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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 05626-85
12 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Otto Reich
Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America
and the Caribbean
Department of State

FROM: [Redacted]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America

25X1

SUBJECT: Nicaragua: Telling It Like It Is (e)

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Robert McFarlane,
dated 11 November 1985, Same Subject

Attached is the unclassified information requested for the preparation of the publication, plus classified "back-up" material to support it. I hope that in our efforts to put something together quickly, we have not left out anything important.

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		SUSPENSE		13 Nov 85	
				Date	

Remarks To 16: Please have NIO/LA take the lead, working with ALA and CATF in meeting this request. Ensure copy of "declassified" info and "backup" material is provided DCI/DDCI. (Note: Advance copies of this tasking provided ALA and CATF upon receipt 11 Nov.)

Suspense Answered
12 Nov 85

Executive Secretary
 12 Nov 85
 Date

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 11, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE F. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Nicaragua: Telling It Like It Is (C)

Next week the Congress is scheduled to take up the FY-86 Intelligence Authorization Bill. The House and Senate Intelligence Committee conferees have included language in their conference report that offers the opportunity for increased support to the democratic resistance. We can expect that this legislation will become known to the Sandinistas and their supporters and that they will, as in the past, launch a propaganda offensive against the proposals set forth in the bill. (S)

It is, therefore, critically important that we urgently and responsibly educate and inform our public on the nature of what is happening in Nicaragua. We should also highlight other attacks on the President's recently announced proposal for resolving regional conflicts. To this end, the following tasks should be expeditiously undertaken:

- The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, should prepare an unclassified publication on the following activities being undertaken by the Sandinistas and their supporters:
 - the renewed military buildup occurring in Nicaragua and Cuba;
 - the increased repression of the FSLN against the people, church, and political institutions of Nicaragua;
 - the intensified military offensive directed against the Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces;

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- the current propaganda, disinformation, and censorship campaign being waged in support of the Sandinistas; and
 - Sandinista intransigence in dealing with their neighbors. (S)
- The Director of Central Intelligence should undertake immediate review of all available information on the five elements depicted above and declassify as much as possible in order to support preparation of the State Department's publication. The DCI should also prepare detailed, classified "back-up" material to substantiate the publication indicated above. This material should also be used to brief the relevant committees of the Congress as corroboration for the unclassified publication. (S)
- The Department of Defense should support this activity with renewed assistance to the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy and by expeditious handling of relevant intelligence collected by military systems. (S)

We should aim to have the State Department's publication, copies of pertinent censored material, the classified "back-up" information, and duplicates of the President's recent 90-day "Report on U.S. Policy Toward and Events in Nicaragua" available not later than Wednesday, November 13, 1985. It is intended that we will use this material for a White House press release followed by a press background session on November 13, 1985. (S)



Robert C. McFarlane

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Talking Points

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Department of State

The re-imposition of the state of emergency by the Sandinista Government has ushered in a major offense by that government designed to eliminate all opposition to the regime.

--The Church: The most effective and outspoken democratic opponent to the regime, the Church is now under attack:

- The government has closed down its radio station, Radio Catolica, because it refused to submit its broadcasts to prior censorship.

- In early October the Church's newsmagazine La Iglesia was prohibited from being printed and circulated.

- Foreign priests are expelled and religious students are drafted in the Sandinista Army if they dare criticize the government.

- Church leaders are fighting back. Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo has publicly spoken out on the government's attacks against the church, a church spokesman presented the government with a written report, which was later circulated to a number of embassies in Managua, outlining the government's duplicitous nature in its dealings with the church.

--The Internal Democratic Opposition: The Sandinista regime has been harsh and cruel in its treatment with the internal democratic opposition:

- While the public position of the government is to negotiate with the democratic opposition, top Sandinista leaders have privately affirmed they

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will never talk with the private business sector.

- **Former leader of the private sector, Jorge Salazar, was murdered on orders from Minister of Interior Tomas Borge because he became a thorn in the side of the government. Others have been threatened by Sandinista security chief, Lenin Cerda.**

- **Internal opposition political parties as the Social Christian Party and the Independent Liberal Party are now prohibited from engaging in any political acts, completely disenfranchised from the political process.**

- **During late October the government raided the headquarters of the democratic labor confederation, arresting three of its leaders, who remain in detention.**

- **The major independent newspaper La Prensa is so heavily censored that it has ceased to become an effective vehicle of news.**

--Arms Buildup: The Sandinista government in purchasing weapons at a record pace, far in excess of the country's internal needs.

- **During Daniel Ortega's last trip to the Soviet Bloc in April 1985 he received commitments of 17 million dollars in military related aid.**

- **Nicaragua is importing sophisticated military equipment to include Soviet made tanks, helicopter gunships, and artillery.**

- **The Sandinistas continue to refuse to seriously discuss with their Central American neighbors verification procedures regarding arms inventories.**

-- The Armed Resistance: The Sandinista People's Army (EPS)

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is engaged in a major offensive against the Nicaraguan resistance:

- The EPS is making greater use of combined operations, in particular providing close air support with MI-25 helicopter gunships.

- In general Sandinista troops have become aggressive in conducting patrols and ambushes. Cuban advisors are urging the EPS to allow the FDN to infiltrate, then cut off escape routes and set up ambushes.

- Special clandestine units have been created to engage in sabotage and political assassination.

- The Sandinistas are not content to limit their aggressive activities in Nicaragua as EPS units regularly violate Honduran and Costa Rican territory.

--Sandinista International Propaganda Effort: Nicaraguan diplomats are involved in an effort to portray the country as "pluralistic", citing the newly drafted FSLN constitution as proof that the country is democratic:

- In fact the constitution was drafted solely by the Sandinistas, opposition sectors were not allowed to provide input.

- The Nicaraguan people have not been consulted on the constitution and it appears that it will be forced upon them.

- The world is starting to realize that Nicaragua is anything but a democracy. Ecuador recently broke relations, citing Nicaragua's repressive political system as a key factor leading to the break.

- Certain South American countries have made quiet demarches to the Nicaraguan government complaining about the re-imposition of emergency measures.

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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5 November 1985

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Colonel Oliver North
 Political-Military Affairs
 National Security Council

FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
 National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: Update of Information on Nicaragua

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Robert McFarlane,
 dated 13 February 1985, Subject: Increased
 Collection, Analysis and Reporting on Activities
 in Nicaragua

Attached for your retention is the tenth submission of selected data on arms deliveries to Nicaragua and the Sandinista military buildup.

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Robert D. Vickers Jr.
 Robert D. Vickers, Jr.

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JPRS-LAP-85-002-L

6 November 1985

SPECIAL TRANSLATION

CENSORED ARTICLES

FROM

MANAGUA LA PRENSA



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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NOTICE

This special translation, "Censored Articles
From Managua LA PRENSA," is a new FBIS report.
It is being distributed to all U.S. Government
consumers of the FBIS Latin America DAILY REPORT.


JPRS-LAP-85-002-L

6 November 1985

SPECIAL TRANSLATION

CENSORED ARTICLES FROM MANAGUA LA PRENSA

[These selected articles are from Managua LA PRENSA as prepared for publication but deleted by government censors



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NICARAGUA

CDN COMMUNIQUE RESPONDS TO H. ORTEGA INTERVIEW

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "CDN Answers Humberto Ortega"]

[Text] We have received the following communique:

The Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Body (CDN), aware of the political and socioeconomic deterioration that the country is undergoing, comments on the interview granted by the Sandinist defense minister, and national chief of the Sandinist People's Militias and the Sandinist Compulsory Military Service [SMO], Commander of the Revolution Humberto Ortega Saavedra.

CDN has the following opinion of the statements made by the subject of the interview:

If the civic opposition has apparently evinced political inconsistency, it is due to the lack of political pluralism, the repression carried out by the state and the total control over the press, radio and television. Noteworthy, among other things, are:

The Nandaime case in 1982; the repression and harassment during the electoral process, against CDN, in the towns of Boaco, Leon, Masaya and Chinandega; the ban on the transmission of Holy Mass; the attack by the "turbas" [pro-Sandinist demonstrators] upon the demonstration held on May Day 1985, against the trade unions and working people; the ban, with death threats, against COSEP [Higher Council of Private Enterprise], which prevented the General Assembly of 7 September of this year; the "turbas" attack during the Holy Father's visit; etc.....

The aforementioned incidents prove that the expression "ideological inconsistency" used by Comdr Ortega is totally dissociated from the truth, when this repression and these acts of the government have been committed because of the political and ideological stability of the civic opposition, organized in CDN.

As for Comdr Ortega's remark concerning Compulsory Military Service, we wish to explain that there are notable differences between the SMO of the democratic

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systems and that of totalitarian regimes such as ours, because the latter use it for the defense of a partisan ideology and for the interests of a new class (nomenklatura).

Evidence of this is the fact that all the military organizations have been christened "Sandinist" by Decree No 67 (Sandinist Army, Sandinist Air Force, Sandinist Police, Sandinist People's Militias, etc.); proving that the army does not serve the interests of the entire nation, but is, rather, the exclusive property of the party, FSLN. Moreover, this service is used to indoctrinate the youth in the political standards of Marxism-Leninism.

The implementation of this decree on SMO was condemned at the time by CDN, because it considered this a sacrifice of young blood, instead of using the regular army, despite the massive nature of the latter.

CDN asks Comdr Ortega: What brought about the counterrevolution?

It is well known that, at the outset, all sectors of national life decidedly supported the replacement of the Somoza dictatorship, with the resultant backing for the Sandinist revolution of a nationalist type, for the establishment of an authentic democratic government, not a people's democracy, which is nothing but a Marxist-Leninist system in disguise.

The myth of the Somoza National Guard as a belligerent force in the counterrevolution, preached by the present government, is unreal, for the following reasons:

- a. Somoza had a regular army of approximately 15,000 guardsmen and paramilitary during the final phase of his government.
- b. Of that number, according to official statistics from government spokesmen, about 4,500 soldiers in the insurrectional guard force died, between 4,000 and 4,500 are in prison, and 3,000 or more are scattered abroad. This makes a total balance of approximately 12,500 National Guardsmen, with a balance of 2,500 left who could have actively joined the counterrevolution.

Furthermore, based on official government information, nearly 5,000 guardsmen have been killed in the current war. Nevertheless, according to official spokesmen, mention is made of the presence of 20,000 armed men, with a tendency to increase to 30,000 forces, based on the remarks by the commander himself. So, we ask: What is the origin of those up in arms against the Sandinist regime?

Could they be merely national guardsmen who have already died, or could they be Nicaraguans who did not and do not accept the Marxist-Leninist regime in their country?

In the view of CDN, they are Nicaraguans who, having been denied the right to fight patriotically, in an effective manner, within the national territory, have chosen armed struggle as the only means for establishing an authentic democracy.

Could the Nicaraguan people approve of this sacrifice to which the present regime is subjecting them? We think not. To prove our assertion, we demand that the Front government call for a national referendum to be supervised by institutions dissociated from the conflict, which might be the Contadora Group and the supporting countries: Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay.

Comdr Ortega speaks of nationalism, and Marxism-Leninism, whose doctrine he professes, does not recognize nationalism. He speaks of a mixed economy, and Marxism-Leninism, by its very nature, recognizes only the planned economy (state capitalism).

In the view of Comdr Ortega, any individual or institution that does not subject its thinking to Marxist standards is a diversionist or counterrevolutionary. Moreover, how could a genuine mixed economy be developed in Nicaragua when the government itself is responsible for causing the loss of its credibility owing to the constant confiscations that it makes and the pressure that it brings to bear on the private sector? Similarly, when Mr Ortega alludes to leaders of the private sector, describing them as not followers of the revolution and "dangerous," it is because they have persistently demanded the fulfillment of the original government program endorsed by the Andean Group and the OAS (consultation organ) at the 17th Assembly of that organization, the fulfillment and continuity of which CDN demands.

The commander indicates that the real democracies cannot solve the people's socioeconomic problems.

It is obvious that, up until the present, it has been difficult to find perfect socioeconomic systems that can solve all problems; but, within the historical context, Marxism has been the least capable of solving these problems, with the aggravating factor of the loss of the inalienable rights of humans, such as their freedom. Examples of this are: Poland, Cuba, China, Ethiopia and all the countries of a Marxist-Leninist type.

He criticizes the American "gorilla" type regimes of Chile, Paraguay and Argentina (during the time of the military), etc., where the denial of fundamental human rights has been obvious, but he forgets to include among them the Cuban totalitarian regime which, with 26 years of dictatorship, has become the biggest "gorilla" in America.

Comdr Ortega attributes the revolution's victory to the ideological features of the FSLN. Nothing could be more untrue. The victory was due to the participation of all Nicaraguan sectors, guided by a democratic platform, but we were despicably deceived; to the massive aid from international solidarity, both military, and economic; and to the international pressure; and, finally, to the dissatisfaction toward Somoza's dynastic regime. Those countries which offered us all their assistance, such as Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, other Andean Group countries and even the United States, are now considered bourgeois-reactionary governments by the FSLN.

With regard to the Central American problem mentioned by Comdr Ortega, it has always existed, but it has become worse with the advent of Sandinism. In the past, the problems were social and economic, but now they have been aggravated by the political problems, and by the war, a result of the dissatisfaction of Nicaraguans who do not accept the Marxist-Leninist system of government.

Furthermore, he claims that this crisis has become exacerbated by an oppressive foreign debt. In this connection, we observe that, during the 6 years of Sandinist government, the foreign debt has risen from \$1.6 million to \$4.9 million, according to official statistics; and the effects of this new debt have not been translated into an increase in production, or of exports, or a substitution of imports. Hence, we suspect that these funds are being channeled for unproductive activities which, consequently, have heightened the national crisis.

He also maintains that, to resolve this crisis, it will be necessary to resolve the violence first; yet up until now the FSLN has not sought the real solution to that problem, such as national dialogue among all Nicaraguans, which CDN has proposed on constant, repeated occasions.

Comdr Ortega repeatedly stresses the continuation of the dialogue with the United States, overlooking the fact that the responsibility of any good government is primarily to consult with its own people. To date, we do not know what the Sandinists have discussed in Manzanillo.

CDN insists upon a genuine referendum supervised by qualified democratic individuals or institutions, in which the Christian people of Nicaragua can say whether they want a Marxist-Leninist government such as the one that the FSLN wants to impose upon us.

We insist that this consultation be genuine, not like the previous ones; for example, the consultation regarding education, in which the FSLN's decisions prevailed, because of an alleged majority or majority support, the proof of which has never been shown.

We hope that the government censorship will not prevent the publication and dissemination of this document.

Otherwise, it will be proven once again that we Nicaraguans are still being denied the right and opportunity to express opinions concerning our rights.

Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Body (CDN)

Dr Eduardo Rivas G., Chairman

Dr Jorge Ramirez A., Executive Secretary

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NICARAGUA

REPERCUSSIONS OF CURRENT PAPER SHORTAGE CITED

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "Paper Shortage in Printing Establishments"]

[Text] Over half of the country's printing establishments have come to a standstill, because there is no paper of any kind. Therefore, Christmas greeting cards will be conspicuous for their absence again this Christmas.

During a tour made by one of our reporters, he found that the only printing establishment that still had paper was the "Union" press, located in the Alta-gracia District. Others are operating with "scrap" paper.

The shortage is evident at the Central American University (UCA) printing shop, where books, notebooks, memo pads, etc. for students are printed; it is at a standstill, waiting to be supplied by the government. Otherwise, the university students will have their studies upset.

The National Press had pledged that it would prepare the ENABUS [National Bus Enterprise] mass transport tickets, but in view of the paper shortage, the transportation enterprise has had to discontinue the ticket system on its buses.

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FLOUR QUOTAS FOR HOTELS, BAKERIES REDUCED

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "Flour Shortage"]

[Text] As of 12 October, MICOIN [Ministry of Domestic Trade] ordered the selling of only 50 percent of the flour quota to first-class hotels. For bakeries, the sale of 10 quintales for every business transaction was assigned.

This announcement was made at AGROSA, a private sector institution which devotes part of its industrial activities to the milling of wheat, to convert it into flour to be sold to the public.

According to the source, after the aforementioned date, hotels such as the Camino Real, Intercontinental, Las Mercedes and Estrella will be provided with only 50 quintales apiece.

As everyone knows, AGROSA periodically purchases wheat from the government, at a price imposed upon it depending on the circumstances. It appears that the donations which have arrived have not sufficed to meet the country's domestic consumption requirements. An AGROSA worker commented: "The most disturbing thing is that, to date, no one has announced another donation of wheat."

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NICARAGUA

PSD'S RIVAS COMMENTS ON 1984 ELECTIONS

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "Febres Cordero Told the Truth"]

[Text] Dr Luis Rivas Leiva, secretary general of the Social Democratic Party [PSD], claimed that what the Ecuadorean president, Leon Febres Cordero, said about the elections held in Nicaragua during 1984 is a fact that the Sandinist Front cannot conceal.

The elections were carried out under unequal conditions. The Sandinist Front had all the state's resources at its disposal to use as it wished, as well as all the freedom that it wanted, and it denied the parties of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Body participation in those elections.

Rivas Leiva added that the recollection of the Sandinist "turbas" [pro-Sandinist demonstrators] is still clearly in mind, attacking the demonstrators in Matagalpa, Chinandega, Leon and Masaya. There are the photographs of all the smashed vehicles and, in addition, the press censorship of the political activities of the Democratic Coordinating Body, before it announced that it would not run in those unsuitably named elections.

He asked: "Why is the Sandinist Front annoyed with President Febres Cordero for stating a fact which culminated on 4 November 1984?"

The Social Democratic leader explained that the Sandinist Front only likes to hear praise and support. When anyone criticizes it, it sets forth like a wild creature. That is typical of this regime, and the ones suffering most have been the civic forces striving for a political solution in Nicaragua.

"Febres Cordero stated a fact that we have been repeating for some time: there should be egalitarian, democratic, free elections in Nicaragua." Dr Rivas Leiva concluded by remarking: "There must be a national dialogue so as to be able to lay the groundwork for an authentic democracy, if we want to achieve peace."

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LABOR MINISTRY DECLARES SLAUGHTERHOUSE STRIKE ILLEGAL

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "Slaughterhouse Strike Declared Illegal"]

[Text] Chinandega--A strike carried out by the slaughterhouses in this town has been declared illegal by the Ministry of Labor.

A meeting took place at the work center, in which delegates from the Slaughterhouse Union, the coordinator of the municipal junta, representatives from the Ministry of Labor and delegates from the CAUS [Central Organization of Trade Union Action and Unity], with which the union is affiliated, participated.

The slaughterhouses had been demanding the expulsion of the current administrator of the Slaughter Control Office, Fabio Catin Romero, claiming that he had falsely accused certain union members of stealing meat.

They had previously held talks with the coordinator of the municipal junta, Nicolas Santos, but no progress was made, and the problem became worse, until the stoppage of activities was ordered last Saturday, 5 October; and since then the citizens of Chinandega have been without that basic food.

The eight members of the Cattle Suppliers Cooperative, who have complete control over meat-cutting, for their part, refused to intervene directly in the conflict, and left it to the authorities to resolve.

The members of the aforementioned cooperative are: Eloy Reyes, the brothers Cesar and Augusto Davila, Maximiliano Huete, Enrique Manzanares, Eduardo Molina, Rolando Soto and Carlos Cardenas.

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NICARAGUA

PSC NATIONAL HEAD ON BREAK WITH ECUADOR

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "Ramirez Comments on Break With Ecuador"]

[Text] The national president of the Social Christian Party [PSC], Erick Ramirez, declared: "The Sandinist Front which, in the past, sought continental support in order to assume power in Nicaragua, must now respond to the historic demand from the free countries of Latin America, by establishing a really democratic regime in Nicaragua."

LA PRENSA: Mr Ramirez, we ask you as a politician what your opinion is of the position adopted by the president of Ecuador, Leon Febres Cordero, during the past few hours, regarding the Central American political crisis.

Ramirez: The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship was due in part to the resolution of the OAS' 17th Consultative Meeting, at which the FSLN itself pledged that it would establish a regime based on the most complete democratic liberties and on respect for human rights.

Ramirez continued: "This proposition had the support of all the countries of Latin America, particularly the Andean Group, of which Ecuador is a member.

"The crisis in Nicaragua has its basic origin in the absence of a truly democratic regime. The elections of November 1984 did not have the participation of democratic opposition sectors, because that electoral process took place under conditions adverse to internal democracy and without suitable public guarantees."

Ramirez went on to say: "This situation has brought us to the brink of widespread war, with the implication of serious, unfortunate consequences for all of Central America, which would be the result of violent action.

"The concern of the Latin American countries over the course of events in Nicaragua reflects an interest in having legitimate democracy prevail in our countries, instead of regimes based on force, of any ideological type."

He added: "The FSLN which, in the past, sought continental support in order to assume power in Nicaragua, must now respond to the historic demand from the

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free countries of Latin America, by establishing a really democratic system in Nicaragua."

Ramirez continued: "A break in diplomatic relations by any Latin American country that would isolate the Sandinist regime could also cause the isolation of us democratic sectors within the country that are engaged in political action. We consider it more suitable to devise a different type of diplomatic pressure that would lead toward democracy and not toward the breaking of relations, or a total break with the regime; because that might also bring about the consolidation of the Sandinist political and ideological system, just as occurred in Cuba during 1960."

Ramirez said: "I hope that, with this situation posed, the good will of the countries backing the Contadora Group and the Support Group, consisting of Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Uruguay, will prevail, aimed at a search for an internal dialogue in the Central American countries that will ensure the effectiveness of political pluralism and the existence of democratic political regimes resulting from free, honest, secret elections."

We asked Ramirez: "FSLN has said that, if an invasion occurs in Nicaragua, the war would be transferred to all of Central America, and the shooting would even reach the Latin American countries, because it would be an attempt to oust the Sandinist regime by force, with American aid. What is your opinion?"

He replied: "FSLN typically reacts like a regime based on force, which wants to impose its views through violence, rather than through reason and good judgment. We cannot support nor agree with that type of pressure; nor do we back this theory, because it would only lead Nicaragua to greater sacrifices and more bloodshed."

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NICARAGUA

PSD LEADER DISCUSSES NEED FOR PEACE

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "PSD Leader Encourages Internal Search for Peace"]

[Text] Engineer Adan Morales, PSD's [Social Democratic Party] secretary for international relations, declared that asking the Contadora Group for its good offices in requesting a kind of truce from the United States Government does not mean attempting to acknowledge that this hostile attitude toward Nicaragua is precisely a result of the antagonism produced by the contradictory positions maintained by the Sandinists.

Peace in the Central American region must be a result of the efforts of each government in the area, and not of the specific impulses of some governments in particular.

The subject of the interview explained: "As I said previously, requesting that the Contadora Group engage in such action is out of context, because we are the ones who must foster the sincere search for that peace which has been so long desired.

"In particular, we also wish to note that, before seeking peace in the region, all of us Nicaraguans should engage in creating the necessary conditions for finding our own internal peace, which will undeniably serve as a driving force to give an impetus to that regional peace, to a large extent."

Engineer Morales Hernandez claims: "The conflicts that exist in Central America have not been created artificially, nor could they have been, because Nicaragua's politics and living experience are different from those of the other countries of the Central American Isthmus.

"These arguments which we are putting forth now have been strengthened when, unfortunately, the Defense Ministry, in discussing a supposed American invasion, says that, if Nicaragua is invaded, they will take the battle to all of Central America.

"These statements undoubtedly alarmed the other governments even more, because they were made by a minister of the Nicaraguan Government, also reflecting a premise that does not correspond accurately to the Central American reality."

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CGT(i) SENDS DELEGATION TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 15 Oct 85

[Article: "They Insist on Demanding the Entire Christmas Bonus"]

[Text] A delegation consisting of 20 of the top-ranking leaders of the General Confederation of Labor (independent) [CGT(i)] showed up in the National Assembly this morning.

Part of that delegation was not able to enter the debating chamber where a working commission was to make known the decision regarding the payment of the Christmas bonus to employees and workers throughout the country.

Meanwhile, at the CGT(i) headquarters, Alejandro Solorzano, surrounded by his colleagues, continued his voluntary fast to express his "peaceful resistance" to the measure to reduce the bonus.

Alejandro Solorzano said that he would continue that "fast," while receiving messages of solidarity and support from workers, laborers and union members.

When reporters from LA PRENSA were holding a dialogue with the CGT workers and leaders, the Socialist congressman, Domingo Sanchez Salgado, arrived, stating that this was a clearcut position on behalf of the workers as a whole.

Later, another leader told the LA PRENSA reporter that a group of CGT(i) leaders was planning to remain in front of the Assembly building, thereby demonstrating the solidarity and backing for the proposition calling for complete, 100 percent payment of the bonus, to all workers and employees of an administrative, technical nature, etc.

Alejandro Solorzano had no comment on what certain news media had published, supposedly expressed by leaders of labor unions such as CST [Sandinist Central Organization of Workers], and ATC [Association of Agricultural Workers], and Sandinist leaders.

Nevertheless, he denied that his position of fasting was a "demagogic, opportunistic" demonstration, as a pro-Sandinist newspaper described it this morning.

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Sanchez Salgado claimed that, in the past, there had been a "Pancho Argenau Papi" in the Chamber of Deputies, and that now there was another similar one.

He remarked: "In the past, there was a newspaper called NOVEDADES; now there is another paper using the same technique, like calling the workers opportunists and demagogues."

The workers from different labor confederations started sending messages of support to Alejandro Solorzano, to the CGT(i) and to the leaders who are engaged in an effort to demand acknowledgment, this year, for payment of the bonus, in its entirety, to all workers.

They also expressed great dissatisfaction with the statements made by a minister of state, who claimed that it was very difficult to provide exact statistics on the unemployment fund; "like someone saying that there is no control there," commented one leader.

The workers also pointed out that the work on the Luis Alfonso Velazquez park had been done with donations from Sweden; the Bolivar freeway, with donations from Venezuela; many projects, such as the Tiscapa one, had donations from France, and so on. Therefore, certain projects and communal works, as well as infrastructural projects have been depicted in a confused manner, as if they were constructed with the unemployment fund. The fact is that many construction projects carried out since the victory have been based on donations from countries friendly toward this revolution and this people, the workers claimed.

Furthermore, it was established that at the end of each year, the ministers are to be given \$500, plus a Christmas basket containing wines, fine liquors, canned goods and delicacies of an expensive type. They are also given very expensive gifts, just because they are ministers or high-ranking officials; but the workers are denied what they have gained through struggles and sacrifices. Another worker commented: "Demagoguery means taking away from the workers what they have gained through sacrifice."

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NICARAGUA

CUBANS ACCUSED OF DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85

[Article: "What Is To Be Done In Such Instances?"]

[Text] Chinandega--Neighbors of a residence occupied by Cubans cannot find anyone to whom they can resort to have the latter's attention called to their constant disturbances.

There is the residence that belonged to Dr Domingo Tuckler Martinez, located in the Guadalupe district, which is currently being used to house a large number of Cubans.

The neighbors note that, late last Thursday night, the aforementioned persons arrived banging at the doors and causing a terrific disturbance.

Furthermore, another house which was owned by Mr Leonidas Zamora has also been converted into a dwelling for Cuban physicians, who are similarly committing abuses.

At about 2300 hours on Friday night, several of these doctors were driving about on the town's streets in a red Toyota, with license plates IICC104, at high speed, jeopardizing the few passers-by who venture out on the streets at night.

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NICARAGUA

UNNAMED COMMANDANTE REBUKED IN OBANDO HOMILY

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85

[Article: "Cardinal Makes Comments..."]

[Text] "All the atrocities being committed in Nicaragua" were complained about today by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo in his homily at the Purity of Mary School which is celebrating the veneration of the Virgin today.

After declaring that the hearts of some people have changed, the archbishop, who was being pursued by several dozen foreign journalists, said that he was shocked at the presumptuousness that an individual (who was not identified), whom he accompanied on a plane traveling to Cuba, has today.

He remarked: "At that time, he told me that he could not explain why he had a machine gun covering his legs, and yet today I see him filled with presumptuousness."

This morning, the cardinal was received by the entire community at the Purity of Mary School, where Alicia Tijerino, a fifth year student, told him: "This day of your arrival is a cherished day for the entire school."

The homily given by the religious figure was concentrated on the maturity of "the purity of the Virgin Mary, from whose heart only goodness and love emerged."

Obando recommended to the school girls that they keep the Virgin Mary in their hearts and on their lips, "so that we may be builders of a fraternal city."

After noting that it must be painful for some Nicaraguans to sing the verses of the national anthem, which speak of "the voice of the cannon no longer roaring" (while waging war), he said that he feared that, in the future, Nicaragua would be a country of old people, "because all the youth are dying in the war."

The cardinal also cautioned the young girls not to drink from the contaminated waters which are the ones causing hatred in hearts.

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NICARAGUA

BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYERS' PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85

[Article: "Nicaraguan Lawyers Bar Association Organized"]

[Text] Dr Francisco Jose Aguado, also a delegate from Managua, stated that, with the Nicaraguan Lawyers Bar Association completely organized in all departments, steps would be taken to establish an office to receive complaints or reports of human rights violations; and that, in addition, a free people's law office would be set up for individuals of small means.

Lawyers: Our Profession Is Civilization

[Question] Is it true that many lawyers have given up the practice of their profession?

[Answer] Yes, it is true. A large proportion of lawyers, the number of whom we could not state exactly (but it exceeds 50 percent) have withdrawn from practicing the profession. There are several reasons: scarcity of work, in some instances and, in others, the risk represented by practicing the profession, etc.

[Question] Doctor, which area of the profession has the most difficulties for its practice?

[Answer] The criminal field. During the tour that we made all over the republic, we always heard, in an identical manner, the same complaints and indignation from lawyers engaged in criminal law practice. For example, there is fear, if not panic, over visiting the police centers. There, lawyers are treated as dangerous enemies.

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NICARAGUA

MANAGUA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON BUSINESS SITUATION

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85

[Article: "Commerce Requests More Facilities"]

[Text] The status of business is becoming more unstable and less competitive every day, with high costs for operations and difficult conditions for imports, provisions and stocks.

The foregoing is inferred from a fragmentary report supplied by an official from the Managua Chamber of Commerce, Mr Manuel Bermudez, who noted that, at the present time, goods can only be imported through a priority list, and that the recreational lines, such as toys, bicycles, tricycles, dolls, etc., are impossible to import.

Moreover, Mr Bermudez said that it is a fact that about 200 businessmen affiliated with the Chamber are being provided with \$1,000 per month in the so-called money exchange office; but that this sum now requires an investment of 720,000 cordobas, and keeping them bogged down in losses for the investors. Hence, the goods which reach the trade are purchased at very high costs, because they are supplied by dealers who have large expenses for hotels, travel fares, etc.

The representative of the Chamber of Commerce remarked: "Direct importing with dollars purchased with one's own funds through the money exchange office, even at 730 cordobas apiece, would be one solution for providing items for business; but that is subject to a list that must be authorized by the Ministry of Domestic Trade."

Stressing the conditions in Managua's business establishments, the promotions, the offers for this coming Christmas and the possibility of purchasing products for Christmas Eve and New Year's, the subject of the interview said that all that was now impossible. The promotions could not be made, the goods acquired inside the country are also very limited and most of the products, such as shoes, clothing, luxury garments and beauty items are being channeled by the state, and the stocks that business can handle are but few, commented Mr Manuel Bermudez in conclusion.

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NICARAGUA

CUS LEADERS CRITICIZE NEWSPAPER CONFISCATION

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85

[Article: "Leaders Condemn Seizure of COPROSA"]

[Text] Both union and political leaders condemned the military occupation of the offices of COPROSA on Tuesday by State Security, which has confirmed the existence of persecution directed at the Catholic Church.

This military action will blur the image of Nicaragua in the international area, and will nullify the Sandinist Front's statement before the National Assembly claiming that religious freedom and the effectiveness of human rights exist.

"We regret what happened at the COPROSA offices," explained union leader Alvin Guthrie Rivers, "because it will not aid internal peace; rather it will make things worse."

This contradicts the Sandinist statement that there is religious freedom and dissemination of the Catholic faith in Nicaragua.

The Confederation for Trade Union Unity (CUS) has expressed great concern over this militarist position; because it will give the Nicaraguans abroad reason to claim that there is no religious freedom.

Dr Luis Rivas Leiva, secretary general of the Social Democratic Party, explained that the armed action carried out by State Security in the COPROSA offices proves, of itself, the militarist features of the Sandinist regime.

The confiscation of thousands of copies of the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference publication, IGLESIA, also shows that there is no freedom of speech or thought in Nicaragua, and that there is religious persecution.

A preeminently ecclesiastical magazine, which does not deal with political nor economic issues, does not deserve the persecuting treatment given by the Sandinist Front.

Azucena Ferrey, head of the Social Christian Party, declared: "The military occupation of the Catholic COPROSA offices eloquently confirms the truth of what has been claimed about the persecution of the Catholic Church.

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"Furthermore, it is a flagrant violation of human rights, and a way of intimidating the Nicaraguan people, the majority of whom are Catholic.

"We claim that the constitution is going to be the same as that of Russia, which calls for all rights and freedoms in the country, but they are not in effect.

"This position heightens the dissatisfaction of the Nicaraguan Catholic people, and serves to maintain their unwavering faith in Christ, gathered around his only true shepherds."

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NICARAGUA

CCT PROTESTS POLICE ACTION AGAINST COPROSA

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 16 Oct 85

[Article: "Protest Over the Raid on the Curia's Publishing Establishment"]

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica

Commandante Daniel Ortega Saavedra,
President of Nicaragua
Managua, Nicaragua

The Central American Workers Confederation (CCT), informed of the raid which the Sandinist police carried out against the publishing establishment of the Catholic Church of Nicaragua, conveys its most forceful protest. This act is reprehensible in the eyes of the entire world because, by its nature, it is an attack against the Christian principles of informational activity as well as against the genuine freedom of speech which has been violated in the rights which the Nicaraguan Catholic agencies have.

Alcimiro Herrera Torres
Secretary General

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END

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SPECIAL TRANSLATION

CENSORED ARTICLES

FROM

MANAGUA LA PRENSA



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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NICARAGUA

ARCHDIOCESE FORMS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 13 Oct 85 p 1

[Article: "The Church Now Has Its Human Rights Commission"]

[Text] The Peace and Justice Commission directed by the Archdiocese of Managua is being formed and will be officially announced soon by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, it was learned from religious sources.

This commission would consist of several departments, among them the Legal Department, which will be headed by Dr Martha Patricia Baltodano, former coordinator of the CPDH [Human Rights Commission]. It was said that this commission would be something like the "Legal Aid" of El Salvador, which is under the direction of the Archbishopric of that country.

The offices of the Peace and Justice Commission are operating in the installations of the Archbishop's Curia in Las Sierritas, Managua.

They will handle cases of human rights violations as well as violations that persons and organizations commit against justice and peace.

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NICARAGUA

ANOTHER ISSUE OF CHURCH BULLETIN APPEARS

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 13 Oct 85

[Article: "Church Newspaper IGLESIA Appears"]

[Text] The church bulletin IGLESIA, published by the Archdiocese of Managua, appeared in public today and is being distributed in all the parishes of Managua and other cities.

According to its publishers, the legal-size bulletin will have a biweekly circulation and in its eight pages will carry ecclesiastic information.

Information provided in the Archbishop's Curia states that the initial edition of this religious bulletin was 15,000 copies and that it could be increased depending on the demand for it.

We learned that for the first edition of the newspaper IGLESIA its cost will be a voluntary contribution; subsequent issues will cost 20 cordobas.

The official organ of the archdiocese, we were told, will not only be at the service of the Curia but also of the other dioceses of the country.

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NICARAGUA

CHURCH BULLETIN CONFISCATED BY POLICE

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85

[Article: "Religious Persecution Continues, MINT Police Confiscate Catholic Bulletin"]

[Text] The first edition of the Catholic bulletin IGLESIA, which began circulating throughout all the parishes of the archdiocese on the 12th of this month, was confiscated on the afternoon of that same day by some 10 armed policemen of the Ministry of Interior who arrived at the printshop of the Curia.

The foregoing was confirmed this morning to LA PRENSA by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, archbishop of Managua, who also said that the total number of 8-page copies confiscated by the military was 10,000.

Asked his opinion or comments on the seizure of the religious newspaper, he answered: "I want to have more information before speaking on the subject; I would like to first have a contact with Monsignor Carballo, who at this time, I understand, is meeting with the police authorities who seized the bulletin IGLESIA last Saturday, through several policemen who surrounded the printshop where it was published."

Prior to these statements by the archbishop, the vicar for the media and director-editor of IGLESIA, informed this evening paper via telephone that the Directorate of the Media of the Ministry of Interior, employing 10 policemen, had last Saturday confiscated 10,000 copies of the Catholic bulletin, which was the entire run published that day.

He added that in addition to the newspapers, they also took the plates and negatives used to print IGLESIA.

All this happened, he explained, while he and other priests and helpers were in the archdiocese print shop of the archdiocese shipping deliveries to the various parishes of the capital.

At that time, he added, a driver of RADIO CATOLICA, Francisco Aleman, who had some copies of IGLESIA with him for distribution, was arrested by the police and hours later released.

According to Monsignor Carballo, the police used force to make the RADIO CATOLICA driver to recover the newspapers which on that same Saturday afternoon he had already distributed in some churches.

Monsignor Carballo also reported that under pressure by the Directorate of the Media IGLESIA was formally registered Saturday morning with that office as a prerequisite for being allowed to publish it, but that they subsequently responded with the confiscation of the 10,000 copies which on Sunday were to be distributed gratis among the faithful of the archdiocese of Managua.

He added that he had been called to appear this morning before Capt Charlotte Baltodano, one of those responsible in the Ministry of Interior for applying press censorship.

This is the first time that something like this has happened to the Nicaraguan Church, since on previous occasions when the Curia had published other registered bulletins they had never been censored nor much less confiscated or seized.

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NICARAGUA

INDEPENDENT LIBERAL PARTY MEETS IN ESTELI

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85

[Article: "Godoy Calls for National Unity"]

[Text] Overcoming the fear existing among the people of La Trinidad, Department of Esteli, the Independent Liberal Party [PLI] held a great municipal assembly in that city, which last 1 August was the scene of large-scale warlike incidents, which according to official figures caused a total of more than 100 casualties.

Members of the national leadership arrived early on the morning of Sunday, 13 October, headed by Dr Virgilio Godoy Reyes, who made a dramatic and patriotic appeal once more for national unity as a step prior to a dialogue among all Nicaraguans. He said: "We must stop this fratricidal war, it is definite that we must resolve the underlying problems that assail us. Indeed, the present is black but if we do not do something to try to change this tragic and gloomy picture, the future will be gray.

"A worthy and self-sacrificing effort is necessary, which has already been done generously by democratic groups and forces supported by all the people in 1978 and beginning of 1979, and which culminated with the government program written in San Jose 6 years ago," said national leader Dr Godoy Reyes. He added: "Unfortunately, from that time until now, the political parties have been cornered in an attempt to make them disappear, threatened with the loss of the legal status they had won because of their refusal to submit, retreat or officially collaborate or coexist."

Throughout the interesting political speech by the esteemed and well-known president of the PLI, among other things, he said: "No one is personally safe today, and much less of the future of his house, property, companies, and so forth. We no longer produce what we eat. Nicaragua had never in its history purchased basic grains; the cordoba of 6 years ago is now worth 100 times less. Every child, before it is born, has a minimum debt of a million cordobas. We have a foreign debt which exceeds \$5 billion and in order to bring our priority requirements up to date, there is a negative balance of \$1.2 billion." In conclusion, national leader Dr Godoy said: "Because of a lack of foresight or technical capability the only two projects of domestic economic salvation implemented left us with astronomical losses. The new Victoria de Julio mill produces sugar at 30 centavos per pound and

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exports it at 4 centavos. The Chiltepe Project will process milk at a cost of more than 1,000 cordobas per liter."

If we are honest, we must admit that the cause of all this is noncompliance with the promise made in San Jose. Nations, like individuals, should honor their signatures, commented the members of the August meeting.

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NICARAGUA

STRIKE AT CHILTEPE MILK PROCESSING PLANT

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85

[Article: "Union Incident at 'Chiltepe Project'"]

[Text] Labor officials were faced with serious problems when they had to avert a strike decreed by more than 100 workers who work at the Chiltepe Milk Project in the people's property area. They demanded wage [increases] and a number of economic incentives, at the same time protesting the increase in the cost of living.

The workers stopped working for more than 24 hours, while the harried officials of the Departmental Inspectors Office and administrators of the complex made great efforts to halt the strike by means of negotiations between the parties.

The members of the union leadership of the milk project showed the labor officials that the wages now being received are not even enough to cover the most pressing needs, indicating that each worker has to support no fewer than four people including his wife.

During negotiations the workers spoke determinedly, saying that if their demands were not met they would extend the strike indefinitely.

It was perhaps the determined attitude of the workers and union leadership which led to the signing of several agreements between the administrators of the project and labor officials, after which the workers halted their strike and returned to their work.

According to reports, the administrators of the milk project promised to raise the percentages of wages, not to take any reprisals against the strikes, and to revise the incentives gradually until they are finally satisfied.

Labor officials, according to union sources, are now supervising the agreements signed, and normalcy has returned to the complex after the 120 workers, who decided to call the strike to make management acknowledge their grievances in matters of wages and incentives, returned to work, the union leaders said.

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MATERIAL SHORTAGES CLOSE COFFEE PLANT

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85

[Article: "Former Employees of Cafe Presto Have Not Yet Found Other Employment"]

[Text] Economic problems, lack of raw materials, and other factors were the reasons which forced the administration of the Cafe Presto S.A. Company to halt its commercial activities and force a hundred workers and employees into unemployment. Authorities have not yet been able to place them.

Union leaders reported that the company had been feeling that it was on the verge of bankruptcy for several months, one of the reasons being the lack of a market, a difficult financial situation, and the lack of essential raw materials. [as published]

Although the administrators of the company held emergency meetings with government officials, particularly with the Ministry of Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian Reform and the Central Bank, to seek foreign currency, the crisis of the company became a reality.

Now labor officials and those of other government bodies are trying to place the workers who were forced into unemployment.

As a first step, said union leaders, the unemployed have been taken in by the company Cafe Soluble S.A., for which purpose there was a meeting recently at an interministerial level, attended by several union bodies and service sector organizations.

[The following appears as a continuation of the above]

Construction work on the Champas de Tiscapa Project of the Managua mayoralty were halted several days ago when more than 400 workers decided to halt their activities in protest at the continuing presence of a treasurer who is not to the liking of the workers.

When they halted their work, the workers said they would only return to their work if the treasurer is removed, otherwise they will stay on strike until he is removed.

The union leaders who provided the information did not reveal the name of the treasurer but said that he was a person with ties to one of the officials of the Junta of Reconstruction of Managua.

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The treasurer was accused of many abuses of which his victims are workers he describes as not being "Sandinists." This charge was made by members of the union leadership to labor officials who intervened to avert the strike.

The workers halted their activities at 0945 on Friday and the conflict had not yet been resolved conclusively this week.

Officials of the Departmental Labor Inspector's Office and members of the administration of the Managua mayoralty, negotiated an agreement whereby they pledge to study the way in which to remove the treasurer so as to also avoid efforts at strikes that may in the future halt the work which is now going on in Tiscapa, said union leaders.

In turn the workers signed another agreement pledging not to act in a hasty manner and in the future to seek the proper channels for handling any misunderstanding.

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NICARAGUA

LABOR LEADER BEGINS HUNGER STRIKE

Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish signed to press 14 Oct 85

[Article: "Union Leader on Hunger Strike in Demand for 13th Month"]

[Text] "Mine is a civic action in solidarity with the working class," said Alejandro Solarzano, the union leader of the Independent General Confederation of Labor (CGT-I), this morning as he began a hunger strike.

"This strike is for the purpose of not harming the revolutionary process, for not provoking an action of greater harm, for avoiding a strike in institutions or a massive demonstration by the working class," he added.

"My action seeks to create an awareness because the working class wants to be paid 100 percent of their 13th month or Christmas bonus," he said.

"A pair of blue denim trousers now costs up to 16,000 cordobas; a worker can do nothing with the wage of 12,000 cordobas for his 13th month," he said.

While Alejandro Solarzano was making these brief statements at the CGT(I) offices, other comrades of the construction industry surrounded the union leader, who with a few but vigorous words reaffirmed his position of support for the demand of the country's working class, who have asked that the Unemployment Fund be reformed by the National Assembly.

This debate has been taking place for several months; it has been discussed and debated among the working class and union leaders of the different worker organizations and it has been established that there is a unanimity of opinions despite strategic, political and ideological differences among them.

However, it is the CGT(I) which has demonstrated the greatest strength in this demand because it contains the large worker mass of the construction industry. The CGT(I) declares that it has more than 20,000 officially enrolled in its ranks.

Alejandro Solarzano is one of the leaders of the CGT in the National Executive Council. His long career in the worker struggles goes back to the harshest years of the Somocist dictatorship. He was the mentor of the great worker strikes for obtaining better wages in the periods before the earthquake. He fought boldly together with other leaders such as Carlos Salgado, Domingo Sanchez Salgado and others for the labor agreements in the construction branch.

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Solarzano also said that last week in the Labor Commission of the Assembly an attempt was made to make it understood that a ceiling of 12,700 cordobas should be accepted, which does not satisfy the needs of the workers.

He said that there is a great support by the CONAPRO [National Confederation of Professional Associations] Heroes y Martires, of Sandinist affiliation, for the derogation of the Unemployment Fund provision. There are also many sectors among the National Assembly deputies, particularly professionals, who agree that this government disposition should be derogated.

He explained that in any case nothing will be known for the next 72 hours, which is when the final decision on the provision will be made in the Assembly.

"I hope that the resolution will be positive," he added. Alejandro Solarzano declared that the hunger strike he has imposed on himself has no limit and it depends on the final resolution of the National Assembly, the commission appointed for the case and the payment of 100 percent of the 13th month, which is the demand of the workers.

He explained that in the meetings of the worker central organizations, all have been in agreement that they request the derogation of the Unemployment Fund Law. Among them are the CTN [Central Organization of Nicaraguan Workers], CUS [Confederation for Trade Union Unity], CAUS [Central Organization of Trade Union Action and Unity], CGT(I), and independent unions. However, he indicated that the Worker Front did not understand it and that it was indecisive and vague toward this demand, and of course there is the CST [Sandinist Central Organization of Workers], which has maintained a negative position toward the workers' petition.

He reaffirmed that his action is civic, spontaneous, personal and in solidarity with the working class, which is demanding that it be paid 100 percent of its 13th month.

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END



PERSPECTIVE

In mid-October, the Sandinistas expanded their three-year old state of emergency, providing a legal framework to tighten controls over opponents who have become increasingly outspoken. The new restrictions include broadened press censorship, limits on public assemblies and internal travel, and bans on political organizing by the opposition parties. The Sandinistas have used the war to justify the decree, stating that it is aimed solely at counter-revolutionaries. The pro-regime press has emphasized the rights still in force--primarily those pertaining to criminal judicial procedures--and has tried to demonstrate that the restrictions have impacted little on daily life.

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[redacted] the Catholic Church hierarchy's increasingly intense attacks on the regime precipitated the decree. Cardinal Obando had been drawing large crowds during his domestic tour and many of his

25X1

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25X1



[redacted]

25X1
25X1

12 Nov 85



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25X1

[Redacted]

masses were only thinly veiled anti-government rallies [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] A series of other incidents--including the government's decision to renege on promises not to draft seminarians and threats to expel foreign priests who supported Obando--further heightened tensions. Just before issuing the decree, the regime confiscated the first issue of a Church-sponsored newsletter, comprised primarily of anti-government articles, although several thousand copies were hidden and will get underground distribution [Redacted]

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25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

In the wake of the decree, the Sandinistas occupied the curia offices and Interior Minister Borge summoned the Cardinal to his office for questioning about the Church's ties to the opposition political parties. The pro-regime press also issued what the US Embassy calls unprecedented attacks on Obando, accusing him of supporting the insurgency. Despite these attacks, the Church has continued to criticize regime policies. The Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference issued a mildly defiant communique reiterating calls for a national dialogue to include the armed insurgents. In addition, the Cardinal defied the government's requirement that he obtain permission for outdoor masses, and, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] his first mass following the decree attracted nearly 6,000 worshippers. [Redacted]

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The regime intensified attacks on civilian opponents as well. The press reports that the Sandinistas warned two leaders of the Democratic Coordinating Board, the main opposition coalition, not to publish any protests or analyses of the government decree. At least one member political party was also warned not to publish its newsletter. In addition, in late October security officials raided the offices of an independent labor federation and arrested three union leaders for

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criticizing the emergency decree, according to press reports. The Sandinistas also continued to harass some private sector leaders. [redacted]

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The Sandinistas' Western supporters expressed chagrin over the emergency decree, but appear disinclined to criticize the regime harshly. French President Mitterand, for example, "lamented" the tough measures, but also criticized US policy in Central America. The Swedes also criticized the restrictions, but [redacted]

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[redacted] reports no plans for a reduction in Swedish economic assistance. The Argentines [redacted] [redacted] hoped to make a joint demarche to the Nicaraguans with other members of the Contadora support group. [redacted]

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The state-of-emergency, in our view, demonstrates the heightened sensitivity of the regime to internal criticism. While it gives the Sandinistas broad powers to control internal dissent, we believe they will continue their policy of selective implementation to avoid charges that they intend to eliminate the entire opposition. Managua probably calculates that this strategy will also defuse broad popular resistance to the law and induce key leaders to go into exile without prompting a damaging mass exit. The Church, as the regime's most formidable opponent, will remain its primary target, in our view. The Cardinal is likely to be able to defy some of the restrictions, but the regime has already used the travel ban to limit attendance at his masses. More vulnerable second echelon clerical and lay officials could also pay the price for Obando's resistance. They could be detained and interrogated by the security services or, in the case of foreign priests, be expelled by the government. The government suspended the hierarchy's radio broadcasts for two days in late October, and publishing facilities could also be closed down permanently. The inability to meet and

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publish communiques will further isolate and fragment the political opposition, in our view. Urban-based opposition political parties and labor unions, for example, will probably have difficulty continuing only recently renewed organizing efforts outside the cities. [Redacted]

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Western and Latin American countries will probably remain critical of the state of emergency, but will likely keep their displeasure out of the public eye. The Sandinistas probably believe they are more vulnerable to internal dissent than foreign opprobrium and that the criticism will likely have little lasting impact on their international standing. Managua probably calculates that its supporters in the West, while disapproving, will not abandon the regime out of fear that it would encourage expanded US military pressures against Nicaragua. Further, the Sandinistas are probably confident that Soviet and Bloc economic assistance would limit the impact of any cuts in aid by Western democracies. In addition, there are thus far no indications that the state of emergency has become an issue in the Contadora negotiations. [Redacted]

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SANDINISTA COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

In recent months, the Sandinista government has stepped up its efforts to defeat the insurgents in the northwestern border area, and to bottle them up inside Honduras.

- Conscription was renewed in August following a four-month suspension, demonstrating the government's determination to keep manpower levels high and replace casualties despite domestic opposition to the draft.
- Since early October, Sandinista troops have concentrated in the border area around the Las Vegas salient, where most insurgent camps are located.
- Insurgent leaders report that guerrilla units have been allowed to cross into Honduras unmolested, but the Sandinistas have been fairly successful in blocking their return to Nicaragua, creating large concentrations of rebels in the border area which they fear the Sandinistas will attack.
- Sandinista forces increased intelligence collection against the rebel base camps by sending patrols into Honduras on several occasions in October.

The Sandinistas also are making greater use of militia units in the northwest, and are attempting to improve their command and control.

- Militia units have been hardened by considerable combat experience over the past two years, and are now much more proficient at defense of towns and villages, allowing regular counterinsurgency troops to concentrate on sweeps against guerrillas in the countryside.
- [redacted] the Sandinista General Staff held a number of meetings in October with northwest region military representatives in an effort to improve command and control.

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Sandinista forces are also intensifying pressure elsewhere to counter guerrilla attempts to spread the war.

- A new counterinsurgency battalion inflicted heavy casualties on insurgents operating in the gold mining region of northern Zelaya Department [redacted]
- Government militia and special forces were also planning operations on the east coast.

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Cubans appears to be playing a heavy role in the prosecution of the war.

-- Cubans are piloting MI-25 helicopters, advising counterinsurgency battalions, and working with signals intercept and radio-direction finding personnel to improve tactical intelligence.

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Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

4 October 1985

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NICARAGUA: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY



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Summary

The Sandinistas' public diplomacy strategy is aimed at discrediting the armed insurgents, undermining US policy in Central America, and preserving critical political and economic ties with Latin America and Western Europe. At the same time, it is intended to defend the regime against charges of human rights abuses, domestic political repression and economic mismanagement. Using well-focused propaganda themes and a range of dissemination techniques, the Sandinistas have, in our view, successfully exploited inherent suspicions of US intentions, despite growing foreign disillusionment with Managua. Given these successes, we foresee the Sandinistas maintaining their basic propaganda thrust, but developments in Nicaragua and the region offer the regime both new opportunities and challenges.

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We believe the Sandinistas see the next few months as critical in containing the rebels and convincing both the US public and the Congress that even with US funding the guerrillas cannot win or force policy changes in Managua. They therefore have to

(Continued)

ALA-M-85-10104C

This Memorandum was requested by the staff of the National Security Council. Information as of 3 October was used in the preparation of this paper. It was prepared by [redacted] Middle America Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments may be directed to the Chief, Middle America Caribbean Division, ALA, [redacted].


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convince their audiences, therefore, that continued US backing for the insurgents only prolongs the devastation of the war and heightens the risk of direct US involvement in coming months. The Sandinistas undoubtedly will trumpet their new constitution as democratic progress. They will lobby hard to internationalize the Central American situation, having achieved some success with the formation of the Contadora support group in South America. Managua reportedly will use the likely favorable decision from the International Court of Justice regarding its charges against the United States for propaganda purposes and to request action by the UN. The Sandinistas next will work to engage the Europeans more actively, either individually or via the EC. Finally, the new governments in Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala are likely to be subjected to a blitz of diplomatic peace initiatives.



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The Sandinistas' public diplomacy effort is a vital tool for achieving key foreign policy objectives, such as discrediting the armed insurgents, marshalling international pressure on Washington to change its policies in Central America, preserving support in Latin America and Western Europe, and defending the regime against charges of human rights abuses, political repression, and economic mismanagement. To this end, the Sandinistas have controlled information at home while developing a sophisticated apparatus for disseminating propaganda abroad, including the use of media, leftist solidarity groups, and personal diplomacy. [redacted]

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Recurrent Propaganda Themes

Discrediting the Rebels. The armed insurgency is a priority target for Sandinista propagandists, who seek to discourage political and material support for the rebels from non-US sources and to build international pressure on Washington to cut off aid. The regime portrays the insurgents as US-backed mercenaries with no popular base in Nicaragua and claims that the largest rebel group--the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)--is dominated by members of former President Somoza's hated National Guard. Further, the regime alleges that the rebels are responsible for over \$1 billion in damage to economic targets that has cost thousands of Nicaraguan jobs and lives, as well as hindered economic development. The Sandinistas also frequently report that significant numbers of insurgents--nearly 2,000 in the past two years--have accepted offers of amnesty. [redacted]

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Allegations of human rights abuses against prisoners of war and civilians also has been a potent propaganda weapon against the rebels. Government newspapers constantly report attacks on farming cooperatives and civilian truck convoys, as well as routine kidnappings of peasants by roving bands of rebels. One [redacted] recently claimed that the insurgents have been responsible for the murders of over 11,000 Nicaraguans since 1980. Testimony by civilian victims and defectors and occasional photographs of insurgent executions lend credibility to Sandinista accusations. Such charges constitute a key argument in the Sandinista case against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). [redacted]

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Undercutting the US. The Sandinistas have long viewed Washington as their most important adversary. In addition to holding the US responsible for human rights violations, they maintain that Washington seeks a military solution to regional problems. As evidence they point to:

- US aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents, focusing most recently on the US Congressional vote in June to provide non-lethal assistance to the rebels. They accuse President Reagan of "war-mongering" and supporting state terrorism, and they have chastised Congress for its lack of independence.
- The threat of a US invasion. The Sandinistas portray themselves as besieged by the United States, pointing to the frequent presence of US naval combatants off both Nicaraguan coasts, joint military maneuvers with Honduras, and military training for Costa Rican security forces. The Sandinistas also claim that the Foley Amendment--intended to limit the President's power to insert US combat forces in Nicaragua--provides the administration with clear "pretexts" for launching an invasion.
- Washington's refusal to resume direct negotiations with Managua. The Sandinistas blame the United States for the impasse in last year's Manzanillo talks and have repeatedly asked for a resumption of the talks, arguing that Washington's position underscores its desire for a military solution to regional problems. [redacted]

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The alleged role of the CIA in the region is another aspect of Sandinista propaganda. In 1983, the regime presented two prisoners it claimed were involved in a CIA plot to assassinate several high-ranking Sandinista officials. Managua also blamed the CIA for an assassination attempt against rebel leader Eden Pastora in May 1984, and the "CIA guerrilla manual" controversy last fall provided considerable grist for Managua's public diplomacy effort. In May, the Sandinista press claimed that the CIA was training commandos in Panama to carry out attacks against embassies throughout Central America in an effort to turn international opinion against Managua. In mid-July, Sandinista security officials publicized the "discovery" of the "CIA's Black Eagle Plan," which called for using Indian rebels to carry out terrorist attacks. [redacted]

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The Sandinistas also blame US policy, primarily the trade restrictions imposed in early May, for Nicaragua's chronic economic problems. Calling the embargo an attack on all Nicaraguans and a violation of international law, the regime charged it was another step toward military intervention. Seeking to elicit international sympathy, the Minister of Health proclaimed that the restrictions would deny Nicaraguan children vital medicines, even though the embargo did not apply to health products. The refusal of the United States to sell badly needed fertilizers and pesticides has also been blamed for poor crop production this year. Indeed, President Ortega has accused Washington of using chemical and biological weapons to bring on the current dengue fever epidemic and a serious cotton blight. The Sandinistas have cited the necessity of replacing lost US markets and combating Washington's "economic warfare" to justify closer ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. [redacted]

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Nicaragua as Democratic Peacemaker. The Sandinistas portray themselves as committed to political pluralism and a regional peace settlement. Regime leaders point to the pluralistic character of the draft constitution, participation in open forums with government officials, the existence of the independent newspaper La Prensa, and their tolerance of illegal opposition political parties as evidence of their commitment to democratic government. Further, they publicize government meetings with Church, business, and political opposition leaders. The large progovernment vote in the November election and huge government-sponsored rallies and marches also are cited as evidence of the regime's popularity. Managua uses the insurgency to justify the three-year-old state of emergency, which provides the legal basis for press censorship. The Sandinistas also are quick to refute charges of human rights abuses, claiming that the allegations are made by malcontents and defectors who are paid CIA informants. [redacted]

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Nicaragua has tried to appear flexible in the Contadora peace talks, blaming the United States and other Central American countries for hindering progress. The Sandinistas have touted their willingness to sign the September 1984 draft treaty--which was highly favorable to Nicaraguan interests--and in early 1985 announced a unilateral moratorium on the acquisition of new weapons systems and a decision to send 100 Cuban military advisers back home as evidence of their desire to reach agreement. Managua claims Washington has used its influence over Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica to impose unacceptable and unjustifiable conditions on Nicaragua. [redacted]

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The Sandinista Propaganda Network

Control over the media in Nicaragua, promoting solidarity with leftists abroad, and foreign leadership travel have been the most effective methods for disseminating Nicaraguan views, according to a range of reporting. Indeed, Nicaragua has launched a massive "Nicaragua Must Survive" campaign to intensify efforts in all these areas to bolster international backing. [redacted]

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Controlling the Information Flow. Sandinista dominance over the media is vital in

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obscuring internal dissent from outside view, giving international coverage to Sandinista positions, and enabling the government to exploit propaganda opportunities. The regime owns two of the three newspapers with a nationwide circulation, both television stations, two powerful radio stations, and a network of smaller ones. The remaining newspaper, La Prensa, and the few independent radio stations are subjected to prior censorship. [redacted]

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[redacted] sometimes as much as 60 percent of La Prensa's material is proscribed. The government also selectively prohibits the rebroadcasts of masses by Cardinal Obando y Bravo, an outspoken critic of the regime. With such tight control, the regime can control information project the impression of broad popular backing, and carefully orchestrate its response to US policy initiatives. Dominance over the media also facilitates the government's frequent disinformation efforts [redacted]. [redacted]

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The Sandinistas gradually have expanded the structures for dissemination of propaganda abroad. The pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union, for example, is associated with similar leftist organizations in Latin America and maintains ties with counterparts in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. The New Nicaraguan News Agency--publicly acknowledged to be progovernment--competes with other wire services in disseminating stories abroad. The extensive Cuban press service, Prensa Latina, also helps to disseminate pro-Nicaraguan stories, according to various sources. The official Sandinista newspaper, Barricada, publishes a monthly international edition in English and Spanish, and a bilingual monthly magazine is devoted to sensationalist stories, anti-Americanism, and personal attacks on US officials. Closer to home, the Sandinistas closely monitor the Costa Rican press and have had some success in placing favorable stories in San Jose periodicals. [redacted]

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Promoting Leftist Solidarity. Managua places particular emphasis on promoting solidarity committees in foreign countries to spread favorable information about Nicaragua, develop political and financial support, and mobilize pressure on other governments to criticize US policies. Solidarity committees in Latin America and Western Europe have mounted vigils and demonstrations, organized letter writing campaigns, collected clothing and money for Nicaragua, placed newspaper advertisements, and mobilized contingents of international volunteers to visit Nicaragua. Last July, Managua hosted delegates from the various international solidarity committees to discuss strategy, according to press reports. The Sandinistas also sponsor seminars in Nicaragua and other countries to provide forums to strengthen ties with leftists [redacted]. Their support for the so-called "popular church" in Nicaragua also has attracted the support of liberation theologians throughout the Third World. [redacted]

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Diplomatic Efforts. The Sandinistas have used a range of diplomatic initiatives to generate international support. They frequently dispatch high-level delegations abroad to defend Sandinista policies. Vice President Ramirez, for example, toured Western Europe in June and South America in July to explain the regime's position in the Contadora talks. Also, in the wake of the US trade sanctions, Sandinista representatives aggressively presented their case before a range of multilateral organizations, even those only marginally involved in commercial matters, to gain publicity. Moreover, Managua continues to foster support in the Nonaligned Movement and has sustained considerable sympathy for its policies in the United Nations. They also have made propaganda gains from diplomatic protests, especially in calling attention to ongoing Honduran and Costa Rican support for the insurgents. [redacted]

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Propaganda Targets

The US Market. In our view, the Sandinistas consider US public opinion the most important target for their propaganda, and believe they can influence US policy by manipulating public perceptions. The Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington closely monitors public and official opinion, and Ambassador Tunnerman--although not always heeded in

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Managua--has demonstrated a keen understanding of the US political system. [redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] Nicaraguan officials are frequent travelers to the 25X1
 United States and meet with student and other groups. The regime also is generally
 receptive to US journalists and Congressional visitors; indeed such openness becomes a
 propaganda theme in itself and is contrasted with US denials of visas to a few high-ranking
 Sandinista officials. These visits, according to various sources, are carefully orchestrated to
 to include model schools, factories, and farm cooperatives. [redacted] 25X1

The Sandinistas appeal to US citizens primarily on moral grounds. Managua constantly
 reports alleged atrocities committed by US-backed guerrillas and discredits defectors who
 accuse the regime of similar human rights violations. The Sandinistas also compare
 Nicaragua to Vietnam, including accusations that the United States is supplying the insurgents
 with a defoliant used in Asia. The regime paints the US President as war-crazed,
 contemptuous of public opinion, and willing to expend millions of dollars and risk thousands
 of American lives in a repeat of the Vietnam War. [redacted] 25X1

Such appeals are aimed especially at US religious and lay groups. The Nicaraguans,
 [redacted] also assisted members of the US-based Witnesses for Peace 25X1
 organization to travel last July to combat areas. Moreover, they almost certainly welcome--if
 not sponsor--the now weekly demonstration in front of the US Embassy by US citizens
 resident in Managua. They also host contingents of private US visitors. Last spring, for
 example, Managua hosted a group of US entertainers, who they anticipated would become
 critics of US policy back home, according to press reports. [redacted] 25X1

In Latin America and Western Europe. In South America, the Sandinistas are
 concentrating on leaders of the democratic governments as well as leftist politicians and
 clergy. Their goal has been to generate regional solidarity for their position and against US
 policy. Managua bases its appeal on traditional Third World themes, including the doctrines
 of non-intervention and self-determination. They argue that US involvement in Central
 America poses a threat to all of Latin America and that a Sandinista defeat would set a
 precedent for future US "aggression" in the region. Regime leaders travel throughout South
 America to press these views, actively seeking endorsements from Latin American
 legislatures. [redacted] 25X1

In Western Europe, the Sandinistas exploit inherent suspicions of US policy among
 government leaders. Their goal is to preserve critical political backing and persuade Western
 leaders to pressure Washington to change its policies. The Nicaraguan diplomatic presence is
 strong in most countries--in Sweden, for example, there are five resident Nicaraguan
 diplomats while the other Central American countries are unrepresented, according to the US
 Embassy. Sandinistas hold observer status in the Socialist International and devote
 considerable attention to maintaining its support. In an apparent attempt to evoke additional
 sympathy, the Sandinistas have likened the alleged atrocities of the insurgents to those
 committed by the Nazis. [redacted] 25X1

Sandinista Propaganda Effectiveness

The Sandinista propaganda machinery, in our view, effectively brings the regime's
 message before world public opinion and raises doubts and suspicions about US policy, even
 when specific accusations appear unfounded. Repeated charges of an imminent US invasion,
 for example, have exploited fears that US involvement in Central America could result in a
 repetition of the Vietnam War. The Sandinistas have also been fairly successful in portraying
 themselves as victims of US intervention, while successfully deflecting charges of human
 rights abuses and political repression. Further, Nicaragua's case in the International Court of
 Justice, bolstered by testimony from a rebel defector and other witnesses, has drawn

considerable attention to Managua's position. Few attempts are made in the international media to rebut Sandinista allegations or demand proof. Government censorship of the Nicaraguan media helps propaganda efforts by stifling criticism and averting refutation of Sandinista positions. [REDACTED]

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Equally important, Sandinista propaganda has helped to sustain the doubts some international leaders have about the insurgents and prevented any precipitous drop in international support for Managua. The Sandinistas probably calculate that popular fears about another seemingly endless financial and human commitment has served as a constraint on US policy. In Western Europe the Sandinistas have successfully exploited opposition to US policies to prevent any substantial policy shifts or reductions in economic aid, despite growing disillusionment among some leaders with Managua's policies. In South America, where leaders have fewer illusions about Managua's intentions, the Sandinistas have appealed successfully to long-standing fears of US military intervention and concerns about leftist backlash at home to discourage any major policy shifts. [REDACTED]

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What to Expect

Given their effectiveness, we believe the Sandinistas will sustain, and probably intensify, the basic thrust of their propaganda themes. Moreover, events in Nicaragua and in the region will offer new opportunities to influence international opinion. Domestically, the Sandinistas have promised to promulgate their new "democratic" Constitution by the end of the year. Trips to hold "consultations" on their charter have provided ample opportunities to demonstrate a commitment to a pluralistic system of government. In our view, the regime may also stage a carefully controlled plebiscite on the constitution, as well as municipal elections to buttress its claims. [REDACTED]

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Regionally, we believe the Sandinistas will look for propaganda opportunities within the newly formed Contadora support group--composed of the left-of-center governments of Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil. Managua lobbied hard for the formation of this advisory group, calculating, in our view, that "Latin Americanizing" the Central American conflict would help to counter perceived US efforts to thwart the pro-Nicaragua environment of the talks. The Sandinistas have consulted these countries frequently on the Contadora issue and almost certainly hope that the support group will back a treaty with less stringent enforcement provisions than sought by the other Central Americans. At the least, Managua believes the group will dilute what it regards as increasing US influence over the members of the original Contadora Nine. [REDACTED]

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We expect the Sandinistas also will look for opportunities to influence the new governments scheduled to assume office in coming months in Honduras and Costa Rica. In recent press interviews, high-ranking Sandinista officials have indicated that they intend to exploit divisions in those countries over the presence of rebels. We expect Managua to intensify further its clandestine and overt propaganda efforts to pressure the new administrations to force the rebels out of their countries. [REDACTED]

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We believe the Nicaraguans consider the next few months to be critical not only for their war against the insurgents but also for their efforts to reverse public and Congressional opinion. The Sandinistas will continue to focus on the moral dimensions of US policy, especially rebel human rights violations. The regime probably will focus on proving that the rebels cannot win--even with US funding--thereby exploiting Congressional concerns about a long-term commitment to the insurgents. [REDACTED]

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Moreover, we believe the Sandinistas may try to internationalize further the Nicaraguan issue in general and the peace talks in particular. The Sandinistas will fully exploit any

favorable decision in the International Court of Justics, and intend to present it formally in the UN Security Council. The regime will probably continue to calculate that an expanded number of players offers the best route to deflect US pressures and achieve an accord based more on general principles than linked to specific verification procedures and controls. Western Europe is the most likely target, in our view. Last year the French, for example, mediated border talks between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and Paris has consistently backed Managua against the United States. The Sandinistas may also approach other countries, either bilaterally or through the EC. They may be tempted to try to move the talks to the more friendly confines of the United Nations, if they cannot avoid an unfavorable treaty. [redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL**Patterns of Sandinista Censorship of La Prensa, November 1984-May 1985**

The Sandinista regime imposed prior censorship of news media in March 1982 under state of emergency provisions. During the past year or so, about 90 articles have been censored partially or entirely each week. On more than 30 occasions since 1982, censorship has been so heavy that La Prensa has decided not to publish. More than half occurred during the last 16 months.









The subjects censored and level of censorship vary widely and seem at times to depend on which censor reviews La Prensa's submissions. A review of the censorship, however, indicates that it tends to diminish when the regime comes into the international limelight or becomes the focus of intense US interest. [REDACTED]

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Patterns of Sandinista Censorships of La Prensa

March 1982		News media censorship imposed by Sandinista regime.
Early July through 4 November 1984		Censorship eased as regime attempted to demonstrate elections would be free.
8 November through December 1984		Censorship resumed, reaching pre-July 1984 levels.
Early January 1985		Reduced censorship as international figures gather for Nicaraguan inauguration. Offensive material intentionally submitted by La Prensa, but was allowed to appear intact.
Late January 1985		Censorship again resumed.
February through early March 1985		Censorship eased, possibly because of congressional debates on aid and increase in US Congressional visitors.
Mid to late March through early April		Intense censorship culminating in La Prensa decision not to publish on 10 April.
10 April until US Congressional vote		As vote on Contra aid approached, censorship virtually ended. On 22 and 23 April only one article censored—regime tolerated heavy criticism of its policies.

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PATTERNS OF SANDINISTA CENSORSHIP OF LA PRENSA

1979-1982

1 Sandinistas establish a pattern of harassment of the sole opposition newspaper, La Prensa.

2/3 -- Sandinistas temporarily close La Prensa five times for violating the Law on Communications Media, which prohibits the publication of articles that mock national symbols, threaten "internal security," or "infringe on" economic stability. One article that prompts the regime to shut down the newspaper includes a joke about FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca, while another is a hostile interview with a businessman whom the regime accuses of tax evasion.

1/4 -- Beginning in January 1980, little news can be published about counterrevolutionary attacks, and the December 1982 proscription on news about the Atlantic coast prevents coverage of the forced relocation of thousands of Miskito Indians.

1 -- Other regime actions include forced publication of government communiques, public threats to close the newspaper unless it changes its editorial policy, and physical harassment of La Prensa employees.

March 1982

1 Prior censorship of all public media is imposed under a newly declared state of emergency.

1 -- The press controls--as well as restrictions on opposition political activities--are triggered by insurgent attacks on two bridges in northern Nicaragua.

5 1 5 -- La Prensa refuses to publish on 24 March because over 50 percent of the news stories are cut and the material is returned too late in the day to permit publication. Over the next three years, the newspaper refuses to publish more than 30 times to protest censorship of up to 90 percent of its front page news. In some cases, some of the news stories have already appeared in the Sandinista press.

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1 -- The regime refuses to allow the newspaper to print blank spaces or poetry in lieu of censored articles, and the substitutions themselves must be submitted to the censors, creating additional delays. Making copies of censored material is technically punishable by a jail term.

1 6 -- The Sandinistas use censorship to limit public criticism, especially by refusing publication of news articles and communiques of opposition political parties. According to Nicaragua's independent human rights organization, over 8,000 articles, editorials, wire service reports, and photographs are censored in whole or in part during 1982 and 1983.

7 -- The government also arbitrarily censors innocuous items. The Interior Ministry blocks publication of a photograph of an elephant skiing, for example, saying it is a distraction from the revolutionary process.

September-December 1983

8/9 Government censors permit somewhat greater coverage of selected domestic and international developments, probably related to Sandinista efforts to engage the opposition in pre-election planning.

9 -- The editor of La Prensa [redacted] deliberately tested the waters by sending to the censors articles critical of the FSLN, producing a 20 percent boost in circulation.

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January-July 1984

10/11/12 Heavy censorship resumes in late January, following provocative La Prensa articles, and the newspaper refuses to publish three times within an eleven-day span.

13 -- The Sandinistas arrest a La Prensa journalist and stage a press conference in May in which he "confesses" to contacts with insurgent agents and implicates a number of opposition leaders and institutions. He also charges falsely that a US Embassy official attends weekly La Prensa editorial meetings. [redacted] the confession was poorly scripted and that a Soviet diplomat implicitly admitted as much.

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14 -- In May, the Sandinista-dominated legislature debates a draconian media law, providing for the full

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1 identification of press sources, banning "false news" leading to price speculation, and prohibiting news "which serves the interests of imperialism." Although the draft law is later withdrawn--probably due to the opposition of the FSLN's own allies--it undoubtedly will serve as a model for the future control of the media when the state of emergency is ended.

Mid-July-Early November 1984

1 Newspaper censorship slightly eases as the regime attempts to demonstrate that the elections will be free.

1 -- Even during this "relaxation," La Prensa fails to publish several times due to heavy censorship, and coverage of opposition leader Arturo Cruz's campaign is limited.

15 -- La Prensa editors tell [redacted] that the Interior Ministry confiscated 30,000 copies of the 29 August edition after the censors had approved it. They speculated that the move may have been related to an article on an anti-draft demonstration or another one reporting FSLN Vice Presidential candidate Sergio Ramirez's involvement with a Somoza organization in 1956.

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November 1984-January 1985

1 Newspaper censorship is resumed at pre-July 1984 levels immediately following the elections.

16 -- [redacted] officials the week following the election that there are now nine areas on which he is instructed not to publish articles, including charges of electoral fraud or abstentions, all political party news, and all military news that does not originate with high-ranking government officials.

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17 -- An average of 10 articles are censored daily in November, compared with an average of 5 in October. Censored articles deal with such topics as shortages of consumer products, the Manzanillo talks, articles written by or about Arturo Cruz, complaints about the Sandinista Defense Committees, and the problems opposition leaders are having in traveling from Nicaragua.

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- 18 -- Chamorro goes into exile in December to protest censorship, saying that 180 articles, photos, cartoons, and headlines have been cut or banned in the first 12 days of the month.
- 19 -- La Prensa fails to publish on 8 January because of heavy censorship and closes its offices the following day in order to attract international attention to its plight on the eve of President Ortega's inauguration. On 10 January, inauguration day, the regime permits the paper to publish intact.

February-Early March 1985

1 Censorship is eased, possibly because of US Congressional debate on aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents and the increase in Congressional visitors.

20 -- [redacted] the volume of censored articles is unchanged, but the censors are more selective, eliminating offending paragraphs rather than whole articles, thereby maximizing the propaganda value of their ostensible liberalization. 25X1

20 -- Censors continue to delay the return of the newspaper's galleys, preventing timely distribution and decreasing reader access.

21 -- In an attempt to convey Sandinista flexibility, Vice President Ramirez meets with La Prensa executives on 7 March to explore what the newspaper's line would be if censorship were lifted. Newspaper officials say they will never agree to self-censorship.

Mid-March-Early April 1985

1 Intense censorship resumes.

22 -- In late March, the Sandinista press attempts to discredit La Prensa editor Jaime Chamorro by accusing him of advocating US support for the anti-Sandinista insurgents. The articles cite tape recordings made during the visit of a group of US "tourists" to the newspaper in February.

23 -- [redacted] Sandinista National Directorate member Bayardo Arce defends censorship, saying that through it "journalists are made aware of what is right to do and what is wrong." 25X1

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24 -- Virtually every reference to President Reagan's 4 April peace initiative is censored from La Prensa, prompting the newspaper to suspend publication on 10 April in protest.

21-23 April 1985

25 Censorship is virtually eliminated in the days immediately preceding the US Congressional vote on aid to the insurgents.

25 -- Only one article is censored on each of the two days preceding the vote.

Late April 1985-Present

26 Censorship is relatively light for two weeks following the Congressional vote, but [redacted] indicates that heavy censorship resumes in early May.

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A20 MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

THE WASH

Managua Sees Unrest In Neighbor States

Anti-U.S. Upsurge Awaited to Aid Cause

By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Staff Writer

MANAGUA, Nicaragua—The Sandinista leaders of Nicaragua, predicting a rise in violence and anti-U.S. feeling in Costa Rica and Honduras, say they are depending on those factors to help them defeat U.S.-backed rebels and preserve the Sandinista revolution.

In interviews, Nicaragua's president, defense minister and interior minister projected determination to persevere amid rebel attacks, a disintegrating economy and rising complaints from the Nicaraguan public, in the expectation that opposition to the rebels from Honduras, Costa Rica and possibly the U.S. public ultimately will combine to force President Reagan to abandon his anti-Sandinista campaign.

"This war will be won by the side that has moral force, and that is our side," President Daniel Ortega said.

The officials' views largely echo those of other diplomats in Central America and in Washington that Reagan's policy now hinges on whether the rebel forces, boosted by nonlethal aid from the United States, can make military headway against the stronger Sandinista Army in the next few months, thus demonstrating popular support for their cause.

If they can, according to this theory, the Sandinistas will have to grant Reagan's demands in order to survive: sever Soviet and Cuban ties, demilitarize and open the political process to the rebels, known here as contras.

If the contras are contained, as the Sandinistas insist they will be, the frustrated rebels are sure to cause trouble and resentment in

Costa Rica and Honduras, where the rebel bases are, and Reagan's policy will have to be reassessed, the diplomats predicted.

At the moment, all sides agree that the Nicaraguan Army has retaken the military initiative from the rebels, who launched some brief but daring raids this summer and have "a presence" but little strength in nine of the 16 provinces.

Many Nicaraguans complain about high prices, low wages, shortages and bureaucratic ineptitude. But the splintered, tightly controlled domestic opposition parties have failed to organize the discontent to their advantage.

In Honduras, officials publicly are supportive of U.S. efforts in the region but privately they are often critical of the contras as brutal and counterproductive. The Costa Rican government, however, recently has become critical of the Sandinistas.

Ortega said Honduras and Costa Rica "are no more than pawns in the U.S. plan," and that popular feeling is not reflected by either government. He and his brother, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, both said this feeling will become more evident as the rebels prove unable to gain any military ground.

"They will become demoralized and become bandits in Costa Rica and Honduras . . . Do not discount the possibility that Costa Rica will begin to resemble Lebanon," the defense minister said. At that point, he continued, neither government will be able to continue giving the rebels sanctuary.

"On the day they decide, they arrest everyone or take them to the border and that's it, the war is over," Ortega said. Contra violence already has begun to be felt in Hon-

duras and will grow, the defense minister predicted. In Costa Rica, he said, the democratic left may soon take up arms to express itself.

"Costa Rica cannot think that the violence of U.S. aggression is not going to cross the border," he said. Asked if that were a threat, he said it was "not a threat, but a description of reality."

Costa Rica is the sole Central American republic with an extended democratic tradition. Honduras' current government also was popularly elected.

U.S. officials have charged Nicaragua with exporting revolution and with training terrorists and have warned the Sandinistas that any Nicaragua-backed attacks on U.S. citizens in the region will provoke retaliation. Interior Minister Tomas Borge called charges of terrorist training camps "an obscene lie."

All three officials dismissed any military threat from the new pro-rebel alliance of Miskito Indian groups formed in Honduras this month. "The alliance is convenient for the FDN," said Borge, referring to the largest rebel group, called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force in English. "But it generates contradictions, too. The FDN discriminates and the groups have no confidence in each other."

Humberto Ortega said any unity among the rebel groups in the recently formed United Nicaraguan Opposition has been imposed by the United States and is tenuous at best. The group has been designated by the State Department to handle the recently approved \$27 million in nonlethal U.S. aid.

The Nicaraguan leaders also dismissed the possibility that the contras could continue their attacks without U.S. help. U.S. aid continues through Honduras despite last year's cutoff by Congress.

The Sandinista leaders agreed that contra pressure, the U.S. economic boycott, low prices for exports and their own wartime spending have brought the Nicaraguan economy to the brink of collapse. But they insisted that the hardships have unified Nicaraguans against the contras.

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