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
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Fundamentals

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

There was a time only 40 years ago when William J. Donovan, a New York lawyer, was a one man CIA for Franklin Roosevelt. His World War I Congressional Medal of Honor and his nickname of "Wild Bill" implanted on him the image of a swashbuckling adventurer. In reality he was a mild, softspoken intellectual, whose deepest interest was intelligence.

By the time Pearl Harbor came, Donovan had gathered hundreds of the finest scholars in America and had them processing geographic, scientific, political and military information in the Library of Congress. Two years later, Donovan had scoured our campuses and mobilized thousands of the finest scholars in America. He had assembled what had to be the most diverse aggregation ever assembled of tycoons and scientists, bankers and foreign correspondents, psychologists and football stars, circus managers and circus freaks, safe crackers, lock pickers and pickpockets, playwrights and journalists, novelists and professors of literature, advertising and broadcasting talent. He drew on the great American melting pot to create small teams of Italian Americans, Franco-Americans, Norwegian Americans, Slavic Americans, Greek Americans.

What did he do with this array of talent? He used it to create intelligence networks behind enemy lines, to support the resistance forces which oppression always creates, to bring disaffected enemy officers over to our side, to dream up scenarios to manipulate the mind of the enemy in deception and psychological warfare programs.

But above all he created a machinery to evaluate, sift and analyze.

Intelligence has many facets. It is a very uncertain, fragile and complex commodity:

First, you have to get a report.

Then you have to decide whether it's real or fake.

Then, whether it's true or false as you find out what other intelligence supports or contradicts it.

Then, you fit it into a broad mosaic.

Then, you figure out what it all means.

Then, you have to get the attention of someone who can make a decision, and,

Then, you have to get him to act.

That's the way it was at the inception of modern American intelligence when Lyman Kirkpatrick and I were in the OSS together and that, at bottom, is the way it is today.

II <u>EARLY DAYS</u>

"The basis for what we know today as the Central Intelligence Agency can be found in the development and operation of an organization known in World War II as the Office of Strategic Services--the OSS. Under the leadership of Major General "Wild Bill" Donovan, a World War I hero and lawyer, the OSS was created on the British model to give the US the capability to carry out clandestine operations during the war, and to establish some form of centralized research and analysis mechanism to exploit the intelligence information collected.

"During the war, the OSS, a multi-service operation, took advantage of the intelligence collection capabilities of all the military services, as well as civilian entities to create the first all-source intelligence analysis organization in the hostory of the US. During the war, many of the systems we have today had their early beginnings. COMINT, ELINT, SIGINT, PHOTINT, and HUMINT all made inputs to the central analysis unit. And the analysis unit, in a break with tradition, began to turn out estimative and analytic research papers. Previously, intelligence analysis had been confined to making comments on individual reports.

*The OSS also developed the capability to carry out what we would today call Covert Action. Psychological warfare, including propaganda operations, sabotage and guerrilla operations, and the use of agents of influence all became part of the OSS' bag of tricks. For the most part, these operations were run in Europe, largely because General MacArthur insisted that all intelligence activity in his theater come under his direct control.

*While the results of the OSS operations got mixed reviews, for the most part historians who have written about that period--and OSS veterans who have related their experiences--have left us a legacy of success. Because the nature of our enemy was so clear--who could argue about doing things to end the reign of the Nazis in Europe--there was little discussion at the time about the morality or utility of its intelligence operations. They received almost unanimous support.

III POSTWAR PERIOD

The immediate reaction to the end of the war in Washington was to revert to the same situation that existed before hostilities. The OSS was disbanded, and General Donovan was handed his walking papers--in a rather cavalier and thankless fashion. Some people in President Harry Truman's administration urged that the COMINT facilities again be shut down, that intelligence activity return to the State or War Departments, and that covert operations be ended. And this form of shutdown did indeed begin.

·But some in Washington did remember the legacy of Pearl Harbor, and they were spurred by the beginnings of what later came to be known as the "Cold War." The Soviets, immediately after the war, began to try to expand their control from a base in Eastern Europe to the West. The Communist Party in Italy threatened to wrest control of the government, and similar situations arose in Greece and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Communists in China threatened to force the Chiang Kai-shek government off the mainland. In that atmosphere, the advice of General Donovan again garnered some support in the White House.

*In a letter to the President, Donovan recommended that a central intelligence service, under civilian control, be established at the national level. He envisioned an organization that would be independent of the other executive departments, that would be non-political and non-partisan, and that would serve to support the national security decison making process as a service of common concern. He suggested that the central service should have the capability to collect information on a clandestine basis, should have an all-source research and analysis capability, and should also be able to carry out propaganda, psychological warfare, and other such clandestine operations in support of the government.

*Donovan also envisioned the appointment of an intelligence "czar" to oversee the intelligence activities of the government. This proposal was more easily acceptable to Truman than the establishment of a central service, and so in 1946 the first Director of Central Intelligence--DCI--was appointed. The DCI was to serve as the President's chief intelligence officer and was to coordinate the intelligence activities then resident in State, War and Navy. Unfortunately, the DCI had no

legislative backing to carry out such a mandate, but the creation of the Central Intelligence Group, which incorporated some. but not all of the other departmental intelligence functions, gave the new DCI some basis for exercising his authority.

"Finally, in 1947 Truman engineered the passage of legislation--the National Defense Act--which established the Department of Defense, regularized the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and created the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was to incorporate all the functions of the Central Intelligence Group and to acquire others as well. The CIA was to be an independent agency with authority to collect information by open as well as clandestine means, was to serve as the central repository of all intelligence information of government, and was to " carry out such other functions related to intelligence as the President and the National Security Council may from time to time direct..." This established the basis for what has become known as Covert Action.

*The CIA was envisioned as an independent organization that would neither belong to State or Defense, but would be non-partisan in philosophy and non-political in structure. While the DCI would be appointed by the President, the tradition was quickly established that all other senior officials would either be professional intelligence officers or senior military officials. In fact, legislation requires that when the DCI is military, his deputy must be a civilian. There have been occasional breaks with tradition in regard to outside appointments at levels below the DCI and DDCI, but they have rare, and rarely sustained. Thus, the CIA has been able to maintain a tradition or remaining outside the political strains that infect State, Defense, and other parts of the Executive Branch.

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Intelligence Cycle

Planning
and
Direction

Dissemination

Production
and Analysis

Collection

Processing

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Presidential Executive Order No. 12333, 4 December 1981, assigns the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility to act as the primary adviser to the President and the National Security Council on national foreign intelligence. To discharge this and other assigned duties, the Director is the appointed head of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community. These relationships and the mechanisms established by the Executive Order to sustain them are discussed below.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)

The NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. The NSC is the highest Executive Branch entity providing review of, guidance for, and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The statutory members of the NSC are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate as advisers.

SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP, INTELLIGENCE (SIG-I)

This committee of the NSC is composed variously of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of the National Security Agency. The SIG chairman varies according to the meeting agenda, e.g., the Director of Central Intelligence is chairman when the body addresses intelligence matters. The SIG (Intelligence) is charged to advise and assist the NSC in discharging its authority and responsibility for intelligence policy and intelligence matters. It ensures that important intelligence policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic coordination. It also monitors the execution of previously approved policies and decisions.

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB)

The PFIAB is maintained within the Executive Office of the President. Its several members serve at the pleasure of the President and are appointed from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside of Government

who are qualified on the basis of achievement, experience, and independence. They serve without compensation. The Board continually reviews the performance of all Government agencies engaged in the collection, evaluation, or production of intelligence or in the execution of intelligence policy. It also assesses the adequacy of management, personnel, and organization in intelligence agencies and advises the President concerning the objectives, conduct, and coordination of the activities of these agencies. The PFIAB is specifically charged to make appropriate recommendations for actions to improve and enhance the performance of the intelligence efforts of the United States. This advice may be passed directly to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, or other agencies engaged in intelligence activities.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB)

The President's Intelligence Oversight Board functions within the White House. The IOB consists of three members from outside the government who are appointed by the President. One of these, who serves as chairman, is also a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The IOB is responsible for discovering and reporting to the President any intelligence activities that raise questions of propriety or legality in terms of the Constitution, the laws of the U.S., or Presidential Executive Order. The Board is also charged with reviewing internal guidelines and the direction of the Intelligence Community. The IOB is a permanent, non-partisan body.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

While the Director of Central Intelligence is head of the CIA, he is at the same time leader of the Intelligence Community of which CIA is but one component. The Intelligence Community refers in the aggregate to those Executive Branch agencies and organizations that conduct the variety of intelligence activities which comprise the total U.S. national intelligence effort. The Community includes the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within the Department of Defense for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and the Intelligence Community Staff. Members of the Intelligence Community advise the Director of Central Intelligence through their representation on a number of specialized committees that deal with intelligence matters of common concern. Chief among these groups is the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which the Director chairs.

The Intelligence Community

Department of Defense Elements
Departmental Intelligence Elements (Other than DoD)
Independent Agency

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Orlando, Florida
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
Roots, rules, reflections

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

Gary J. Schmitt

In the section of *Democracy in America* titled "Accidental Causes That May Increase the Influence of the Executive Power," Tocqueville states:

> If executive power is weaker in America than in France, the reason for this lies perhaps more in circumstances than in the laws. It is generally in its relations with foreign powers that the executive power of a nation has the chance to display its skill and strength. . . . The President of the United States possesses almost royal prerogatives which he has no occasion to use . . . the laws allow him to be strong. But circumstances have made him weak.[1]

Tocqueville's statement comes as a surprise to most students of American government. It is surprising because it suggests that at bottom the American presidency is in some respects "imperial." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., notwithstanding, Tocqueville clearly sees within the formal office of the chief executive the seeds of a powerful head of state.

Such a conception of the potential of the presidency is alien to most students of the American constitutional system of separation of powers because most have accepted without question an interpretation of separation of powers most memorably expressed by Justice Louis Brandeis:

> The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among the three departments, to save the people from autocracy.[2]

In short, separation of powers is an institutional tool that was employed by the architects of the American constitutional system for restraining government's power, but not for promoting its effective use.

This view of separation of powers is not without some powerful and prestigious adherents; it can be found in Woodrow Wilson's *Constitutional Government*, in Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*, and in James MacGregor Burns' *The Deadlock of Democracy*. The American constitutional system was designed for deadlock, not decision.

That this vision of the formal framework of the government has had such a powerful hold on academics and politicians alike is not surprising given the

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[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Mayer (New York. Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1969), pp 125-26.

[2] *Myers v. United States*, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)

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pedagogic capacity of someone like Wilson and the regime's ever-present democratic impulse to suspect instinctively any complexity as an impediment to the immediate attainment of its desires. Its staying power notwithstanding, the fact is, history gives little support to this interpretation of the American system of separation of powers. As one suspects of most such matters, the truth is more complex.

To begin with, if stalemate and inertia had been the goal toward which the framers were in single-minded pursuit, it is somewhat difficult to explain their substantial expenditure of energy in shedding the Articles of Confederation. If ever there was a system of government designed for deadlock, that was it. Moreover, if that had truly been their goal, then in forming the constitution almost any division of power among any number of arbitrarily chosen branches would have sufficed. But this is not what happened. The framers were careful to define the powers of government and almost equally careful in distributing them to the branches of government which had been specifically constructed to house them. To a much larger degree than is commonly understood, and in contrast to Neustadt's famous description of the government as "separate institutions sharing powers," the architects of the American system of separation of powers were driven by "the belief that kinds of power are best exercised by particular kinds of bodies."[3]

By the time of the Constitutional Convention, the general incompetence of the Congress of the Articles of Confederation and the capriciousness of the various state assemblies had changed many of the framers' minds about the government's need for a vigorous and independent executive. Having earlier reacted to the perceived abuses of king and governors alike with the establishment of weak state executives and the disestablishment of an independent executive authority on the national level, it was, according to James Wilson, "high time that we . . . chastise our prejudices; and that we . . . look upon the different parts of government with a just and impartial eye."[4]

The desire for a separate executive branch of the government was partially fostered by the incapacities of Congress under the Articles of Confederation in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs. The letters of Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Morris and even Jefferson bear testimony to this concern.[5] For example, frustrated by the lack of energy and dispatch exhibited by the national assembly in prosecuting the war, Colonel Hamilton concluded that Congress had "kept the power too much into their own hands." After all, "Congress is," Hamilton continued, "properly a deliberative corps and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive."[6]

Congress' reputation fared little better in the area of foreign affairs. John Jay, a member of Congress and eventually its Secretary for Foreign Affairs,

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[3] Richard E. Neustadt. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York Wiley and Sons,1960), p. 33. Ann Stuart Diamond. "The Zenith of Separation of Powers Theory. The Federal Convention of 1787." Publius (Summer 1978), p 59

[4] James Wilson. *Works*. ed. McCloskey (Cambridge Harvard Univ. Press. 1967). Vol. 1. p 293.

[5] See Louis Fisher. "The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers." *Journal of American Studies* (August 1971)

[6] Alexander Hamilton. *Papers*. ed. Syrett (New York Columbia Univ. Press. 1961). Vol 2. p. 404

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complained repeatedly about the assembly's impotence in this area of concern. The plural composition of the Congress made timely action nearly impossible, and always improbable. Vacillation, not decision, was the norm. This was especially evident in those issues of most importance to states, as exemplified in Congress' tortured and factionalized attempts to draft instructions for the negotiators of the peace treaty with Great Britain. Jay, like Hamilton, did not blame particular members of Congress for the delays or the failures. Congress was just being a congress. In a letter written to Jefferson in 1787, just prior to the Constitutional Convention, Jay suggests that the functional incapacities then plaguing the government could only be overcome by the adoption of separation of powers. As matters stood under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was given both executive and legislative duties. According to Jay,

> Congress is unequal to the first . . . but very fit for the second . . . and so much time is spent in deliberation that the season for action often passes by before they decide on what should be done; nor is there much more secrecy than expedition in their measures. These inconveniences arise not from personal disqualifications but from the nature and construction of government.[7]

As Hamilton was to state succinctly elsewhere, there "is always more decision, more dispatch, more secrecy, more responsibility where single men, than when bodies are concerned."[8]

Instructed by their experience, the Constitution's framers adopted and, through the administrations of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, maintained an executive office whose institutional logic was consonant not only with the maxims of free government but also those of effective government.[9] In general, they recognized that the doctrine of separation of powers when effectively implemented was not simply a tool to prevent power's abuse but a means to assist its use. Brandeis' statement about the intention of the founders is only half true. Charles Thach in his little-read *The Creation of the Presidency* completes the picture:

> The adoption of the principle of separation of powers as interpreted to mean the exercise of different functions of government by departments officered by entirely different individuals, also seemed insistently demanded as a *sine qua non* of governmental efficiency.[10]

Specifically, the framers came to understand a government's need for an independent and unitary executive whose powers and office were as carefully molded as the checks they placed upon it. Through their implementation of separation of powers, they hoped to meet the particular demands and neces-

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[7] John Jay, *Correspondence and Papers*, ed. Johnston (New York: Putnam's, 1890-93), Vol. 3, p. 223.

[8] Hamilton, *Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 245.

[9] See, in general, Abraham Sofaer, *War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: the Origins* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976) Of the first eight years, Sofaer comments that the "framework for executive-congressional relations developed" during that time "differs more in degree than in kind from the present framework." p. 127.

[10] Charles C. Thach, Jr., *The Creation of the Presidency: 1775-1789* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1929), p. 74.

sities placed upon a nation by its being only one among (a possibly hostile) many.

This functional aspect of the American system of separation of powers is key to understanding Tocqueville's statement about the presidency. Seen from this perspective, it is hardly surprising that as circumstances warrant and the necessities of foreign affairs grow, the latent powers of the presidency would be tapped.

Again, if separation of powers is properly understood, the fact that there was a rather marked increase in the power of the executive office after World War II does not of itself mean that some form of constitutional usurpation had taken place. Quite the contrary, given America's expanded role in the world, it was "natural" that such an increase should occur. What some critics in the not-too-distant past dismissed as rationalizations for the *de facto* dominance of the presidency in foreign affairs are in fact connected to that office's *de jure* qualities. As Edward Corwin wrote in the wake of World War I, "that organ which possesses unity and is capable of acting with greatest expedition, secrecy and fullest knowledge—in short, with greatest efficiency—has obtained the major participation."[11]

In general, through separation of powers the framers attempted to construct a government which is both effective and safe. Its powers were to be complete but also carefully hedged. So understood, it is natural that over the two hundred years of the Constitution's existence that power and prestige would ebb and flow from the various branches of the government. Its explicit division of labor made it inevitable that at different times, and in different sets of circumstances, the different branches would grow and recede in strength.

There is in this system a certain assumption made by the framers that adjustments in the strength of the branches would coherently follow the dictate of necessity. To a large extent, their Enlightenment belief that necessity—especially that of self-preservation—would be self-evident has been borne out. In such instances as the Civil War and World War II, power has accrued quite readily to the executive office. However, in those instances outside the circumstance of war, exercise of a strong executive power has proved more difficult. In particular, since the end of World War II we have seen a shift from an "imperial" to an "imperiled" presidency. The necessities of war are clear and paramount; unfortunately, the necessities of peace and events leading to war are rarely so clear. As a result, what becomes crucial is the public's understanding of the circumstances the nation faces in times short of war. It is at these times that the dominance of the presidency is dependent not upon the necessities themselves, but the public apprehension and consensus about them.

It is the thesis of this essay that the key to understanding the history and the prospects of congressional oversight of one of the President's more valued prerogatives—the exercise of clandestine activities—is precisely that con-

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[11] Edward S. Corwin, *The President's Control of Foreign Relations* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1917), p. 205. See also, Corwin, "The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention," 30 *American Historical Review* (1925), pp. 511-36.

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sensus. While the independent, deliberative capacity of the Congress should not be dismissed, neither should it be accorded undue weight. Congress is, to state the obvious, a representative body, first and foremost.

The Cold War and Executive Prerogative

In 1947, the Cold War began and with it two decades of consensus over the principles and necessities guiding American foreign policy. In March of that year, President Truman, reacting to the crisis posed by communist sub-version in Greece and Turkey, declared that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." Truman's Doctrine was given its most famous, expanded, and authoritative elucidation in George F. Kennan's "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Within four months, the theory and practice of American foreign policy coalesced, and the execution of the policy known as contain-ment had begun.

As explained by Kennan, containment was a political and military strat-egy to resist Soviet expansion. It was, according to Kennan, "the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geograph-ical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." Containment, as explicated by Kennan and understood by most, was a long-term strategem to be used by the United States and its allies in a world of undeclared hostilities.[12] The hot war had become cold, but it was war never-theless.

The public consensus that formed around the policy of containment was remarkable in its strength. While a Democratic administration gave contain-ment birth, its most explicit applications were to be found in the Republican administration of President Eisenhower. The Republican platform of 1952 notwithstanding, Eisenhower rejected the policy of rolling back the Soviet Union's imperium in favor of maintaining the status quo central to the doc-trine of containment in the case of Korea and, later, Hungary. Around con-tainment a bipartisan, national consensus coalesced. It was a consensus that would last for some twenty years and four administrations—Truman's, Eis-enhower's, Kennedy's, and Johnson's.

This post-World War II consensus about foreign affairs was the dominant factor in how congressional oversight of intelligence was carried out. In an era of undeclared hostilities it seemed only proper to most members of Congress that the restraint they had shown toward the Executive Branch during the war should carry over to this novel—but no less dangerous—age. Oversight of intelligence was to be no exception.

As a former Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee noted at the time, "[legislative interference with intelligence] would tend to impinge upon the constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the

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[12] "Mr. X" [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, reprinted in G. F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951).

conduct of foreign affairs."[13] Or, as one scholar has put it a bit more pithily, "[Congress'] World War II motto was said to be 'Trust in God and General Marshall.' In the Cold War atmosphere . . . the attitude seems to have been 'Trust in God and Allen Dulles.' "[14]

Formally, Congressional oversight did in fact exist. In the Senate and the House of Representatives the Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees had authorizing and appropriating jurisdiction for the intelligence community. Special subcommittees of these four committees were formed to handle oversight, with the chairman of the full committee assuming the chair of the subcommittee.

Substantively, however, oversight was *de minimis*.[15] There were never more than a few members of either house of Congress actually involved in intelligence oversight. In fact, because of the leniency of Senate rules governing committee membership, there were Senators who held seats on both the Armed Services and Appropriations intelligence subcommittees simultaneously. So great was the overlap that during a period in the 1960s, when Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia was chairman of both the Armed Services and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, the two Senate intelligence subcommittees often met and transacted their business as one.

Limited membership on the intelligence subcommittees was matched by an even more limited number of committee staff to assist them in their deliberations. Often no more than the clerk and an assistant had access to the subcommittee material. As one might expect, the number of subcommittee hearings held was also limited. Indeed, there were several years where the "joint" committee of the Senate met only once or twice. According to the CIA, from 1967 to 1972 it averaged 23 annual appearances before congressional committees. The greatest percentage of these appearances was before committees other than the four intelligence subcommittees.

This pattern of oversight seems generally not to have been a product of CIA or intelligence community reluctance to appear before the committees or inform the Congress. The subcommittees were apparently regularly informed of the most significant covert programs and routinely briefed on the intelligence budget. The mechanism for oversight clearly existed; what was missing was an interest in using it—or more properly speaking, a consensus that would legitimize its use. Such major events as the creation of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the merging of the State Department's Office of Policy Coordination with the CIA's Office of Special Operations (centralizing clandestine activities within the CIA) were carried out by executive fiat. In short, while Congress appropriated millions of dollars for the

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[13] Statement of Sen. Carl Hayden, cited in Harry Howe Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ Press, 1970), p. 161.

[14] Ransom, *Establishment*, p. 172.

[15] "At their most active, the House 'subcommittees' reportedly met with agency officials a half-dozen times a year, spending as much (or as little) as fifteen to twenty hours in oversight. There was little, if any, record keeping of formal reporting or staffing, with the exception of budget review.   The pattern in the Senate was similar." Roy Godson, "Congress and Foreign Intelligence," eds. Lefever and Godson, *The CIA and the American Ethic* (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, 1979), p. 33.

Oversight

intelligence agencies, their creation and operations were generally understood, for nearly a quarter of a century, as lying within the realm of executive prerogative.

The year 1947 saw the adoption of the policy of containment. The effect of the consensus supporting that policy on congressional oversight of intelligence is largely exemplified in the National Security Act of the same year. The Act created the Central Intelligence Agency, yet one would search in vain among the various committee reports accompanying the legislation for more than a passing reference to its establishment.

Isolation and Congress as Semi-Sovereign

From 1947 to the late 1960s the consensus surrounding the policy of containment was solid. Under the pressure of the war in Vietnam that consensus began to dissolve as criticism of our military intervention in Southeast Asia necessarily brought with it questions about the wisdom and the utility of the strategy of containment. This critique was carried on at two levels. On the first, containment's apparent call to counter every thrust by the Soviet Union left the US with little leeway to raise tactical and prudential questions necessarily involved in any particular commitment of US power and prestige. A second and more fundamental critique appeared later in the debate over Vietnam. It held that US intervention was not only tactically wrong but that intervention *per se* was, in the words of the former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a manifestation of the "arrogance of power." In short, not only was the consensus upholding the means of containment shattered, so also was the public's resolve to achieve its end.

The Nixon Doctrine and strategy of detente was an attempt to salvage the goal of containment while jettisoning its unacceptable means. In place of US intervention and dependence on US military strength, a sophisticated array of coalitions (China), surrogates (Iran), and incentives (Pepsi-Cola) was to carry the task of moderating Soviet behavior. Sophisticated or not, the Nixon Doctrine never stood a chance of gaining public acceptance on an order that resembled the consensus surrounding containment. Left substantially unaddressed was that larger critique of containment which concerned the legitimacy of its ends. Indeed, the language used during this period—that of spheres, superpowers, and balance of power—tended to cast the struggle between the East and West in terms more appropriate to mechanics than to statecraft. The Nixon Doctrine exacerbated the very forces of isolation that it had ostensibly attempted to counter.

As the consensus in support of containment disappeared, so did confidence in the institution most conspicuous in carrying it out. The isolationist reaction to an active American role in the world implied a diminished role for the President and the instrumentalities he wielded in support of it. One after another, presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs were challenged. Presidential discretion in these matters was greatly curtailed as Congress passed numerous pieces of legislation to make him more accountable to the legislative

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branch.[16] A key element in the program to make the presidency less imperial was the effort to reduce both the resources and autonomy of the intelligence arm of the Chief Executive.

The impetus to rein in the presidency and American intelligence was enhanced by a series of revelations and events. In 1971, the Pentagon Papers were published; in 1972, the Watergate scandal began; in 1973, Agnew resigned; in August of 1974, Nixon resigned. One month later, a highly controversial covert action program in Chile was disclosed. Three months later, during Christmas week, the *New York Times* ran a front-page story on what it called a "massive" domestic intelligence operation run by the CIA.

Immediately upon Congress' return from its holiday recess, both the House and Senate created special committees to investigate the past and present activities of the intelligence agencies. The two committees, most widely known by the names of their respective chairmen, Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis Pike, were, in the words of the former, after the "rogue elephant." They were joined in that hunt by the President's own special commission, known by the name of its chairman, Vice President Rockefeller. For the next year and a half, the nation was treated to a deluge of reports from these three bodies concerning the past failures and abuses of the intelligence community. Among other things, they found: questionable domestic surveillance operations, assassination plans, intercepts of mail and cable traffic, programs to infiltrate dissident domestic groups, drug experiments on unwitting individuals, and efforts to topple foreign governments.

In their final reports both the Church Committee and the Pike Committee recommended a major change in the oversight process. Both called for the creation of select, permanent standing committees tasked specifically with overseeing the intelligence community. In May of 1976, the Senate established the Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and, a year later, the House created its Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).

Given their inheritance, it is not surprising that the new intelligence committees initially focused on setting down new rules and creating restraints. Because the debate about intelligence during the mid-1970s had been concerned principally with examples of improper and/or illegal activities, it was natural that the agenda for the House and Senate intelligence committees be the imposition of restrictions on the intelligence community.

Three pieces of legislation, two of which eventually became law, dominated the first few years of the new oversight process. The most important of these, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, had been enacted into law before the establishment of the intelligence committees. As with the creation of the committees, Hughes-Ryan was unprecedented. It was the first law ever passed by Congress which called explicitly for congressional oversight of an activity of a component of the American intelligence community.

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[16] See, in general, Allen Schick, "Politics Through Law: Congressional Limitations on Executive Discretion," ed. King, *Both Ends of the Avenue* (Washington: AEI, 1983).

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President Ford signed Hughes-Ryan (P.L. 93-559) on 30 December 1974. The amendment consisted of two key provisions. The first was that the CIA could spend no monies on programs not related to the collection of intelligence (that is, on covert action) until the President had certified "that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States." The second key provision of Hughes-Ryan was that after the President had made such a finding he was obligated to report it "in a timely fashion" to the "appropriate" committees of the Congress.

The first requirement had the consequence that in the future all covert activity would clearly be the responsibility of the President. Although the claim was advanced that internal executive branch guidelines made that the case already, Hughes-Ryan gave those regulations the force of law. Under Hughes-Ryan, there would be no room for a repetition of ambiguously authorized attempts to assassinate the likes of Fidel Castro; presumably, there is for presidents no longer any room, for better or worse, for "plausible denial." A second consequence of the requirement for presidential certification of every covert action as "important to the national security" is the implication that presidents are to make covert action an exceptional rather than a characteristic tool of American foreign policy.

The indirect effects of Hughes-Ryan were small in comparison with its direct effect on clandestine activities by the requirement that the "appropriate" committees of Congress be notified prior to or upon initiation of any presidentially approved covert action. Before passage of Hughes-Ryan, covert action had been rather loosely monitored by the Congress. Typically, a handful of senior committee chairmen were informed of major operations. The discretion as to when or in what detail to brief the Congress lay mainly within the domain of the executive branch. This discretion largely disappeared with the passage of Hughes-Ryan. Reporting to the "appropriate" committees was understood to mean reporting to the full membership of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the Senate and House Defense Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To these six bodies, both the House and the Senate Intelligence Committees were added. In sum, under the prescriptions of Hughes-Ryan eight committees were to be informed of each covert action.

The result was inevitable. As one scholar noted at the time, "Most [covert actions] ... which have been brought to the attention of congressional committees pursuant to Hughes-Ryan have become public knowledge." Succinctly stated, it had "all but ruled out effective *covert* operations."[17]

Formally, of course, Hughes-Ryan only required that the committees be notified of covert operations. Unlike the War Powers Act, Hughes-Ryan made no mention of a congressional power to veto a President's decision. But having so many members of Congress in the know virtually guaranteed that proposed covert programs were not going to stay covert for very long. The result was that Hughes-Ryan gave any member of the eight committees a virtual veto

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[17] Godson, "Congress," p. 27. Emphasis added.

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over any truly controversial covert action through the power of the timely leak. It was not long after the enactment of Hughes-Ryan that the executive branch was proposing in the main only programs it was willing to see discussed in public. With regard to covert action, statecraft gave way to poll-watching.

Covert action was not the only area of intelligence in this period to come under new restraints. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, commonly known as FISA (P.L. 95-511), domestic collection was also targeted. FISA governs electronic surveillance (wiretaps, etc.) of places or persons, foreign or American, believed to be involved in espionage or terrorism in the United States. Under FISA, before a US person's domicile or place of work can be wiretapped, the intelligence community must make a case before a special secret court detailing its reasons for wanting to take that action. If convinced by that case, the judge will issue a warrant allowing the tap. The standard the judge uses to rule on each case is specified in the Act as essentially a criminal standard. Under FISA, there must exist probable cause to believe that the person in question is knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence activities or terrorism before issuance of a warrant is justified. In short, the government, under FISA, cannot tap a US person's phone to gather sensitive intelligence which is otherwise unavailable.[18]

The era of restraint culminated in the attempt to pass a comprehensive charter for governance of the whole of American intelligence. This particular piece of legislation, while proposed, was never enacted into law. The charter was first drafted by the Senate Intelligence Committee and ran for some 300 pages. It attempted to establish a lengthy and complex set of regulations and prohibitions to rule and restrain every activity of American intelligence. From a few dozen words in the National Security Act of 1947 to several hundred pages of charter legislation, congressional oversight of intelligence had evolved from the sublime to the absurd.

Yet, the fact is, Hughes-Ryan, FISA and the proposed charter rather accurately reflected the prevailing distrust and cynicism about the institutions of government. Vietnam and Watergate produced a public both indignant about and distrustful of its government. Congressional oversight of intelligence mirrored both. Of course, what was not reflected in a serious or sustained way was an equally pressing concern about the competence of the intelligence agencies themselves. As Samuel Huntington has bitingly noted:

> In a different atmosphere . . . congressional committees investigating the CIA might have been curious as to why the Agency failed so miserably in its efforts to assassinate Lumumba and Castro. . . . [At the time, however] no one was interested in the ability of the Agency to

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[18] One could argue that FISA was enacted as a positive remedy to the legal and political situation that existed at the time with regard to domestic electronic surveillance. Before passage of FISA, the Attorney General reported that, with one exception, no US citizen was then a target of electronic surveillance. The use of electronic surveillance for intelligence collection had all but ceased. In order to get the officers and agents of the various intelligence agencies back into the streets (or, in this case, the adjoining room), something like FISA was required. What this helps explain, of course, is the existence of the law. However, its content—complex and restrictive proscriptions conjoined to judicial review—is best explained by a quite different animus.

do what it was told to do, but only in the immorality of what it was told to do.[19]

The Collapse of Detente and a Sense of Relief

Congress never did pass an intelligence charter. The animus for doing so gradually passed away. In some measure, this was caused simply by the passage of time and the fact that the intelligence community and the intelligence committees got to know each other a little better. In place of the charter's lengthy list of proscriptions and guidelines there was developing within the oversight process a spirit of comity. This change was perhaps no better exemplified than by the Senate Intelligence Committee's decision in 1979 to drop its Subcommittee on Investigations.

General maturation was not the principal reason for the change in spirit. Much more important was the growing recognition that detente had collapsed. A decade of its implementation had not produced a stable, balanced relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan—all supplied more than ample evidence that Moscow's expansionist behavior had not been fundamentally modified by detente and the process of "normalization." Indeed, if Soviet military expenditures, especially in the area of strategic weapons, were any indication, then Soviet aggressiveness could be expected to grow, not lessen. Faced with these facts and rudely shocked by events in Iran, the American public began to reconsider issues of national security. Given this change in the public's mood, it is not surprising that it was reflected in the actions taken by their representatives—including those charged with overseeing the intelligence community.

If the early years of congressional oversight had set as its agenda the reining in of the American intelligence community, then the agenda of the past 4 years has been, generally, to allow it to regain its former pace. This program of relief has more or less typified the legislative record of the two intelligence committees, with one obvious and important exception. Yet even here, in the wake of the debate over Nicaragua, both the Senate and the House have passed legislation exempting the operational files of the CIA from the normal search and review requirements established under the Freedom of Information Act.

The year 1980 appears to have been pivotal for this change of agenda. In 1980 Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (P.L. 96-456), also known as the "greymail" act. This bill established new procedures for the introduction and protection of classified information in trials. In the past, threats by defendants to subpoena volumes of classified information and expose that information in legal proceedings had, it was claimed, forced the government and the intelligence agencies to drop a prosecution. With passage

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[19] Samuel P. Huntington. *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 191.

of the act, blackmailing the government into dropping such cases became less of a problem.[20]

The year 1980 also saw the introduction of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, enacted into law (P.L. 97-200) 2 years later. This legislation made it a crime for any person to seek out and publicize the names of American intelligence agents. Despite the fact that the law applied to journalists as well, it passed both houses with overwhelming majorities.

The most important legislative event of 1980 was the passage of the Intelligence Oversight Act (P.L. 96-450), which as Title V of the National Security Act became law on 14 October. The act was noteworthy for two reasons. First, it amended Hughes-Ryan. The key change was that the number of committees to which the President was required to report covert operations was reduced from eight to two: the intelligence committees of the House and Senate. Other provisions were added which allowed the President to act, if circumstances warranted, with greater dispatch and secrecy. The President could now limit prior notice of covert action to the leadership of the House and Senate and the ranking members of their intelligence committees. If he so desired, the President could dispense with prior notification altogether so long as he reported his actions in a "timely fashion" and provided a "statement of the reasons" for dispensing with the prior notice. The second noteworthy aspect of the Intelligence Oversight Act lay in the fact that it made a matter of law the principle behind Hughes-Ryan, the legitimacy of congressional oversight in these matters. While the act itself was unprecedented in that it codified that principle, it nevertheless was understood to be a measure of some comfort to the intelligence community.

The Oversight Act was, in quantity and quality, much different from two charters introduced by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Even the more moderate of the two documents was nearly 200 pages in length; what emerged as law covered all of two pages.

The Intelligence Oversight Act established four basic obligations for intelligence officials. The first was that they keep the two intelligence committees "fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities." The second outlined the revised notification provision concerning covert activities previously noted. The third prescription in the act was that the intelligence agencies were to "furnish any information" deemed necessary by the oversight committees to carry out their responsibilities. The fourth, and final, obligation concerns illegal or failed intelligence activity: both are to be reported to the committees in a "timely fashion."

These obligations are themselves bound by provisions which recognize the legal and constitutional duties of executive branch officials. For example, after enumerating the various reporting requirements, the act directs the House and the Senate committees to establish procedures, "in consultation with the

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[20] As with FISA, there were mixed motives behind passage of the Classified Information Procedures Act. While the substantive thrust of the act was to grant some relief to the government in protecting classified information, the act was also supported by some as a measure that might facilitate prosecution of active or former intelligence officers charged with some wrongdoing.

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Director of Central Intelligence," to protect the classified information that is to be given. Equally important is the preamble to the specific mandates of the act. There the need to protect classified information and information "relating to intelligence sources and methods" is confirmed. Additionally, the preamble acknowledges the "duties" conferred by the Constitution upon the executive and legislative branches of the government.

When compared with the various proposed intelligence charters the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 is, both in substance and tone, more moderate. In place of congressional oversight's becoming dominated by legal particulars, it became a matter more of comity between the branches. In general, passage of the act was, for the intelligence community, a matter of relief.

The Committees and the Elements of Intelligence

The literature on congressional oversight and the committee system is, with some notable exceptions, generally governed by models constructed from "interest group" theories. According to these models, the essential role played by Congress and the committees is that of facilitating the process by which the various interests of the society are aggregated and adjusted. The principal activity of the Congress and its parts, then, is to haggle over, bargain about and divvy up the federal pie for the constituents back home. Congressmen are understood to be principally brokers.

While not completely without merit, this view of Congress and the oversight process is hardly sufficient. As Arthur Maas has written: "Much of what Congress and the President do cannot be described adequately by using these models"; they are often "insufficient" and "misleading."[21] This strikes one as generally true with regard to congressional oversight in the area of foreign affairs. While social and economic interests may well play some role in decisions on such matters as the Panama Canal Treaty, SALT II, or a military assistance bill for El Salvador, most members of a committee involved in the legislative process will base their judgments on factors other than the subpolitical. This seems to be particularly true for the process of congressional oversight of intelligence activities. Put crudely, since most of the oversight process in this area takes place behind closed doors, there accrues to the Representative or Senator on an intelligence committee little of the traditionally understood advantage of using his seat on the committee to serve the home district or state.

A more straightforward model of Congress and congressional oversight is one based on the proposition that Congress' principal function in this area is to reflect and refine the views of the population. It should be both representative and deliberative.

The Committees

Today the primary institutional forms through which that process is to take place in the area of intelligence are the House Permanent Select Com-

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[21] Arthur Maas. *Congress and the Common Good* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 4-5, 7-12.

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mittee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.[22] To understand how they both might reflect and refine public opinion on intelligence, a closer look is required.

Before examining the committees and how they do or do not fulfill those functions, however, one is obliged to note the revolutionary nature of the now generally accepted assumption that committees should be so engaged. Prior to 1976, there were no permanent, standing committees dedicated uniquely to overseeing the intelligence community. Notwithstanding Congress' stature as the most powerful legislative body in the world, it had never exercised its oversight powers so directly. In fact, this arrangement was revolutionary not only in the United States but in the rest of the world as well; no other legislature had ever created such an entity.

Not that the idea of creating an intelligence committee was all that new. As early as 1948, a motion was made to establish a joint committee to oversee intelligence. Yet it, like the nearly 150 similar proposals made over the next quarter of a century, never had the slightest chance of passing. Indeed, only two motions ever made it to the floor; both were soundly defeated by margins of more than two to one.[23]

The first seriously considered proposal to establish an intelligence committee was put forward by the Rockefeller Commission in its final report. In February of 1976, President Ford advanced the Commission's recommendation of a joint committee in a message ·· Congress. Ford's recommendation, however, was made not much in advanc of the Congress' own. In 1975, both the House and the Senate had establish:·d temporary select committees to investigate the perceived abuses of the intelligence community. By early 1976, it was clear that both the Church Committee and the Pike Committee would urge their respective chambers to create standing, permanent intelligence committees.

The Church Committee's final report (S.Rept. 94-755) was issued in April of 1976. As expected, it did call for the creation of a Senate committee specifically charged with the oversight of intelligence. Within a month, on 19 May, by a vote of 72 to 22, the Senate established, under S.Res. 400, the SSCI. With the possible exception of a Tower-Stennis proposal to delete from the new committee's jurisdiction the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense, no serious challenge to the new committee was raised. Even here, the vote against deletion was by a margin of two to one.

The House, largely because of the turmoil surrounding its rejection of the Pike Committee's final report and the subsequent publication of large seg-

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[22] HPSCI maintains three subcommittees: Legislation; Program and Budget, and Oversight and Evaluation. The SSCI in the recent past has had four subcommittees: Analysis and Production; Budget; Collection and Foreign Operations; and Legislation and the Rights of Americans.

[23] On 11 April 1956, Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, a resolution to establish a joint committee, was defeated by a vote of 59 to 27. Among its list of 33 co-sponsors were Senators Mansfield, Jackson, and Ervin. A decade later, on 14 July, Senate Resolution 283, a resolution to establish a separate Senate intelligence committee, was, on a point of order, defeated by a vote of 61 to 28. Only four senators who had previously voted for the joint committee voted for the Senate committee also. Most notable among the four was Senator Fulbright.

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ments of it in the *Village Voice*, took almost a year longer to establish an intelligence committee of its own. On 14 July 1977, by a vote of 247 to 171, it passed H.Res. 658 creating HPSCI.

While there are some important differences between H.Res. 658 and S.Res. 400, the critical fact is that both committees are given by their respective charters legislative, investigative, and authorizational authority for all of the intelligence community. Each is to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence; each shares jurisdiction over the rest of the community (NSA, DIA, and the intelligence components of the Department of Defense, State, Treasury, Justice and Energy) with the Armed Services, Foreign Relations/Affairs and Judiciary Committees of both houses.

The resolutions mirror each other in other respects as well. A key point is that both intelligence committees are "select" committees. Members are chosen by the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate. The majority and minority leaders also serve as *ex officio*, although nonvoting, members of their respective committees. With regard to the professional staff, again the resolutions are the same. All employees of the two intelligence committees are required to sign secrecy agreements and be cleared in a manner "determined ... in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence."

H.Res. 658 and S.Res. 400 also establish elaborate procedures for declassifying information. While neither resolution finally gives up its chamber's right to declassify information, the procedures, formally at least, make the exercise of that right quite unlikely. The two resolutions also require the HPSCI and the SSCI to maintain "crossover" members from the Armed Services, Foreign Relations/Affairs, Judiciary and Appropriation Committees. The difference between the charters here is that S.Res. 400 mandates that there be two "crossover" members from each of those committees and that the two be split between the majority and minority parties; H.Res. 658 requires only one "crossover" member from each of those committees and there is no mention of bipartisanship.

The resolutions also speak of rotating "to the greatest extent practicable" a substantial portion of the committee membership each new congress. From the HPSCI's total of 14, the number is 4; from the SSCI's total of 15, the number is 5. Finally, both H.Res. 658 and S.Res. 400 establish bounds on the length of time a senator or representative may remain on the intelligence committee. For members of the HPSCI, the limit is six years; for members of the SSCI, eight.[24]

Similarities aside, there are significant differences between the two resolutions.

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[24] With the end of the 98th Congress, both the SSCI and HPSCI faced a significant turnover in membership. Nine of the SSCI's 15 members reached the eight-year limit at the end of the session, including the Chairman (Senator Barry Goldwater) and the Vice Chairman (Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan). On the House side, HPSCI lost 7 of its 14 members, including the Chairman (Rep. Edward P. Boland) and its ranking minority member (Rep. J. Kenneth Robinson).

One such difference is that under S.Res. 400 the SSCI's jurisdiction does not extend to include tactical military intelligence. H.Res. 658's mandate to the HPSCI is broader and is understood to cover that facet of intelligence.

The most important difference between S.Res. 400 and H.Res. 658 is that the former attempts to create a bipartisan committee while the latter makes no such effort. Unlike the typical Senate committee, the ratio of majority to minority members on the SSCI is not distinctly disadvantageous to the minority. Of its fifteen members, the SSCI has seven seats reserved for members from the minority side of the aisle. Also, the next ranking member on the SSCI after the chairman is not, as is normally the case, a member of the majority party. Under S.Res. 400, the next ranking member is a member of the minority and is titled vice chairman. In the Chairman's absence, he is acting chairman.

The Senate's decision to establish the SSCI on a bipartisan basis was predicated in large measure by its judgment that if the intelligence agencies were to regain their feet future activities had to rest on the widest consensus possible. The bipartisan makeup of the SSCI was designed to establish that basis. As one of the authors of S.Res. 400 noted, the SSCI was meant to "reflect the composition and philosophy of the entire Senate."[25]

In this regard, the difference between the SSCI and the HPSCI could hardly be great··. Of the latter's total membership of 14, 9 are from the majority. Implicitly or explicitly, no mention is made of bipartisanship in H.Res. 658.

Coming as it did a year after the passage of S.Res. 400, the House resolution's omission of the earlier document's bipartisan features stood out clearly. As expected, their absence in H.Res. 658 was a matter of considerable dispute. Representative John Rhodes, then Minority Leader, strongly objected to the lack of "any provision establishing bipartisan membership" for the new committee. Rhodes' objection did not go unchallenged. Representative Richard Bolling, Chairman of the Rules Committee, which had reported H.Res. 658, rejoined: "The gentleman ... knows that matters of intelligence ... involve policy ... it is only reasonable for us to follow the mandate of the American people in our election to the House of Representatives on policy matters."[26]

Elements of Intelligence

That the committees reflect the generally dominant views of the public with regard to intelligence seems true enough from our earlier discussion.

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[25] *Congressional Record* (May 13, 1976), p. S7275. The desire to maintain as broad a base as possible on the SSCI has been reinforced by the composition of its staff. Under the rules of the committee, the professional staff works for the committee as a whole. However, since its earliest days, each member has had the power to designate one individual to serve on the professional staff. As a result, most of the professional staff serve at the pleasure of a particular senator. Not surprisingly, "committee" work often takes a back seat to the needs and agendas of the individual members. The size of the professional staff is normally in the mid-20's.·

[26] *Congressional Record* (July 14, 1977), p. H22942. In contrast to the composition of the SSCI professional staff, HPSCI's professional staff is composed principally of "nonpartisan" appointments hired by and reporting to the chairman. While the staff, like the SSCI's, is also under a mandate to work for the committee as a whole, the hiring and firing practices of HPSCI make it clear that most of the staff works for the chairman. The size of the professional staff is normally a little over 10.

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What is far less clear is how the two intelligence committees refine those views, how they as committees affect the essential elements of American intelligence—collection, analysis, and covert action.

Collection

Discerning the effect of oversight on the collection of intelligence is no easy matter. There is a paucity of public sources upon which one can draw to make one's case. This fact is itself significant. The lack of leaks and public reports suggests a general lack of interest in this element of intelligence on the part of the two committees. With little at immediate stake politically, it is not surprising that the intelligence committees have generally turned their attention elsewhere.

Two exceptions exist to this pattern of behavior. The first is that the budget process has in the past generated discussion and review of individual components of the collection process. Typically, however, this review is single-member driven or produced by the need to trim the authorization package back to an acceptable level. The second exception to the attention generally given to collection by the committees is tied to major ongoing political debates (SALT II) or to events in which American lives may have been lost due to what is perceived to be poor collection (Beirut). While perhaps not unusual for the Congress, there is much in the way that the two intelligence committees oversee collection that is *ad hoc* in nature.

It is possible to argue, of course, that the reason why collection has not been given more attention by the committees is that all is healthy. Yet this appears dubious on its face. For example, it is well known that most of America's intelligence collection effort is targeted at the Soviet Union; it is also known that much of that effort, at least in terms of dollars spent, is technically based. Yet within the past decade, according to press accounts, three major and essential collection platforms have been compromised through espionage: ELINT, Boyce-Lee; IMINT, Kampiles; and COMINT, Prime. One would assume that, given these events, a thorough and resounding debate on the state of American collection capabilities *vis a vis* the Soviet Union would be in order. There is no evidence that this has in fact occurred in either the SSCI or the HPSCI.

If the committees have not thought it necessary to review the state of intelligence collection on America's prime adversary, it is not surprising that there is little evidence that either committee has ever in a methodical manner addressed the most fundamental question in the area of collection—which is, what it is that we actually want collected. It is obvious but insufficient to say "intelligence." It is no longer clear exactly what is meant by that term. There are, in fact, two types of intelligence being collected today, each distinct and each with its own advocates in the intelligence community and on Capitol Hill. The first type is the kind of specialized, sensitive information we traditionally associate with cloak and dagger; the second type is the kind of general, macro-level information about countries and the world generated by the social sciences. Within the American intelligence community these two conceptions of intelligence compete with each other for resources and attention. In order

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for the intelligence committees to resolve that competition in a reasonable manner, it would seem essential that at some point they engage in some form of debate about the relative merits of each. That neither committee seems to have undertaken such a debate is further evidence that its oversight in the area of collection is unsystematic and largely event-driven.

This reactive approach persists even in the area of domestic collection where constituent concerns about civil liberties sharpen a Senator's or Representative's political sensibilities. Under the terms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the Attorney General is required to brief the two committees fully twice a year on all electronic surveillances conducted in the United States for purposes of intelligence collection. What is unique, and helpful for the student of the oversight process, is FISA's requirement that the SSCI and HPSCI report annually on the first few years of the act's implementation and include in that report an analysis of its functioning.

HPSCI has issued its fifth and final report. In none of HPSCI's reports has it recommended any amendment to FISA. The clear impression is that the committee is satisfied with the act's implementation and operation. The SSCI has also issued its fifth and final annual report. As with the HPSCI, the SSCI has not recommended a single change to FISA.

In general, the issues raised in the annual reports have been quite minor, ranging from "certain paperwork problems" to "inadvertent" irregularities during the execution of an electronic surveillance. The most serious question posed by the committees' reports has centered on FISA's utility as a legal basis or model for authorizing physical search techniques. In none of the reports is there more than a hint that the committee has reviewed the implementation of the act with an eye to determining its effect on the collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence and whether that collection was in any way adequate. While both the SSCI and HPSCI, according to their reports, thought it necessary to do more than take the word of executive branch officials with regard to the act's requirement that dissemination among agencies of information concerning US persons be minimized, they took at face value the statement of FBI Director William Webster that FISA "has not had a deleterious effect on our counterintelligence effort."

It is difficult, after reading FISA and seeing the various complexities and hurdles it constructs, not at least to wonder about its inhibiting effect on the collection of intelligence. At first glance, it appears that whatever effect FISA is having, it is not that. To date, out of the hundreds of applications made to the special courts by the Department of Justice, not a single one has been rejected. For many, this is a sign that the judges of the FISA court have become a "rubber stamp" for the executive branch. But in theory, it is equally possible that instead of executive initiative overwhelming judicial restraint, judicial restraint has infused itself into the collection process. The very existence of the court has probably compelled the Justice Department to "scrub" its applications so thoroughly that only the clearest cases are put forward for the FISA judge to review.

It would seem reasonable to expect the two intelligence committees to sharply question this statistical anomaly. But neither has. Both committees

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would undoubtedly be alarmed if a large percentage of FISA applications were rejected by the court. That a similar concern has not arisen over the fact that not a single FISA request has ever been turned down is telling.

In general, concerted congressional interest in collection has been episodic and largely driven by political concerns of the moment. Even in those instances when committee oversight is exercised on a more systematic basis, it leaves much to be desired.[27]

Analysis

The effect congressional oversight has had on intelligence analysis is difficult to measure. Neither of the two intelligence committees can be said to have ignored this area. For example, during reviews of the intelligence community's budget, changes in either manpower or dollar levels are made to strengthen or weaken specific analytic fields. Typically, these changes will reflect the strong desires of a particular member. Some of the changes have been substantial, others less so. Yet the total direct effect on the analytic element of the community is far from clear.

Perhaps the most important impact of the new oversight process on analysis derives from the two committees having become themselves major "consumers" of finished intelligence. With rare exception, the bulk of the analytic product is now available to the SSCI and the HPSCI. Certainly, all National Intelligence Estimates are.

It is easy to speculate that this constant committee perusal of the community's product increases the likelihood of its politicization. Surely in an area where policy is in dispute a President or his representative, the DCI, has a strong incentive to ensure either by heavy-handed or subtle means that the finished intelligence does not undermine the administration's stated position.

Any politicization that occurs, however, probably is much less dramatic. As the committees have become consumers, Congress has begun to see the two intelligence committees as its own independent repositories for sensitive information. Given its expanded role in the conduct of foreign affairs, Congress will undoubtedly use the committees to review, challenge or validate intelligence assessments that underlie key executive branch policies. Two past examples of this phenomenon are the SSCI's 1979 report, "Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty," and the HPSCI's 1982 report, "U.S. Intelli-

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[27] A representative sample of committee oversight of FISA is the Senate Intelligence Committee's final report. "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The First Five Years." U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence Report 98-660. Oct. 5. 1984. In the report's 26 pages, not a single paragraph can be found which indicates that the committee made an independent assessment of the impact FISA has had on domestic intelligence collection. On the other hand, numerous pages are dedicated to reassuring the public that under FISA "Big Brother" is not listening. The single-mindedness of the oversight process in this area of collection is exemplified by the first sentence of the report's final paragraph "The Committee considers its oversight role to be an integral part of the system of checks and balances that is necessary to protect constitutional rights."

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gence Performance on Central America."[28]

Such reviews have their effect. Like any set of bureaucrats, intelligence analysts become set in their opinions and adopt "house" positions. Once these positions have been established, individual reputations and institutional interests make it difficult for contrary views to be heard. Because the committees offer a readership with a wide range of political views for these products, assumptions are inevitably questioned and conclusions challenged. There is much to be gained from a process in which analysts and agencies are required to defend in a more exacting manner their "pet" positions.

On the other hand, there are dangers here. Not every analyst or agency will rise to the challenge. When faced with the committees' wide range of opinionated readers, it is equally possible that the analyst or agency will be tempted to turn out a product that least offends the greatest number. This, of course, only exacerbates the well-known problem within the analytic community of consensus-produced estimates.

In general, it is unlikely that serious oversight of the analytic process is possible if the committee's principal manner of proceeding is to challenge areas of analysis on a seemingly random, case by case basis. At best, such case studies raise the level of analytic reasoning in a particular area for some limited amount of time. More likely, they quicken bureaucratic instincts.

Yet, to date, oversight has been carried out in precisely this manner. Both committees have undertaken a handful of case studies on diverse topics. Among the subjects reviewed have been the fall of the Shah, the oil crisis of 1973-74, the expulsion of the Marielitos, and Soviet oil production. As is suggested by this sample, the committees characteristically examine an issue after it has become a matter of public concern or dispute.

The most recent HPSCI case study was a sharp critique of analysis on selected issues pertaining to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Despite its title, "U.S. Intelligence Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern," the report left no question that the committee saw far too few achievements and much about which to be concerned. Some of its specific criticisms were that the community had at times overstated its findings in regard to external support to the Salvadoran insurgents, that it seemed to have little interest in or grasp of rightist violence in El Salvador, that it was overly simplistic in its analysis of the conflict between the Miskito Indians and the Sandinistas, and that it sacrificed its more reasoned judgment about the Nicaraguan military buildup to rhetoric. What praise the report did hand out was in reference to the community's analysis of the organization and activities of the Salvadoran guerrillas and its "detection" of assistance to the insurgents by Cuba and other communist countries. Even so, the praise was faint since the report's final judgment was that there were signs that the analytic "environ-

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[28] U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "Principal Findings of the Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty." Committee Print, October 1979. U.S. House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation. "U.S. Intelligence Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern." Committee Print. September 22, 1982.

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ment" was "under pressure to reinforce policy rather than to inform it." Left unsaid, but clearly implied, was that the community's "achievements" were the result of the administration's particular policy concerns.

Opponents of the Reagan Administration's policies in Central America were quick to praise the report; supporters just as quickly denounced it. Debate was heated. Retired Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, who had become a consultant to HPSCI after leaving the Deputy DCI position earlier in the year, felt obliged to resign as a consultant to protest its publication. Whatever the report's merits, it produced results which were sharply partisan. HPSCI's report on Central America is markedly different from the SSCI's report on perhaps the most important analytic effort of the last decade, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's (PFIAB) competitive examination of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic capabilities, the so-called "A-B Team" experiment.[29] HPSCI's report raises substantive concerns; in contrast, the SSCI's document is void of any substantive discussion of the findings of the A-B Team effort.

The Senate report begins with the statement that its purpose is to assess "whether the A-B experiment had proved to be a useful procedure in improving National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on a centrally important question." Its conclusion was that review of NIEs by outside experts is generally useful. It also concluded that in this particular instance the review was "less valuable" than it might have been.

Most of the reasons the SSCI report gives for this judgment are minor in nature and essentially procedural in character. For example, it faults PFIAB's B Team for reviewing more NIEs on Soviet strategic capabilities than had originally been agreed upon with the DCI. The report also objects to the fact that the experiment itself was leaked to the press and that the "agencies needlessly allowed analytic mismatches by sending relatively junior specialists into the debating arena against prestigious and articulate B Team authorities."(!)

What the reader does not find in the SSCI report is any discussion of the merits of the B Team's findings or any analysis of its arguments. The document's drafters might claim that it was not the committee's intent to resolve the debate between the community and the PFIAB. Nevertheless, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the usefulness of any analytic experiment independent of some assessment of the arguments themselves.

The very different tenors of the two committee reports reflect, of course, the difference in the committees' respective constitutions. The majority-dominated HPSCI might naturally be expected to produce a critique with a partisan edge; the bipartisan SSCI to shy away from divisive analytic disputes. Obviously, neither is finally satisfactory.

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[29] U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Collection. Production, and Quality, "The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives." Committee Print. February 16, 1978.

Covert Action

Covert action (sometimes referred to as "special activities") is defined by the law as "operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence." This definition, which tells you what covert action is by telling you what it is not, obviously implies that under the rubric of covert action lies a wide range of options. Covert action is a tool of foreign policy which can be either carrot or stick, mundane or not. It may simply consist in planting a news story in another nation's press or it may encompass the training, arming, and employment of a paramilitary operation. Covert action, in short, may be used to change a government's behavior or to change a government altogether.

Formally, the reforms of the mid-1970s left the President's discretion to use covert action intact, the only exception being the Clark Amendment of 1974 (P.L. 94-329) which prohibits clandestine assistance to the insurgents fighting in Angola. The only other prohibition is a self-imposed one against assassination. While the SSCI and HPSCI are to be informed and briefed on every presidential finding, they have no advise and consent responsibility.

Nevertheless, in practice the two intelligence committees may exercise a great deal of influence. The most direct formal control the committees have over covert programs is through the budget process, as every covert operation is subject to specific authorization by the committees. The second form of control is much less direct. but nonetheless significant. The possibility that an individual member mig!· xercise a "legislative veto" by leaking a particular program to the press can- and does—inhibit the options put forward by the executive branch. In shor while a president, under the law, has at his disposal wide discretion in empl . ng a variety of "special activities." he has in fact a more limited number of options. Only noncontroversial findings remain covert.

The Reagan Administration's reported covert support for the anti-Sandinista insurgents is a case in point.[30] According to press accounts. the President apparently signed the requisite funding in December of 1981.[31] In short order, the stories were out.[32]

In some sense this was only too predictable. The controversy generated by the State Department's White Paper on "Communist Interference in El Salvador," published less than a year previously, clearly indicated a serious lack of consensus regarding the strategic problems facing the US in Central America. Ironically, it was perhaps the very absence of a consensus that would precipitate a decision to challenge the Moscow-Havana-Managua nexus with a

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[30] "A Secret War for Nicaragua." *Newsweek.* Nov. 8, 1982.

[31] "Secret War." *Newsweek.* p. 44

[32] "Reagan Backs Action Plan for Central America." Washington *Post.* Feb 14. 1982. p A1. "U.S. Approves Covert Plan in Nicaragua." Washington *Post.* March 10, 1982. p A1 As is typically the case. the administration then attempted to get its side of the story out. The result ("according to senior Administration officials") "U.S. Reportedly Spending Millions to Foster Moderates in Nicaragua." New York *Times.* March 11, 1982. p. A1. "U.S. Said to Plan Covert Actions in Latin Region." New York *Times.* March 14, 1982. p. A1.

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covert program.[33] According to Alexander Haig's account in *Caveat*, he was "virtually alone" among the President's senior advisers in suggesting that the US bring its "overwhelming" military power "to bear on Cuba in order to treat the problem at its source." The other camp favored, according to Haig, "a low-key treatment of El Salvador as a local problem and sought to cure it through limited amounts of military and economic aid . . . along with certain covert measures."[34] If true, it would seem to be a classic example of covert action's being used as "a 'safe' option—something between diplomacy and sending in the Marines—but in effect as a substitute for policy itself."[35]

More than a year and a half would pass before President Reagan would make a nationally televised address before a joint session of the Congress on the Administration's policy in Central America.

Predictably, in the absence of a policy publicly articulated by the President, the apparent tacit support initially given by the SSCI and the HPSCI began to unravel. As noted previously, from a congressman's point of view the normal political benefit of being a member of an intelligence committee is small. The major problem he faces is the exposure of a sensitive, perhaps embarrassing, and often misrepresented covert program. Not free under the rules of secrecy established by each committee to defend his position or the reasonableness of a particular program in any adequate manner, the member is bound to feel politically exposed. For this reason the committees will tend to act as a brake on covert programs.[36]

The two committees do not exercise this power in the same manner, as is apparent in their respective handlings of the Nicaraguan program. The Senate committee has addressed this issue in a fashion consonant with its composition as a bipartisan body, one which is intended to "reflect the composition and philosophy of the entire Senate." As reported by the press and the committee itself, the SSCI forced the Administration over the spring and summer of 1983

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[33] "Early on in the crisis, it was decided that problems with Cuba and Central America should not become 'presidential,' according to two senior Reagan advisors, who calculated that there was much political risk and little potential gain in the military and political crises of the region. . . . A tide of protests . . . poured in to the White House over Central American policy. Richard Wirthlin, the presidential pollster, reported a sharp and sudden drop in presidential popularity." "Central America: The Dilemma," Washington *Post*, March 4, 1982, p. A1.

[34] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 128-29. "Some officials, led by then-Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., favored a naval quarantine of Cuba and Nicaragua, but the Pentagon was leery. As the result of a National Security Council meeting on November 16, 1981, Reagan approved a 10-point program including economic and military aid to friendly nations, U.S. contingency planning and military preparedness—but no U.S. military action. One of the 10 points, according to NSC records, was to 'work with foreign governments as appropriate' to conduct political and paramilitary operations 'against the Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support infrastructure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.'" "U.S.-Backed Nicaraguan Rebel Army Swells to 7000 Men," Washington *Post*, May 8, 1983, p. A1.

[35] Malcolm Wallop, "U.S. Covert Action: Policy Tool or Policy Hedge?" *Strategic Review* (Summer 1984), p. 10.

[36] A useful history of this tendency can be found in "Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1984," U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report 98-665, October 10, 1984, see "History of Nicaraguan Program," p 4ff. One result of the controversy generated by this program has been the further formalization of the reporting process of covert activities by the CIA to the two committees. On the nature and content of this new process, see "Covert Action Reporting Procedures," *ibid.* pp. 13-15.

to rewrite the presidential finding authorizing covert activity in Nicaragua.[37] While the Senate committee apparently agreed to continued support of the paramilitary operation, it did so by reaching a consensus, a middle position, between those willing to see the Sandinista regime overturned and those generally disinclined to support paramilitary actions at all. The result was a program which foreswore the former but maintained the program as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Sandinista regime to end its "subversion in neighboring countries."[38] It was a compromise which produced a program still large enough to be controversial in nature but probably not large enough to be decisive.

The House Intelligence Committee, unburdened by the institutional norms of bipartisanship, could act in a straightforward and decisive manner. Partisan in its composition, HPSCI was a ready vehicle from which to challenge a program that lacked any semblance of majority support. Since 1983, the HPSCI, in concert with the Democratic leadership, has voted repeatedly to end any support to the Nicaraguan insurgents.

The one exception to this voting pattern was the HPSCI's reported ultimate approval of $24 million for the paramilitary program for FY 84.[39] This exception can perhaps be explained by the fact that, while there was no public mandate in support of the program, neither was there a clear mandate to end it and suffer the consequences ending it might bring. Also, the House found itself in a legislatively difficult position. Essentially, the House was willing to hold up passage of the intelligence authorization bill over its position on the Nicaraguan program. However, it had to be willing as well to frustrate adoption of the Defense Appropriation Act, which contained the authorized appropriations for the program. Politically, holding up the former, given its relatively small and secret numbers, over one highly visible issue is not nearly as difficult as tying up all Department of Defense appropriations over the same issue. Finally, the House conferees broke and accepted the Senate position, but with the additional—and later, as funds ran out, crucial—proviso that spending for the program be capped at $24 million.

For FY 85, the House appeared to face a similar legislative dilemma. If the House conferees were to maintain their opposition to the program, they did so at the risk of holding up a "catch-all" appropriations bill required to finance most of the government for the next 12 months. The administration faced a dilemma as well; the first Tuesday in November was only a month away. The White House obviously figured that the political cost of having to shut down the government for an extended period—solely in order to save the

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[37] *Ibid*, p. 6. "U.S.-Backed Nicaraguan Rebel Army Swells to 7000 Men," *Washington Post*, May 8, 1983, p. A1. "New Justification for U.S Activity in Nicaragua Offered," *Washington Post*, Sept 21, 1983, p. A29. "Shultz States New Case for Covert Aid to Rebels," *Washington Post*, Sept. 22, 1983, p. A33. "Panel Approves Nicaraguan Aid," *New York Times*, Sept 23, 1983, p. A4.

[38] "Aid to Nicaragua Rebels Backed," *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1983, Sec. A, p. 4.

[39] "Sec. 108. During fiscal year 1954, not more than $24 million of the funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency ... may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting ... military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." P.L. 98-215.

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program—was too high. The result: the House prevailed and aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents was banned for 5 months.[40]

HPSCI's opposition to the program, its later acquiescence, and its final victory are examples of that committee's tactical flexibility. As the political advantage or liability of its position becomes clear, the House committee is able to shift its position accordingly. While the SSCI often reflects a broad but somewhat flaccid unanimity, the HPSCI just as often reflects a narrower but more partisan-edged consensus.

To state the obvious, covert programs today do not fare well when they operate outside the pale of consensus. It is equally obvious that world events may run in advance of a well-grounded and publicly articulated policy. A nation's foreign environment may be outside its control; friends in battle may overnight become one's enemies. As a result, the contingencies of foreign affairs may easily outstrip the consensus that ordinarily must exist if a democracy is to pursue a policy. Most of the time this does not pose much of a problem. At other times, however, the stakes may be very large. Given the general tendency in the current system of congressional oversight to pull covert action into directions on which there is little debate, the question arises as to whether, in inhibiting imprudent risk-taking, it may also inhibit necessary risk-taking.

Conclusion

Congressional oversight of American intelligence has on the whole been uneven in character. On the one hand, reports of a CIA program to support the insurgency in Nicaragua have caused serious divisiveness between the intelligence community and the two intelligence committees and among committee members, and have shattered the calm that followed the stormy days of the Church and Pike Committees. On the other, reports of a CIA program to aid the insurgency in Afghanistan have elicited none of the same protest. In fact, it is difficult to find a member of either the SSCI or HPSCI who has publicly criticized the idea of giving assistance to the Mujahidin. What criticism there is holds that not enough is being done.

To some degree the controversy generated by reports of a Nicaraguan program is an exception to Congress' general bent in recent years to grant relief and be supportive of the intelligence agencies. Perhaps no better evidence is available to support this view than that while Congress was prohibiting US support to the Nicaraguan insurgents it was at the same time passing legislation relieving the CIA from some of the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act and enacting an authorization bill for FY 85 which, according to press accounts, continued the prior years' substantial increases in the community's budget.[41]

The trend seems clear; however, it does not rest on a deeply held consensus. As a result, the oversight system appears susceptible to sudden and some-

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[40] "Conferees Approve '85 Funds," Washington *Post*, Oct. 11, 1984, p. A1.

[41] P.L. 98-477. "Senate Balks at Raising Debt After Funding Bill is Enacted," Washington *Post*, Oct. 12, 1984, p. A1.

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times disabling shocks. While it is true that events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the debacle in Iran changed public and elite attitudes about the need to strengthen the various elements of the national security establishment, there still lingers an underlying suspicion about those elements in general, and intelligence in particular. Events, not a publicly articulated set of strategic principles, have produced what little consensus there is; events can strain and disrupt it just as quickly.

In theory, the two houses of Congress were meant to be both representative and deliberative. Through the committee system, Congress' division of labor, both functions are to be carried out in a particular area of public policy. It is not difficult to conclude that both the SSCI and HPSCI have managed the former fairly well, although somewhat unevenly. As for deliberation, oversight has left much to be desired. Over the past 4 years, public opinion has generally been supportive of the need to enhance intelligence capabilities. The two committees have reflected that outlook but have not made a serious effort to refine this support by a sustained and thorough review of these capabilities.

The potential for the two committees to exercise more substantive oversight exists. First, both the SSCI and HPSCI are "select" committees; their members are chosen by the leadership especially for this task. This presumably means that the membership of both is a cut above the usual congressional committee. Second, while the lack of the typical constituent payoff may at times disincline a member from expending much effort on committee work, that very lack of constituent responsibility may also free him to deliberate more seriously about the matter at hand.

It has also been argued that a sounder oversight process might be achieved by exchanging the two intelligence committees for a joint committee. Depending on just how the joint committee was constituted, this might well prove to be the case. One could hypothesize that a single body, smaller than the combined numbers of the two separate committees, would bear more responsibility and be more responsible in fulfilling this function. At minimum, creation of a joint committee would be a sign that the pendulum of authority in foreign affairs was swinging back toward the executive branch after a decade of expanding congressional power. Whatever the merits of a joint committee, however, the irreducible fact will remain that a congressional committee is a congressional committee is a congressional committee.

More critical to the future of oversight than any institutional change is the public adoption of a new, coherent set of principles to guide American foreign policy. The present period is marked by the abatement of the isolationist impulse; however, no publicly accepted doctrine of foreign policy has arisen to take its place.

For want of a majority-binding doctrine of foreign policy, it is hardly surprising that oversight of intelligence should give way to the tendency, under separation of powers, to muddle along. However, separation of powers, properly understood, also provides a possible remedy. Through the establishment of an independent, unitary executive, the system invites (though it does not guarantee) the exercise of presidential leadership. The presidency is, as Theodore Roosevelt pointed out, a "bully pulpit."

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Bully pulpit or not, only the presidency holds the potential for setting in place a coherent foreign policy which might attract a solid, secure consensus.[42] Establishment of such a set of principles is key to defining the premises from which those charged with oversight may best deliberate. Lacking a clear idea of exactly what operative principles underlie American foreign policy today, oversight naturally reflects that incoherence in its disposition of intelligence issues. To those involved a decade ago in challenging the "imperial" presidency it may seem ironic, but the invigoration of the current intelligence oversight process is likely to require a vigorous and sustained assertion of presidential leadership.

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[42] This, however, is not to underestimate the difficulty of building and sustaining such a consensus. Consider, for example, Walter Lippman's appraisal of the viability of Kennan's policy of containment given American political culture. *The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy* (New York. Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 15ff.

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From Remarks Before The University
Club, Washington, D.C.,
18 September 1986, by William J.
Casey

"Before I sit down, let me lay down just one more marker. I am sure
you have all heard about our recent efforts to deal with an old national
security problem that is becoming increasingly intolerable. I am
talking about the deliberate leaking of sensitive classified
intelligence information from the Executive Branch of our government,
and the replaying of that information by the media.

"I don't have time now to go through the whole chamber of horrors on
leaks. But I can tell you that we can, and do, lose sensitive
collection systems that cost billions of hard-earned tax dollars —
agents can, and do, die as a result of leaks — our allies can, and do,
lose faith in our abilities to protect information they pass us.

"Just a few weeks ago, the intelligence service of one of our
closest allies told us they can no longer pass us advance information on
terrorist activities. It has had enough of reading about its most
sensitive, well-protected information in the U.S. media. And when
intelligence sources and methods are compromised in areas such as
counterterrorism, the direct result easily could be dead American
tourists and other ordinary citizens. Unauthorized disclosure of
classified information puts lives and national security at risk and does
more damage to our intelligence capabilities than Soviet espionage.

"We know we can't throw rocks around in a glass house. Our first
priority must be to tighten discipline within our government and,
believe me, we are doing just that. We are putting into place
mechanisms to aggressively investigate apparent cases of leaking within
the government and to take punitive and legal action against government
employees who betray the trust placed in them. People have lost their
jobs in recent months.

"But, of course, the leak itself is just one side of the equation.
We have to do a much better job than we have in the past of convincing
the American people and the media of their own responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and sensitive collection systems.

"In this dangerous world we live in and in this modern era of
intelligence, the stakes have become entirely too high to sweep this
breach of trust, irresponsibility and violation of law in the handling
of sensitive classified information under the rug.

"The men and women of our intelligence services are in a dangerous,
difficult, and not particularly well paid profession because they want
to ensure that their children and grandchildren, and yours, will
continue to enjoy the protection of the First Amendment and the

privilege of living in a country with a free press. But national
security is also a Constitutional right and privilege. Obviously what's
needed is some balance and accommodation between the government and the
media.

"The issue is simply one of responsibility, discretion and common
sense. Who pays for establishing a new collection system or recruiting
a new human source to replace ones that have been compromised? You, me,
and every other taxpayer in the country."

Ross · Rothco

"In a way, I guess it was inevitable."

COVERING THE WATERFRONT

The first trend Gates saw was "the coming revolution in the way intelligence is communicated to policy makers." The electronic dissemination of finished intelligence from the analysts to the policy makers was already being planned. There would be computer terminals on the desks of key people, which, it was thought, "would speed current intelligence to real time should a policy maker want it," and which might have a talkback capacity that would improve the relationship between policy makers and analysts. Such a system would have security advantages, it was argued, because there would be much less paper and access to the information could be by handprint or other means specific to the individual. The terminals would be designed so that they could not be connected to other terminals or to printers.[31] The weakness of this scenario was that it is not just how fast information reaches a policy maker that matters, but how it may be buried by what else is on his or her desk. The telephone already provides the same basic access as a terminal, but it is not often used by policy makers contacting analysts, which suggests that the terminal-on-the-desk future would simply be more clutter. For it to be otherwise, intelligence recipients would have to be taught how to see information through intelligence eyes—much as Stansfield Turner attempted with Jimmy Carter.* The education of the consumer is as important as the information received. Even the argument of security improvement was suspect: people will always doublecheck by looking over each other's shoulders and by speaking to each other. Information is separate from the way it is recorded.

The second trend foreseen was that "the data we need will be more difficult to obtain." Soviet camouflage and disguise techniques were already reducing the effectiveness of telemetry in monitoring missile tests, quite apart from the traditional Soviet refusal to divulge information about their weapons systems development even when it came to arms reduction and limitation talks. Compounding this, information that was once available about the Soviet economy was no longer published and was increasingly restricted within the Soviet governing elite. Further afield, other countries were increasingly picking up American intelligence techniques and improving their own methods of camouflage and deception.[32]

The increasing difficulties of intelligence collection, however, also con-

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* Speaking in general terms, Stansfield Turner observed:

Each President has to work out his own system. He's got to learn about intelligence. He has to have tutorials. He can read a book, he can get briefing papers, he can listen to people. But he has to understand that satellites stay over Moscow only for three minutes a day, and that every other day there are clouds, and that therefore he should not call up the DCI and say, "Get me a picture of the Olympics in Moscow today. I want it by three o'clock!" The probability of doing this is only about 25 percent. The chances of getting it by three o'clock are directly related to the satellite schedule—it may pass over Moscow at ten o'clock, and you can't change that. The President has got to understand these things. Each President has to have some technique for absorbing enough mechanical intelligence to know how to manage it (interview, Stansfield Turner, July 29, 1983).

tained important benefits. It was not a one-way street. For example, by denying economic information that until recently was published, the Soviets were preventing levels of their own government from having it, thus increasing both the chances of mismanagement and fueling an increase in espionage as Russians, in effect, had to spy on themselves to discover facts about their own economy. And with more people trying to obtain information, it would be easier for the United States to "lose" its informers in the general activity. Any society pays a heavy price for the degree of secrecy sought by the Soviet Union, because it is, in fact, seeking to keep information from itself.

The third future trend identified by Gates was that "recruitment would become more difficult." The number of people of the right standard to be CIA officers, and who could pass the polygraph, was declining. The overall pool of talent for intelligence work was diminishing, and the effort to recruit people was enormous. Additionally, government service was becoming less attractive, although once people joined the agency they tended to stay. Among professionals, there was a less than 4 percent attrition rate, better than anywhere else in the government or in industry.[33] The principal reason for polygraph failure was drugs, a strictly cultural problem which was likely to be accommodated in some way eventually.* All societies learn how to adapt to themselves: in the 1920s the consumption of alcohol would have been a disqualification, but American law changed. A question behind the low attrition rate was, "Do you want twenty-year people in the CIA?" The length of tenure was a clear statement of the agency as an established bureaucracy rather than the fast-moving and flexible creation of 1947. And the pride in the low attrition rate was a demonstration of contentment with this position.

Fourth, there was already "a revolution in relations with Congress," which would continue. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the flow of finished intelligence to Congress had come to mean that Congress had as much intelligence as the executive branch. Building on this, observed Gates, the huge number of

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* In the early 1950s, China started to cultivate its traditional drug production with a view to affecting American troops in Japan and Korea. In 1960, Castro apparently signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union to help distribute Soviet-produced drugs in America in cooperation with elements of Czechoslovak intelligence. In 1962, the intelligence forces of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact joined this effort. In 1965, Chou En-lai was reported to have told Nasser that China was manufacturing heroin to spread addiction among U.S. servicemen in Vietnam and through them back to young people in the United States. In 1975, Warsaw Pact efforts to distribute drugs in the United States and Western Europe were stepped up, with Cuba acting as the coordinator for America. It was an estimated $200-billion-a-year operation (interview, October 12, 1985).

Thus, in an important sense, the Soviet Union and China as drug suppliers were effectively damaging the CIA by affecting potential agency recruits. "Drugs are the secret weapon of the KGB," observed one analyst. "In the last two years they've targeted Ireland to get at the British forces there. We could cut the legs from under it by doing two things: address the alienation in our society in the first place, and secondly, legalize drugs. But instead we treat drugs with a Jerry Falwell approach. There is no rhyme or reason based on fact about it" (interview, October 14, 1985).

staff on Capitol Hill had enabled Congress to ask tougher and better-informed questions of often hard-pressed officials. In turn. he suggested. this had resulted in Congress playing a larger and more effective role in foreign policy.[34] While this was certainly true, the important point was ignored: Congress has never *initiated* foreign policy. The result of what Gates described was simply more *business* of foreign policy. Further, the developing relationship with Congress was seen as a demonstration that Congress was a partner to the agency. In the 1970s the agency had lost its special place as the President's secret arm; in the 1980s it was seeking a special place with Congress. What, it might be wondered, would have been said if Gates had observed that, despite the flow of intelligence, Congress was not effective in policy-making terms?

The fifth trend was "the use by the executive branch of intelligence for public education." It had begun under Carter and Turner with the release in 1977 of the agency's detailed analysis of the performance and prospects of the Soviet economy,* and had subsequently expanded to include up-to-the-minute analysis which required special declassification. In the summer of 1985, for example, the agency's "key judgments" (the summary conclusions of an Estimate) on Soviet strategic forces had been published in a sanitized form at the insistence of the Executive branch.† It was part of the Reagan administration's effort to win support for its defense policies in the press and in Congress.[35]

This public education aspect held serious implications not only for the CIA but for the intelligence effort of the United States. Public education used to be done through background briefings to journalists and congressmen, but the suspicions surrounding the intelligence community as a whole during the 1970s forced more openness, and the publication of sensitive reports was a consequence. This development gave analysts, collectors, and secret informants a headache. Still more, it betokened the isolationism which underpinned both Carter and Reagan, since it was saying that America was strong enough (or unconcerned enough) to reveal its secret intelligence assessments and withstand any consequent damage delivered to its collection and analytical abilities (for example, by disinformation ploys) by the Soviet Union. Finally, the use of sensitive information for public education in this way was political, and the more involved politically intelligence becomes, the more vulnerable it is to the small change of politics where superior information can put someone

* This was *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects* (Washington. DC: CIA, 1977). It was followed by supplementary reports on *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production* (Washington. DC: CIA, 1977) and *USSR: Some Implications of Demographic Trends for Economic Policies* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1977).

† *Soviet Strategic Force Developments.* testimony before a joint session of the subcommittee on strategic and theater nuclear forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the defense subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, by Robert M. Gates. Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Director for Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency, and Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, National Intelligence Council, June 26, 1985.

on the "inside" and where leaks are commonplace. "That's always been a fear," Bernard McMahon agreed. "The design of the oversight committee, the composition of the staff, the nonpartisan nature of the effort, are all geared to reduce temptation. But it is a natural tendency because there is a sense in the executive branch that the secrets belong to them and not to Congress because intelligence belongs to the executive branch. Then there is the insider's fear that the outsider is going to use that information against him—a political means to a political advantage. What people talk about less is the power of the executive branch to declassify information. Take the publication of the report on *Soviet Strategic Defense Programs*: is that a glossy leak on legitimate declassified data? A skeptic could say that it is sophisticated leaking for political purposes because the President is down to the wire on SDI. The committee takes an interest in this process, because Congress has paid for the systems that collected the information and it does not like to see leaks done for partisan political purposes when the appropriation of funds was nonpartisan and for the good not of any particular administration but for the country as a whole."[36] "The *Strategic Defense Programs* release was an almost word-for-word replication of the National Intelligence Estimate," said a senior CIA official. "A lot of it was declassified just for the purpose of putting out that document. Somebody made the decision for political purposes. It was released by the White House. They had obviously decided that now was the time to inform the American people that the Soviets were doing SDI too, even though Gorbachev denies it."[37] "We have had little choice about the intelligence we provide to Congress," said Gates. "*So far* it has provided us with no serious problems. *So far.*"[38] "I would contrast what Bob Gates and Bill Casey want to do with what Colby and Turner tried to do," said a congressional intelligence staffer. "Colby and Turner wanted to declassify stuff just for university, academic use—basic encyclopedic knowledge—not so much to educate the public in the political sense about the Soviet threat, but just to have CIA as a massive storehouse and disseminator of encyclopedic information, noncontroversial for the most part. What Bob and Bill want to do is make intelligence public and use it as part of the political process."[39]

"The increasing use of intelligence by the policy community to show the rectitude or the efficacy of our foreign policy to our allies" was the sixth trend Gates identified. Dissemination of U.S. intelligence had also expanded beyond the United States' traditional allies.[40] This development was a secondary event in the much bigger show of changing world opinion. The receptivity of allies—and others—to U.S. intelligence marked a shift in attitudes toward both the United States and the Soviet Union by those allies. Policy makers are power seekers, and they will always use intelligence for what they want and need, so this use was to be expected. An institutional worry would always be that agency intelligence distributed in this way would inevitably be double-checked wherever possible by the recipients, with possible beneficial or detri-

mental results for the CIA depending on whether the double-checking was done with a cooperative interest or not.

The seventh prospect already discernible was "the dramatic increase in the diversity of subjects the community is required to address," said Gates. The main subjects used to be the Soviet Union, China, and Southeast Asia. While the Soviet Union and China were still major subjects, they had been joined by a range that included foreign technology developments; genetic engineering; trends in food, population, and resources worldwide; religion; human rights; arms control; drugs; terrorism; and high-technology transfers.[41]

This was a key observation by Gates. The list of subjects alone showed that the agency was thinking of itself not so much as a partner in policy, but as a manager and a servant of policy. This had always been its formal position, but its founding fathers had in fact established an agency role in the policy-making area. Now, with the overwhelming balance of CIA interest and attention reserved for its analytical and collection work, its intelligence effort was following the general direction of the social sciences. The agency was becoming an instrument for applied social science, ever less operational and ever more seeking to fill in the blank spaces in forecasting. The range of subjects showed an agency terrified of missing anything. It was another bureaucracy saying it covered the waterfront, the reverse of its starting attitude of being the worthy challenger to the State Department or the Department of Defense, of being the agency that identified a few essential themes and mastered them. Now it was, in effect, a secret extension of the Library of Congress.

"That's very true," said Bernard McMahon:

> When you ask the agency what they're doing and why they're doing it, there are two responses. The first is that more intelligence is better than less, and who can argue with that? The second is that they never know what questions they'll be asked, and they feel they have to be ready. So there's a limitless approach on their part. The National Intelligence Requirements document has nine thousand listings. You can find a home for anything there. That's why we say to them that they need a strategy. Apart from the fact that without a strategy there's no way to tell where the money is going, if all they do is provide a library of material that nobody draws much out of, the CIA, the intelligence community as a whole, will be a machine driven to its own perfection. Some requirements they are the best people to determine because they know what they need for their data base. And somebody has to perform a role as Cassandra. But they should identify these requirements, and then we will be able to see if all the intelligence goes into a library or goes into the product.[42]

"No, I do not feel that the agency has become a secret annex of the Library of Congress," William Casey declared:

> We have the kind of data that does not get into a library. The big surprise for me coming back into intelligence was the breadth and the depth of the analytical work. Donovan did start that element with a formidable bunch of

people, and they did range beyond the military, but they weren't into things like drugs or terrorism or international trade competition or oil flows or currency movements like we are today. In the OSS days, all you had to do was figure out where a German division was. It was far more tactical than strategic, which is the change today. We make a great effort to make every product practical. But the important thing is that the analysis and assessing have been done. The fact that it's been done. The fact that it's there. The fact that somebody did it. That's what is important.[43]

"An increasing growth in the diversity of the users of intelligence" was the eighth trend identified by Gates. Use in the early days was concentrated in the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. Now, in addition to these, principal users included the Treasury and the Departments of Commerce and Energy.[44] Again, the agency saw this as a welcome challenge, defining its nature in the process. It was welding itself to the bureaucracy, just as with Congress, seeking allies and support. For all the talk about the speed with which intelligence should reach the policy makers' desks, the agency was no longer being defined by its ability to respond, but by its ability to meet its quota of information and to drown questions with an enormous volume of intelligence rather than with farsighted and accurate political analysis. Secret intelligence is rarely general in its application. In 1973, for example, it was obvious that the Egyptians were considering attacking the Israelis across the Suez Canal in the Sinai. But the enormous defensive sandbanks the Israelis had built on the east bank of the canal were regarded by analysts in Washington (and by the Israelis) as major impediments to a successful Egyptian attack. So, like the French in 1940, who thought that their Maginot line would prevent a successful German attack, the Israelis placed undue confidence in their sandbanks. Secretly, the Egyptians bought fire hoses, nozzles, and compressors. They had worked out that they could blast through the sandbanks with water from the canal. This knowledge, coupled with the purchase of the necessary equipment, was the secret. For the CIA to extend its effort to cover such specialized intelligence analysis as would have been involved in estimating Egyptian intentions and capabilities in 1973 (and it had failed to do this then, much to Nixon's fury), so that it was providing specialized and useful information combined with accurate forecasting on a wide range of subjects such as Egyptian fire-hose purchasing as well as international currency markets, trade, and energy to the respective government departments, would involve a gargantuan effort very unlikely to be speedy. Ultimately, accurate forecasting depends far more on the caliber of the forecaster than on the quantity of information.

Gates' ninth trend was that "intelligence is becoming steadily more central to the foreign policy process of the government." In certain areas, policy itself depends on intelligence. In technology transfer, drugs, terrorism, there would, he suggested, be no effective policy without intelligence. In some other areas, notably arms control, policy had become more dependent on intelli-

gence.[45] In effect, this was another way of saying that police work had become more international. Technology transfer could be seen as involving a superior form of patent law; drugs, a superior form of prohibition and traditional police/customs work; terrorism, a superior deterrent and police work for kidnapping and murder. In these areas, a superior FBI might be better suited to informing policy than the CIA. Indeed, in many of the subject areas along the waterfront being covered under Casey, other government agencies might be more appropriate and expert in the work required.

The last trend that Gates saw expanding in the future lay in the fact that "intelligence is the only arm of government looking to the future." As the world became more complex and as policy makers needed more data, the intelligence community was the only government sector looking two, five, ten or more years ahead. This threw up the perennial working challenge of "having to go to a policy maker whose hands are full and convince him to do something which will benefit the future—a successor's successor's successor—at a time when the cost of doing it is still low, but when there is no immediate benefit."[46] It was a problem of democracy's short horizons and brief attention spans which all of Bob Gates' predecessors had faced and all of his successors would face.

Lt. General Lincoln D. Faurer, who retired as director of the National Security Agency in 1985, made a further point about future planning:

> People like to think that we are in competition with the Japanese. We are, in fact, in competition with ourselves to provide systems that suit our needs in a controlled manner for specific purposes. Our technological ingenuity creates a threat to us by encouraging the pursuit of new, more, and costly systems all the time. We can always find ways of making things better, but we should not continue to pursue perfection. We must be more disciplined in deciding what to pursue and sticking to it. We need to go back to basics in identifying requirements. As a nation, we have always failed to be modest and austere in identifying our requirements. And as resources become more scarce, as money becomes tighter, a reduction in our requirements will enable us to release money for the task.[47]

Faurer was voicing a major truth (although, of course, the United States was also in competition with Japan). All nations face the danger of strangling themselves by self-competition and becoming uncompetitive with the outside world, as happened to Britain. At the same time, self-competition is vital to a vibrant political and market economy, as it generates efficiency and focuses effort on important problems. In Aesopian language, Link Faurer was identifying the fact that in intelligence there are few operations anymore where two or three elite people can be effective. The United States was engaged in an intelligence siege, not a battle, with the other countries of the world, a siege in which what was involved was massive and would date very quickly.

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GLOSSARY OF INTELLIGENCE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

acoustical intelligence* (ACOUSTINT): Intelligence information derived from analysis of acoustic waves radiated either intentionally or unintentionally by the target into the surrounding medium. (In Naval usage, the acronym *ACINT* is used and usually refers to intelligence derived specifically from analysis of underwater acoustic waves from ships and submarines.)

actionable intelligence: Intelligence information that is directly useful to customers without having to go through the full intelligence production process; it may address strategic or tactical needs, close-support of U.S. negotiating teams, or action elements dealing with such matters as international terrorism or narcotics.

administratively controlled information: Privileged but unclassified material bearing designations such as FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, or LIMITED OFFICIAL USE, to prevent disclosure to unauthorized persons.

advisory tasking: A non-directive statement of intelligence interest or a request for intelligence information which is usually addressed by an element of the Intelligence Community to departments or agencies having information collection capabilities or intelligence assets not a part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

agent*: A person who engages in clandestine intelligence activity under the direction of an intelligence organization but who is not an officer, employee, or co-opted worker of that organization.

agent of influence*: A person who is manipulated by an intelligence organization to use his position to influence public opinion or decisionmaking in a manner which will advance the objective of the country for which that organization operates.

alert memorandum: A document issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to National Security Council-level policymakers to warn them of possible developments abroad, often of a crisis nature, of major concern to the U.S.; it is coordinated within the Intelligence Community to the extent time permits.

analysis*: A process in the production step of the intelligence cycle in which intelligence information is subjected to systematic examination in order to identify significant facts and derive conclusions therefrom. (Also see *intelligence cycle*.)

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*See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

assessment*: (1) *(General use)* Appraisal of the worth of an intelligence activity, source, information, or product in terms of its contribution to a specific goal, or the credibility, reliability, pertinency, accuracy, or usefulness of information in terms of an intelligence need. When used in contrast with *evaluation* assessment implies a weighing against resource allocation, expenditure, or risk. (See *evaluation*.) (2) *(Production context)* See *intelligence assessment*. (Also see *net assessment*.)

asset*: See *intelligence asset*. (Also see *national intelligence asset* and *tactical intelligence asset*.)

authentication: (1) A communications security measure designed to provide protection against fraudulent transmission and hostile imitative communications deception by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, station, or designator. (2) A means of identifying or verifying the eligibility of a station, originator, or individual to receive specific categories of information. (Also see *communications deception*.)

automatic data processing system security: All of the technological safeguards and managerial procedures established and applied to computer hardware, software, and data in order to ensure the protection of organizational assets and individual privacy; it includes: all hardware/software functions, characteristics, and features; operational procedures, accountability procedures, and access controls at the central computer facility; remote computer and terminal facilities, management constraints, physical structures and devices; and the personnel and communication controls needed to provide an acceptable level of protection for classified material to be contained in the computer system.

basic intelligence*: Comprises general reference material of a factual nature which results from a collection of encyclopedic information relating to the political, economic, geographic, and military structure, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign nations.

biographical intelligence: Foreign intelligence on the views, traits, habits, skills, importance, relationships, health, and curriculum vitae of those foreign personalities of actual or potential interest to the United States Government.

cartographic intelligence: Intelligence primarily manifested in maps and charts of areas outside the United States and its territorial waters.

case officer*: A professional employee of an intelligence organization who is responsible for providing direction for an agent operation. (See *agent*.)

1

Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP): See *National Foreign Intelligence Program.*

cipher*: A cryptographic system in which the cryptographic treatment (i.e., the method of transforming plain text by predetermined rules to obscure or conceal its meaning) is applied to plain text elements such as letters, digits, polygraphs, or bits which either have no intrinsic meaning or are treated without regard to their meaning in cases where the element is a natural-language word.

clandestine: Secret or hidden; conducted with secrecy by design.

clandestine activity: Secret or hidden activity conducted with secrecy by design. (The phrase *clandestine operation* is preferred. Operations are *preplanned* activities.)

clandestine collection: The acquisition of intelligence information in ways designed to assure the secrecy of the operation.

clandestine communication: Any type of communication or signal originated in support of clandestine operations. (Also see *illicit communication.*)

clandestine operation*: A pre-planned secret intelligence information collection activity or covert political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary action conducted so as to assure the secrecy of the operation; encompasses both clandestine collection and covert action.

Clandestine Services: That portion of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that engages in clandestine operations; sometimes used as synonymous with the CIA Operations Directorate.

classification: The determination that official information requires, in the interest of national security, a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made; the designation is normally termed a *security classification.* (Also see *declassification.*)

classification authority: Those officials within the Executive Branch who have been authorized pursuant to an Executive Order to originally classify information or material.

classified information*: Official information which has been determined to require, in the interests of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure and which has been so designated.

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*See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

code*: A cryptographic system in which the cryptographic equivalents (usually called *code groups*), typically consisting of letters or digits (or both) in otherwise meaningless combinations, are substituted for plain text elements such as words, phrases, or sentences.

code word*: Generally, a word or term which conveys a prearranged meaning other than the conventional one; specifically, a word or term chosen to conceal the identity of a function or action, as distinguished from a *cover* name which conceals the identity of a person, organization, or installation. (Also see *cover.*)

CODEWORD*: Any of a series of designated words or terms used with a security classification to indicate that the material so classified was derived through a sensitive source or method, constitutes a particular type of sensitive compartmented information (SCI), and is therefore accorded limited distribution.

collateral: All national security information classified under the provisions of an Executive Order for which special Intelligence Community systems of compartmentation (i.e., *sensitive compartmented information*) are not formally established.

collection*: See *intelligence cycle.*

collection guidance: See *guidance.*

collection requirement: An expression of an intelligence information need which requires collection and carries at least an implicit authorization to commit resources in acquiring the needed information. (Also see *intelligence requirement.*)

combat information: Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the customer's tactical intelligence requirements.

combat intelligence: That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (Also see *tactical intelligence.*)

Committee on Exchanges (COMEX): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee.* (Also see DCID 2/6.)

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee.* (Also see DCID 1/13.)

communications cover: See *manipulative communications cover.*

communications deception: The deliberate transmission, retransmission, alteration, absorption, or reflection of telecommunications in a manner intended to cause a misleading interpretation of these telecommunications. It includes:

2

a. **imitative communications deception**—Intrusion into foreign communications channels for the purpose of deception by introducing signals or traffic in imitation of the foreign communications.

b. **manipulative communications deception**—The alteration or simulation of friendly telecommunications for the purpose of deception.

communications intelligence* (COMINT): Technical and intelligence information derived from intercept of foreign communications by other than the intended recipients; it does not include the monitoring of foreign public media or the intercept of communications obtained during the course of counterintelligence investigations within the United States.

communications security* (COMSEC): The protection resulting from any measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from telecommunications, or to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications.

communications security signals acquisition and analysis: The acquisition of radio frequency propagation and its subsequent analysis to determine empirically the vulnerability of the transmission media to interception by hostile intelligence services; it includes cataloging the transmission spectrum and taking signal parametric measurements as required but does not include acquisition of information carried on the system; it is one of the techniques of communications security surveillance. (Also see *communications security surveillance.*)

communications security surveillance: The systematic examination of telecommunications and automatic data processing systems to determine the adequacy of communications security measures: to identify communications security deficiencies, to provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed communications security measures, and to confirm the adequacy of such measures after implementation.

Community On-Line Intelligence System (COINS): A network of Intelligence Community computer-based information storage and retrieval systems that have been interconnected for interagency sharing of machine formatted files.

compartmentation*: Formal systems of restricted access to intelligence activities, such systems established by and/or managed under the cognizance of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect the sensitive aspects of sources, methods, and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. (Also see *decompartmentation.*)

compromise*: The exposure of classified official information or activities to persons not authorized access thereto; hence, *unauthorized disclosure.* (Also see *classified information.*)

***See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

compromising emanations: Unintentional emissions which could disclose information being transmitted, received, or handled by any information-processing equipment.

computer security*: The computer-driven aspects of automatic data processing system security encompassing the mechanisms and techniques that control access to or use of the computer or information stored in it. (Also see *automatic data processing system security.*)

Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP): See *National Foreign Intelligence Program.*

Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS): The automated management information system used to identify and display the expected distribution of all intelligence resources within the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

consumer*: See *customer.*

co-opted worker: A national of a country but not an officer or employee of the country's intelligence service who assists that service on a temporary or regular basis. (In most circumstances a co-opted worker is an official of the country but might also be, for example, a tourist or student.)

coordination: (1) *(In general)* The process of seeking concurrence from one or more groups, organizations, or agencies regarding a proposal or an activity for which they share some responsibility, and which may result in contributions, concurrences, or dissents. (2) *(In intelligence production)* The process by which producers gain the views of other producers on the adequacy of a specific draft assessment, estimate, or report; it is intended to increase a product's factual accuracy, clarify its judgments, resolve disagreement on issues that permit, and sharpen statements of disagreement on, major unresolved issues.

counterintelligence*: See *foreign counterintelligence.*

cover: Protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to prevent identification with clandestine operations.

covert: See *clandestine.*

covert action: A clandestine operation designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of United States foreign policy; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities. Covert action is referred to in Executive Order No. 12036 as *special activities.* (See *special activities.*)

covert operation: See *clandestine operation* (preferred term). A covert operation encompasses covert action and clandestine collection.

Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee.* (Also see DCID 2/2.)

3

critical intelligence*: Intelligence information or intelligence of such urgent importance to the security of the United States that it is transmitted at the highest priority to the President and other national decisionmaking officials before passing through regular evaluative channels.

Critical Intelligence Communications System (CRITI-COMM): Those communications facilities under the operational and technical control of the Director, National Security Agency which have been allocated for the timely handling of critical intelligence. (Also see *critical intelligence.*)

critical intelligence message* (CRITIC): A message designated as containing critical intelligence. (Also see *critical intelligence.*)

cryptanalysis (CA): The steps or processes involved in converting encrypted messages into plain text without initial knowledge of the system or key employed in the encryption.

CRYPTO: A designation which is applied to classified, cryptographic information which involves special rules for access and handling. (Also see *cryptographic information.*)

cryptographic information: All information significantly descriptive of cryptographic techniques and processes or of cryptographic systems and equipment, or their functions and capabilities, and all cryptomaterial ("significantly descriptive" means that the information could, if made known to unauthorized persons, permit recovery of specific cryptographic features of classified crypto-equipment, reveal weaknesses of associated equipment which could allow recovery of plain text or of key, aid materially in the cryptanalysis of a general or specific cryptosystem, or lead to the cryptanalysis of an individual message, command, or authentication). (Also see *CRYPTO.*)

cryptographic security: The component of communications security that results from the provision of technically sound cryptographic systems and which provides for their proper use.

cryptographic system: All associated items of cryptomaterial (e.g., equipment and their removable components which perform cryptographic functions, operating instructions, and maintenance manuals) that are used as a unit to provide a single means of encryption and decryption of plain text so that its meaning may be concealed; also any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising, authenticating, or concealing the contents, significance, or. meanings of communications; short name: *cryptosystem.*

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*See Appendix B. Alternate Definitions

cryptography*: The branch of cryptology used to provide a means of encryption and deception of plain text so that its meaning may be concealed.

cryptologic activities: The activities and operations involved in the production of signals intelligence and the maintenance of signals security.

cryptology: The science of producing signals intelligence and maintaining signals security. (Also see *cryptanalysis* and *cryptography.*)

cryptomaterial*: All material (including documents, devices, or equipment) that contains cryptographic information and is essential to the encryption, decryption, or authentication of telecommunications.

cryptosecurity: Shortened form of *cryptographic security.* See above.

cryptosystem: Shortened form of *cryptographic system.* See above.

current intelligence*: Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest to the users of intelligence; it may be disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation, interpretation, analysis, or integration.

customer: An authorized person who uses intelligence or intelligence information either to produce other intelligence or directly in the decisionmaking process; it is synonymous with *consumer* and *user.*

damage assessment: (1) *(Intelligence Community context.)* An evaluation of the impact of a compromise in terms of loss of intelligence information, sources, or methods, and which may describe and/or recommend measures to minimize damage and prevent future compromises. (2) *(Military context.)* An appraisal of the effects of an attack on one or more elements of a nation's strength (military, economic, and political) to determine residual capability for further military action in support of planning for recovery and reconstitution.

DCID 1/2 Attachment: An annual publication by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) which establishes a priorities classification system; it presents requirements categories and foreign countries in a geotopical matrix, against which priorities are assigned which provide the Intelligence Community with basic substantive priorities guidance for the conduct of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities; it includes a system for adjusting priorities between annual publications; priorities are approved by the DCI with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. (Also see *priority.*)

deception: Those measures designed to mislead a foreign power, organization, or person by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Also see *communications deception, electronic countermeasures,* and *manipulative deception.*)

4

declassification: Removal of official information from the protective status afforded by security classification; it requires a determination that disclosure no longer would be detrimental to national security. (Also see *classification*.)

decode: To convert an encoded message into plain text.

decompartmentation: The removal of information from a compartmentation system without altering the information to conceal sources, methods, or analytical procedures. (Also see *compartmentation*.)

decrypt: To transform an encrypted communication into its equivalent plain text.

decipher: To convert an enciphered communication into its equivalent plain text.

defector*: A national of a designated country who has escaped from its control or who, being outside its jurisdiction and control, is unwilling to return and who is of special value to another government because he is able to add valuable new or confirmatory intelligence information to existing knowledge about his country. (Also see *emigre, refugee,* and *disaffected person*.)

Defense Intelligence Community*: Refers to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Military Services' intelligence offices including Department of Defense (DoD) collectors of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs.

departmental intelligence*: Foreign intelligence produced and used within a governmental department or agency in meeting its assigned responsibilities.

direction finding (DF): A procedure for obtaining bearings on radio frequency emitters with the use of a directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver or ancillary equipment.

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): The President's principal foreign intelligence adviser appointed by him with the consent of the Senate to be the head of the Intelligence Community and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and to discharge those authorities and responsibilities as they are prescribed by law and by Presidential and National Security Council directives.

Director of Central Intelligence Committee: Any one of several committees established by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to advise him and to perform whatever functions he shall determine; DCI Committees usually deal with Intelligence Community concerns, and their terms of reference ordinarily are specified in DCI Directives; members may be drawn from all components of the Intelligence Community. (Also see *Director of Central Intelligence Directive*.)

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID): A directive issued by the Director of Central Intelligence which outlines general policies and procedures to be followed by intelligence agencies and organizations which are under his direction or overview.

disaffected person: A person apparently disenchanted with his current situation who may therefore be exploitable for intelligence purposes; e.g., by the willingness to become an *agent* or *defector*. (Also see *walk-in*.)

disclosure: The authorized release of classified information through approved channels.

dissemination*: See *intelligence cycle*.

domestic collection: The acquisition of foreign intelligence information within the United States from governmental or nongovernmental organizations or individuals who are witting sources and choose to cooperate by sharing such information.

double agent*: An agent who is cooperating with an intelligence service of one government on behalf of and under the control of an intelligence or security service of another government, and is manipulated by one to the detriment of the other.

downgrade: To change a security classification from a higher to a lower level.

economic intelligence*: Foreign intelligence concerning the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, labor, finance, taxation, and other aspects of the international economic system.

Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see DCID 3/1.)

electro-optical intelligence (ELECTRO-OPTINT): Intelligence information derived from the optical monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet (0.01 micrometers) through far (long wavelength) infrared (1,000 micrometers). (Also see *optical intelligence*.)

electronic countermeasures (ECM): That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic countermeasures include *electronic jamming*, which is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing the uses of electronic equipment used by an adversary; and *electronic deception*, which is similar but is intended to mislead an adversary in the interpretation of information received by his electronic system.

electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM): The division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to ensure the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite an adversary's use of electronic countermeasures. (Also see *electronic warfare*.)

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electronic emission security: Those measures taken to protect all transmissions from interception and electronic analysis.

electronic intelligence* (ELINT): Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources.

electronic order of battle* (EOB): A listing of non-communications electronic devices including site designation, nomenclature, location, site function, and any other pertinent information obtained from any source and which has military significance when related to the devices.

electronic security* (ELSEC): The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from their intercept and analysis of non-communications electromagnetic radiations; e.g., radar.

electronic surveillance*: Acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.

electronic warfare (EW): Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (The three divisions of electronic warfare are: electronic warfare support measures, electronic countermeasures, and electronic counter-countermeasures.)

electronic warfare support measures (ESM): That division of electronic warfare involving actions to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of exploiting such radiations in support of military operations; thus, electronic warfare support measures provide a source of electronic warfare information which may be used for immediate action involving conduct of electronic countermeasures, electronic counter-countermeasures, threat detection and avoidance, target acquisition, homing, and other combat support measures.

emanations security (EMSEC): The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from other than cryptographic equipment and telecommunications systems. (Also see emission security.)

emigre: A person who departs from his country for any lawful reason with the intention of permanently resettling elsewhere. (Also see refugee and defector.)

* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

emission security: The component of communications security resulting from all measures taken to deny to unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptographic equipment and telecommunications systems. (Also see emanations security.)

encode: To convert plain text into a different form by means of a code.

encipher*: To encrypt plain text by means of a cipher. (Also see cipher.)

encrypt*: To convert plain text into a different form in order to conceal its meaning.

end product: See finished intelligence. (Also see product.)

energy intelligence: Intelligence relating to the technical, economic and political capabilities and programs of foreign countries to engage in development, utilization, and commerce of basic and advanced energy technologies; it includes: the location and extent of foreign energy resources and their allocation; foreign government energy policies, plans, and programs; new and improved foreign energy technologies; and economic and security aspects of foreign energy supply, demand, production distribution, and utilization.

espionage*: Intelligence activity directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine means and proscribed by the laws of the country against which it is committed.

essential elements of information (EEI): Those items of intelligence information essential for timely decisions and for enhancement of operations and which relate to foreign power, forces, targets, or the physical environment.

estimative intelligence: A category of intelligence which attempts to project probable future foreign courses of action and developments and their implications for U.S. interests; it may or may not be coordinated and may be either national or departmental intelligence.

evaluation*: Appraisal of the worth of an intelligence activity, information, or product in terms of its contribution to a specific goal; or the credibility, reliability, pertinency, accuracy, or usefulness of information in terms of an intelligence need. Evaluation may be used without reference to cost or risk, particularly when contrasted with assessment (Also see assessment); it is also a process in the production step of the intelligence cycle. (See intelligence cycle.)

evasion and escape (E & E): The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from enemy-held or hostile areas to areas under friendly control.

evasion and escape intelligence: Processed intelligence information prepared to assist personnel to avoid capture if lost in enemy-dominated territory or to escape if captured.

exploitation*: The process of obtaining intelligence information from any source and taking advantage of it for intelligence purposes. (Also see *source.*)

finished intelligence: The result of the production step of the intelligence cycle; the intelligence product. (Also see *intelligence cycle* and *end product.*)

foreign affairs community: Those U.S. Government departments, agencies, and other organizations which are represented in U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, and those which may not be represented abroad but are significantly involved in international activities with the governments of other nations.

foreign counterintelligence (FCI): Intelligence activity, with its resultant product, intended to detect, counteract, and/or prevent espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist activities, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons; it does not include personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs.

foreign instrumentation signals (FIS): Electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems which may have either military or civilian application; it includes but is not limited to the signals from telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, tracking/fusing/arming/command systems, and video data links.

foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT): Technical and intelligence information derived from intercept of foreign instrumentation signals (see above).

foreign intelligence* (FI): The product resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of intelligence information about a foreign power and which is significant to the national security, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States, and which is provided by a government agency that is assigned an intelligence mission (i.e., an *intelligence agency*). (Also see *intelligence cycle.*)

foreign intelligence service: An organization of a foreign government which engages in intelligence activities.

foreign materiel (FORMAT) intelligence: Intelligence derived from the exploitation of foreign materiel.

foreign official: A person acting in an official capacity on behalf of a foreign power, attached to a foreign diplomatic establishment or an establishment under the control of a foreign power, or employed by a public international organization.

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system: An infrared imaging system which raster scans the scene viewed by internal means, both horizontally and vertically; it can be spaceborne, airborne, seaborne, mounted on a ground vehicle, or placed at a fixed site; and its field of view is determined by the optics used, the scanning mechanism, and the dimensions of the detector array.

fusion: The blending of intelligence information from multiple sources to produce a single intelligence product.

fusion center: A term used within the Department of Defense referring to an organization having the responsibility of blending both compartmented intelligence information with all other available information in order to support military operations. (Also see *actionable intelligence* and *tactical intelligence.*)

General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP): See *National Foreign Intelligence Program.*

geographic(al) intelligence: Foreign intelligence dealing with the location, description, and analysis of physical and cultural factors of the world, (e.g., terrain, climate, natural resources, transportation, boundaries, population distribution) and their changes through time.

general medical intelligence (GMI): See *medical intelligence.*

guidance*: Advice which identifies, interprets, clarifies, and/or expands upon an information need. (Also see *information need.*)

human intelligence (HUMINT): A category of intelligence information derived from human sources. (Also see *human source reporting* and *human resources collection.*)

human resources collection: All activities which attend collection of intelligence information from human sources. (See *human intelligence* and *human source.*)

Human Resources Committee (HRC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee.* (Also see DCID 1/17.)

human source: A person who wittingly or unwittingly conveys by any means information of potential intelligence value to an intelligence activity.

human source reporting: The flow of intelligence information from those who gather it to the customer; it may come from information gathering activities either within or outside the Intelligence Community. (A form of the term is also used to denote an item of information being conveyed, as in *human source report.*) (Also see *human intelligence.*)

illegal: An officer or employee of an intelligence organization who is dispatched abroad and who has no overt connection with the intelligence organization with which he is connected or with the government operating that intelligence organization.

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illegal agent: An agent operated by an illegal residency or directly by the headquarters of an intelligence organization. (Also see *illegal residency*.)

illegal communication: An electronic communication or signal made without the legal sanction of the nation where it originates.

illegal residency: An intelligence apparatus established in a foreign country and composed of one or more intelligence officers, and which has no apparent connection with the sponsoring intelligence organization or with the government of the country operating the intelligence organization. (Also see *legal residency*.)

illicit communication: An electronic communication or signal originated in support of clandestine operations; it is a type of clandestine communication.

imagery: Representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media.

imagery intelligence (IMINT): The collected products of imagery interpretation processed for intelligence use. (Also see *imagery interpretation* below.)

imagery interpretation (II): The process of locating, recognizing, identifying, and describing objects, activities, and terrain represented by imagery; it includes *photographic interpretation*.

imitative communications deception: See *communications deception*.

imitative deception: The introduction into foreign channels of electromagnetic radiations which imitate his own emissions.

indications and warning (I & W): Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to U.S. or allied military, political, or economic interests, or to U.S. citizens abroad. It encompasses forewarning of: enemy hostile actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; serious insurgency; nuclear/nonnuclear attack on the U.S., its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities; terrorist attacks; and other similar events.

information: Unevaluated material of every description, at all levels of reliability, and from any source which may contain intelligence information. (Also see *intelligence information*.)

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* See Appendix B; Alternate Definitions

information handling: Management of data or information which may occur in connection with any step in the intelligence cycle; such management may involve activities to transform, manipulate, index, code, categorize, store, select, retrieve, associate or display intelligence materials; it may involve the use of printing, photographic, computer or communications equipment, systems or networks; it may include software programs to operate computers and process data and/or information; and may include information contained in reports, files, data bases, reference services and libraries.

information security: Safeguarding knowledge against unauthorized disclosure; or, the result of any system of administrative policies and procedures for identifying, controlling, and protecting from unauthorized disclosure or release to the public, information the protection of which is authorized by executive order or statute.

information need: The requirement of an official involved in the policymaking process or the intelligence production process for the best available information and intelligence on which to base policy decisions, recommendations, or intelligence production.

infrared imagery: A likeness or impression produced as a result of sensing electromagnetic radiations emitted or reflected from a given target surface in the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.

integration*: A process in the production step of the intelligence cycle in which a pattern is formed through the selection and combination of evaluated intelligence information. (Also see *intelligence cycle*.)

intelligence*: (1) A body of evidence and the conclusions drawn therefrom which is acquired and furnished in response to the known or perceived requirements of customers; it is often derived from information which is concealed or not intended to be available for use by the acquirer; it is the product of a cyclical process. (Also see *intelligence cycle*.)

Examples:
— Policy development requires good *intelligence*.
— Timely *intelligence* is important to informed decisionmaking.

(2) A term used to refer collectively to the functions, activities, or organizations which are involved in the process of planning, gathering, and analyzing information of potential value to decisionmakers and to the production of intelligence as defined in (1) above. (Also see *foreign intelligence* and *foreign counterintelligence*.)

Examples:
— Human source collection is an important *intelligence* activity.
— Central *Intelligence* Agency.
— *Intelligence* is a demanding profession.

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intelligence activity(ies)*: A generic term used to encompass any or all of the efforts and endeavors undertaken by intelligence organizations. (Also see *intelligence organization.*)

intelligence agency: A component organization of the Intelligence Community. (Also see *Intelligence Community.*)

intelligence assessment: A category of intelligence production that encompasses most analytical studies dealing with subjects of policy significance; it is thorough in its treatment of subject matter—as distinct from building-block papers, research projects, and reference aids—but unlike estimative intelligence need not attempt to project future developments and their implications; it is usually coordinated within the producing organization but may not be coordinated with other intelligence agencies. (Also see *estimative intelligence.*)

intelligence asset: Any resource—person, group, instrument, installation, or technical system—at the disposal of an intelligence organization.

intelligence collector: A phrase sometimes used to refer to an organization or agency that engages in the collection step of the intelligence cycle. (Also see *intelligence cycle.*)

Intelligence Community (IC): A term which, in the aggregate, refers to the following Executive Branch organizations and activities: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State; intelligence elements of the military services; intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); intelligence elements of the Department of Treasury; intelligence elements of the Department of Energy; intelligence elements of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff): A term referring to an organization under the direction and control of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) formed to assist the DCI in discharging his responsibilities relating to the Intelligence Community.

intelligence consumer: See *customer.*

intelligence cycle*: The processes by which information is acquired and converted into intelligence and made available to customers. There are usually five steps in the cycle:

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

a. **planning and direction**—determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection entities, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection entities.

b. **collection***—acquisition of information or intelligence information and the provision of this to processing and/or production elements.

c. **processing***—conversion of collected information and/or intelligence information into a form more suitable for the production of intelligence.

d. **production***—conversion of information or intelligence information into finished intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and/or interpretation of all available data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated customer requirements.

e. **dissemination***—conveyance of intelligence in suitable form to customers.

intelligence estimate*: The product of *estimative intelligence.*

intelligence information*: Information of potential intelligence value concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of any foreign power, organization, or associated personnel.

Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee.* (Also see DCID 1/4.)

intelligence information report: A product of the collection step of the intelligence cycle. (Also see *intelligence report.*)

intelligence officer: A professional employee of an intelligence organization who is engaged in intelligence activities.

intelligence organization: A generic term used to refer to any organization engaged in intelligence activities; it may include either an intelligence agency or a foreign intelligence service, or both. (Also see *intelligence agency* and *foreign intelligence service.*)

Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB): A body formed by appointment of the President to provide him and the Attorney General with reports and advice on the legality and propriety of intelligence activities; membership and duties are expressed in Executive Order No. 12036.

intelligence producer: A phrase usually used to refer to an organization or agency that participates in the production step of the intelligence cycle. (Also see *intelligence cycle.*)

intelligence related activities (IRA): Those activities specifically excluded from the National Foreign Intelligence Program which: respond to departmental or agency tasking for time-sensitive information on foreign activities, respond to national Intelligence Community advisory tasking of collection capabilities which have a primary mission of supporting departmental or agency missions or operational forces, of training personnel for intelligence duties, or are devoted to research and development for intelligence and related capabilities.

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intelligence report*: A product of the production step of the intelligence cycle. (Also see *intelligence information report*.)

intelligence requirement*: Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of intelligence information or the production of intelligence. (Also see *collection requirement*.)

Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR & DC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see DCID 1/12.)

intelligence user: See *customer*.

Interagency Defector Committee (IDC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see DCID 4/1.)

interagency intelligence memorandum (IIM): A national intelligence assessment or estimate issued by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of appropriate National Foreign Intelligence Board components.

intercept(ion)*: Acquisition for intelligence purposes of electromagnetic signals (such as radio communications) by electronic collection equipment without the consent of the signallers.

intercept station: A station which intercepts communications or non-communications transmissions for intelligence purposes.

international lines of communications (ILC): Those communications services which are under the supervision of the International Telecommunication Union and which carry paid public communications traffic between different countries; also known as: International Civil Communications, International Commercial Communications, Internationally-Leased Communications, International Service of Public Correspondence, and commercial communications.

international terrorist activity*: The calculated use of violence, or the threat of violence, to attain political goals through fear, intimidation or coercion; usually involves a criminal act, often symbolic in nature, and is intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims. *International terrorism* transcends national boundaries in the carrying out of the act, the purpose of the act, the nationalities of the victims, or the resolution of the incident; such an act is usually designed to attract wide publicity in order to focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands of the perpetrators.

interpretation: A process in the production step of the intelligence cycle in which the significance of information or intelligence information is weighed relative to the available body of knowledge. (Also see *intelligence cycle*.)

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see DCID 3/3.)

joint intelligence: (1) *(Military context.)* Intelligence produced by elements of more than one military service of the same nation. (2) *(Intelligence Community context.)* Intelligence produced by intelligence organizations of more than one country.

laser intelligence (LASINT): Technical and intelligence information derived from laser systems; it is a subcategory of *electo-optical intelligence*. (See *electro-optical intelligence*.)

legal residency: An intelligence apparatus in a foreign country and composed of intelligence officers assigned as overt representatives of their government but not necessarily identified as intelligence officers. (Also see *illegal residency*.)

manipulative communications cover: Those measures taken to alter or conceal the characteristics of communications so as to deny to any enemy or potential enemy the means to identify them. Also known as *communications cover*.

manipulative communications deception: See *communications deception*.

manipulative deception: The alteration or simulation of friendly electromagnetic radiations to accomplish deception.

measurement and signature intelligence* (MASINT): Scientific and technical intelligence information obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same.

medical intelligence* (MEDINT): Foreign intelligence related to all aspects of foreign natural and man-made environments which could influence the health of military forces; it incorporates general medical intelligence which is concerned with foreign biological medical capabilities and health situations, and medical scientific and technical intelligence which assesses and predicts technological advances of medical significance, to include defense against Chemical, Biological, Radiological Warfare; it applies to both tactical and strategic planning and operations, including military and humanitarian efforts. (Also see *biographical intelligence*.)

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military intelligence (MI): Basic, current, or estimative intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity.

monitor: To observe, listen to, intercept, record, or transcribe any form of communication or media for collection of intelligence information or communications security purposes, either overtly or covertly.

multi-level security: *(For automatic data processing (ADP) systems.)* Provisions for the safeguarding of all information within a multilevel information handling system. The multilevel information handling system permits various levels, categories, and/or compartments of material to be concurrently stored and processed in a remotely-accessed resource-sharing ADP system, while simultaneously permitting material to be selectively accessed and manipulated from variously controlled terminals by personnel having different security clearances and access approvals. Security measures are therefore aimed at ensuring proper matches between information security and personnel security. (Also see *uni-level security.*)

national estimate: See *national intelligence estimate.*

National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC): An organization established by and under the control and supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence, which is responsible for production of national intelligence.

National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB): A body formed to provide the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with advice concerning: production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; the protection of intelligence sources or methods; activities of common concern; and such other matters as are referred to it by the DCI. It is composed of the DCI (chairman), and other appropriate officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the DCI, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, the offices within the Department of Defense for reconnaissance programs, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; senior intelligence officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force participate as observers; a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may also attend meetings as an observer.

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP): Includes the programs listed below, but its composition shall be subject to review by the National Security Council and modification by the President.
 (a) The programs of the Central Intelligence Agency;
 (b) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and the programs of the offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance except such elements as the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded;
 (c) Other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
 (d) Activities of the staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
 (e) Activities to acquire the intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations by the United States military forces are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

national intelligence*: Foreign intelligence produced under the aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence and intended primarily to be responsive to the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other Federal officials involved in the formulation and execution of national security, foreign political, and/or economic policy.

national intelligence asset: An intelligence asset funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the primary purpose of which is the collection or processing of intelligence information or the production of national intelligence. (Also see *intelligence asset* and *national intelligence.*)

National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE): A thorough assessment of a situation in the foreign environment which is relevant to the formulation of foreign, economic, and national security policy, and which projects probable future courses of action and developments; it is structured to illuminate differences of view within the Intelligence Community; it is issued by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. (Also see *Special National Intelligence Estimate.*)

National Intelligence Officer (NIO): The senior staff officer of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the DCI's Deputy for National Intelligence for an assigned area of substantive responsibility; he manages estimative and interagency intelligence production on behalf of the DCI; he is the principal point of contact between the DCI and intelligence consumers below the cabinet level; he is charged with monitoring and coordinating that portion of the National Foreign Assessment Center's production that involves more than one office or that is interdisciplinary in character; and is a primary source of national-level substantive guidance to Intelligence Community planners, collectors, and resource managers.

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National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC): The central organizational mechanism established under the direction, control and management of the Director of Central Intelligence for coordinating and tasking national foreign intelligence collection activities, and for providing advisory tasking to other intelligence and information gathering activities.

national security: The territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international freedom of action of the United States. (*Intelligence activities relating to national security* encompass all the military, economic, political, scientific and technological, and other aspects of foreign developments which pose actual or potential threats to U.S. national interests.)

national/tactical interface: A relationship between national and tactical intelligence activities encompassing the full range of fiscal, technical, operational, and programmatic matters.

near-real-time: The brief interval between the collection of information regarding an event and reception of the data at some other location, caused by the time required for processing, communications, and display.

net assessment: A comparative review and analysis of opposing national strengths, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses. (An *intelligence net assessment* involves only foreign countries.)

nuclear intelligence (NUCINT): Intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources.

nuclear proliferation intelligence: Foreign intelligence relating to (1) scientific, technical, and economic capabilities and programs and the political plans and intentions of nonnuclear weapons states or foreign organizations to acquire nuclear weapons and/or to acquire the requisite special nuclear materials and to carry on research, development, and manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, and; (2) the attitudes, policies, and actions of foreign nuclear supplier countries or organizations within these countries toward provision of technologies, facilities, or special nuclear materials which could assist nonnuclear weapon states or foreign organizations to acquire or develop nuclear explosive devices.

official: See *foreign official.*

official information: Information which is subject to the control of the United States Government.

open source information: A generic term describing information of potential intelligence value (i.e., *intelligence information*) which is available to the general public.

operational control (OPCON): (*military context*) The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy the forces concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those forces. (It does not, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.)

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

operational intelligence* (OPINTEL): Intelligence required for planning and executing operations.

operations security (OPSEC): Those measures designed to protect information concerning planned, ongoing, and completed operations against unauthorized disclosure.

optical intelligence (OPTINT): That portion of electro-optical intelligence that deals with visible light. (Also see *electro-optical* intelligence.)

order of battle (OB): Intelligence pertaining to identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any foreign military force. (Also see *technical intelligence.*)

overt: Open; done without attempt at concealment.

overt collection: The acquisition of intelligence information from public media, observation, government-to-government dialogue, elicitation, and from the sharing of data openly acquired; the process may be classified or unclassified; the target and host governments as well as the sources involved normally are aware of the general collection activity although the specific acquisition, sites, and processes may be successfully concealed.

penetration: (1) *(clandestine operations.)* The recruitment of agents within or the infiltration of agents or introduction of technical monitoring devices into an organization or group or physical facility for the purpose of acquiring information or influencing its activities. (2) *(automatic data processing (ADP) operations.)* The unauthorized extraction and identification of recognizable information from a protected ADP system.

personnel security: The means or procedures—such as selective investigations, record checks, personal interviews, and supervisory controls—designed to provide reasonable assurance that persons being considered for or granted access to classified information are loyal and trustworthy.

photographic intelligence (PHOTINT): The collected products of photographic interpretation classified and evaluated for intelligence use; it is a category of *imagery intelligence.*

photographic interpretation (PI): The process of locating, recognizing, identifying, and describing objects, activities, and terrain represented on photography; it is a category of *imagery interpretation.*

physical security*: Physical measures—such as safes, vaults, perimeter barriers, guard systems, alarms and access controls—designed to safeguard installations against damage, disruption or unauthorized entry; information or material against unauthorized access or theft; and specified personnel against harm.

plain text*: Normal text or language, or any symbol or signal, that conveys information without any hidden or secret meaning.

planning and direction: See *intelligence cycle.*

12

Policy Review Committee (As pertains to intelligence matters) (PRC(I)): A committee established under the National Security Council which when meeting under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence is empowered to establish requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence and to evaluate the quality of the intelligence product; it is sometimes referred to as the *Policy Review Committee (Intelligence)*; its specific duties are defined in Executive Order No. 12036.

political intelligence*: Intelligence concerning the dynamics of the internal and external political affairs of foreign countries, regional groupings, multilateral treaty arrangements and organizations, and foreign political movements directed against or impacting upon established governments or authority.

positive intelligence: A term of convenience sometimes applied to foreign intelligence to distinguish it from foreign counterintelligence.

priority: A value denoting a preferential rating or precedence in position which is used to discriminate among competing entities; the term normally used in conjunction with intelligence requirements in order to illuminate importance and to guide the actions planned, being planned, or in use, to respond to the requirements.

processing*: See *intelligence cycle*.

product: (1) An intelligence report disseminated to customers by an intelligence agency. (2) In SIGINT usage, intelligence information derived from analysis of SIGINT materials and published as a report or translation for dissemination to customers. (Also see *production* in Appendix B.)

production*: See *intelligence cycle*.

proprietary: A business entity owned, in whole or in part, or controlled by an intelligence organization and operated to provide private commercial cover for an intelligence activity of that organization. (Also see *cover*.)

radar intelligence (RADINT): Intelligence information derived from data collected by radar.

radiation intelligence* (RINT): The functions and characteristics derived from information obtained from unintentional electromagnetic energy emanating from foreign devices; excludes nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.

raw intelligence: A colloquial term meaning collected intelligence information which has not yet been converted into intelligence. (Also see *intelligence information*.)

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

reconnaissance (RECCE or RECON): An operation undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods information relating to the activities, resources or forces of a foreign nation; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

recruitment-in-place: A person who agrees to become an agent and retain his position in his organization or government while reporting on it to an intelligence or security organization of a foreign country.

RED/BLACK Concept: The separation of electrical and electronic circuits, components, equipment, and systems which handle classified plain language information in electric signal form (RED) from those which handle encrypted or unclassified information (BLACK); RED and BLACK terminology is used to clarify specific criteria relating to and differentiating between such circuits, components, equipment, and systems and the areas in which they are contained.

refugee: A person who is outside the country or area of his former habitual residence and who, because of fear of being persecuted or because of hostilities in that country or area, is unwilling or unable to return to it. (Also see *defector* and *emigre*.)

report: See *intelligence report* and *intelligence information report*.

requirement*: See *intelligence requirement* or *collection requirement*.

residency: See *illegal residency* and *legal residency*

sabotage: Action against material, premises or utilities, or their production, which injures, interferes with, or obstructs the national security or ability of a nation to prepare for or carry on a war.

safe house: A house or premises controlled by an intelligence organization that affords—at least temporarily—security for individuals involved or equipment used in clandestine operations.

sanitization: The process of editing or otherwise altering intelligence information or reports to protect sensitive intelligence sources, methods, capabilities, analytical procedures, or privileged information in order to permit wider dissemination.

scientific and technical (S & T) intelligence*: Intelligence concerning foreign developments in basic and applied scientific and technical research and development including engineering and production techniques, new technology, and weapon systems and their capabilities and characteristics; it also includes intelligence which requires scientific or technical expertise on the part of the analyst, such as medicine, physical health studies, and behavioral analyses.

13

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see DCID 3/5.)

security: Establishment and maintenance of protective measures which are intended to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.

TYPES OF SECURITY

Automatic Data Processing System Security
Communications Security
Computer Security
Cryptographic Security
Electronic Emission Security
Electronic Security
Emanation Security
Emission Security
Information Security
Multi-level Security
National Security
Operations Security
Personnel Security
Physical Security
Signals Security
Transmission Security
Uni-level Security

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security classification: See *classification.*

Security Committee (SECOM): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see DCID 1/11.)

sensitive*: Requiring special protection from disclosure to avoid compromise or threat to the security of the sponsor.

sensitive compartmented information* (SCI): All information and material requiring special controls for restricted handling within compartmented intelligence systems and for which compartmentation is established. (Also see *compartmentation.*)

sensitive intelligence sources and methods: A collective term for those persons, organizations, things, conditions, or events that provide intelligence information and those means used in the collection, processing, and production of such information which, if compromised, would be vulnerable to counteraction that could reasonably be expected to reduce their ability to support U.S. intelligence activities.

Service Cryptologic Agency(ies) (SCA): See *Service Cryptologic Elements*.

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

Service Cryptologic Elements: A term used to designate separately or together those elements of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force which perform cryptologic functions; also known as Service Cryptologic Agencies and Service Cryptologic Organizations.

Service Cryptologic Organizations (SCO): See *Service Cryptologic Elements*.

sensor: (1) A technical device designed to detect and respond to one or more particular stimulae and which may record and/or transmit a resultant impulse for interpretation or measurement; often called a *technical sensor*. (2) *special sensor:* An unclassified term used as a matter of convenience to refer to a highly classified or controlled technical sensor.

side-looking airborne radar (SLAR): An airborne radar, viewing at right angles to the axis of the vehicle, which produces a presentation of terrain or targets.

SIGINT activity: Any activity conducted for the purpose of producing signals intelligence. (Also see *SIGINT-related activity*.)

SIGINT Committee: See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see DCID 6/1.)

SIGINT-related activity: Any activity primarily intended for a purpose(s) other than signals intelligence (SIGINT), but which can be used to produce SIGINT, or which produces SIGINT as a by-product of its principal function(s). (Also see *SIGINT activity*.)

SIGINT technical information: Information concerning or derived from intercepted foreign transmissions or radiations which is composed of technical *information* (as opposed to *intelligence*) and which is required in the further collection or analysis of signals intelligence.

signal*: Anything intentionally transmitted by visual and other electromagnetic, nuclear, or acoustical methods for either communications or non-communications purposes.

signals intelligence* (SIGINT): Intelligence information comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted.

signals security (SIGSEC): A term which includes communications security and electronics security and which encompasses measures intended to deny or counter hostile exploitation of electronic emissions.

signals security acquisition and analysis: The acquisition of electronic emissions and subsequent analysis to determine empirically the susceptibility of the emission to interception and exploitation by hostile intelligence services; it includes cataloging the transmission spectrum and taking signal parametric measurements as required, but does not include acquisition of information carried on the system; it is one of the techniques of *signals security surveillance*. (Also see *signals security surveillance*.)

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signals security surveillance: The systematic examination of electronic emissions to determine the adequacy of signals security measures, to identify signals security deficiencies, to provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed signals security measures, and to confirm the adequacy of such measures after implementation.

source*: A person, device, system, or activity from which intelligence information is obtained. (Also see *human source* and *sensitive intelligence sources and methods*.)

special activities: As defined in Executive Order No. 12036, activities conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives which are designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad and which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but not including diplomatic activity or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions; also known as *covert action*. (Also see *covert action*.)

Special Activities Office(r) (SAO): A control point for certain categories of compartmented information. (The acronym is often used to refer to the compartmented information itself.)

Special Coordination Committee (SCC): A committee established under the National Security Council which deals *inter alia* with the oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, such as covert actions, which are undertaken on Presidential authority.

special intelligence (SI): An unclassified term used to designate a category of sensitive compartmented information (SCI). (Also see *sensitive compartmented information*.)

special intelligence communications* (SPINT-COMM): A communications network for the handling of all special intelligence and consisting of those facilities under the operational and technical control of the chief of intelligence of each of the military departments, under the management of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and under the technical and security specification criteria established and monitored by the National Security Agency.

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE): National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) which are relevant to specific policy problems that need to be addressed in the immediate future. SNIEs are generally unscheduled, shorter, and prepared more quickly than NIEs and are coordinated within the Intelligence Community to the extent that time permits. (Also see *National Intelligence Estimate*.)

Special Security Office(r) (SSO): A control point for security procedures within any activity authorized access to sensitive compartmented information.

special sensor*: See *sensor*.

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* See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions

strategic intelligence: Intelligence which is required for the formulation of policy and military plans at national and international levels; it differs primarily from tactical intelligence in level of use, but may also vary in scope and detail.

strategic warning: Intelligence information or intelligence regarding the threat of the initiation of hostilities against the U.S. or in which U.S. forces may become involved; it may be received at any time prior to the initiation of hostilities.

Support for the Analysts' File Environment (SAFE): A joint CIA/DIA project to develop a new computer /microfilm m system to support production analysts in reading, filing, and routing cable traffic; building and searching private and central files; and writing, editing, and routing intelligence memoranda and reports.

surveillance: The systematic observation or monitoring of places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

tactical intelligence* (TACINTEL): Foreign intelligence produced under the aegis of the Secretary of Defense and intended primarily to be responsive to the needs of military commanders in the field to maintain the readiness of operating forces for combat operations and to support the planning and conduct of combat operations. (Also see *combat intelligence*.)

tactical intelligence asset: An intelligence asset funded in Department of Defense programs, the primary purpose of which is the collection or processing of intelligence information or the production of tactical intelligence. (Also see *tactical intelligence* and *intelligence asset*.)

target: A country, area, installation, organization, weapon system, military force, situation (political or economic), signal, person, or other entity against which intelligence operations are conducted.

target intelligence: Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its identification, vulnerability, and relative importance.

tasking: The assignment or direction of an individual or activity to perform in a specified way to achieve an objective or goal.

technical intelligence (TI): Intelligence on the characteristics and performance of foreign weapons and equipment; a part of *scientific and technical intelligence* and distinct from *order of battle*.

technical sensor: See *sensor*.

technical SIGINT: Intelligence information which provides a detailed knowledge of the technical characteristics of a given emitter and thus permits estimates to be made about its primary function, capabilities, modes of operation (including malfunctions), and state-of-the-art, as well as its specific role within a complex weapon system or defense network; it is a contributor to *technical intelligence.*

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telecommunications: Any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writing, images, and sounds or information of any nature by wire, radio, visual, or other electromagnetic systems.

telemetry intelligence (TELINT): Technical and intelligence information derived from intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry; a subcategory of *foreign instrumentation signals intelligence*.

teleprocessing: The overall function of an information transmission system which combines telecommunications, automatic data processing, and man-machine interface equipment and their interaction as an integrated whole.

TEMPEST: An unclassified term referring to technical investigations for compromising emanations from electrically operated, information processing equipment; they are conducted in support of emanations and emission security.

terrorist organization: A group that engages in terrorist activities. (Also see *international terrorist activity*.)

traffic analysis (TA): The cryptologic discipline which develops information from communications about the composition and operation of communications structures and the organizations they serve. The process involves the study of traffic and related materials, and the reconstruction of communication plans, to produce signals intelligence.

transmission security (TRANSEC): The component of communications security which results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and from exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis.

unauthorized disclosure: See *compromise*.

uni-level security: *(For automatic data processing systems)* Provision for the safeguarding of all material within a single information handling system in accordance with the highest level of classification and most restrictive dissemination caveats assigned to any material contained therein, as distinguished from multilevel security. (Also see *multi-level security*.)

United States Signals Intelligence System (USSS): An entity that is comprised of the National Security Agency (including assigned military personnel); those elements of the military departments and the Central Intelligence Agency performing signals intelligence activities; and those elements of any other department or agency which may from time to time be authorized by the National Security Council to perform signals intelligence activities during the time when such elements are so authorized; it is governed by the *United States Signals Intelligence Directives (USSID)* system.

upgrade: To determine that certain classified information requires, in the interest of national security, a higher degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, coupled with a changing of the classification designation to reflect such higher degree. (Also see *classification*.)

user: See *customer*.

validation: A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence information which provides official status to an identified requirement and confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given collector and has not previously been satisfied. (Also see *collection requirement*.)

walk-in: A person who on his own initiative makes contact with a representative of a foreign country and who volunteers intelligence information and/or requests political asylum. (Also see *disaffected person*.)

Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC): See *Director of Central Intelligence Committee*. (Also see *DCID 3/4*.)

Appendix A

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACINT	Acoustical Intelligence (Naval acronym; see definition.)
ACOUSTINT	Acoustical Intelligence
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence (Army or Air Force)
CA	Cryptanalysis
CAMS	COMIREX Automated Management System
CCF	Collection Coordination Facility
CCP	Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CCPC	Critical Collection Problems Committee
CI	Counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAP	Central Intelligence Agency Program
CIFAX	Enciphered Facsimile
CIPHONY	Enciphered Telephone
CIRIS	Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System
CIVISION	Enciphered Television
COINS	Community On-Line Intelligence System
COMEX	Committee on Exchanges
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMIREX	Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONTEXT	Conferencing and Text Manipulation System
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence Message
CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications System
CRYPTO	CRYPTO (See definition.)
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEFSMAC	Defense Special Missile and Astronautic Center
DF	Direction Finding
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI	Director of Naval Intelligence
ECCM	Electronic Counter-Countermeasures
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
E&E	Evasion and Escape
EIC	Economic Intelligence Committee
ELECTRO-OPTINT	Electro-optical Intelligence
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
ELSEC	Electronic Security
EMSEC	Emanations Security
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EW	Electronic Warfare
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service

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Appendix A (Continued)

FCI	Foreign Counterintelligence
FI	Foreign Intelligence
FIS	Foreign Instrumentation Signals
FISINT	Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
FLIR	Forward-looking infrared
FORMAT	Foreign Materiel
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program
GMI	General Medical Intelligence
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HRC	Human Resources Committee
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
ICRS	Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee (COMIREX)
IDC	Interagency Defector Committee
IHC	Intelligence Information Handling Committee
II	Imagery Interpretation
IIM	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
ILC	International Lines of Communications
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IOB	Intelligence Oversight Board
IRA	Intelligence-Related Activities
IR&DC	Intelligence Research & Development Council
I&W	Indications and Warning
JAEIC	Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
JINTACCS	Joint Interoperability Tactical Command and Control System
LASINT	Laser Intelligence
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MEDINT	Medical Intelligence
MI	Military Intelligence
NFAC	National Foreign Assessment Center
NFIB	National Foreign Intelligence Board
NFIP	National Foreign Intelligence Program
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NIO	National Intelligence Officer
NITC	National Intelligence Tasking Center
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center
NOIWON	National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network
NPHR	National Foreign Intelligence Plan for Human Resources
NPIC	National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSA	National Security Agency
NSCID	National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSOC	National SIGINT Operations Center
NSRL	National SIGINT Requirements List
NTPC	National Telemetry Processing Center
NUCINT	Nuclear Intelligence

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Appendix A (Continued)

OB	Order of Battle
OPCON	Operational Control
OPINTEL	Operational Intelligence
OPSEC	Operations Security
OPTINT	Optical Intelligence
PARPRO	Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program
PHOTINT	Photographic Intelligence
PI	Photographic Interpretation or Photographic Interpreter
PRC(I)	Policy Review Committee (Intelligence)
RADINT	Radar Intelligence
RECCE or RECON	Reconnaissance
RINT	Radiation Intelligence
S&T	Scientific and Technical
SA	Signals Analysis
SAFE	Support for the Analysts File Environment
SAO	Special Activities Office
SCA	Service Cryptologic Agencies
SCC	Special Coordination Committee
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information or Source Code Indicator
SCO	Service Cryptologic Organizations
SECOM	Security Committee
SI	Special Intelligence
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIGINT Committee	Signals Intelligence Committee
SIGSEC	Signals Security
SIRVES	SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Sub-committee (of SIGINT Committee)
SLAR	Side-Looking Airborne Radar
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOSUS	Sound Surveillance System
SOTA	SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority
SPINTCOMM	Special Intelligence Communications
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SSO	Special Security Officer
STIC	Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
TA	Traffic Analysis
TACINTEL	Tactical Intelligence
TI	Technical Intelligence
TELINT	Telemetry Intelligence
TRANSEC	Transmission Security
USSID	United States Signals Intelligence Directive
USSS	United States Signals Intelligence System
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems
WSSIC	Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee

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Collection

From "The Clandestine Service
of the Central Intelligence
Agency", by Hans Moses

It has often been said, and more often intimated, that Clandestine Service personnel are, or must be, a special breed. Advocates of clandestine activities have stressed intelligence, discipline and dedication as essential characteristics; critics have charged deviousness, moral blindness, and over-aggressiveness.

Actually, Clandestine Service employees are no less varied in background and personality than those in most other large organizations in and out of government; nor, as a matter of experience, are the criteria for success fundamentally different. What distinguishing features there are pertain not to ability or character, but to orientation. Clandestine Service personnel must be, or become, intensely interested in foreign affairs. Beyond that, they must be able to adapt themselves to certain environmental conditions if they are to have a chance for a satisfactory career. They must accept the fact that much of what they do, see, and hear cannot be freely discussed with outsiders, nor necessarily with all their own colleagues. As a rule, they must be willing to work for distinction within the organization and forego the satisfaction of potential public acclaim. They, and their families, must be ready to live with the inhibitions to social life and public utterance that flow from the acceptance of secrecy and relative anonymity. Depending on personality and outlook, this kind of existence can be natural, easy, difficult, or impossible for an individual. Those who find it too difficult or impossible are, of course, not suitable for a Clandestine Service career and, if they nevertheless accept the required restrictions, are apt to become frustrated and to create problems for the service and for themselves. For those who can make the adjustment, however, the work can be highly rewarding.

b. Operations Officers

The "operations officers" or "case officers" (erroneously called "agents" by the media) are the mainstay of the Clandestine Service. They are, in other words, the people most directly responsible for the spadework of the Clandestine Service, as described above under "Collection Operations" and "Types of (Special) Activity."

Operations officers get extensive training and guidelines and follow certain basic procedures ("tradecraft"). While some of the elements of their professional activity have parallels in other investigative, technical, and adminstrative work as well as in news gathering and salesmanship, the combination represented by their profession is unique. An operations officer must, of course, be able and willing to live and travel abroad, he must know something about the language and the culture of his area, and he must be effective in person-to-person contact. He must be able to achieve a thorough understanding of others without losing his independence of judgment. And he must maintain discretion as well as integrity.

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It should be noted that few case officers are equally adept at all phases of operational activity. One, for instance, may have great success at recruiting agents while another may show special strength in exploiting a recruited source over the long haul. Also, notwithstanding all common doctrine, no two operations officers ever appear to get results in exactly the same way, nor do different agents necessarily react the same way to any one operations officer. Finally, even though an operations officer often gets into situations where he must depend on his own ingenuity, he knows that there are other people — superiors as well as specialists and other potential supporters — on the same team. Thus, certain facets of any operation are liable to become matters of shared participation and responsibility. This is particularly likely when an operation requires knowledge or resources beyond the capacity of an individual officer.

c. Specialists

For reasons not hard to grasp, operations officers have sometimes been called "generalists." That term distinguishes them from the many others — in effect, the "specialists" — whose services are either necessary or helpful in the operational framework. The range of such services is wide. There is room for linguists, area experts, engineers, technicians, researchers, reports and requirements officers, communications officers, and many more. The Clandestine Service has all of them within its ranks and, of course, all types of clerical personnel as well. Beyond that, it will be remembered, its efforts are supported, as the occasion demands, by personnel in other Central Intelligence Agency offices, especially those with facilities for research and analysis.

From "Facing Reality",
by Cord Meyer

The Agency officers serving under cover in the stations overseas are known as case officers. Under the supervision of the station chief. they are America's front-line troops in the continuing effort to extract from human sources the information that the policymakers require but which cannot be obtained from either the media. communications intercepts, or satellite surveillance. They are both the main competitors with the much larger KGB and its satellite services and. individually, the principal and most important targets of KGB recruitment and harassment. These case officers are not in most instances spies themselves, but their job is to recruit and protect foreign agents who do have access to the required information. In countries that are close allies of the United States, these officers work cooperatively with the host government's intelligence and security services. Within the Soviet bloc their every move is watched. their telephones tapped, and their apartments bugged. In addition to their primary duties. most of them have to work at other jobs within the embassy in order to make their cover credible.

They can receive no public credit for their achievements and even when they receive awards within the Agency their citations are deliberately vague and uninformative. When they retire early in their mid-fifties, which is the practice in the clandestine service. they have little to show prospective employers to demonstrate their competence, and in recent years a clandestine career in the Agency has not been an easily salable commodity on the job market. In spite of these drawbacks, I continued to be impressed up to the time of my own retirement by the quality and ability of the young men and women seeking this kind of intelligence career, and by the generally impressive competence of the personnel serving in the clandestine service. An awareness of the high stakes involved in this peculiar and unique area of our competition with the Soviets perhaps explains the seriousness of purpose and dedication that I found to be widespread.

What then about the motivation of the foreigners who agree to provide secret information to CIA case officers at considerable risk? Among the prevailing misconceptions is the belief that foreign agents working for the United States are primarily motivated by greed. and that the more valuable the information they produce the more money they are paid. In reality. the reasons that persuade foreign citizens to cooperate with American intelligence are infinitely various and range across the whole spectrum of human motivation. Admittedly. some of them are prompted only by financial considerations. but the information they produce is often of marginal value. since they are seldom in positions of authority. The most productive agents are frequently those for whom financial reward is a secondary consid-

eration, and who are primarily moved by far more complex ambitions, resentments, and beliefs. For example, there are those like Oleg Penkovsky who come to the conviction that the Communist system is a growing threat to the survival of human freedom, and believe that they must warn the West of the danger and give it the information it needs to defend itself.

There are others inside the Soviet bureaucracy who are dissatisfied with the progress of their own careers, and who so resent the privileges and favoritism of the elite that they are presented to act against it. There are still others who have personal reasons for seeking revenge against some arbitrary act of regime injustice from which they or their close relatives have suffered. There are even those who have lost all belief in the official ideology and have become so profoundly bored by the pervasive propaganda that they are prepared to assert their own individuality by an adventurous act of defiance against the entire system. Service abroad by Soviet diplomats and KGB officers tends to expose them more than the ordinary Soviet citizen to the wide gap between propaganda and reality, and the new generation of Soviet officials tends to lack the depth of revolutionary conviction that protected their fathers against disillusionment.

Then, there are many in Eastern Europe who are true believers in the cause of national independence for their countries and who bitterly resent Soviet domination. Some of these are ready, at great personal risk, to carry their opposition to the point of cooperation with the United States in the hope that they can hasten the day when the foreign yoke is removed. Within the U.S.S.R. itself, there are minority ethnic groups with their own ancient national traditions and cultural heritage. Some of them see themselves as victims of an internal colonialism ruled over by the dominant Great Russians, who control the state machinery and access to the best jobs. This suppressed resentment can find expression in a decision to act against the privileged Russian elite. In the far reaches of the third world, there are determined men who have helped their countries win their independence from Western colonial rule. They see Soviet intervention in their internal affairs as threatening a new colonialism, which they are prepared to resist by providing the United States with information on the extent and nature of clandestine Soviet operations. High-minded belief in the cause of human liberty, patriotic nationalism, a personal search for revenge, sheer adventurism, avarice—all these motives and more, from the lowest to the highest, are to be found among those who daily risk their lives by cooperating with American intelligence. Modern espionage is far removed from

the caricature of the slinking spy in a trench coat with his hand out for payment.

Another widely held misconception is the belief that the typical CIA officer overseas leads an exotic existence and is himself engaged in penetrating the secrets of the opposition by assuming false identities and disguises and by seducing the beautiful mistresses of high-ranking officials. Reality is far different, as can be demonstrated by following the recruitment and managment of an individual agent. Whether he volunteers his services as a "walk-in," as many of the most productive agents have done, or whether his willingness to cooperate results from a long period of careful assessment and cultivation, the first step after he has agreed to supply secret information is to determine whether the offer is genuine. As previously noted, the KGB makes extensive use of double agents to identify American methods of operation, to divert attention from more promising targets, and to plant deliberately misleading information.

Recruitment and Training of
Foreign Collection Sources

● *Recruitment:* Recruitment of a foreign collection source will nor-
mally constitute the culmination of a relatively lengthy and gradual
process of personal cultivation of that individual by an Agency oper-
ations officer during which the potential source is assessed with
respect to both his access to intelligence information of genuine
importance and the likelihood that he or she will prove receptive to
recruitment. An exception to this general rule.is. of course. the so-
called "walk-in," the person who suddenly presents himself. usually
at an American embassy or consulate overseas. in order to seek some
form of reward for information he believes likely to be deemed
valuable by the USG. A walk-in usually entails minimum risk to a
CIA Station of the kind of security flap that an unsuccessful recruit-
ment attempt can produce, but he will frequently overestimate the
true value to the USG of the intelligence information at his disposal,
if indeed he is not a deliberate fabricator. Initial meetings with a
walk-in should accordingly focus intensively on his true identity. his

real access and his actual motivation for offering his services as a source. If the walk-in is finally adjudged to be *bona fide* and of real potential value as an intelligence source. he will immediately become an ongoing collection operation and further meetings with him should be conducted in a fully secure. clandestine fashion.

As noted above, however, the recruitment process usually involves extended cultivation and assessment of a potential source by an Agency operations officer. Such cultivation will usually begin with an initial chance or contrived encounter, often one at a diplomatic reception. The operations officer's interpersonal skills must immediately be brought into play in order to establish reasonably precisely with whom it is that he has just come into contact. to make a tentative judgment as to whether the new contact might be able to contribute to any of the Station's assigned collection objectives and to create a positive framework for further meetings on a one-on-one basis. Clearly the operations officer's interpersonal skills will continue to be critical to his success in developing an increasingly close relationship with the potential source that can be manipulated to determine his probable access to desired intelligence information. his basic personal motivations and his ultimate susceptibility to a proposal for recruitment. The relationship should be brought by the operations officer to a degree of sufficient cordiality that even if the potential source should decline to be recruited. he will not use its offer in order to embarrass the officer who extended it.

● *Training:* Whether the newly-acquired source is the product of cultivation leading to his successful recruitment or an effectively validated walk-in, he or she will require training from the outset. Many new sources will show surprisingly little concern for the security aspects of their new activity, and few will possess the knowledge of how best to protect their own security. Training should thus focus initially on sharpening the source's sense of security and on the means by which to ensure true clandestinity in all aspects of his activities in his role as source. most importantly acquisition. temporary storage and ultimate transmittal to the Agency operations officer of sensitive intelligence information: his movement to and from meetings with the officer; his concealment of any clandestine gear which it may be necessary to issue him to enhance his effectiveness as a source; and finally. his use of the extra income he will now be receiving for his clandestine cooperation. The training of the new source must also explore in depth the vital matter of his precise access to intelligence information to ensure both that he exploits it

without drawing undesirable attention to his actions and that he does
so with maximum feasible productivity. Further training may well
become necessary as the operation develops in order to improve its
clandestinity and its effectiveness. This training might include such
kinds of covert communications techniques as dead drops. microdot.
secret writing or clandestine two-way radio: coding and decoding;
and clandestine photography. In reaching a decision to issue clan-
destine gear to a source it will always be necessary to judge as nearly
as possible whether or not his possession of such gear may constitute
a greater threat to his security than the improvement in his produc-
tivity would warrant. In general. the use of sophisticated clandestine
gear will more likely be truly required for sources in denied areas
than those in areas where the general security risk is distinctly lower.

Attention to the training aspects of a clandestine collection oper-
ation must continue to be accorded throughout the operation's dura-
tion, as sources will often prove prone to grow careless and cut
corners in the area of personal security and professional use of
tradecraft. The maintenance of true clandestinity in an operation
always requires greater effort and attention to detail. and the con-
scientious operations officer has to do all he can to protect his source
from the latter's potential security sins of omission and commission.
The assessment of a source must also continue consistently following
his recruitment, for his real motives may change. his access may
diminish or be lost entirely and thus impel him into fabrication in
order to retain his income for collaboration, or he may, of course,
be doubled against the service by some third party.

TULSA TRIBUNE
28 January 1976

"I will now read the minutes of our last top secret meeting . . ."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
9 January 1978

"Did I get this report direct from a journalist? Well, not exactly!"

From "Street Man", by
E. C. Ackerman

Chapter VII

Martov came to me. But he was the exception. You can't just sit around and wait for opportunity to knock at your door. You have to hustle. The street man's reason for being is to seek out, assess and recruit the sources that can provide the information he has been directed to obtain.

Who are those targets? One group consistently heads the list. Soviet party and government officials. Soviet military officers are number one. Their country alone possesses the military capability to destroy our civilization. Of course, we have satellites that can photograph their missile sites and eavesdrop on their military communications. But these technical means cannot inform us of their intentions—of any budding plans to use those weapons. Or to attack us politically. Or to attack us economically. Only human sources can provide that type of information.

Officials of countries allied to the Soviet Union can also, to a lesser degree, provide this type of information. So civil and military officers of Warsaw Pact nations are also targets. As are officials of other countries clearly hostile to us—China, Cuba, North Korea, Viet Nam—and clearly capable of damaging us militarily, politically or economically.

And there are other targets of a more-passing nature. With the Arab oil boycott, economic warfare has gained high priority. An economist from an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nation can give us early warning of economic moves against us. A source in a Latin American terrorist group can help avert the kidnapping of an American diplomat. A Turkish back-alley contact can keep a kilo of heroin off the streets of Chicago.

How does the street man identify potential sources in target groups? Many

ways. Sometimes an established source will point out a colleague or a contact who for one reason or another might be willing to cooperate. Sometimes CIA files call attention to a particular individual. Reports from many different sources, when pieced together, may suggest an approach to a given individual. Sometimes a street man meets the potential source by chance. More often, he places himself in a position wherein he is likely to come upon potential sources. He makes his own luck.

How do you get to the targets? You can't depend on circular letters, though, believe it or not, it's been tried: and *Pravda* doesn't accept that kind of advertising. You have to go to the targets—get belly to belly with them. You have to develop a human relationship with them. To come to understand what motivates them. To reach the point at which you can make a reasonably good assessment of their willingness to cooperate, to provide intelligence information.

Getting next to them involves the use of cover. Say the target is a Czech military attaché stationed in Paris. You can't very well phone him, introduce yourself as a CIA officer and invite him to lunch. But he might be available for an American military attaché or a diplomat. Likewise, an OPEC economist might not wish to meet with an American government official. But he might talk to an American economist or an investment counselor. And a Latin American radical politician might not agree to meet with *any* American. But he might agree to chat with an Italian socialist or a Cuban Trotskyite.

In the course of my CIA career I operated under a wide variety of covers. I met several Czech military attachés as an American diplomat. The diplomat to diplomat approach is the most polite and most traditional. All major intelligence services use it.

It entails attendance at a lot of diplomatic cocktail parties and consumption of lots of *hors d'oeuvres*. You meet your target and zero in. Luncheon invitations are exchanged. Your aim is to develop a human relationship with him—to find out what makes him tick. You wonder about his designs on you. Are you dealing with another intelligence officer? Or has he been co-opted by his intelligence service to report on you?

Verbal fencing takes place. Sometimes you draw the conclusion that the target can't be recruited and go on to someone else. Sometimes he tries to recruit you before you've had a chance to get your own effort underway. And

sometimes your instincts tell you that a pitch might just be in order.

What brings you to this conclusion? Take the case of the Czech. Ideally, there is some distinct discomfort with the present regime, with Soviet domination, perhaps some ideological affinity for the United States. Surprisingly, this attitude isn't all that uncommon. I've met damn few Czechs who weren't nationalists at heart and secret admirers of deposed Communist Party Secretary Alexander Dubcek, secret proponents of the Prague Spring of 1968.

Few recruitments, however, are entirely ideological. In most cases there is more than one motivating factor. Perhaps the target needs money. Perhaps he is seeking revenge against a hated superior. Maybe he has a psychological defect which can be manipulated. Or maybe he is filled with self-hate for having remained silent in the face of the Soviet invasion of his country. Maybe he is compelled to strike back.

But even if one or more of these factors is present, there's no assurance that your target will say yes. It's like propositioning a woman. You never really know until you ask. For one thing, it takes a great deal of courage to enter into a clandestine relationship with a foreign intelligence service. The Czech is laying his very life on the line, and no one knows it better than he. Needless to say, it's damned tough to assess courage indirectly.

Sometimes, if the case officer is operating in his own name, as is usually the case on the diplomatic circuit, and does not want to blow his own cover, a colleague will be introduced in alias to make the actual pitch. The pitch itself is always made *unter vier Augen*, under four eyes. In the case of a Soviet bloc official it is always made boldly: "Will you provide information on a confidential basis to U.S. intelligence?" There is no use in beating around the bush. Those fellows know the score.

Mostly, they'll say no. And if they do, you shrug it off. You're playing in a tough league. If you bat .200 you're on the all-star team.

What about the targets who aren't diplomats and who don't want to deal with diplomats? To approach them, non-official cover is used. The OPEC economist doesn't want to be seen with an American official, but he will talk to an economist or an investment counselor. Setting up that cover can be complicated. It's very nice if the case officer can represent himself as an officer of a large, well-known Wall Street investment house. But the investment houses aren't standing in line to seek out embarrasing situations, so

more often you're stuck with being a consultant from Omaha. And maybe your office in Omaha is really just an answering service.

Ideally, the street man ought to have an academic or employment background which fits the commercial cover he's using. But that's a luxury you can't always afford. It is more important that the case officer have experience and proven abilities as a recruiter. He must be able to get in close to the target personality, to read him, and to carry out the pitch. And that can't be taught. If his knowledge in a given academic area leaves something to be desired, he's given a set of books on the subject and a week to read in.

Of course, this type of flying by the seat of your pants leads to some tough moments and some close calls. I called on an economist once at his university. He was a macro-economist with expertise in central banking, so I naturally said I was a micro-economist, with specialization in the development of light industry.

"Splendid," he said, "I've been asked to take over a seminar on micro-economics this afternoon. Won't you please lead a discussion on your specialty?"

Somehow I bluffed my way through ninety minutes on the generation of trickle-down industries in developing economies, and went on to develop a warm personal relationship with the professor. Months later, when I dropped my cover and pitched him, he was good-humored about the whole thing: "I'll have to work with you," he said. "If not, you might tell people about how you made a fool of me. To think you wouldn't know the multiplier effect from a plate of spinach!"

I assured him that I knew all about the multiplier effect, but not very much more.

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GRIN AND BEAR IT — BY LICHTY

"Our information is that Red China has the nuclear capacity to destroy one American city. . . . Your mission is to find out which one!"

THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD, OR AT LEAST PRE-TENDED TO, AND WENT BACK INTO THE COLD, PERHAPS AS A CIA PLANT WHO WILL RETURN FROM THE COLD UNLESS ITS ALL A KGB PLOT AND HE STAYS IN THE COLD

A JOHN LeCARRE-LIKE THRILLER

From "Breaking with Moscow"
by Arkady N. Shevchenko

1

DRIVING MORE CALMLY, I returned along back roads to the Grand Central
Parkway, over the Triborough Bridge, and found a parking space on a
dark street on the upper East Side. I hailed a taxi and took it to a corner
in the East Sixties. I was about ten minutes late. I hurried down an empty
side street and descended the steps of an ordinary brownstone.

The man who answered the doorbell introduced himself as Bert John-
son. He had a firm handshake and wore a well-cut conservative dark suit.

"I've been waiting for you," he said. "Come on upstairs."

Johnson was businesslike but hospitable. He offered me a drink. I
asked for scotch. We sat down on a sofa in a comfortably furnished library,
its walls filled with books and paintings, but the pleasant surroundings did
nothing to ease my tension.

I looked at him closely, searching his face for a clue to what kind of

man he was. His manner was easy and natural. He showed neither surprise nor distrust.

He seemed to be waiting for me to get down to the business which brought us together. But even after so much private rehearsal I could not, for a while, find the words to begin.

"I'm not here on impulse. And this isn't something I just decided to do in the last few days," I said at last.

He nodded quietly and somehow the gesture distressed me.

"The idea of escaping has been growing in me for years and I'm ready to act and now I ask for your help," I continued.

Johnson nodded again. I could see that I would get no guidance from him. I would have to proceed on my own.

"I'm telling you that I have decided to break with my government," I blurted.

His nodding reaction was certainly natural, for he already knew what I was going to say. But I grew more uneasy. I suddenly realized that what bothered me was that he wasn't bombarding me with questions and arguments regarding my motivations as I had anticipated. I stopped in a pause that seemed to yawn for hours. Johnson did not try to fill the silence.

I started again. I tried to explain the process by which my convictions had become clear to me. My lack of expertise in English had never seemed so important before; now my head ached with my efforts to express myself properly. I attempted to stress that I was no longer a Soviet in spirit, and no longer could be a part of the Soviet world. I told him of the intolerable situations where I often had to act like an idiot at the UN, defending a Soviet position while at the same time pretending to act objectively, as I was obliged to do, as Under Secretary General. My reasons seemed so weak that I tried again from another angle.

I told Johnson that in the beginning I was full of hope. I bragged to him how fast my career had moved, and boasted that I had friends, people I had been to school with and liked, in positions of influence, and that some of us once thought we might make a difference, might be able to help open up the Soviet system.

Johnson simply sat there and let me ramble. Only later did I understand that at that moment he (and the U.S. government) was not really interested in researching my motivations. Rather, it was his job to make a suggestion that would test me not by words but by deeds. I tried to calm down, to sound more pragmatic, less idealistic.

"It isn't money or comfort," I said. "I get all the benefits of being a Soviet ambassador. My wife and I have a good apartment in Moscow filled with fine things; we have anything we want. We have a dacha, a country place, in one of the best areas outside Moscow. We have plenty of money, *plenty.* It's not that at all," I repeated. "It's that in exchange I have to be as obedient to the system as a robot to his master—and I no longer believe in the system."

I told him that our telephones were always tapped, that the KGB was constantly watching me, often following me, that the Party was always after me to do political work which had nothing to do with my job as a diplomat but which intruded into my own and others' personal lives. I was required to be a propagandist for them, to parrot whatever they wanted me to say at meetings and encourage others to think the same way. But, most distasteful of all, I was compelled by the Party to be a moral watchdog over my fellow Soviets in New York. I detested the hypocrisy that this entailed; I wanted instead to work for what I believed in and was interested in; I wanted to do something valuable with my life.

Johnson listened in silence. Then he asked me whether I had informed my wife about our meeting. I said I had not, but that I intended to do so. I could see that Johnson was pleased with my answer, but he made no further remark.

Finally, I made my request. What I meant to do was defect openly and speak out for myself. I needed protection and I did not want to be controlled.

"I want to work and write and live without any government telling me what to do or say. Will your government let me do that?"

Johnson stood up and walked to the bar in the corner of the room. "I don't know about you, but I'm going to have a double. How about you?" he said.

The tone of his remark made all the difference. It was friendly; he seemed to understand my tensions. He was suddenly a human being, not an institution or court before which I had to justify myself. I quickly accepted his offer. We stood at the bar while he poured scotch and soda. He raised his glass to touch mine. For the first time that night we both smiled.

Back on the couch, he lit a cigarette. "Okay," he said, leaning back. "First of all, I'm authorized to offer you the protection you asked for. If you're ready to defect, we're ready to welcome you, to help you, to receive you right now if that's what you want."

"It's exactly what I want," I interjected.

"We know a lot about you," he continued. "We've followed your career for a long time, so I have to ask if you're really sure about this. If you have any doubts, you should tell me now. Once this goes forward, neither of us can stop it."

"I've made up my mind."

He said that in the United States I wouldn't have any special privileges of the kind I had become used to as a member of the Soviet upper class. No car and driver, no government-supplied home. None of the luxuries that the Soviet government showered on its favored bureaucrats.

"All those things you take for granted—we don't supply them," he reiterated. "Could you really give them up?"

"Yes, I can. I know what is important to me in life." I had a sudden

urge to laugh. I had the surreal feeling that I was in some sort of marriage ceremony, a wild contrast to my emotions of two minutes before.

Johnson sipped his drink and put it down on the table in front of us. He looked at me a moment and then said, "You realize that if you live openly there will always be a risk to your life."

I knew quite enough about the KGB's long arm and memory. I wondered why Johnson said this: was he trying to discourage me from defecting instead of reinforcing me in my decision? I began to be apprehensive.

Johnson broke into my thoughts: "A minute ago you said you wanted to do something worthwhile. Do you think that defecting is the only way you can do this?"

"Well . . ." I hesitated. "By defecting I can contribute a great deal."

"There's no doubt about that," he said. "But think about how much you could do if you stayed where you are a little while."

"What do you mean?"

He described the initial excitement in Washington when it was learned that I wanted to defect. Everyone realized what a blow this would be to the Soviets. And they were ready to help me if that's what I wanted. But there had been other ideas too. Would I consider staying on as Under Secretary General for a while? There was a lot of information I could provide from that vantage point if we worked together. I could help them find out more about Soviet planning and intentions, about the leadership's thinking. Besides, he pointed out, I would need time to get my family ready for the eventual defection.

I felt something like a chill cross my chest.

"That is to say, you want me to be a spy," I said.

"Well, not exactly," he replied. He thought for a few seconds and continued: "We wouldn't have to call it spying. Let's say from time to time you could provide us with information at meetings like this."

I didn't know what to say. The proposal had thrown me off my bearings. "What you're asking me to do is extremely dangerous," I said finally. "I don't have any training for that sort of thing."

He took another swallow of scotch. "Please think about it," he said quietly.

I looked at him closely. His manner was not threatening or pressuring, but it was clear what he wanted from me. I was not prepared to hear it; I needed time to digest the idea. Almost automatically I told Johnson I would think it over.

That satisfied him and seemed to conclude the meeting. I got up to leave.

"When can we talk again?" he asked.

"Next Friday would be the best time for me. Is there a way to reach you, a telephone number?" I asked.

He gave me a number to memorize. I repeated it several times to fix

it in my mind. We shook hands and I left, once again to journey through Manhattan and out to Long Island, this time with a curious mixture of relief and dread.

3

THE FOLLOWING WEEK I was in turmoil, swinging from one decision to another. To my surprise, I slowly began to reconcile myself to Johnson's proposal. If our places had been reversed, I knew I would do my utmost to try to use him as an opportunity to penetrate the Soviets at a high level. But although this seemed logical and natural as an abstract proposition, I was still uneasy at being the man involved.

The more I reflected on the idea, the more I was able to find positive aspects in it: I could gain time to prepare myself. Time would enable me to make a better case with Lina, to persuade her to my view. We could make practical arrangements for our new lives in America by bringing some of the things we loved from our Moscow home. Furthermore, I thought, to work for the Americans for a while would be the most effective way of dissipating any doubts they might have about my honesty and sincerity. The Americans could grant me political asylum, all right, but I figured they were under no obligation to do more than that for me, and I would need protection for quite some time as well as help in getting settled. After the debriefings, they might throw me away like a squeezed lemon. I hoped for more than that.

I resolved to prove myself not in words but in deeds. After all, my original plan had been to help the United States by exposing the secrets of the Soviet regime and speaking out against it; I wanted to help the West. Here was a way to do it in spades.

The arrangements for my next meeting with Johnson seemed simple, but when the time came to make the confirming phone call, I suddenly

found the mechanics daunting. I could not phone from my home, from the Mission, from my UN office. All those lines were monitored. I could use a pay telephone, but that seemed too risky. A Soviet colleague might see me and wonder what I was up to, why I wasn't using my office phone.

Friday morning, as I sat in a UN committee meeting, I listened with only half an ear to the diplomats' talk, my mind preoccupied. Finally I remembered the telephones the UN provided for the delegates' convenience on the main floor. Even if those lines were tapped, my conversation would be short, my voice unidentifiable. When the session broke for lunch, I joined my colleagues and walked with them to the North Delegates' Lounge. That huge hall, whose bar and comfortable chairs draw diplomats for both serious and trivial talk throughout the working day, is well supplied with telephones. It would be perfectly natural for me to use one as though I were simply checking with my office for messages. Nonetheless, I could not shake off an anxiety that mounted as I scanned the lounge. Others were using the telephones and I had to wait.

I decided to take my chances in another place, the corridor that runs behind the podium of the General Assembly. There was no bar here to attract a crowd. Two telephones sat on separate tables about six feet apart, and one of them was already taken. The man speaking into it was a stranger whose English carried a heavy Spanish accent. A Cuban? Did he recognize me? I stood indecisively for a moment, and then took what seemed to me like an enormous plunge. I sat down and dialed the number. It rang twice before a woman answered.

"Hello," she said. No other identification.

"This is Andy. I'll be on time tonight."

"That's fine," came her reply. "I'll tell him."

I hung up. The Latin American—as I had decided he was—was still deep in his own conversation. If he had noticed mine, he gave no sign. Still, to be on the safe side, I called my office in case I had been observed and the observer checked on me later on.

The day wore on routinely, but apprehension continued to cloud my perceptions. One of my Soviet assistants walked into my office unannounced; I was startled, but all he wanted was my permission to leave early, to lengthen his weekend by a few hours. I probably surprised him with my quick assent. My only thought, however, was to get rid of him.

My appointment at the East Side town house was for between eight and ten o'clock that night. It was close to eight when I finished supper at home and proposed to Lina that she join me for a walk. It was a safe offer to make; she liked to walk in the country but not in the city. When she went shopping, it was with a purpose. I liked to browse; she liked to buy. That evening, as I expected, she chose to stay home.

Out on the street, I tried to look like a casual pedestrian. I gazed at shopwindows, pretending an interest in men's clothing stores while my

real concern was to detect if anyone was following me. A few blocks down Third Avenue I went into a delicatessen I often patronized, bought a package of Finn Crisp crackers and a bottle of Perrier water, and came out with my parcel and with a stronger feeling that no one was shadowing me. Nevertheless, I walked further down the avenue, past the side street where Johnson waited, turned right onto another quiet crosstown street, right again on Lexington Avenue, and then quickly right again back toward Third Avenue and the brownstone.

I hurried along the pavement, glad of the trees that lined it but also worried that behind any one of them, invisible to me, might be some KGB agent observing me and my destination. In the brownstone's doorway it seemed an eternity until Bert Johnson answered my ring and let me in.

"It's good to see you," he said as he closed the door. "Everything okay?"

"Yes . . . and no," I answered. "I don't think anyone saw me, but I don't really know."

Johnson told me to relax and led me to an elevator at the back of the entrance hall, a creaking, old-fashioned wooden machine that groaned its way to the second floor. As we rode up to the library, I noticed that his appearance had changed. Instead of the dark business suit of the week before he wore casual clothes and his shirt was open. Where he had been reticent and formal, he was now affable, easygoing.

His attitude helped me to calm down as well, and I agreed with pleasure when he proposed that we call each other by our first names. I liked that American custom, which is followed in Russia only between close friends or relatives. As we sat down on the sofa, I expected him to put the question I had been thinking about for a week. I still was not sure exactly how best to approach it.

Instead, Johnson began by asking about my health. I admitted I was exhausted. I told him that my workload at the UN was heavy, and that the Mission had been after me more than usual lately, always wanting something. He expressed sympathy; he asked whether I took any exercise, whether I had any vacation plans.

Why didn't he get to the point? I fidgeted slightly as I told him that I had had little vacation, that the meetings in the Security Council had been wearing, that I was tired. "Besides," I said, "since we talked, I haven't thought of anything else."

"Well, what have you been thinking?" He wouldn't ask the question directly.

I began to question Johnson about the nature of his proposal, and at the same time said I wasn't sure I could do what he wanted. I reiterated that I had never belonged to the KGB and I did not know their techniques, had no training. Furthermore, I'd be taking a terrible chance; I would probably be caught before I got started. I hoped he would let me off the hook; he didn't.

Johnson said that Washington was aware that I had no KGB connections, that his government trusted my sincerity. He touched a nerve. Of all things, good or bad, that anyone could say about me, that was a point about which I wanted no mistake.

"But I think you're exaggerating," he continued. "You're letting your imagination run away with you." He stressed that the Americans had no intention of involving me in dangerous operations, and that they did not want me to follow people around or steal and photograph documents. They would never ask me to do anything that would require the kind of maneuverings people read about, with secret drops for material and all kinds of fantastic gadgets.

What they desired was information to which I already had access. They wanted to know about policy matters, political decisions, and how those decisions were reached. They welcomed material that came from my background, my contacts, my work.

"You've worked closely with Gromyko and a lot of others. You know what they're thinking about and what's going on behind the scenes in Moscow and in the Mission here. You can help us understand what the policies are, how they're made, and who makes them."

I protested that I already intended to give that knowledge to American government specialists, so it wasn't necessary for me to stay in my present position any longer for that purpose.

Johnson interrupted me: "Wait a minute, let me finish. There's another angle to all this: your own motivation. You convinced me last week that there's nothing impulsive or selfish about your decision. If you wanted wealth and security, you'd stay with the Soviets, but if you really want to fight them we can help you do it in the most effective way."

I told Johnson that my special position in New York had disadvantages as well as benefits. I had freedom to go anywhere and meet with anyone without getting permission, but that also made me more exposed. The KGB had to watch me because my safety was their responsibility. Although the agents could not limit what I did or where I went, they were always suspicious because their first instinct was to trust no one. I said I didn't see how I could meet Johnson on a regular basis because I didn't know how I could shake them.

He sensed that my unease was real and tried to reassure me, repeating that he would not ask me to take foolish risks. He emphasized that I would avoid establishing a set pattern or routine for contacting or meeting him, that I would use various telephones when calling, and that I would make no change from my usual habits.

His words were reassuring but they still did not address the core of my doubts. I could spot most, but not all, KGB when I was under surveillance. I had no idea whether they had followed me on the street, even tonight. I asked Johnson if he had people who could check whether the KGB showed any special interest in what I did and where I went.

He promised to organize a special detail right away. He said he would let me know immediately if there were any signs of trouble, and assured me that the Americans would move in if necessary.

I was grateful for this attitude, but I knew that every time I entered the Mission I would remember that I could be held captive inside it and forced to fly directly home to Moscow. Just that year, I had seen a junior diplomat hustled out of New York with no chance to save himself.

The victim had been a Mission official who had been arrested by the New York police for a drunk-driving episode that had included a quarrel with a bus driver. The Soviet claimed, probably to protect himself, that the arrest had been a provocation, that the Americans had used the incident to try to recruit him. Whether or not the Mission security men believed him, as soon as the city police released him to Soviet custody, he was put under what amounted to arrest inside the Mission and shipped home on the next Aeroflot flight.

I told Johnson about this episode, tame indeed compared to what I was contemplating, to underscore my worry that something similar could happen to me. "I go to the Mission almost every day. Once I'm inside, there is nothing any government on earth could do if the Mission detains me. They could invent any pretext for holding me or for sending me back to Moscow. A sudden heart attack, a stroke, anything. They have used such excuses over and over."

"But there are things we can do," Johnson insisted. He said there really wasn't much danger that they would kill me inside the Mission. I was too well known for them to risk that kind of disappearance; my wife would raise a storm; the United Nations would ask embarrassing questions. I agreed that the Soviets wouldn't want those kinds of things to be aired in public.

"If they did try to take you back to the Soviet Union, they'd have to get you through Kennedy Airport," he continued. "There we can step in and make sure you're leaving of your own free will." He told me I should always let them know when I would be taking a trip myself, and especially whenever I was going to Kennedy. He asked me whether I went there to meet people coming from Moscow on the regular Aeroflot flight.

I told him I went there frequently to welcome delegations or important visitors or just to greet friends. Johnson said that they wanted to know in advance when I was going, if possible. American agents routinely watched those flights, and they would receive particular instructions about me. They would go on special alert if I appeared unexpectedly.

"If that happens and you're in trouble, you should make a sign of some sort, raise your right hand, and we'll know you need help," he said.

Johnson was completely businesslike in discussing this contingency, but I pictured myself being shuffled, heavily drugged, by a squad of KGB men through the airport lounge, unable to make any sign of distress at all. I tried to repress the fantasy as he went on.

"Besides, we would be alerted if you stayed in the Mission for an unusual length of time. But we should have an emergency arrangement to contact you. Is there an American doctor that you see regularly?"

There was the dentist, but my wife used him more than I did. There was a dermatologist I had seen several times during my assignment in the sixties. I gave Johnson his name.

"Would it be unusual for him to ask you to come in for an appointment?"

"No, not really. He's done it before to remind me that I'm due for a checkup," I replied. "My secretary knows he's my doctor."

"Okay. Then if you get a message that he's phoned, call me immediately. It should be a good way to warn you if something goes wrong."

Johnson was now clearly assuming that I would accept his proposition, and he was right. I had no real resistance. He probably sensed that I felt I had no choice.

"Look," he said, "why don't you try it for a while? I know you can do it. You'll find it easier than you think. Don't worry, we're not going to put you in danger." He paused. "Okay?"

"All right. For a while."

"Good." He smiled. He repeated his advice not to change my normal routine. "As long as you keep to your habits, you won't create any suspicion."

I looked at my watch. It was close to ten o'clock. We made arrangements for our next meeting the week after next.

Tuesday, twelve days ahead, was clear, assuming no emergency arose at the UN. Johnson suggested that we try to get together in the middle of that day rather than at night, to vary the schedule. I promised to confirm the meeting by telephone on Monday, but added that if I did not come Tuesday, Johnson should wait for me again on Wednesday around lunchtime.

We had talked so much about procedures that we had neglected substance. What kind of information should I bring?

Johnson said I would be the best judge of what was important and of how much time to give to any subject, but that it would help to have a basic pattern. He suggested I start with the most recent cables received in the Mission, the date, the time they were sent, the text as fully as I could get it.

I was startled. What did he mean, the full text of cables? One minute he was reassuring, concerned for my safety, minimizing the dangers I would have to confront. Next he was asking me to risk my neck. To copy a code cable inside the Soviet Mission would invite almost certain detection.

"I can't do that," I protested. "We aren't even supposed to make notes on what we read in the code room, just the gist, not the actual language. And you said I shouldn't take photos or have any compromising materials on me."

He quickly responded that they did not expect full copies, just whatever I could remember of the important messages.

I didn't want Johnson to expect too much from the cables that came to the Mission. and I explained the limits on information received there. He assured me that the lack of immediacy would not be a major drawback.

"The big developments will stick out a mile," Johnson said, "you'll spot them right away." What might be of more interest to Washington might be difficult for me to identify at first. Something that seemed completely routine to me because it was so familiar might be absolutely novel to them. I should try to read as if I were seeing the information for the first time. I must try to think of its value to outsiders, what it might reveal to someone without my background and experience.

Johnson particularly wanted me to be on the lookout for nuance, new shades of meaning signaling a change in policy or indicating debates on certain issues. I must have looked skeptical, for he reassured me that, although I might not think so now, it would come very naturally after a while and that my worries were more the product of my imagination than of reality.

At home Lina was awake but incurious. I mumbled something about my walk having made me thirsty, poured myself a glass of Perrier, and settled into my chair, pretending interest in a book. My mind, however, was on my conversation with Johnson. I had begun it uncertain as to where it would end. Yet with the decision made, I felt a surge of anticipation. I would strike this bargain with the Americans to win my freedom and gain their assistance in my campaign against the Soviet regime. But I was impatient to start anew, and I wanted a quick passage through that interim existence.

I did not realize at the time that I had overlooked a crucial point. I had put no limit on the length of my secret service. I had entered a shadow world without defined boundaries, and assumed that a matter of months would be long enough to prove my sincerity. But years of anxiety were before me and the danger which I first thought I could not face became, for all that time, my constant companion.

5

RECRUITING RUSSIANS

TWO AGENTS-IN-PLACE

On New Year's Day 1953 a short, neatly dressed man handed a letter to an American vice-consul about to enter his car with a girl friend in the international sector of Vienna. It read: "I am a Soviet officer. I wish to meet with an American officer with the object of offering certain services. . . ." The letter specified the time and place for a meeting, at which the Russian satisfactorily identified himself as a major assigned to the Vienna office of Soviet military intelligence—the GRU. For the next six years Major B was the key CIA source on Soviet military matters.

I took a particular interest in the self-recruitment of Major B because he had been hailed by some of my colleagues as an example of a real "ideological" agent, a Russian who had come to us purely out of principle. In conversations with the operations officers involved and from reading his case file, it was clear that Major B had a strong sense of social injustice. Born in 1923, the son of a peasant, he lived through Stalin's collectivization program and retained an enduring hatred for the regime's continuing mistreatment of the poor peasants. Yet it was his own personal circumstances that triggered his act. He was being criticized by his GRU chief for recruiting only a few useless agents, one of whom, a Serbian woman, he had taken on as his mistress without informing his boss. When his wife and child arrived from the Soviet Union, he began to run short of the money needed to support two establishments.

Only late in his first conversation with a CIA officer did he disclose, almost casually, that he had offered his services because he had "an affair to straighten out" and that he came to CIA only "as an extreme measure." Political principle is rarely the sole or main reason for the transfer of a man's allegiance, and Major B was no exception.

He and one CIA case officer met secretly once or twice a

month in comfortable middle-class surroundings, where their
sessions often lasted eight or nine hours. They became inti-
mate companions with a strong mutual affection. B found in
his case officer the only man he had ever been able to talk to
in his adult years about his feelings and anxieties, his job
frustrations, and his attitude to his bosses and the regime.
After one of their many discussions about the relative merits
of the CIA and the GRU, B expressed his feelings about the
two services:

> This is what I like about your organization. You can find
> time to drink and relax. It is an entirely human approach.
> You have respect and regard for an individual. With us, of
> course, the individual is nothing, and the Government's
> interest is everything.

As the years went by, his secret contacts with the CIA
became "nerve-wracking." The GRU, apparently growing
suspicious, asked him to return to headquarters.

In his last meeting before going back to Moscow he felt
shaky but remarkably confident. He was urged by his case
officer to defect, but he refused: "I am not the man for that."
Arrangements were made to meet him in Moscow if he so
wished.

Major B was apparently arrested in February 1959, shortly
after his return to Moscow, but the Soviet authorities kept
his arrest quiet in order to use him against the CIA. We
continued the contact in the hope of keeping him alive, but
immediately after an emergency meeting with him in October
1959, the CIA case officer was arrested. After attempting to
cajole him to work for the GRU, the Soviet security officials
released him on the basis of his diplomatic immunity. Accord-
ing to an official Soviet announcement, Major B was exe-
cuted shortly thereafter.

Major B was the most valuable source of Soviet military
intelligence of the time. He provided technical specifications
on Soviet conventional weapons, including the first informa-

tion on several new Soviet tanks. He furnished detailed order
of battle data and tables of equipment for Soviet tank,
mechanized, and rifle divisions. He reported large increases
in the number of amphibious vehicles and armored personnel
carriers a full eighteen months before they were spotted by
other sources. His other firsts included the description of
several tactical missile systems and reports on the existence
of Soviet nuclear submarines, a new heavy tank division, and
Soviet Army tactics in the utilization of atomic weapons.

This one man's reporting had a direct and substantial ef-
fect on U.S. military organization, doctrine, and tactics, and
saved the Pentagon at least a half-billion dollars in its re-
search and development program.

The second agent-in-place, unlike Major B, was a well-
educated aristocrat—the most publicized of CIA agents: Oleg
Penkovsky. The son of upper-class pre-Bolshevik parents, he
was a brilliant man who became a full colonel at the age of
thirty. He was sophisticated and extravagant, with a taste for
luxuries from white nylon sheets to good porcelain and fine
ladies. Not merely articulate, but voluble, he was a dynamo
of energy. He hit like a cyclone.

His first approach to the Americans resembled that of B in
Vienna. After reconnoitering the American Embassy in
Moscow for several days, and noting that all visitors were
being photographed from a KGB safe house across the way,
he strolled along the unlighted banks of the Moscow River,
and at 11 P.M. on August 12, 1960, he approached a pair of
obviously American tourists taking a walk. As an earnest of
his bona fides, he gave them some hitherto undisclosed de-
tails on the shooting down of the U-2 plane the previous
May—fourteen rockets had been fired, there had been no
direct hits, one near-burst had brought it down, etc. He then
handed them a letter to be delivered to the American Em-
bassy.

The letter offered his services to the United States "for the
ideals of a truly free world and of democracy for mankind." It

stated that he had "very important materials on many sub-
jects of exceptionally great interest" and wished to transmit
them to the Americans through a dead drop whose descrip-
tion he enclosed or through a drop designated by the Ameri-
cans.

In the atmosphere of the time, with the antispy crusade in
full swing, this approach by an anonymous stroller along the
Moscow River was read by the embassy and by Washington
as a possible KGB provocation, a clumsy effort to implicate an
American official in espionage as another proof to the Soviet
citizenry of the need for vigilance. Accordingly, no attempt
was made to establish contact.

Fortunately, Penkovsky was persistent. In December,
under cover of his civilian job in the State Committee for
Science and Technology, he asked a visiting British scientist
to deliver a package to the American Embassy. The scientist
refused. Penkovsky then actually passed a bulky sealed en-
velope to a Canadian trade official who, equally skeptical,
returned it intact.

Finally, on March 10, 1961, Penkovsky told a member of a
British commercial delegation led by a Mr. Greville Wynne
that he would soon head a Soviet delegation on a return visit
to England. He handed Wynne some papers and a letter. The
letter was addressed to the President of the United States and
the Queen of England.

On April 20, two British and two American intelligence
officers sat down with Penkovsky in a London hotel and let
him talk. He explained that various personal factors had en-
tered into his decision to work against the Soviet regime. His
principal motivation, however, was his overwhelming fear
that Khrushchev, then at the height of his power, would use
his atomic weapons to destroy the human race. He hated
Khrushchev and the system. Khrushchev *was* the system,
and he had to stop him from the threatened holocaust. It was
an *idée fixe* possible only in a brilliant mind.

Over the next two years, through carefully arranged con-

tacts in Moscow, Penkovsky supplied Western intelligence
with the most valuable strategic military information pro-
duced by an agent since World War II.

His detailed reports on Soviet strategic offensive and de-
fensive capabilities provided a firm basis for American esti-
mates on Soviet ICBM strength, on Soviet ABM capabilities,
and on Soviet doctrines of strategic and tactical nuclear war-
fare. He provided comprehensive details on Soviet medium-
range missile systems, unique data on tactical surface-to-air
missiles, and details on antimissile systems and locations. On
ten separate occasions between mid-July 1961 and September
1962 Penkovsky supplied timely and valuable comments of
senior Soviet generals on Khrushchev's announced effort to
force the Allies out of Berlin.

Largely through Penkovsky, when the Cuban missile crisis
came to a head in October 1962, President Kennedy *knew* the
realities of Soviet missile capability (it was inferior to the
American) and could safely work on that premise. Further,
the data provided by Penkovsky on the medium-range missile
system deployed in Cuba by the Russians permitted Ameri-
can intelligence to make precise estimates of the construction
stages and the dates for operational readiness of the Soviet
missiles—a crucial factor in the timing of the American re-
sponses. Pentagon concern over a Soviet countermove against
Berlin in response to the American action against Cuba was
moderated by his reporting.

Without Penkovsky's reporting the Soviet-American con-
frontation over Cuba would have been an even more precari-
ous event than it was.

By that time, however, Penkovsky was apparently already
under Soviet surveillance. There is no definitive evidence on
what led KGB counterintelligence to suspect him, but it is
likely that he was under close investigation in the summer of
1962 and placed under KGB control by mid-September. In
May of 1963 he was tried in open court, and, according to
official report, later executed for his espionage activities.

Drawing Board

THE TULSA TRIBUNE
8 February 1977

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Collection—When the Machine Takes Over

AUDIO SURVEILLANCE

A technical aid to espionage of another kind is the concealed microphone and transmitter which keeps up a flow of live information from inside a target to a nearby listening post; this is known to the public as "telephone tapping" or "bugging" or "miking." "Audio surveillance," as it is called in intelligence work, requires excellent miniaturized electronic equipment, clever methods of concealment and a human agent to penetrate the premises and do the concealing.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in early June of 1960 displayed before the United Nations in New York the Great Seal of the United States which had been hanging in the office of the American Ambassador in Moscow. In it the Soviets had concealed a tiny instrument which, when activated, transmitted to a Soviet listening post everything that was said in the Ambassador's office. Actually, the installation of this device was no great feat for the Soviets since every foreign embassy in Moscow has to call on the services of local electricians, telephone men, plumbers, charwomen and the like. The Soviets have no difficulties in seeing to it that their own citizens cooperate with their intelligence service, or they may send intelligence officers, disguised as technicians, to do the job.

In Soviet Russia and in the major cities of the satellite countries certain hotel rooms are designated for foreign travelers because they have been previously bugged on a permanent basis. Microphones do not have to be installed in a rush when an "interesting" foreigner arrives on the scene. The microphones are already there and it is only the foreigner who has to be installed. All the hotels are state-owned and have permanent police agents on their staffs whose responsibility is to see that the proper foreigners are put in the "right" rooms.

When Chancellor Adenauer paid his famous visit to Moscow in September, 1955, to discuss the resumption of diplomatic relations between Russia and West Germany, he traveled in an official German train. When he arrived in Moscow, the Soviets learned to their chagrin that the wily Chancellor (who then had no embassy of his own to reside in, for such limited security as this might afford) intended to live in his train during his stay in Moscow and did not mean to accept Soviet "hospitality" in the form of a suite at one of the VIP hotels for foreigners in Moscow. It is reported that before

leaving Germany the Chancellor's train had been equipped by German technicians with the latest devices against audio surveillance.

Outside its own country an intelligence service must consider the possible repercussions and embarrassments that may result from the discovery that an official installation has been illegally entered and its equipment tampered with. As in all espionage operations, the trick is to find the man who can do the job and who has the talent and the motive, whether patriotic or pecuniary. There was one instance when the Soviets managed to place microphones in the flowerpots that decorated the offices of a Western embassy in a neutral country. The janitor of the building, who had a weakness for alcohol, was glad to comply for a little pocket money. He never knew who the people were who borrowed the pots from him every now and then or what they did with them.

There is hardly a technological device of this kind against which countermeasures cannot be taken. Not only can the devices themselves be detected and neutralized, but sometimes they can be turned against those who install them. Once they have been detected, it is often profitable to leave them in place in order to feed the other side with false or misleading information.

In their own diplomatic installations abroad, the Soviets and their satellites stand in such fear of audio surveillance operations being mounted against them that they will usually refuse to permit local service people to install telephones or even ordinary electrical wiring in buildings they occupy. Instead, they will send out their own technicians and electricians as diplomats on temporary duty and will have them do the installing. In one instance where they evidently suspected that one of their embassies had been "wired for sound" by outsiders, they even sent a team of day laborers to the capital in question, all of them provided with diplomatic passports for the trip. To the great amusement of the local authorities, these "diplomats" were observed during the next few weeks in overalls and bearing shovels, digging a trench four or five feet deep in the ground around the embassy building, searching for buried wires leading out of the building. (They didn't find any.)

Chapter 1

It had taken me ninety minutes to get to Piazza Venezia, which is at most a fifteen-minute walk from my hotel. Three taxi rides. One shopping gallery. Four narrow streets.

Lots of window shopping, using the plate glass much like a mirror to spot surveillance. One of my training officers had put it this way: "When you catch yourself really looking at the lingerie, it's the first sign that you've been on the streets too long." Well, some day I may have time to look at the lingerie and to talk to the pretty girls in the cafes. But not today.

My principal challenge right now is to cross the *piazza*. Roman traffic is always the same. The world's most affable people, but put them behind the wheel of a Fiat or an Alfa and they detest humanity. If all goes well, crossing and re-crossing this *piazza* will be the riskiest part of this operation.

I walk around Victor Emmanuel's monument and up the stairs of the Campidoglio, which is tucked behind it. A simple square, closed in on three sides by two-story buildings. Designed by Michelangelo himself. Beautiful in their simplicity. And two statues that look like David's kid brothers. They always make me wonder if Michelangelo really was queer.

Every tourist who comes to Rome eventually visits the Campidoglio. He'll be here too—looking like any other European. Sandals. Shirt collar opened and worn over his sport coat. German camera—or maybe Japanese. I spot a man who could pass for his brother. Brown hair. Solid build. Strong neck. But it isn't my man. Not the face. How well I know that face!

Four o'clock. To be precise, 1602 hours. I'll linger for three more minutes. If he doesn't show I'll walk down to the Forum, kill an hour and return.

Is there any chance of a misunderstanding? Remember Murphy's Law—it is the natural order of things to be screwed-up. If an arrangement admits the slightest possibility for an error or a misunderstanding, it will happen. The corollary: Make every contact plan accident-proof and idiot-proof. I thought I had, but you never knew.

He called yesterday—a number in Brussels. He spoke in French. "This is Vidal. I have a message for *Monsieur* Duran. The shipment from Rome will arrive at the airport at four p.m. on the tenth." Today is the tenth. There is no doubt that he meant to set up a meeting in Rome at this hour. Will he remember that the contact point in Rome is the Campidoglio? He will. He's a good one.

It could be that he had a last minute meeting laid on by his embassy, in which case he'll show at five p.m., or seven p.m.—or tomorrow at one of those times. Well, no matter. At least it's the Campidoglio. It's better than the Paris East Railway Station. Had to keep coming back to that depressing place for three days once. Glad I thought to set the contact point here.

There he is. A split second of eye contact. But how many important messages are passed! The most important is also the most basic. He's alive—and as anxious to see me as I am him. A quick glance to his breast-pocket. No pen. That too carries a message. He's safe—not under hostile control.

I take off back down the steps. He'll follow at a discreet distance. A right turn at the foot of the steps, back towards the *piazza*. Through groups of

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tourists—high school students, nuns, Hadassah ladies, pilgrims. All out to commune with art and with eternity. All oblivious to the procession of two winding through their midst.

Then across the *piazza*. Again the reality of the Roman drivers. Made it. Hope he does too.

Here comes a Roman beauty. Exquisite. There are more knock-outs here per square foot than anywhere I've ever been. I'll turn around to admire her. He's still behind me. Good. One of this days I want to turn around and really look at the girl.

Next up is a stroll past a sidewalk cafe. Quite crowded. My eye settles on an impeccably attired continental type in the second row who has obviously discomfited the two American teachers-on-holiday alongside him. They'd be a pushover for the distinguished gray-haired likes of him. Wouldn't they be disappointed if they knew Tom was from Newark! And that he had taken that particular table in order to have an unobstructed view of the square. Foot surveillance—motorcycle—car surveillance. Tom's good. If they're on us, he'll spot them.

Right on via Tritone. And into the Innocente Department Store. Up to the third floor. He's still with me. Escalators are great for looking back. A pause in the men's clothing department. Past a man trying on a sport coat. I don't think they'll make the sale. Willie has two kids in college and another finishing high school. He's still wearing three-button pin-stripes and couldn't care less. Now to the down escalator. He'll follow me. If anyone follows him, Willie will make him.

Out a side door. Are we clean? Don't know yet. Here comes another pretty girl. Tall and fair—ash blond hair. Could be from Milan or Torino or Venice—or Pittsburgh. I stare her down. She avoids my gaze. Excellent. If she had winked I would have been in deep trouble. That would have meant that Tom or Willie or another stake-out had spotted hostile surveillance. My handkerchief would have come flying out of my pocket, and he would have broken off in another direction. Sometimes it's nice to have a pretty girl *not* respond to you.

Now a left down a side street. Via Marcello. Third *palazzo* from the corner. Looks like all the rest. It's illegal to change the facing of a Roman building. They dig antiquities. You couldn't sell them Collins Avenue. Door is locked.

I open it with my key and step inside. leaving it ever so slightly ajar. I wait. He'll take a last look around before he risks entry. For him this is the moment of truth. If anyone sees him enter the building he'll have a lot of explaining to do.

Perhaps he could explain. Apartment five. on the second floor is rented to *Signora* Marissa Gambelli who is. after all. known to entertain gentlemen. And she will be prepared to swear that she did pass that afternoon with a gentleman of his description.

Maybe they would accept that explanation and merely reprimand him for violating socialist principles of morality. Or maybe they would check deeper and find out that Marissa had spent the afternoon and evening with one of her regulars—at the sea in nearby Ostia. That lucky fellow is probably still wondering why Marissa had the sudden urge to spend a whole day with him for the price of a *tête-à-tête*. That's easy. *Dottore* Minervi pays Marissa's rent. and when the good doctor asks her to disappear for a spell. she dissapears.

I hear him open the door. I'm already on the stairs. Two flights—the longest part of the journey, it always seems. So near to the safe-house.

At last the door. The key. I'm inside. He's inside. After the door closes the *abrazzo* comes. A warm bear hug that seems awkward to many Americans but is quite acceptable among other men.

It lasts a long time. There is great emotion on both sides. He had once told me: "You are more than my brother."

I felt the same way. We were half a world apart. Different countries. Different ethnic backgrounds. Different languages. Brought up under totally different political systems. Yet. more than brothers.

5

I was scheduled to fly to Cuba the following Saturday. I would get there in time to inspect the arrangements for the seminar and work on any last-minute problems before it opened on Monday. Early in the week I dropped off my razor with Johnson, and on Friday evening, the night before my departure, I went to see him.

It was our first meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria. A large reception in a downstairs ballroom gave me my excuse to be at the hotel. At the party I chatted briefly with the host and a few other UN ambassadors, but soon was able to slip out. I took an elevator to one of the upper floors.

Johnson had sketched the location of the room for me: it was down a corridor to the right of the elevator shaft. But other people left the car with me. I walked the length and width of the hotel and came to the room from the back corridor, having reassured myself that the other elevator passengers were ordinary guests uninterested in me or my destination.

Johnson was waiting for me, obviously pleased with himself. He pointed to a low coffee table and two razors lying on it side by side. "Which one is yours?" He grinned.

I examined them, hefted them in my hands, and could find no difference between them.

"They're both yours from now on," Johnson said, "but the one on the left isn't the kind you can buy at the drugstore. I'll show you the difference."

He picked up the instrument and, as I watched, set the numbers on the metal ring below the razor head at the minimum opening and then, pushing hard against the bottom of the handle, twisted the cylinder. The handle came apart, revealing that it was hollow. Into the opening Johnson slipped a tiny roll of microfilm.

"That has everything you need on it," he said. "In case you forget the details of the contingency plan we went over the other night. It's got phone numbers, locations, people to contact in case you need them."

He made me practice opening and closing the razor until he pronounced me an expert. I didn't feel like one.

I packed both razors the next morning and went to Kennedy Airport to catch a flight for Jamaica, where, after a layover, I would take another plane to Havana.

My UN associates who met me at the Havana airport were preoccupied with last-minute problems in the organization of the apartheid seminar. There was no Soviet welcoming party for me, no KGB detail on hand.

I stayed at a former luxury hotel which had become distinctly seedy. The bathrooms were a rusty mess. Plumbing fixtures were exactly the kind of thing the Cubans hoped the Soviet Union would supply to them. But the U.S.S.R. had too little of such equipment for itself. Another item the Cubans were desirous of was Coca-Cola. They missed their Cuba Libres.

The Soviets were never able to produce Coca-Cola, so they asked the Czechs, who did their best, but the result was not very good. "Checka-Cola" never worked as well as Coca-Cola. The Soviet Union found it much easier to be generous with military equipment, of which they had no short-age.

I spent the next day checking arrangements for the apartheid discussions. I met the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba only when the seminar opened and he arrived to represent the U.S.S.R. at its sessions. We were not acquaintances and, although we found time for a brief talk during a break in the speechmaking, we made no effort to go beyond superficial conversation. I did, however, accept his offer to spend the evening with two couples from the embassy who were willing to accompany me for dinner and a Cuban nightclub performance. It proved to be a pleasant evening, and as I prepared to pack and return to New York, I told myself that Johnson had been right. My worry had been for nothing. The worst was over. As so often before, the worst had been mostly in my imagination.

My mood didn't last. I noticed that two of my shirts were not where I had left them. Their disappearance was annoying, but I assumed they would turn up somewhere in the suite. My nonchalance vanished completely when I went into the bathroom. The razor I had put on a shelf above the sink was not there.

Sweat broke out all over my body. Which razor had I left in the bathroom? I had forgotten to test it when I unpacked, to distinguish the original from the hollow one. Where had I left the other one? In my suitcase. That was it. I would get it, check it, find out for certain if I was safe or self-betrayed.

Walking as though I were underwater, I went back to the bedroom and fumbled through the clothes I had already packed until my fingers grasped the razor. I brought it out and stood a moment, trying to recall the procedure for opening it.

Set the number as low as possible. Twist the bottom part of the handle.

Damn. It wouldn't move. I tried again. Nothing.

They had taken the hollow one. I was found out.

I collapsed into a sitting position on the edge of the bed, staring at the worn, dingy carpet, unable to organize my thoughts, to get control of myself.

I do not know how long the seizure lasted, but it seemed an eternity until I began to swim back toward reason. Finally, in a corner of my mind, I remembered that I had omitted a step in the process of opening the razor handle.

I tried a third time. Do it slowly. Do it right. Set the number. Push hard on the handle and twist. Push hard. That was the action I had forgotten on the first two attempts. Now turn it.

It turned. It unscrewed. The microfilm was still safe inside.

I gasped aloud with relief. Only a hotel maid stealing a few things from her socialist brother. But was it? Perhaps it really had been Castro's security police or the KGB. Maybe they had discovered something and were sifting all possibilities. Maybe there was a mole in the CIA who had tipped them off or even, I thought with rage, one of their moronic, careless leaks. Only time could give me the answer.

From then until I returned that night to New York, I kept the razor in my briefcase and never let the case out of my hands. Home in my apartment I waited until Lina and Anna were asleep and then went into the bathroom with scissors and a pair of heavy pliers. I extracted the microfilm, minced it into slivers, and flushed it away. Then I mangled the razor itself, twisting it into an unrecognizable lump. The remains went into the trash.

For some time after, I was on the alert and suspicious of anything even slightly unusual in anyone's behavior at the Soviet Mission. But as my routine settled back into ordinary patterns, the residue of shock from my own "Cuban crisis" receded.

Contributing to the relaxing of my tensions was my somewhat surprising discovery that there were many similarities between spying and diplomacy. Spies and diplomats live double lives: one life for outsiders and another among those whom they trust or for whom they work. Both jobs require constant vigilance, good nerves, and time to devote to collecting information and compiling it for reports to one's government.

I began to feel that I was fishing in my own pond. Johnson had proved right about my ability to make the gathering of intelligence a manageable part of my routine. It took time, but I acquired the facility. He was wrong, however, about my fears eventually dwindling away. Anxiety always remained in a back corner of my mind. I was acutely aware that while diplomats usually finished their lives with honor and died in their beds, even brilliant spies often came to an abrupt and violent end or lived out their lives in prison and disgrace.

4 SURVEILLANCE

Tapping

There are two types of taps—direct and wireless. Direct taps, as their name suggests, are intercepts that are attached directly to the phone line anywhere between the telephone and the exchange and then run off by wire to a listening post—which may be manned by either the stereotypical agent, sweating in the basement, or merely a tape recorder. A wireless telephone tap, although employing a direct intercept of the line current, uses a radio transmitter rather than a direct wire to send the intercepted call to the listening post.

If a spy wishes to tap a phone directly, he or she first locates the phone line that is to be invaded. This is obviously easier to do when it is just one overhead wire running from the suburban residence of a foreegn consul than when it is one line of thousands in a downtown building where the consul's office is located.

To tap a household in a suburban situation (the consul's or perhaps a suspected Bulgarian safehouse in a town near Silicon Valley), the wiretapper follows the "drop wire" that emerges from the house and goes to a nearby pole-mounted terminal, where it connects to a twenty-five-pair aerial distribution cable. The tapper then climbs the pole and notes the color of the pair to which the houses's drop wire is connected. He can either hook up a tap there or follow the aerial distribution cable a few blocks to another pole-mounted terminal, where it hooks up with an aerial branch feeder cable with 200 pairs (in eight binder groups). Again, he can either hook up the tap there or follow the line to the main feeder cable, which consists of 600 pairs in twenty-four binder groups. Agents consider it best to tap into the line at a terminal post because the cables between the terminals are pressurized, so that any break in their sheathing can be detected.

Tapping in an urban area poses problems. Whether the agent is after a consular office in an office building or the apartment home of a suspected terrorist, he must go to the basement where terminal boxes are usually located in apartment and office buildings. There are several ways the tapper can find the pair of lines he wishes to tap into if the subject is in an office or an apartment. If the person or persons he wishes to tap happen to be on the line while he is at the terminal box, he can simply hook up his headphones to each pair of lines until he finds the voice he is looking for.

He may also hook up a lineman's handset to any pair, then dial the number he wishes to tap, and let it ring. He then runs a wet finger or a coin down the terminal posts in the box until he feels

either a small jolt or sees a spark from the 48 line volts being used to ring the person's phone. To avoid this minor shock, a small light bulb attached to a resistor can be touched to the posts, and it will light up when it touches the active line.


Diagram of the installation of series and parallel transmitters.

When the proper line has been determined, the wiretapper can then hook up a battery-powered high-impedance amplifier and some headphones to the line and listen in. This type of tap is hooked up in a parallel circuit, which does not use the phone system's power but

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requires batteries or some other form of power generation. If the spy must use the phone system's electricity, then the tap can be hooked up in series. These series taps create an extra draw on the line, causing a drop in the line voltage that is easily detected. In fact, any drop of over 20 milliamperes can be detected by the phone company itself, and if they do detect an extra draw, they will send out a repairman to investigate—something the agent does not want.

Another type of tap, the inductive tap, is also considered to be a direct tap even though it does not require any direct contact with either the telephone or the line. The inductive tap operates on the basic principle of electromagnetism, that a magnetic field surrounds

Installation of an induction tap.

any flow of electric current. Theoretically, therefore, by picking up the magnetic field surrounding the current in the phone line an agent can intercept a phone call without ever touching the line. But this is more than theory. The inductive tap actually works, using a metal coil wrapped around the phone lines, with wires from either end of the coil running off to an amplifier. One advantage of this method is that a properly installed inductive tap is virtually impossible to detect. There are, however, detractions. Because the magnetic field it taps is rather weak, the signal output from the sensing coil is somewhat low, and the coil is subject to interference and distortion from other magnetic sources as well.

Any tap can be made into a wireless tap. All that is necessary is to hook up a small radio transmitter to the tap itself, so that intercepted calls can be broadcast to a nearby receiver rather than run there by wire. The simplest of these is the drop-in telephone bug, a tap that is disguised to look exactly like a telephone microphone. The agent merely unscrews the microphone cap, takes out the old mike, and drops in the new one. Inside this otherwise normal-looking telephone mike is a small radio transmitter that broadcasts the intercepted conversation along the phone line to the

eavesdroppers. Although easy to install, drop-in transmitters can be easily detected because they draw power from the phone lines.

Other radio-transmitting taps are usually hooked up somewhere along the line and are no larger than a grain of rice; tiny enough to be slipped inside the insulation cover on a telephone line. However, as will be discussed later, radio-frequency (RF) transmitters pose certain problems in operation, so that direct wiretaps are preferred by eavesdroppers.

There are a few devices that can make an eavesdropping agent's life easier. With a gadget called a dropout relay, a tap can be set to turn on only when the phone is in use (it detects the drop in line voltage when the handset is lifted off hook). Also useful are recorders, which will note when and to what number each call from the phone under surveillance was dialed. Of course, the numbers can also be recovered by taping the calls and playing them back at a slower speed in order to pick up either the number of rotary dial clicks or the tones from a push-button phone.

The Telephone as a Bug

Not only can a spy tap into a line to intercept phone calls; in addition, the telephone and its line also can be used to bug a room, and as the telephone is virtually omnipresent these days, such a prospect can be very attractive to the spy. Essentially, a phone used to bug a room must be actually off hook while appearing to be on hook. The hook switch must be bypassed so that some current gets through to operate the carbon microphone. Thus activated by the current, the mike can pick up the room conversation and then transmit it over the telephone lines as if it were a regular telephone conversation.

The notorious infinity transmitter is designed to do just that. This type of transmitter got its name from its original manufacturer who claimed that it could be operated from virtually an "infinite" distance—from anywhere in the world with direct dialing. It is a small device that is installed directly in the target's phone. When the spy wishes to listen in to the room conversation, he dials the target's number and immediately, before the phone rings, sends a tone along the line that activates the infinity transmitter, which bypasses the hook switch and cuts off the ring. The phone has, in effect, been answered: It is now off hook, even though it is still resting on the cradle and appears on hook, and the occupant of the room is none the wiser.

The infinity transmitters used by agents and other professional eavesdroppers have different levels of sophistication. The simplest is triggered by one tone sent over the line. The problem with this is that countersurveillance experts will "sweep" phone lines with a tone generator in an attempt to trigger such a device. However, the more sophisticated infinity transmitters are turned on by a coded sequence of up to five tones, which makes them virtually impossible to uncover with a tone sweep.

Infinity transmitters are not perfect eavesdropping tools. The telephone's microphone can only pick up conversation within about 30 feet of the phone (if that), and the sound quality is rather poor. Also, the switching systems in some countries may delay the triggering tone so that it does not reach the target telephone befor it rings. The abbreviated ring may alert the person the agent is trying to bug that something is amiss.

Another problem is that the infinity transmitter only picks up room conversation and will shut itself off the instant the phone is put in use. It must do so, for if it remained in operation when the target picked up his phone, the target would have a direct line to the eavesdropper. Also, there is an attendant drop in line voltage with the use of one of these devices. It doesn't drop so much that the phone company thinks there is something wrong with the telephone; it only goes down to around 23 volts, the voltage used when one is on hold. But even this meager drop is easily detected by professional sweepers.

The biggest problem with the infinity transmitter is that while it is in use anyone else calling the target number will get a busy signal. People who are told by friends that their phone is busy all the time, even when they are not using it, would certainly get suspicious—if not of an infinity transmitter, then at least that the phone was malfunctioning.

The Listen-back, Keep-alive, and Direct Crosswire

The listen-back and the keep-alive, like the infinity transmitter, are tiny devices that are wired directly into the telephone instrument and that allow the eavesdropper to bypass the hook switch and listen in on the room conversation. But while the infinity transmitter is triggered by a tone, with a listen-back or keep-alive the target phone

must be answered to trigger the circuitry. Then, when the target hangs up, the keep-alive or listen-back will continue to allow a small amount of current to trickle through the microphone and back down the line to the eavesdropper; this current is shut off when the eavesdropper hangs up. Of course, anyone calling in will activate keep-alives and listen-backs, which are also subject to the liabilities of an infinity transmitter (voltage drop, busy signal, etc.). Still, such devices are very small and may be harder to detect by visual inspection than an infinity transmitter.

The direct-crosswire technique can be used only with six-button

The Telephone: direct crosswire technique

2.

Hookswitch

Operating pairs for each line

1.   Spare pairs

1.

2.

The direct crosswire, listen-back and keep-alive techniques. In box one we see where the spare pair is hooked up to the line coming from the curly cord. Box two shows the workings of the hookswitch. As shown, the phone is on hook; if the nodules were touching it would be off-hook. Listen-backs and keep-alives rig the switch so that it is always off-hook, whether the receiver is on the cradle and the buttons depressed or not.

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phones (five lines and one hold button). In such phones there is usually one pair of lines to each button as well as a loose spare pair or two. One of these spare pairs can be hooked up directly to the lines coming in from the microphone through the curly cord that connects the handset to the phone. Then, outside on the line somewhere, this spare line can be tapped. In effect, hooking up the spare pair directly to the microphone bypasses the hook switch and keeps one line open at all times. In addition, as this is a spare line and not a number that one could dial, it does not cause anyone calling in to get a busy signal.

Intelligence Liaison

My understanding of the intelligence world increased immensely in this period when I succeeded in getting assigned to the CIA contingent in London, serving there until November 1953. The assignment was something of an accident. Beetle Smith decided to integrate the CIA activities overseas in major posts by assigning what he called Senior Representatives of the Director of the CIA. This meant the warring factions of OPC and OSO would have a local umpire in addition to the station chief, who often tended to get embroiled in the struggles. Smith appointed General Lucian Truscott to manage the mammoth German station and a suave, old-school Virginia gentleman, retired Brigadier General Thomas Betts, to be Senior Representative in London. Betts was one of the few professional military officers with a long career in intelligence. He had the good judgment to see that exchanging our new intelligence product—the NIE—with the British, in return for their Joint Intelligence Committee appreciations on the same subject, would be mutually beneficial. Betts asked for a staff officer from the new ONE to explain what we were doing to the British and to find out what was going on in the more mature British system.

When the message from London reached Washington, I immediately asked Langer to let me leave ONE, which had pretty well shaken down to the pattern of activities it maintained for 20 years, and establish this new job in London. It would give us the benefits of seeing how the evidence on common strategic problems looked from the viewpoint of another nation, a close ally with similar but separate interests. I thought ONE and the CIA would benefit and I would learn much from the British process. I believe I was right; the exchange of "finished"—i.e., evaluated and analyzed—reports with London continues to this day as does an informal liaison exchange system on the analytical level. At its peak, it kept 13 CIA analysts busy in London comparing notes with their counterparts in economic intelligence, scientific intelligence, and general strategic analysis. The link is still strong and valuable today. The foresight of Smith, Langer, and Betts paid off handsomely.

My real awakening in London was the discovery of how much we still benefited from formal liaison exchanges of intelligence with Great Britain, over and beyond the give and take of analytical papers. Tom Betts was an easygoing boss, perfectly willing to let me do whatever I wanted, and he gave me free rein to help other CIA components in London. I was also lucky in having taken one of the best of the ONE secretaries, Barbara Ewen, whose looks and southern accent devastated the young Englishmen I dealt with.. She ran the office, handled the paperwork, and managed my program to maximum benefit.

This fact I mention not only to show why I had so much spare time in London, but to make a general point about secretaries, especially those dealing with the sensitive and sometimes delicate matters of intelligence handling and intelligence exchange. It can be serious if they make a slip in talking with high-ranking officials, especially foreign officials, by referring to specific intelligence items they may not be supposed to know about. My good fortune has been in having the .help of extremely competent women. To all of them—most of them grossly underpaid for the responsibilities they carried—I am much indebted, especially to my OSS secretary Penny Wright, my first CIA secretary Marcelle Raczkowski, to Barb Ewen, to Rosie Sarson in Taiwan, and to Dolores Unick, my last CIA secretary, who went to Germany with me. These encomiums are also due to Thayal Hall, my secretary in the State Department in 1969-1973. All of these able women were actually research assistants, managerial backups for my administrative chores, and personal representatives with the outside world.

With such support from Barb Ewen in London, I got around, not ony with all kinds of British intelligence officials, but also with the CIA liaison staff in Great Britain. The wartime partnership was still paying off handsomely. The British, recognizing the importance of keeping the United States actively engaged in an effort to contain Soviet disruptive thrusts, were extraordinarily open and cooperative with Americans in intelligence matters. They provided not only most of their highest-level joint intelligence estimates but also supplied the station chief in London with most of their clandestine intelligence MI-6 reports. The station chief was not

very communicative with me in accordance with clandestine tradition, but my OSS background, my acquaintance with senior U.S. military men I had interviewed while writing the Army history, and my entree to high-level British officials made me *persona grata* with his staff, particularly his deputy, who cooperated closely with me with the chief's tacit acquiescence. I learned a lot from this collaboration.

One of the CIA's most closely guarded secrets is that its own espionage efforts have been supplemented greatly in both numbers and importance by contributions from the intelligence services of friendly allies. Much of this intelligence is circulated in Washington as standard CIA Information Reports so that few know the difference. Of course a vast amount of reporting from foreign governments was not disseminated outside the CIA because it was unreliable or of little interest. Even this material has helped, however, to guide the CIA's own collection staffs.

Some of the material thus exchanged with liaison services was from intercepted electronic signal messages. Eventually most of this material was worked into the reporting system of the National Security Agency, the consolidated cryptanalysis and signals intercept facility set up in 1950 to manage the signals intelligence work of the military services. The contribution from this source has been enormous over the years and still is. Here, too, many Washington recipients of intercepted messages do not realize they are reading traffic that would not be available except for good liaison relations with allies. On the periphery of the Soviet Union and China, communications and other electronic (radar, missile telemetry, etc.) intercept bases provided unique data from remote regions.

The importance of these bases rose and fell with technological and political changes over the years, but it is fair to say that the CIA's official intelligence liaison in this field netted more reliable material for Washington analysts and intelligence processors than any other source. Many allies have contributed to U.S. security in this way. In particular, West German and the Nationalist Chinese efforts, exploiting native language abilities and regional expertise, have greatly assisted the success of the U.S. signals processing machine and thus created a solid fund of knowledge on which analysts could draw in making their all-

source studies of defense and foreign policy issues. It was in London, the hub of the closest intelligence exchange in all history, that I perceived very early what vast benefits our allies provided in the way of good intelligence. Without them, the alliance system itself could not function effectively; U.S. citizens will understand and value our foreign friends better if they know this simple fact.

In Great Britain these extensive liaison arrangements were supplemented by equally crucial exchanges in the counter-espionage and counterintelligence field—also important in liaisons with many other allies with good internal security services—and by a unique system of sharing the burden of monitoring and translating foreign broadcasts. While this latter work is overt intelligence collection, it is a technically complex and costly undertaking. By roughly dividing the world between them and exchanging the materials recorded, the United States and Great Britain have always saved themselves a great deal of money and trouble and continue to do so.

It was most educational for me to have the opportunity to look at global intelligence problems from the viewpoint of this liaison link between the two most productive mature intelligence systems in the world. One lesson I learned from the British: there is no way to be on top of intelligence problems unless you collect much more extensively than any cost-accounting approach would justify and then rely on the wisdom and experience of analysts to sift out the small percentage of vital information that needs to be passed to the top of the government. You might think you could do without most of what is collected; but in intelligence, in fact, as in ore mining, there is no way to get the nuggets without taking the whole ore-bearing compound. Once at a cocktail party in London in 1952 or 1953 I heard this point made succinctly by Sir Kenneth W.D. Strong, the hawk-faced patrician Englishman who had served as Eisenhower's G-2 in the Allied Forces in Europe in World War II and stayed on to be the dominant personality in British intelligence for about 25 years.* He observed that "an intelligence official simply has to be temperamentally adjusted

*He wrote two reflective books on his career in intelligence, *Intelligence at the Top* (1968) and *Men of Intelligence* (1970).

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to the fact that 95 percent of his organization's total effort is utterly wasted, although it is all necessary to get the 5 percent that is useful to policymaking." A young man there said in dismay, "General Strong, surely you are exaggerating the percentage of wasted effort?" Strong drew himself up to his considerable height and somewhat histrionically proclaimed, "Perhaps I should reconsider; yes, on second thought, I would say 97 percent is useless effort, but our national safety depends on finding the 3 percent!" It is not a bad formula.

"Sometimes I wonder why I ever joined CIA in the first place!"

Saturday Evening Post - 11 August 1962

THE WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1963

"I've Got Good News for You, Comrade... You Have Passed the Espionage Test and You Are Now a Full-Fledged Cultural Attache!"

12

THE CIA AT HOME

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

Domestic support of CIA's secret operations is extensive. It is essential to our foreign mission. It is carried out in secret with cleared individuals, and often involves the secret handling of money and contracts. It ranges from confidential contacts with individual citizens to complex arrangements with large corporations. The most crucial element in the domestic support of CIA's secret operations is the provision of cover for overseas case officers.

CIA operators overseas do not normally advertise themselves as "CIA" even in friendly countries where their main

business is to work with the local security intelligence services. The latter prefer that the affiliation of their American colleagues not be made public.

In the vast majority of overseas assignments CIA officers operate under official American cover—as employees of the Department of State or Defense or the Agency for International Development, usually depending upon the nature of their assignments and the area involved. During the American occupation of Germany, for example, virtually all CIA officers were DACs: Department of Army civilians. In Indochina during the sixties, Army and AID cover was most appropriate. Today most CIA officers operate from our embassies abroad.

Operating out of an embassy has many advantages for any service, not least of which is diplomatic immunity for its offices, files, and personnel. "Diplomats" are not arrested and tried for espionage, but simply expelled. The main disadvantage, both for the CIA and the KGB, is the ease with which official cover operators can be identified, surveyed, and sometimes provoked. If diplomatic relations are broken off, of course, the operators are forced to leave with their legitimate colleagues.

Nonofficial cover—operators acting as ordinary American citizens on business abroad—makes a less obvious target for suspicion and often permits access to circles not open to the local embassy. It also permits CIA case officers to remain in place in a country that has broken off diplomatic relations with the United States. It poses one rather drastic disadvantage. If a man under unofficial cover is caught spying, he can be arrested and jailed.

Several types of "commercial cover" have been employed over the years. In most cases CIA officers have been sent out as employees of a company created and owned by the CIA, so-called proprietary companies like Air America or front organizations like Radio Free Europe. In other cases small firms have been established by CIA with the express purpose

of supplying a notional cover for a few men operating in one or more countries. These covers require the cooperation of many non-CIA Americans in setting up the companies and acting as officers.

Sometimes a CIA officer is provided cover by an established American company with offices abroad. In these cases a training period at company headquarters is often a preliminary to a foreign assignment, for the CIA officer must be qualified to carry out the firm's business. The main handicap in this type of assignment is that the CIA officer often must spend most of his time on his cover work, sometimes to the detriment of his operational assignments.

Since an officer under unofficial cover is subject to arrest for espionage acts, his assignments are normally confined to handling an already recruited agent whose value and reliability have been proved. He is normally in touch with the local CIA station and can recommend potential recruits for follow up by a "diplomat."

American manufacturers are also a vital element in CIA operations involving advanced technical equipment. In the late fifties CIA contracted with Lockheed to build the U-2 supersonic aircraft for overflights across Soviet territory. A decade later plans were made to raise a sunken Soviet submarine in the Pacific, and contracts were let to the Summa Corporation to build a highly sophisticated salvage ship, the *Glomar Explorer*. These are only two of the most conspicuous examples of the contributions made by American science and technology to CIA's collection of foreign intelligence.

Other CIA activities in the United States in support of its overseas intelligence operations have very little to do with American citizens. Foreign agents who cannot be trained at overseas sites are handled at home—for example, the high-altitude training of Tibetans in Colorado, or the selection and training of Cuban émigrés for intelligence operations against Cuba. CIA agents working abroad sometimes visit the United States or are assigned here on official or unofficial business.

Contact is maintained with them while they are here and
often provides an opportunity for more intense training and
debriefing than is practical overseas. Most high-level Soviet
and other intelligence defectors are brought to the United
States for interrogation by interested Washington intelli-
gence agencies. In these cases private American citizens or
companies often play a part in resettling them by helping to
cover their real identities, getting them a job or credit status,
etc.

From "The CIA and the U. S.
Intelligence System", by
Scott D. Breckinridge

9

CLANDESTINE COLLECTION

COVER

Clandestine collection of foreign intelligence requires that the operator, often referred to as case officer, is not known publicly for what he or she is. Operators must be able to move normally through the environment in which they work. The *Rockefeller Commission Report* effectively summarized this issue as follows:

Many CIA activities—like those of every foreign intelligence service—are clandestine in nature. Involved CIA personnel cannot travel, live or perform their duties openly as CIA employees. Even in countries where the CIA works closely with cooperative foreign intelligence services, Agency personnel are often required by their hosts to conceal their CIA status.

Accordingly, virtually all CIA personnel serving abroad and many of the Agency's professional personnel in the United States assume a "cover." Their employment with CIA is disguised and, to persons other than their families and co-workers, they are held out as employees of another government agency or of a commercial enterprise.

Cover arrangements frequently have substantial domestic aspects. These include the participation of other United States government agencies, business firms, and private citizens and creation and management of a variety of domestic commercial entities. Most CIA employees in need of cover are assigned "official cover" with another component of the federal government pursuant to formal agreements between the CIA and the "covering" departments or agencies. Where official cover is unavailable or otherwise inappropriate, CIA officers or contract employees are assigned "nonofficial" cover, which usually consists of an ostensible position with CIA-created and controlled business entities known as "proprietary companies" or "devised facilities." On occasion, nonofficial cover is provided for a CIA officer by a bona fide privately owned American business firm.[28]

The considerations applying to CIA employees abroad, especially those engaged in clandestine operations, apply similarly to the collectors and operators belonging to military intelligence organizations. Military operatives can and do use nonofficial cover arrangements, although not usually with the complex of special arrangements described in the *Rockefeller Report*. It should be apparent that the need for nonofficial cover is not as great with military intelligence personnel as it sometimes is with CIA.

Clearly clandestine operators cannot engage in their missions abroad if the purpose of their work is known, or if their identities are suspect. They must have some plausible cover that avoids special attention. Because of the publicity CIA has received, this principle applies to its administrative and clerical personnel abroad, as well as to those officers involved only in the relatively prosaic chores of liaison with allied services.

In friendly areas, the lightest cover often is acceptable for liaison officers. An individual assigned such work is officially accredited to the host nation, is known to many within the intelligence community there, and works with them much as other personnel in the official U.S. installation deal with people in the various ministries of the host government. Although the work is relatively overt, many of those assigned to liaison duties may belong to the Clandestine Service and remain subject to later assignment to operational tasks. For them, some continuity of sound cover is required. Their cover will be more complete, being known as "deep" cover, in contrast to the "light" cover of less sensitive personnel.

In practice, the very fact of cover presents some problems for clandestine operators. If integrated into the personnel system of another government organization, they may be expected to perform some work for it. These "cover duties" intrude on the time otherwise available for basic activities and tend to stretch the work day. Official protocol chores may become a part of the assignment, further trespassing on the time available. As mentioned earlier, the Church Committee expressed concern over the effect of protocol duties on Defense Attachés. Yet "living one's cover" is an important part of the work.

Official cover carries with it the inconvenience of having to work out of an official installation, where hostile counterintelligence officers are better able to identify a possible operator and establish surveillance of him or her. This situation complicates the mobility of the person under official cover, requiring extra activity to ensure that there is no surveillance before engaging in the more sensitive work, or eluding it if it is present.

Those serving under nonofficial cover are free from the burdens of official cover, often doing only enough work at their ostensible vocation to be convincing to the casual observer. That applies primarily to the person in a devised or proprietary facility, as mentioned in the *Rockefeller Report*. In a bona fide commercial organization, intelligence personnel must also perform normal duties within that company to avoid attracting attention. The advantages of mobility that may attach to the person under nonofficial cover are offset, at least in part, by problems of communication. The person "outside"—that is, not working in an official installation—has the same responsibility to report on a timely basis as does the person "inside." Sometimes this situation presents problems, one of which is the time consumed during observation of security procedures. Emergency contact can be established and occasionally special communications can be arranged, but the basic problem remains.

Clandestine intelligence operations are somewhat labor-intensive, involving detailed one-on-one meetings between agent and case officer. The problems of operational security and communications add to this labor-intensive situation, in which cover is but one aspect of the problem. Living one's cover is a built-in feature of the clandestine operator's tradecraft. To the experienced officer it becomes an accepted, though onerous, part of the work.

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JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) is a domestic field office of the FBIS Production Group. Guided by Community requirements, the divisions of Production Group select material to be processed from foreign publications. These unclassified items are then sent to JPRS for translation by some 1,300 independent contractors skilled in more than 70 languages. JPRS staff editors, based on their knowledge of each contractor's capabilities, assign the work to an appropriate contractor. Contractors normally receive their assignments by mail and do their translations at home. They are paid by the number of foreign-language words they translate. When an assignment is completed, the staff editors prepare it for publication and send it to Printing and Photography Division for printing.

JPRS publishes 54 serial reports, totalling 300,000 pages annually. Distribution within the government averages 175 copies per report. Except for those restricted to official use only, reports are on sale to the public through the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce.

All JPRS publications are listed in the "Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications." Bound copies of most JPRS reports are held in the Current Periodicals Reading Room of the Library of Congress, and photocopies may be obtained from its Photoduplication Service. An index to JPRS publications is prepared monthly by Bell and Howell's Microphoto Division.

JPRS' premises are unclassified and include a reading room open to U.S. Government personnel. Available to readers are the tables of contents of JPRS reports back to 1963, report indexes and microfiche copies of reports published since January 1975. Microfiche readers are available.

JPRS also offers its translation services to other government agencies on a cost-reimbursable basis. JPRS does not ordinarily publish these translations. Reimbursable work accounts for about 10 percent of JPRS translations.

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1 AUGUST 1985

CONSOLIDATED TRANSLATION SURVEY

The FBIS-maintained Consolidated Translation Survey (CTS) is an index of items which have been translated into English from foreign publications. It is the only systematic means available to the U.S. Government to ensure that translations done by one agency are not duplicated by another at a later date, thereby saving the U.S. Government some $2 million annually in prevented duplications.

The CTS file dates from 1949 and contains more than 2 million entries. CTS includes records of only unclassified translations. Documents are indexed by:

1. Author's or editor's name and
2. Source--the transliterated title of the original document.

The CTS product is a bibliographic citation. CTS does not make the actual translation available to the requester but rather refers the requester to the office which produced the translation.

CTS can provide printouts by author and by source. Analysts and researchers can request printouts of the translated articles by a particular scientist or journalist or from a particular specialized journal or other publication. Such printouts can serve as an index to translated materials on a particular subject.

CTS includes data on items translated or in the process of translation by agencies throughout the U.S. Government, primarily those of the Intelligence Community. The CTS file contains references to translations produced by more than 60 U.S. Government organizations; commercial translating houses; and Australian, British, and Canadian governmental or quasi-official agencies.

CTS welcomes queries from all U.S. Government departments and agencies. Government agencies should call CTS:

1. To determine whether an item has been translated.
2. Before beginning to translate.
3. To advise that a translation is in process (CTS enters "in-process" translations in its files so other agencies will not need to undertake the same translation).
4. To advise that a translation has been completed.

Agencies can contact CTS by mail both to request a search of the data base and to inform CTS of the availability of a completed translation. Correspondence should be sent to Foreign Broadcast Information Service/CTS, P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Government agencies are also welcome to telephone CTS at 703-351-2567.

To arrange for a translation, contact Chief, Translation Services Staff at the same address; telephone number is 703-351-2979.

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1 AUGUST 1985

DAILY REPORTING DIVISION

The Daily Reporting Division (DRD), is responsible for the two primary outlets for the distribution of information--the Wire Service and the DAILY REPORT. The division also serves as the focal point for quality control of the field product and trains Information Officers for field assignments. DRD is organized into the Office of the Chief, the Wire Services Staff, the Publications Staff, the Reference Staff, and four geographic branches that prepare the DAILY REPORT.

The 24-hour Wire Service functions as the operations center for FBIS. Supported by a communications and computer system, its duty officers screen all incoming traffic from the field, averaging 300,000 words a day, for information of immediate concern to key national operations centers and other recipients of the Wire Service "ticker." The Wire Service carries an average of 30,000 words a day. As watch officers, Wire Service personnel alert major offices to newsbreaks, oversee and coordinate FBIS field bureau coverage of breaking developments worldwide, and act as liaison between consumer offices and FBIS Headquarters and field components during evening and overnight shifts and on weekends. The Wire Services Staff's Communications Center provides general communications support to FBIS Headquarters components and operates the computer system that produces the Wire Service "ticker" and the FBIS DAILY REPORT.

The DAILY REPORT, published Monday through Friday, is divided into eight geographic volumes--China, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Asia & Pacific, Middle East & Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and South Asia. The Middle East & Africa and the South Asia volumes are the only books produced using computerized text editing and composition facilities. The other six volumes will be automated in the near future. Together the eight volumes carry about 300,000 words in 400 pages each day. They include selected items provided by the area divisions of Production Group along with material monitored in the FBIS field. They are printed overnight for distribution the next morning in more than 10,000 copies throughout the government and are available for public subscription through the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce. Microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORT are also available.

The Reference Staff provides reference services to Headquarters and field personnel and handles cable distribution to all Headquarters components.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

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ANALYSIS GROUP

1 AUGUST 1985

The Analysis Group (AG) systematically studies the content and behavior of broadcast and print media of the Soviet Union, China, and other key countries, reporting and interpreting its findings in the weekly TRENDS and in ad hoc Analysis Reports and Special Memoranda. Analysis Notes, run on the FBIS Wire or issued in typescript, call attention to developments of immediate interest.

The focus of FBIS analysis has long been on policy trends in the communist countries, whose controlled, integrated media lend themselves to systematic examination for clues to regime attitudes, problems, goals, and intentions. Analysis efforts now also address media of Third World countries, chiefly in the Middle East and Central America.

AG's stock-in-trade is analysis of current public statements and propaganda in the perspective of past statements and in the context of political developments--identifying new elements, changes in formulations, and in general any departures from the norm that might point to incipient policy shifts or political trends. The TRENDS contains articles on such topics as Soviet-U.S., Sino-U.S., and Sino-Soviet relations, developments in East Europe, Eurocommunism, arms control issues, leadership politics in communist countries, policy trends and international alignments in the Middle East, and developments relating to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Salvadoran insurgents. Issues of current interest are examined in greater depth and over longer time spans in Analysis Reports. Special Memoranda often respond to requests from Agency offices, the State and Defense Departments, and the National Security Council. A list of projected special studies in AG's Research Program is distributed quarterly to key consumers.

The TRENDS and most special reports are distributed to government recipients in some 600 copies. Selected articles from the TRENDS are wirefiled to U.S. missions abroad and to Washington-area recipients in advance of the printed version to ensure that they reach these consumers without delay. Research and analysis support for U.S. embassies, for U.S. negotiators at international conferences, and for high-level U.S. officials traveling abroad is also provided by wire or cable.

USSR/Europe and China/Third World divisions include six branches whose analysts maintain close working relationships with counterparts throughout the intelligence and policy communities.

AG's Research Staff develops and maintains central media files used by analysts throughout the Group in researching the antecedents of current statements. Research Staff also responds to requests levied directly by other offices.

The staff's holdings include comprehensive files of the texts of speeches by top foreign leaders, official government and party statements, publicized diplomatic communications, and authoritative press articles covering some 35 countries, as well as statements by 134 nonruling communist parties in 82 countries. Extracts of Soviet and Chinese authoritative statements addressing key themes and issues are computerized in Project PASKEY, a program that permits retrieval by thematic category and keyword. The computerized theme file of Soviet

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

statements dates from October 1964 and of Chinese statements from 1960.
A smaller PASKEY file covers North Korean statements from 1978. Other
theme files are projected. Modernization planning looks toward a
computer-based system encompassing PASKEY and other files now maintained
in paper.

Volume and audience targeting data on Moscow and Beijing
international radio broadcasts are also maintained in the Research Staff,
developed from listings compiled by FBIS field bureaus.

1 AUGUST 1985

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), with some minor title changes, has monitored foreign media on behalf of the U.S. Government since 1941. FBIS expanded its mission in 1967 to assume the translation of foreign publications, as a service of common concern to departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

FBIS administers both overseas and domestic installations in support of its mission. Units abroad are staffed by a mix of U.S. and foreign national personnel and generally function as part of a sponsoring embassy, consulate, or military unit.

The products of FBIS monitoring are made available in several ways:

--Selected materials are wirefiled to U.S. embassies and military commands worldwide from the foreign field installations.

--Watch officers functioning round-the-clock in FBIS Headquarters screen all incoming field teletype information and disseminate via the FBIS Wire Service priority selections to a number of official recipients, including the White House and State Department.

--The bulk of the field-processed material focusing on news accounts, commentaries, and official speeches and statements appears in the FBIS DAILY REPORT, published Monday through Friday in eight geographic volumes--China, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Asia and Pacific, Middle East and Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, and South Asia. Most of the finished translations from foreign-language publications in the political, economic, technical, and scientific fields are organized into serial reports and ad hoc issuances published by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), a domestic facility of FBIS. All reports are distributed to a wide range of government users; most are available for public subscription through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Va. 22161.

--Video selection lists, describing selected video portions of monitored foreign television, are wirefiled to interested customers and are available through regular liaison channels. The videotapes also may be ordered for viewing through the same liaison channels.

Additionally, FBIS analyzes the content and behavior of the broadcast and printed media of key countries in support of the government's foreign affairs community, reporting its findings in serial and ad hoc publications. Analytic observations of immediate interest are disseminated to major U.S. Government users by means of the FBIS Wire Service.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Introduction

ABOUT AN AIRPLANE

Twenty-five years ago, with the U-2 still new, work on its successor was under way. The effort would produce a revolutionary airplane. In this issue of *Studies in Intelligence*, the Editorial Board presents a three-dimensional account of that accomplishment, a technological triumph for intelligence with a bittersweet twist.

The account begins with "Development of the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird," by Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, who was in charge of that development. Next is another first-hand recollection, "J58/SR-71 Propulsion Integration," by William H. Brown, an authority on the engine. Both articles were originally published in Lockheed *Horizons*, Issue 9, Winter 1981/82, Copyright (c) 1981—Lockheed Corporation, Burbank, California 91520. The Editorial Board gratefully acknowledges permission from Lockheed *Horizons*, its editor, Roy A. Blay, and the authors to reprint the articles and accompanying illustrations.

The third part of the account is a *Studies* classic, "The Oxcart Story," by Thomas P. McIninch, reprinted from the Winter 1971 issue (Volume 15, No. 1)—as a convenience for readers who did not see that issue, and as a refresher for those who did.

As the articles discuss the various versions of the airplane under development, the nomenclature expands. A glossary:

— A-11 was the designation Mr. Johnson gave to his initial design as submitted to CIA. It was frequently used thereafter, as for example in the President's announcement.

— A-12 was the designation for the single-seated CIA reconnaissance version. It remained classified.

— OXCART was the familiar name for the A-12, and also the code name for the program which developed the basic aircraft. Also classified.

— YF-12A was the designation given to a two-seated interceptor version of the A-11, three of which were built for the Air Force. Two of these three were flown to Edwards Air Force Base for display after the President's announcement. Unclassified.

— SR-71 became the designation for a two-seated reconnaissance version produced for the Air Force. Unclassified.

Lockheed SR-71 at altitude.

Recollections from the "Skunk Works"

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOCKHEED SR-71 BLACKBIRD

Clarence L. Johnson

This paper has been prepared by the writer to record the development history of the Lockheed SR-71 reconnaissance airplane. In my capacity as manager of Lockheed's Advanced Development Division (more commonly known as the "Skunk Works") I supervised the design, testing, and construction of the aircraft referred to until my partial retirement five years ago. Because of the very tight security on all phases of the program, there are very few people who were ever aware of all aspects of the so-called "Blackbird" program. Fortunately, I kept as complete a log on the subject as one individual could on a program that involved thousands of people, over three hundred subcontractors and partners, plus a very select group of Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency people. There are still many classified aspects of the design and operation of Blackbirds but by my avoiding these, I have been informed that I can still publish many interesting things about the program.

In order to tell the SR-71 story, I must draw heavily on the data derived on two prior Skunk Works programs—the first Mach 3-plus reconnaissance type, known by our design number as the A-12, and the YF-12A interceptor, which President Lyndon Johnson announced publicly 1 March 1964. He announced the SR-71 on 24 July of the same year.

Background for Development

The Lockheed U-2 subsonic, high-altitude reconnaissance plane first flew in 1955. It went operational a year later and continued to make overflights of the Soviet Union until 1 May 1960. In this five-year period, it became obvious to those of us who were involved in the U-2 program that Russian developments in the radar and missile fields would shortly make the U-Bird too vulnerable to continue overflights of Soviet territory, as indeed happened when Francis Gary Powers was shot down on May Day of 1960.

Starting in 1956, we made many studies and tests to improve the survivability of the U-2 by attempting to fly higher and faster as well as reducing its radar cross-section and providing both infrared and radar jamming gear. Very little gains were forthcoming except in cruise altitude so we took up studies of other designs. We studied the use of new fuels such as boron slurries and liquid hydrogen. The latter was carried into the early manufacturing phase because it was possible to produce an aircraft with cruising altitudes well over 100,000 feet at a Mach number of 2.5. This design was scrapped, however, because of the terrible logistic problems of providing fuel in the field.

Continuing concern for having a balanced reconnaissance force made it apparent that we still would need a manned reconnaissance aircraft that could

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be dispatched on worldwide missions when required. From vulnerability studies, we derived certain design requirements for this craft. These were a cruising speed well over Mach 3, cruising altitude over 80,000 feet, and a very low radar cross-section over a wide band of frequencies. Electronic counter-measures and advanced communications gear were mandatory. The craft should have at least two engines for safety reasons.

Getting a Grasp on the Problem

Our analysis of these requirements rapidly showed the very formidable problems which had to be solved to get an acceptable design.

The first of these was the effect of operating at ram-air temperatures of over 800°F. This immediately ruled out aluminum as a basic structural material, leaving only various alloys of titanium and stainless steel to build the aircraft. It meant the development of high-temperature plastics for radomes and other structures, as well as a new hydraulic fluid, greases, electric wiring and plugs, and a whole host of other equipment. The fuel to be used by the engine had to be stable under temperatures as low as minus 90°F in subsonic cruising flight during aerial refueling, and to over 350°F at high cruising speeds when it would be fed into the engine fuel system. There it would first be used as hydraulic fluid at 600°F to control the afterburner exit flap before being fed into the burner cans of the powerplant and the afterburner itself.

Cooling the cockpit and crew turned out to be seven times as difficult as on the X-15 research airplane which flew as much as twice as fast as the SR-71 but only for a few minutes per flight. The wheels and tires of the landing gear had to be protected from the heat by burying them in the fuselage fuel tanks for radiation cooling to save the rubber and other systems attached thereto.

Special attention had to be given to the crew escape system to allow safe ejection from the aircraft over a speed and altitude range of zero miles per hour at sea level to Mach numbers up to 4.0 at over 100,000 feet. New pilots' pressure suits, gloves, dual oxygen systems, high-temperature ejection seat catapults, and parachutes would have to be developed and tested.

The problems of taking pictures through windows subjected to a hot turbulent airflow on the fuselage also had to be solved.

How the Blackbird Program Got Started

In the time period of 21 April 1958 through 1 September 1959, I made a series of proposals for Mach 3-plus reconnaissance aircraft to Mr. Richard Bissell of the CIA and to the U.S. Air Force. These airplanes were designated in the Skunk Works by design numbers of A-1 through A-12.

We were evaluated against some very interesting designs by the General Dynamics Corporation and a Navy in-house design. This latter concept was proposed as a ramjet-powered rubber inflatable machine, initially carried to altitude by a balloon and then rocket boosted to a speed where the ramjets could produce thrust. Our studies on this aircraft rapidly proved it to be totally unfeasible. The carrying balloon had to be a mile in diameter to lift the unit, which had a proposed wing area of one-seventh of an acre!

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SR-71 Blackbird

Surface temperatures at design cruising speed and altitude.

Convair's proposals were much more serious, starting out with a ramjet-powered Mach 4 aircraft to be carried aloft by a B-58 and launched at supersonic speeds. Unfortunately, the B-58 couldn't go supersonic with the bird in place, and even if it could, the survivability of the piloted vehicle would be very questionable due to the probability of ramjet blow-out in maneuvers. At the time of this proposal the total flight operating time for the Marquardt ramjet was not over 7 hours, and this time was obtained mainly on a ramjet test vehicle for the Boeing Bomarc missile. Known as the X-7, this test vehicle was built and operated by the Lockheed Skunk Works!

The final Convair proposal, known as the Kingfisher, was eliminated by Air Force and Department of Defense technical experts, who were given the job of evaluating all designs.

On 29 August 1959 our A-12 design was declared the winner and Mr. Bissell gave us a limited go-ahead for a four-month period to conduct tests on certain models and to build a full-scale mock-up. On 30 January 1960 we were given a full go-ahead on the design, manufacturing, and testing of 12 aircraft. The first one flew 26 April 1962.

The next version of the aircraft, an Air Defense long-range fighter, was discussed with General Hal Estes in Washington, D.C. on 16 and 17 March 1960. He and Air Force Secretary for Research and Development, Dr. Courtlandt Perkins, were very pleased with our proposal so they passed me on for further discussions with General Marvin Demler at Wright Field. He

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directed us to use the Hughes ASG 18 radar and the GAR-9 missiles which were in the early development stages for the North American F-108 interceptor. This we did, and when the F-108 was eventually cancelled Lockheed worked with Hughes in the development and flight testing of that armament system. The first YF-12A flew 7 August 1963.

In early January 1961 I made the first proposal for a strategic reconnaissance bomber to Dr. Joseph Charyk, Secretary of the Air Force, Colonel Leo Geary, our Pentagon project officer on the YF-12; and Mr. Lew Meyer, a high financial officer in the Air Force. We were encouraged to continue our company-funded studies on the aircraft. As we progressed in the development, we encountered very strong opposition in certain Air Force quarters on the part of those trying to save the North American B-70 program, which was in considerable trouble. Life became very interesting in that we were competing the SR-71 with an airplane five times its weight and size. On 4 June 1962 the Air Force evaluation team reviewed our design and the mock-up—and we were given good grades.

Our discussions continued with the Department of Defense and also, in this period, with General Curtis LeMay and his Strategic Air Command officers. It was on 27 December 1962 that we were finally put on contract to build the first group of six SR-71 aircraft.

One of our major problems during the next few years was in adapting our Skunk Works operating methods to provide SAC with proper support, training, spare parts, and data required for their special operational needs. I have always believed that our Strategic Air Command is the most sophisticated and demanding customer for aircraft in the world. The fact that we have been able to support them so well for many years is one of the most satisfying aspects of my career.

Without the total support of such people as General Leo Geary in the Pentagon and a long series of extremely competent and helpful commanding officers at Beale Air Force Base, we could never have jointly put the Blackbirds into service successfully.

Basic Design Features

Having chosen the required performance in speed, altitude, and range, it was immediately evident that a thin delta-wing platform was required with a very moderate wing loading to allow flight at very high altitude. A long, slender fuselage was necessary to contain most of the fuel as well as the landing gear and payloads. To reduce the wing trim drag, the fuselage was fitted with lateral surfaces called chines, which actually converted the forward fuselage into a fixed canard which developed lift.

The hardest design problem on the airplane was making the engine air inlet and ejector work properly. The inlet cone moves almost three feet to keep the shock wave 'where we want it. A hydraulic actuator, computer controlled, has to provide operating forces of up to 31,000 pounds under certain flow conditions in the nacelles. To account for the effect of the fuselage chine air flow, the inlets are pointed down and in toward the fuselage.

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?-71 Blackbird

The use of dual vertical tails canted inward on the engine nacelles took dvantage of the chine vortex in such a way that the directional stability mproves as the angle of attack of the aircraft increases.

Aerodynamic Testing

All the usual low-speed and high-speed wind tunnel tests were run on the various configurations of the A-12 and YF-12A, and continued on the SR-71. Substantial efforts went into optimizing chine design and conical camber of the wing leading edge. No useful lift increase effect was found from the use of wing flaps of any type so we depend entirely on our low wing-loading and powerful ground effect to get satisfactory takeoff and landing characteristics.

Correlation of wind tunnel data on fuselage trim effects was found to be of marginal value because of two factors: structural deflection due to fuselage weight distribution; and the effect of fuel quantity and temperature. The latter was caused by fuel on the bottom of the tanks, keeping that section of the fuselage cool, while the top of the fuselage became increasingly hotter as fuel was burned, tending to push the chines downward due to differential expansion of the top and bottom of the fuselage. A full-scale fuel system test rig was used to test fuel feed capability for various flight attitudes.

By far the most tunnel time was spent optimizing the nacelle inlets, bleed designs, and the ejector. A quarter-scale model was built on which over 250,000 pressure readings were taken. We knew nacelle air leakage would cause high drag so an actual full-size nacelle was fitted with end plugs and air leakage carefully measured. Proper sealing paid off well in flight testing.

With the engines located half way out on the wing span, we were very concerned with the very high yawing movement that would develop should an inlet stall. We therefore installed accelerometers in the fuselage that immediately sensed the yaw rate and commanded the rudder booster to apply 9 degrees of correction within a time period of 0.15 seconds. This device worked so well that our test pilots very often couldn't tell whether the right or left engine blew out. They knew they had a blowout, of course, by the bad buffeting that occurred with a "popped shock." Subsequently, an automatic restart device was developed which keeps this engine-out time to a very short period.

Powerplant Development

Mr. Bill Brown of Pratt & Whitney presented a fine paper on this subject 13 May 1981 to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Long Beach, California. Mr. Brown's paper is reproduced following this article.

I have little to add to Mr. Brown's fine paper except to record an interesting approach to the problem of ground starting the J-58. We learned that it often required over 600 horsepower to get the engine up to starting RPM. To obtain this power, we took two Buick racing car engines and developed a gear box to connect them both to the J-58 starter drive. We operated for several years with this setup, until more sophisticated air starting systems were developed and installed in the hangars.

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Provisional engine starter cart (above) which used two Buick racing car engines (below) geared to a common shaft drive to rotate the J58 engine. This rig produced over 600 horsepower for starting.

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
SR-71 Blackbird

Structural Problems

The decision to use various alloys of titanium for the basic structure of the Blackbirds was based on the following considerations:

1. Only titanium and steel had the ability to withstand the operating temperatures encountered.

2. Aged B-120 titanium weighs one half as much as stainless steel per cubic inch but its ultimate strength is almost up to stainless.

3. Conventional construction could be used with fewer parts involved than with steel.

4. High strength composites were not available in the early 1960s. We did develop a good plastic which has been remarkably serviceable but it was not used for primary structure.

Having made the basic material choice, we decided to build two test units to see if we could reduce our research to practice. The first unit was to study thermal effects on our large titanium wing panels. We heated up this element with the computed heat flux that we would encounter in flight. The sample warped into a totally unacceptable shape. To solve this problem we put chordwise corrugations in the outer skins and reran the tests very satisfactorily. At the design heating rate, the corrugations merely deepened by a few thousandths of an inch and on cooling returned to the basic shape. I was accused of trying to make a 1932 Ford Trimotor go Mach 3 but the concept worked fine.

The second test unit was the forward fuselage and cockpit, which had over 6,000 parts in it of high curvature, thin gauges, and the canopy with its complexity. This element was tested in an oven where we could determine thermal effects and develop cockpit cooling systems.

We encountered major problems in manufacturing this test unit because the first batch of heat-treated titanium parts was extremely brittle. In fact, you could push a piece of structure off your desk and it would shatter on the floor. It was thought that we were encountering hydrogen embrittlement in our heat-treat processes. Working with our supplier, Titanium Metals Corporation, we could not prove that the problem was in fact hydrogen. It was finally resolved by throwing out our whole acid pickling setup and replacing it with an identical reproduction of what TMC had at its mills.

We developed a complex quality control program. For every batch of ten parts or more we processed three test coupons which were subjected to the identical heat treatment of the parts in the batch. One coupon was tensile tested to failure to derive the stress-strain data. A quarter-of-an-inch cut was made in the edge of the second coupon by a sharp scissor-like cutter and it was then bent around a mandrel at the cut. If the coupon could not be bent 180° at a radius of X times the sheet thickness without breaking, it was considered to be too brittle. (The value of X is a function of the alloy used and the stress/strain value of the piece.) The third coupon was held in reserve if any reprocessing was required.

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For an outfit that hates paperwork, we really deluged ourselves with it. Having made over 13 million titanium parts to date we can trace the history of all but the first few parts back to the mill pour and for about the last 10 million of them even the direction of the grain in the sheet from which the part was cut has been recorded. On large forgings, such as landing gears, we trepanned out 12 sample coupons for test before machining each part. We found out the hard way that most commercial cutting fluids accelerated stress corrosion on hot titanium so we developed our own.

Titanium is totally incompatible with chlorine, fluorine, cadmium, and similar elements. For instance, we were baffled when we found out that wing panels which we spot welded in the summer failed early in life, but those made in the winter lasted indefinitely. We finally traced this problem to the Burbank water system which had heavily chlorinated water in the summer to prevent algae growth but not in the winter. Changing to distilled water to wash the parts solved this problem.

Our experience with cadmium came about by mechanics using cadmium-plated wrenches working on the engine installation primarily. Enough cadmium was left in contact with bolt heads which had been tightened so that when the bolts became hot (over 600°F) the bolt heads just dropped off! We had to clean out hundreds of tool boxes to remove cadmium-plated tools.

Drilling and machining high strength titanium alloys, such as B-120, required a complete research program to determine best tool cutter designs, cutting fluids, and speeds and feeds for best metal removal rates. We had particular trouble with wing extrusions which were used by the thousands of feet. Initially, the cost of machining a foot out of the rolled mill part was $19.00 which was reduced to $11.00 after much research. At one time we were approaching the ability at our vendor's plants to roll parts to net dimensions, but the final achievement of this required a $30,000,000 new facility which was not built.

Wyman Gordon was given $1,000,000 for a research program to learn how to forge the main nacelle rings on a 50,000-ton press. Combining their advances with our research on numerical controls of machining and special tools and fluids, we were able to save $19,000,000 on the production program.

To prevent parts from going undergauge while in the acid bath, we set up a new series of metal gauges two thousandths of an inch thicker than the standard and solved this problem. When we built the first Blackbird, a high-speed drill could drill 17 holes before it was ruined. By the end of the program we had developed drills that could drill 100 holes and then be resharpened successfully.

Our overall research on titanium usage was summarized in reports which we furnished not only to the Air Force but also to our vendors who machined over half of our machined parts for the program. To use titanium efficiently required an on-going training program for thousands of people—both ours in manufacturing and in the Air Force in service.

SR-71 Blackbird

YF-12A test pilot in full pressure suit with walk-around oxygen kit.

Throughout this and other programs, it has been crystal clear to me that our country needs a 250,000-ton metal forging press—five times as large as our biggest one available today. When we have to machine away 90 percent of our rough forgings today both in titanium (SR-71 nacelle rings and landing gears) and aluminum (C-5 fuselage side rings) it seems that we are nationally very stupid! My best and continuing efforts to solve this problem have been defeated for many years. Incidentally, the USSR has been much smarter in this field in that it has more and larger forging presses than we do.

Fluid Systems

Very difficult problems were encountered with the use of fuel tank sealants and hydraulic oil. We worked for years developing both of these, drawing as much on other industrial and chemical companies as they were willing to devote to a very limited market. We were finally able to produce a sealant which does a reasonable job over a temperature range of minus 90°F to over 600°F. Our experience with hydraulic oil started out on a comical situation. I saw ads in technical journals for a "material to be used to operate up to 900°F in service." I contacted the producer who agreed to send me some for testing. Imagine my surprise when the material arrived in a large canvas bag. It was a white powder at room temperature that you certainly wouldn't put in a hydraulic system. If you did, one would have to thaw out all the lines and other elements with a blow torch! We did finally get a petroleum-based oil developed at Penn State University to which we had to add several other

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chemicals to maintain its lubricity at high temperatures. It originally cost $130 per gallon so absolutely no leaks could be tolerated.

Rubber O-rings could not be used at high temperatures so a complete line of steel rings was provided which have worked very well. Titanium pistons working in titanium cylinders tended to gall and seize until chemical coatings were invented which solved the problem.

The Flight Test Phase

The first flight of the A-12 took place 26 April 1962 or thirty months after we were given a limited go-ahead on 1 September 1959. We had to fly with Pratt & Whitney J75 engines until the J58 engine became available in January 1963. Then our problems really began!

The first one was concerned with foreign object damage (FOD) to the engines—a particular problem with the powerful J58 and the tortuous flow path through the complicated nacelle structure. Small nuts, bolts, and metal scraps not removed from the nacelles during construction could be sucked into the engines on starting with devastating results. Damage to the first-stage compressor blades from an inspector's flashlight used to search for such foreign objects amounted to $250,000! Besides objects of the above type, the engine would suck in rocks, asphalt pieces, etc., from the taxi-ways and runways. An intensive campaign to control FOD at all stages of construction and operation—involving a shake test of the forward nacelle at the factory, the use of screens, and runway sweeping with double inspections prior to any engine running—brought FOD under reasonable control.

The hardest problem encountered in flight was the development of the nacelle air inlet control. It was necessary to throw out the initial pneumatic design after millions of dollars had been spent on it and go to a design using electronic controls instead. This was very hard to do because several elements of the system were exposed to ram-air temperatures over 800°F and terrific vibration during an inlet duct stall. This problem and one dealing with aircraft acceleration between Mach numbers of 0.95 to 2.0 are too complex to deal with in this paper.

Initially, air temperature variations along a given true altitude would cause the Blackbird to wander up and down over several thousand feet in its flight path. Improved autopilots and engine controls have eliminated this problem.

There are no other airplanes flying at our cruising altitude except an occasional U-2 but we were very scared by encountering weather balloons sent up by the FAA. If we were to hit the instrumentation package while cruising at over 3,000 feet per second, the impact could be deadly!

Flight planning had to be done very carefully because of sonic boom problems. We received complaints from many sources. One such stated that his mules on a pack-train wanted to jump off the cliff trail when they were "boomed." Another complained that fishing stopped in lakes in Yellowstone Park if a boom occurred because the fish went down to the botton for hours. I had my own complaint when one of my military friends boomed my ranch and broke a $450 plate glass window. I got no sympathy on this, however.

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SR-71 Blackbird

Operational Comments

The SR-71 first flew 23 December 1964. It was in service with the Strategic Air Command a year later.

In-flight refueling from KC-135s turned out to be very routine. Over 18,000 such refuelings have been made to date by all versions of the Blackbirds. The SR-71 has flown from New York to London in 1 hour 55 minutes then returned nonstop to Beale Air Force Base, including a London/Los Angeles time of 3 hours 48 minutes.

It has also flown over 15,000 miles with refueling to demonstrate its truly global range. It is by far the world's fastest, highest flying airplane in service. I expect it to be so for a long time to come.

The author about to fly in an early A-12 flight test.

CLARENCE L. (KELLY) JOHNSON is serving as senior advisor to Lockheed corporate management and the firm's advanced development projects (Skunk Works). He retired as senior vice president of the corporation in January 1975 and from the board of directors in May 1980.

Johnson joined Lockheed in 1933 as a tool designer. After assignments as flight test engineer, stress analyst, aerodynamicist, weight engineer, and wind tunnel engineer, he became chief research engineer in 1938. In 1952, Johnson was named chief engineer at Lockheed's Burbank, California plant,

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now the Lockheed-California Company. When the office of corporate vice president–research and development was established in 1956, he was chosen for the post. He became vice president–advanced development projects in 1958, a member of the board of directors in 1964 and a senior vice president of the corporation in 1969.

Johnson has played a leading role in the design of 40 world renowned aircraft—among them the F-80, America's first production jet; the high altitude U-2; the double-sonic F-104 Starfighter; and the spectacular 2000-m.p.h. YF-12A and SR-71.

A native of Michigan, Johnson was born in Ishpeming on February 27, 1910. He later moved to Flint, was graduated from Flint Junior College, and completed his education at the University of Michigan, where he received his bachelor of science degree in 1932 and his master of science degree in aeronautical engineering in 1933.

Many honors have come to him for his unique contributions to aerospace development through the years, and to the defense of the United States. He has won the Collier Trophy twice and has also received two Theodore von Karman and two Sylvanus Albert Reed Awards. In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson presented to him the Medal of Freedom, the highest civil honor the President can bestow. He was elected to the Aviation Hall of Fame in 1974 and is the 1981 recipient of the Daniel Guggenheim Award.

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Technical Means of Reconnaissance

Of the various means used in technical reconnaissance, photo intelligence is the youngest, though not by much.[11] Most studies on the subject make mention of the balloon view of Boston's downtown area taken by James Wallace Bleck in October 1860; even earlier, aerial pictures had been taken in Europe. In 1890 the first of many textbooks on the subject was published, and in 1909 the first motion pictures were taken from an airplane (piloted by Wilbur Wright). From that date on, the airplane replaced kites and balloons as the main platform for aerial photography. The two world wars, especially the second, gave a great boost to the new art. Comparative coverage (repeated checks to discover changes) had already been developed in World War I, night photography was developed in the 1930s, and infrared film came into use during World War II to detect camouflaged targets. Stereoscopic vision and other basic tools of the trade were introduced, and it was quickly recognized that the shape of objects observed was of great importance, as were tone and texture, configurations, shadows, and halation.[12]

According to a prediction, probably apocryphal, by the German General

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Fritsch, the side with the best photo reconnaissance would win the war. According to General Chennault, 80 percent of all vital U.S. wartime intelligence came from aerial photos. This may have been true in the Far Eastern theater of war, but elsewhere it was not. By and large, World War II was a SIGINT, not a PHOTINT war.

Following some abortive attempts at aerial reconnaissance, the major intelligence breakthrough in the postwar period came with the appearance of the U-2, which made its first flights over the Soviet Union in 1956. This plane, a CIA-sponsored project, had a range of 3,000 miles and could fly at an altitude of over 70,000 feet. At one time the plane produced some 90 percent of the hard data on Soviet military developments. Each overflight of the Soviet Union had to be authorized by the president. The era of the U-2 came to an end when Gary Powers's plane was shot down (or exploded) over Sverdlovsk in May 1959. The U-2 was succeeded some five years later by the SR-71 (Blackbird), another plane developed by Lockheed, flying at Mach 3 and at a height of nearly fifteen miles. It was equipped with optical and infrared sensors, radar and television cameras, and transmitted data back to earth instantaneously. But the SR-71 has not been used for flying over the USSR except for some peripheral flights along Soviet borders. Its main task has been reconnaissance in other parts of the world.

Today the term "remote sensing"—exploration by means of electromagnetic sensors, mainly from airborne and spaceborne platforms—is frequently used to cover the whole range of activities of which aerial photography is just a part. Other tools include aerial thermography, which measures the radiant temperature of earth surface features through thermal and multispectral scanners. Another technique, spectral pattern recognition, is largely an automatic process based on a numerical key that identifies and classifies the physical features of the target through pattern recognition. A third method is microwave sensing, better known as radar, which can see through clouds and other obstacles that were otherwise impenetrable during World War II. Side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) was a major innovation of the 1950s; in contrast to most previous radar, it produced images. The part of radar in remote sensing has further expanded with the utilization of lower wavelengths on the one hand and the application of space exploration to intelligence on the other.[13]

Not all remote sensing is carried out from space. Aircraft, ships, and ground bases are involved, and in at least one case, a large helium balloon carrying sensitive antennae. In 1978, fifty-four Soviet fishery research ships were identified as electronic platforms of various types; some of them

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The Production of Intelligence

came close to Cape Canaveral, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and the Charleston, South Carolina naval base.

American ground intelligence operations of this kind are mainly run by the National Security Agency and usually serve more than one purpose. Electronic listening posts equipped with over-the-horizon radar designed to intercept radio transmissions can monitor Soviet missile tests. Some of these posts in Pakistan, Iran, and Ethiopia were lost in the 1970s, but others continue to operate.[14]

Several basic considerations should be borne in mind about remote sensing. Techniques are steadily advancing, military application is probably ten to fifteen years ahead of usage in the civilian sector, and information on the precise resolution of photographs is classified. For the fourth generation of satellites, which came into use in the 1970s, it was claimed that they could identify various makes of automobiles, read car license plates, and even distinguish between Guernseys and Herefords on the range.[15] Specific claims have been questioned, and some even ridiculed, but it is certain that there is steady progress in this field.*

Since the early 1960s, the burden of intelligence collection in highly denied areas has passed to space-borne sensors. The first recovery of a film canister from a satellite *(Discoverer 13)* was accomplished just a few months after the U-2 had gone down over Sverdlovsk. The first Soviet surveillance satellite is thought to have been launched two years later. Since then both nations have launched hundreds of satellites designed to intercept signals from various points along the electromagnetic spectrum.

The most important surveillance satellites have been those for early warning using infrared telescopes to detect quickly the hot emissions of missile boosters. The multipurpose use of satellites—early warning and verification of arms control, "close look" cameras carrying multispectral scanners, and "search and find" techniques covering a wider area to locate unidentified targets—became possible with the fourth generation of satellites, the "Big Bird" since 1971 and the "Key Hole," or KH-11 system first orbited in 1977.

Other new techniques in reconnaissance include thermal imaging, using infrared scanners that measure temperature differences between the earth's surface and its targets. Thermal imaging can detect emissions from tank engines, and even evidence of underground construction. Other recent

*The size of objects that can be identified as "resolved" is obviously a factor of paramount importance. Further improvement in this direction is hampered for the time being by the grain size of photographic film emulsion or by the atmospheric scattering of light. This may be corrected by further development of the new technique in adaptive optics that eliminates "image wander" as the atmosphere changes. The traditional kind of film is gradually being replaced by light-sensitive silicon with integrated circuits embedded in it.

innovations include long-wave infrared technology for the detection of radiation, and digital-image processing systems using sonar and satellite data for the detection of submarines and the analysis of aerial reconnaissance information.[16]

After the outbreak of the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the Soviet Union was able to launch five additional surveillance satellites within two weeks to supplement its coverage of the Middle East, which had previously been handled by a single satellite. By contrast, shortly after the start of the Iran-Iraq conflict in the late 1980s, one of two U.S. reconnaissance satellites over the region failed. As no backup was immediately available for launch and collection, capabilities were halved for some time.

Seen in historical perspective, the dividing line between photo intelligence, or remote sensing, and signals intelligence has become less rigid with the development of modern technologies. In the popular mind, SIGINT until recently was the breaking of codes, a preoccupation going back at least a few thousand years. In its modern form it came into being with the use of electronic communications. While cable lines were tapped and telegrams purloined in the nineteenth century, systematic military monitoring began only on the eve of World War I, when monitoring and decoding became established practice. The achievement of the British Admiralty's "Room 40," where up to 2,000 signals were daily intercepted are well known, especially because of the political uses to which intercepts such as the Zimmerman Telegram were put. Signals intelligence (ULTRA, MAGIC) played an even more important role in World War II. The British military historian Ronald Lewin wrote that every large war has its salient characteristics, and if the unprecedented use of masses of artillery was the most striking feature of World War I, SIGINT was the dominant feature of World War II.[17] Since then enormous technical progress has been made in SIGINT technology, with its main components of COMINT (radio communications intelligence), ELINT (the interception of electronic signals), and RADINT (radar intelligence).[18]

Specially designed satellites are an important source of SIGINT. Since the early 1970s, electronic surveillance, or "ferret," satellites have been orbited, deploying huge antennae capable of eavesdropping on broadcast transmissions along the electromagnetic spectrum. Some SIGINT satellites are launched into geosynchronous stationary orbit 22,300 miles above the earth, providing uninterrupted, full-time coverage of the targeted area. Other electronic intercept satellites are in lower orbit to detect signals such as radar emissions and local radio broadcasts. The satellite network can also pick up and broadcast back to earth telemetry data from satellites and missile tests.

3 THE USE OF SPY SATELLITES

Operations

Even where satellites are used, they are not automatons that operate by themselves, they are machines operated by people. A satellite will not take a picture unless it has been instructed to do so. The request for a satellite picture to be taken may start with a low-level analyst in the CIA's Intelligence Directorate, who, upon reading intelligence reports and after looking at a collection of satellite photographs taken before, may decide that it is time for a new series of photographs of, for example, the Soviets' Tyuratam space and missile launch facility in Central Asia.

1. Vandenberg Air Force Base △	14. Berlin
2. Sunnyvale ⋏	15. Bodo
3. Los Angeles	16. Leningrad
4. Colorado Springs	17. Murmansk
5. San Cristobal	18. Plesetsk ★
6. Havana	19. Moscow
7. Cape Canaveral △	20. Sverdlousk
8. Miami	21. Seychelles Islands ⋏
9. Washington, D.C.	22. Tyuratam ★
10. New York	23. Peshavar
11. New Hampshire △	24. Peking
12. Thule ⋏	25. Guam △
13. London △	26. Hawaii ⋏

MAP KEY

△ American launch sites
⋏ American satellite ground stations
★ Soviet launch sites

Map of key spots discussed, including American satellite control ground stations and American and Soviet launch sites.

The analyst's request for more Tyuratam photos will pass upward through the hierarchy, being evaluated for priority at every level, until it finally reaches the national intelligence officer responsible for the junior analyst's area of concern. (In this case it might be Soviet Central Asian missile sites or Soviet military space activity.)

With the proper support and priority, the request will go on to the reconnaissance committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). The reconnaissance committee—or Comirex—is composed of members representing the various agencies that request photo reconnaissance data. If the board members agree that the request is warranted, they will pass it along to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

The NRO (established August 25, 1960) has for a long time been the most secret of U.S. intelligence operations, even more hush-hush than the equally colossal National Security Agency (which monitors communications and makes and breaks codes). Although its budget is almost $3 billion annually, and its personnel numbers perhaps 50,000, the NRO is neatly hidden away in Air Force Intelligence. Only recently has the public been made at all aware of this spy-satellite operations agency—indeed, as late as 1981 many congressmen and senators had never heard of it.

The NRO's budget is controlled by the National Executive Committee for Reconnaissance (Excom), which is composed of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, and the President's National Security Adviser. As mentioned, the NRO receives operational requests from Comirex, and it is from those requests, and the priority assigned each, that it draws up the Joint Reconnaissance Schedule, which sets down what the satellites will gather and when.

Master Control

Once a satellite mission request is posted in the Joint Reconnaissance Schedule, it will find its way to the Big Blue Cube. Located in Sunnyvale, California, the Big Blue Cube is a nine-story, pale-blue, windowless block of a building in the middle of an industrial park. The only hints of its true business are the telltale white satellite dishes in the parking lot. Housed inside the Cube is the Satellite Test Center, the headquarters of the Satellite Control Facility (SCF). The SCF comprises a system of eight ground stations (including the Big Blue Cube) located around the world that are used to monitor and control the NRO's secret satellites. The other stations are at Thule, Greenland (800 miles from the North Pole), the Seychelles Islands (in the middle of the Indian Ocean), Guam, Hawaii, Vandenberg AFB, New Hampshire, and England (just south of London).

The SCF monitors and controls the roughly fifty military satellites that are in orbit at any one time, making five contacts with each satellite each day. It is within the Big Blue Cube at Sunnyvale, however, that the true control of the satellites is maintained. There are seven mission-control centers inside the Cube, each assigned to a different type of satellite (reconnaissance, navigation, communications, etc.). Each mission control has its own line of communication to the various tracking stations, so that it can instruct the personnel at each station what commands are to be transmitted to the satellite when it passes over that station. These stations can command the satellite to do any number of things, from turning on a camera to firing a thruster to boost the satellite into a higher orbit. The stations also receive information from the satellite in the form of telemetry, information that ranges from the mundane (the satellite's report on its position and condition) to the dramatic (a picture of a new Soviet radar site in Siberia). This information is sent back to that satellite's mission-control center in the Cube, then finally on to whichever agency or service requested the information.

CODES AND CIPHERS

"Gentlemen," said Secretary of State Stimson in 1929, "do not read each other's mail," and so saying, he shut down the only American cryptanalytic (code-breaking) effort functioning at that time. Later, during World War II, when he was serving as Secretary of War under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he came to recognize the overriding importance of intelligence, including what we now call "communications intelligence." When the fate of a nation and the lives of its soldiers are at stake, gentlemen do read each other's mail—if they can get their hands on it.

I am, of course, not speaking here of ordinary mail, although postal censorship has itself often played a significant role in intelligence work. However, except in the detection of secret writing, there is little technology involved in postal censorship. Modern communications intelligence, on the other hand, is a highly technical field, one that has engaged the best mathematical minds in an unceasing war of wits that can easily be likened to the battle for scientific information which I described a little earlier.

Every government takes infinite pains to invent unbreakable systems of communication and to protect these systems and the personnel needed to run them. At the same time, it will do everything in its power to gain access or insight into the communications of other governments whose policies or actions may be of real concern to it. The reason for this state of affairs on both sides is obvious. The contents of official government messages, political or military, on "sensitive" subjects constitute, especially in times of crisis, the best and "hottest" intelligence that one government can hope to gather about another.

There is a vast difference between the amateur and professional terminology in this field. If I stick to the amateur terms, I shall probably offend the professionals, and if I use the professional terms, I shall probably bore and confuse the amateur. My choice is an unhappy one and I will be brief. In a code, some word, symbol or group of symbols is substituted for a whole word or even for a group of words or a complete thought. Thus, "XLMDP" or

"79648," depending upon whether a letter or number code is used, could stand for "war" and every time they turn up in a message that is what they mean. When the Japanese Government set up the famous "East Winds" code for their diplomats in the United States in December, 1941, they were prepared to indicate through the simplest prearranged code words that an attack in the Pacific was forthcoming.

In a cipher, a symbol, such as a letter or number, stands for a single letter in a word. Thus, "b" or "2" can mean "e" or some other letter. In simple ciphers the same symbol always stands for the same letter. In the complex ciphers used today, the same symbol can stand for a different letter each time it turns up. Sometimes a message is first put into code, and then the code is put into cipher.

The United States military forces were able to resort to rather unusual "ready-made" codes during World War I, and in a few instances during World War II, in communications between units in the field. These resources were our native American Indian languages, chiefly the Navajo language, which has no written forms and had never been closely studied by foreign scholars. Two members of the same tribe at either end of a field telephone could transmit messages which no listener except another Navajo could possibly understand. Needless to say, neither the Germans nor the Japanese had any Navajos.

In modern terminology, the word "crypt," meaning "something hidden," conveniently gets around the distinction between codes and ciphers since it refers to all methods of transforming "plain text" or "clear text" into symbols. The over-all term for the whole field today is "cryptology." Under this broad heading we have two distinct areas. Cryptography has to do with making, devising, inventing or protecting codes and ciphers for the use of one's own government. Cryptanalysis, on the other hand, has to do with breaking codes and ciphers or "decrypting" them, with translating someone else's intercepted messages into proper language. To put one's own messages into a code or cipher is to "encrypt" them. However, when we translate our own messages back into plain language, we are "deciphering."

A cryptogram or cryptograph would be any message in code or

cipher. "Communications intelligence" is information which has been gained through successful cryptanalysis of other people's traffic. And now, having confused the reader completely, we can get to the gist of the matter.

The diplomatic service, the armed services and the intelligence service of every country use secret codes and ciphers for classified and urgent long-distance communications. Transmission may be via commercial cable or radio or over special circuits set up by governments. Anyone can listen in to radio traffic. Also, governments, at least in times of crisis, can usually get copies of the encrypted messages that foreign diplomats stationed on their territory send home via commercial cable facilities. The problem is to break the codes and ciphers, to "decrypt" them.

Certain codes and ciphers can be broken by mathematical analysis of intercepted traffic, i.e., cryptanalysis, or more dramatically and simply by obtaining copies of codes or code books or information on cipher machines being used by an opponent, or by a combination of these methods.

In the earlier days of our diplomatic service, up to World War I, the matter of codes was sometimes treated more or less cavalierly, often with unfortunate results. I remember a story told me as a warning lesson when I was a young foreign service officer. In the quiet days of 1913, we had as our Minister in Rumania an estimable politician who had served his party well in the Midwest. His reward was to be sent as Minister to Bucharest. He was new to the game and codes and ciphers meant little to him. At that time our basic system was based on a book code, which I will call the Pink Code, although that was not the color we then chose for its name. I spent thousands of worried hours over this book, which I have not seen for over forty years, but to this day I can still remember that we had six or seven words for "period." One was "PIVIR" and another was "NINUD." The other four or five I do not recall. The theory then was—and it was a naïve one—that if we had six or seven words it would confuse the enemy as to where we began and ended our sentences.

In any event, our Minister to Rumania started off from Washington with the Pink Code in a great, sealed envelope and it

safely reached Bucharest. It was supposed to be lodged in the lega-
tion's one safe. However, handling safe combinations was not the
new Minister's forte and he soon found it more convenient to put
the code under his mattress, where it rested happily for some
months. One day it disappeared—the whole code book and the
Minister's only code book. It is believed that it found its way to
Petrograd.

The new Minister was in a great quandary, which, as a politician,
he solved with considerable ingenuity. The coded cable traffic to
Bucharest in those days was relatively light and mostly concerned
the question of immigrants to the United States from Rumania and
Bessarabia. So when the new Minister had collected a half-dozen
coded messages, he would get on the train to Vienna, where he
would quickly visit our Ambassador. In the course of conversation
the visitor from Bucharest would casually remark that just as he
was leaving he had received some messages which he had not had
time to decode and could he borrow the Ambassador's Pink Code.
(In those good old days, we sent the same code books to almost all of
our diplomatic missions.) The Minister to Bucharest would then
decipher his messages, prepare and code appropriate replies, take
the train back to Bucharest and, at staged intervals, send off the
coded replies. For a time everything went smoothly. The secret of
the loss of the code book was protected until August, 1914, brought
a flood of messages from Washington as the dramatic events leading
up to World War I unrolled. The Minister's predicament was
tragic—trips to Vienna no longer sufficed. He admitted his derelic-
tion and returned to American politics.

The uncontrollable accidents and disasters of war sometimes ex-
pose to one opponent cryptographic materials used by the other. A
headquarters or an outpost may be overrun and in the heat of re-
treat code books left behind. Many notable instances of this kind
in World War I gave the British a lifesaving insight into the mili-
tary and diplomatic intentions of the Germans. Early in the war
the Russians sank the German cruiser *Magdeburg* and rescued from
the arms of a drowned sailor the German naval code book, which
was promptly turned over to their British allies. British salvage
operations on sunken German submarines turned up similar find-

ings. In 1917 two German dirigibles, returning from a raid over England, ran into a storm and were downed over France. Among the materials retrieved from them were coded maps and code books used by German U-boats in the Atlantic.

Military operations based on breaking of codes will often tip off the enemy, however. Once the Germans noticed that their submarines were being spotted and cornered with unusual and startling frequency, it was not hard for them to guess that communications with their underwater fleet were being read. As a result, all codes were immediately changed. There is always the problem, then, of how to act on information derived in this manner. One can risk terminating the usefulness of the source in order to obtain an immediate military or diplomatic gain, or one can hold back and continue to accumulate an ever-broadening knowledge of the enemy's movements and actions in order eventually to inflict the greatest possible damage.

Actually, in either case, the attempt is usually made to protect the real source and keep it viable, by giving the enemy fake indications that some other kind of source was responsible for the information acquired. Sometimes an operation that could damage the adversary is not undertaken if it would alert the enemy to the fact that its origin was solely due to information obtained by reading his messages.

During World War I the first serious American cryptanalytic undertaking was launched under the aegis of the War Department. Officially known as Section 8 of Military Intelligence, it liked to call itself the "Black Chamber," the name used for centuries by the secret organs of postal censorship of the major European nations. Working from scratch, a group of brilliant amateurs under the direction of Herbert Yardley, a former telegraph operator, had by 1918 become a first-rate professional outfit. One of its outstanding achievements after World War I was the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic codes. During negotiations at the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921, the United States wanted very much to get Japanese agreement to a 10:6 naval ratio. The Japanese came to the conference with the stated intention of holding to a 10:7 ratio. In diplomacy, as in any kind of bargaining, you are at a tre-

mendous advantage if you know your opponent is prepared to retreat to secondary positions if necessary. Decipherment of the Japanese diplomatic traffic between Washington and Tokyo by the Black Chamber revealed to our government that the Japanese were actually ready to back down to the desired ratio if we forced the issue. So we were able to force it without risking a breakup of the conference over the issue.

The "Black Chamber" remained intact, serving chiefly the State Department until 1929, when Secretary Stimson refused to let the department avail itself further of its services. McGeorge Bundy, Stimson's biographer, provides this explanation:

> Stimson adopted as his guide in foreign policy a principle he always tried to follow in personal relations—the principle that the way to make men trustworthy is to trust them. In this spirit he made one decision for which he was later severely criticized: he closed down the so-called Black Chamber. . . . This act he never regretted. . . . Stimson, as Secretary of State, was dealing as a gentleman with the gentlemen sent as ambassadors and ministers from friendly nations.[2]

Our Army and Navy had, fortunately, begun to address themselves to the problems of cryptanalysis in the late 1920s, with particular emphasis on Japan, since American military thinking at that time foresaw Japan as the major potential foe of the United States in whatever war was to come next. By 1941, the year of Pearl Harbor, our cryptanalysts had broken most of the important Japanese naval and diplomatic codes and ciphers; and we were, as a result, frequently in possession of evidence of imminent Japanese action in the Pacific before it took place.

The Battle of Midway in June, 1942, the turning point of the naval war in the Pacific, was an engagement we sought because we were able to learn from decrypted messages that a major task force of the Imperial Japanese Navy was gathering off Midway. This intelligence concerning strength and disposition of enemy forces gave our Navy the advantage of surprise.

A special problem, in the years following Pearl Harbor, was how to keep secret the fact that we had broken the Japanese codes. Investigations, recriminations, the need to place the blame somewhere

[2] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, Harper & Brothers, 1948.

for the disheartening American losses threatened to throw this "Magic," as it was called, into the lap of the public, and the Japanese. Until an adequate Navy could be put on the seas, the ability to read Japanese messages was one of the few advantages we had in the battle with Japan. There were occasional leaks but none evidently ever came to their attention.

In 1944, Thomas E. Dewey, who was then running for President against President Roosevelt, had learned, as had many persons close to the federal government, about our successes with the Japanese code and our apparent failure before Pearl Harbor to make the best use of the information in our hands. It was feared that he might refer to this in his campaign. The mere possibility sent shivers down the spines of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall himself then wrote a personal letter to Mr. Dewey, telling him that the Japanese still did not know we had broken their codes and that we were achieving military successes as a result of our interception and decoding of their messages. Mr. Dewey never mentioned our code successes. The secret was kept.

One of the most spectacular of all coups in the field of communications intelligence was the British decipherment of the so-called Zimmermann telegram in January, 1917, when the United States was on the brink of World War I.[3] The job was performed by the experts of "Room 40," as British naval cryptanalytic headquarters were called. The message had originated with the German Foreign Secretary Zimmermann in Berlin and was addressed to the German Minister in Mexico City. It outlined the German plan for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, stated the probability that this would bring the United States into war, and proposed that Mexico enter the war on Germany's side and with victory regain its "lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona."

Admiral Hall, the legendary Chief of British Naval Intelligence, had this message in his hands for over a month after its receipt. His problem was how to pass its decrypted contents to the Americans in a manner that would convince them of its authenticity yet would prevent the Germans from learning the British had broken their

[3] This story has been well told in Barbara Tuchman's book. See Bibliography.

codes. Finally, the war situation caused Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, to communicate the Zimmermann message formally to the American Ambassador in London. The receipt of the message in Washington caused a sensation at the White House and State Department, and created serious problems for our government—how to verify beyond a doubt the validity of the message and how to make it public without letting it seem merely an Anglo-American ploy to get the United States into the War. My uncle, Robert Lansing, who was then Secretary of State, later told me about the dramatic events of the next few days which brought America close to war.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the Germans had used American diplomatic cable facilities to transmit the message to their Ambassador in Washington, Count Bernstorff. He relayed it to his colleague in Mexico City. President Wilson had granted the Germans the privilege of utilizing our communication lines between Europe and America on the understanding that the messages would be related to peace proposals in which Wilson was interested.

The President's chagrin was therefore all the greater when he discovered to what end the Germans had been exploiting his good offices. However, this curious arrangement turned out to be of great advantage. First of all, it meant that the State Department had in its possession a copy of the encrypted Zimmermann telegram, which it had passed to Bernstorff, unaware, of course, of its inflammatory contents. Once the encrypted text was identified, it was forwarded to our embassy in London, where one of Admiral Hall's men re-decrypted it for us in the presence of an embassy representative, thus verifying beyond a doubt its true contents. Secondly, the fact that deciphered copies of the telegram had been seen by German diplomats in both Washington and Mexico City helped significantly to solve the all-important problem that had caused Admiral Hall so much worry, namely, how to fool the Germans about the real source from which we had obtained the information. In the end the impression given the Germans was that the message had leaked as a result of some carelessness or theft in one of the German embassies or Mexican offices which had received copies of it. They continued using the same codes, thus displaying a remarkable but welcome

lack of imagination. On March 1, 1917, the State Department released the contents of the telegram through the Associated Press. It hit the American public like a bombshell. In April we declared war on Germany.

When one compares the cryptographic systems used today with those to which governments during World War I entrusted the passage of their most vital and sensitive secrets, the latter seem crude and amateurish, especially because of their recurring groups of symbols which tipped off the cryptanalyst that an important word or one in frequent usage must lie behind the symbols. When Admiral Hall's cryptanalysts saw the combination "67893" in the Zimmermann telegram, they recognized it and knew that it meant "Mexico." Under the German system it always meant that. Today such a cipher group would never stand for the same word twice.

Today not only all official government messages but also the communications of espionage agents are cast in equally secure and complex cryptographic systems. Soviet agents, for example, in reporting information back to Moscow, use highly sophisticated cipher systems. Here as elsewhere, as defensive measures improve, countermeasures to pierce the new defenses also improve.

Principles of Photo Interpretation

NPIC was started under Art Lundahl's direction in the 1950s and is now located in the Washington, D.C. Navy Yard, at the corner of 1st and M streets in the Southeast section of the city. Building 213 in the yard is the home of NPIC. It is a five-story, yellow cement building notable for the fact that most of its windows have been cemented over, in an effort, it is supposed, to prevent eavesdropping. To gain an understanding of what goes on behind those closed windows, it is necessary to look at some of the principles of photo interpretation.

The most basic aerial photo interpretation is done with a single black-and-white photograph. The first step in interpretation is to learn the nature of how objects on the ground appear from the air. In day-to-day life we usually see objects on the ground from a height of 5-6 feet. And we are used to seeing cars and buildings and landmarks from the side, not the top. Accurate identification of objects depends of course on the size of the object itself and on the resolution of the photograph (from above, a haystack may look the same as a small tree or a shrub).

In general, long, thin objects like roads are the easiest to identify. Unpaved roads are lighter in color and are easier to spot then paved roads, which usually have more regular, controlled curves. Similarly, railway lines, which appear dark and narrow and are difficult to spot, can be distinguished by their long, smooth curves. While power lines themselves are too fine to be resolved, individual power line towers can be spotted, and the route of the lines can be plotted when they cut a swath through a wooded area.

In identifying other objects, such as buildings, vegetation, and landmarks, shadows play an important role—they may be either a help or a hinderance. They can help by giving a sense of the height of an object, but they hinder interpretation when the shadow can be confused with the object that casts it (from above, the shadow of a house with a black roof and the house itself may together just look like one big house). Shadows can also fall on other objects of interest, blacking them out.

The most helpful tool for a PI is a stereoscope. Most aerial photographs are taken with 60-percent overlap, so that a feature on one photograph will also appear either on the photograph before it or on the one after it in line. As the airplane or satellite is at a different point over the feature when the first picture is taken than it is when the second is snapped, the two photos will show two slightly

An Air Force intelligence photo interpreter at work.

different angles on an object. The stereoscope exploits this slight difference in angle so that the object can be viewed with the illusion of three dimensions.

A stereoscope is a pair of special magnifying glasses that are set 3-4 inches above a pair of overlapping photos. The matching features on the photographs are separated by the distance between the viewer's pupils—roughly 2 inches. By looking at photographs through the stereoscope, the brain is tricked into thinking that these separate images are the slightly different angled images that each eye normally sends to the brain. It takes some patience and concentration, but once the brain is fooled, it fuses the two flat images into one with three dimensions of startling, exaggerated proportions.

The stereoscope is essential in gauging the contour of terrain, something that is almost impossible to judge without a sense of depth. Through a stereoscope one can tell if a road is following a stream, a valley, or a ridge, or whether a feature is being obscured by a shadow, as the feature will pop up while the shadow remains flat. Objects viewed through a stereoscope will be vertically exaggerated by two to three times, so that a two-story building may appear to be six stories in height through a stereoscope. If, however, one happens to know the true height of at least one object in a photograph, even

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with the stereoscope's exaggeration, one can then calculate the height of other objects shown.

The use of infrared-sensitive film is another boon to the photo interpreter. Because of chlorophyll's specific absorption spectrum, green vegetation, which appears dark on regular panchromatic film, is quite light in infrared. Thus, one can tell the difference between true vegetation and something only painted to look like vegetation, such as military camouflage. Infrared is also very handy in plotting the precise location of water (water appears black in IR photos) and of paths and roads through fields (the vegetation appears light while the track comes out dark), and in separating a shadow from the object that cast it.

While film cannot pick up the longer-wave IR emissions from objects, detectors (like those used in the KH-11) have this capability. The information can then be translated into photographs for use by the PIs. The great advantage in detecting longer-wave IR is that it includes thermal radiation—heat. It is said that the thermal IR detectors available during the Vietnam War were so sensitive that they could pick out footprints in the jungle at night, since the footprints were warmer than the ground around them. For the PI, however, the great advantage of thermal IR information is that it can give indications of what goes on inside buildings—previously completely inaccessible terrain. By analyzing the heat patterns that emanate from a building, one can figure out the building's internal structure, traffic flow, energy consumption, and level of activity.

The partner of IR photography is multispectral photography. Just as vegetation has its own specific absorption spectrum in IR, so it does in every other band of light. This applies to all objects. A road may appear very light in the blue band and very dark in the yellow. By comparing photographs of the same terrain taken in different bands, one may distinguish between features that in panchromatic film may have appeared to be exactly the same. An example is a well-traveled road versus an unused one. Through comparison of photographs multispectral photography can provide information on the shape, size, texture, color, hue, and contrast of an object, all areas that are very hard to determine with black-and-white or even color photography.

Computers have revolutionized photo interpretation just as they have everything else. Photographs can be stored digitally, making such things as comparing different multispectral photographs easier and more exact. For example, a computer can process a picture taken

in the blue band and simply superimpose it on one taken in the red. The PI is then able to see instantly the differences and similarities between the two photographs. A thermal IR picture of a missile site taken one night may indicate activity in one area, while a picture taken the next night may reveal work going on in a slightly different place. By comparing the two pictures in a computer, the PI can find out where the activity is concentrated.

Of crucial strategic value is the computer's ability to measure exactly. Its precision in photogrammetry allows the PI to judge, for example, whether or not the gauge of a rail line is wide enough to support the transport of missiles or, indeed, if a new missile's size violates a treaty. The computerized viewing screens at NPIC allow PI to move a cursor around on a photograph and get an exact measurement of an object instantly.

With the KH-11's digital imaging system, the data already exist in a form compatible with a computer, making the use of such information that much simpler. The computer is able to manipulate the image in ways that one is unable to do with pictures taken on film. If there are several different pictures of the same terrain taken from slightly different angles, the computer can fuse these images to form a graphic composite model that can be manipulated on all three axes. Suddenly, one is able to examine a three-dimensional model of a missile site that is not exaggerated like a stereoscopic image. Thus height, depth and contour become ever more measurable.

The computer is also able to scan back through a history of digital images of one target site so that it can determine what developments and changes have occurred at the site over the years. Computers can also enhance images by removing any static, by increasing or decreasing the intensity of the light, and by enlarging and highlighting certain areas, all at the touch of a key.

The new technology has in many ways made the job of the PIs easier (they can quickly scan for patterns, check old pictures, measure objects, and perform other tasks almost instantly), but it has also made their jobs harder by increasing the amount of information that each PI has to digest. Essentially, though, computers or not, the PIs' duties have remained the same since the days of Art Lundahl in the 1950s and '60s: They are supposed to figure out what is going on on the ground by examining pictures taken from as far as 100 miles above the Earth.

5 SECRET COMMUNICATIONS

The NSA Network

The NSA intercepts communications all around the world, using either its own equipment and personnel or those of the armed services. Its main targets are the Soviet Union's radio and radar signals. Because of this there are listening posts flanking all sides of Russia—in the arctic, Japan, Turkey, Germany—wherever a base can be put close to the border. A listening post can be anything from a receiver in the back of a van in Berlin to a mammoth Wullenweber antenna sprawling across the Scottish highlands.

The Wullenwebber facility in Edzel, Scotland, looks like something out of a science-fiction movie—a 20th-century Stonehenge. Designed to pick up everything from low-band submarine communication to high-frequency radiotelephones, it is composed of four concentric rings of poles, ranging in height from 8 to 100 feet, with the outer ring having a diameter of 1,000 feet. The outer ring, which picks up high-frequency transmissions, is a series of 120 poles, one for each 3 degrees of the circle. The next ring coming inward, or second ring, is a reflector screen that protects the outer ring from unwanted signals. It is made up of wires dangling down from horizontal braces suspended between tall poles. The third ring picks up low-frequency signals with a series of very tall poles, and the fourth ring—the inner ring—acts as the third ring's reflector screen.

In the middle of the Wullenwebber antenna are two boxlike operations buildings. Cables, all exactly the same length, run from the poles to the buildings. By noting which pole receives a signal first, operators get the direction of the transmitter, and by cross-referencing with other listening posts, they can figure out exactly where the signal is coming from by using a process of triangulation.

Two of the major listening posts in the United States are at Vint

Hill Farms in Virginia (30 miles south of Washington) and Two Rock Ranch in California (north of San Francisco). Vint Hill uses rhombic arrays to pick up communications to and from the embassies in Washington. A rhombic array is a wire strung a few feet off the ground around a set of four posts arranged in a diamond shape, with no more than 10 feet separating any two posts. Unlike a Wullenweber antenna, a rhombic array will only receive in a very specific direction, and so there are thirty or forty of these arrays scattered over several hundred acres at Vint Hill, all connected to an operations facility by coaxial cable.

The NSA's biggest station, and their biggest failure, is the antenna at Sugar Grove, West Virginia. Sugar Grove is in the middle of a 100-square-mile radio-quiet zone, initially established in the 1950s for the purposes of radio astronomy. In 1959 the NSA decided that it would be an ideal place for the ultimate listening post. The grand scheme was to build an antenna that could pick up Soviet communications as they bounced off the Moon. Originally priced at $60 million, the antenna was to be the largest movable structure ever created. It was to take 36,000 tons of steel to make the dish, which was to be 66 stories tall and 600 feet wide, and was to rest on mammoth drives capable of angling it up and down and moving it 360 degrees around a 1,500-foot track. Unfortunately, the mathematics needed to build such a structure was so complex that at that time there wasn't a computer in the world that could handle it. As well, the costs of the project skyrocketed—it was estimated that it would have cost $200 million or more to complete—and eventually it was canceled.

Even though the big dish was abandoned, to this day an intense secrecy still surrounds Sugar Grove, perhaps because only 60 miles away, in Etam, West Virginia, are the COMSAT dishes, used to carry half of the commercial international communications that go in and out of the United States. Etam is only one of the COMSAT's four ground stations. Conveniently, the NSA has a station nearby the three other COMSAT facilities in Maine, Washington, and California.

Not all international communications go via satellite. How is the NSA to tap the transatlantic cable? It would be possible to lay a second cable down nearby and pick up the conversations by induction, but that would be very expensive and complicated. As it happens, at the U.S. end of the cable, in Rhode Island, the signals are converted to microwaves and beamed to the AT&T station in Montville, Connecticut. It is a simple matter for the NSA to

intercept that link (as we saw in the earlier section on data surveillance) as well as any other microwave links in the country—especially those used by foreign governments between New York and Washington.

Intelligence From Above

As was mentioned in the first half of this book, in order to gain information on how the air defenses of an enemy operate, the United States flies quick-penetration border sorties to trigger radar and radio alerts, while nearby (or actually flying the penetrations themselves) are reconnaissance planes such as an EC-47 or an EC-121, waiting to pick up this RADINT (RADar INTelligence) and ELINT (ELectronic INTelligence). The NSA is responsible for analyzing much of this data, much of which also comes from satellites.

The most important satellites to the NSA are the Rhyolite series, all of which are designed to monitor Soviet missile test launches (picking up TELINT, or TELemetry INTelligence) as well as to intercept whatever microwave transmissions they can. It is believed that Rhyolite, although a successful satellite, is nevertheless no replacement for the loss of the ground station in Iran, which was only a few hundred miles away from the Soviet test site at Tyuratam, instead of over 20,000 miles up in space. The only possible replacements for Kabkan may be a combination of the new Aquacade ELINT satellite (if it ever gets up in the shuttle) and a listening post in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, a remote mountain area in China. (At this point the Chinese are willing to cooperate with the United States if it means getting information on the activities of the Soviets.)

While the National Reconnaissance Office operates the satellites, the NSA maintains its own ground stations to receive the data the satellites pick up. There are stations in Australia (at Pine Gap), England (Menwith Hill Station in Harrogate), and the United States (Buckley Air National Guard Base near Denver).

Listening From the Sea

In the early 1960s, while the NSA had the Soviet Union and China well covered, they lacked an extensive listening-post network

for the rest of the world—there were only two posts in all of Africa—so a decision was made to copy the Soviets and outfit trawlers with listening gear and send them along the coasts of the world. The NSA used big, old boats that could creep along the shore without creating suspicion, for they moved so slowly. They patrolled the coasts of Africa, South America, and throughout the Indian Ocean, the South Seas, and the Pacific. However, after what many refer to as the "accidental" destruction of one such ship, the *Liberty*, by Israeli jets and torpedo boats during the 1967 war, and after the capture of the *Pueblo* by the North Koreans in 1968, the sea venture, as a clandestine eavesdropping activity, was dropped. Military ships, however, continue to listen in to whatever they can pick up as they patrol.

The Targets of the NSA

The main target of the NSA is of course the communications of the Soviet Union. That is what makes the computers whir and the cryptanalysts sweat over their blackboards and graph paper, as they consult their foreign language dictionaries. But it also appears that there have been times when the NSA has done some eavesdropping at home.

It began in 1945, when AT&T, ITT, and RCA were approached by the U.S. government to turn over all international cables sent or received by foreign governmental representatives in this country. Although the companies were at first reluctant, afraid they would be breaking the law, they were assured that all was legal, as the government was only interested in the activities of foreign nationals. Operation Shamrock, as it was known, did indeed begin its career as a foreign intelligence operation, but over the years it grew increasingly domestic, and by the 1960s the system was being used to gather information on drug traffickers, criminals, and even peace groups, in a direct contravention of the U.S. Constitution. When Shamrock was exposed in the mid-'70s, it was quickly dismantled.

Some suspect that the NSA is still secretly conducting domestic surveillance. It has been estimated however, that even with its vast facilities the NSA is at best only capable of monitoring one tenth of one percent of the nations communications, primarily because listening in requires so much time and manpower. Still, one tenth of one percent of the American population is roughly 250,000 people, a not insignificant amount. In the future, voice identification and transcription computers may drastically cut down the amount of effort required to mount such an operation.

10

TECHNICAL COLLECTION

SIGINT COLLECTION

SIGINT activities of the U.S. government consist of a number of different technologies. The oldest of these, Communications Intelligence (COMINT), involves intercepting and, where necessary, decoding the communications of other nations. As the eavesdropping aspect of this procedure offended the sensibilities of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in 1929, he was prompted to terminate the department's support for the work. The U.S. Army and Navy, viewing the requirements of national security differently, continued to intercept foreign radio communications and thereby produced intelligence from them.[2]

SIGINT also encompasses Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), once referred to as Electronics Intercept at a time when some questioned whether its technical contributions really constituted "intelligence." ELINT consists of technical and intelligence information derived from the interception of electromagnetic radiations emitted by radars and other special communications equipment. These electronic signals are studied to determine the equipment's unique characteristics. An outgrowth of this activity was the sophisticated study of missile telemetry, known as Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT),[3] provided for in the SALT II Agreement.

Secretary Vance's explanation of SALT II referred to the radar facilities at Shemya Island in Alaska, where reentry of Soviet test-missile firings is monitored. Such activities gave rise to the term RADINT, for Radar Intelligence. Mentioned here—not because it is SIGINT (it is not), but

because of the electronic technology involved—is infrared photography[4], which will be discussed later in the context of overhead reconnaissance.

The U.S. government's SIGINT program is managed by the National Security Agency (NSA). Unlike CIA, which has a legislative charter, NSA was created in October 1952 by presidential directive. It replaced the short-lived Armed Forces Security Agency, which had only limited powers over the government's SIGINT activities. NSA, which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, was given operational control over the military cryptologic agencies: the Army Security Agency (ASA), which subsequently was merged with other organizations into the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); the Naval Security Group (NSG); and the Air Force Electronic Security Command (for many years known as the Air Force Security Service).[5] These three organizations, subordinate to their respective departments, are responsive to NSA operational direction. Estimates of the personnel engaged in the national SIGINT program range between 70,000 and 120,000;[6] a more accurate estimate would probably fall about halfway between these extremes.

NSA responds to both national and tactical requirements, political as well as military, but its major and primary collection effort is directed to military targets.[7] The scope of coverage by NSA and the three military cryptologic agencies requires that personnel be stationed around the world,[8] including an impressive net of facilities abroad. According to the *Church Committee Report* of 1976, the U.S. SIGINT program was then the largest and most expensive single program in the national intelligence budget.[9] The rapid growth of the overhead reconnaissance program, with its highly sophisticated technology and equipment, may have modified the balance somewhat.

One writer close to the SALT II process described the intelligence programs of which SALT II verification was a part. His description was general, but it included a specific reference to the SIGINT facilities that had been located in northern Iran prior to the fall of the Shah:

> The Iran stations were part of a varied and far-reaching network of American facilities that kept track of Soviet military activity, including missile tests. These facilities include airplanes, satellites, ships and ground stations outfitted with an array of equipment for taking photographs, detecting launches by infrared sensors, intercepting radio messages and tracking missiles and their warheads by radar. Many of the functions are overlapping. Redundancy is a deliberately designed and highly prized feature of the system.[10]

The Eurasian landmass occupied by the Soviet Union and its empire extends from 10° east longitude at the western limit of East Germany, through 170° east longitude at the end of the Chukotsk Peninsula across

the Bering Strait from Alaska. The size of the collection task in this vast area is enormous. Numerous collection activities around the periphery of the Soviet Bloc are required. The reported loss of the valuable sites in Iran conveys something of the nature of the intelligence effort. The press has reported collection efforts in Turkey, where U.S. forces had at one time been ousted owing to a congressional initiative in relation to Cyprus. Unconfirmed press reports have stated that an arrangement exists with China for operation of a similar collection site in western China. Such widely separated activities suggests something of the scope and variety of the effort involved.

Europe has been considered an area of strategic priority among U.S. interests, both military and cultural. The largest military confrontation exists there, given the NATO forces aligned to oppose any armed aggression from the Warsaw Pact forces in East Europe. Probably the greatest concentration of U.S. SIGINT collection facilities is in the NATO area, where both the United States and its NATO allies conduct independent SIGINT programs, with arrangements for exchange of the "take" among them. SIGINT collection serves the essentially defensive purposes of NATO strategy and tactics, but it also exhibits a potential for offensive use in the event of war.

Permanent installations have been established along the length of the East European borders. As a rule, their locations are determined by terrain and radio reception conditions, although sometimes by the location of communications and other collection targets in East Europe. SIGINT facilities engage in electronic "listening" for all manner of signals emanating from the other side of the East European borders.

Soviet and other Warsaw Pact ground forces in East Europe can rely on ground lines (normal telephone systems) when not on maneuvers. But wireless communications systems must be kept active, and when the troops take to the field for seasonal exercises, or to move their location, they invariably use radio communications. During routine practice and "command post exercises," SIGINT collection on the ground forces is most active. Maneuvers are followed closely to verify continuation of known procedures and to identify new ones, as well as to learn what communications may reveal about organization. Exercises are monitored closely to ensure that they do not a cloak a real offensive. Air-to-air and air-to-ground radio communications also form a part of normal air force operations in peace or in war. Electronic observation of Warsaw Pact flight activity makes it possible to determine aircraft basing, movement, levels of flight experience and training, numbers, and organization.

As Warsaw Pact forces are relatively near and mobile, continuing watch is maintained by the United States for any indication of change in deployment and readiness. "Indications" and "warning" intelligence

is crucial to Western readiness to meet possible military initiatives from the East. Against such an eventuality a list has been prepared of steps to be expected in the event the Pact began preparations for hostilities, and a watch is kept of developments in those areas. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has a "watch list" of some 500 discrete indicators (more than 700, counting subsets), and daily reports are assembled for review.[11] SIGINT is one of the more important sources of information to be included in these lists of possible preparations for war.

Similarly, there are collection programs targeted on the Soviet Navy, which has become a "blue water navy" in the past two decades in contrast to its traditional role as something of a coastal defense force.[12] Soviet ships can be observed visually when they exit the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic. This susceptibility to visual observation probably was a probable factor in the Soviet decision to base a considerable portion of its fleet, especially its submarines, along the Kola Peninsula on the White and Barents seas, which are quite inhospitable in winter. Other Soviet naval bases exist in East Asia, both in northern USSR and in Vietnam. The new global role of the Soviet navy makes it a more difficult SIGINT target than it was when it had a more limited mission. Although SIGINT facilities in the European and Mediterranean areas provide considerable coverage in those regions, other arrangements have had to be made for surveillance of Soviet naval forces in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.

The majority of the Soviet SIGINT targets are at fixed sites, although a number of the radar facilities have some mobility. Of special continuing interest are the large fixed-site facilities that would have to be dealt with in the event of retaliation against Soviet aggression in Europe. For example, the capabilities of the Soviet Bloc air defense system would have to be determined in order to design tactics to penetrate it.

SIGINT collection sites along the borders between West and East Europe can identify different types of Soviet radars—general search and aircraft-acquisition radars, anti-aircraft artillery radars, surface-to-air missile radars, tracking radars, interceptor radars for aircraft, and so on. To identify and locate these radars is not enough. It is necessary also to know how they function in operational situations. This information is acquired in part through so-called ferret flights, in which specially equipped aircraft fly along the borders of the East European line of demarcation. These aircraft will be picked up by Soviet Bloc radars and tracked, accompanied by routine precautionary measures in the Warsaw Pact air defense system. Bloc interceptor aircraft are often scrambled to move along with the ferret flights. Anti-aircraft systems will activate their equipment against the possibility that the ferret flights might turn to penetrate the East European airspace. Western SIGINT collection

facilities, as well as the electronic equipment on the ferret aircraft, monitor these reactions as defensive responsibility is moved from sector to sector in the Warsaw Pact air defense system. These defensive responses usually provide subject matter for COMINT and ELINT collection. It also reveals a good deal about the organization, functioning, and capabilities of Pact air defenses, and contributes to the design of tactics and strategy for penetrating the system if that should become necessary. The Soviet Bloc is quite aware of what is happening. but it usually feels obliged to react in order to ensure that the ferret flights are not about to turn east over Warsaw Pact airspace.

Ferret flights along the demarcation line in Europe are in friendly airspace, often with accompanying fighter protection. They have proven to be basically safe patrol missions. But the same has not always been true of similar flights that approach Soviet or other communist coastal areas over international waters. These latter flights occasionally have been attacked and U.S. patrol aircraft downed. Such incidents occurred in 1955, 1956, 1958, and 1960[13] during the Eisenhower administration, and in 1969 during the Nixon administration.[14] Analysis of those incidents has indicated that the aircraft had invariably flown over international waters. Communist motives have not always been clear, although there doubtless is some irritation about the obvious purpose of the ferret flights.

In addition to the aircraft usually employed in ferret activity, the U.S. Air Force operates a special high-performance aircraft—the SR-71—capable of speed in excess of MACH-3 at very high altitudes. Originally designed as the follow-on to the U-2 aircraft, the SR-71 has been used on a limited basis owing, at least in part, to the performance of reconnaissance satellites. The SR-71 can perform SIGINT along with its other missions. Unmanned drone aircraft equipped with sensors have been flown into areas in which a hostile reaction is expected.[15] The Church Committee, concerned with the risks of overflight activity, both to human life and the possibility of escalating reactions if an aircraft is shot down, recommended that unmanned drones be used where possible in place of manned ferret flights.[16] Although surveillance satellites have eliminated much of this element of risk, manned flights may sometimes be necessary.

Ferret flights are supplemented by naval equipment. Secretary Vance has mentioned the use of ships to monitor Soviet missile tests. The role of DCI Helms in their use of these ships for this work was also mentioned in Chapter 5. There are other naval vessels equipped for more general SIGINT work. Naval communications ships designed for SIGINT missions execute more normal collection tasks, although their work is not always without risk. The USS Pueblo, engaged in a general SIGINT mission

off North Korea in 1968, was attacked on the high seas and seized by North Korea. [17] The USS Liberty, conducting SIGINT operations in the eastern Mediterranean during the so-called Six Day War in June 1967, was attacked repeatedly by Israeli naval vessels and aircraft. [18]

Other forms of SIGINT collection were discussed by the Church Committee in the context of electronic techniques. Although these discussions concerned domestic activity in particular, the techniques obviously have application for foreign collection activities as well. Mentioned in the Church Committee summary were intercept of voice communications from microwave relay systems, intercept of non-voice communications from microwave relay links, and intercept of both voice and nonvoice communications from satellites. [19]

Not all SIGINT operations involve the intercept of signals on the air. One dramatic incident that received some publicity is known as the Berlin Tunnel Operation. In the mid-1950s a tunnel was dug from an empty building on the west side of the Berlin Wall to underground communications cables on the east side. CIA communications specialists installed banks of recorders tapped in to East German and Soviet communications cables in the tunnel. [20] The operation ended in a scramble in mid-1956 when Soviet authorities stumbled on it.

This general discussion should provide some sense of the scope and nature of both usual and unusual SIGINT collection. Although much of the activity is *pro forma* in nature, special opportunities may result in unique operations. Given the variety of modern technology, SIGINT has found a place in the overhead reconnaissance program as well.

Counterintelligence

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
13 June, 1985

Peter Steiner

THE WALKER FAMILY REUNION

THE WASHINGTON TIMES 21 June, 1985

CARTOON

CHAPTER ONE

Counterintelligence:
An Introduction

Roy Godson

It is not easy to define counterintelligence. Its practitioners them-selves disagree about the meaning of the concept. At a minimum, however, CI can be defined as the identification and neutralization of the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and the manip-ulation of these services for the manipulator's benefit. Some say CI is more all encompassing: That it should deal with a wider range of threats to a nation's security, from that posed by adversary states in their totality, rather than by their intelligence services alone, as well as threats posed by such non-governmental forces as terrorist groups and internationally-organized crime. But the "minimalist" focus on the threat posed by foreign intelligence services is almost universally shared, as a starting point at least.

Few also would disagree that CI is important not only to the nation's security but to the effective functioning of the nation's apparatus for intelligence as well. The public is reasonably well aware that CI exists to prevent spies, foreign and domestic, from penetrat-ing our government, armed forces and intelligence agencies. There is even widespread recognition that this country should not be with-out means to safeguard the security of the high technology produced by our industry, and that nations cannot deal with terrorist organi-zations, or with large-scale internationally-organized crime, by *ad hoc* investigations alone, subsequent to the event.

Essential to dealing with all of these threats is information that can be obtained only by clandestine technical and human means, by a panoply of what have come to be called "intrusive techniques," often involving audiovisual surveillance. Nor is there much need to argue that if the US is going to discover the "illegals" whom the Soviet Union has sent to this country for purposes of long-term infiltration, the systematic counteraction must comprise sophisti-cated analysis as well as investigation. There are those—among them the leaders of the American Civil Liberties Union—who have urged the virtual abolition of all CI and clandestine collection from human sources, both home and abroad (see, for example, Ernest Lefever and Roy Godson, *The CIA and the American Ethic*, Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1979). But the proposition that CI is essential to the maintenance of democratic processes and human liberties usually does not have to be demonstrated.

It is far less clear, however, except to specialists, that CI is essen-tial to the success of all other components of intelligence. Neither collection nor analysis can produce reliable results, nor can covert action be effectively conducted without constant attention to what hostile (and even friendly) services might do to turn our intelligence activities to their advantage.

The security of the processes by which we collect intelligence is often precarious. For example, it is impossible to know *a priori* whether any human source is actually working for us or is feeding us

false or doctored information. Intelligence services traditionally, wisely and necessarily employ a variety of techniques to investigate and, above all, to test their human sources. Technical sources also can be used by hostile services to deceive us. Telemetry (the signals emitted by missiles in test flight) is an obvious example of information that the adversary knows we are capable of picking up. It would be uncharacteristic, at the very least, if the adversary failed to take this into account in planning the format and content of the telemetry of its test platforms. We also must assume that the adversary is aware of its potential vulnerability to other methods of technical collection and is doing the utmost not only to deny us data but to bias the data we do get. We always can try to minimize our vulnerability to countermeasures by keeping our collection activities as secure as possible. But the collection system has yet to be devised that will be able completely to neutralize the adversary's efforts to deny and to misinform. Therefore, CI experts must constantly devise and carry out tests to determine how, and how well, the adversary is coping with our collection activities.

Covert action couples the promise of significant gains for our country with the real prospect of embarrassing failure and the waste of precious assets. This century is replete with examples of covert political and paramilitary activity turned to the initiator's disadvantage. Among the major methods of determining if a covert action is about to be ''turned'' are painstaking, skeptical analysis of all the information connected with the operation and the subtle, constant, testing of both assets and opponents. Only by working hand-in-glove with CI, as a general rule, can those in charge of covert action maximize their chances of success.

Analysis may be the most important and is surely one of the most vulnerable components of the intelligence process. Analysts are required to answer difficult questions on the basis of usually limited data. Thus they are frequently tempted to accept data more or less at face value. The active involvement of CI specialists can be very helpful in assisting analysts to deal with the adversary's efforts to confuse them or lead them deliberately to the wrong answers. CI specialists, by highlighting the activities of foreign services, may also be able to provide positive information of extraordinary value to analysts. The down side is that excessive concentration on CI can sterilize the analytical process. But, at its effective best, CI not only protects analysts against deception but provides them with a vital increment of in-depth knowledge of their subject.

The Soviet KGB and other hostile intelligence services pose a broad-gauged threat both to our country and to our intelligence, considered organizationally and substantively. The KGB, the largest and most centralized major intelligence service in the world, has excelled over the years in traditional espionage and the penetration of Western services. The number of intelligence officers under legal cover in Soviet embassies and official missions in the US and other countries grew considerably in the 1970's. In addition, unlike many of the Western services that operate against the Soviet Union, the KGB does not limit itself to sending out "legal" intelligence officers to recruit agents and sources. The KGB and other bloc services make extensive use of "illegal" agents, who are infiltrated into target countries until ordered into action, sometimes years later and after thoroughly establishing their local credentials. The Soviet services also have demonstrated a facility to use the considerable assets of the world's Communist parties and front groups both for collection and for covert action.

Given the nature of open societies in the West and the ready supply of Moscow's human assets, the Soviet Union does not have to put particular emphasis on sophisticated and expensive means of technical collection. It is likely, however, that the Soviets realize that the US has had to rely (or even over-rely) on precisely these means. Thus, the Soviets have the incentive, and may have developed the means to bias the results of US technical collection. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that they devote significant resources and senior personnel to deceiving their adversaries at almost every level of competitive endeavor, from infantry tactics to international trade, to missilery.

Powers hostile to the US, and especially the Soviet Union, also have developed impressive capabilities for unconventional warfare and for training and supporting terrorist organizations. The transnational movement of paramilitary forces, terrorists and members of their support groups, poses a serious challenge to US counterintelligence. These groups frequently are organized and do much of their work prior to the actual initiation of hostilities or violent terrorist acts. Insofar as such paramilitary forces and terrorists become involved in bolstering political movements friendly to the Soviet bloc and undermining pro-western governments and nongovernmental forces such as democratic trade unions, co-operative movements and the independent press in many parts of the world, the US is obliged to treat these activists as challenges to itself. And, CI must begin to identify and prepare to neutralize these forces before they strike.

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Counterintelligence

In today's spy-conscious world each side tries to make the opponent's acquisition of intelligence as difficult as possible by taking "security measures" in order to protect classified information, vital installations and personnel from enemy penetration. These measures, while indispensable as basic safeguards, become in the end a challenge to the opponent's intelligence technicians to devise even more ingenious ways of getting around the obstacles.

Clearly, if a country wishes to protect itself against the unceasing encroachments of hostile intelligence services, it must do more than keep an eye on foreign travelers crossing its borders, more than placing guards around its "sensitive" areas, more than checking on the loyalty of its employees in sensitive positions. It must also find out what the intelligence services of hostile countries are after, how they are proceeding and what kind of people they are using as agents and who they are.

Operations having this distinct aim belong to the field of counterespionage and the information that is derived from them is called counterintelligence. Counterespionage is inherently a protective and defensive operation. Its primary purpose is to thwart espionage against one's country, but it may also be extremely useful in uncovering hostile penetration and subversive plots against other free countries. Given the nature of Communist aims, counterespionage on our side is directly concerned with uncovering secret aggression, subversion and sabotage. Although such information is not, like positive intelligence, of primary use to the government in the formation of policy, it often alerts our government to the nature of the

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thrusts of its opponents and the area in which political action on our part may be required.

In 1954, the discovery of concealed arms shipments, a whole boat-load of them, en route from Czechoslovakia to Guatemala first alerted us to the fact that massive Soviet support was being given to strengthen the position of a Communist regime in that country.

The function of counterespionage is assigned to various U.S. agencies, each of which has a special area of responsibility. The FBI's province is the territory of the United States itself, where, among other duties, it guards against the hostile activities of foreign agents on our own soil. The CIA has the major responsi-bility for counterespionage outside the United States, thereby con-stituting a forward line of defense against foreign espionage. It attempts to detect the operations of hostile intelligence before the agents reach their targets. Each branch of the armed forces also has a counterintelligence arm whose purpose is mainly to protect its commands, technical establishments and personnel both at home and abroad against enemy penetration.

The effectiveness of this division of labor depends upon the co-ordination of the separate agencies and on the rapid dissemination of counterintelligence information from one to the other.

It was a coordinated effort that resulted in the capture of Soviet spymaster Colonel Rudolf Abel. In May, 1957, Reino Hayhanen, a close associate and co-worker of Colonel Abel in the United States, was on his way back to the Soviet Union to make his report. While in Western Europe, he decided to defect and approached U.S. in-telligence, showing an American passport obtained on the basis of a false birth certificate. Hayhanen's fantastic story of espionage included specifics as to secret caches of funds, communications among agents in his network and certain details regarding Colonel Abel. All this information was immediately transmitted to Wash-ington and passed to the FBI for verification. Hayhanen's story stood up in every respect. He came back willingly to the United States and became the chief witness at the trial against Abel.

As soon as Hayhanen reached our shores, primary responsibility for him was transferred to the FBI, while CIA continued to handle foreign angles.

The classical aims of counterespionage are "to locate, identify and neutralize" the opposition. "Neutralizing" can take many forms. Within the United States an apprehended spy can be prosecuted under the law; so can a foreign intelligence officer who is caught red-handed if he does not have diplomatic immunity. If he has immunity, he is generally expelled. But there are other ways of neutralizing the hostile agent, and one of the best is exposure or the threat of exposure. A spy is not of much further use once his name, face and story are in the papers.

The target of U.S. counterespionage is massive and diverse because the Soviets use not only their own intelligence apparatus against us, but also those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, all of which are old in the ways of espionage if not of Communism. Chinese Communist espionage and counterespionage operations are largely independent of Moscow, though many of their senior personnel in earlier days were schooled by Soviet intelligence.

Although the purpose of counterespionage is defensive, its methods are essentially offensive. Its ideal goal is to discover hostile intelligence plans in their earliest stages rather than after they have begun to do their damage. To do this, it tries to penetrate the inner circles of hostile services at the highest possible level where the plans are made and the agents selected and trained, and, if the job can be managed, to bring over to its side "insiders" from the other camp.

One of the most famous cases of successful high-level penetration of an intelligence service is that of Alfred Redl, who from 1901 to 1905 was chief of counterespionage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire's military intelligence service, and later its representative in Prague. From the available evidence it would appear that from 1902 until he was caught in 1913 Redl was a secret agent of the Russians, having been trapped by them early in his intelligence career on the basis of two weaknesses—homosexuality and overwhelming venality. He also sold some of his wares at the same time to the Italians and the French. But that wasn't all. As a leading officer of the Military Intelligence, Redl was a member of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army and had access to the

General Staff's war plans, which he also gave to the Russians.

Despite the fact that Redl was apprehended just before the war, his suicide at the "invitation" of his superior officers immediately after his treachery was discovered eliminated the possibility of interrogating him and determining the extent of the damage he had done. The Austrians were more interested in hushing up the scandal. Even the Emperor was not told of it at first.

Ironically enough, Redl was caught by a counterespionage measure—postal censorship—which he himself had developed to a point of high efficiency when he had been counterespionage chief. Two letters containing large sums of banknotes and nothing else were inspected at the General Delivery Office of the Vienna Post Office. Since they had been sent from a border town in East Prussia to a most peculiar-sounding addressee, they were considered highly suspicious. For almost three months the Austrian police doggedly waited for someone to come and collect the envelopes. Finally Redl came, and the rest is history. However, it still amazes counterintelligence specialists who study the case today that the Russians, in an operation of such immense significance to them, could have resorted to such careless devices for getting money to their agent, especially since postal censorship was one of the favorite counterespionage devices of the Okhrana itself.

It is, of course, not necessary to recruit the chief, as in the Redl case. His secretary, had he had one, might have done almost as well. Actually, the size of a major intelligence organization today makes it impossible for the chief to be concerned with all the operational details an opposing service would wish to know. Not only that, but today the headquarters of an intelligence organization are as "impenetrable" as the best minds assigned to the task can make them. As a consequence, counterespionage usually aims at more accessible and vulnerable targets directly concerned with field operations. These targets will often be the offices and units which intelligence services maintain in foreign countries. As is well known, they are frequently found in embassies, consulates and trade delegations, which may afford the intelligence officer the protection of diplomatic immunity as well as a certain amount of "cover."

How does the counterespionage agent "penetrate" his target? By what means can he gain access to the personnel of another intelligence service? One of the ways is to come supplied with beguiling information and offer it and his services to the opposition. Since some of the most crucial intelligence in recent history has been delivered by people who just turned up out of a clear sky, no intelligence service can afford to reject out of hand an offer of information. Of course, behind the Iron Curtain and in most diplomatic establishments of the Soviet Bloc outside the Curtain, the general distrust and suspicion of strangers is such that an uninvited visitor, no matter what he is offering, may not go beyond the receptionist. In the end, however, his ability to get a foot in the door depends on the apparent quality of the information he is offering. Every intelligence service has the problem of distinguishing, when such unsolicited offers come along, between a bona fide volunteer and a penetration agent who has been sent in by the other side. This is no easy matter.

If counterespionage succeeds in "planting" its penetration agent with the opposing service, it is hoped that the agent, once he is hired by the opposition, will be given increasingly sensitive assignments. All of them are reported duly by the agent to the intelligence service running the "penetration."

The Soviets used this method against Allied intelligence offices in West Germany and Austria during the 1950s. Refugees from the East were so numerous at that time that it was necessary to employ the better-educated ones to help in the screening and interrogation of their fellow refugees. The Soviets determined to take advantage of this situation and cleverly inserted agents in the refugee channel, providing them with information about conditions behind the Curtain which could not fail to make them seem of great interest to Western intelligence. Their task for the Soviets was to find out about our methods of handling refugees, to get acquainted with our personnel and also to keep tabs on those among the refugees who might be susceptible to recruitment as future Soviet agents.

This same penetration tactic can be used to quite a different end, namely, provocation, which has an ancient and dishonorable tradi-

tion. The expression *"agent provocateur"* points to French origins
and was a device used in France during times of political unrest,
but it is the Russians again who made a fine art of provocation. It
was the main technique of the Czarist Okhrana in smoking out
revolutionaries and dissenters. An agent joined a subversive group
and not only spied and reported on it to the police, but incited it to
take some kind of action which would provide the pretext for
arresting any or all of its members. Since the agent reported to the
police exactly when and where the action was going to take place,
the police had no problems.

Actually, such operations could become immensely subtle, com-
plicated and dramatic. The more infamous of the Czarist *agents
provocateurs* have all the earmarks of characters out of Dostoevski.
In order to incite a revolutionary group to the action that would
bring the police down on it, the *provocateur* himself had to play
the role of revolutionary leader and terrorist. If the police wished
to round up large numbers of persons on serious charges, then the
revolutionary group had to do something extreme, something more
serious than merely holding clandestine meetings. As a result, we
encounter some astounding situations in the Russia of the early
1900s.

The most notorious of all Czarist *provocateurs*, the agent Azeff,
appears to have originated the idea of murdering the Czar's uncle,
the Grand Duke Sergius, and the Minister of the Interior, Plehwe.
The murders then gave the Okhrana the opportunity of arresting
the terrorists.

One of Lenin's closest associates from 1912 until the Revolution,
Roman Malinovsky, was, in fact, a Czarist police agent and *provoca-
teur*, suspected by Lenin's entourage but always defended by Lenin.
Malinovsky helped reveal the whereabouts of secret printing presses,
secret meetings and conspiracies to the police, but his main achieve-
ment was far more dramatic. He got himself elected, with police
assistance and with Lenin's innocent blessing, as representative of
the Bolshevik faction to the Russian parliament, the Duma. There
he distinguished himself as an orator for the Bolsheviks. The police
often had to ask him to restrain the revolutionary ardor of his
speeches. Indeed, in the cases of both Azeff and Malinovsky, as with

many "doubles," there is some question as to where their allegiance really lay. Since they played their "cover" roles so well, they seem at times to have been carried away by them and to have believed in them, at least temporarily.

The double agent is the most characteristic tool of counterespionage operations, and he comes in many guises. In an area like West Germany with its concentration of technical and military installations, both those of the West Germans and of the NATO forces, there is a flood of agents from the Soviet Bloc spying on airfields, supply depots, factories, United States Army posts, etc. Many are caught. Many give themselves up because they have found a girl and want to stay with her or simply because they find life in the West more attractive. Such men become double agents when they

can be persuaded to keep up the pretense of working for the Soviet Bloc under Western "control." The ones who are caught often agree to this arrangement because it is preferable to sitting in jail for a couple of years.

The aim is to build up the agent, allowing him to report back to the Bloc harmless information, which is first screened. It is hoped that the Soviets will then give him new briefs and directives, which show us what the opponent wants to know and how he is going about getting it. Sometimes it is possible, through such an agent, to lure a courier or another agent or even an intelligence officer into the West. When this happens, one has the choice of simply watching the movements of the visitor, hoping he will lead to other agents concealed in the West, or of arresting him, in which case the operation is naturally over, but has succeeded in neutralizing another person working for the opposition.

A more valuable double is the resident of a Western country who, when approached by an opposition intelligence service to undertake a mission for them, quietly reports this to his own authorities. The advantages are obvious. If the Soviets, for example, try to recruit a Westerner, they must have something serious in mind. Secondly, the voluntary act of the person approached, in reporting this event, points to his trustworthiness. The target of Soviet recruitment will usually be told by his own intelligence authorities to "accept" the Soviet offer and to feign cooperation, meanwhile reporting back on all the activities the Soviets assign him. He is also provided with information which his principals desire to have "fed" to the Soviets. This game can then be played until the Soviets begin to suspect their "agent" or until the agent can no longer stand the strain.

The case of the late Boris Morros, the Hollywood director, was of this kind. Through Morros, who cooperated with the FBI for many years, the Soviets ran a network of extremely important agents in the United States, most of them in political and intellectual circles. This operation led to the apprehension of the Sobles, of Dr. Robert Soblen and numerous others.

"Surveillance" is the professional word for shadowing or tailing. Like every act of counterespionage, it must be executed with maximum care lest its target become aware of it. A criminal who feels or knows he is being followed has limited possibilities open to him. The best he can hope for is to elude surveillance long enough to find a good hiding place. But an intelligence agent, once he has been alarmed by surveillance, will take steps to leave the country, and he will have plenty of assistance in doing so.

The purpose of surveillance in counterespionage is twofold. If a person is only suspected of being an enemy agent, close observation of his actions over a period of time may lead to further facts that confirm the suspicion and supply details about the agent's mission and how he is carrying it out. Secondly, an agent is rarely entirely on his own. Eventually he will get in touch, by one means or another, with his helpers, his sources and perhaps the people from whom he is taking orders. Surveillance at its best will uncover the network to which he belongs and the channels through which he reports.

Surveillance was largely responsible for the British success in rounding up five Soviet agents in the Lonsdale ring in January, 1961. Harry Houghton, an Admiralty employee, was suspected of passing classified information to an unidentified foreign power. Scotland Yard tailed Houghton to a London street, where he met another man so briefly that it was impossible to tell for certain whether anything had passed between them or whether they had even spoken.

However, the fact that both parties acted furtively and seemed extremely wary of surveillance convinced the British that they were on the right track. The Yard split its trained men into two teams to follow the suspects separately. This eventually led them, after many days of tireless and well-concealed surveillance, to a harmless-looking American couple who operated a secondhand book store. Their role, if any, could not be immediately ascertained.

On a later occasion Houghton came up to London again, this time with his girl friend, who worked in the same naval establishment. Again under surveillance, the two of them, walking down the street carrying a market bag, were approached from the rear by the same man whom Houghton had met previously. Just as this fellow was about to relieve Houghton and the girl of the market bag, which was clearly a prearranged method for passing the "goods,"

all three were arrested. The unknown man was Gordon Lonsdale, the Soviet "illegal" with Canadian papers who was running the show.

A few hours later, the harmless-looking American booksellers met the same fate. They were being sought by the FBI for their part in a Soviet net in the United States and had disappeared when things had become too hot for them. In London they had been operating a secret transmitter to relay Lonsdale's information to Moscow.

Drawing
Board

RELAX, MR. JONES, DON'T THINK OF IT AS A LIE DETECTOR, THINK OF IT AS A STRESS DETECTOR.

STRESS IS MERELY AN INDICATION THAT YOU'RE A LIAR, MR. JONES, SO RELAX, BECAUSE ONE SHAKY ANSWER AND

YOUR ENTIRE GOVERNMENT CAREER IS OVER. WE'LL BEGIN WITH AN EASY QUESTION, MR. JONES. HAVE YOU EVER

CONSIDERED PICKING UP THIS POLYGRAPH AND SHOVING IT DOWN MY FACE ? NO? NOT A GOOD START, MR. JONES.

PUT IT DOWN, MR. JONES.
NO, NOT THERE MR. JONES...

BY TOLES FOR THE BUFFALO NEWS

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Wishing you ....,
9 April '85

Peter Steiner

DEPARTMENT OF DISINFORMATION

ENTRANCE

CHAPTER · 9

The Causes
of Failure

Deception

Deception is an integral part of warfare, yet the peacetime manipulation
of potential enemies, while frequently attempted, is successful only under
certain conditions. In wartime it is possible to influence the other side's
assessment by "plants," or by the systematic fabrication of false evidence.
World War II offers countless examples; among the best known are the
story of the "man who never was," the *Englandspiel* carried out by the
German *Abwehr*, and the successful British attempt to "turn" (that is,
convert into double agents) virtually all German spies operating in Britain.
In our time, the question of whether the Soviet Union has lived up to its
commitments under the SALT Treaty, and how great its military expendi-
ture has been, have been issues of intense debate. The same refers to the
unending disputes about whether certain defectors from the Soviet Union
were genuine or double (or even triple) agents.

On the other hand, it is difficult to think of successful strategic deception
in peacetime. In the 1920s Germany tried to conceal the fact that it was
rebuilding its army in violation of the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles.
Yet the news still came out—in many different ways—and if Britain and
France failed to react, it was not for lack of information.[51] The alleged
German manipulation of Stalin in the 1930s has frequently been invoked
as a classic case of successful deception. German intelligence informed
Stalin that Soviet military leaders had conspired with German generals
against him, whereupon Stalin ordered the execution of most members of
the Soviet general staff. The story is probably apocryphal, for Stalin was
engaged in a large-scale purge of the entire party and state apparatus
anyway and there is no sound reason to assume that he would have
excepted the army, no matter what information he received from
Germany. He may even have used this information as evidence without
believing it.

Another famous case of deception often cited as the cause of a major
intelligence failure was the Stalin-Hitler pact in August 1939. The head of
the Northern Department in the British Foreign Office later claimed that
he and his colleagues faced a problem very similar to the captain of the

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forty thieves in the story of Ali Baba. That is, the enemy had provided so
many possible clues as to what was going on that rational choice among
them was impossible.

The reference to the story of Ali Baba is an interesting example of special
pleading, but the analogy does not hold up. Had Hitler made a violent
anti-Soviet speech while negotiations with Russia were proceeding, or had
Stalin attacked Nazi Germany just then, we would be dealing with a clear
case of deception. But there were no such blatant attempts to mislead the
outside world. The real reason for the intelligence failure was far more
prosaic—Great Britain and France were not informed about the talks be-
tween Berlin and Moscow, let alone the fact that the negotiations were
going well.[52] So ignorance, not deception, was to blame.

In the Second World War neither American, German, nor Soviet military
leadership was willing to devote very much effort to strategic deception.
This was partly due to the innate conservatism of military leaders, but also
to the firm belief that the really decisive components of victory would be
elements like massive firepower, the concentration of troops, and speed of
maneuver—not rumors spread by diplomats, wooden tanks, or other
decoys. Major operations had to be kept secret, of course, but military
leaders saw no reason to go beyond the elementary rules of caution. The
British leadership on the other hand, believed in deception and it invested
a good deal of effort in such operations, two of them of some importance.
Fortitude South induced the German command to make false dispositions
in France at the time of the invasion, and to a lesser extent, Fortitude North
persuaded the Germans to retain troops in Norway and Denmark that were
thus unavailable for the defense of France.[53]

Deception is rarely a total success even in wartime—the Trojan horse (if
the tale is true) is an exception. Usually the most to be hoped for is to
spread doubt, rather than to make the antagonist accept a specific untruth.
If through Fortitude North or Fortitude South, the Allies had induced the
Germans to concentrate all of their forces in Norway or the south of France
in 1944, the war would have been over sooner. But then, the Allied inva-
sion would probably not have succeeded had the Germans known the
exact time and place of the landing. In that event, Allied deception was
partly successful. The Germans knew about the impending invasion, but
they thought that it was more likely to occur in the Pas de Calais, 300 miles
from the D-day landings. Yet they took other possibilities into account and
therefore did not concentrate all their forces in the part of France nearest
to the English coast.

Is it true that Soviet counterintelligence successfully deceived the CIA
during the 1960s and much of the 1970s about the extent of Soviet defense
spending and the number and accuracy of Soviet missiles? It is no longer

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seriously questioned that the CIA underrated the Soviet military effort. It is also true that the Soviets were hiding whatever could be hidden but whether systematic Soviet disinformation played a decisive role is doubtful. Western errors were not based on false figures, procurement costs, or dollar-ruble conversion tables smuggled in by Soviet influence agents. They were rooted in mistaken fundamental assumptions about the nature of Soviet aims and strategy. The belief that the Soviet aim was strategic parity amounted to Western mirror imaging, not to successful Soviet deception.

One of the great masters in the field, R. V. Jones, once noted that "In principle it should always be possible to unmask a deception." However, he added the important corollary that "it is surprising how effective deception can be in the stress and speed of operation."[54] As there is usually far less stress and urgency in peace than in war there should be correspondingly little successful deception when the guns are silent.

Then how does one explain the frequent intelligence failures in peacetime such as, for instance, the misjudgment on the part of British intelligence of the extent of German and Italian rearmament in the 1930s, or the fact that Hitler underrated Soviet military preparations? It is certainly true that Mussolini greatly exaggerated both numbers and performance of his air force and navy, but he deceived himself and his allies even more thoroughly than his enemies. Despite the Duce's impressive claims, British intelligence had doubts about the Italian war potential from the beginning. Hitler used deception with regard to German rearmament, especially in the early years (1936–38) when he was trying to appear strong when he was still weak. British intelligence was admittedly feeble at the time; the information received from a retired group captain, Malcolm Christie, was more reliable than the estimates of the officials in charge of intelligence production.[55]

Yet even in its weakened state, British intelligence was never far off regarding the order of battle of the German air force; that applies both to the early years (they knew Hitler was bluffing in 1935) and to the time of the Munich crisis.* British intelligence predicted in December 1938 that the Germans would have 3,700 planes by the end of 1939; when war broke out Germany had 3,647 planes. The British committed serious mistakes in their projections up to 1937, underrating the German effort and assuming that the British aircraft industry could keep step. They were also mistaken in their appraisal of German strategy for use of the air force. They were

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*Most governments were by and large correctly informed both on the eve of World War I and II about their potential enemies' capabilities. They mainly erred with regard to their intentions. See Ernest R. May, ed., *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessments Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).

The Causes of Failure

mistaken, however, not because Hitler deceived them, but because they made no real effort to understand the Nazi phenomenon—a combination of British conservatism and mirror imaging.

The Soviet Union was more effective in keeping its military preparations secret. Hitler and the German staff seriously underestimated the number of Soviet divisions, as well as the quantity and quality of Soviet equipment.[56] They underrated the capacity of the Soviet armament industry. They belittled the fighting spirit of the Soviet soldier and exaggerated (like everyone else) the impact of the purges of the late 1930s on the senior officer corps of the Red Army. Yet Soviet secrecy also had its dangers— if the Soviet Union had played down its military strength, its supposed weakness might have invited attack. But if it had made known the full extent of its preparedness, even exaggerated it, this could have provoked Hitler to attack "before it was too late."[57] In any case, it was not deception that misled the rest of the world about the state of Soviet armed might, but secrecy. The Soviet Union was a closed society, the opportunities of outside intelligence to obtain reliable information were minimal. Given the difficulties of penetrating a society of this kind, even the most accomplished theory of deception or counterdeception would have been to no avail.

Attempts have been made to compose a theory of deception, drawing heavily on work done in experimental psychology, especially that concerned with judgment under uncertainty. This approach rests on a number of indisputable propositions: that the evidence facing the intelligence interpreter is frequently incomplete, ambiguous, and fuzzy; that perceptions once formed are resistant to change; that human beings have a preference for consistency and are willing to base their judgment on a narrow basis of facts, or continue to cling to discredited evidence just to avoid inconsistency; and that there is a bias in thought (particularly pronounced perhaps among intelligence analysts and policy makers) toward causal explanations, to see direction and planning where there is just accident.[58]

All this is true, but it is not sufficient to ensure successful deception in time of peace. Deception is usually costly, and to prepare it with sufficient thoroughness requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort—as the cost increases with the scale of the deception.[59] The U.S. intelligence community in the postwar period has been influenced more by Sun Tzu, the great believer in deception, than by Clausewitz. No doubt Mao's victory has something to do with this.[60] Allen Dulles extensively quoted Sun Tzu, and so did many other practitioners and writers. But this reverence derives, at least in part, from a misunderstanding. For deception is bound to play a considerably greater role in the kind of partisan warfare con-

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caused demoralization in London and a certain amount of distrust among the Western Allies. Yet the *Englandspiel* had no influence on the course of World War II. While Philby and his friends played a lamentable role, it would be difficult to show that, but for their treasonable activities, British postwar history would have taken a different course.[62] As Lord Dacre (Hugh Trevor Roper) wrote many years later, the idea that men like Philby could influence British policy was absurd; mechanically it was impossible. Usually they were not even in a position to suppress intelligence passing through their hands, and on the rare occasions that this might have been possible, it was not likely to be effective, for "a Foreign Office does not base policy on the narrow trickle of evidence which a single counterespionage officer can occasionally block."[63]

Why has so much recent attention been paid to deception?[64] Partly, no doubt, because a great deal of shrewdness and inventiveness has been invested in various schemes and ploys of this kind, giving it a certain intellectual fascination. Another reason is that Soviet intelligence has greatly increased its disinformation effort during the last twenty-five years. Some students of deception, not content with the study of classic cases, have come to include in their purview not only active deception (fraud) but also self-deception, general confusion, incompetence, and "passive deception" (secrecy). But a certain amount of secrecy is the normal climate in which foreign policy has been and is conducted. It seems no more fair to put secrecy and active deception in the same category than to equate, say, a Trappist monk and a pathological liar.

Deception is an interesting subject; its importance has to be measured, however, not by the ingenuity of its methods but by its ultimate political results. Seen in this light there are obvious limits to successful strategic deception in war, and there is even less scope for it in peace, provided that elementary rules of vigilance are adhered to.

Covert Action

THE NEW YORKER

December 11, 1965

"The C.I.A. did it. Pass it along."

"Be Careful, 009! You're Spilling Our Strategy!"

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Analysis

I. William E. Colby

Three revolutions have taken place in American intelligence since it became a permanent professional service—and it will be well to keep them in mind, as a kind of ground base, in all the reflections that follow. These major changes are the "central" role that analysis has assumed since 1942; the technological revolution that has resulted from the U-2 and satellites, electronics and computers; and the evolution of the spy as a contributor but no longer as the "central" feature of the process. Each of these three revolutionary changes, and all of them together, have changed the nature of intelligence from the secret spy service answerable only to the monarch. This must be better understood in our centers of learning and knowledge, and within the communications universe, so that recruitment for intelligence can take place with less media titillation and protest generation. These revolutionary changes bear as well on the training of analysts and the incentives that influence their performance.

Another approach to the subject at hand involves the following key question: What kind of analysis is needed for the best intelligence results? A variety of possible approaches present themselves, and the selection of any one would predetermine the techniques of recruitment, training, and incentive for it.

Does analysis equate with academic discipline, with its careful marshalling of evidence, its arrangement into rational patterns, rigorous examination of alternatives, selection of the more and the less probable among them, and subjection of the conclusions to scholarly and critical debate?

Or does analysis today stress the "methods" approach, employing all the assistance the new information processing machinery and disciplines can provide, to ensure that all facts are centrally related and interrelated, that models are all-inclusive and sensitive to what

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might apparently be minor changes in input, and that a firm audit trail exists for any conclusions through the factors and facts which led up to them?

Or should the analysis function stress the value of intuition, particularly that based upon the analyst's experience with the subject being analyzed? This involves reliance upon the wisdom of individuals who have struggled and suffered with the subjects for many years. It allows the inclusion of intangibles, which are otherwise more visible in hindsight than in foresight. It requires acceptance of imprecision in conclusions which are perhaps hard to dissect into their rational foundations.

Related to these questions is whether the analyst should ideally be a specialist in his subject, acquainted with its details and accustomed to its twists and turns over time, or whether he should be the generalist who can look beyond a subject to see the other factors which might impinge upon it from the outside and cause major changes in its conformation.

The best answer to these questions is, of course, "all of the above." Each approach can make a substantial contribution to better analysis. As the so-called information age has come upon us, it has become increasingly clear that the broadest possible approach must be taken to the problem of knowledge, which is fundamentally what intelligence is seeking. Myopic focus on sensational scenes has too often obscured the reality of complex situations, as in simplistic fascination with the dramatic guerrilla theater media event. Our awareness has grown that events are interrelated and that there are no shortcuts to wisdom. Analysis cannot rest alone on the output of the brash computer expert, as he may only produce garbage if he unthinkingly puts garbage in. But the tweed-jacketed professor is equally mistaken if he rejects the contribution the machine can make to the management of today's information explosion. The acceleration of communication has forced us to seek new forms of analysis and thought in order to keep up with fast-breaking events.

The challenge of the intelligence profession today is to absorb the mass of information which forces itself upon us. We can neither narrow our attention to a specialty to the extent that we lose contact with the real factors outside it nor, on the other hand, generalize at the expense of becoming so shallow that significant details and differences are overlooked. The same problem faces many professions, from medicine to journalism. The old dilemma of learning more and more about less and less is matched by the equal dilemma of learning

less and less about more and more. It is precisely through the re-
cruitment, training, and incentives, and I might add organization, of
analysts that we have to look for the resolution of these problems in
intelligence, and indeed in the private world at large which faces
much the same problem.

It is plain then, that recruitment cannot seek only one of these
types of analysts. Any hard and fast requirement of a post graduate
degree in history, political science, or economics could bar from the
corps of analysts the mudcaked activist who has tramped the back
jungle and fluently empathized with its inhabitants, learning more of
their incentives and values than any anthropological study might
provide. Recruitment on the basis of current expertise in a subject
could fill an immediate need but possibly omit the individual whose
life history reveals a pattern of successful examination of new prob-
lems and selection of the right course of action to take among them.

But some qualities are directly related to the intelligence process.
Curiosity is, of course, fundamental, as is a thoughtful turn of mind,
matched with some humility against presumptions of infallibility.
Neither bubbling optimism nor cynical pessimism are appropriate,
but an ability to communicate, orally and in writing, are essential if
the intelligence process is to function internally and serve its "cus-
tomers." And with the wide spectrum of subjects demanding intel-
ligence attention, it is certainly appropriate to acquire expertise
already accumulated through study or experience.

These considerations about the types of analysts intelligence needs
point out the targets for recruitment. The universities obviously are
a source for such individuals, both at the undergraduate and the
graduate level. But they should not be the only source. Thus the
public at large through advertisements, the personnel job search
agencies, the military and other government career services, and the
professional and commercial world must all be probed for individuals
who could find more fulfillment in the analytical function in intelli-
gence than in their present positions. Recruitment must include the
lateral entrant as well as the youthful entrant on the bottom of the
ladder, despite the strain and trauma this usually presents to a settled
career service.

A preliminary step to as broad an approach as this must be a better
comprehension in the world at large of the true nature of analysis
and of modern intelligence. University student protests against the
intrusion on campus of a nefarious spy service will continue until the
public is convinced that American intelligence has clear proscriptions

against behavior Americans would reject. The public must perceive that the true challenges of the decades ahead lie more in the intellectual gymnastics of coping with the flood of information than in the physical or even sexual gymnastics of latter day James Bonds. This message is gradually permeating the *cognoscenti*. But only a steady program of explanation of the real nature of intelligence today will cause it to be understood and accepted by all but the most extreme fringe.

Part of the recruitment process is the screening of potential applicants to avoid wasting the time of the intelligence service or the applicant on useless applications. Thus the jobs and careers for which recruits are sought must be carefully outlined in advance literature with as little obscurity and exotic connotation as possible. Matching of immediate needs with potential applicants is important, but it must be supplemented by a broader approach than simple "hiring" for particular job assignments. The individual with an extensive knowledge of the Middle East and unique experience therein may not fill the requirements of a specific job to analyze Central Africa, but a wise recruitment process seizes upon his obvious potential contribution and straightens out the job allocations later.

The screening process involves the security clearance. This means more than a check of central records to see whether the individual has previously been convicted of some felony or today is the active agent of a foreign intelligence service. The security clearance should include a broader approach, as does that of CIA, looking into vulnerabilities to outside pressure and to the applicant's basic equanimity, to lessen the chance of later explosion in frustration at the slowness of promotion or substantive disagreement with the intelligence agencies' policies. The analytical function does not require that the selection process determine whether the individual can parachute, but it does require some modern psychological testing to judge overall suitability for a life in the comparative half-light of intelligence. These testing techniques should also assist in determining analytical weaknesses such as a tendency to intellectual arrogance, a disinclination to drudgery, and satisfaction with the superficial.

Recruitment must also maintain clear records on accepted and rejected applicants and the reasons therefor. Some cross analysis of these and some *ex post facto* review in later years can bring out significant lessons on the techniques, the targets, and the arenas of recruitment, and the successful or unsuccessful later employment histories of the applicants chosen.

Training for analysts requires a consideration of the role of analysis in decisionmaking. The traditional concept was that the analyst should be carefully insulated from the enthusiasms of the collectors and the preferences of the policymakers. Only thus, the theory maintained, can he distill objective analyses of the situations facing the country. This produced an academic campus away from the center of power on which such analysis could be conducted, the results being handed down the Potomac River with somewhat the same implication as those which came down from mountains in earlier eras.

But the theory did not work. Careful insulation of the analysts from collectors ensured that the analysts would be operating in a sterile world of paper, not a world of grimy human beings with different cultures, languages, and predilections. Separation from the policymaker may have made the intelligence estimates more Olympian, but it also tended to make them less relevant to the day-to-day concerns and agonies of the decisionmakers. And the analysts in the rarified academic atmosphere had a tendency to embrace the theses currently fashionable in other academic centers at the time. Congressional praise for "objective" CIA comment reducing the Pentagon's threat projections was reversed by Albert Wohlstetter's article demonstrating its underestimates of the pace of Soviet strategic growth in the 1960's. The certainty of some analysts that the Soviet Backfire bomber could not be a strategic weapon because it could not make a round trip in a nuclear encounter finally yielded to the fact that American B-52s also are programed for one-way missions.

The training process then is directly related to the organizational and conceptual role of the analyst. I believe that this is moving toward an integrated "intelligence officer" approach, whereby each participant in the process must understand the entire process and not satisfy himself with a mere motion on the assembly line as the product passes him. This can be accomplished through the normal methods by which such training is accomplished in other situations, i.e., by descriptive courses, by orientation on the organization and its procedures, by intern assignments, by periodic refresher courses, and by rotation of duty assignments. Intelligence has, of course, some special restraints on this process, in terms of the sensitive source information which must be protected against too much rotation and exposure. This is not an insoluble problem, however, as many of these duties can be performed without specific knowledge of the sources involved; compartmentation can be preserved by rotation to

different functions but always restricted to one general subject.

Particular care is required so that the analyst receives appropriate direct exposure to the subject of his analysis. The analyst of a geographic area must have a chance to visit his area of concern, to serve there for an extended period of some months to absorb its intangibles, and to make return visits periodically over the years. The functional analyst of military weapon systems should supplement his studies by direct visits to military units. The oil flow analyst must visit petroleum production and transportation facilities.

And familiarity with the subject language must be insisted upon, despite current American disdain for such studies. Idioms, expressions, and even pronouns reveal much of the culture in which languages flourish, and help in the deduction of attitudes and motives in many situations.

On the other end of the process, the analyst must have a sense of the final product to which his material contributes. He should have a direct relationship with the individuals occupying the policymaking offices (or their staffs) to permit easy and informal communication of interests, concerns, and hopes for which the analyst could produce helpful material.

A continual effort must be made to keep substantive analysis as the primary focus of senior officer attention and not allow him to be suffocated by or subordinated to managerial concerns. The inevitable bureaucratic impulse is to focus on management as the indicator of success rather than the quality of individual product. "Training" along these lines really constitutes an organizational problem of how to ensure that analysts are rewarded for their substantive work, through direct recognition, commendation, and promotion. In part this can flow from geographic organization, so that the leader of an organizational element becomes the spokesman in the community for the intelligence contribution to any decisionmaking on the subject, rather than left to manage while other experts star.

Another element of training must include discipline. This does not mean the times of arrival and departure at the desk but rather the techniques to ensure that the analyst is continually aware that he is subject to high standards and that his performance against them is being noted. Techniques of accomplishing this start with the hard editorial blue penciling of overly smooth and comprehensive English prose which covers all of the alternatives but gives little indication as to the choice between them. They include periodic recording in precise terms of analysts' estimates of major developments for later

evaluation. even in probabilities. so a track record can be seen. Other procedures can be applied to force the analyst to articulate the basis for his position and his reasons for modification from one period to another. These techniques must of course be protected against the dangers of playing safe. sticking to the general consensus opinion so that error will at least have company if it occurs. and discouraging the more venturesome lonely cry of alarm. The important element of our discussion here is the need to recognize the need for this kind of discipline in training and development for better analysis.

The chief incentive for better analysis will and must lie in challenge to analysts. Even when the analyst continues his work over the years to constitute a career, each day he must be stimulated to generate the enthusiasm and adrenalin to improve the performance of the individual and of the team. The intricate raw material, the process of intelligence analysis, and the purpose served in policymaking to make a direct and visible contribution to a better world are thus the chief bases for incentive.

The primary incentive is thus intellectual, the search for better ways to understand the complex workings of our world. This requires the collection of as much relevant material as possible, its careful organization and dissection, and meticulous consideration of its meaning. As the intelligence profession has become more institutionalized, and the role of the analyst better understood, the single information report is seen in better perspective; and awareness has increased that it must be viewed in the matrix of events to which it is related. The days of fascinating presidents with raw reports have been replaced by a discipline requiring such reports to be processed before presentation, so that their reliability can be established and their significance assessed, in order to reduce the risk of premature and erroneous reaction. Whether this analysis focuses on the immediate likely behavior of a terrorist gang, or the longer term implications of a change of the Soviet Union from an oil exporter to importer, it is clear that the contribution of the intelligence analyst to better decisionmaking is substantial.

This intellectual challenge is not only in the utilization of analysis today but also in the innovation and invention of new techniques for tomorrow. New processes of modeling, tracing of decision trees and their alternatives, new techniques of interrelating material, new procedures to ensure that facts are examined in proper perspective, all are parts of the next revolution in intelligence, i.e., the new disciplines which will be applied to the analytical process to improve its

precision. its breadth. and its depth. The TV camera may zoom in on the single soldier out of step in a parading battalion. but the analyst judging the unit's training and combat discipline will insist that the frame be extended to show the whole unit. the circumstances of the parade, and the mission of the unit when not parading.

Intellectual challenge can also be found in the interplay of ideas and assessments among those knowledgeable in the field. In this respect, the increasing tendency to declassify the substance of information about the world and the explosion of information otherwise publicly available through modern communications techniques has expanded the circle of those able to conduct scholarly debate about many of the important governmental issues of our time. No longer is intelligence information only the private prerogative of an intelligence priesthood: to an increasing degree, the intelligence analyst is wrestling with the meaning of the same raw information as his colleague in the academic community, the think tank, or the commercial risk analysis service. Challenge can stem from exchange and debate with panels of these experts from the public as well as the intelligence world. The Team B exercise was certainly a useful step, as were certain other intelligence panels; they need now to be supplemented by Teams C, D, and E *ad infinitum* to enable many qualified and knowledgeable participants to sift evidence and arrive at better conclusions through debate and contest over alternate interpretations.

And one incentive for better analysis is psychic. This can be in the realm of the contribution an anonymous analyst makes to the identification of some danger, or the suggestion of some unnoticed potential benefit. The experience of briefing the National Security Council or seeing national policy turn on the result of an analysis can be a strong incentive to renewed dedication. These psychic rewards are considerable even at the first-level interagency meeting at which the photographic interpreter points out the laying of a keel in some faraway hostile shipyard.

For best results this psychic reward should be encouraged by giving direct personal recognition of the contribution made by individual analysts. Their names should appear on their final work product, and they should participate in interagency and policy discussions so that their reputation grows with the excellence of their contribution over time. This presents an organizational problem to permit the individual expert on the narrow question to surface through the layers of hierarchy all busily managing and being generalists, so that he or she can present a direct contribution to the policymaker at the time

of decision. The expert on Senegal must be known as that and not subordinated under generalists on West African politics, economics, and military affairs, in order to reward the several year attempt to learn and understand the intricacies of Senegal at a time when little interest is shown. The experts on Turkistan, Uzbekstan, and Kazakhstan must be gathered with their colleagues from the other sectors of the Soviet Union in mock Central Committee meetings to see how an overall Soviet policy alternative appears to its component republics. The war game long familiar in the Pentagon must be supplemented by the political, the economic, the trade games, to permit more challenging hypotheses to emerge and to force the unexpected and the unlikely before the analysts for examination. These psychic incentives will be of far greater stimulation to better analysis, better understanding, and knowledge than complex debates about grade levels and step increases. These latter rewards must indeed be provided, and they should be supplemented by appropriate awards in medals or in certificates, but the real incentive should be the psychic.

This review, then, indicates that intelligence analysis is no longer a special discipline limited only to the secret corridors of a shadowy intelligence service. More and more its raw material is being exposed to public use and comparison with that available from open media, communication, and information dissemination capabilities. Whatever intelligence might lose from this in romanticism or exoticism, it can gain more by a frank recognition of its partnership with the world of academic research, commercial and industrial information and risk analysis centers, and the media. With these, it can wrestle with the problems of collection, analysis, and communication of information and assessments to permit wise decisionmaking by the political leader or by the voter, investor, or consumer. The more intelligence analysis is seen to share this common problem, the more it can benefit by common focus on the need to improve recruitment, training, and incentives for analysts in all of these fields. Opening American intelligence to this new public discipline is the next task to be accomplished, and I believe that its impact on the excellence of our intelligence analysis will be as revolutionary as the impact of technology on our collection capabilities has been in the past twenty years.

D. Analysis

Most intelligence organizations have a body of *analysts*, each assigned to a particular geographic or functional specialty, broad or narrow. The collection and processing systems are designed to bring to the individual analyst all the information from all sources pertinent to his responsibilities.

If he or she is a *current intelligence analyst*, the job is to absorb incoming information as it arrives, to evaluate it, and to produce a kind of continuing assessment of the state of affairs within his or her field.

A *research analyst's* task is different; the job here is to define the question to be answered, to issue the necessary requirements for new collection, to review and evaluate both existing and new information, and to produce from the results a paper or briefing responsive to the task given him.

Analysts in all agencies are formally grouped into functional or geographic units, but equally important is the ad hoc task grouping, formed to bring together all the specialists involved in responding to a given question. A question with regard to Cubans in Angola, for instance, will involve not only the Angola analyst from an African regional unit, but the Cuba analysts from a Latin American regional unit, air and sea transport specialists from an economic intelligence unit, and foreign policy specialists from a Soviet analytical unit.

During periods of crisis in foreign affairs, as during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, or to support critical negotiations, units called *task forces* are normally formed in each of the agencies involved, and for a major crisis the DCI may direct that a *National Task Force* be organized, with a particular agency as executive agent responsible for its support. Such a national task force has as one of its major tasks the production of periodical *situation reports* (SITREPS), disseminated to the appropriate policy-makers.

The general product of analysis and of analysts, however, is called *finished intelligence*. This is a term of art to describe intelligence that has been evaluated and, if necessary, correlated with other information. It is possible for a raw intelligence report to be totally valid and need neither comment nor additional context. In this case the act of the analyst in determining that it stands by itself converts it from raw to finished intelligence.

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Intelligence Briefing on Southeast Asia

*To point out
the discontinuities*

THE TRAVAIL OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Richard W. Mansbach

The intelligence professional is in an ambiguous position. He is neither the initial collector nor the final consumer of intelligence information. On the one hand, he must be able to spin gold from common cloth by addressing critical issues with a paucity of data. On the other hand, he must have the skill to provide crisp and timely evaluations even as he tries to stay abreast of mountains of information. His most difficult task is to synthesize diverse materials and clothe them with context and logical inference in order to make them germane to the choices confronting policymakers. As facts rarely speak for themselves, the intelligence analyst must speak on their behalf and elaborate their present and probable future consequences for his government. He is successful to the extent he is able to provide the intelligence and policymaking communities with a common meaning for information that might otherwise assume as many meanings as there are observers. In doing so, his judgment is tempered by his knowledge of history and his inferences are refined by the accepted canons of logic.

In fact, the analyst's work rarely meets the exacting standards which he sets for himself. His labors are corrupted by the pressures of time and politics and by the demands of his organization and career. Consequently, the analyst will be tempted to take cognitive shortcuts. The challenge is to navigate the epistemic perils that await him as he compensates for the imperfections of his environment.

Interpretation vs. Narration

The remorseless demands for rapid assessment of unfolding situations pose the single greatest barrier to thoughtful and comprehensive analysis. Under these conditions, there is a temptation to serve up information as it is received—stringing together cable traffic or snippets from papers already on the shelf. This procedure is economical in terms of time and protects the analyst from egregious error and controversy because it tends to reiterate "agreed" judgments and avoids the necessity to reopen intra-agency negotiation on an issue. Resulting analyses, however, contribute little to the work of initial collectors and forgo fresh assessment in favor of the mere accretion of information. The pressure of time notwithstanding, the intelligence specialist is responsible to distinguish between "true" and "false" facts and to winnow out trivia from incoming information in order to reassess the logic of events in light of policy and national interest.

The propensity to substitute narration for interpretation is fostered by the intelligence community's encouragement of narrow research specialties. On

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the one hand, such specialization provides a needed pool of technical expertise; on the other hand, it reduces conflicts over "turf." But whatever the virtues of the system, its consequences are an insensitivity to linkages among events and issues, an inability to make analysis relevant to policy concerns, a subtle propensity to ignore anomalies and amass information to confirm agreed-upon hypotheses, and a flight from analytic responsibility. And those who might be expected to comprehend the big picture are necessarily absorbed in managing the myriad tasks of narrowly focused experts. Finally, the community's structure encourages the proliferation of standard operating procedures for routine occurrences and effectively discourages the search for emerging discontinuities.

Analysis vs. Speculation

Speculation—in the sense of uninformed or baseless prediction—is anathema to intelligence analysis. At its worse, speculation may appear as prejudice informed by nothing more than casual introspection. But the boundary between speculative and analytic enquiry is often very narrow, and the intelligence specialist's professed aversion to speculation may mask a propensity to unjustifiable caution. Aware that they will have to defend idiosyncratic judgments to skeptical peers and superiors, analysts tend to rationalize anomalies so that they reinforce "conventional wisdom." Confirmed evidence is commonly demanded for uncomfortable assertions of change in existing patterns; in the absence of such evidence, assertions of this nature may be dismissed as "speculative." The cult of confirmation, however, may lead to analyses that predict only what has *already* happened—*post hoc* rationalizations.

This mind set tends to confuse speculation (predictions based on pre-existing biases and randomized guesswork) and deductive-nomological hypotheses (theoretical predictions of specific events derived from general propositions about how actors behave under certain conditions). It reveals a preference for strictly inductive analysis in which general conclusions are seen as valid only if they are based on the cumulation of data.

Unfortunately, the institutional preference for induction minimizes the prospect that analyses will encompass subtle variations in the logic of a situation or awareness of important possibilities that are incompatible with past patterns. The common practice of legitimizing projections of the present into the future by imbedding them in highly subjective probability statements further reduces the incentive to account for emerging anomalies. Of course, the probability that significant shifts will occur in a defined period of time in major situations (e.g., the stability of a government) is low. The future usually will repeat the past, and most policy planners—even if deprived of intelligence—are able to fare tolerably well on the basis of that assumption. Nevertheless, significant changes will occur in the global environment every year, and these changes—however few—are more important to political leaders than all the "non-changes."

Pointing out possible discontinuities—however improbable they may be in a statistical sense—and elaborating their implications may be the most critical

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Travail

task an intelligence analyst can perform. As a rule, policymakers prefer to believe that the calculable status quo will persist, and conservative judgments by intelligence specialists tend to reinforce such wishful thinking. Only if significant contingencies are pointed out by the intelligence community in timely fashion is it possible for policy to be initiated in order to preclude undesirable developments. Paradoxically, such policy may "falsify" the original analysis on which it was based.

Policy Advocacy

One reason commonly given for avoiding "speculation" is that the inclusion of judgments that are not fully confirmed is likely to reflect political or ideological preferences. While there is no need here to discuss the necessity of avoiding policy advocacy, it should be pointed out that, in fact, every analysis contains implicit or indirect policy recommendations. The purpose of intelligence analysis is to facilitate the policy process; an analyst is indulging in irresponsibly irrelevant diagnosis and prognosis if he fails to explicate the impact that US policy has had or may have on the situation before him.

Although the analyst cannot substitute his judgment for that of the policymaker and must protect the "neutrality" of his examination, comprehensive diagnosis and prognosis inevitably entails the subtle inclusion of policy prescription. Diagnosis requires this because the present and past policies of the United States are likely to have been critical factors in shaping the problem being confronted. More importantly, US action or inaction will inevitably impinge on the manner in which the situation at hand will unfold and will, in consequence, intrude upon the analyst's prognosis. An evaluation of the differing effects of alternative US policies is a necessary component of the most "disinterested" analysis. If stated so as to be relevant to the policymaker, it will indicate those courses of action that will benefit or harm him.

The intelligence specialist, moreover, has a responsibility to point out the impact of systemic and secular conditions on the issues at hand in order to indicate the *limits* of policy. The zealous policymaker, viewing foreign affairs through the prism of his limited tenure and constantly in the hurly-burly of making decisions, tends to look at the world around him as far more plastic than it really is. The analyst, with a longer perspective, must assume the responsibility for distinguishing between those aspects of a situation that are malleable and those that are not.

Whatever his self-image may be, no intelligence specialist is free from political conviction. On occasion, the failure to wrestle with convictions directly actually leads to the unrecognized inclusion of bias. The analyst, priding himself on being a guardian of intellectual continuity, is dismayed by rapid shifts in perception and policy from administration to administration. The focus of the Carter Administration on human rights and the Third World was seen by some as entailing an underestimation of the Soviet factor in world politics. Similarly, the Reagan Administration's focus on the Soviet "threat" was viewed by others as a dangerous excursion into the past. In both instances, papers and estimates were written that were unconsciously slanted toward the

status quo ante—often by declaring that there was "insufficient" evidence to justify the shift. The exercise, however laudably motivated, inevitably included unadmitted advocacy. In a sense, it is the antithesis of telling the policymaker what he wants to hear, but it is equally unjustifiable.

Short-Term vs. Long-Term Analysis

The demands of policymakers and the episodic eruption of crises place a premium on rapid turnaround and brevity of expression. The necessary emphasis on the unfolding present commonly leads the intelligence specialist to dichotomize falsely between short- and long-term analysis. The dichotomy is false because the analysis—while dealing explicitly only with the present and near future—can transcend journalism only if it is infused with implicit models of the past and future patterns of events surrounding the topic at issue. Whether conscious or not, such models provide the analyst with necessary premises about his topic. And, however brief the exposition, the analyst's premises should be articulated in order to reveal the logic that lies behind the analysis and its conclusions. Long-term analysis, then, even if only dimly apparent in any single report or piece of research, is the father of true probability statements about individual events. And each event in turn will serve to modify the analyst's assumption about his topic once again. If the specialist were not engaged in continuous long-term analysis, his short-term conclusions would be no more valuable than informed opinion, and he would not be a specialist at all.

Conclusion

This brief essay by no means encompasses the range of analytic pitfalls into which the intelligence specialist may step. Those that have been addressed are rarely the consequences of intellectual limitation. Rather, they are the products of the intellectual milieu and culture of the intelligence community. They are responses to the host of pressures and constraints imposed by bureaucratic mores, institutionalized practices, and the pressures of time and career in a hierarchical organization. As a consequence, however diligent the individual specialist, they will not be eliminated. Nevertheless, self-conscious appreciation of the degree to which they may detract from intelligence products may minimize their impact.

CRISIS AND INTELLIGENCE: TWO CASE STUDIES *

Allen H. Kitchens

An international crisis can take on different forms and result from various developments—a surprise attack, the outbreak of war, a coup, the collapse of a government, increasing growth of an insurgency, rampant demonstrations and riots, assassination of an important political leader, massive economic failure, downing of aircraft, sinking or seizure of a ship, and so forth. A crisis can develop suddenly with little or no warning, it can gradually develop over time and then suddenly blow, or it can be a heightening of or sudden development within a crisis already in progress.

The role of intelligence prior to a crisis is to eliminate surprise by alerting and warning of an impending development. Once the crisis is taking place, the role of intelligence is to keep the policymakers and crisis managers informed of what is going on and what to expect. There are a wide variety of ways prior to and during a crisis in which intelligence is fed into the policymaking and management machinery. Written products primarily include the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) *National Intelligence Daily*, the Department of State's (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR) *Morning Summary*, and the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) *Daily Intelligence Summary*. These are intelligence community priority publications, read daily at the White House and by others at the top in the foreign affairs and defense establishment. Other written products include Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), briefing memoranda, and warning memoranda. The Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other top advisers also receive special briefing materials provided daily to the President.

A fast-breaking situation causes a great surge of incoming material—cables, intelligence reports, news items—and produces an acute need on the part of the policymakers to know quickly what is happening and what may be about to take place. In addition to the regular daily intelligence publications, situation reports are particularly useful in meeting this urgent need for information and analysis. In addition to the situation reports and other special memoranda, there would be—depending on the type of crisis—oral briefings using maps, photographs, and charts.

The timely production of objective analysis and its proper use by the policymakers is critical to the handling of a crisis. There are unfortunately a number of obstacles and barriers which often lead to intelligence and policy failures. Richard Betts of the Brookings Institute, in an article entitled "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," commented that "most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the product of

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* Adapted from a presentation to the International Studies Association, March 1984, in Atlanta, Georgia.

intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organizational."

Betts and others have over the years observed various reasons for failure or near failure. In terms of the cases I will be discussing, the most significant factors are:

— Policymakers tend to disregard analysis which runs counter to preconceptions; that is, the mindset. In addition, some at the policy level tend to place more weight on raw intelligence than on analysis in finished intelligence. This is particularly the case in a crisis situation where both data flow and policy formulation outpace analysis; the policymakers and crisis managers develop, as former INR Director Thomas Hughes put it, "the succulent taste for the hot poop." Some policymakers have a bias against intelligence analysts; they may insist on being their own intelligence officer. Policymakers also tend at times not to share vital information with the intelligence community. This impedes accurate analysis.

— Intelligence analysts tend to be guilty of mindset—to be overly cautious and unwilling to challenge effectively conventional wisdom, to be ambivalent and waffle. In such a situation the analyst serves little purpose in assisting the policymakers by objectively informing her/him of what is going on and why, a· l what to expect and why.

— There is a tendency in the joint preparation of estimates, such as SNIEs, to resolve through consensus substantive differences to the point that the product may make ambivalent or ambiguous judgments.

— The presence in a crisis of an excess of information, much of it fragmentary and conflicting, makes it very difficult for an analyst to sort out what is real and unreal in order to be able to make clear judgments as to what is happening and what it all means.

— Operational agencies tend to justify their own performance by issuing overly optimistic assessments and reports.

— Policymakers tend to be preoccupied by other often equally significant policy matters, or to be suddenly distracted by another crisis somewhere else in the world or right smack in the middle of the one already at hand. This kind of situation also affects the intelligence community.

Case Study: Tet Offensive in Vietnam, 1968

On 30 January 1968, during Tet, the lunar New Year, nearly 70,000 communist soldiers launched a surprise offensive of incredible scope. These forces attacked more than a hundred South Vietnamese cities and towns, including Saigon, thus shifting the war for the first time from the rural setting to the seemingly secure urban areas.

After some days of fierce combat, the enemy was cleared from most cities and towns. While the communists may have concluded that they suffered a political defeat because their more ambitious objectives were not reached—to

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liberate key urban areas long enough to organize the population and lead a genuine rebellion against the Saigon regime—the offensive dealt the US and its allies a severe setback by demonstrating the communists' great capacity to launch major attacks and to inflict severe punishment. The demonstration of urban vulnerability also had a major adverse effect on allied confidence in ultimate victory, and it had a decisive effect on American public opinion. Tet set into motion the eventual changes in US policy on Vietnam.

The investigations and other post-mortems which took place in the aftermath of Tet found that the scope, intensity, coordination, and timing of the attacks were not fully anticipated; that the nature of the attacks—against urban and not rural area targets—had not been predicted; that a major unexpected element had been the communists' ability to hit so many targets simultaneously; and that civilian and military leaders had been lulled into a false sense of security—based on a belief fed by illusory reports on communist strength, casualties, infiltration, recruitment, and morale—that the communists' overall position had deteriorated.

With regard to the timing of the communists' offensive, most of the intelligence analysts concluded that the offensive likely would occur immediately prior to or following the Tet holiday period which extended from 27 January to 3 February. Some analysts and commanders, including General Westmoreland, included in their estimates the possibility that the attacks might take place during the holidays and shifted some troops just in case. Throughout the fall and into the winter of 1967-68, there was a considerable amount of fragmentary evidence that the communists were planning a major offensive around Tet. That fall the communists had taken the offensive in a series of assaults against allied border positions and then began the siege at Khe Sanh on 21 January. Throughout that period reports were coming in that communist units were being upgraded with greater, more modern firepower, and were developing an improved command and control capability that would allow them to coordinate operations between regular and guerrilla forces, as well as between headquarters (including between Hanoi and COSVN) and widely separated operational areas. The allies were caught off guard not because they did not anticipate the usual attacks in and around Tet, but probably because they were distracted or maybe even deceived by what was happening at Khe Sanh and elsewhere during this period. At the time the military believed that the communists were closing in on Khe Sanh as part of a broad strategy designed to seize and hold South Vietnam's northernmost provinces prior to negotiations.

In the intelligence available in the pre-Tet period, there were indications that the communists were preparing for a series of coordinated attacks on a larger scale than previously attempted and the intelligence even mentioned as possible targets many of the places actually attacked. The intelligence did not suggest that the attacks might concentrate on urban targets to the virtual exclusion of the rural areas, nor did the analysts predict the extent of the attacks which actually occurred or the communists' ability to attack simultaneously to the degree that they did. Moreover, Washington and Saigon had dismissed the possibility that the communists might make a go-for-broke general offensive, thus risking not only their regular troops and their best guerrilla forces but their political cadres, local militia, and underground

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administrative infrastructure as well. The judgment made in January 1968 was that the offensive would be more intensive but follow ˙traditional lines— attacks against military bases, airfields, command posts, outposts, pacified hamlets, and that most of the effort would be aimed at the northernmost provinces (again the trend which many thought was being set by the Khe Sanh siege). In the case of a situation like Vietnam where some policymakers and leaders have been deeply involved in it for some time, the task of intelligence in attempting to get them to recognize new courses becomes even more difficult.

One problem which contributed to underestimating the communists' capabilities was the controversy beginning in 1967 over the strength of the communist forces. CIA, DIA, and INR concluded that the communists had an insurgency base—regulars and militia—of about 600,000, a number which then suggested to the analysts that the war of attrition was not as successful as previously thought, and that the communists were able to recruit, something else which had become almost unthinkable. The US Embassy and military in Saigon, however, supported a figure of 300,000, the difference being that Saigon did not accept the development of a militia from which new cadre and regulars could be drawn. In addition, those in Saigon could not accept the fact that the communists were able to recruit. Despite efforts by the intelligence community, especially in Washington, to resolve the differences, the matter remained unresolved and thus contributed to a serious misreading of the situation on the ground.

The enormous amount of raw intelligence being received on Vietnam, much of it fragmentary, had a significant effect on the ability of the intelligence apparatus—in Washington and in Vietnam—to sort out, analyze, and respond in a timely fashion. In addition, the clutter of conflicting and confusing reports served to dull the warnings. Many senior officials in Washington and Saigon faced with the necessity of having to make prompt decisions often were unable to wait for processed intelligence and instead frequently relied on raw intelligence reports. Thus they were in a situation which exceeded their capability to absorb or scrutinize the high volume of material judiciously.

The final element which contributed to the policymakers' failure to give sufficient focus to the impending situation on the ground in Vietnam was Washington's preoccupation with the *Pueblo* crisis at the same time. The seizure by North Korea of the *Pueblo*, a US intelligence ship, a week before Tet immediately plunged most of the foreign affairs and defense establishment into a crisis which raised the spectre of war on the Korean peninsula and worries over the security of Japan. In addition, Washington was at the time also deeply concerned with growing tensions in the Middle East.

Case Study: The Iranian Situation, 1977-1979

The Iranian crisis culminated in the departure of the Shah, the coming to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the taking of the US hostages, the serious setback for US interests, and the further heightening of tension in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. My comments on this crisis and the role intelligence played in it generally will cover the period from late 1977 to the Shah's departure on 16 January 1979, and Khomeini's return to Iran on 1 February 1979.

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Case Studies

During preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran in 1975, the intelligence community concluded that the Shah's regime was inherently vulnerable because it was not only rigid but also highly fragile—there were no independent institutions to support it, no legitimate succession procedure to select viable survivors, and no mechanism to diffuse and reconcentrate power and authority as the pressures of various situations might require. The community in essence concluded that should the regime receive a shock or come under sustained pressure, it would probably collapse. But no one in the group that prepared the NIE, and members of the academic community who were consulted, could honestly claim later that he or she could have foreseen the events that would later transpire. The missing element was the breadth and depth of anti-Shah sentiment—the hidden apathy, ambivalence, and hatred.

Although no one could predict what ultimately happened, there was a warning failure. Violent demonstrations and hostilities erupted in 1977 and more so in 1978, placing the regime in jeopardy and with it the substantial US interest in Iran's stability. Still, the attention of top policymakers was not brought sufficiently to bear on Iran until October 1978. By then, the rapid pace of events and the degree of dissidence made orderly transition away from the Shah's rule nearly impossible and policy options which might have existed earlier no longer held promise.

In 1979 the House Subcommittee on Evaluation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that rather than being simply an intelligence failure, it was "a failure to which both the intelligence community and the users of intelligence contributed. The intelligence and policymaking communities must each carry part of the blame for insensitivity to deep-rooted problems in Iran. More importantly, intelligence and policy failings were intertwined."

The subcommittee made two basic findings. First, intelligence collection and analysis were judged to be weak. There was an inadequate information base with which to gauge the capability of the religious opposition and the breadth of popular opposition and to predict that certain events would come together to drive out the Shah and lead to a collapse of the government.

This conclusion is not entirely fair. The problem connected with the Iranian situation developed not because of inadequate intelligence. The US compiled a substantial amount of accurate information and analysis about major events, particularly the demonstrations and riots. In terms of the overall situation and its implications, however, there were a number of factors which inhibited analysis and more effective policy and decision making. These were:

- the difficulty in diagnosing the potential of religion combined with economic dislocation and corruption as a political weapon;

- the rapid development of revolutionary organizations in 1978 from rudimentary demonstrators in January and February to well-disciplined cadres by September, a development so rapid that it exceeded the capacity of analysts and users effectively to analyze the situation, and to propose and carry out timely action;

- the lack of a watershed event to wake everyone up and unify perceptions, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor or the photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba; and

— the policymakers' strong, personal beliefs concerning the staying power of the Shah.

The latter factor leads to the subcommittee's second basic finding that the policymakers' confidence in the Shah's ability to weather the storm in turn skewed intelligence. Long-standing US attitudes toward the Shah inhibited intelligence collection, dampened policymakers' appetites for analysis on the Shah's position, and deafened policymakers to the warning implicit in available current intelligence. Because of this attitude—this mindset—there were no incentives for analysts to challenge conventional wisdom. The nature of American policy vis-a-vis Iran influenced the formulation and evaluation of intelligence reporting and analysis. Analysts were not required to consider the possibility that religious and popular opposition might undermine the Shah's rule. Policymakers were not asking whether the Shah's autocracy would survive; policy was premised on that assumption.

In terms of the intelligence community's performance—a portion of which has been discussed above—there were a number of specific inadequacies.

Until mid to late 1977, embassy and intelligence community reporting on the Iranian political situation received low priority compared to reporting on other matters concerning Iran. Very few reports based on contacts with the religious opposition had appeared during the previous two years, and there was little reporting on the internal situation based on sources within the opposition during the first quarter of 1978.

As indicated above, one of the significant weaknesses was insufficient insight into the goals and expectations of opposition elements, and popular attitudes toward them. The subcommittee found that the critical weakness in intelligence collection on Iran was a lack of widespread contact with Iranians of various persuasions, leaders and followers alike. Such contact would have made possible more reliable assessments of the volatility of the situation, the degree of polarization, and relationships among groups and between individuals.

A senior official in the US Embassy at Tehran during this period contends that as the political pace quickened in 1977, the mission picked up hints that the dissidents were growing more powerful and began to cultivate the organizers. By September 1978, he indicates that Farsi-speaking officers knew personally at least one leader in each of the dissident groups except the communists. The one bare spot was that until March 1978 there were no direct encounters between embassy officers and religious leaders. This was an important reason why we failed to comprehend the organizational capability and the skills of the Shiite religious community, and the degree to which the religious leaders had infiltrated and co-opted elements of the military.

Current intelligence was most effective as a warning vehicle and in reporting on events that stood out clearly, but did not lend itself as well to assessments of the long-term significance of events and their implications for US policy and interests. The long-simmering problems in Iran, when examined over time and through hindsight, did show a clear pattern. But at the time the events were occurring the task of sorting out reliable data from the mass of information obscured the significance to analysts.

Case Studies

The last, and a serious intelligence community inadequacy, was the failure to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran. The process bogged down in differences over the product's focus and substance. As the year 1978 wore on, and events in Iran attracted consumers' attention and increased the need for short-term estimation, analysts regarded the NIE as a distraction from more pressing business and there was a tendency to avoid tackling the substantive differences. Ultimately, no NIE was produced.

The issue which divided the intelligence community was over the critical elements of the Shah's power—where it resided. CIA and DIA supported the view that his power rested with the military and security services; it was only necessary, therefore, to monitor the loyalty of the Shah's military and security services and ensure that he maintained his own self-confidence. INR assigned greater weight to popular support and to economic conditions which were exacerbating popular dissatisfaction. INR believed that in determining whether the Shah and his regime were in danger of losing control and power it was more important to ask more questions about the level of popular dissatisfaction and the trends that had been uniting intellectual dissidents and religious traditionalists.

In terms of the policymakers' view, the United States' historical connection with Iran, particularly its close ties with the Shah, weighed heavily. The Shah's power was generally seen as stable for the foreseeable future and assessments to the contrary tended to be played down or ignored. There was no formal policy review to assimilate new ideas and trends, let alone to change existing policy. The failure of the users lay in paying insufficient attention to intelligence analysis—though it was somewhat flawed—and in misjudging the personal power of the Shah.

In this crisis, as with Tet, the pace of events outran the ability of those involved to keep fully abreast of them. John Stemple, a foreign service officer who was directly involved in the Iranian crisis, pointed out in his book, *Inside the Iranian Revolution,* that "even the opposition, which maintained greater control over the pace than any other participants, found itself caught up and pushed along by the onrushing accidents of history—the Abadan fire, the Jaleh Square shootings, and the Tabriz riot." For Washington, the developing crisis came at a time when the President and the top policymakers were preoccupied with the SALT II negotiations, the normalization of relations with Beijing and, in the crucial time-frame of August to December 1978, the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks at Camp David.

Regrouping in the Aftermath

Official post-mortems of intelligence failure usually contain recommendations for reorganization and changes in operating norms. In the case of Tet, it was recommended that a study be made to determine whether the normal intelligence process could be improved in order to ensure the timely and accurate collection and preparation of intelligence during critical situations. If the normal process could not be improved, then institutional changes should be made. In the case of Iran, recommendations were made for a more centralized effort to watch international situations as they developed over time in order to put the intelligence community in a better position to predict what might happen.

While some bureaucratic and procedural fixes will help, the belief that reorganizations and so forth will ensure—or at least lessen the chance of surprises—that there will be no more Tets or Irans is illusory. Richard Betts in his article, "Analysis, War, and Decision," accurately makes the case: "Intelligence can be improved marginally, but not radically, by altering the analytic system. The illusion is also dangerous if it abets overconfidence that systemic reforms will increase the predictability of threats. The use of intelligence depends less on the bureaucracy than on the intellects and inclinations of the authorities above it." In the same article Betts also points out that:

> "Organizational solutions to intelligence failure are hampered by three basic problems: most procedural reforms that address specific pathologies introduce or accent other pathologies; changes in analytic processes can never fully transcend the constraints of ambiguity and ambivalence; and more rationalized information systems cannot fully compensate for the predispositions, perceptual idiosyncrasies, and time constraints of political consumers. Solutions that address the psychology and analytic style of decision makers are limited by the difficulty of changing human thought processes and day-to-day habits of judgment by normative injunction."

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How well do we do?

THE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE *

Helene L. Boatner

Facing the press after the Bay of Pigs disaster, President John F. Kennedy quoted an old saying: "Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan." [1] A colleague at CIA has adapted this bit of wisdom to the business of intelligence analysis as "Failure has many fathers; success is an orphan." Our failures attract a great deal of attention, while our successes usually go unheralded—and sometimes unrecognized even by ourselves. Our greatest successes occur when nothing happens.

In evaluating the contribution of intelligence to US foreign policy, there are two major issues:

— How successful are we (which depends on how you define our role in the policy process)?

— How successful can we reasonably expect to be (which varies greatly by topic)?

Intelligence and Policy

The role of intelligence in the policy process is a longstanding topic of debate—among intelligence analysts, among policy officials and between the two groups.[2] The issue was a favorite topic of Sherman Kent, who headed the Office of National Estimates from 1952 through 1967.

For analysts, the fundamental question is how intrusive a role intelligence should play.

— Those who are purists on the question of separating intelligence from policy would prefer to deliver authoritative judgments—buttressed by facts, when available—and watch the policymakers accept those judgments and act accordingly.

— At the other extreme are analysts who argue for intimate involvement at all stages during the formulation and execution of foreign and defense policy.

Consumers, for their part, have varying views of what intelligence should do for them.

— Some believe intelligence units exist to deliver facts in response to their questions and that policymakers should make the analytic judgments, as well as the policy decisions that follow.

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* This article is adapted from a paper prepared for the twenty-fifth annual convention of the International Studies Association, March 1984, Atlanta, Georgia.

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— Other policymakers value analysis, forecasting, and speculation in principle, and want the intelligence community to take the initiative in raising issues. But even they often resent such offerings if they happen to run contrary to existing policy or to the policy preferences of the individual.

The two groups have somewhat different perspectives on the relative importance of the situation abroad to the policy decisions being made.

— Intelligence analysts typically see foreign developments within their purview as the central issue for policymakers—they expect the policymakers to do what is "right" on their accounts. They like to believe that the intelligence input to decisions is of prime importance. And they take pride in seeing the world "as it is."

— Policymakers are usually juggling a variety of foreign and domestic considerations within the confines of a particular view of how the world should operate—a policy perspective.

— Normally, moreover, policymakers see a shapeable world, while intelligence analysts see a less tractable world.

Early debates on this subject emphasized the dangers of close interaction between the two groups. Kent, for example, was something of a purist, believing that too much contact with the policy community could undermine the objectivity of our work. My own view of our role, after listening to a decade of criticism of our work as not relevant enough to the real concerns of policymakers, lies more toward the activist end of the spectrum and strongly in favor of analysis and estimating. I would define our job as contributing to formulation and execution of policies that have a good chance of succeeding.

— In my opinion, we cannot contribute effectively unless we are involved in the process.

— Assembling facts and making them intelligible is a vital function, but the judgments we draw are the essence of our business—and by far the hardest part of the job.

— To maintain the independence of our judgments, however, our involvement must stop short of policy advocacy.

— Drawing that line is not easy. The lure of actually making policy is ever-present and seductive. A former chief of Israeli Military Intelligence summed it up eloquently: an intelligence chief who gets too close to the policy process "is then unable to detach himself from the festivities of policymaking just like the other self-gratified members of the court who bask in their connections with power." *

The basic argument for involvement is that intelligence officers need to know what is going on in the US Government in order to contribute in a timely and effective manner. And policy officials are prone to keep their initiatives, and the options under consideration, secret from anyone who is not involved in the deliberations. Ray Cline has made no secret of the fact that he resigned as head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

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* See "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle" following this article.

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Research because Henry Kissinger would not share information that was essential to effective intelligence support, and Cline cites such secrecy as a major cause of intelligence failure.[4] There is no element more important to good intelligence support for the policy process than a clear set of priorities established, and continually revised, at the policy level—a point made in the final report of the Church Committee and nearly every other study done on the subject.[5] Only by sitting in on the policy deliberations can we detect the shifting needs for intelligence support in a timely fashion.

Reasonable Expectations

Intelligence analysts can be certain of two things beyond death and taxes:

— They will make errors. (Even if they never go beyond reporting facts, some of those "facts" will be wrong.)

— Their message will usually be unwelcome, since they usually will be pointing out problems and drawing attention to obstacles facing the policymaker.

Not surprisingly, therefore, intelligence analysis is a profession that appeals to the brave, the dour, and the aspiring martyr.

In judging the quality of analysis, a number of factors have to be considered. Accuracy (on both facts and judgments) is one key ingredient. Timeliness is another—if the analysis does not arrive before the critical US decisions are made, it serves no useful purpose. Effective delivery—a clear message forced to the attention of the people who need it—is another essential. Finally, objectivity is the characteristic that separates intelligence analysis from advocacy or from catering to the policy preferences of our customers. Of these, accuracy and objectivity are the two that come in for the greatest amount of discussion.

How right or how wrong we can expect to be varies a lot by topic.

— Some distinctions are obvious, like our differing access to facts in open versus closed societies.

— Concealment and deception are potential hazards on many subjects.

— But the accuracy of our assessments also depends on whether relationships between the facts we have and the ones we lack are fixed (physics), generally predictable within some range (economics), or highly irregular (politics). The more human decisions affect the relations between the known and unknown facts, the harder it is for an analyst to assess the present, to say nothing of predicting the future.

— Moreover, the future is always to some degree governed by the intentions of human beings; intentions are always hard to glean and subject to change.

— The problem is compounded if you are dealing with advanced technologies. The object of your analysis is not merely a machine or weapon but also a scientist, or group of them, who may have made a

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major technological breakthrough or a major technological mistake. In either case the decisions to apply the technological developments to actual weapons development will be made by human beings balancing a wide range of political, economic, and military considerations.

To make matters more challenging, it is the discontinuities we are trying to predict. Henry Kissinger once commented that "all intelligence services congenitally overestimate the rationality of the decisionmaking process they are analyzing," and he is certainly correct.[5] Some of our most famous "failures" have involved this factor. But any analyst who begins with the presumption that all decisionmaking processes are irrational and likely to produce irrational results is left with nothing to analyze. This approach is about as helpful as an admonition to believe only reliable intelligence, about which Clausewitz commented: "What is the use of such feeble maxims? They belong to that wisdom which for want of anything better scribblers of systems and compendia resort to when they run out of ideas."[6] The trick is to remind ourselves constantly that irrationality is possible and accidents happen. We also have to remind our readers that non-Western thought processes can lead to decisions that might appear illogical or irrational to us but are entirely sensible in another cultural context.

In very general terms—and subject to many exceptions—I would characterize the spectrum of difficulty in intelligence analysis as follows:

The easiest task is to report on implementation of a decision already made that involves a wealth of straightforward evidence:

— an army on the move,

— policies and actions of organized groups in an open society,

— construction, production, or delivery of physical objects (ships, grain, oil, tanks).

For problems of this sort, the most important job of an analyst is what we practitioners call collection tasking—figuring out what you need to know to follow the problem and how that information can be obtained.

Unfortunately, dealing with the "easy" questions is seldom enough. More often, the important questions we face deal with decisions not made or evidence that is not clear. We are asked to assess the reactions of various countries to alternative US policy moves, to predict the outcomes of wars on the basis of imperfect knowledge of opposing armies, and to make economic forecasts without access to vital economic data. Generally speaking—and my own background as a political analyst no doubt influences my thinking—I would say that military analysis is somewhat "easier" than economic analysis and economic somewhat "easier" than political analysis—in the sense of the probability of being "right"—but not in the sense of the need for rigor, experience, and training.

In sum, we are not soothsayers. We cannot predict the future with confidence. But we can reduce the range of uncertainty facing the policymaker, promote more thorough and enlightened debate within the policy

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community, examine the probable consequences of policy alternatives, and alert our customers to possible disrupting events and potential areas for progress toward US objectives. If we do these things effectively, we have succeeded, in my view.

Consumer Reaction

Consumer reaction to our various products varies considerably, but all our attempts to survey consumers show consistent results.

— Receptivity to what we call basic intelligence ("give me the facts") is uniformly high. People throughout the government appreciate access to a storehouse of biographic material, maps, directories of foreign government officials, data on weapons, economic statistics, population figures, insider reports on cabinet meetings or terrorist plans, and a variety of other data. In short, customers value transfer of knowledge from us to them.

— Reactions to our regular current intelligence products are more mixed—from comments that they are uniformly good to charges that they are superficial. (In large measure I think the variation relates as much to what the particular customer expects as to what we deliver.)

— We get consistently high marks for our responsiveness to requests for products tailored to the specific needs of policymakers engaged in crisis management, because sensible decisions cannot be made in fast-breaking situations without up-to-date information. (If you were reading your daily newspapers after the tragic shootdown of a Korean airliner last year, you got a good example of the amount of detail we can pull together in a hurry when the situation demands it.)

The greatest criticism of US intelligence analysis has always focused on "estimates"—a form of the art that refers to longer range predictions and usually carries a connotation of intelligence community participation. Many customers feel that they can project the future as well as we, if they have the same facts. And they are particularly prone to be critical if they do not like the conclusions we reach. Dick Betts, for example, has cited Lyndon Johnson's view that negative CIA assessments on Vietnam were undermining the policy process, not contributing to it.[8] Perversely, policymakers have also been known to dismiss our estimative work as unnecessary if it happens to support existing policies, although President Johnson was delighted with our gloomy findings on the Soviet economy in the early 1960s and President Carter was similarly pleased with our estimates of the world oil outlook.[9]

Certain peculiarities of the human thought process also increase the level of criticism on estimates. Numerous experiments demonstrate that knowing the outcome of any situation inevitably leads ex-post-facto judges to perceive that outcome as much more likely—hence more predictable—than it was. And as Roberta Wohlstetter has argued in her brilliant post-mortem on Pearl Harbor, hindsight also makes it much easier to separate "signals" from "noise."[10]

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Strengths and Weaknesses

For someone who is on the inside of the intelligence establishment to try to assess the quality of our work in a public forum presents certain practical difficulties. For one thing, my objectivity is suspect. Moreover, most in-depth examinations of the product in the past have taken the form of "post-mortems"—which is to say, examinations of situations in which intelligence failed, at least in part, to warn of impending trouble or to accurately predict events. A number of our internal evaluation efforts of this sort have gotten into the public domain, notably via the Pike Committee. As a result, our failures are fairly well documented on the public record, while our successes are not. But even some of the failures involved elements of success. Success is, in any event, difficult to judge.

For example, we clearly did not predict that the Soviets would introduce missiles into Cuba in 1962. But did the fundamental error of judgment lie with US intelligence or with the Soviets? Our judgment was based on a careful assessment, reached after serious consideration, that the Soviets were not prepared for the major confrontation with the US that such a move would entail. And our reason for our judgment turned out to be correct—they were not prepared for confrontation and when it came they reversed themselves. So we were fundamentally right about the USSR's strategic position, although we erred in assuming that the Soviets would correctly assess the strength of US reaction to such a move. Moreover, intelligence performance during the missile crisis was superb—reporting and analysis provided all the information needed to force Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles.[11]

Then there is the problem of self-defeating prophecy. If we judge that one country is planning an action that is undesirable from the US perspective, and if the US undertakes a private demarche, and if the action does not occur, have we succeeded or not? Did US representations to New Delhi and Moscow during the India-Pakistan war of 1971 dissuade the Indians from their reported plans to try to destroy the Pakistani army in West Pakistan? Or were there no such plans, as the Indians claimed, and many US officials believed?[12]

Yet another problem is action and reaction. Much has been written on the accuracy of our estimates of Soviet strategic weapons deployments over time. And there is no doubt that we have made mistakes, as well as a number of "right" estimates, in this area. But the political impact of intelligence judgments may well have had a major impact on weapons trends. Here the argument is that the "missile gap" controversy of the late 1950s led to a major US defense buildup. The Soviets, in response, accelerated and expanded programs already underway (and tried to put missiles in Cuba). The buildup on their part led in turn to perceptions in Europe and the US that the West faced an increasing threat and to a buildup by the US that is now in its early stages.[13]

There is also the difficulty of how human beings use evidence. Psychological research indicates that readers typically underestimate how much they learn from new facts or new analyses—and hence give less credit than they should to the contributions of intelligence to their own knowledge or thought

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processes.[14] This, too, is illustrated by Henry Kissinger's belief that it was he who made the analytic leap in 1970 from soccer fields near a naval facility in Cuba to an increased Soviet naval presence there; he has no doubt completely forgotten that he heard it first from the intelligence analysts. And he also does not seem to realize that it turned out to be an analytic error; we learned later that soccer had become quite popular in Cuba by 1970 and was not a good indicator of Soviet presence.[15]

That said, let me offer my own opinion of our historical track record and the present state of affairs with regard to quality of analysis. There is no gainsaying that we have made some major errors—the Middle East war of 1973 and the overthrow of the Shah are two of the most notable. However, most of the attention to our work on the 1973 war has centered on our negative assessments immediately before the war broke out; far less mention has been made of very good work a few months earlier, both in an interagency paper and in the Department of State, pointing to the possibility of war by fall and outlining in some detail the events that might bring about such a result. At that juncture, we clearly understood that Sadat might initiate a war for political reasons, knowing that he would not win militarily. By the time the war began, our analytic perspective had shifted, and we discounted war because we were confident that the Arabs could not win and that they knew it. The real question, therefore, is why we lost sight of the right answer, not why we never found it.[16]

On Iran, the public report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence dealing with intelligence performance faults the users of intelligence equally with the producers—for their lack of receptivity to the negative information they did receive, as well as their failure to question their own confidence in the Shah.[17] Kissinger argues that Iran was not primarily an intelligence failure but rather a conceptual failure in understanding the impact of rapid economic development.[18] For my own part, I believe that our misestimates of how the Iranian situation would evolve lay less with our lack of understanding of the social forces at work—although we certainly did not do well on that score—than with our belief that the Shah had accurate information about his own country and would act effectively to handle the situation.

We have also made some relatively inconsequential mistakes that have been blown all out of proportion for political reasons. For example, we discovered a Soviet brigade in Cuba in the fall of 1979 that had probably been there undetected for years. Substantively, this mattered little. But the political climate of the time was highly charged and the matter of the brigade got linked to the very contentious issue of SALT ratification. Consequently it was the subject of glaring headlines and heated exchanges—in the US and between the US and the USSR.[19]

The public focus on such errors has left an erroneous impression that intelligence seldom spots impending developments before they are obvious to all. As I said at the beginning, our greatest successes leave few ripples, and most are not a matter of public record. But some are. For example, we correctly alerted policymakers to the impending Sino-Soviet split at a time

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when conventional wisdom held that the USSR and China were still firm allies. We alerted President Eisenhower and the National Security Council to the possibility of a Soviet earth satellite several months before the first Sputnik was launched, and we have been highly successful in predicting the advent of major new Soviet strategic systems well before they have become operational. We were very accurate in predicting the timing of the first Chinese nuclear explosion. We did a remarkable job on the Arab-Israeli war of 1967— predicting it, predicting who would win, and predicting how long it would last. And this was done in the face of great skepticism at the senior policy level. Thomas Powers cites this performance as the single most important factor accounting for the high regard in which Richard Helms was held by the Johnson Administration. We were right—much to the displeasure of many in the policy community—in judging in 1969 that the Soviet SS-9 missile would not have a MIRV capability. We made some mistakes on certain tactical or specific questions concerning Vietnam—notably with regard to the Tet offensive of 1968 and the role of Sihanoukville as a transshipment point. But the overall record of intelligence assessments on Vietnam from 1954 on is very good, and especially so considering the political pressures involved.[20]

More recently, our work on Soviet oil production, while initially flawed by inadequate consideration of the ability of the USSR to finance oil imports at the level we suggested, destroyed the then prevalent assumptions about Soviet oil production capabilities (and incidentally probably caused the Soviets to increase their resource commitments to energy production). Our examination of alternative withdrawal lines was vital to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai. We began discussing the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan months before it happened, and we were right about Soviet reluctance to invade Poland. Recent reports of the two congressional oversight committees have given us good marks on predicting the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, on forecasting the world oil market, on alerting the Carter administration to the possibility of a mass emigration from Cuba, on Central America (with particular kudos for our work on Nicaragua in the period before and after Somoza was overthrown and our work on the Salvadoran guerillas), and on Soviet involvement in international terrorism.[21]

Indeed, in the long run, I believe that much of the criticism of intelligence analysis in recent years, sparked in large measure by public release of some of our own post-mortems, has had efficacious results. The fact that the analytic elements of the intelligence community were understaffed and underfunded emerged clearly, and you may have noted that we are actively recruiting for personnel these days. Less noticeably, we have the funds necessary to finance foreign travel, support conferences, let contracts, and underwrite training—all essential to improving our capabilities. One major benefit that stems from these more generous budget allocations is increased interaction with the private sector, which helps to counteract a tendency to insularity. And we have examined our own ways of doing business and made some changes.

From my perspective, there are several key areas where I think we can still do better. We don't put as much emphasis as I think we should on the

Evaluation

responsibility of analysts for guiding intelligence collection assets in an active way. We have been habituated to making our best estimate of how a particular situation will evolve; we need to move further than we have toward examining less likely outcomes if they have significant implications. Examination of alternative outcomes has to leave room for the possibility that one or another actor will have motives we do not fully understand or a view of the "facts" we do not share. We still tend to seek consensus when "point-counterpoint" might be more effective and helpful for our consumers. We are presently well attuned to the policy process at the highest levels of government, but we need to do better at forging links with policymakers at lower levels, so we can find out what kinds of research and analysis can make the greatest contribution to the process. We need to do better at ensuring that our products reach the people who need them. And we need to encourage more movement of people into the intelligence business at middle and senior levels and more movement back and forth between the analytic, policy, academic, scientific, and business communities.

We have our strengths as well. Critics notwithstanding, we have excellent personnel. We work in a "can do" environment—intelligence analysts as a group are willing to put out the effort to produce what is needed, when it is needed, using the information available to them. They accept midnight phone calls, canceled vacation plans, and wasted theater tickets as part of the job. And we have been given a clean bill of health on the politicization issue by a long string of investigators, including our oversight committees.[22] We have access to a massive amount of information that really does provide unique insights into foreign capabilites and foreign intentions. In the studies I and my group have done, we have consistently found more to praise than to criticize.

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Production

E. Presentation

There are four broad categories of finished intelligence presented to the consumer by the agencies listed in Section III of this guide:

1. *Current intelligence* essentially follows day-to-day events, seeking to apprise the consumer of new developments, to deepen his understanding of their background, to appraise their significance, to warn of their near-term consequences, and to alert him to potentially dangerous situations in the near future. Current intelligence answers such questions as: What are present Turkish attitudes toward Cyprus? Is tomorrow's mobilization in southern Peru an exercise or a prelude to war with Chile? What is the meaning of today's statement from the Iranian Oil Minister? Current intelligence is presented in daily, weekly, and some monthly publications, and frequently in ad hoc oral briefings to senior officials.

2. *Estimative intelligence*, often but by no means always enshrined in *National Intelligence Estimates* (NIEs), projects forward; it deals with the unknown (but knowable) and with the unknowable: What are the present Soviet capabilities for war against China? What is the likely outcome of an Arab-Israeli war in 1985? Estimates may be briefed orally, but the normal form of presentation is in a document which can be cited as authoritative and which can be more or less formally subscribed to or dissented from. NIEs and their "special" counterparts, SNIEs, as well as estimative Interagency Memoranda, are produced under the aegis of the *National Intelligence Officers*. NIEs and SNIEs are reviewed and approved by the *National Foreign Intelligence Board* (see Section I.A. above).

3. *Warning intelligence* relates to warning of hostile attack against the US or its allies, or to some other imminent major development strongly inimical to US interests. As used in the Intelligence Community, a warning notice or paper is assumed to carry such impact that it will lead the consumer to consider taking some kind of action immediately when he receives it. A warning notice also implies that the Intelligence Community itself has already placed its assets on some degree of alert to gather and analyze additional information about the development.

4. *Intelligence research* is presented in monographs and cooperative studies from virtually all agencies. Research underpins both current and estimative intelligence, grappling with such questions as: What are

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the characteristics of the Soviet SS-X-20 missile system? Where are the Arabs investing their oil profits? What is the political "base" of the new Soviet Defense Minister? A vast amount of technical research on foreign military matters is done within the Department of Defense to assist in developing its own programs and in support of the services and commands; this material seldom enters the general stream of national intelligence production on its own. Much of the research done by and for the *Bureau of Intelligence and Research* of the Department of State is for the direct support of the policy bureaus or for the Secretary himself, but it also circulates in the Intelligence Community.

Basic intelligence, a subcategory of research, consists primarily of the structured compilation of geographic, demographic, social, and political data on foreign countries. This material is presented to the consumer in the form of maps, atlases, handbooks, and even on occasion sand-table models of terrain. The *Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research* in CIA is a major resource for basic material of this kind.

From a speech given at Brown
University on 15 October 1981,
by William J. Casey

ON THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS

The highest duty of a Director of Central Intelligence is to produce
solid and perceptive national intelligence estimates relevant to the issues
with which the President and the National Security Council need to concern
themselves.

Over the years and particularly during the last decade a lot of
criticism has been levied at our national intelligence estimates.

Much of the criticism is based on unrealistic expectations of what an
intelligence service can do. The CIA does not have powers of prophecy.
It has no crystal ball that can peer into the future with 20-20 sight. We
are dealing with "probable" developments.

If we can't expect infallible prophecy from the nation's investment in intelligence, what can we expect? We can expect foresight. We can expect a careful definition of possibilities. We can expect professional analysis which probes and weighs probabilities and assesses their implications. We can expect analyses that assist the policymakers in devising ways to prepare for and cope with the full range of probabilities. The President does not need a single best view, a guru, or a prophet. The nation needs the best analysis and the full range of views it can get.

The process of analysis and arriving at estimates needs to be made as open and competitive as possible. We need to resist the bureaucratic urge for consensus.

We don't need analysts spending their time finding a middle ground or weasel words to conceal disagreement. Their time needs to go into evaluating information -- searching for the meaning and the implications of events and trends -- and expressing both their conclusions and their disagreements clearly. The search to unify the intelligence community around a single homogenized estimate serves policymakers badly. It buries valid differences,

forcing the intelligence product to the lowest or blandest common denominator. The search for consensus also cultivates the myth of infallibility. It implicitly promises a reliability that cannot be delivered. Too frequently, it deprives the intelligence product of relevance and the policymaker of the range of possibilities for which prudence requires that he prepare.

Above all, the policymaker needs to be protected from the conventional wisdom. Let me give you some horrible examples.

Before there was a CIA, Senator Brian McMahon and Lewis Strauss, then a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, performed one of the most important intelligence missions in the history of our nation. Together, they insisted that we had to develop a program to monitor and detect all large explosions that occurred at any place on the earth. We had to have that intelligence.

The first chance to perfect such a system was offered by tests which we were planning to conduct in the vicinity of Eniwetok in the spring of 1948. A detection system was devised by the end of 1948 but the Air Force found itself short of funds to procure instrumentation for the monitoring program and that about a million dollars would be required to complete it. Contracts had to be let at once if the instruments were to be ready in time. Lewis Strauss, a great patriot and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, volunteered to obligate himself for the million so that the contracts could be made firm immediately. This effort was launched in the nick of time and in September it established that an atomic explosion had occurred somewhere on the Asiatic mainland and at some date between August 26 and 29, 1949.

Had there been no monitoring system in operation in 1949, Russian success in that summer would have been unknown to us. In consequence, we would have

made no attempt to develop a thermonuclear weapon. It was our positive intelligence that the Russians had exploded an atomic bomb which generated the recommendation to develop the qualitatively superior hydrogen weapon -- thus to maintain our military superiority.

On January 30, 1950, President Truman made the decision to build the bomb. We were able to test our first hydrogen bomb in November, 1952. The Russians tested their first weapon involving a thermonuclear reaction the following August.

Had we relied on the conventional wisdom about Soviet nuclear capability, the Russian success in developing thermonuclear weapon capability in 1953 would have found the United States hopelessly outdistanced and the Soviet military would have been in possession of weapons vastly more powerful and devastating than any we had.

Early in 1962, John McCone, newly arrived as Director of Central Intelligence, saw reports coming in about the arrival of anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba. What are they there to protect, he wondered. There are no targets there now, he concluded, so they must intend to bring something there which will need to be attacked and hence will need to be defended. Thus, he was many months ahead of anyone in Washington in predicting the possibility that Moscow might base offensive missiles in Cuba. When Cuban refugees brought reports that large missiles were being brought in and installed, McCone considered this confirmation of his tentative forecast, while everyone else in Washington dismissed them on the basis that the Soviets would never do anything so foolish, until the U-2 pictures could not be denied.

To protect against the conventional wisdom, CIA, military intelligence, and every other element of the intelligence community should not only be allowed to compete and surface differences, but be encouraged to do so. The time has come to recognize that policymakers can easily sort through a wide range of opinions. But, they cannot consider views and opinions they do not receive.

The time has also come to recognize that the intelligence community has no monopoly on truth, on insight, and on initiative in foreseeing what will be relevant to policy. For that reason, we are in the process of reconstituting a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. It will be made up of strong and experienced individuals with a wide range of relevant backgrounds.

To get all the intelligence we need, we've got to go beyond the formal intelligence organizations. We've got to tap all the scholarly resources of the nation and the perspectives and insights you develop from your activities around the world. We're geared to do that in open and direct contact with the campuses, the think tanks and the business organizations around the country.

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FINISHED INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATES

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) can be considered the culmination of the intelligence process. Its purpose is to provide a synthesis of the Intelligence Community's knowledge and wisdom, telling policy levels what is known and what it means. Sherman Kent described his understanding of the Estimate in the one section in his book, under the section headed "Probable Courses of Action: Estimates."[33] Obviously, if reliable predictions can be made about what another nation will do, they are invaluable to those responsible for the conduct of national foreign policy.

Given the uncertainties of intelligence, one can entertain some reservation about Kent's description of the estimative product pointing out "probable courses of action." One would prefer a description of the conclusions as "most likely courses of action." Such a description has something to do with the state of mind in which estimators approach the analytical task, and with what policy-level consumers may feel entitled to expect in the reports they receive.

The hazards of estimating future events have been stressed in the preceding pages. Even if there is a report of a foreign leader's declared intention to do a certain thing, problems encountered in implementing

the action may modify what actually is done, not to mention the influence that colleagues may have on that judgment. Moreover, an opponent's foreign policy may change in reaction to the United States' own response to some initiative or act of preparation.

The American word *estimate* has acquired the connotation of prediction, and some of those engaged in the work have come to believe that prediction is what they unerringly can do. The temptation to speak out clearly and to avoid "weasel words" sometimes causes one to make categorical statements. When this tendency replaces the careful distinctions of precise writing, it can prove embarrassing. The British, who tend to be more conservative and precise in their use of the English language, use the word *appreciation* to describe their review and appraisal of a situation, and what it may mean for the future.

Sherman Kent was called to Washington to put his principles into practice, and for about a quarter of a century presided over the center of the Intelligence Community's estimative function, giving it form, life, and purpose. His CIA Office of National Estimates (ONE) was unique, with a senior Board of National Estimates composed of officers from private life and other government agencies, supported by a staff of experts who labored with the substantive problems. In 1973 the Office of National Estimates was disbanded in favor of a new approach to the work.

The strength of the ONE arrangement was, initially, its function as a central mechanism for producing national estimates. Specialists on the office's staff worked on their areas of special interest. The board members, responsible for bringing to bear senior experience and knowledge of attitudes and developments outside the relatively cloistered life of ONE, had a direct influence on research. In addition, members of the board usually chaired meetings within the Intelligence Community on the various NIEs being processed. The ONE system provided direct and substantive support, centrally, with access to the agencies in the Intelligence Community. Among the perceived problems of the office was the tendency for personnel to stay on instead of rotating to other assignments after a period, as had originally been the practice. This tendency was seen as developing an in-grown quality that placed staff members at ONE increasingly out of touch with the activities and interests of others in the Intelligence Community. A system of rotational assignments might have prevented this problem. Some critics felt that members of the staff also developed attitudinal biases on certain issues in which objectivity was essential.[34]

Dissolving the Office of National Estimates seemed a drastic way of handling the perceived problems, especially as the new arrangement experienced some basic problems in the beginning. In place of a formally

organized office, the new approach consisted of a group of senior officers attached to the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. They were titled National Intelligence Officers (NIOs)" and were known collectively as the National Intelligence Council." Each NIO was assigned an area in which he or she had special expertise. Six NIOs were responsible for specific geographic areas: Africa, China-East Asia, Latin America, Near East and South Asia, USSR-Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Four NIOs had general assignments (not described in a chart published in late 1980) and three had special responsibilities: Strategic Programs, General Purpose Forces and Warning. Presumably the categories of responsibility were subject to some variation to meet changing requirements.

In the earlier days of the system, its weaknesses were felt to be a result of both the loss of direct control over staff-level support on substantive matters and the reduction of institutional access to community resources (which, in turn, resulted from the loss of formal organization behind the NIO). As the NIOs came from different agencies, they were able to solve the problems incurred by loss of familiarity with the Intelligence Community, which were thought to have become a collective weakness of ONE. ONE had gathered a staff of superior writers over the years, and when the office was dissolved that reservoir of talent was lost. As a result, some of the papers produced by the new system were criticized as being too ponderous (however well documented they might have been as research papers) for busy policy-level consumers to read and digest. It was felt that the personal access the NIOs had to members of the Intelligence Community counterbalanced this problem as the new system developed.

With the passage of time, in the way of all administrative organizations, a line of command developed within the National Intelligence Council—including a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, who had clear roles in organizing the work, and formalized procedures for coordinating within the Intelligence Community. The terms of reference for proposed NIEs are developed by this council, contributions to be used in preparing draft NIEs are submitted by members in the Community, and one person is designated to prepare a working draft for review at a coordination meeting of representatives from members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. An agreed draft—when agreement exists—is prepared for submission to the NFIB. Where there is disagreement, the points of variance are set out clearly, thus highlighting the issues for policy levels.

But the overall objective remains unchanged, whatever the machinery. This objective is the production of a clear summary of the subject, consideration of its significance, and formulation of alternative future developments. Sometimes the summary can provide a reliable forecast; even in times of uncertainty, it still can highlight the issues. In some cases it describes how foreign governments may react to various courses of action from which U.S. policymakers must choose. This latter function comes close to the making of policy, which must be handled carefully in order to preserve the objectivity of the analytical effort.

From "The Estimative Process",
3 March 1987, prepared by
the National Intelligence
Council, CIA

THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS

Interagency intelligence production of the country's National Intelligence Estimates is centered in the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC serves the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in his role as head of the US Intelligence Community not as Director of the CIA. The NIC is comprised of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and 16 National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), their staffs, and a supporting Analytic Group. Each NIO acts as the DCI's senior substantive officer in the Intelligence Community, for either a geographic region of the world, a transnational issue, or a specialized functional issue. There are six regional NIOs plus ten NIOs for functional or transnational issues such as Soviet strategic programs and science and technology. They serve as special advisors to the DCI, and his representatives to the Community. They are responsible for the development of all interagency intelligence estimates in their area. They oversee the objectivity and integrity of the process that produces these estimates.

Although the NIC is located at CIA Headquarters, its officers are drawn from throughout the Intelligence Community (DIA, CIA, NSA, State, the military services, etc.) as well as academia, outside think tanks, and the business world. The Chairman of the NIC (C/NIC) is at present an Air Force general officer. The role of the NIC, in particular its NIOs, is to work with the Intelligence Community to produce quality, timely estimates relevant to key questions affecting national security; these estimates look ahead several months to several years and attempt to predict developments of key importance to the United States.

The NIC, in conjunction with the Intelligence Community, produces five types of coordinated Intelligence Communty papers:

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). NIEs deal with issues of fundamental importance; they are fully coordinated within the Intelligence Community and issued by the DCI upon the recommendation of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). SNIEs can have the same characteristics as NIEs, but they are more urgent and accomplished in a shorter period of time. They are usually specially requested by a policymaker and produced in a matter of weeks or days.

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM). IIMs deal with more detailed and focused topics than NIEs and SNIEs. They are produced by working level representatives of NFIB agencies and generally do not require formal NFIB review. They are normally approved by C/NIC.

Interagency Intelligence Assessments (IIA). IIAs are short estimates produced very quickly when a more formal paper is inappropriate, possibly involving less than all the NFIB agencies. They are approved for publication by C/NIC.

1

Memorandum·to Holders (M/H). M/Hs to any of the products above are updates where extensive reconsideration is not required. M/Hs are managed by the same procedures as their parent papers.

In order to be useful to policymakers, estimates must deal with the topics that are relevant and timely, and must reach the right officials before key decisions on the particular issue are made. Estimative topics are generated in several ways. A policymaker or the DCI may ask the Intelligence Community to take a thorough look at an issue; or the C/NIC or an NIO--trying to anticipate policymakers' needs--may initiate an estimate.

Following the identification of the estimates to be produced, the key stages in the estimative process are:

Concept Paper/Terms of Reference (CP/TOR). The CP indicates the estimate's origin and purpose and asks key questions to be answered; the TORs outline in greater detail the central or pivotal issues to be addressed in the estimate. The CP/TOR are reviewed by the Community; representatives of National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) agencies meet to discuss and amend them, and they are then approved by the DCI.

Writing of Estimates. The NIO supervising the draft selects a drafter from the NIC, or from the analytic offices of the CIA or one of the other agencies of the Intelligence Community. When the draft is completed, it is reviewed by the NIO and the NIC's front office, and by the DCI's Senior Review Panel (SRP)--whose members include former ambassadors, general officers, and academicians. When possible, estimates are also reviewed by specialists outside the Community to provide fresh perspectives. Estimates accommodating these comments as appropriate are sent to the DCI with a recommendation that they be sent out to NFIB agencies for formal coordination.

Coordination. Formal coordination meetings with representatives from the Intelligence Community are held, in which any differences are either resolved or highlighted, with emphasis on the latter when they are significant. Such dissenting views are clearly stated in the estimates as alternative language or footnotes.

NFIB Approval. Once an estimate has been so coordinated, the DCI reviews the paper. If he is satisfied with the quality of the product, he submits it to NFIB principals for final coordination. NFIB, comprised of the heads of the government's intelligence agencies, reviews the estimate, sometimes challenges its judgments and adds additional alternative language or footnotes, and recommends that the DCI approve or remand it.

Feedback. Once an estimate is approved and published, feedback is sought from the policymakers concerning the relevance of the analysis. Further retrospective analysis is done as the topic is being prepared for treatment again to determine how the Community's views may have changed and why.

2

The National Intelligence Daily

The Intelligence Community's primary vehicle for disseminating current intelligence is the National Intelligence Daily. The NID is published every morning except Sundays and holidays; it distills into 15 pages or so the Community's information on and judgments about international political, economic, military, and technological developments relevant to US policy interests. The NID is the closest thing the government has to an insider's New York Times, and for a while it was even produced in a tabloid newspaper format.

The Daily's designation as a "national" publication means that it conveys the collective views of the Intelligence Community. The great majority of items published in the NID are prepared by analysts at CIA. But each item is reviewed in draft by, at least, the intelligence component of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Their formal concurrence is indicated on the last line of each item. The Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Energy also weigh in on subjects of particular interest to them.

Most NID items, unless they are essentially analytic in content, are formally divided into "fact" and "comment" sections. The reader is presented first with the bare specifics of a story uncolored by analytic interpretation. Analysts as well as readers can and do differ about the meaning of a set of "facts." The NID accommodates interagency differences of this sort by appending a dissenting paragraph -- with attribution -- to the originating agency's analysis. Two or three longer, more interpretive pieces usually occupy the last few pages of the NID. These judgments often have been summarized from extensive research papers.

The Daily is an "all source" document, incorporating information from a variety of both openly available and classified reporting from human and technical sources. The sensitive intelligence sources and methods involved necessitate strict control -- and prompt return to CIA -- of every NID. Duplication of any portion requires specific prior authorization.

The Daily is disseminated in its most highly classified version to a hundred or so recipients at the deputy assistant secretary level and above. Several hundred more copies of a "sanitized" version are published at a lower level of classification. These copies will have sentences, paragraphs, or even whole items deleted. The NID is also passed electrically -- with differing levels of sanitization -- to US diplomatic and military installations.

The President's Daily Brief

The President's Daily Brief is our principal regular means
of conveying current intelligence to senior policy makers. It is
published six days a week and draws on the analytic expertise of
the entire Intelligence Directorate with occasional contributions
from the Operations Directorate.

The PDB now has a total of seven recipients, but it is very
much the President's publication and the only intelligence
community document he receives regularly each morning. As a
result, we try to stay in tune with his interests. A piece on
the Moroccan economy is more likely to run if King Hassan is here
in the next day or two. Stylistically, we keep individual entries
short for our busy readers, and we use as many maps, photographs
and charts as we can to illustrate our point.

PDB coverage parallels that of the National Intelligence
Daily, but its limited distribution enables us to include the
most sensitive intelligence reporting. Unlike the NID, the PDB is
a CIA product and is not coordinated in the Intelligence
Community. We are, however, sensitive to substantive differences
within the Community and try to ensure our readers are aware of
different points of view when they exist.

At the President's order, the PDB also goes to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the President's Chief of Staff and his National Security Adviser. In most of these cases, we actually take the PDB to the individual's office and sit with him--one-on-one-- while he reads. This has provided valuable feedback for both analysts and collectors, as well as an opportunity to get answers quickly for our readers when there are questions.

The PDB is transmitted electrically to the seven readers when they are traveling abroad or on vacation. We often ride with them to meetings or see them at their homes on Saturdays or holidays. Briefings have been held in the Secretary of Defense's helicopter, and one rainy morning under an umbrella at the entry to the National Press Club.

Our regular briefing sessions mean we can personalize the service with intelligence reporting in addition to the PDB. Often this involves updating items with information received after the PDB has gone to bed at about 0400. It also means carrying individual reports on subjects we have learned will be of interest to one or more of the recipients.

It is the nature of our business that most of our reporting is of wars and pestilence. Occasionally, we like to ease the burden with a light-hearted item. One recent example was a report from a small Caribbean nation about a security official

who was sure his country's problems were the result of UFOs and who took counter-action with a shotgun--getting three geese in the process.

More seriously, our relationship with senior policy makers provides an unprecedented opportunity for service. It also makes us very conscious of the need to maintain an independent and unbiased view, to work hard to be policy relevant without being policy prescriptive, and to have the courage to bring news of a failed policy if that is what the evidence shows.

JUN 1 9 1985

CARTOONS

America, America

"Briefly the problem is this: The State Department has five million to stabilize their government, and the CIA has ten million to overthrow it."

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

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*"Intelligence is like money and love:
there is never enough."*

— A Senior White House Official

AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED

The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence
Analysis at the White House

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OUR GOAL

"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal—producing accurate reliable intelligence. . . . Who are the customers who get this finished product? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."

—Intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)

And what have our most important customers and their principal assistants had to say about how well we achieve that goal?

"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."

— Jimmy Carter, 1978

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"

— Richard Nixon, 1970

"In the 1960s and early 1970s, for eleven years in a row, the Central Intelligence Agency underestimated the number of missiles the Russians would deploy; at the same time the CIA also underestimated the totality of the Soviet program effort and its ambitious goals. . . . Thanks in part to this intelligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the mid-1980s."

— Richard Nixon, 1980

"CIA Director McCone . . . made recommendations for checking and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I promptly accepted the suggestions. . . ."

— Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs

"During the rush of . . . events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United States."

— Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs

"The Agency usually erred on the side of the interpretation fashionable in the Washington Establishment. . . . The analytical side of the CIA . . . generally reflected the most liberal school of thought in the government. . . . When warnings

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*become too routine they lose all significance; when reports are not called specifically
to the attention of the top leadership they are lost in bureaucratic background noise,
particularly since for every admonitory report one can probably find also its opposite
in the files."*

— Henry Kissinger, Memoirs

*"During the past year, I have seen no clandestine reporting from Soviet sources
that significantly influenced my judgment on how to deal with the Soviet
Union. . . . The Intelligence Community must find ways to sharpen and improve its
analysis. . . . We see too many papers on subjects peripheral to our interests. . . . Too
often the papers we see explain or review events in the past and give only a bare nod
to the future."*

— Zbignier Brzezinski, 1978

During the darkest days of revelations about CIA by the Rockefeller Commission
and the Church and Pike Committees, professional intelligence officers clung to the
notion that, whatever misdeeds might have occurred, throughout its history CIA had
rendered exceptional service to American Presidents by producing the finest analysis
based on the best human and technical sources in the world. We judged our contribu-
tion to White House decisionmaking on issues of moment and events great and small,
and found it outstanding. This contribution made us, in our view, indispensable and
cemented a special relationship between several Presidents and CIA. Have we been so
long and so deeply mistaken? Has an entire Agency of people who specialize in
political nuance, subtle signals and human relationships deluded itself and over a
generation totally miscalculated the value of its work to six very different Presidents?
The above quotations would suggest so. After all, they *did* in fact say those terrible
things about us—and still are.

The way intelligence is processed at the White House and how it is received and
regarded behind the scenes has never been clear to CIA, even at senior levels, except
in broadest outline. It is time to lift a corner of that curtain in order that intelligence
professionals might better understand what happens at the White House to the prod-
uct of our collection and analysis, what the President and his Assistant for National
Security Affairs expect, what they see, how it is processed, how they react—and,
finally, whether they really mean what they say about us.

SETTING THE SCENE

To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the White House first
requires an understanding of the context in which it is received. The sheer volume of
paperwork addressed to the President is staggering. Hundreds of federal employees in
more than 200 agencies seek to draw his attention to this or that program, proposal or
vital piece of information. An astonishing amount of their work survives departmental
review and finds its way to the White House. There these papers join a river of
correspondence to the President from countless consultants, academics, think tanks,
political contacts, family and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign
leaders, and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence can easily be
disregarded, it is my view that most Presidents often attach as much—if not more—
credibility to the views of family, (old) friends and private contacts as they do to those
of executive agencies. Vice President Rockefeller once asked my office if Denmark
really was planning to sell Greenland. Wondering all the while if he was in the market,
we confirmed with CIA that this rumor from a private source was untrue. But Rocke-
feller had taken it seriously.)

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It is the responsibility of the Domestic Policy Staff, the NSC, other Executive offices, and the White House Office itself to impose order on this avalanche of pulp and to reduce it to proportions manageable by someone who works 15-16 hours a day, often seven days a week. The NSC alone processes 7,000-10,000 "action" papers a year—not including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational" papers. Dr. Brzezinski once asked me to calculate how many pages of reading he sent to the President weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages—and among White House offices the NSC is among the most stringent with respect to the length and number of items going to the President. These, then, are the first hurdles that an intelligence product faces: a president with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and demands for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a main role trying to keep that President from being overwhelmed by paper; and a President with vast and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also relies and in which he often has considerable confidence.

WHAT HE GETS

The President routinely receives only one intelligence product that is not summarized or commented upon by someone outside the Community: *The President's Daily Brief*. He is handed this by his National Security Adviser early every morning, along with a package that has varied little from President to President:

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Contrary to what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly scheduled package of current intelligence the President receives during the day. However, through the course of the day, the National Security Adviser keeps the President apprised of significant developments overseas and may handcarry especially important cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of information increases. More analysis and reports will be given to the President. He will receive current intelligence orally in meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and Intelligence advisers, as well as from the media—often the first source of information. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis apart from the *PDB*, successive Presidents generally have seen only that current intelligence selected by the National Security Adviser, who works to make that morning package as succinct and small as he responsibly can.

It was not always this way—even in modern times. Before the Kennedy Administration, the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied almost entirely on CIA and State to provide incoming current intelligence as soon as it was processed by their operations centers and circulated to substantive officials who could decide what to send to the White House. This system was revolutionized, however, when President Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which CIA, State, NSA and the Pentagon began to provide unprocessed intelligence information electronically. Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and diplomatic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and often before, intelligence analysts. (The present system is not without flaws, however. Henry Kissinger observes in his memoirs, for expample, that, "*It is a common myth that high officials are informed immediately about significant events. . . . It happens not infrequently—much too frequently for the security adviser's emotional stability—that even the President learns of a significant occurrence from the newspapers.*" He notes that President Nixon learned of the historic 1969 meeting in Beijing between Kosygin and Chou En-Lai when he read about it in *The Washington Star*. One result of the establishment of the Situation Room was a significant diminution in the value of current intelligence publications that to this day has not been fully grasped by the

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Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lent (and lends) value to current intelligence provided the White House. Daily publications reporting purely factual information without trenchant analysis—apart from Situation Reports on crises—too often have been duplicative, too late and irrelevant. Thanks to the Situation Room, urgent information from abroad is often in the President's hands before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officials, and sometimes the media.

Naturally, the President receives information through channels other than the early morning folder and the occasional cable during the day. For example, President Carter routinely received current and longrange intelligence analysis through regular briefings by the DCI. Such frequent sessions specifically devoted to analysis were an innovation under Carter and provided an opportunity that did not exist before 1977 for interchange among the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and National Security Adviser on substantive intelligence issues. DCI Bush on occasion gave President Ford personal analytical briefings and, of course, analytical matters would often come up spontaneously during Bush's twice-weekly meetings with the President. All DCIs also have briefed the President and his senior advisers routinely in formal meetings of the National Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to convey information to the President from diverse sources. The President also receives abbreviated versions of intelligence assessments which are included in policy options papers.

President Carter saw fewer CIA assessments, NIEs, research papers and other longer range studies than either Presidents Ford or Nixon. This is due primarily to greater encouragement during the latter two Administrations for the NSC Staff to prepare "Information Memoranda" summarizing for the President the salient points of such longer intelligence papers and attaching the full text. The only longer intelligence reports to reach President Carter were those the DCI delivered personally or the infrequent instances when the National Security Adviser forwarded an exceptional one for the President's reading. Thus, while under Nixon and Ford virtually no major intelligence study reached the President without an NSC cover memorandum summarizing it and perhaps making independent comments or judgments, many more reports reached their desks than reached Mr. Carter. The NSC Staff was not encouraged to forward such studies, due in large measure to reluctance to burden the President with additional—and optional—reading; again, the consequence of the volume of paper coming into the White House. This was due in part to President Carter's penchant to read an entire paper—not just the summary—and the consequent effort to avoid diverting him with "interesting" versus "essential" reading.

In sum, each of the last three Presidents has received through regular channels only a tiny portion of published intelligence and only a fraction even of analysis specifically prepared for senior policymakers. This has placed a premium on the *PDB*—an opportunity neglected until recently—and on the willingness of the DCI to give important assessments (published or oral) directly to the President or call them to the direct attention of the National Security Adviser. (Even personal transmittal slips to the latter are of little value since as everyone resorts to this device and thus render it too common to be effective.) Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI to take an activist role is a severe—even irreparable—handicap to ensuring that intelligence assessments are read by the President and the National Security Adviser.

WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET

Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are for years there has been an adage at the White House that the absence of criticism should be regarded as praise. Along these lines, Presidential comment on intelligence assessments are so rare that we

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are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction with what is being received. Regrettably, however, this is doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments we do receive are critical and, more importantly, Presidents have repeatedly (during or after their term of office) expressed general dissatisfaction with broad aspects of intelligence analysis—as for example President Carter did in his well-known note to the Secretary of State, DCI, and National Security Adviser in November 1978, and as President Nixon did both while in office and in his memoirs. Mr Nixon often criticized CIA analysis of the Soviet Union and Europe for not being sufficiently "tough-minded." Kissinger also presumably reflected both Nixon's and Ford's dissatisfaction when he would assail CIA's failure to predict various developments or events abroad, or for preparing "flabby" assessments that he regarded as written from the standpoint of a bureaucrat of the subject country rather than of the United States Government.

These and other principals—note the introductory quotes of this article—also have faulted the Agency for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of the President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping itself informed on policy issues under consideration. Neither these Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security Affairs felt it their responsibility to keep senior Agency officials well informed in this regard, to provide day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback. The Agency had to depend for such guidance on what the DCI could pick up in high-level meetings and contacts—and the skill and interest of different DCIs has varied greatly in both.

Of the three Administrations I served at the NSC, the Carter team worked most conscientiously to inform CIA of the analytical needs of the President and constructively to advise the Agency of perceived shortcomings in its analysis, especially with respect to subject, timing and form. President Carter personally communicated his concerns and criticisms.

Pehaps the most comprehensive White House guidance (and indication of the President's views) in recent years was provided by Dr. Brzezinski in January 1978, when he sent a memorandum to the DCI that made the following points:

— Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine collection targeted on the thinking and planning of key leaders or groups in important advanced and secondary countries, how they make policy decisions and how they will react to U.S. decisions and those of other powers.

— Political analyses should be focused more on problems of particular concern to the U.S. Government. Too many papers are on subjects peripheral to U.S. interests or offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular problems, events or developments of concern to the U.S. Government.

— There needs to be greater attention to the future. More papers are needed that briefly set forth facts and evidence and then conclude with a well-informed speculative essay on the implications for the future: "We expect and hope for thought-provoking, reasonable views of the future based on what you know about the past and present. ... Analysts should not be timorous or bound by convention."

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.The Carter White House took other steps to ensure better communication of high-level substantive concerns as well as perceptions of analytical shortcomings. The Political Intelligence Working Group, set up to organize remedial action in response to the President's November 1978 note, interpreted its charter broadly and worked to

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improve and better focus field reporting by State, CIA and Attaches, to improve cover so critical to good reporting; to resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting; and a number of other issues aimed at improving analysis and making it more responsive. As part of the work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of Dr. Brzezinski met periodically with representatives of the Secretary of State and the DCI to review foreign developments or issues of current concern to the President and to provide feedback on intelligence coverage. I believe all involved would agree that these efforts had a salutary effect in improving communication between intelligence and the White House and thus improving intelligence support to the President.

Presidents and their senior advisers will never be fully content with intelligence support and analysis. First, and despite occasional protestations to the contrary, Presidents expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the end-product should be able to predict all manner of coups, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and the like with accuracy. Intellectually, they know most such specific events are incredibly hard to predict—and that we are incredibly lucky when we do. Nevertheless, in the early morning hours when the National Security Adviser must repair to the President's study with the (usually) bad news about such events, the Chief Executive will not unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him surprise.

Second, Presidents do not like internal controversy in the Executive Branch—especially if it becomes public. And, from time to time, intelligence analyses provoke dispute, often in public. DCI Helms' disagreement with Secretary of Defense Laird a decade ago before Congress on whether the SS-9 was a MRV or a MIRV is a case in point. Internal Executive Branch disputes over energy estimates, technology transfer, Soviet civil defense, and verification of aspects of SALT are others. Such controversies have become more frequent as disputes to contain within the Executive Branch become harder by virtue of greater Congressional access, journalistic aggressiveness and leaks. The White House's general unease with unclassified CIA analysis is rooted in this dislike for what is regarded as needless controversy. Our own citizens, not to mention foreign readers, cannot be expected to assume that a CIA publication does not reflect an official U.S. Government view—and this confusion is of concern to the White House and often a public relations and policy headache. Thus, to the extent intelligence analysis results (in White House eyes) in internal government controversy, problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw Presidential ire or at a minimum leave the Chief Magistrate with unflattering and enduring feelings toward intelligence.

Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence assessments undercutting policies based on earlier assessments. As professionals, we are constantly revisiting important subjects as better and later information or improved analytical tools become available. When this results in changing the statistical basis for the U.S. position in MBFR, substantially elevating estimates of North Korean forces at a time when the President is pressing to reduce U.S. forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a Soviet brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe that Presidents regard us less than fondly. Presidents do not like surprises, especially those that undermine policy. Intelligence is most often the bearer of such surprises—and pays the price such messengers have suffered since antiquity.

Finally, successive Administrations have generally regarded with skeptical the growing direct relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond the actual oversight process. In recent years, the provision of great quantities of highly sensitive information and analysis to Members of Congress and their staffs has eroded the Executive's longstanding advantage of a near monopoly of information on foreign affairs and defense. The flow of information to the Hill has given the Congress a

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powerful tool in its quest for a greater voice in the making of foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis the Executive—and Presidents cannot be indifferent to the fact that intelligence has provided Congress with that tool and that the White House is nearly helpless to blunt it except in very rare cases.

OVERCOMING ISOLATION (OURS) AND SUSPICION (THEIRS)

Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide timely, accurate and farseeing analysis. Thus, nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence are critical—prompted by our failure to meet expectations. Indeed, all but one quote at the outset of this article was in response to a *specific* situation where intelligence was perceived to have failed to measure up. In short, Presidents often consider intelligence as much another problem bureaucracy to be dealt with and warily watched as it is a source of helpful information, insight and support.

To the extent intelligence professionals isolate themselves from White House, NSC officials and are unresponsive to White House *analytical* needs, this adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized and understanding of what we can and cannot do will be lacking. Thus, the Intelligence Community must take the initiative to establish and maintain close personal ties to White House and NSC officials from the President on down. It must also aggressively seek new ways to get the maximum amount of analysis before the President, even while experimenting with old mechanisms, such as the *PDB*. White House procedures and relationships are always dynamic; accordingly, we must always be searching for new and better ways to serve our principal customer.

Although the routine order of business and internal organization may vary greatly from Administration to Administration, I would suggest several general rules:

— Senior intelligence officials must establish and maintain a network of personal contacts in the NSC Staff and the immediate office of the National Security Adviser to ensure that we are well informed as to the issues of concern to the President; policy matters under consideration in which intelligence analysis can make a contribution; and the overall foreign and defense affairs agenda so that we can anticipate the President's needs.

  • For intelligence to be useful, it must be timely. Insofar as policy issues, foreign visitors and such are involved, often a day or two makes the difference between a vital or irrelevant contribution.

  • Periodic visits to NSC staffers on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis to seek guidance during the coming period is worse than useless; they can be misleading and eventually waste valuable analytical resources. Most NSC staffers do not think about their work in these terms. The ordinary result of such an approach is that the staffer will respond off the top of the head (or off the wall) or ask for work related to what he has just completed or knows to be in his in-box. We will do ourselves more good by establishing daily dialogue.

  • Similarly, as has been done occasionally in the past, the terms of reference of major papers should be shared with the NSC to ensure that what we have in mind best meets the policy need and to obtain suggestions of additional points to be covered to be most helpful.

— The role of the DCI is central to understanding the President's needs and conveying analysis to him. Few DCIs before Admiral Turner took a sustained interest in analysis or an active role in getting substantive matters before the

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President either orally or in writing. Few have been so brash as literally to hand the President published intelligence reports to read. Future DCIs must be persuaded that these undertakings are central to their role as the President's principal intelligence adviser. Moreover, the DCI should assume a similar role with the National Security Adviser—perhaps the best source of information on issues of topical interest to the President and the foreign affairs and defense agenda. Finally, the importance of routine, detailed feedback by the DCI from policy meetings, briefings and conversations with the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser and Chairman, JCS to analytical managers, NIOs and senior analysts must be impressed upon DCIs. The dearth of feedback before 1977 was damaging to our work and contributed to a sense "downtown" that we were unhelpful and unresponsive. Contrary to the views of some intelligence professionals, we cannot properly do our work in splendid isolation.

— We must exploit every opportunity to get analysis to the President. When exceptional analysis is available, an appropriate senior intelligence official should *telephone* his personal contact(s) noted above and alert him to the paper (but judiciously to preserve credibility). Meanwhile, DCI briefings, NSC meetings, intelligence contributions or annexes to policy options papers, typescript memoranda, spot reports, and all other means need to be used to get information to the Security Adviser and to the President.

— Intelligence should be unafraid to speculate on the future. Everyone else around the President does—and most are far less experienced or capable analysts than we. A preferred approach would be to alternative futures and then above all state clearly our best estimate, however we caveat it. Waffling conclusions have too long made intelligence estimates a laughingstock among policymakers. "On the one hand ... but on the other ... " is no help to a policymaker and clearly undermines confidence in our analytical capacity. If we have no confidence in our judgment, why should the President?

— In all but two or three cases National Intelligence Estimates as presently prepared have been ignored by the White House in recent years. They are usually too late, too formalistic, and too equivocal to be of value to senior policymakers—much less the President or his Security Adviser. This need not be so. A return to the practice of issuing brief, short-deadline special NIEs that would focus on specific policy relevant issues would mean that intelligence would be available before decisions are made—and would better serve the President and his senior advisers. It would also ensure that the intelligence assessment is not buried in long options papers which rarely reach the President anyway.

  • Such SNIEs would have to be disseminated on a restrictive basis. On important issues, the circle of policy players is kept small; the contribution of any intelligence paper will be enhanced by its limited circulation and, more importantly, by the perception by its readers of its limited high-level readership. If the President or his closest advisers make a special request of analysis, they do not like to see a response apparently published in the hundreds of copies. We are mistaken as well when we become preoccupied with format and presentation to the detriment of analytical (vice reportorial) content—a problem in the past.

— The responsibility for making intelligence more relevant, timely and helpful is that of senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone. Analysts and

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managers at all levels must assume the burden of keeping better up to date on events and policy issues relevant to their area of professional concern. Such awareness must infuse all analysis from drafter to Director. Only when priority attention is given at all levels to the relevance and value of intelligence *to the consumer* from President to desk officer will intelligence analysis be better received and, in the end, be better.

The above "rules" apply to doing our work better. They will not resolve the several causes of Presidential displeasure—our support of Congress, changing assessments that have policy implications, surprises, and so forth. Even here there are some steps we can take. For example:

— We should take the initiative to let the Security Adviser or the NSC Staff know that we are preparing an estimate or other form of analysis that will revise earlier assessments and have an impact on the President's policies. This would include advance warning of new and important conclusions in military estimates.

— Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better informing the White House about support provided to the Congress. The intelligence agencies are part of the Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports to the President. It is not improper or inappropriate for us to keep the President's foreign affairs staff more completely and regularly advised of papers we provide the Congress, possibly controversial testimony or briefings, etc. Again, some of this has been done—but a mere schedule of planned appearances or an occasional phone call are not enough. Keeping the Executive informed about our dealings with Congress is an important aspect of building Presidential confidence that we are not trying to undercut him or his policies by responding to legitimate Congressional requests.

— Finally, it would be helpful to continue keeping the White House informed in advance when we plan to publish an unclassified substantive intelligence and to highlight possible controversial points. This will become important as pressure for such unclassified publications increases. We should acquiesce in those rare circumstances in which the Security Adviser or the President asks us not to publish certain information for public consumption. Our charter is to serve the President and, secondarily, the Congress. Once information and analysis is provided to them, our responsibility is fulfilled. Unclassified publications are indeed a public service but also, frankly, a public relations enterprise. If such a service/enterprise complicates life for the President, we should be prepared to forgo it. Only a fraction of unclassified publications would be affected—and our willingness to withhold them would help build confidence at the White House that we seek to be supportive.

Although several of the above "rules" and suggestions may be controversial, the reader should be aware that all have been pursued by CIA at one time or another and by one official or another. I wish to emphasize that *haphazard*, occasional implementation has not ameliorated the underlying suspicion and dissatisfaction of successive Presidents and their advisers with intelligence analysis or their perception that we often peddle our product to the Congress and public in a freewheeling manner designed to benefit us, regardless of the problems caused the policymaker.

Some will argue that the steps I propose would subvert the independence of the analysis process and subordinate our judgments to policy considerations. That is not so!

None implies any interference with the analyst or his judgments—except to make the latter relevant to the needs of the President and to improve the odds someone at the White House will value the analyst's work. Most are intended to allot the analyst his rightful voice in policy deliberations and to ensure that receptivity to his work is not diminished by irritation or pique resulting from controversy we have sparked on the Hill; the White House being caught unawares by analysis that undercuts policies based on earlier intelligence conclusions; or because the White House has been embarrassed by publication of unclassified analysis.

Above all, we in intelligence should appreciate the primacy of personal relationships in making government work. We have neglected to develop fully such relationships at the White House and NSC in recent years—although of course there have been exceptions. We must pursue such contacts—bearing in mind that we start all over every four or eight years and, indeed, every month as familiar faces at CIA and downtown are replaced by new. These personal contacts and a greater sensitivity to White House needs and perceptions (including of us) are essential to mitigating Presidential criticism and ensuring that the best possible intelligence product in fact reaches our "most important customer" in time to make a difference.

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HANS HEYMANN

Intelligence/Policy Relationships

> If we in intelligence were one day given three wishes, they
> would be to know everything, to be believed when we spoke,
> and in such a way to exercise an influence to the good in the
> matter of policy. But absent the Good Fairy, we sometimes get
> the order of our unarticulated wishes mixed. Often we feel the
> desire to influence policy and perhaps just stop wishing there.
> This is too bad, because to wish simply for influence can, and
> upon occasion does, get intelligence to the place where it can
> have no influence whatever. By striving too hard in this
> direction, intelligence may come to seem just another policy
> voice, and an unwanted one at that.
>
> —Sherman Kent[1]

In the catechism of the intelligence officer, the thesis that
intelligence is and should be strictly separate from policy is taken as
axiomatic. It is as hallowed in the theology of intelligence as the
doctrine of the separation of church and state is in the U.S.
Constitution. For much of our early history we tended, somewhat
self-righteously, to view intelligence as objective, disinterested, and
dispassionate and, somewhat disdainfully, to regard policy as slanted,
adulterated, and politicized. We strove mightily to maintain the
much-touted arm's-length relationship with policy, believing that
proximity to policy would corrupt the independence of our intelligence
judgments. Indeed, legend has it that members of the Board of
National Estimates of the 1950s and 1960s systematically discouraged
analysts and estimators from going downtown to have lunch with
policymakers, for fear that such exposure would make them policy
advocates and tempt them to serve power rather than truth.

Whatever the validity of this legend, such strictures were quite in
keeping with the traditional view of a proper intelligence/policy
relationship. By enforcing this kind of rigorous separation, the old
Board of National Estimates no doubt hoped to protect the policy
neutrality of intelligence; what it did was to impose a splendid
isolation upon intelligence that ensured its eventual policy irrelevance.
The vanishing applause for its product coming from the policy side
prompted intelligence to reexamine its assumptions, and a new,
unconventional wisdom came to be heard. Its message was that our
faith in the arm's-length relationship was misplaced, that no such

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relationship really ever existed, and that close ties between intelligence and policy are not only inevitable but also essential if the policymakers' needs are to be served.

A new way of thinking about intelligence and policy emerged, in which the two communities were seen as awkwardly entangled and intertwined in what might be described as a competitive and often conflictual symbiotic relationship. Thomas Hughes put it most aptly when he spoke of the relationship "as a two-way search: of intelligence in search of some policy to influence and of policy in search of some intelligence for support."[2] Suddenly defunct is the comforting illusion that intelligence stands outside of and above the policy fray, that it can load analytic and estimative ammunition on its wagon and let the wagon roll down in the general direction of the battle without worrying where it will come to rest, whether the ammunition is of the right caliber, or how it will be used—to say nothing of whether someone might shoot it back. In place of that illusion is the less comfortable notion that if it is to be at all relevant to policy, intelligence must participate in the battle; it must be attuned to the strategy and tactics being pursued; and it is by no means invulnerable to being seesawed and whiplashed in the sociopolitical tug of war known as the policymaking process.

How this process unfolds in the real world and the intricate ways in which intelligence interacts with it have been the subject of some first-rate analytic writing. Within the past decade, three contributions to this literature on intelligence and foreign policy are particularly worthy of note:

1. First is the observation, vividly illustrated by Thomas Hughes,[3] that the intelligence community is no more a unitary actor than is the policy community, and that it should instead be seen as a Hydra-headed agglomeration of competing institutions often at odds with each other and not necessarily falling into predictable patterns. In studying the budgetary, organizational, and substantive struggles within this community, Hughes notes that

> the cross-cutting complexities were striking: position disputes within agencies, alliances shifting with issues, personal strayings from organizational loyalties, hierarchical differences between superiors and subordinates, horizontal rather than vertical affinities, and much ad hoc reaching for sustenance somewhere outside. Thus, while the struggles within the intelligence community sometimes mirrored simultaneous struggles in the larger policy community, they did so by no means invariably and never symmetrically.

It should not be astonishing, therefore, to find that policymakers view the intelligence process with as much ambivalence and suspicion as intelligence makers perceive the policy process, and that the interactions among them tend to be contentious and rivalrous. To quote again from Hughes:

> Viewed from above by the ranking policy-makers, the intelligence community often seemed cumbersome, expensive, loquacious, probing, querulous, and at times axe-grinding. Viewed from below by the intelligence experts, the policy community often seemed

determined to ignore evidence plainly before it—or (even worse) to mistake the intelligence managers for the experts. Viewed from in between at the intelligence-policy interface, it looked like controlled chaos—and not surprisingly—for here was where means and ends were brokered—jurisdictional rivalries compromised, contentious controversies delineated.[4]

2.   Second is the thesis, persuasively argued by Richard Betts,[5] that so-called intelligence failures are more often than not policy failures; to put it more gently, it is usually impossible to disentangle intelligence failures from policy failures, since (intelligence) analysis and (policy) decisions are interactive rather than sequential processes. Betts sees the intelligence role as seeking "to extract certainty from uncertainty and to facilitate coherent decision in an incoherent environment." In seeking to reduce uncertainty, intelligence is often forced to extrapolate from evidence that is riddled with ambiguities. Inability to resolve these ambiguities leads to intelligence products that oversimplify reality and fail to alert the policy consumers of these products to the dangers that lurk within the ambiguities. Critical mistakes are consequently made by policymakers who, faced with ambiguities, will substitute wishful thinking and their own premises and preconceptions for the assessments of professional analysts. As Betts puts it, "Because it is the job of decision-makers to decide, they cannot react to ambiguity by deferring judgement . . . . When a welter of fragmentary evidence offers support to various interpretations, ambiguity is exploited by wishfulness. The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions."[6]

3.   A third example is the recent revelation, in a strikingly outspoken article by Yehoshafat Harkabi (Israeli scholar and former chief of Israeli Military Intelligence and adviser to the Israeli Prime Minister)[7] that the tense and ambivalent relationship between intelligence and policy is not a uniquely American phenomenon. Reacting sharply to the highly critical Kahan Commission report and its public indictment of the performance of the Israeli Defense Force's Intelligence chief of the Yom Kippur war, Harkabi argues that the greater fault lay with the policy side. His observations, made in an Israeli political setting, reveal some of the same peculiarities of the intelligence/policy relationship noted earlier by Hughes and Betts. To wit:

1.   The selective rejection of intelligence by policy consumers: What they often look for is not so much data on the basis of which to shape policy, but rather support for preformed political and ideological conceptions.

2.   The importance of preconceptions: Matters get worse the more ideologically motivated is the regime, for then policy is made more on the basis of ideological inputs than on the basis of intelligence reportings on reality which, to the extent that they contradict the ideology, may be discarded, and the intelligence service ends up frustrated.

3.   Policy's resistance to change: Policy can be judged according to the extent of its "sensitivity" to intelligence. Will it change if a certain (intelligence) evaluation requires such a change? As a concrete example, what intelligence reporting could induce a change in Israel's present policy on Judea and Samaria? Does the rigidity of a

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political position make it impervious to intelligence? In short, good intelligence is no guarantee of good policy, and vice versa.

4. The pros and cons of intelligence/policy intimacy at the top: Presumably it is good that the chief of the intelligence service be on close terms with the policymakers and have their trust. However, such bosom companionship also has its drawbacks. True, the more the policymaker is a part of the inner Byzantine court that develops as a matter of course around state chiefs, the greater is his or her influence; however, the policymaker then also loses perspective as well as independent critical vision, and gradually succumbs to the conceptions of the policymakers.

The dilemmas and foibles associated with the intelligence/policy interface are hardly novel or startling to seasoned intelligence practitioners, especially those senior officers charged with "brokering" the intelligence/policy relationship—the communicators and interactants who reside in the twilight zone between intelligence and policy. For them, this is familiar terrain. As managers and stimulators of intelligence production, they know with what difficulty a crisp, lucid analytic product is extracted from a dissentious community; as participants in the interagency policy process, they observe the ease with which that product can be selectively utilized, tendentiously summarized, or subtly denigrated. But for these privileged practitioners who move readily from the world of analysis to the world of action, familiarity with policy does not breed contempt. Rather, an appreciation of the murky and frenetic policy environment tends to evoke a certain sympathy for the policymakers' plight.

However, such knowledgeable, involved practitioners represent only a very small fraction of the intelligence population. The vast majority of that population—collectors, operators, and analysts—is essentially isolated from the hurly-burly of the policy process. The intelligence services at large, therefore, are often mystified and frustrated by the policymakers' perennial unhappiness with their product. Given this puzzlement, it seems worthwhile to try to delve a little more deeply into the reasons for such unhappiness.

THE VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE

Clearly, policy does not speak with a single voice. Policies have multiple authors. The numerous players who take part in policy formulation differ in temperament, education, and experience, as well as in personal and institutional loyalties. As a consequence, their attitudes toward intelligence and their propensity to accept or reject its assessments will also vary widely. Nevertheless, although generalizations are always hazardous, we can discern some common attributes and concerns of policymakers, especially the "national security principals"[8]—the key players at the highest levels of government—that predispose policymakers to react to intelligence offerings in predictable ways.

First, key decisionmakers are political leaders who have risen to their positions by being decisive, aggressive, and self-confident rather than reflective, introspective, and self-doubting. They attribute their success at least in part to their tried and proven ways of thinking, to the simplified models and paradigms that explain to them what makes

the world go 'round. They often regard themselves as their own best analysts and hence tend to be distrustful of the untested and often counterintuitive judgments of the intelligence professionals.

Second, they have a strong vested interest in the success of their policies and will be disproportionately receptive to intelligence that "supports" these policies. They bear the burdens of great responsibility and find themselves perpetually embattled with a host of critics, competitors, and opponents, all eagerly looking for chinks in their armor. They thrive on optimists and boosters but encounter mostly alarmists and carping critics.

Festooned in this way, and operating in so hostile an environment, these highest-level consumers of intelligence can hardly be blamed for responding to its product with something less than boundless enthusiasm. In fact, it can be documented that every president since Eisenhower, and virtually every secretary of state since Acheson, has expressed dissatisfaction and irritation with intelligence analysis, either in his memoirs or in public or semipublic statements. The best-remembered and most widely quoted expostulation was reported to have been delivered by Lyndon Johnson to his director of Central Intelligence at a White House dinner: "Policy making is like milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more and the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow with its tail whips the bucket and all is spilled. That's what CIA does to policy making."[9]

Is intelligence at fault for creating this unhappiness? Should it alter its ways to court greater popularity? Or is the problem integral and endemic to the intelligence/policy relationship? The answers to these questions may become clearer as we look at some of the concrete ways in which the frictions arise.

WHY POLICY RESENTS INTELLIGENCE: FIVE WAYS TO BE UNPOPULAR

Presidents and their senior advisers will be unhappy with intelligence when it is not supportive of their policies. They will feel particularly frustrated under the following circumstances.

When Intelligence Fails to Reduce Uncertainty

Policymakers operate under a burden of pervasive uncertainty, much of it threatening to the viability of their policies. They are forever hopeful that someone will relieve them of some of this uncertainty, and so they look to intelligence for what common sense tells them should be reserved to augury and divination. Forecasting, to be sure, is the lifeblood of the intelligence estimator; but there is a world of difference between a forecast (an analytic judgment resting on carefully defined assumptions) and an oracular prophecy (secured by divine inspiration). Unfortunately, much of what is expected of intelligence by policymakers occupies this latter realm.

A good example is the perennial complaint that intelligence failed to predict a coup d'etat—that is, a coercive regime change or palace uprising; but, of course, a coup is typically a conspiratorial act that

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depends for its success on the preservation of secrecy. If intelligence gets wind of such an event, it means that secrecy has been compromised and that the coup is almost certain to fail.

Intelligence forecasting is actually done quite respectably by the community and can be of real value to the thoughtful policy analyst. When it stays within its legitimate bounds of identifying and illuminating alternative outcomes, assigning subjective probabilities to them, and exploring their possible implications for U.S. policy, the decisionmakers are well served; but the decisionmakers themselves will rarely think so. For such a forecast, far from narrowing uncertainty, will make them aware of the full range of uncertainty they face and render their calculations more difficult rather than easier. Indeed, much intelligence estimation is and must be of this nature. Precisely because it seeks to reflect complex reality, its product often makes for hardship in the lives of harassed decisionmakers.

When Intelligence Restricts Options

Every new administration comes into office with a national security agenda of its own, bent upon putting its mark on the nation's foreign policy. It believes that a significant shift in that policy is both desirable and possible. It will encounter a foreign policy bureaucracy (including intelligence) that believes it is neither. Intelligence professionals will greet the administration's new policy initiatives with cogent analyses, showing how vigorously allies will oppose these new policies, how resolutely neutrals will pervert them to their own ends, and how effectively adversaries will blunt them. At every step, it will appear to the policy leaders that intelligence fights them, seeks to fence them in, and, indeed, helps them fail.

The pattern persists. As the policy leaders face unexpected foreign challenges, their quick responses will often be met with more intelligence assessments that seem to be saying "it didn't work" or "it will almost certainly not succeed." The decisionmakers will conclude that intelligence not only constricts their room for maneuver but arms their political opponents as well. Worst of all, it constantly and annoyingly reminds them of their limited capacity to influence events. No matter how well the interaction may serve the interests of sound policy, there is no question that it builds tension between the two sides.

In these encounters, we should acknowledge that intelligence does not always "know better." There are times when intelligence is unaware that stated objectives are not real objectives of policy and will leave out of its analysis elements of the picture that may be important to the decisionmakers. Presidents paint upon a canvas far larger than the particular segments on which intelligence tends to focus. The assessments of intelligence, therefore, may be quite valid for those segments, but they may also miss broader considerations that presidents care about.

The Carter administration's proposal to impose sanctions—including a grain embargo—on the Soviet Union in response to their invasion of Afghanistan provides a vivid example. The stated objective was to penalize the offender by imposing political and economic costs on him. When intelligence was asked to assess the potential impact of the

sanctions package, it responded with a judgment, the thrust of which was that the sanctions package would not be an effective instrument. It was argued that without solid participation by our allies, sanctions would do no serious damage to the Soviet economy nor impair the leadership's objectives in any significant way. Not surprisingly, President Carter gave the assessment a rather frigid reception, and the assessment's negative judgments turned out to be a less than decisive factor in his calculus. From the president's perspective, the sanctions package was just right. He considered a highly visible response to Afghanistan to be imperative, but it also had to be low risk. A military undertaking was ruled out as far too hazardous. Inaction was ruled out because it would signal to the rest of the world the existence of U.S. irresolution and condonement. The sanctions, though unsatisfying in terms of direct effects, would convey a strong sense of disapprobation and censure, without engendering worrisome consequences. It would satisfy the popular need to express the nation's sense of outrage and would portray the president as willing to take the political heat of angering an important domestic constituency—the farmers—for the sake of a foreign issue of principle. Intelligence could not then, and can never, be expected to take such considerations into account.

When Intelligence Undercuts Policies

Administrations have often found that intelligence analyses appear at times and in various ways unhelpful to the pursuit of policies on which they had embarked. This can happen in two ways: (1) through a genuine and protracted divergence of intelligence judgments from publicly stated administration views of a given situation, and (2) through fortuity or inadvertence.

An example of the first phenomenon was provided by the stubborn independence displayed by the intelligence community in the early phases of the Vietnam escalation in 1964-1965, when its national intelligence estimates consistently offered up a far more pessimistic assessment of North Vietnamese staying power than was reflected in the Johnson administration's public assertions. Although this divergence between intelligence and policy did not become public knowledge until the infamous appearance of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the intelligence performance of the mid-1960s evoked considerable disquiet and chagrin among policy insiders at the time.

The days of such protracted differences of view between intelligence and policy are probably over. In the intelligence/policy environment of the 1980s, it seems highly unlikely that a divergence of assessment could be sustained for very long. Congressional oversight and its intimate access to intelligence analysis would bring any significant disparities quickly to the surface and thus cause them to be resolved.

The other cause, policy undercutting by fortuity and inadvertence, is more likely to survive as it constitutes a matter of human frailty. Sometimes it is merely a question of miserable timing—as in the classic case of the intelligence reassessment of North Korean military forces that credited them with substantially greater capabilities than had been previously appreciated. The estimate was fine, but it just happened to

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"hit the street" within a week of President Carter's announcement of his controversial decision to begin withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. A pure coincidence, but it caused understandable consternation.

At other times, this policy undercutting is a matter of inattention—as in the so-called discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, which, it turned out later, had been there all along. Issues of this kind, seemingly unimportant, can suddenly escalate into heated public controversy and make life difficult for the policy leaders. However minor the transgression, they will regard intelligence less fondly thereafter.

When Intelligence Provokes Public Controversy

From time to time, routine differences within the community over how to interpret ambiguous intelligence evidence turns into heated, and perhaps even acrimonious, debate. When the competing interpretations clearly affect important policy issues, the internal controversy can easily spill over into the public arena. In the 1950s and 1960s, when what transpired in the world of intelligence remained largely opaque, such disputes could easily be contained within the executive branch. Now, with the progressive "opening up" of intelligence through Congress and the media, and through its more visible involvement with policy, a disputation within the community soon finds itself drawn into and exploited by the public debate, often in ways that make life more difficult for the national security policymakers.

Examples of policy-relevant debates that have been stimulated or intensified by intelligence controversy come quickly to mind: whether the Tupolev Backfire bomber is an intermediate-range or an intercontinental-capable bomber; whether extensive Soviet civil defense preparations add up to enhanced "survivability" for Soviet society; how significantly Western technology contributes to the growth of the Soviet economy and its military power; whether Western calculations of Soviet military spending adequately reflect the real size and burden of Soviet defense; and to what extent the Soviet natural gas pipeline will aggravate Western Europe's dependence on imported energy.

This brief sampling is sufficient to show that the issues in dispute often bear on strategic, budgetary, arms control, or economic policy decisions important to an administration's overall strategy. To the extent that intelligence controversy helps arm the opposition in such disputes, its contribution is not exactly appreciated.

When Intelligence Fails to Persuade

Ever since John F. Kennedy's tour de force in unveiling photographic intelligence on the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba to a hushed UN audience, successive administrations have sought to emulate that feat. Although the results have been mixed at best, hope springs eternal that a release of intelligence findings or a public display of exotic evidence will enlighten an uninformed or misinformed public, win over a cynical journalist, or convince a skeptical member of Congress. The intelligence product now finds its way into the

public domain through more and more channels and in ever greater volume—most of it, of course, at the instigation and under the aegis of the policy community. It moves through such vehicles as press conferences, media briefings and backgrounders, testimony on the Hill, formal reports to Congress, and official glossy publications widely disseminated.

In a general way, this sea change in public access to intelligence has undoubtedly had its beneficial impact on public understanding of often complex and murky situations. Far more questionable, however, is whether intelligence can be used effectively as an instrument of public persuasion—whether the marshaling of intelligence evidence on one side or another of a sharply debated issue ever succeeds in gaining solid converts. In a tactical situation, when a heated debate moves toward a crucial vote, a well-focused, lucid intelligence briefing can often sway a wavering agnostic and stiffen an irresolute supporter. The record suggests, however, that the conversion will not stick, that the gnawing doubts will soon return.

The reasons for this phenomenon are not hard to find:

1. When public disclosure of intelligence was a rare and notable event that summoned up an aura of mystery and miracle, the product was endowed with uncommon authority. As disclosure became ever more routine, the gloss wore off and an inevitable "debasement of the currency" set in. Moreover, in today's world of global information overload and media hype, even the most striking intelligence "release" will find it heavy going to try to capture the attention of a perpetually distracted audience.

2. Intelligence assessments—when lifted out of their context, fuzzed, and diluted ("sanitized") to protect sources and methods--lose much of their authenticity. To the intelligence professional who has built his or her mosaic from a welter of carefully evaluated raw data, often accumulated over many years, the evidence may be totally compelling. To a public audience, coming to the issue cold and exposed only to the sanitized version, the evidence will often seem ambiguous and the judgments inadequately supported.

3. Intelligence evidence is brought into public play in situations of deep controversy, in which the contention usually occurs not over observable facts but over principle. The physical phenomena that intelligence is best at recording are often not much help in settling points of principle. Central America offers a good example: Divergent views of the threat implicit in that area revolve around the conceptual question of whether the revolutionary situation in El Salvador is fundamentally endogenous (i.e., rooted in and fueled by internal, historic forces) or exogenous (i.e., externally stimulated and sustained). This conceptual issue cannot be resolved by displays of intelligence evidence, however persuasive, that Soviet arms do indeed flow through Nicaraguan ports to Salvadoran rebels.

4. The impact that intelligence can have on public perceptions is further constrained by the understandable tendency of people to reject bad news—what social psychologists used to call "cognitive dissonance." A classic example is the case of "Yellow Rain," discovery of lethal toxins being used under Soviet tutelage in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. In spite of the overwhelming weight of confirmatory evidence accumulated over eight years, the findings continue to be challenged and contested, sometimes with offerings of bizarre scientific

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counterexplanations that utterly defy common sense. The extreme reluctance to accept the evidence at face value cannot be attributed simply to the fact that intelligence could never meet the rigorous laboratory standards for evidence. Rather, it must surely lie in the unpleasantness of the implications, insofar as they raise doubts about the viability of arms control agreements.

In sum, policy leaders are bound to develop a rather ambivalent view of the support they can hope to get from their intelligence community. Clearly the resulting "love-hate relationship" is endemic to the situation, and there is not much that intelligence can, or should, do to alter it. Indeed, a greater effort to "serve policy well" could lead to even greater ambivalence and discord on the part of those we seek to serve. Thus, we return to Sherman Kent's admonition in the leitmotiv at the beginning of this chapter: "By striving too hard in this direction, intelligence may come to seem just another policy voice, and an unwanted one at that."

NOTES

1. Sherman Kent, "Estimates and Influence," originally presented in London (September 1966) and subsequently published in Foreign Service Journal 46 (April 1969).

2. Thomas Hughes deserves great credit for being the first, and surely the most articulate, iconoclast toppling the old conventional wisdom. His two Farewell Lectures as departing director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State in July 1969 contain the quoted passage. The lectures were subsequently reprinted in Thomas L. Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 233, 1976).

3. Thomas L. Hughes, "The Power to Speak and the Power to Listen," in Thomas M. Frank et al., eds., Secrecy and Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 15.

4. Ibid., p. 19.

5. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World Politics 31 (October 1978).

6. Ibid., p. 70.

7. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 30 (Winter 1984), p. 125.

8. These principals include, at a minimum, the president, vice-president, national security adviser, secretary of state, and secretary of defense.

9. Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 103.