agreement on SALT II and that a meeting between the President and Soviet General Secretary might accelerate progress toward an agreement.[8] A note containing the U.S. response to the Soviet proposals of May 1975 was presented at the end of July. The United States indicated substantial agreement with Soviet proposals on verification. It favored a ban on ballistic missiles in space, in seabeds, and on ocean floors, as well as those with a range of over 600 kilometers deployed on surface ships. The United States further suggested that these areas of basic agreement together with a number of other technical matters be referred to the two nations' negotiating teams at Geneva for final resolution. The U.S. note also stated it was willing to accept "substantial parts of the Soviet position on cruise missiles," including a ban on the deployment of cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers which were "carried on aircraft other than heavy bombers," and a ban on the development of intercontinental cruise missiles. The United States sought modifications in Soviet proposals on submarine and surface launched cruise missiles. Finally, the U.S. note reiterated the position that the Backfire bomber must be considered in the strategic arms talks.[9]

In the guidance memorandum Secretary Kissinger forwarded to President Ford on July 29, 1975, two objectives dominated U.S. strategy for the Helsinki summit: 1) progress in SALT negotiations and 2) reaffirmation of the commitment of both sides to improve U.S.-Soviet relations as a matter of basic policy. Kissinger advised the President that he should underline his government's insistence that U.S.-Soviet cooperation was a "two-way street." Movement toward solution of such key issues as SALT, the MBFR talks, and the implementation of the CSCE Final Act was the best means to calm U.S. public suspicions that the Soviet Union was exploiting detente, thereby preserving the basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation.[10]

While no formal agenda was prepared for the Ford-Brezhnev talks, the State Department prepared briefing material on the following substantive issues:

--CSCE implementation
--MBFR talks
--The Middle East peace process
--The strategic balance in the Indian Ocean
--The Portugese situation
--U.S.-Soviet trade
--Emigration from the Soviet Union

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The briefing material provided President Ford outlined U.S. policy in the following manner. The United States viewed the CSCE Final Act as a set of guidelines for the future conduct of East-West relations; it established standards of behavior that could be translated into practice. The President should press Brezhnev to break the deadlock over MBFR. If the Soviet Union raised the Middle East question, the United States would seek to reassure Soviet leaders that it was not seeking to expel their influence from the area. Soviet cooperation, preferably by nonintervention in U.S. peacemaking efforts, was welcome. The President was also prepared to discuss the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean area, and to note that the United States had no desire to start a regional arms race, but would counter continued development of Soviet bases in the region through construction of a facility at Diego Garcia island. Similarly, the United States would urge Soviet restraint and nonintervention in Portugese internal affairs which had taken an increasingly radical course since the April 1974 revolution, thereby offering the Portugese Communist Party an enticement to attempt to seize power. In addition to SALT, other arms control issues were being discussed by the great powers, and the President was prepared to state that the United States was ready to sign the just completed treaty limiting peaceful nuclear explosions to a 150 kiloton threshold and, with only a few details remaining before completion of an environmental warfare agreement, the United States was ready to work out a common strategy for its presentation and ultimate signature. Finally, on the troubled and intertwined issues of trade and emigration, the President was to promise that he would seek revision of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to permit the Soviet Union to enjoy most favored nation trading status. However, Ford was to explain candidly that prospects for disentangling the two issues were limited and that progress toward full trade status was likely to be slow.[11]

Discussions: Progress on Detente and Deadlock on SALT

President Ford arrived at Helsinki on the afternoon of July 29, 1975 after state visits to the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. The Presidential party included Secretary of State Kissinger, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Stoessel, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft, and State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt. The President's schedule was arranged to provide time for two lengthy morning meetings with the aging and recently ill Brezhnev, immediately before and after the CSCE ceremonies, which were scheduled for the afternoon of July 30 through August 1. The Brezhnev party included Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and his senior foreign affairs advisers.

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The first negotiating session between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev took place at the residence of the U.S. Ambassador to Finland on the morning of July 30, 1975 and lasted approximately 3 hours.[12] At the request of the Soviet Union, the participants deferred discussion of SALT until the second meeting. President Ford then made a statement in which he stressed the United States commitment to detente and indicated his expectation to remain in office for a second term to see the process of cooperation continued. Noting that detente had serious critics in the United States, Ford stated that further progress on SALT and the successful implementation of the CSCE agreements would silence them. The President also pointed out that a projected Brezhnev visit to the United States in the fall of 1975 would depend on progress on a SALT agreement.

Brezhnev responded by underlining his desire to reach an accord on SALT and stated that the Soviet Union would be fully prepared to devote itself to the issue at the second session of the summit after a more detailed study of the latest U.S. proposals. Brezhnev also introduced the idea of extending the CSCE process to other areas of the globe, noting that Ford had stated that detente was not only for Europe but for the rest of the world as well.

The Soviet General Secretary raised the issue of the Middle East. He indicated that the United Nations was not a suitable forum for settling the Arab-Israeli problem. Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union wanted to know more about U.S. plans for a Middle East solution and added that without U.S.-Soviet accord on a solution the suspended Geneva Conference on the Middle East would collapse. In response to a Ford request for Soviet suggestions and recommendations, Brezhnev replied that his government's position was that Israel must surrender territory occupied since June 1967, and that the Palestinian rights and Israel's "free and secure" existence must be guaranteed. Prodded by Gromyko, Brezhnev then noted Soviet concern that the step-by-step method of returning occupied lands was in danger of becoming divorced from the larger issue of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

President Ford agreed that the United Nations was not a suitable forum for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The President added that the United States wanted to avoid a clash between the great powers and to find a means of bringing together the parties to the dispute. According to the memorandum of conversation, Ford then complimented the Soviet Union for its "very helpful actions." Ford stressed that the "step-by-step" approach which the United States was employing

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had reached a stage "where either it will achieve another success, or else there is a possibility of a comprehensive proposal . . . that would encompass all of the issues that have festered there for years." Kissinger added the United States believed that "after the next step we will have reached the point where a comprehensive approach will be required." After further comments on the complexity of the Middle East problem, Kissinger reiterated the need for a U.S.-Soviet accord on common policy for the region and warned against the danger of being drawn into a confrontation by "volatile" peoples who had no loyalty to either of the great powers.

Brezhnev insisted that an agreed-upon forum existed in the proposed Geneva Conference and the time had come for the United States to give up its step-by-step diplomacy, which was not producing a comprehensive solution, in favor of a conference of all the parties which could settle the entire matter.

The talks also dealt with the intertwined issues of Soviet emigration policy and most-favored-nation trading status. President Ford praised Brezhnev for his frank discussions with a U.S. Senatorial delegation on matters relating to trade and economics. Ford stressed the close connection between a satisfactory settlement of the issue of Jewish emigration and his Administration's efforts to secure a favorable trade bill from the Congress. Brezhnev introduced statistics on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to show that the number of Jews wishing to leave had declined precipitously from a high point of 33,000 in 1973, because those who wished to leave had now departed. He claimed that the Soviet Union had met 98.4 percent of all requests for emigration submitted since 1945 and that those cases which had been denied permission to emigrate involved security matters. Fewer Soviet Jews wished to emigrate to Israel and the Soviet Union could not forceably expel Jewish citizens who wished to remain in the Soviet Union to meet the demands of the U.S. Congress.

President Ford did not challenge the Soviet presentation but instead stressed the need for creating a favorable perception of the Soviet Union and the detente process by further progress on the basic issues of SALT and CSCE and by making it clear that the possibility for emigration from the Soviet Union existed.

Brezhnev concluded the meeting by noting statements by U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger which implied that the United States might launch a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. President Ford assured the Soviet leader that he made U.S. policy and that the policy was detente.

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Both Ford and Brezhnev participated in the largely ceremonial concluding sessions of the CSCE between July 30 and August 1 and signed the Final Act. In their speeches to the conference prior to the August 1 signing ceremony, the U.S. President and the Soviet General Secretary underlined their commitment to detente and the implementation of the CSCE accords. Thus, their second 3-hour meeting on the morning of August 2 on the key issue of SALT negotiations began in a favorable atmosphere. This second meeting, however, was less productive. Brezhnev, who had recently recovered from an illness, appeared fatigued to U.S. officials and apparently ill-prepared to discuss the substance of SALT. President Ford's memoirs indicate that the Soviets refused to back away from the position that the Backfire bomber was not a strategic weapon. A heated exchange ensued between Ford and Brezhnev over the truthfulness of Soviet claims that Backfire was not a strategic weapon. A "theatrically outraged" Brezhnev insisted that the United States could not doubt the word of the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party. The Soviets also insisted on linking concessions on verification to an agreement on cruise missiles which would severely limit both their range and their deployment. No progress was made toward resolving the impasse over the issue of arms limitations. In an intriguing aside, Brezhnev appeared to offer a deal in which the Soviets would sell oil to the United States at below world market prices in exchange for a favorable grain sales arrangement. U.S. officials were very interested in an offer which might undercut the OPEC cartel and later dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Charles Robinson to Moscow for talks on the possible trade. The deal was never consumated.[13]

Results: A Domestic Setback for the President and Detente

U.S. leaders were pleased with the outcome of the first summit session. Kissinger's briefing paper for an August 6, 1975 cabinet meeting noted that Brezhnev had made a "rather strong and sometimes emotional" commitment to detente and that the Soviet position on the Middle East was generally conciliatory and they would await the outcome of U.S. efforts at step-by-step diplomacy before pressing for the convening of a Geneva meeting. The second meeting on SALT indicated that substantial disagreements existed between the two sides which could only be resolved through hard negotiations.[14]

The Helsinki summit did little to rebuild U.S. public support for the policy of detente. Although President Ford claimed "progress" in the SALT negotiations at a postsummit meeting with the press, he admitted that failure to reach an accord on this issue was "disturbing." Moreover, the summit at

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Helsinki was part of what Ford later termed a "Soviet propaganda victory" at the CSCE. Ford repeatedly defended the U.S. decision to sign the Final Act and participate in the Helsinki meetings, but he admitted that U.S. public opinion had concluded that the Soviets had gained an advantage over the United States, securing Western recognition of existing European frontiers, recognition of the legitimacy of Eastern European Communist governments, and the Soviet Union's forced incorporation of the three pre-World War II Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the U.S.S.R. Ford faced a torrent of domestic criticism including charges that the United States had "sold out" the peoples of Eastern Europe at Helsinki which helped to lay the groundwork for a major challenge to his renomination. Kissinger was called to testify before hostile congressional committees. He told his staff he believed that Defense Secretary Schlesinger, who opposed substantive concessions on cruise missiles to the Soviet Union, was leaking information designed to undercut administration policy.[15]

The policy of detente yielded at least one benefit for diplomacy. Shortly after the summit, Kissinger secured a second pullback of Israeli forces in the Sinai. The Soviet Union did not interfere with the final round of intense diplomacy and did not attack the agreements in official statements.

Overall relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, however, deteriorated during the remainder of the Ford administration. Soviet assistance to one of the factions in Angola's civil war provoked public criticism from Kissinger and seemed to strengthen the case of critics who claimed that detente was a one-way policy. One of the leading critics of the policy, former California Governor Ronald Reagan challenged President Ford for the Republican nomination, claiming that by pursuing detente U.S. foreign policy was becoming subservient to the Soviet Union.

Negotiations on a SALT II Treaty continued into 1976. The two sides were unable to overcome their differences on either cruise missiles or the Backfire bomber. A Kissinger visit to Moscow in January 1976 failed to break the arms control logjam or produce any give over Angola. The onset of the U.S. Presidential election campaign led to a suspension of the talks, and following President Ford's defeat the conclusion of a SALT II agreement was left to the incoming Carter administration.

In spite of its initial propaganda triumph at CSCE, the Soviet Union soon found the "Helsinki process" was an encumberment to both its foreign and domestic policies. The

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Western states pressed for full compliance with the CSCE agreements and utilized subsequent CSCE review meetings to highlight repeated Soviet violations in a number of areas, including human rights. Meanwhile, Eastern European and Soviet dissidents, aided by the Western press, spotlighted Soviet repressive practices. This coverage undercut Soviet hopes of attaining an unencumbered most-favored-nation trading status with the United States.[16]

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING AT HELSINKI
JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1975

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Gerald Ford, President of the United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Department of State
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

Soviet Union

L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
G.M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
V.M. Sukhodrov, Counselor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
A. Vavilov, U.S.A. Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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NOTES

1. Telegram SECTO 420 to Aswan, March 13, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis). Memorandum from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, December 29, 1974, with attached communication from First Secretary Brezhnev for Ford. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive)).

2. Letter from Ford to Brezhnev, February 26, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S).

3. "CSCE Background Paper," July 1975. (S/S-I Files, Lot 75 D 738, briefing books) (U).

4. The New York Times, July 21, 1975. Washington Post, July 25, 1975. Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 297-301.

5. President Ford's July 25 statement is in Department of State Bulletin, August 11, 1975, pp. 204-206.

6. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and his senior staff, March 29, 1975 (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--January-March 1975) (S/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only). Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," undated, (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files). (S/Sensitive).

7. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, July 10, 1975. (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--June-July 1975") (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

8. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to Ford, July 11, 1975. Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--June-July 1975") (S/Sensitive). Memorandum from Hyland to Kissinger, July 17, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive).

9. Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Lodal to Kissinger, July 25, 1975. (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR-June-July 1975") (TS/Sensitive).

10. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, July 29, 1975. (Stoessel Files, Lot 82 D 307, "Helsinki") (S/Sensitive).

11. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, July 29, 1975, op. cit. The briefing books for the Helsinki summit are in S/S-I Lot 75 D 538.

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12. Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Brezhnev, July 30, 1975. (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--June-July 1975") (S).

13. No memorandum of conversation for the second Ford-Brezhnev meeting was located. Information on this meeting is taken from Ford, A Time to Heal, pp. 303-304 and "Talking Points for the Secretary" op. cit. Ford appears to have gotten the chronological sequence of his meetings with Brezhnev confused, placing the discussions on SALT at the first meeting instead of the second. Information on the oil-grain trade off was supplied by Helmut Sonnenfeldt in an interview with James Miller and David Mabon, September 26, 1985. Sonnenfeldt also confirmed the harsher tone of the second Ford-Brezhnev meeting and described Brezhnev's theatrical manner.

14. "Taking Points for the Secretary at the Cabinet Meeting," August 6, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (TS/Sensitive).

15. Ford Question-and-Answer session with reporters aboard Air Force One, August 2, 1975, in Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 308-311. Ford, A Time to Heal, pp. 306-307. Memorandum of a conversation between Kissinger and his senior staff, Sept. 8, 1975, (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "August-Sept-1975") (TS/Nodis).

16. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 264-267. Briefing Paper for September 1975 Kissinger-Gromyko meeting, undated, (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S). Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, Sept. 25, 1975, ibid.

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VIENNA
1979

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CARTER AND BREZHNEV AT VIENNA, JUNE 15-18, 1979

The only U.S.-Soviet summit conference held during the Carter administration opened in Vienna on June 15, 1979, and continued through June 18, with five plenary meetings as well as a private meeting between President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The convening of the summit was linked to the completion of complex and difficult negotiations on the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II), which began in the Nixon and Ford administrations and was pursued to completion by the Carter administration. The State Department prepared briefing papers on a wide range of issues that might be discussed at the Vienna conference, and Department and White House working groups coordinated the planning. Discussions at the summit focused on the following subjects:

1. SALT II
2. SALT III and other arms control issues
3. International issues
4. Bilateral and trade issues.

The major achievement at Vienna was the signing of the SALT II Treaty on strategic arms. Many other issues were discussed and positions clarified, but little movement toward specific agreements resulted. Subsequently, the Soviet Union reacted negatively to the NATO two-track decision in mid-December 1979 to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe while simultaneously pursuing arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces later that month removed all hopes for progress toward a rapprochement in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter asked the Senate to delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty; the agreement still has not been ratified.

Initiative: Linkage with SALT II

The Carter administration inherited a legacy of five U.S.-Soviet summits from the Nixon and Ford administrations. In his inaugural address President Carter expressed hope for "the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth,"[1] and his administration attempted from the outset to negotiate a SALT II Treaty with the Soviet Union to supersede the limited

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1972 SALT I agreement on offensive nuclear arms, due to expire in October 1977. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Moscow in late March 1977 to initiate an arms control dialogue with the Soviet leadership. Believing arms control agreements should not merely codify or limit the arms race but should result in substantial arms reductions, President Carter instructed Secretary Vance to propose drastic cuts in the number of each country's nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviet leadership rejected this U.S. initiative as a radical departure from the understandings reached with President Ford at Vladivostok in November 1974 and as very one-sided in favor of the United States.[2]

Despite the failure of the Vance mission, the Carter administration resumed the SALT talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva in May 1977. These protracted negotiations included regular sessions in Geneva between Paul Warnke, Chairman of the U.S. SALT Delegation, and his Soviet counterpart, Vladimir Semenov, as well as several meetings between Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Washington, Geneva, and Moscow and occasional meetings in Washington between President Carter and Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin. These talks gradually resolved many of the outstanding substantive and technical issues between the two sides.[3] Each side stated in September 1977, shortly before the expiration of the SALT I interim agreement, that it would adhere to the provisions of that treaty during SALT II talks if the other exercised similar restraint.[4]

During the negotiations the Soviet Union accepted a basic framework of 2,250 total missile launchers for each side beginning in 1981, 1,320 of which could contain multiple (MIRVed) warheads. Each side agreed to sublimits of 1,200 for MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 820 for land-based ICBMs. The Soviets also dropped their previous insistence on a range limit for the testing and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles and later dropped the limit on testing of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs). The United States reciprocated by accepting a prohibition on the flight testing and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles and a strict definition of a 600-kilometer limit on GLCMs and SLCMs in the protocol of the treaty, which would be in force through December 1981. The two sides also resolved the modernization question. Each could test and deploy one new ICBM, with defined characteristics, if the aggregate number of ICBMs was limited to 1,200.[5]

Throughout these negotiations Brezhnev let it be known on several occasions that he favored a "well prepared" summit

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meeting with President Carter to confirm and sign a SALT II agreement. Progress in resolving the major arms control questions in SALT by early fall of 1978 raised President Carter's hopes that a summit meeting could take place in late 1978 or early 1979.[6]

Difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations nonetheless delayed agreement on a summit meeting until the spring of 1979. Differences arose during 1978 over the issue of encryption of telemetry in missile tests. Warnke and Semenov had reached an understanding at Geneva in which the Soviet Union agreed to ban the encoding of electronic signals from its missile tests that impeded U.S. ability to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT II accord. Vance supported this understanding. But other U.S. officials, especially Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, advocated an outright ban on all telemetry encryption. Gromyko informed U.S. officials that the SALT I agreement allowing for national technical means of verification was also adequate for the SALT II agreement, and the United States was raising an "artificial" issue with its insistence on a prohibition of encryption.[7]

Secretary Vance believed that although both nations were groping toward the same end, the Soviets emphasized the permissibility of encryption unless it impeded verification while the United States was trying to stress its restriction. New compromise language for an agreement was worked out between Gromyko and Vance in Geneva in late December 1978, but during these meetings new instructions from Washington required the Secretary to reserve the U.S. right to challenge telemetry encryption under the treaty. The loss of U.S. monitoring capabilities in Iran in early 1979 following the revolution in that country made U.S. concerns on the verification issue more urgent. President Carter sent letters to President Brezhnev stating his administration's opposition to the encryption of telemetry and suggesting possible solutions to the impasse.[8]

The Soviet Backfire bomber issue also remained unresolved. The Soviets insisted that the Backfire bomber had only medium-range capability and therefore was not a strategic weapon, but seemed willing to meet U.S. concerns on its range and payload capabilities by making a separate statement outside the treaty framework that it would not significantly increase the annual production rate and the range/payload of this aircraft. The details of this arrangement were not confirmed in writing during these discussions, however, and the issue would resurface as the subject of considerable discussion at the summit meeting.[9]

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Other U.S. concerns were Soviet activities in Southern Africa (Namibia, Angola, and Rhodesia) and growing Soviet military presence in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, and Cuba. Regarding the latter, the Carter administration in the fall of 1978 sought clear assurances from the Soviets that the Mig-23s, which U.S. intelligence had learned were being delivered to Cuba, did not have a nuclear capability and that only a limited number of a nonnuclear-capable ground attack version would be sent to Cuba.

After considerable negotiations, the Soviet Union said that it would not object to the Carter administration issuing of a public statement that indicated the non-nuclear capabilities of the Mig-23s in Cuba, provided the statement did not imply that the Soviet Union had agreed not to increase the number of these airplanes in Cuba. Though not entirely satisfied, the President stated on November 30 and December 7 that he had received Soviet assurances that it had not violated the 1962 U.S.-Soviet understanding that the Soviet Union would not deploy nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems in Cuba. Carter also affirmed that his administration would continue to monitor Soviet actions there very carefully.[10]

Throughout his discussions with Soviet officials, Vance emphasized that the Soviet Union's focus on selective detente limited to strategic arms was inadequate. U.S. leaders warned that Soviet restraint and cooperation on regional questions were required to persuade Senators that overall detente was working so that they would give their consent to a SALT II agreement.[11]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union reacted negatively to the growing rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The joint U.S.-China announcement on December 15, 1978, of full diplomatic relations commencing on January 1, 1979, followed by Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States, presaged the possibility of U.S. arms sales to China. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in particular believed the Soviet leadership faced a serious dilemma--whether to try to foster detente with the United States or move in other directions--and he felt that the exploitation of the China relationship would elicit a Soviet response one way or the other. Though Brezhnev had written President Carter immediately after the joint announcement that he hoped the U.S. relationship with China would not preclude an early SALT agreement, he soon reversed these private assurances through the Soviet news media. President Carter's subsequent statements that the United States would not sell arms to China failed to convince Soviet leaders who continued to express publicly their displeasure at the

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prospect of increasingly friendly relations between their two major rivals.[12]

Though some State Department officials believed that the U.S. decision to establish normal diplomatic relations with China seriously complicated U.S.-Soviet relations and delayed the summit meeting, Brzezinski believed that too many SALT issues (telemetry ecryption and the Backfire, for example) remained unresolved to conclude a SALT II treaty at a summit. It took in fact almost weekly meetings, about 25 in all, between Vance and Dobrynin from January to June 1979 as well as ongoing negotiations between the SALT delegations in Geneva to resolve the outstanding SALT questions. The continuing progress on SALT II gradually convinced both sides that the major issues on strategic arms had been resolved and that a summit meeting of the heads of government was desirable in the near future.[13]

A last detail in these discussions was agreement on the site for the summit. Because the last meeting between the heads of the two governments held in either nation had taken place at Vladivostok, protocol required that this summit be held in the United States. Soviet officials apparently claimed, however, that Brezhnev's poor health precluded a long journey to the United States, and the two sides agreed instead on Vienna. A more neutral meeting place like Vienna had certain advantages for constructive discussions. As Brzezinski later observed, the Vienna site permitted the summit to take place with less fanfare and fraternization than would have been the case if it had been held in the United States.[14]

Finally, on May 11 the two governments announced that a summit meeting would be held June 15-18, 1979, in Vienna to "confirm and sign the treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms" and "discuss other issues of mutual interest."[15]

Preparations: Many Issues, Few Prospects for Agreements

Several months before the formal announcement of the Vienna meeting, Carter administration officials began to prepare briefing papers on a wide range of issues that might be discussed at a summit conference. Department of State and National Security Council (NSC) officials organized an interdepartmental working group to coordinate the planning for a summit meeting. In March 1979, the Department also organized its own working group. Robert Barry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (EUR), served as chairman of the Department's working group of 16-20 officials,

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most of whom were Soviet specialists, arms control experts from the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and public affairs officials from the Bureau of Public Affairs, EUR, Voice of America, and the International Communications Agency. (The public affairs input declined when it was decided to hold the summit outside the United States.) This working group handled overall planning, including the preparation of briefing, "issues," and talking points papers. Barry, who also served on the NSC working group, acted as liaison with the White House on the preparations. Marshall Shulman, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, worked closely with Barry and the Department's working group and met frequently with Vance and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in discussing the agenda and planning for the summit. Department principals also consulted regularly with the American Embassy in Moscow concerning these preparations.[16]

The Department of State and NSC working groups agreed on an agenda comprising four main subject areas:

1) The overall relationship, including the possibility of annual summit meetings and regular meetings at the Foreign Minister-Secretary of State level, and a dialogue between the two Defense Ministers or their Chiefs of Staff;

2) SALT II and other arms control issues, including SALT III, mutual balanced and force reduction (MBFR) talks, anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), comprehensive test ban (CTB), chemical and radiological weapons, Indian Ocean, and nuclear non-proliferation;

3) International and regional issues, including the Middle East peace process, Iran, Southern Africa, Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf, Cuba, and global development issues; and

4) Bilateral and trade issues, including most-favored-nation (MFN) status, agreement on a new U.S. consulate in Tashkent, reciprocity in media and commercial representation, human rights, cultural exchange agreement, and parliamentary exchanges.[17]

Subsequent meetings between Vance and Dobrynin or their deputies resulted in agreement on an agenda for the summit. Dobrynin objected only to the inclusion of human rights and reciprocity in media and commercial representation. Regarding other arms control issues, such as gray areas, ASAT, CTB, and MBFR, he noted that "so far we are not encouraged by the position of the U.S. side at the negotiations and in the course of bilateral exchanges on these issues."[18] His comment foreshadowed the inconclusive result of the discussions on these issues at the Vienna summit.

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The two sides also agreed to negotiate in advance the communique to be issued at the conclusion of the summit. Following Soviet presentation of its draft communique on May 25, EUR prepared a counterdraft, with contributions from the Office of the Legal Advisor, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Policy Planning Staff, and regional bureaus. This counterdraft incorporated some of the Soviet language but, "in contrast to the rather bland Soviet text," set forth the U.S. "maximum realistic positions on key issues." The draft was given to the Soviets on June 1.[19] On the following day representatives from the Soviet Embassy met with Barry and David Aaron and Reginald Bartholomew from the NSC to devise an agreed text.

Discussions on the communique revealed that the Soviet Union sought a general declaration of principles expressing in rather abstract terms the two nations' commitment to peaceful coexistence as they had done at the Moscow summit in 1972, while the United States preferred to emphasize the specific and concrete. The Soviets complained about the U.S. draft communique dropping references to "peaceful coexistence," "non-intervention in each other's internal affairs," strategic parity, and "complete equality" as the principles guiding SALT, and to abjuring efforts "to achieve military supremacy." Similarly, the Soviets objected to U.S. language on a U.N. role in the Middle East peace process and to the "commitment to freedom of movement" in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) context. They also rejected the selective references to South Asia on nonproliferation matters, and to specific references to Indochina, Iran, and Afghanistan. When willing to engage in specifics, the Soviets wanted to spell out U.S.-Soviet differences on the Middle East and South Africa. This contradicted the U.S. desire for more positive language in the communique.[20] The disagreements on the communique foreshadowed the differences on the same issues that Carter and Brezhnev would express to each other at the summit.

Carter administration officials' desire for a constructive summit meeting prompted them to recede from their initial maximum positions and to meet the Soviets more than halfway on the communique. The agreed items in the communique worked out in time for the opening of the summit were clearly more general than specific. The communique included the Soviet emphasis on the principles guiding the SALT process and mentioned other arms control issues mainly in terms of agreement to continue talks on them. It also referred only to the importance of increasing cooperation on international and regional issues and did not cite any third country by name as a special concern.

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Likewise, on bilateral issues it mentioned only positive developments on a range of cultural, academic, scientific, and technical exchange programs and the importance of working toward the elimination of obstacles to mutually beneficial trade relations. Other U.S. concerns, such as annual summit meetings and biannual meetings at the Secretary of State-Foreign Minister level, which Vance had vigorously promoted within the Department and at the White House, and advance notification of all strategic missile tests were deferred for subsequent discussion at the summit.[21]

In early June, Brzezinski and Vance sent papers to President Carter on U.S. objectives at the Vienna meeting. Brzezinski's memorandum, which was not submitted to the State Department in advance, divided the objectives into agreements/understandings and positions. Brzezinski had little hope for specific outcomes beyond the signing of the SALT II Treaty, agreement in principle to reduce missile launchers to 1,800 in SALT III, a possible preliminary agreement on ASAT, agreement on a framework for a Phase I agreement on MBFR and other arms control issues, and Soviet agreement in the communique to freer flow of information and to greater equality and reciprocity in media and commercial representation. He perceived the summit mainly as an opportunity "to convey our perspectives and positions clearly and firmly to the Soviets so they know where we (and they) stand. This may, at a minimum, heighten their sensitivity to our concerns and possible actions and reduce the chances of miscalculation." Here Carter noted in the margin, "Too Timid. We should have clear goals and strive for them." He wrote similar comments elsewhere on Brzezinski's memorandum.[22]

There had been too many ups and downs in Soviet-American relations since his inauguration more than 2 years earlier for the President to be overly sanguine about major breakthroughs at the summit. Nevertheless, he thought that his face-to-face meetings with Brezhnev would enable them to clear the air and begin to search, on a human level, for common ground in confronting the major problems affecting their peoples.[23]

Secretary Vance's memorandum, like Brzezinski's, also forecast only modest specific accomplishments. Vance, however, described much more fully the political psychology of the Soviet leadership, including Brezhnev. Because the Secretary believed that the Soviet leaders "attach great weight to the personal element of political relationships," he impressed upon Carter that "Brezhnev and his entourage will be heavily influenced by your personal style and their perception of your motivations." Despite their competitive tactics on many issues, Vance was convinced that Brezhnev and other Soviet

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leaders were deeply committed to the stability and respectablility that went with a smooth U.S.-Soviet relationship. Thus, he urged that "a major objective of this Summit should be to reinforce the incentives for the Soviet leaders to adhere to the general course they have taken away from the Cold War, while at the same time nudging them towards a more realistic understanding of what modifications in their behavior are essential if this course is to prosper." More specifically, he emphasized, "the primary focus of your exchanges with Brezhnev should be to reaffirm the basic framework of US-Soviet relations, which is based on substantial common interest in strategic stability, mutual acceptance of the status quo in the developed world, and avoidance of confrontation in dealing with the Third World."

The Secretary singled out bilateral trade as an issue where Brezhnev might be most tractable. Brezhnev, he noted, had his own domestic constituency. His promises to segments of the Soviet elite to gain access to American technology and even consumer goods gave the United States potential leverage at the summit. Vance believed that trade with the Soviet Union had been constricted by linking it narrowly to Jewish emigration under the Jackson-Vanik amendment (section 402) of the Trade Act of 1974. According to Vance, the Soviet Government had recently begun to allow many more people to emigrate. If President Carter received positive assurances from Brezhnev of further Soviet improvement of the emigration process, then Carter would be willing to grant MFN status to the Soviet Union. Congress, Vance predicted, would not disapprove his action.[24]

Vance and Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal probed Dobrynin on this proposal in May and early June. The Soviet Ambassador had expressed Soviet objections to any linkage between trade and emigration, but held open the prospect of major progress on this issue in Vienna.[25] "If we can resolve the impasse over MFN," Vance argued optimistically in his memorandum, "we will have restored the economic option to our tools for dealing with Moscow, and we will have strengthened the hand of those in the USSR who favor detente as a path to modernizing the economic and social system."[26]

Expectations of a trade agreement resulted in a State Department plan that Blumenthal and Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, be present at the summit. Brzezinski, however, knew that Vance did not believe in linkage and was probably not serious about linking MFN to other issues. In any event, Brzezinski feared that the raising of the trade issue at the summit would deflect attention from what he considered to be more fundamental geopolitical questions. He wanted the

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discussions with Brezhnev limited to "two simple themes--arms cuts and regional restraint," and prevailed upon Carter to leave Blumenthal and Kreps at home.[27]

Vance also stressed Brezhnev's frail health as a limiting factor at the summit. At his worst the Soviet leader "would show the symptoms of growing senility." Even if at his best, Brezhnev could only endure two short negotiating sessions each day. In consequence, "actual negotiation on central issues is unlikely." Finally, Vance proffered advice on what the President should advance at each negotiating session in order to convey most effectively U.S. positions and concerns.[28]

Discussions: Verbal Stalemate

Carter and Brezhnev had morning and afternoon plenary sessions on June 16 and 17 and a brief private meeting on June 18 immediately followed by a final plenary meeting on bilateral matters. They held the first two plenary sessions at the U.S. Embassy and the second two at the Soviet Embassy. The two leaders had their private meeting at the U.S. Embassy and then moved to the Soviet Embassy for the final plenary meeting. Vance, Brzezinski, one of Brzezinski's aides (Aaron or Bartholomew), Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, JCS Chairman Gen. David Jones, George Seignious, who had replaced Warnke as ACDA Director in early 1979, Ralph Earle, head of the SALT Delegation, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon, and personal advisers Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell accompanied President Carter at the plenary meetings; while Gromyko, Dobrynin, Brezhnev's assistant A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, K.U. Chernenko, G.M. Korniyenko, W.V. Ogarkov, L.M. Zamyatin, and the head of the SALT delegation, V.P. Karpov, sat in with Brezhnev. Each leader also had his own interpreter. Except for Gromyko, who regularly participated in the discussions, Carter and Brezhnev did almost all the talking at these plenary sessions; but because each session was only $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 hours in length, presumably out of deference to Brezhnev's uncertain health, the two leaders had only about 10 hours of direct talks. The requirement for translation of each leader's remarks further constricted the time available for full exploration of the issues. Prospects for substantive achievements beyond SALT II were unlikely in this short period. Even their introductory meetings on June 15 and short luncheons and dinners together following the sessions on June 16 and 17 did not allow for more than pleasant, informal conversation and toasts.[29]

Shortly after the delegations arrived in Vienna, Vance and Gromyko sat down on the afternoon of June 15 to discuss

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unresolved items for possible inclusion in the communique, but they made very little progress. Vance pressed for inclusion of annual summit meetings and frequent meetings at other levels, including between their military and defense leaders, a statement on "no victor in a nuclear war," advance notification of military exercises, prohibition on destruction of objects in outer space, the convening of a Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, and a U.N. role in the Middle East. Gromyko acceded, however, only to mention of more regular meetings and a continuation of the ASAT talks, a statement that "nuclear war would be a disaster for all mankind," and the holding of a Second Special Session to be followed by a world disarmament conference, which the Soviets had earlier proposed.[30]

Carter and Brezhnev first met that evening when they paid their respects to Austrian President Kirchschlaeger. Following the formal greetings the leaders of the two superpowers had a brief, private conversation during which they agreed that success at the summit was necessary for themselves and for the rest of the world. "If we do not succeed," Brezhnev said, placing his hand on Carter's shoulder, "God will punish us." They talked again briefly that night at the opera.[31]

The subject of the first plenary meeting on the following morning was the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Though President Carter was the host, selected in advance by a flip of the coin, and was supposed to speak first, Brezhnev interjected that he would speak first and proceeded to read a prepared statement.[32]

Brezhnev conceded that there were problems in U.S.-Soviet relations but the two nations had been Allies during World War II. The two leaders needed to engage in frank and constructive discussions in trying to resolve their disagreements. "If we have good relations and mutual understanding between our countries," he stressed, "there will be peace, there will be no nuclear war, and jointly we will always be able to prevent that. And that we must do, I want to repeat and emphasize--we must." He said that his thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations had always proceeded from the principle of peaceful coexistence between nations with different social and economic systems. It was not necessary to exacerbate their differences and risk a nuclear war that neither would win.[33] Pointing across the table at Vance, Brezhnev remarked, "He is the only one who does not want that." (Brezhnev's comment was probably intended for Brzezinski, not Vance, but he had confused the two.)[34]

The Soviet leader also focused on the complete equality between the two nations underlying their better relations, and emphasized that the Soviet Union had no hostile intentions

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toward the United States. He thought President Carter felt the same way, but he could not understand why the United States persistently built up its military forces which triggered an arms race.

Carter responded that it was his highest goal to restructure U.S.-Soviet relations on a stable basis. He quoted Brezhnev's remark the previous day that God would not forgive them if they failed. He felt that often differences arose because of lack of understanding and of regular consultations. When he added that he sometimes had the impression that the two Foreign Ministers did not share the same objectives as their leaders, Gromyko protested: "That is a very bold statement." Carter conceded that competition would remain, but they needed a full discussion of the potentially destabilizing aspects of this competition. Neither side could dominate the other, and the arms race resulted in much waste of human and natural resources and the development of unnecessary capabilities.

Brezhnev, who frequently interrupted to indicate his agreement with Carter, at this point interjected that Carter had already approved a greatly increased military budget for the coming year, so he did not know whether he should believe Carter's statement. Carter replied that he understood that the Soviet Union had steadily increased its expenditures for weapons of all kinds during the past 15 years and at a faster rate than that of the United States. Both nations, he urged, should exercise greater restraint.

After a few further frank but amicable exchanges, during which Carter stressed the importance not only of SALT II but preparation for SALT III and further progress on MBFR, CTB, and other arms control issues, Brezhnev stood up abruptly and announced that it was time for lunch. Though the session was not scheduled to end for another half hour, Brezhnev's action resulted in early adjournment.[35]

The focus of the second plenary meeting that afternoon was SALT II. In his opening statement Brezhnev emphasized the difficulties and compromises required in negotiating the SALT II agreement. He did not like everything in the treaty but felt it met the interests of both sides. After mentioning the requirement of unilateral statements by both sides, he handed over the Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber. He pointed out that the statement was a gesture in good will because the Backfire did not relate to arms covered in the treaty. If the United States in the same spirit should state that the production rate was 30 per year, he added, no rebuttal would be made by the Soviets. He then remarked that it should be clear that until the agreement entered into force, it could not be

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binding on either side. He was confident the Supreme Soviet would ratify the treaty, but he expressed concern about its opponents in the United States.

General Secretary Brezhnev further declared that Soviet military doctrine was defensive only and did not envisage first use of nuclear or any other weapons, and he invited a similar statement from President Carter. Such a public statement, he predicted, would be a rebuff to opponents of the treaty and those demanding amendments to it. He made clear that only the treaty as signed could go into force.

He then raised the question of the MX. The Carter administration had announced its decision to produce and deploy this new missile only a week before the opening of the summit. Brzezinski especially worked assiduously to win the President's endorsement of the MX and for Soviet acceptance of one new missile system for each side in the SALT II treaty. He firmly believed that the administration's commitment to the MX was required to help to neutralize hard-line opposition to the treaty and in any case was necessary to counter the Soviets' growing superiority in land-based missiles.[36] Frankly, Brezhnev stated, he did not see how the MX decision promoted the arms control objectives of the treaty. He added that the multiple protective shelters basing mode for deployment of the MX could not be verified and would preclude reaching agreement on SALT III.

Brezhnev continued that SALT III would have to take into account additional concerns, especially long-range SLCMs and GLCMs limited only until the end of 1980 in the protocol of SALT II, U.S. forward-based systems in Europe, and the nuclear missile potential of NATO and China. How, he asked, were these countries to be associated with the process of limiting strategic arms? He thought that frequent references in the West to gray areas were very vague. He asserted that Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft could not reach the United States, while U.S. weapons could strike Soviet territory. These were not simple questions, but SALT III would have to resolve which systems were gray and black.

President Carter first responded by congratulating Brezhnev on his success in negotiating the SALT II agreement over many years with three U.S. Presidents. Because he believed the Soviet side had prevailed in these lengthy negotiations, he suggested that it was time for Brezhnev to be more generous to the Americans. Brezhnev responded, "I am ready."

The United States, Carter continued, had no intention of deploying more than 20 cruise missiles during the term of the

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treaty. Regarding Minuteman launchers, the President handed Brezhnev a copy of the agreed statement. He also stated that despite U.S. problems with the Backfire bomber, the United States had agreed to exclude it from the treaty. He understood that the Soviet side would not exceed the production rate of 30 per year. Soviet agreement on this matter was the basis on which he agreed to sign the treaty. He also stated that the United States had the right to produce comparable aircraft.

Carter then raised the issue of encryption of telemetry in missile tests. Gromyko said that the two sides had gone over this question hundreds of times and that the Soviets had agreed that there would be no encryption of information related to the parameters envisaged by the treaty. Any questions on the matter would be taken up by the Standing Consultative Commission. Brezhnev read a statement affirming Gromyko's interpretation. Following a brief exchange of the interpreter's choice of words, Carter remarked that he understood that encryption of information regarding the parameters envisaged by the treaty must not impede national technical means. He added that his administration had proposed discussion of these parameters, but the Soviets had refused.

The President went on say that he was prepared to act as if the treaty was in force in accordance with international law pending ratification, if the Soviets would do the same. Both Brezhnev and Gromyko replied, however, that this was not general practice in Soviet treaties, and they would not agree to accede to the provisions of SALT II until it entered into force. Carter repeated that he would like to treat the agreement as well as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as binding until ratification, and regardless of the Soviet decision he intended to take no action not consistent with the SALT Treaty. Brezhnev responded that their disagreement was clear, and they should go on to the next issue.

Carter stated that they could agree to a joint agreement on non-first use of nuclear weapons, and Brezhnev confirmed that they could work on it. Carter argued that the MX was not nearly as formidable as the Soviet SS-18 or SS-19 missiles, and he recalled that he had already informed Brezhnev in a personal message that the MX would not be excluded from verification by national technical means. Finally, the extension of the protocol was a matter for negotiation, not presumption, at this time. Its terms were not to be assumed to set a precedent. He suggested they defer other issues, such as intermediate-range and forward-based systems and China, to the next meeting on SALT III and other arms control issues.[37]

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In his opening remarks the following morning Carter argued that SALT II did not go far enough in limiting the arms race, and he outlined steps the two might explore together in curtailing it in their approach to SALT III. Because he thought improved verification increased mutual trust, he hoped they might agree to the elimination of all encryption of telemetry, notification of all missile flight tests and massive bomber exercises, the improvement of monitoring stations, and on-site inspection in certain circumstances. He also indicated the United States was prepared to agree to large reductions in the number of missile launchers and warheads and in throw-weight, and to explore the prospect of an immediate moratorium on the construction of new missile launchers and warheads. Prior to SALT III, they might look into the possibility of five percent reductions each year provided the reductions were balanced.

Carter explained that he wanted agreements not only to reduce the number of nuclear weapons but to make the remaining ones less vulnerable. Ustinov interrupted to ask if it was not inconsistent to try to reduce the number of weapons while improving the quality of the remaining ones. Carter replied that making missiles less vulnerable to attack was an improvement only in a defensive sense, and he cited as a possibility an agreement making nuclear submarines immune from antisubmarine activities in certain ocean waters.

He thought the two leaders could explore the possibility of further constraints on the modernization of weapons systems, a process started with the SALT II Treaty, and a prohibition on the testing of missiles in a depressed trajectory because they reduced the warning time of attacking missiles. He also wanted to proceed with a comprehensive test ban agreement, if necessary even without the participation of Great Britain, which objected to verification provisions. The United States would do everything possible to induce other nations, especially France, Britain, and China, to join in substantial reductions of nuclear weapons deployed. He argued that the absence of cooperation from other nations should not be allowed to interfere with their bilateral arms control efforts.

The two nations, Carter continued, should also agree to sell nuclear fuel or technology only to nations that had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and had agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. He indicated his readiness to sign a partial agreement with the Soviet Union on antisatellite (ASAT) systems that would prohibit the damage to or destruction of the other's satellites, and to announce publicly that neither side planned

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to test antisatellite missiles or systems. Finally, he suggested that Defense Secretaries Brown and Ustinov could meet separately on MBFR to see if they could break the impasse on a definition of what constituted a soldier and other data that obstructed progress on these talks at Vienna.

Brezhnev's presentation recited well-known Soviet positions on the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles and the comprehensive test ban. Regarding the latter, he hoped the United States could persuade the British to change their inflexible position. He also reminded Carter that on non-proliferation he had already written him about U.S. plans to supply nuclear reactors to China but had not received a satisfactory reply. He blamed Pakistan for working on nuclear weapons and claimed that its argument of defense against India was a pretext. He believed Indian leaders' arguments, however, that they were reluctant to sign the NPT when Western nations were providing military support to China, which had territorial claims against India.

After Brezhnev reviewed Soviet initiatives on MBFR, Gromyko added that the Western nations cited force levels in Europe for the Soviet Union and its allies more than 150,000 men (Ustinov said it was 180,000) higher than the actual situation. Carter reiterated that separate talks between Brown and Ustinov might be able to resolve this question at least for their two nations.[38] (The two met that afternoon but made no progress on MBFR. During that meeting Ustinov also deferred for later discussion Brown's invitation for him to visit the United States as well as for exchanges of military personnel.)[39]

Gromyko also expanded Brezhnev's remarks on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction. He thought prospects for an agreement on radiological weapons were encouraging. Negotiations on chemical weapons, however, were going badly. He thought they had to resolve the question of verification. Moreover, for such an agreement to be effective, all the major powers had to accede to it. He further complained that agreements on ASAT, conventional arms transfers, and Indian Ocean arms control were impossible on the basis of the current U.S. positions, though the Soviets were prepared to continue the discussions.

Following Carter's short elaboration of the U.S. position on these regional issues, Brezhnev suggested that the two sides explore naval affairs, such as an agreement prohibiting their ships from cruising thousands of miles from their own territory. He mentioned that the United States had not responded to a Soviet proposal requiring the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet ships carrying nuclear weapons from the

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Mediterranean. He also said that he was willing to discuss advance notifications of strategic exercises of their military forces. He concluded by reading a paper which reiterated what he had stated on the Backfire bomber the previous day and added that the Soviet Union could not be bound by any U.S. unilateral interpretation of that statement.

Carter replied that it had been agreed before Vienna that the production rate of the Backfire would not exceed 30 a year, but he had still not received that confirmation. When he directly asked for that confirmation, Gromyko argued that it had been agreed before the summit that Carter would state that it was his understanding that the Soviet Union would not produce more than 30 a year, and the Soviets would not rebut that statement. Vance also engaged in the argument, making it clear that the United States required an affirmative, not merely a nonnegative, statement from Brezhnev on the production rate. The General Secretary finally interrupted to state explicitly that the Soviet Union would not produce more than 30 Backfires each year. Carter then confirmed that Brezhnev's statement resolved the issue.

Carter pointed out in conclusion that Brezhnev had not responded to his several specific suggestions for SALT III, but he saw areas of agreement in Soviet willingness to halt production of nuclear weapons and reduce stockpiles, to adhere to nonproliferation and IAEA safeguards, and to move forward on CTB and MBFR.[40]

The fourth plenary meeting on international issues convened late the same afternoon. The exchanges were wide-ranging, covering all contentious geographical areas. Brzezinski has written that in terms of substance this was the best session.[41] Carter reviewed at some length U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, and his concerns on Cuban activity in Africa sponsored and supported by the Soviet Union. He expressed his deep concern over Vietnam's incursions into Kampuchea and the Soviet Union's use of Vietnamese ports and facilities. He hoped, moreover, that the two sides would cooperate in supporting efforts of the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to select governments of their own choice.

Carter also reviewed U.S. efforts to resolve differences in the Middle East, beginning with the U.S.-Soviet call to bring together all parties at Geneva. That initiative had failed because of opposition from Syria and other parties, but Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem had resulted in progress between Israel and Egypt. He hoped that Security Council members,

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including the Soviet Union, would approve a U.N. force to supervise Israel's proposed withdrawal from the Sinai.

Carter also expressed U.S. support for the independence of Iran and Afghanistan and and his concerns about possible Soviet interventions in these nations. He also tried to assure Brezhnev that U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China was not directed at the Soviet Union. He concluded, "I hope you agree with everything I said."

Before responding on international issues, Brezhnev referred briefly to SALT III. That agreement, he stressed, should include not only the nuclear systems of the two superpowers but their allies as well, and all the factors determining the strategic situation needed to be taken into account in the follow-on negotiations.

Regarding international issues he argued that the Soviet Union had no intentions to expand into Africa and Asia, and he complained at the loose talk in the United States of its vital interests on the other side of the globe. He conceded that the political situation in Europe had improved considerably under detente, although he complained that the United States should adhere to all the provisions of the Helsinki agreement and not just selectively to those that provided a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of other states.

Brezhnev proposed that the members of the CSCE should sign a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear or conventional arms. President Carter no longer responded to this issue, perhaps because several of his advisers agreed that "it would be a serious mistake to write a new non-first use pledge into the communique without first discussing it with our allies."[42]

President Carter, Brezhnev continued, had already received his letters containing his opinions on the Middle East. He insisted that the U.S. policy was anti-Arab, and the Egypt-Israel treaty had actually increased the dangers of conflict in the Middle East. He argued that Israel, protected by Egypt, was waging a war in Lebanon that at any time could turn into a serious conflict. He was also resolutely opposed to the use of U.N. forces in the Sinai. A firm Middle East peace, he maintained, could only come about with the full liberation of Arab lands and creation of an independent Palestinian state.

Not surprisingly, Brezhnev condemned Chinese "aggression" in Vietnam and praised the Vietnamese people's "heroic" rebuff to the invaders. He asserted that the Soviet Union was merely fulfilling its treaty obligations to Vietnam and denied the

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known fact that the Union had military bases in Vietnam. He added that he was pleased with events in Kampuchea whose people had "revolted and finally freed themselves from a regime of rapists and killers imposed by Peking."

Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union supported national independence movements in Africa but sought no economic or strategic advantages there. He also asserted that the social revolution in Afghanistan was entirely internal, even claiming that the Soviet leadership first heard about the revolution from foreign broadcasts and the wire services. Regarding Cuba, he reemphasized that the Soviet Union complied strictly with the 1962 understandings and denied that the Soviets were using Cubans to interfere in other areas. Cuba was an independent nation and provided assistance to other legitimate governments threatened by aggression. "Perhaps those in the U.S. who were so vociferous concerning the Cuban actions," he remarked, "have forgotten that during the American War of Independence the ranks of General Washington's army contained foreign units."

Because their time was exhausted, Carter merely noted their differences on international issues and handed the Soviet leader a memorandum, which he had written following the plenary meeting on SALT III, containing a list of items that he wanted included in the follow-on arms control negotiations.[43]

Only Brezhnev and Carter and their interpreters attended the private meeting the following morning. Brezhnev made a short statement complaining about the Carter administration's human rights policies, which the Soviet Union regarded as its internal matter, but spent almost all his time at this meeting talking about the U.S.-China relationship. Obviously preoccupied with this question, he emphasized that he did not object to normal diplomatic relations between the United States and China but would view anything more than that "with grave concern." He also objected to any linkage between human rights and trade.

Carter in turn again raised the question of encoding of missile data. He emphasized that the United States had to monitor Soviet tests and might want to conduct overflights of Turkey for this purpose. Though he did not elaborate on the prospect of such overflights, Turkey had indicated to the Carter administration that it was willing to permit such overflights only if the Soviet Union agreed to them. In his response Brezhnev equated overflights of Turkey with Soviet flights over Cuba. He thought that the encryption issue should be discussed at the SALT III talks, though he said he would investigate the matter further.

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Carter also raised human rights directly. He urged the Soviet leader to continue a more liberal emigration policy, and he asked for the release of Anatoly Shcharansky and other dissidents. Brezhnev reminded Carter of his previous statement on human rights but added that Shcharansky had been convicted in a Soviet court of espionage, and he was bound to support the laws of his nation.[44]

The final plenary session lasted only 1/2 hour because both leaders had agreed that they did not want to delay the signing ceremony for the SALT II agreement. After Carter had expressed his gratitude for the summit meeting and his hope for further progress on issues in the future, Brezhnev quickly reviewed the bilateral contacts in cultural, political, scientific, and other areas. Despite some difficulties he believed that they brought the two nations closer together and were mutually beneficial.

Brezhnev singled out trade as a special area of concern and repeated his objections to any linkage between emigration policy, a purely internal affair, and trade. After noting the progress on the trade question at the 1972, 1973, and 1974 summits, he complained about subsequent U.S. discriminatory legislation. While the U.S. Government had recently begun to examine the possibilities of normalizing trade with the Soviet Union, he emphasized that this was entirely an internal matter of the United States. He pointed out, however, that his nation's long-term agreements with several European nations could serve as a model for U.S.-Soviet economic cooperation. The Soviet Union, he noted, had an enormous market that would interest U.S. firms.

He also claimed that the United States had raised "artificial obstacles" on air travel and maritime shipping. Carter noted that their time was up, but he promised to look into these problems and would respond through Secretary Vance.[45]

The signing ceremony was impressive and dignified. Following the signing, Carter and Brezhnev shook hands and embraced. Carter was convinced that their personal feelings for each other were genuinely warm, and he was determined to continue his search for peace and understanding.[46]

Results: The Unraveling of Detente

President Carter flew back to Washington on the afternoon of June 18 and addressed a joint session of Congress that same evening. His speech, which emphasized the advantages of SALT

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II for enhancing U.S. national security and international stability, opened what proved to be a lengthy debate over the merits of detente with the Soviet Union in general and the SALT II accord in particular.[47]

Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski were well aware that the struggle for obtaining Senate advice and consent to the treaty would be long and difficult. Indeed, in his June 18 speech to Congress, Carter conceded, "SALT II will undoubtedly become the most exhaustively discussed and debated treaty of our time, perhaps of all time."[48] Many Republican Senators, including possible Presidential hopefuls for the 1980 election, had already indicated that they would oppose the treaty, and it was likely that the Republican Party would make the treaty a partisan issue. Several Democratic Senators also had strong reservations about the treaty, particularly its verification provisions.

Carter administration officials were sensitive to these domestic political concerns but believed that the treaty was fundamentally sound, would withstand the many criticisms from the political right, and finally be consented to by the Senate.[49] They had already taken several actions which they thought would enhance prospects for the treaty. Carter, for instance, had regularly consulted with the Joint Chiefs and received their endorsement of the agreement. Their Senate testimony, he felt, might be persuasive. Moreover, when Warnke, whom some in the administration had regarded as too dovish, resigned as ACDA Director, the President, disregarding Vance's strong reservations, appointed Seignious, a retired Army general, as his replacement. The decision on the MX just before the summit, administration principals believed, would neutralize some of the opposition which was concerned about the Soviet Union's growing superiority in land-based missiles.[50]

Their preoccupation with encryption of telemetry before and at the summit was in part a response to the critical importance Americans attached to verification. For the same reason Carter had raised with Brezhnev at Vienna the prospect of overflights of Turkey to monitor Soviet missile tests. Domestic concerns about the Soviet Backfire bomber also probably helped to steel Carter administration officials at the summit to insist upon an affirmative statement from Brezhnev on its production rate.

Despite these measures the treaty debate intensified in the summer and fall. The revelation in late August of the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, even though it had been there many years, was politically harmful to the Carter administration. As Vance later wrote, "in the political climate of late 1979, a rational separation of the brigade

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issue and SALT was not possible." Although the administration took several steps to defuse the issue, it lingered as a problem during the ratification debate.[51]

The treaty, already in trouble, was dealt a decisive blow with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late December 1979. This Soviet action confirmed the worst U.S. fears regarding Soviet behavior, and Carter asked the Senate to delay consideration of the treaty until his administration could assess the Soviet actions and intentions.[52] (The Senate to date has not voted on the SALT II accord.)

Analysts have advanced various explanations for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. From the Soviets' perspective strong opposition to the SALT II treaty in the United States, the Carter administration's promotion of the MX, and the NATO announcement only a few weeks before the Soviet intervention of its decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe made even arms control with the United States very uncertain.[53] Growing Soviet leaders' concerns that detente was already dying and that they therefore had little to lose from the West if they acted decisively in Afghanistan may have influenced their decision for intervention. It is likely, however, that the Soviet leaders decided to intervene primarily because of their perception of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and their security interests in that country. Whatever the specific reasons, the Soviets almost certainly underestimated the damaging consequences that ensued, such as the grain embargo, Carter Doctrine, and strongly negative Third World reactions.[54]

With the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the United States response, including the grain embargo, the fragile fabric of "detente," which was already in danger of coming apart at the time of Vienna summit, began to unravel rapidly in the final year of the Carter administration.

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING
AT VIENNA
JUNE 15-18, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
George Seignious, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
Jody Powell, Assistant to the President
Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Ralph Earle, II, Chief of the U.S. Delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
David L. Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Reginald Bartholomew, National Security Council Senior Staff
William D. Krimer, Interpreter
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

Soviet Union

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Defense
K.U. Chernenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
L.M. Zamyatin, Section Chief of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
V.G. Komplektov, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
V.P. Karpov, Chief of the U.S.S.R. delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

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NOTES

[1]Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977 (Washington, 1977), I, p. 3.

[2]The Arms Reduction Initiative of March 1977 (Office of the Historian), RP 1399, January 1984 (S/Nodis).

[3]Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York, 1983), pp. 56-63, 99-107; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982), pp. 220-223, 229-233. Extensive documentation on Vance's and Carter's meetings with Gromyko and Dobrynin is in the Gelb Files, Lot 81 D 101. Leslie H. Gelb was Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from January 1977 to July 1979.

[4]Documents on Disarmament, 1977 (Washington, 1979), pp. 577-578.

[5]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 106-107; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York, 1983), pp. 325-329. A survey of the SALT II negotiations is Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New York, 1979).

[6]Telegram 9138 from Moscow, April 27, 1978 (S/Nodis), and telegram 30031 from Moscow, December 7, 1978 (C/Nodis); Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 221-222, 232.

[7]The Warnke-Semenov understanding is contained in Secto 12102 from Moscow, October 21, 1978 (S/Nodis). Also see telegram 643 from Moscow, January 14, 1978 (S/Nodis); telegram 28629 from Moscow, November 22, 1978 (S/Nodis); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 329-330; and Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 107-109, 134.

[8]Ibid., pp. 109-112; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 329-330. Carter's letters to Brezhnev, September 2, 1978, and March 27, 1979 (TS), on the encryption issue, and Brezhnev's response, March 11, 1979 (S/Nodis), are in the Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109.

[9]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 328; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 107, 134-135.

[10]Ibid., pp. 132-133.

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[11]Telegram 9138 from Moscow, April 27, 1978.

[12]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 109-122; Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 201; author's memorandum of conversation with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985, PA/HO Files (C).

[13]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 133-135. Documentation on these Vance-Dobrynin meetings, most of which is contained in a comprehensive "blue book" detailing the final stages of SALT II from November 1978 to June 1979, is in the Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109. For Brezhnev's oral message to Carter, December 19, 1978, and his letter to Carter, December 27, 1978 (S), and Carter's reply to Brezhnev, January 17, 1979, see ibid.

[14]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 331.

[15]Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979 (Washington, 1980), I, p. 839. (Hereafter Public Papers: Carter, 1979.)

[16]Memorandum from Shulman to Vance, January 26, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (C); memorandum from William T. Shinn, Jr. to Shulman and Barry, March 12, 1979, ibid. (C/Secret attachment); memorandum from Shulman to Peter Tarnoff, March 29, 1979, ibid. (C); memorandum from Barry to Shulman, April 4, 1979, ibid. (S); memorandum from Barry to Arnold Raphel, May 11, 1979, ibid. (C); State 121668, May 12, 1979 (S/Nodis); telegram 11933 from Moscow, May 14, 1979 (S/Nodis); telegram 12125 from Moscow, May 15, 1979 (S); State 123220, May 15, 1979 (S/Exdis).

[17]Memorandum from Tarnoff to George Seignious, Shulman, and all bureau heads (except Public Affairs), May 17, 1979, S/S-I Files, Lot 80 D 110 (C). The minutes and other papers of the NSC working group were not available for this study.

[18]Memorandum of conversation with Soviet Embassy representatives by Barry on Summit Arrangements, May 14, 1979 (C/Nodis); State 131893 (Tosec 40062), May 24, 1979 (S/Nodis).

[19]Memorandum from Aaron to Shulman, May 23, 1979, with attachments received from Dobrynin on May 23, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Eyes Only); State 136109 (Tosec 40157), May 26, 1979 (S/Nodis); State 136110 (Tosec 40158), May 26, 1979 (S/Nodis). The State Department counterdraft is in State 136108 (Tosec 40156), May 26,

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1979 (S/Nodis).

[20]Preliminary Soviet Comments on US Communique Draft, attachment to Barry and Shulman to Vance, June 1, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (C); memorandum of conversation by Barry, June 3, 1979, of Communique Negotiating Session II, June 2, 1979, ibid. (S); State 146853, June 7, 1979 (S/Nodis); memorandum from Shinn to Marshall Brement, June 12, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S).

[21]Shulman wrote "keep," "why not include," "why do we drop this," in the margin in several places next to the listing of Soviet counter proposals to the U.S. counterdraft communique contained on Barry's memorandum of conversation, June 3, 1979, of Communique Negotiating Session II, June 2, 1979; State 146853, June 7, 1979 (S/Nodis).

[22]Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, May 24, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S); note from Jack [Perry] to Shulman, May 29, 1979, ibid. (U); Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 240.

[23]Ibid., pp. 240-241; cf. Vance, Hard Choices, p. 138. Brzezinski recalled that Carter naturally wanted a politically successful summit and retained lingering hopes for a breakthrough on arms control issues there. Author's memorandum of conversation with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985.

[24]Memorandum from Vance to Carter, June 8, 1979, S/S-I Files, Lot 80 D 110 (S).

[25]State 107269, April 28, 1979 (C/Nodis); State 131859 (Tosec 40058), May 23, 1979 (S/Nodis); memorandum of conversation by Shulman between Vance and Dobrynin, June 6, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Sensitive).

[26]Memorandum from Vance to Carter, June 8, 1979.

[27]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 341.

[28]Memorandum from Vance to Carter, June 8, 1979.

[29]For the recollections of three U.S. participants at the Vienna summit, see Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 243-261; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 138-139; and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 341-344.

[30]Memorandum of conversation by William D. Krimer

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(interpreter), June 26, 1979, on Vance-Gromyko Discussion of Joint Communique, June 15, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Nodis); Carter; Keeping Faith, pp. 242-243. Cf. the Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Communique issued at the end of the summit, June 18, 1979, printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1979, pp. 1081-1087.

[31]Carter apparently quoted Brezhnev's remark, "...God will punish us" (Bog nas nakazhet), incorrectly as "...God will not forgive us," at the first plenary meeting the following morning. Note from Jack [Perry] to Peter [Tarnoff], undated, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (U). Carter repeated this incorrect version in his memoirs, Keeping Faith, pp. 245-246.

[32]Ibid. p. 246, says: "Because I was acting as host, I requested that Brezhnev make the opening statement;" but the memorandum of conversation by Krimer, June 16, 1979, of First Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Nodis) indicates that Carter said he would speak first, and Brezhnev nonetheless announced that he would speak first and proceeded to read his prepared statement.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Memorandum of conversation reconstructed from Toon's notes, typed June 21, 1979, of First Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[35]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, of First Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979.

[36]For the fullest discussion of the MX decision in the SALT context, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 331-338. Also, author's memorandum of conversation with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985. Brezhnev earlier conveyed his concerns on the MX in his letter to Carter, April 15, 1979, and Carter attempted to allay these concerns in his reply to Brezhnev, April 30, 1979, both in the Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109.

[37]Memorandum of conversation reconstructed from Toon's notes, typed June 21, 1979, of Second Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[38]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, June 20, 1979, of Third Plenary Meeting, June 17, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[39]Memorandum of conversation by Brig. Gen. Carl R. Smith, June 21, 1979, of Meeting Between Brown/Jones and Ustinov/Ogarkov, June 17, 1979, ibid. (S/via Alpha Channel).

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Both Krimer and Brzezinski believed in retrospect that there was a chance for a breakthrough on MBFR, but neither could recall the details of how this might have occurred. Krimer remembered Carter responding enthusiastically to Brezhnev's presentation but thought Carter's advisers, especially Harold Brown, persuaded Carter at the lunch just before the afternoon defense talks not to moderate the U.S. position. Brzezinski regretted that he had not taken more interest in this question. Author's memoranda of conversation with Krimer, September 18, 1985, PA/HO Files, and with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985.

[40]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, of Third Plenary Meeting, June 17, 1979.

[41]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 342.

[42]Memorandum from Shulman to Vance, June 17, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S).

[43]Memorandum of conversation by Dimitri Arensburger (interpreter), June 17, 1979, of Fourth Plenary Meeting, June 17, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis). For Brezhnev's letter to Carter, March 19, 1979, on the Middle East, see ibid. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 253, contains the text of the note Carter wrote to Brezhnev at the summit.

[44]Ibid., pp. 258-260. No memorandum of this private conversation was found for this study, although Krimer later recalled that he was the U.S. interpreter for this meeting and wrote one. Author's interview with Krimer, September 18, 1985. For background of U.S. talks with Soviet and Turkish officials on possible overflights of Turkey, see State 133017 (Tosec 40090), May 24, 1979 (S) and memorandum of converation by Shulman of conversation with Christopher and Dobrynin, May 25, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Sensitive).

[45]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, of Fifth Plenary Meeting, June 18, 1979, Shulman Files, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[46]Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 260-261.

[47]Public Papers: Carter, 1979, I, pp. 1087-1092.

[48]Ibid., p. 1088.

[49]See especially Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 349-358, 364-367.

[50]See especially Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 331-338; and Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 218, 222-225, 262,

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[51]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 358-364.

[52]Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81 (Washington, 1981), I, p. 12.

[53]For the texts of the NATO communiques of December 12 and 14, 1979, announcing the decisions on missile deployment and arms control, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (Washington, 1983), pp. 494-499.

[54]For a recent, detailed treatment of Soviet motivations regarding Afghanistan, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, 1985), Ch. 26.

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