

1 July 1982

NOTE FOR: NIO/SP

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Colby's call for a joint US-Soviet "war room" (See Sun item, attached) is another indication of gathering interest in the Nunn proposal that we talked about yesterday.

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Also FYI, I plan to send

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a memo summarizing yesterday's discussion about problems attending a nuclear freeze with a suggestion that he try to fit in a visit to Oak Ridge.

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cc: SA/NPI
C/ACIS

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State Dept. review completed

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1THE BALTIMORE SUN
29 June 1982

Ex-CIA chief favors nuclear arms freeze

From Wire Services

Washington—Former CIA Director William E. Colby yesterday endorsed the idea of a Soviet-American nuclear weapons freeze, saying either a freeze or an arms limitation agreement "is adequately verifiable for the safety of the country, and the chance of violation is minimal."

"The chance of injury to the country is minimal, and the advantage to our country and the advantage to the Soviets of reducing the numbers of and the ingenuity of these new devices which are progressively more dangerous is well worth that minimal chance of violation of a minimal degree," he said.

In fact, he said, any nuclear arms accord with Moscow would make it "easier rather than harder" to keep tabs on what the Soviets are doing by empowering the United States to demand an explanation of any suspicious Soviet arms behavior.

Mr. Colby, who headed the CIA from 1973 to 1976, made his remarks at a press breakfast organized by the nuclear freeze movement.

He said normal CIA intelligence checks on Soviet compliance—through satellite photography, electronic eavesdropping and analysis of observable Soviet activities and publications—would come into play. In addition, he said, the Soviets would

have to consider whether some Soviet official knowledgeable about the cheating would reveal it.

He said the Soviets could surreptitiously violate an agreement to freeze the production, deployment or testing of new nuclear weapons for a while, but not for long enough to endanger America's security to any significant degree.

"It is conceivable they can go into one of those salt mines and produce something and hammer it out all very quietly and secretly, and nobody will be able to see it or know about it," he said. "But the question has to be asked, can they do that in a way that has any strategic significance? And there I think the answer is basically no."

His position on verification differs from the Reagan administration's. In April, a State Department policy statement said:

"A freeze on all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified. The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets."

Mr. Colby said that although no sane American or Russian leader would use nuclear weapons in a first strike, "we have the problem of insane men getting ahold of them—that's why we have to reduce them."

He endorsed President Reagan's proposal for deep mutual cuts in nuclear warheads through a strategic arms reduction treaty.

The assumption that war can be forever deterred by the fear of mutual annihilation "is becoming more and more tenuous as a logical basis for living," Mr. Colby said.

He also called for a treaty that would establish a joint "war room" staffed by American and Russian officers as a means of preventing an accidental nuclear war.

"We have got to improve our crisis communications," he said, adding that with the two superpowers deploying increasingly accurate missiles, a nuclear crisis "can take place in a matter of hours and even shorter."

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INCOMING


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PRIORITY

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ACTION: NONE



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USIAEA

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/17/02 (BLACKWILL, ROBERT D)
 TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UR
 SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO USA INSTITUTE ON PROPOSED ARMS
 CONTROL TOPICS

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 6169; (B) VIENNA 6901

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT:-
2. WHILE WE DO NOT WANT TO SUGGEST THAT DAVYDOV AT USA INSTITUTE CONSTITUTES AN OFFICIAL CHANNEL, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO INFORMALLY IDENTIFY TO DAVYDOV IN GENERAL TERMS FOUR AREAS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTS MIGHT EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION: (1) ENCOURAGING ADHERENCE TO NON-PROLIFERATION TREATIES (NPT AND TLA TELOLCO); (2) TIGHTENING EXPORT CONTROLS; AND (3) ENCOURAGING SUPPLIERS TO ADOPT A FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS POLICY. WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTIONS IN REF A, EMBASSY MAY WISH TO DRAW UPON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN DISCUSSION WITH DAVYDOV. NON-PROLIFERATION TALKING POINTS ARE LARGELY BASED ON MATERIAL PREPARED FOR DISCUSSION WITH MOROZOV ON MARGIN OF RECENT IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNMENTS (SEE REF B). THE EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO INFORM DAVYDOV THAT SOME RECENT SOVIET PRESS ARTICLES, HIS IN PARTICULAR, BADLY DISTORT U.S. POLICY AND ARE NOT HELPFUL TO U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE.
3. BECAUSE A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND BREZHNEV HAS NOT YET BEEN ARRANGED, EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO DAVYDOV THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS AN AGENDA.
4. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS WITH SOVIETS ANY JOINT U.S.-SOVIET ACTION WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM JACKSON-NUNN PROPOSAL.

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PAGE 003

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-- AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE UNITED STATES PRESENTED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION PAPER PROPOSING THAT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS ADOPT A COMMON POLICY OF REQUIRING THAT RECIPIENT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL PRESENT AND FUTURE FACILITIES AS A CONDITION FOR SIGNIFICANT NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLY.

-- IN GENERAL, THE U.S. IS SUPPORTIVE OF EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE COVERAGE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND BELIEVES THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES CAN PROMOTE PROGRESS TOWARD THIS GOAL BY VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTING IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON THEIR CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. WELCOMES THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON MAY 15 AT SSOD II IN NEW YORK OF THE USSR INTENTION TO PLACE A "PART OF" ITS CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA "CONTROL." HAIG
END OF MESSAGE

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