

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Call Study
OLL 84-0035

Director, Office of Legislative Liaison 7 January 1985

NOTE TO: DCI

STAT Re comment in the press:

o Attached are cover and page 6 of HPSCI Annual Report which we received this A.M.

o If you are still considering responding publicly, the HPSCI conclusion on page 6 moots the issue.

STAT

Charles A. Briggs

cc: DDCI
EX DIR
D/PAO

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Union Calendar No. 679

98th Congress, 2d Session - - - - -

House Report 98-1196

R E P O R T
ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DURING THE
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
Pursuant to
Clause 1(d) Rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives



JANUARY 2, 1985 --Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
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In fairness to the intelligence officials, however, it should be noted that the Committee's review of problem areas indicates that not all the fault lies with the intelligence agencies. In a number of instances, the policy makers or military commanders failed to make use of available intelligence or failed to ask the intelligence community for the kind of information they needed or failed to understand what kind of intelligence could realistically be expected to be provided.

There is a clear need for better coordination between the users of intelligence and the providers of intelligence so that the best possible intelligence is available when it is needed. The Committee understands its role in helping improve this situation and will continue to press for better results.

These are not new concerns. President Carter, in a note to his Secretary of State, his CIA Director and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the political intelligence he was receiving. In 1978, this Committee submitted to the House its first report following its creation in the summer of 1977. It pointed out that while "great improvements have been made in the collection, processing and dissemination of data in the warning process . . . improvements in analysis and the integration of analysis with policy formulation have lagged far behind."

Certain specific steps were taken by the management of the intelligence community (in part at the suggestion of this Committee) to improve those shortcomings, but national security is not a static affair. New challenges arise and old ones increase or change in nature. The intelligence community must meet those challenges.

In its 1980 report to the House, the Committee noted that the coming decade would present the intelligence community with challenges that would be "many, serious and growing." The report noted that its Evaluation Subcommittee study of the analytic component of the CIA has commended recent improvements made by Director Turner and his deputy in charge of analysis, and especially their efforts to revitalize the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) process.

The Committee is pleased that the current Director of Central Intelligence has continued and expanded the effort to improve the NIE process. Those studies represent the coordinated judgment of the intelligence community and are issued under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. They can be of particular value to the policy makers.

The Committee has noted recent criticism in the press by a former CIA employee who stated that he had been pressed to rewrite a draft National Intelligence Estimate to support Administration policy. Several Directors of Central Intelligence, including the current DCI, have taken the position that NIEs should represent their own views and that any views that differ should be included so that the policy maker can have the benefit of differing analysis. The Committee examined the earlier drafts and the final version of that particular NIE and found that dissenting views were printed at the very beginning of the study, a practice the Committee applauds.