



Directorate of  
Intelligence

**MASTER FILE COPY**  
**DO NOT GIVE OUT  
OR MARK ON**

~~Secret~~

[ ]

25X1

17

**Near East and  
South Asia Review**

[ ]

25X1

30 August 1985

~~Secret~~

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985

Copy 416

**Page Denied**

Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**Near East and South Asia Review** [Redacted]

25X1

30 August 1985

Page

**Articles**

**Algeria: Intentions Toward Morocco** [Redacted]

1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Although the Moroccan Prime Minister has portrayed Algeria as an imminent threat to his country, Algiers does not want relations to deteriorate to the point that large-scale military hostilities are likely but will instead focus its pressure on King Hassan to negotiate an arrangement allowing some Saharan autonomy. [Redacted]

25X1

**Tunisia: The Political Momentum of Islam** [Redacted]

5

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

As Tunisia's traditional, Western-oriented nationalism loses impetus with the aging of President Bourguiba and the waning of his appeal, Islam provides a focus for those repulsed by Soviet-style Marxism and offended by what they perceive to be the overweening influence of European political and cultural values. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X6

**God's Squads: Saudi Arabia's Religious Police** [Redacted]

11

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Saudi Arabia, among the most conservative of the world's Islamic states, maintains religious police to assure public adherence to the regime's religious and social strictures, with powers to arrest, detain, and even flog transgressors, and, as the country grows more conservative, these police will play a more visible role. [Redacted]

25X1

**The Palestinian Diaspora: Perspectives on Status and Prospects in the Arab World** [Redacted]

15

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Palestinians working in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were surveyed on the way they were treated by their host governments, their economic prospects and plans, political activities, attitudes toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East peace process, and the issue of a separate homeland. This article summarizes the results in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia [Redacted]

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985

Secret

[REDACTED]

25X1

**Iraq: The Kurdish Fursan** [REDACTED]

21

25X1

25X1

The Fursan, a paramilitary force of Kurdish tribesmen who assist Iraq in suppressing dissidents in Kurdistan, have begun to waver in their loyalty to the regime, and this could seriously complicate Baghdad's task of keeping peace in its troubled Kurdish region.

[REDACTED]

25X1

**The Ordeal of a French Journalist in Afghanistan** [REDACTED]

23

25X1

25X1

Jacques Abouchar's account of his six-week imprisonment in Afghanistan, *In the Bear's Cage*, gives a unique picture of Soviet and Afghan handling of suspected foreign intelligence agents, although he was better treated than many suspected foreign agents would have been because he is a well-known French journalist.

[REDACTED]

25X1

**India: Gujarat—Social Conflict and Stability** [REDACTED]

27

25X1

25X1

For more than five months, the industrialized west Indian state of Gujarat has been the scene of major caste and communal violence, and by moving deliberately on Gujarat's problems Prime Minister Gandhi has demonstrated that he is less likely than his mother to meddle in state governments but in return will expect from them greater competence.

[REDACTED]

25X1

**India's Military Airlift Capabilities** [REDACTED]

31

25X1

25X1

Although most of India's military airlift assets are deployed to support ground forces along its mountainous northern border, new Soviet-built IL-76 and AN-32 transports will give India an enhanced ability to intervene in the islands of the Indian Ocean, and the door is slightly open for US sales of C-130s to India.

[REDACTED]

25X1

**Sri Lanka: Population Redistribution and Resettlement—A Backdrop to Negotiations** [REDACTED]

35

25X1

25X1

The continuing redistribution of the Sri Lankan population will have a strong impact on prospects for a negotiated settlement between the Sinhalese-dominated government and the Tamil separatists.

[REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

ii

Secret



25X1



25X1



25X1

---

*Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors,*



25X1



Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1

### Articles

#### Algeria: Intentions Toward Morocco [Redacted]

25X1

The Moroccan Prime Minister recently portrayed Algeria to US officials as an imminent threat to his country. We believe the two countries' historically troubled relationship is at a low point over the Western Sahara conflict and King Hassan's political union with Libya. Nevertheless, Algiers, in our judgment, does not want relations to deteriorate to such a point that large-scale military hostilities are likely. We do not believe that Algiers is actively seeking Hassan's overthrow, which could produce a more hostile government in Rabat. With regard to the Western Sahara problem, small skirmishes probably will continue with little warning along Morocco's defensive berm to keep pressure on King Hassan to negotiate an arrangement allowing some Saharan autonomy. The greatest danger is that these minor clashes might lead to wider warfare. President Bendjedid's willingness to tighten the screws on Rabat may also be limited by Hassan's "union" with Libya and the danger that Algeria could suddenly encounter hostilities on both its eastern and western borders.

[Redacted]

If the allegations of an Algerian role are true, Algiers may have decided to put pressure on King Hassan by stirring up trouble inside Morocco, rather than trying to do something on the Western Sahara issue. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] President Bendjedid is under pressure from his senior Army officers to act more forcefully against Morocco. They are concerned about Bendjedid's refusal to prevent Rabat's completion of extensive defensive berms in the Western Sahara. The more leftist-leaning officers also are disgruntled with Bendjedid's courting of the United States and the West, particularly because of continued US and French military support for Morocco. They want to give the Polisario guerrillas more weapons and to prosecute the war with Morocco with even greater vigor. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

#### Moroccan Dissidents: A New Angle?

The most recent incident highlighting the tensions between Morocco and Algeria are charges by Rabat, heatedly denied by Algiers, that the Algerians are attempting to foment political instability in Morocco. The government of Morocco put on trial 17 dissidents whom it claimed were captured in July after entering the country from Algeria. Rabat also claims the dissidents were trained by Algerian security officials.

[Redacted] the majority of those arrested have admitted that they were acting in cooperation with a Moroccan Islamic fundamentalist leader living in exile in France. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Another possibility is that the dissidents were allowed to reside in Algeria, but that their plans and activities were not closely monitored by the government. Senior security and military officials opposed to Bendjedid may have sponsored the infiltrations, expecting them to fail, to embarrass Bendjedid by illustrating to foreigners the "contradictions" in the moderate foreign policy image he has sought to establish. We believe this may have been the case with last spring's abortive PLO raid on Israeli defense headquarters.

The terrorists told the Israelis that senior Algerian officials knew about the operation and authorized carrying it out during Bendjedid's state visit to Washington. In our opinion, Bendjedid would not have approved something that was not only doomed to fail but would have also negatively affected his effort to improve relations with the United States. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

**Legacy of Bitterness**

Rabat's accusations of Algerian support for dissidents are part of the longstanding antagonism between Morocco and Algeria. Underlying the dispute are deep-seated suspicions based on political, geographic, economic, and psychological factors. Algeria and Morocco have the largest populations and most abundant resources in the Maghreb, and each views the other as the principal roadblock to its regional dominance. In addition, the political systems of the two countries—revolutionary socialism versus a feudal monarchy—are antithetical. [redacted]

The principal source of tension between Algeria and Morocco in the past decade has been Rabat's claim to the Western Sahara. Algerian leaders believe their assistance to the Polisario is necessary both to counter what they see as Moroccan expansionism and to demonstrate Algeria's commitment to support wars of national liberation. Although Algeria has won the political battle thus far in the OAU and Nonaligned Movement by gaining widespread diplomatic recognition for the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, its prospects on the battlefield—where the outcome will be determined—are grim. Morocco's commitment of 80,000 men and its construction of a defensive perimeter during the past two years have proved effective in defending the territory from attacks by the 3,500 Polisario. Moreover, King Hassan's political union with Libya has created a new threat on Algeria's eastern frontier, and Algeria will have to consider action from Libya if it becomes embroiled with Morocco. [redacted]

Algiers has tried different, and often contradictory, strategies to counter these diplomatic and military setbacks. President Bendjedid earlier this year emphasized finding a political solution, almost certainly realizing that the Moroccan berm precludes a military victory by the Polisario. Hassan's rejection of Algeria's peace plans, however, appears to have encouraged Algiers to adopt a more confrontational policy toward Morocco. For example, contacts between the two countries have been reduced, and we are seeing more intensive efforts among nonaligned countries to win wider diplomatic recognition for the Polisario. (Liberia recently granted recognition after Algiers offered Monrovia petroleum, and some press reports suggest India may follow suit.) [redacted]

**The Algerian Strategy: More of the Same**

In our judgment, Algiers's continued support for the Polisario and its diplomatic wrangling with Rabat are the primary elements in Bendjedid's program to harass Hassan for his "intransigence" on the Western Sahara problem. The Algerians probably believe that they can make the Western Sahara conflict so costly that Hassan at some point will agree to Saharan autonomy. Algeria may also anticipate that its support for the Polisario will deter Hassan from a more ambitious scheme to resurrect the idea of a "greater Morocco," which includes not only the Western Sahara, but Mauritania and parts of southwest Algeria as well. [redacted]

We believe that the Bendjedid government does not want a major military conflict with Morocco. Even though Algeria enjoys an overwhelming local military advantage, its leadership almost certainly realizes that the rugged terrain along the border would limit military action to cross-border strikes by Algeria that could lead to a protracted war of attrition. Algiers may also realize that Morocco has a clear advantage along the southern portion of the border and could overrun Tindouf, the only significant Algerian settlement in the southwest and the political and military headquarters of the Polisario. Rabat could also launch airstrikes against Algeria's strategic petroleum and natural gas facilities. [redacted]

Algiers probably perceives that a protracted military engagement may prompt a successful move against Hassan. Senior Algerian officials have [redacted] expressed their preference for a Morocco led by Hassan and view the King as a factor for stability there. They fear his departure would produce a weak government led by Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed, which could be manipulated by strongly anti-Algerian elements or even Libyan leader Qadhafi. Neither does Algeria want a nationalistic military regime in Rabat that would be readier to adopt a belligerent policy toward Algiers. [redacted]

**Alternative Scenarios**

A number of developments might compel Algeria to reassess its position toward Morocco and encourage its leaders to adopt an even tougher policy. A decision

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret



Secret

by King Hassan to engage in "hot pursuit" of Polisario guerrillas into Algeria or possibly into northern Mauritania might lead the Algerians to become more directly involved in the fighting and to use its Army to harass the Moroccans along the northern frontier. This could lead to wider conflict between the two countries.

25X1

There are other, less likely scenarios that, in our opinion, could result in a more aggressive anti-Hassan posture. Morocco's purchase of highly sophisticated weapon systems, for example, might cause Bendjedid to feel more threatened and to consider a preemptive military strike. The Bendjedid government probably would respond militarily if it believed that Morocco and Libya were planning aggression against it or in retaliation for a hostile act, such as terrorism. Bendjedid might even consider the military option if he and his advisers suspected Moroccan-Libyan involvement in a plot to subvert his government.

25X1

25X1

Secret



Secret

**Tunisia: The Political Momentum of Islam** [redacted]

25X1

The role of Islam both in the personal life of Tunisians and the politics of the country continues to grow. As the traditional, Western-oriented nationalism loses impetus with the aging of President Bourguiba and the waning of his appeal, Islam provides a focus for those who are repulsed by Soviet-style Marxism and offended by what they perceive to be the overweening influence of European political and cultural values in an Arab and Muslim society. [redacted]

MTI leaders sentenced in 1981 for antiregime political activities. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] noted renewed use of neighborhood mosques for political agitation by religious militants in both urban and rural areas. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Embassy reporting indicates that the principal Islamic organization, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), is taking advantage of the appeal of Islam to expand its influence in key opposition labor and student organizations. Extremist Muslim groups have appeared as well, some with reported connections to Libya, which might be a catalyst for widespread domestic unrest in a post-Bourguiba period. At a minimum, any successor to President Bourguiba probably will have to make political accommodations with the Islamists to maintain domestic stability. [redacted]

[redacted] these activities as the latest attempt of the MTI to press the government to legalize the MTI as a full-fledged political party. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**MTI Targets Students and Labor**

The MTI now appears more willing than it was in the past to solicit cooperation with—or co-opt—legal political movements often at loggerheads with the government. Tunis is only now acknowledging this trend—and its potential for instability—as a result of MTI successes among university students. Last November, university students backing the MTI organized a general student congress to reactivate the General Union of Tunisian Students. The government tacitly supported the convocation in the belief that students affiliated with the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) would control the proceedings.

25X1

In fact, [redacted] the MTI faction controlled the proceedings. Moreover, student elections last spring resulted in a decisive victory for the MTI at the universities, especially on the major campus at Tunis. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Islam Spreads Its Roots**

According to the US Embassy in Tunis, the practice of Islam is enjoying a renewal in public life. During this year's Ramadan holy month, for example, more Tunisians observed the daylight fast, and restaurants tended more often than in the past to enforce voluntarily regulations prohibiting the consumption of alcohol. The Embassy also reports incidents of harassment by religious zealots of Tunisians either not observing Ramadan or conspicuous for their Western dress. [redacted]

More critical in terms of potential instability is the MTI's alleged contact with the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the largest mass political movement other than the ruling PSD. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Concurrent with the rise of Islamic consciousness during Ramadan is a resurgence of political activity by MTI leaders. In June the MTI reconstituted its political bureau, and leaders hope to enlarge the bureau with the return of MTI members living in Europe. The regrouping of the MTI was made possible by the government's pardon of 17 MTI leaders last August, including MTI President Rachid Ghannouchi and Secretary General Abdefatteh Mourou. The government now has released all 105

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985

Secret

[Redacted]

particularly Western—influence. These positions echo demands of other groups, such as the main political opposition Social Democratic Movement of Ahmed Mestiri. The MTI and its leaders, unlike most other regime opponents, have never been affiliated with Bourguiba and the country’s traditional elite.

25X1

[Redacted]

Consequently, they have the advantage of offering a “fresh” and, what younger Tunisians in particular view to be, a truly independent opposition stance.

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] the removal of Taieb Baccouche, editor of the union newspaper, could be connected to UGTT-MTI consultations. Baccouche is an opponent of UGTT leader Habib Achour and publicly blamed his removal on MTI influence in the union. He believes that Achour fired him because of a desire to solidify control of the UGTT through cooperation with the MTI. [Redacted]

25X1

**Government Response: From Stick to Carrot**

The government of Prime Minister Mzali appears to be wary of the appeal of the MTI and Islamic fundamentalism in general and is mixing jawboning with accommodation in dealing with the Islamists, in our view. Release of the 17 MTI leaders last August probably marks a new and “softer” government policy. Uppermost in the minds of Tunisian leaders is the need to placate civil servants, military officers, and Tunisians outside the government who may be latently sympathetic to the MTI. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Basis of MTI Strength**

The emergence of the MTI as a potent political force since the late 1970s derives from two general sources: deteriorating social and economic conditions in the country and the group’s unique position among opposition movements. The MTI draws much of its appeal from the burgeoning ranks of Tunisian students, who are having considerable difficulty finding satisfactory employment in an increasingly tight job market. Most of the population is under 26 and has little memory of the first two decades of rapid economic growth and prosperity. At the same time, their high rate of education by Middle Eastern standards has created expectations that the government cannot satisfy. The inability of the Bourguiba government’s Western economic model to alleviate economic problems and the social strains caused by rapid urban migration and population growth have made young people receptive to other political and economic solutions. Increasing economic disparities between the more affluent north and the less developed and less “modernized” south also have provided the MTI with a regional theme and audience for its propaganda. [Redacted]

At the same time, Mzali has accompanied his “softer” policy with pressure on the MTI to lower its political expectations. At the time of the release of the MTI leaders, official statements and progovernment editorials called upon the MTI to abide by the established political rules. The Embassy in Tunis has reported that the government has talked to the MTI behind the scenes about its demand for political recognition. Mzali is most concerned about winning a firm MTI pledge to renounce violence, to accept the Constitution, and to avoid ties to foreign governments. In return, Mzali has admitted publicly that Islam could provide a base for the future life of the country. Nevertheless, he has called upon religious leaders to interpret the Koran in ways that will be applicable to modern life and has emphatically refused any reconsideration of the personal status code. The code, which was unveiled by Bourguiba after independence and puts the social position of women in the family and society on a Western footing, has been the main target of the MTI. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The MTI draws supporters because of its political program and position on the political spectrum. Along with other oppositionists, the MTI calls for nonviolent political reform, including a new national charter ensuring democratic freedoms, recognition as a legitimate political party, the equitable redistribution of society’s wealth, support for Third World liberation movements, and rejection of foreign—and

Secret

Secret

**The Muslim Fringe**

One factor that could further complicate relations between the MTI and the government is the political activity of radical Islamic activists, some of whom operate outside the MTI. MTI leader Mourou has alluded in press interviews to an extremist wing in the MTI, [redacted]

[redacted] the MTI contains a faction known as Al Dawa (The Call), consisting largely of students and dedicated to harassing the government to goad it into a repressive posture. The group apparently believes such retaliation would help recruitment efforts. [redacted]

Other groups outside the MTI include the Islamic Liberation Party, the Information Committee of the Islamic Movement, the Arab Nationalist Grouping, the Islamic Progressive Movement, and the Islamic Cooperative Movement. None of these groups is as large or as influential as the MTI. [redacted]

[redacted] they share some of the objectives of the MTI. On the other hand, they are more inclined to operate clandestinely, since they espouse pan-Arabism and a political system with only Islamic parties. The Islamic Liberation Party, which is perhaps the most active of these extremist groups, envisions the re-creation of the caliphate. This party is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Libya and has recruited adherents in the armed forces. Although the extent of foreign influence over these smaller groups cannot be ascertained, the Al Dawa grouping in the MTI, the Arab Nationalist Grouping, and the Islamic Progressive Movement are sympathetic to Libya. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Tunisia, in comparison with the other Maghreb countries, is the most vulnerable to resurgent Islam. Unlike Algeria, in which Islam supported the anticolonial struggle, and Morocco, where Hassan's political strength rests in large part on his descent from Muhammad, Islam in Tunisia has had no political role. Traditionally, Islamic clerics were tied to the political power structure but played no role in the independence movement because of Bourguiba's dominance. Moreover, Bourguiba consciously sought

to remove Islam as a social force in the years following independence because of his antipathy to it. The renewed appeal of Islam in Tunisia puts in doubt the success of Bourguiba's policy and suggests that Islam will present a formidable challenge to his successors. [redacted]

In the short term, the growth of the MTI probably will depend to a large extent on the government's attitude toward domestic political reform. As long as the government maintains its policy of "benign authoritarianism" toward its opponents and refuses to allow democratic representation, the MTI will gain adherents because of its emphasis on egalitarianism and its platform of social populism. [redacted]

MTI's effectiveness also will depend on its ability to control its radical followers and undercut the more extremist groups. The unwillingness of the MTI to clarify its stand on secularism and general social and political issues—no doubt because of its need to strike a balance between its extremist followers and moderate Tunisians—could jeopardize the moderates' control of the MTI and inhibit the organization's growth. Efforts by the MTI to work with more established and nonreligious opposition groups also could split the MTI and encourage radical Islamic fundamentalists to immerse themselves in clandestine activity. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret



**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

## God's Squads: Saudi Arabia's Religious Police [redacted]

25X1

Saudi Arabia is among the most conservative of the world's Islamic states and adheres to religious and social strictures that often seem arbitrary and oppressive to Westerners. The Mutawaiin, or religious police, perhaps the most curious institution in Saudi Arabia, are charged with maintaining at least public adherence to these strictures, enforcing religious observances and ensuring public morality. The members of the organization have the power to arrest, detain, and even flog suspects, and can be a particular nuisance to unwary or incautious expatriates. [redacted]

Over the last few years the government has tried to strengthen the organization, upgrade the quality of police recruits, streamline training, and make the organization more aware of the cultural differences of foreigners. At the same time, the Saudi regime bases its claim to legitimacy on its defense of Islamic values and principles and will continue supporting the activities of this extremely conservative organization. Moreover, the Iranian revolution has heightened Riyadh's awareness of the potential threat from the conservative Islamic backlash against Western influence, and the Saudis are cautioning Westerners that they must respect the country's Islamic precepts. As the country grows steadily more conservative, a process likely to be accelerated by the current economic downturn, the Mutawaiin will play a more active, arbitrary, and visible role. [redacted]

### The Enforcers

The approximately 7,000 Mutawaiin—known collectively as the Organization for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice—enforce religious observances such as closing shops at prayer times and attendance by the faithful at mosques. They also monitor public morality, ensuring that men and particularly women are modestly dressed, that they display a minimum of flesh or jewelry, and that women are accompanied in public by a male relative. [redacted]

The Mutawaiin patrol city streets and shopping malls in groups of three to four from 0600 to 1000 and again from 1600 to 2000. They are easily distinguishable by their beards, relatively short robes, and batons used to beat offenders on the spot. In residential areas they generally patrol in jeeps equipped with loudspeakers, blaring the call to prayer. They occasionally search restaurants to ensure sexually segregated dining. They were also instrumental in early 1983 in closing video arcades in Makkah Province on the grounds that they were a corrupting influence on Saudi youth. They cooperate with Ministry of Interior officials and police on issues related to morality, such as alcohol or drug problems, but have occasionally been criticized for involving themselves in civil matters outside their jurisdiction. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The organization's influence has grown in the major urban areas, according to Embassy reporting. It is most powerful in the Nejd, the heartland of Saudi Arabia where Riyadh is located, and less influential in the more cosmopolitan Jidda area and in Taif. Although zealous about monitoring public behavior, the enforcers generally do not extend their purview to private homes. [redacted]

25X1

### Extensive Powers

The organization and its individual police have considerable power. Its conservative president, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al al-Shaykh, has Cabinet rank and reports directly to the King. The Mutawaiin are bureaucratically independent of both the Interior Ministry and the government's premier religious organization, the Department of Religious Research, Advisory Opinions, Proselytization, and Guidance. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985



**Secret**

The vice president of the organization, Shaykh Saleh ibn Saad al-Luhaydan, is increasingly influential in the Saudi religious establishment, according to Embassy reporting. Only 37 years old, he has served in several senior judicial positions and in his current post supervises many Mutawaiin officials considerably older than he. He attends the weekly meetings of the senior religious leaders with King Fahd, at which they discuss Islamic law and its application in the kingdom as well as major social issues. Although Luhaydan is believed to have good relations with the government, his outspokenness on social issues prompted government officials to cancel his conservative religious television program in 1982 because of his growing appeal among Islamic traditionalists. [ ]

Individual police are empowered to arrest and detain suspected offenders for up to 48 hours in cells attached to neighborhood Mutawaiin offices, after which suspects must be turned over to regular police. They frequently flog suspects during interrogation or as a summary punishment if they confess. Although they do so rarely, they can search private homes without warrants if they suspect immoral behavior is taking place. [ ]

The group is not popular with much of the public, according to Embassy reporting. The enforcers are avoided by most people and only rarely challenged. Although frustration with them is high among some segments of the populace—Westernized middle-class Saudis and university professors, for example—it is confined to private grumbling. The police, however, enjoy considerable support among the growing conservative elements of the population, which makes both the government and their critics reluctant to challenge them. Although King Fahd is believed to hold more moderate views, he has not curbed their growing power for fear of focusing conservative criticism on the excesses of the royal family. [ ]

#### **Headaches for Expatriates**

The Mutawaiin are generally more of a nuisance than a threat to Westerners, largely by limiting their ability to move freely and enforcing an often shifting and capricious standard of dress and public behavior. Western expatriates apprehended for immodest dress

are usually deprived of their resident permits, taken to a neighborhood center, then lectured and released upon signing a statement of confession and repentance in Arabic. [ ]

Arrests are infrequent. Cases of Westerners being flogged are rare, according to the Embassy, although US officials are looking into allegations by one US citizen. In Riyadh, government officials will intervene with Mutawaiin on behalf of foreigners if prompted, and in one case it had an overzealous enforcer transferred to a remote area. [ ]

The problem for expatriates has been most severe in the isolated Eastern Province, where the oil industry and much of the expatriate community is concentrated. Pressure from the Mutawaiin appears to fluctuate. Reports of harassment increased, for example, in the spring of 1984, when expatriate women increasingly were confronted by the religious police for alleged improper dress. In recent years before each Christmas, the local religious police chief issued strong proscriptions against holiday parties or decorations by expatriates. He is one of the most conservative and hard line of the Mutawaiin and has been difficult for Westerners to deal with. The problem was worsened by the previous Amir of the province, who was notoriously reluctant to rein in the police and who deflected requests for help from the US Consulate. According to the Consulate, the new Amir probably will be more responsive to appeals from US officials. [ ]

The expatriate population of the Eastern Province has dropped by a third in the last two and a half years, from 30,000 to 20,000, but pressure by the religious police has not been a major reason for the sharp decline, [ ] It probably has been a contributing factor, however, as the economic downturn has made working in the kingdom much less attractive financially, and workers are less willing to live under social and religious constraints. [ ]

#### **Gradual Changes**

The Mutawaiin leadership has attempted over the last few years to streamline the organization and improve

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

relations with both the Saudi populace in general and the expatriate community. In 1980 its personnel system was amended to conform with other Saudi civil service organizations. Although the religious police are generally believed to be older and poorly trained, the organization is successfully recruiting among the young—particularly religious zealots—and improving the training of recruits, according to the Embassy. Many recruits receive a yearlong course in Islamic practices and lectures to acquaint them with different expatriate customs and diplomatic immunity. [redacted]

Although harassment of expatriates will occur less frequently as their numbers decline, those remaining are likely to come under greater pressure to conform to Islamic precepts and may find themselves targets of arbitrary abuses, particularly if they are blamed for growing economic troubles. Such a trend probably will not pose a major risk to expatriate security, but it may require much greater caution in public behavior.

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

In addition, the leadership of the organization has expressed its willingness to work more closely with diplomatic officials to prevent future problems. The current police vice president, who appears to be the principal public relations spokesman, seems to be reasonable. He noted to US officials that he had read Dale Carnegie and is quick to praise such modern events as Prince Sultan's space flight and criticize what he characterizes as Khomeini's misguided interpretation of Islam. [redacted]

25X1

**Prospects**

The Mutawain are likely to play a more powerful role in policing Saudi public behavior, at least for the near term. There are no signs that the growing religious conservatism in the country will abate soon, and [redacted] it is growing rapidly among the young. A further downturn in the economy is likely to fuel this trend, and public displays of wealth or frivolity will come under sharper attack by the religious establishment. The government is not likely to try to rein in the conservatives to avoid being charged with failing to preserve the public welfare.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Secret



Secret

## The Palestinian Diaspora: Perspectives on Status and Prospects in the Arab World

surveyed Palestinians working in four Arab countries on the way they are treated by their host governments, their economic prospects and plans, political activities, attitudes toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East peace process, and the issue of a separate homeland. In all, 299 Palestinians from diverse economic backgrounds were interviewed in 1984 in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Twenty interviews with Middle East specialists in the United States supplemented the field research. Interview data are fleshed out with descriptions of the host countries' formal policies and informal practices for handling both their Palestinian expatriate populations and the Palestinian question as a political issue. This article summarizes material from interviews with 75 Palestinians in Kuwait and 50 Palestinians working in Saudi Arabia.<sup>1</sup>

Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have contributed greatly to the modernization of their host countries, but they probably will be squeezed out gradually over the next few years because of economic and political forces largely beyond their control. Reversals in the oil market have led Gulf governments to hire cheaper foreign labor and to cut back on the educational and health benefits that attracted so many Palestinians over the last several decades. Moreover, Gulf interest in the Palestinian question is declining as concern over the terrorist threat is rising. Most Palestinians have not yet fathomed the implications of these trends. Apolitical or politically moderate, they focus their efforts on achieving a high standard of living for themselves and their children and rarely express animosity toward their host governments. The inevitable outflow of thousands of Palestinians from the Gulf states probably will create serious problems for Jordan, which will be expected to absorb them, and will revitalize the notion of an independent Palestinian homeland.

**Table 1**  
**Distribution of Palestinians**  
**in Selected Arab States, 1980**<sup>a</sup>

*Thousand  
persons*

	Egypt	Jordan	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia
<b>Total</b>	<b>48.5</b> <sup>b</sup>	<b>1,160.8</b>	<b>276.4</b>	<b>127.0</b>
Male	28.7	607.1	147.3	69.2
Female	19.8	553.7	129.1	57.8

<sup>a</sup> Official census data where available or estimates.

<sup>b</sup> Recent interviews with Palestinian sources place this figure at more than 125,000 (1984): 62,000 before and after the 1948 partition; 55,000 after the 1967 war; 3,000 after the Jordanian civil war; and 6,000 in 1982. The official 1976 census reported only 29,162, a number that the *Palestinian Statistical Abstract* also reports. Unless post-1980 migration has been much higher than previously believed, the 1984 figure appears to be inflated.

### Kuwait

It is often said that the Palestinians built modern Kuwait. The approximately 350,000 Palestinians in Kuwait (roughly 20 percent of the Kuwaiti population) occupy key positions of professional and intellectual leadership in Kuwait's educational institutions, government organizations, and business and financial enterprises. With a small native population (currently less than 40 percent of its total), Kuwait sought skilled foreign labor to fulfill its ambitious modernization plans. Arabs, compatible in language and religion, were preferred. Palestinians were among the most highly educated Arabs and flocked to Kuwait in large numbers in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Kuwait offered foreign workers excellent health and housing benefits along with educational opportunities for their children, an advantage much valued by

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985

Secret

**Table 2**  
**Palestinian Occupational Structure**  
**in Selected Arab States by Category <sup>a</sup>**

	Egypt (1976)		Jordan	Kuwait (1975)		Saudi Arabia (1974)	
	<i>Number of Persons</i>	<i>Percent of Total Employed</i>		<i>Number of Persons</i>	<i>Percent of Total Employed</i>	<i>Number of Persons</i>	<i>Percent of Total Employed</i>
Professional/technical	884	16.8	NA	11,449	25.3	12,589	56.1
Administrative/managerial	230	4.4	NA	534	1.2	570	2.5
Clerical/administrative support	769	14.6	NA	7,910	17.5	1,205	5.4
Sales	932	17.7	NA	3,605	8.0	629	2.8
Services	374	7.1	NA	3,881	8.6	722	3.2
Agriculture	197	3.7	NA	848	1.9	881	3.9
Production/transportation/general labor	1,222	23.2	NA	17,041	37.5	5,875	26.1
Miscellaneous	656	12.5	NA				
Employed	5,264	100.0	NA	45,268	100.0	22,471	100.0
Unemployed	14,039 <sup>b</sup>		NA	NA		511	
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,303</b>		<b>NA</b>			<b>22,982</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Based on official census data for years indicated.

<sup>b</sup> Given the rapid growth in the Egyptian economy after 1976 and the sharp increase in employment opportunities elsewhere, this figure was no doubt considerably reduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s.



25X1

Palestinians. Palestinians have enjoyed access to jobs at nearly all administrative and managerial levels. Only the very highest executive levels and politically appointed positions were beyond their reach.

Palestinians have become well integrated in Kuwait's economy, but they have remained outside its political and social life. Very few have been granted citizenship. While allowed to engage in entrepreneurial activities, they cannot buy or hold land. Even after working two or three decades in Kuwait, they have no continuing job rights and receive no social security (although a lump sum payment is customary upon retirement).

The presence of a large Palestinian population has reinforced Kuwait's support for the Palestinian cause. The government allows the PLO to operate offices in the country, provides financial assistance, and offers Arafat unrestricted access to decisionmakers.

Kuwait's posture, however, is less ideologically and culturally rigorous than that of the frontline Arab states and tends to mirror that of other moderate Gulf states.

Secret

16

Secret

In recent years, crises in the economy and in internal security have caused Kuwaiti leaders to turn increasingly inward, resulting in a decline of interest in the Palestinian issue and a new policy toward expatriate workers that will have serious implications for the Palestinians. Plummeting oil revenues, followed by the collapse of the domestic stock market have produced a climate of economic malaise. Threats of further radical terrorist attacks and the proximity of the Iran-Iraq war have heightened the Kuwaiti sense of vulnerability already inflamed by the population imbalance between natives (36 percent) and foreigners (64 percent).

Kuwait's long-term development goals reflect revised priorities: the number of expatriate workers will be reduced by half within five years. Highly paid expatriates with families (mostly Palestinians) will be replaced by foreigners who will accept lower status jobs, lower pay, and leave their families at home—primarily South Asians and Egyptians. After training, Kuwaiti nationals will take over other jobs held by foreigners.

Specific measures taken by the government strongly affect Palestinian interests: the children of foreign workers can no longer attend government schools (private schools are prohibitively expensive for many Palestinians); the dependent children of nonnationals cannot remain in the country after graduating from high school unless they have a job; if they leave the country to attend college, they cannot reenter, even for a visit, as long as they are in school. They may return after completing school only if they have a job. Only a limited number of expatriate children are allowed to attend Kuwait University, and even then, only in the less prestigious fields of liberal arts or commerce. They too must leave the country at graduation unless they have a job. Expatriates can no longer bring their families with them to work in Kuwait. The government is also breaking up Palestinian residential areas by tearing down the older apartment buildings and replacing them with high-cost buildings. (A lump sum payment to those evicted may be offered.) The government is requiring most foreign workers to live in labor camps, a measure that further discourages families.

These steps have not dramatically affected the size of the Palestinian population in Kuwait, but some Palestinians have left, most returning to Jordan. Some of those remaining in Kuwait have begun sending their assets out of the country so that when they receive notice—they may be given as little as a week to leave—they will have less to lose. A substantial drop in Kuwait's Palestinian population is inevitable, although it will probably happen gradually, given the serious obstacles to indigenization.

Kuwait's official policy of supporting the Palestinian cause is not likely to change fundamentally. Nevertheless, there is likely to be some drift, possibly major, away from the prevailing support for the Palestinian position, and financial assistance will probably decline.

#### **Palestinian Perspectives**

Palestinians in Kuwait characterize themselves as moderates or apolitical. Most express support for the mainline PLO and Yasir Arafat. Few—primarily professors, trade unionists, and the like—have been politically active on the local scene working for a settlement of the Palestinian issue.

The Palestinians see Kuwait as a nice place to work in for as long as they can. Their attitude toward Kuwait combines a sense of economic vulnerability and resentment at being treated shabbily after long service, with a desire to remain permanently if possible. They believe they have been the most dependable and stable portion of the non-Kuwaiti labor force and are being dismissed because of the Palestinian issue and fears of terrorism. They accept their fate with resignation and claim to harbor no animosity toward the government for denying them full rights. Although they have not absorbed the implications of Kuwait's new policies or fathomed the hard choices ahead, their reactions are likely to be social and personal rather than political.

All respondent groups demonstrated pronounced insecurity with their situation, most especially the youngest and those ready to retire. The youngest have known no other home and will have to leave after high

Secret

**Secret**

school graduation. Their elders face the prospect of leaving behind friends and possessions and moving to an unfamiliar place, or a place they may have left decades ago. Educated and skilled members of the middle class believe they will be the last affected and, in any case, will have job options elsewhere. Members of trades and crafts realize that Kuwait has removed much of the financial incentive for staying and will try to relocate, although with little optimism.

A very large number would prefer to remain in Kuwait, as permanent residents if possible. Most say they would feel more at home in Kuwait than in Jordan. They also would prefer Kuwait to a future Palestinian state. But they realize that they have been living on borrowed time in Kuwait and are beginning to consider other options seriously. The Gulf states, however, are following policies similar to those of Kuwait, and the war has damaged Iraq's economy severely, leaving little opportunity for foreign workers until a settlement is reached. As for Jordan, the Palestinians fear that it could not absorb them and that the Jordanian economy is not strong enough to provide appropriate employment and the necessary protection for their assets. They believe that Israel has made the West Bank an unattractive place to live.

Palestinian sentiment for some sort of resolution to their dilemma is likely to build quickly. Many Palestinians are beginning to believe they have no other choice but to look to a separate homeland—a place where they can raise their children safely, where they can retire, and which provides a secure haven for their capital and other assets. New employment opportunities elsewhere would ameliorate this trend, but none appear on the horizon.

Palestinians in Kuwait do not expect the United States to play a constructive role in reaching a settlement, believing that US policy is subject to Israeli interests. Some express a faint hope that a united Arab coalition might make some progress.

Some of those interviewed believe that Jordan will bear the brunt of the Palestinian exodus. Jordan will be denied the steady inflow of remittances that have supported its economy for many years, and it cannot sustain the number of workers who will have to be

repatriated (most with Jordanian passports). Thus, Jordan could be the place where Palestinian frustrations and hopelessness crystallize into political activism.

#### **Saudi Arabia**

The Saudis have not developed a coherent, integrated policy on the import of labor, and the mix of expatriates has fluctuated widely over time. Originally, Muslims were preferred; then East Asians were hired for their greater productivity. Most recently, both skilled and unskilled South Asians are being hired because they will accept lower wages.

Foreigners are not as predominant in Saudi population statistics as they are in Kuwait's, nor do Palestinians predominate in the expatriate work force. Of about 10 million Saudis, 1.5-2 million are estimated to be foreign workers, and, of these, about 150,000 to 200,000 are Palestinians. As in other host countries, the Palestinians fill many of the most highly skilled positions as doctors, engineers, teachers, and professors.

The Saudi Government tightly controls the entry of all foreigners and allowed few to enter the kingdom before about 1978, when large development programs got under way. It also maintains strict controls over naturalization and emigration as well as over expatriate behavior in the country. Only Muslims are eligible for citizenship. As in Kuwait there is little chance that any of the children born in the kingdom to foreign parents will become naturalized citizens. Working primarily through employers, the government keeps close tabs on worker activities and has a policy of prompt banishment for even minor criminal offenses. Political activity is proscribed for foreigners. As a rule, high economic payoffs offer expatriate workers good incentives for circumspect behavior.

Those Palestinians that succeeded in immigrating during the earlier years (1948 or earlier) generally managed to integrate themselves, obtained citizenship, and even attained leadership roles in government and business. Those that arrived after 1967 achieved only economic acceptance.

**Secret**

Secret

Officially, the Saudis support the Palestinian cause by offering financial support to the PLO, as well as allowing PLO leaders high-level access—but on a more limited basis than in Kuwait. In return for Saudi aid, the PLO restricts its activities in the country. Saudi support is diluted by suspicions deriving from the 1970 civil war in Jordan and Palestinian actions in Lebanon. These suspicions also affect the Saudi view of Palestinian workers, who are believed to be more highly politicized than other foreigners in the country.

Deteriorating economic conditions have taken their toll in Saudi Arabia, and, while the Saudis are not publicly announcing a change in policy toward the import of foreign labor, they are implementing existing restrictions more vigorously (if selectively) and adding new conditions. Three conditions for granting a job to a non-Saudi must be met: the prospective foreigner must be qualified for the job; no qualified Saudi native can be found for the job; and the worker must have a sponsor who will vouch for and employ him. New restrictions affect dependents, limit the staying time of foreigners (even if they find a new job, they must leave the country and reenter), and penalize employers of foreigners who try to evade the law. It is now more difficult for Palestinians to enter the country than other Arab nationalities. The government is also active in cutting wages and replacing highly paid workers with lower paid, as well as “Saudi-izing” the work force as rapidly as possible.

Pressure to Saudi-ize the work force is strongest in the public sector, although it is apparent in the private sector, too. The kinds of jobs that Palestinians hold are coveted by educated Saudis—professional and engineering jobs, middle- and high-level managerial positions, or highly skilled technical positions. In the push to replace foreigners with Saudis, minimal attention is apparently given to qualifications. Saudi Arabia has been increasing the pace at which foreigners are removed from important civil service posts to give them to generally young, inexperienced nationals, most of whom have just completed their education. For example, a Palestinian with 22 years of experience who had been the general manager of a Saudi bank told of being replaced with a Saudi half his age with virtually no experience. Few Palestinians will be allowed to take new jobs at technical and

managerial levels, and some are being replaced by nonnationals with comparable skills and experience but at lower pay.

No recent statistics are available on trends in the Saudi labor market. Observers believe that the level of Palestinian workers is declining slowly and project a continuing gradual decline, mostly through attrition. Saudi Government actions are not usually sudden or acute, but slow and situation oriented. The government can avoid the onus of appearing anti-Palestinian by allowing market forces to do its work.

#### **Palestinian Perspectives**

Economic opportunities brought the Palestinians to Saudi Arabia. Originally, their dependents had few restrictions placed upon them and were free to take advantage of Saudi schools and universities, except for the Medical College. Social security benefits are available to Palestinians working for the government; private business tends to pay large lump sum payments. Health care has been available at no cost, although expatriates working in the private sector will soon lose this benefit.

Aside from these advantages, Saudi society holds little attraction for Palestinians. They generally regard the Saudi system as backward, tribal, and archaic [redacted]

Unlike the case in Kuwait, once the economic and educational benefits dwindle away, little will remain to keep the Palestinians in Saudi Arabia.

The younger Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia express some resentment at the tightening restrictions on their activities. They carry no refugee stigma in their own minds and recognize the discrimination against them. While they fear being displaced from the only home they have known, they realize that opportunities are becoming increasingly limited in Saudi Arabia. Their elders are resigned to the situation and remark that “insecurity is a way of life” for Palestinians, who must take their opportunities where they can. Few would want to retire in Saudi Arabia anyway. Those who have lived there less than 15 years are most outspoken in their criticism.

25X1

Secret



**Secret**

Most Palestinians in Saudi Arabia regard themselves as apolitical or decidedly moderate. They support Arafat and the PLO but do not engage in political activism and are cautious about even expressing opinions about the host country. None expressed the desire to see the system change or to be active in seeking to change it but comment about it with a sense of superiority and detachment.

Saudi-based Palestinians support an independent homeland more strongly than those who live in Kuwait. The fact that few Palestinians in Saudi Arabia have any desire to stay permanently appears to play a large role in their attitude toward a separate state. Their reasons are the same as those residing in Kuwait—the need for long-term economic security, a safe place to invest their assets, and for practical requirements such as passports and an acceptable international entity to defend their rights.

On the other hand, they doubt that a separate homeland would be economically viable and question if it could absorb large numbers of highly skilled Palestinians, at least initially. In the absence of other attractive options, however, the separate state solution is being more seriously considered than at any time in the past four or five years.

Palestinians in Saudi Arabia are fatalistic about their prospects for achieving a homeland. They believe the United States has a role to play in a Middle East settlement but generally characterize US policy as unhelpful and not likely to change. The former idealism about what the United States stands for has been dissipated, although no strongly negative feelings were expressed toward the United States.

In sum, for these Palestinians, life in Saudi Arabia is preferable to unemployment elsewhere. They will try to stay as long as they can, but there will be no assimilation. Domestic economic and security issues will preoccupy Saudi leaders, and their interest in the Palestinian issue will probably decline. Even if the oil market should turn around, the gradual downward trend in the Palestinian presence in Saudi Arabia is likely to continue. Many unemployed Palestinians will return to Jordan, and support for a Palestinian homeland will grow.

[Redacted]

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

**Iraq: The Kurdish Fursan** [ ]

25X1

The Fursan, a paramilitary force of Kurdish tribesmen who assist Iraq in suppressing dissidents in Kurdistan, have begun to waver in their loyalty to the regime. [ ]

Fursan are starting to doubt Baghdad's ability to contain the rebel threat. Disaffection among the Fursan could seriously complicate Baghdad's task of keeping peace in its troubled Kurdish region. [ ]

**Background**

The Fursan is a militia composed primarily of Kurds recruited from the Herkki, Sorchi, and Zibari tribes.<sup>1</sup> The tribesmen have sided with the government in part because they have longstanding feuds with some of the major Kurdish resistance groups. The US Embassy in Baghdad estimates there are some 25,000 Fursan fighters divided into 54 battalions. According to the Embassy, the Iraqi Government pays 750 dinars monthly to each Fursan commander who provides 1,000 fighters; individual militiamen get 85 dinars (an Iraqi Government Minister earns 500 dinars monthly). [ ]

Initially, the Fursan shared the job of guarding the north with the Popular Army—the militia of Iraq's ruling Ba'th Party. Embassy officials report that recently Baghdad has begun to redeploy Popular Army units to the southern front at Al Basrah. This leaves the Fursan as the most important security force in the Kurdish region, an area beset by two insurgencies. Some 5,000 members of the Kurdish Barzani tribe have started a revolt along the Iraqi-Turkish border, while 2,000 to 3,000 guerrillas of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are fighting farther south around As Sulaimaniyah [ ]

<sup>1</sup> The term Fursan comes from the Arabic for "cavalrymen." Baghdad has designated the Kurdish tribesmen loyal to it the "cavalrymen of Salahadin." Salahadin, a Kurd, was the Muslim warrior who defeated the Crusaders. The Fursan also are referred to as Light Battalions. [ ]

**The Fursan Versus the PUK**

In 1983, Iran invaded Iraq at Panjwin, the stronghold of the PUK. Fearing that the PUK would join forces with the Iranians, Baghdad negotiated a deal with the group's leader, Jalal Talabani. The government enrolled the PUK into the Fursan and paid the guerrillas regular subsidies, in return for which the PUK helped Baghdad to repel Iran's invasion. [ ]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

The PUK's deal with Baghdad lasted only nine months, largely because the Fursan undermined it. [ ]

[ ] the Fursan refused to accept Talabani as an ally because they had fought him for years. They conspired to drive a wedge between him and Baghdad by luring an aide of Talabani to a meeting and murdering him. When Talabani sought revenge, open warfare erupted between the two groups, and ultimately Baghdad was drawn into fighting Talabani. The government's anti-Talabani campaign continues today. [ ]

25X1

25X1

**The Fursan Versus Barzani**

The Barzani tribe spearheaded Iran's invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1983. The Barzanis' objective was to regain tribal land from which they had been driven in the mid-1970s. As a result of the invasion, the Barzanis carved out a number of bases along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The Fursan subsequently tried but failed to drive the Barzanis out of this region. [ ]

25X1

25X1

Last August, Mas'ud Barzani—the leader of the Barzanis—traveled to Syria and Libya, where he met President Assad and Colonel Qadhafi. The two

25X1

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985

Secret

leaders invited Barzani to join the Democratic National Front, a coalition of Iraqi dissidents seeking to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. In return, the Syrians and Libyans promised Barzani arms and ammunition. According to US Embassy officials, Barzani has used the equipment Syria and Libya supplied him to expand his control over the border region. [redacted]

If the Fursan continue to strike deals with the guerrillas, Baghdad's job of keeping control over Kurdish-inhabited areas will become more complicated. The regular Iraqi Army already is stretched thin defending the central and southern battlefronts against Iran. It seems unlikely that Baghdad will risk a major confrontation with the rebel Kurds. It probably will cordon off the area they hold and not try to reclaim it until after the war with Iran. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

**The Fursan Have Second Thoughts**

[redacted] some elements of the Fursan recently have begun to waver in their loyalty to Baghdad. [redacted] Fursan fighters are disturbed by the Iraqis' apparent inability to wipe out the PUK. Baghdad has pushed a ruthless campaign to reconquer the area held by Talabani, but the PUK guerrillas have stubbornly held out, and in recent weeks Iran has begun to supply them with aid. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

The Fursan also are dismayed by the sophisticated weaponry Barzani is getting from Syria and Libya. A Fursan chief claimed the Barzanis are being supplied with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. Recently, the guerrillas shot down an Iraqi MI-17 helicopter with one of the missiles. The helicopters formerly were the scourge of the Kurdish guerrilla groups. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1  
25X1

US Embassy officials report that some Fursan units are avoiding engagements with the guerrillas, and a few appear to have concluded local truces with them. According to these officials, the Fursan and the Barzanis are jointly administering several areas of the Kurdish north. The officials claim that in one area along the border, only two of 80 villages are under Baghdad's authority. [redacted]

25X1

**Implications for Baghdad**

The Fursan's disaffection from Baghdad is likely to continue. According to US Embassy officials, years of living on the government's bounty have spoiled the Fursan. Individual commanders have grown wealthy and are no longer willing to risk their lives against the guerrillas—many of whom, like Barzani, are fighting for land they believe was unjustly taken from them. The officials contend the Fursan are seeking a modus vivendi whereby they and the guerrillas can live side by side. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

## The Ordeal of a French Journalist in Afghanistan

25X1

Jacques Abouchar's account of his six-week imprisonment in Afghanistan, *In the Bear's Cage*, gives a unique picture of Soviet and Afghan handling of suspected foreign intelligence agents. The Soviets and Afghans tried to force Abouchar to say he worked for US or French intelligence by using threats, frequent and prolonged interrogation, and isolation, but they did not physically abuse him. Abouchar denied any ties to the CIA or French intelligence, but he provided his captors with some potentially useful information on the insurgents.<sup>1</sup>

shared their food and water with him. They seemed much more interested in France—repeating frequently “Paris” and “champagne”—than in Afghanistan.

25X1

The Soviet forces, however, stole Abouchar's traveler's checks, toothpaste, and toilet paper. Only their commander prevented them from taking his watch.

25X1  
25X1

Abouchar noted that the troops' clothes were filthy, their boots had no laces, and they used string to hold up their pants.

25X1

### Capture by Soviets

Jacques Abouchar, a noted French television journalist, and two French camera technicians entered Afghanistan from Pakistan with an insurgent band allied with resistance leader Sayed Ahmad Gailani on 17 September 1984. Abouchar intended to film the group's planned attack on Soviet and Afghan regime forces. Although Abouchar's network is controlled by the French Government, he claims that the French Foreign Ministry and the French Embassy in Islamabad were unaware of his project.

### Soviet Interrogation in Qandahar

After his capture, Abouchar was taken to Qandahar, where he was interrogated for three days by Soviet officers. The senior Soviet officer asked Abouchar about CIA operations in France and CIA relations with French intelligence, but the officer did not pursue the subject when Abouchar said he knew nothing. The officer at Qandahar was fairly relaxed and ended the interrogation by recalling the fine relations between France and the Soviet Union during World War II.

25X1

25X1

Soviet airborne troops apparently had advance intelligence about Abouchar's plans. They captured him in Qandahar Province after his group had been in Afghanistan only a day; the French technicians escaped to Pakistan. The Soviet commander indicated that he had known when the party was going to enter Afghanistan. Abouchar believes that Afghan Government agents found out about the party's plans at Chaman, the Pakistani border town where the party stayed for several days.

Lower ranking Soviet officers were more hostile toward Abouchar. One officer accused him of belonging to a neo-Nazi organization and of planning sabotage.

25X1

### Afghan Interrogation Techniques

Abouchar was then taken to Sidorat prison in Kabul. During his first week there, Afghan intelligence (KHAD) officers tried to force Abouchar to admit that he was either an employee of the CIA or French intelligence. During the second and third weeks, the Afghans tried to persuade him to admit that he had been forced into carrying out his project by his superiors at French television. Two KHAD officials interrogated him most of the time.

25X1

25X1

<sup>1</sup> Abouchar's book, *Dans la Cage de l'Ours*, was published in France in 1985. He is currently working in Washington for French television.

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985

Secret

Abouchar says that KHAD director Dr. Najibullah, who joined the interrogation before Abouchar's press conference and trial, tried to convince him to cooperate. Najibullah was correct but cold. None of the interrogators tried to recruit Abouchar to work for Afghan or Soviet intelligence. [redacted]

Afghan intelligence used threats, frequent and prolonged interrogation, and isolation to try to extract a confession:

- They threatened Abouchar with a long prison term unless he cooperated.
- Although they never threatened physical violence, Abouchar shared a cell with Afghans who were beaten, and he occasionally heard screams of people being tortured.
- Afghan intelligence questioned him nearly every day for periods lasting up to 12 hours. Most interrogations started at dawn, although some began around midnight.
- They gave him a monotonous diet of thin soup, corned beef, and bread. He had to sleep in a cold, small cell with three other people, wash with cold water despite the cold weather, and was allowed to use the toilet only at certain times. He was allowed walks only rarely but was permitted to see a doctor.
- They isolated Abouchar from nearly all contact with the outside world, rejecting his repeated requests to see the French Ambassador in Kabul or receive letters from his family and colleagues. They also forbade contact with all prisoners except those in his cell. Abouchar heard no news because prison guards intentionally lowered their transistor radios during news broadcasts. [redacted]

#### Abouchar's Response

Abouchar made few compromises with his interrogators. He admitted only to having entered Afghanistan illegally and to having claimed falsely on his passport to be a businessman. Abouchar denied categorically that he had links to the CIA and French intelligence and claimed he revealed little important intelligence information. He, however, did provide KHAD with a physical description of the insurgents



Jacques Abouchar on trial in Kabul. [redacted]

he accompanied and described where they procured their arms and how the Pakistani Army allowed them to pass unhindered through numerous roadblocks in Baluchistan. He claimed this information was too vague to be of much use. [redacted]

#### Show Trial and Release

After his interrogation at Sidorat, Afghan and Soviet authorities displayed Abouchar at a press conference and trial. There they accused him of being a member of foreign intelligence services and presented his captured camera equipment and introductory letter to an insurgent group in Qandahar as evidence. [redacted]

After a brief show trial, Abouchar was found guilty and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Abouchar's treatment improved during his short incarceration at Puli-Charki prison in Kabul. He could awaken when he wanted, ate better food, and circulated freely among most of the prisoners. He was released on 29 October after only five days. [redacted]

We believe that Abouchar was released quickly after his trial because Moscow wanted to limit damage to its relations with France. Abouchar's capture received widespread publicity in France and sparked protests and demonstrations, including several outside the Soviet Embassy in Paris. Even the French Communist Party sought his release. The French Government told Soviet officials that bilateral relations would suffer seriously if Abouchar were imprisoned for a long period. [redacted]

Secret

Secret

We believe Abouchar was better treated than many suspected foreign agents would have been because he is a well-known French journalist. Soviet and Afghan authorities treated a French doctor whom they captured in 1983, Philippe Augoyard, far worse. Augoyard spent five months in prison even though he praised the Afghan Government and criticized the insurgents at a public trial. Afghan authorities also periodically threatened Augoyard with hanging.<sup>2</sup>

[redacted]

25X1

<sup>2</sup> Augoyard's book, *La Prison pour Delit d'Espoir*, was also published in France in 1985. Augoyard is still active in France in support of the insurgency. [redacted]

[redacted]

STAT  
25X1

Secret

Secret



705186 5-85

Secret

Secret

**India: Gujarat—Social Conflict and Stability** [redacted]

25X1

For more than five months the industrialized west Indian state of Gujarat has been the scene of major caste and communal violence that has cost more than 250 lives and millions of dollars in property damage.<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister Gandhi's slowness in resolving this crisis is in sharp contrast with his decisive approach to other issues that he saw as more urgent, such as the Sikh problem in Punjab and the Sri Lankan conflict. Gandhi also was preoccupied with his foreign visits this spring. By moving deliberately on Gujarat's problems, Gandhi is trying to signal to the state Congress parties that he is more patient than his mother and less likely to meddle in state government, but in return he will demand greater competence and honesty from the state parties. [redacted]

**Gujarat—Background to Caste Violence**

The widespread violence in Gujarat demonstrates that the antidiscrimination measures in the Indian Constitution cannot protect the rights of all members of society in the face of the institutionalized and traditionally sanctioned strictures of the caste system. [redacted]

The conflict in Gujarat stems from disgruntlement among higher caste Hindus and opposition parties with the state government for its political manipulation of job and education opportunities reserved for members of low castes and local tribes. Violence erupted last March after Gujarat's Chief Minister Solanki promised on the eve of the state election that he would raise the percentage of reserved positions for Other Backward Classes by 18 percent if elected. Upper caste Gujaratis were already feeling pinched by the number of school and employment opportunities reserved for low caste applicants and

<sup>1</sup> Caste refers to the hereditary classes into which Hindus are divided by orthodox tradition. A person's caste dictates his social status, rules of social intercourse, customs, and occupation. Marriage, social relationships, and employment opportunities are all mitigated by caste. [redacted]

---

**Caste in the Indian Constitution**

*Under the Indian Constitution, a percentage of educational openings and government jobs at the national and state level are reserved for members of tribal groups and Hindu untouchables. The exact proportion of reserved positions varies with the caste makeup of each state. This parity formula is set nationally for each state—in Gujarat, 14 percent of government jobs and educational opportunities are reserved for untouchables ("scheduled castes," in legal usage) and 7 percent for indigenous groups (or "scheduled tribes"). States have discretion in allotting seats to other locally disadvantaged groups, known as other backward classes (OBCs)—most of them also low in caste and social status. In Gujarat, OBCs account for another 10 percent of all reserved positions.* [redacted]

25X1

25X1

called for strikes and demonstrations. Low caste Hindus and members of scheduled tribes in the major cities of the state struck back with counter-demonstrations and economic boycotts. Clashes between "reservationists" and "antireservationists" increased through the spring, and the level of violence rapidly escalated. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Although Chief Minister Solanki won the election by a large margin, he could not control the mounting violence. As more state institutions were closed by strikes and Solanki's inability to restore order became increasingly apparent, Prime Minister Gandhi finally sent in the Army to patrol the state capital, Ahmedabad, and other urban centers in late spring. [redacted]

25X1

The violence, however, spread to other cities, arousing longstanding local Hindu-Muslim rivalries as well. By

25X1  
25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985



Secret

mid-June calls for Solanki's ouster began to increase within the state Congress Party as well as the opposition. Gandhi sent trusted party officials to Gujarat in June to measure the damage and prepare an assessment. Based on the findings of this committee and personal interviews with party leaders in Gujarat and with Solanki himself, Gandhi removed the chief minister in early July and replaced him with a less flamboyant official from the local Congress Party apparatus, A. Chaudhuri. [redacted]

Solanki's dismissal cleared the way for a new round of political negotiations between the government and leaders of the pro- and antireservationist factions, and by the first week in August Chaudhuri could withdraw the Army from most cities. He offered high caste leaders a compromise by reducing quotas for educational and government positions to their preelection levels. Most state employee unions have accepted some form of this offer and returned to work. [redacted]

Upper caste student association leaders, however, apparently sense the potential for more gains, perhaps even a full reversal of the reservation policy, and are still calling for strikes and demonstrations. Sporadic violence is continuing between pro- and antireservationist groups. Moreover, Chaudhuri's proposals have had little effect in dampening violence between Hindus and Muslims in Ahmedabad, according to press reporting. [redacted]

In our view, Gandhi moved quickly once he decided that Solanki must go. He brought Chaudhuri into the picture promptly and supported his appointment with public statements. Chaudhuri's immediate concern is to show that he can balance the conflicting demands of the three contending groups in Gujarat: the low caste proreservationists, the high caste antireservationists, and the several communal groups that are fighting for control in the streets. In the short term, we believe his first priority will be to demonstrate to New Delhi his ability to maintain order and obviate the need to call back the Army. [redacted]

#### **Why Did Gandhi Allow Gujarat To Unravel?**

We believe Gandhi failed to respond to the situation in Gujarat in the early stages because his attention

was centered on the crisis in Punjab and his state visits to the Soviet Union and the United States in late spring. Gandhi had identified the Sikh conflict as the primary challenge facing his administration after his election last winter. The timing of last month's Punjab accord suggests he probably spent much of the spring working on the details of the agreement. In addition, his foreign travels occupied much of May and June, when the violence in Gujarat took some critical turns for the state government [redacted]

Gandhi's inexperience with center/state relations also may have slowed his response. For example, he may have failed to realize how corrupt the state party had become under Solanki or the kind of irresponsible maneuvering the chief minister was willing to undertake to increase his hold on the state government. [redacted]

Rajiv's reluctance to move quickly in Gujarat is also due, in part, to Congress Party politics. Gujarat has been a stronghold of support for the Congress Party largely on the strength of its coalition with a number of scheduled castes and tribes. Solanki, who headed the state government for five years, was from a backward class. Because his successor, Chaudhuri, is a member of a scheduled tribe, the Congress Party-led government in Gujarat cannot afford to give too much ground on the reservation issue. [redacted]

Moreover, we believe that Rajiv's closest advisers have reminded him of the severe challenge posed to his mother by caste unrest in the state in 1974. Many observers trace her imposition of a nationwide state of emergency in 1975 and subsequent loss of the prime-ministership in 1977 to her inability to contain the spread of caste-based violence in Gujarat. Rajiv appears to want to display greater patience in responding to state challenges and is seeking to avoid renewing fears of a return to his mother's heavyhanded tactics. [redacted]

#### **Looking Forward for Gujarat and Gandhi**

Gandhi probably believes he has bought some breathing time in Gujarat by changing chief ministers. We believe he is looking forward to a period

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

of reconciliation and a respite from opposition criticism of his leadership on this issue. [redacted]

25X1

We believe Gandhi hopes to use his handling of the issue to send signals to several sectors of Indian society regarding his developing style of leadership. He wants to demonstrate that compared to his mother, who attempted to emasculate Congress Party leadership at the state level to prevent challenges to her domination of the party, he will give greater latitude to state leaders, but that in return he will expect a higher level of competence. [redacted]

25X1

The communal and caste conflict in Gujarat, nevertheless, demonstrates a dilemma for Indian leaders that we believe will persist regardless of Gandhi's immediate response. Lower castes have come to look to the Congress Party in both the national and state governments for further special concessions to advance their social and economic status. Upper castes, however, increasingly view such concessions as encroachments on their access to economic and educational opportunities. The Indian Government—and Rajiv Gandhi—will continue to have difficulty either reconciling or defusing these conflicting demands. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Secret



Secret

**India's Military Airlift Capabilities** [redacted]

25X1

New Soviet-built IL-76 and AN-32 transports are expanding the Indian Air Force's readiness and reach. Although most of India's military airlift assets are deployed to support ground forces along its mountainous northern border, these aircraft also give India an enhanced ability to intervene in the islands of the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the new transports do not fully satisfy Air Force requirements, and the door is slightly open for US sales of C-130s to India. [redacted]

New Delhi acquired its Canadian, US, and British-made transports over 20 years ago, and they have long passed into obsolescence. The Indians contracted to purchase 98 AN-32s, valued at \$539 million, in 1981, and over 40 have been delivered [redacted]

25X1

The Indians have been quick to press their AN-32s into service. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] that Clines have replaced C-47s in one squadron at Jorhat in the northeastern sector. A second AN-32 squadron has been established at Agra, home of India's sole parachute brigade, replacing one of two C-119 squadrons. The AN-32s, probably from this squadron, have been seen in small numbers at Pathankot, Chandigarh, and Srinagar—airfields along the northwestern rim of the Himalayas. [redacted]

25X1

**Current Deployments**

The large majority of the Air Force's fixed-wing and helicopter airlift assets are deployed in an arc along the Himalayan mountains that runs from Kashmir to Assam. In our judgment, this deployment indicates that their primary mission is to supply and transport ground forces defending India's northeastern and northwestern frontiers, which lack adequate roads and rail lines. For example [redacted]

New Delhi ordered at least six IL-76 Candid transports in 1984 for \$155 million. The first arrived this spring and has been pressed into service. This summer the Air Force converted one of its two AN-12 Cub squadrons to IL-76s, allowing the AN-12s, many of which are inoperable, to be consolidated into one squadron, according to [redacted]

25X1

Indian airlift assets are also used, although to a lesser extent, to support military operations and exercises elsewhere. The southernmost-based helicopter unit, equipped with MI-8 Hips, is colocated in Jodhpur with one of the Army's five parachute battalions. According to satellite photography, AN-12s were present at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands this spring to support India's annual triservice amphibious exercise. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

**Helicopters.** India's inventory of MI-8 helicopters is being supplemented with new Soviet-built MI-17s, which will probably be used in an air assault role. India purchased 20 MI-17s in 1984, and, according to satellite imagery, 13 have been delivered so far this year. None are yet operational. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Modernization Programs**

The Indian Air Force has placed a high priority on the modernization of its airlift fleet. Since 1980 it has spent over \$650 million to procure 120 fixed- and rotary-wing transport aircraft. [redacted]

India has requested delivery of 16 MI-26 Halo heavy-lift helicopters from the Soviet Union, but Moscow has not yet agreed. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the Air Force needs at least 10 of these aircraft, which can each carry 100 troops, to move 1,000 men on short notice. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Fixed Wing.** The Air Force is in the midst of a major upgrading to replace seven squadrons of C-47 and C-119 aircraft with new Soviet-built AN-32 Clines. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985

Secret

**Increased Capabilities**

The new Soviet aircraft will increase the capacity and range of the Indian air transport fleet. The Air Force's older aircraft had experienced significant operational problems in the last few years. All of the C-119s were grounded in 1982, placing an increased strain on the aging AN-12s. Overall, the Air Force had only 60 percent of its transports operational last year. With the new AN-32s and IL-76s, this percentage should increase to about 80 to 90 percent in the next few years. [redacted]

Obtaining the new aircraft has also allowed New Delhi to use its older aircraft to form new units for less critical missions. [redacted]

[redacted] a new squadron has been formed at the Air Force reserve base at Sulur in southern India where satellite photography shows an increased number of C-47s. [redacted]

were used last year to help form an air wing for the paramilitary Border Security Force. The Border Security Force is looking into obtaining some helicopters to enhance its capability and may obtain additional C-47s and other old transports as the Air Force accepts newer aircraft. [redacted]

We estimate that the new aircraft will allow the Air Force almost to double the number of paratroopers and the amount of cargo it can carry by the end of the decade (see table). Under optimal conditions the Army will be able to move two, instead of one, infantry brigades by air on a single mission. [redacted]

The Air Force will also be able to support missions much farther from its airbases or conduct more missions close to home with fewer planes. The IL-76s will be able to fly troops and supplies over 4,000 nautical miles from India's southernmost airbases, significantly increasing India's ability to intervene in the island nations of the Indian Ocean. [redacted]

Nevertheless, the new Soviet aircraft—purchased for political and economic as well as military reasons—do not meet all Air Force requirements. Their performance at high altitudes and on short runways in the mountainous regions where India's transport aircraft primarily are used is suspect. When the Air Force first considered the IL-76 in early 1981, it

**Projected Indian Fixed-Wing Airlift Capabilities**

	Paratroops (men)	Cargo (1,000 kilograms)	Force Structure
1984	3,000	700	13 squadrons with seven different types of aircraft, 60 percent operational
1990	5,600	1,300	98 AN-32s and 26 IL-76s, 80 percent operational
1990	5,000	1,600	98 AN-32s, 18 IL-76s, and 36 C-130s, 80 percent operational

25X1

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

discovered that the aircraft could not take off with cargo from the airfield at Leh, where India's northernmost Army division in Kashmir is stationed. The Indians are also aware that an AN-32 would have problems staying in the air in the Himalayas if it lost power in one of its two engines. [redacted]

25X1

Air Force planners have considered buying US C-130s to overcome these limitations.<sup>1</sup> The deal has been postponed because of funding problems, although visiting high-ranking [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] that funds were available for necessary systems. The Indians have not given the C-130 deal a high priority in recent arms negotiations with the United States. [redacted]

25X1  
25X125X1  
25X1**An Army Aviation Corps**

Final Indian decisions on the C-130 deal and possibly new helicopters may await the outcome of the Army's longstanding battle to create an aviation corps.

25X1

<sup>1</sup> By purchasing two squadrons of C-130s at the expense of some IL-76s, the Indians would significantly increase their cargo-carrying capability while only slightly reducing their paratroop-lift capability. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

[redacted] the Army has proposed sequentially gaining control of:

- Observation aircraft now operated by the Army, but owned and maintained by the Air Force.
- Air Force helicopters used to transport Army troops and supplies.
- Air Force fixed-wing aircraft committed to the same task. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] suggest that the Army has pointed to the Pakistani Army's attack helicopters and the takeover of Iraq's helicopter air assault assets by the Iraqi Army to support its case. The government is inclined to favor the Army's position largely because of its outstanding performance in internal security over the last few years. If the Army wins this interservice contest, it will join the ranks of a handful of armies in the Third World that have successfully won possession of their own airlift assets. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Secret

**Page Denied**

Secret

**Sri Lanka: Population  
Redistribution and Resettlement—  
A Backdrop to Negotiations** [ ]

25X1

The continuing redistribution of the Sri Lankan population will have a strong impact on prospects for a negotiated settlement between the Sinhalese-dominated government and the Tamil separatists. The redistribution involves two major migration streams: a government-sponsored program to resettle Sinhalese on state lands in the Northern and Eastern Provinces claimed as "traditional homelands" by Tamils; and the resettlement of Indian Tamils from the plantation areas of the central highlands to state lands in the north and east. [ ]

the resettlement, Tamils are still the majority in five of Sri Lanka's 23 districts but have lost the majority they once held in Trincomalee District as a result of resettlement and differing population growth rates. [ ]

25X1

Colombo has also proposed major political redistricting. The redistricting plan is aimed at the same goal as the resettlement of Sinhalese: dilution of Tamil political strength in areas of the country where they are now concentrated. [ ]

As a counterstrategy, Indian Tamils, under the sponsorship of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), a plantation workers' union with close ties to the ruling United National Party, have been migrating gradually from the central highlands and resettling on state land in northern and eastern areas of the country. According to a 1983 government study, a CWC land redistribution center located in Vavuniya District planned the resettlement of about 20,000 Indian Tamils in northern Batticaloa District within a triangular area along the eastern coast reserved by the government for Sinhalese settlement. Although condoned by the central government, this resettlement scheme was opposed by hardline Buddhist leaders who led Sinhalese into the area to seize lands targeted by the Indian Tamils. The Buddhist-Sinhalese countermove was apparently successful, although the government has given no indication of a shift in resettlement policy. [ ]

25X1

25X1

At the root of much of the current and proposed resettlement in Sri Lanka are an extensive political gerrymandering attempt by the Sinhalese and a Tamil attempt to secede from the country. The movement of Sinhalese into Ceylon Tamil-dominated areas helps local electorates return Sinhalese candidates. In response, the Ceylon Tamils have used the resettlement of Indian Tamils to create a buffer zone against the Sinhalese population. [ ]

Indian Tamil participation in a broad Tamil resettlement scheme is not an indication of support for the separatist movement. Indian Tamils have supported neither the insurgency nor separatism, in general, and the leader of the CWC, S. Thondaman, is a member of the Cabinet and an avowed opponent of the separatist movement. Thondaman, however, is the leading Indian Tamil politician and a champion of Indian Tamil rights. The creation of Indian Tamil majorities in sparsely settled voting districts is a way of increasing the political power of Indian Tamils, the majority of whom have gained Sri Lankan citizenship only in the last decade. [ ]

25X1

25X1

**Resettlement**

Government-sponsored programs to settle Sinhalese in northern and eastern areas of the country have been under way since the 1960s. The strategy, according to public statements by government leaders, is to create a society in which each province reflects a mix of population equal to the national proportion of ethnic groups. Ceylon Tamils, dominant in the sparsely settled areas targeted for resettlement, oppose the programs because they would give the Sinhalese, who constitute more than three-quarters of the national population, dominance in every province of the country. The government recently has provided arms and ammunition to the Sinhalese settlers for defense against angry Tamils facing eviction. Despite

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-019  
30 August 1985



Secret

**Redistricting**

Colombo could also rely on more traditional gerrymandering such as the redrawing of electoral boundaries. A government study recommends the creation of three new administrative districts that would in effect drown Ceylon Tamil concentrations in a sea of Sinhalese. Minor civil divisions and voting districts along the east coast are generally elongated north and south, as are the larger administrative districts. Since Ceylon Tamils are concentrated in the coastal strip, the existing voting districts tend to favor Tamil majorities. The government plan would reorient districts in an east-west direction to include large inland Sinhalese concentrations. The port city of Trincomalee, for example, has a large concentration of Ceylon Tamils, while the hinterland is solidly Sinhalese. By redrawing political boundaries so that each district has a small concentration of coastal Tamils and a large number of hinterland Sinhalese, Tamil political strength would be diluted. [redacted]

The Sri Lankan Constitution prohibits creating such districts, and we doubt that a constitutional amendment can be passed. Redistributing Sinhalese, rather than redistricting, is likely to remain the principal government strategy even if some redistricting is part of a negotiated settlement. [redacted]

President Jayewardene, as recently as August 1985, however, has suggested that some local redistricting may be possible without amending the Constitution. The government is likely to propose to Tamil separatists some redistricting in the Northern and Eastern Provinces as part of a negotiated settlement. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Any settlement of the current communal conflict will have to deal with past and proposed population redistribution. Tamil separatist leaders, we believe, will settle for less than a separate Tamil state but will insist on considerable regional autonomy for the Tamil-dominated areas. Such an agreement, however, is pointless unless it provides for a cessation of Sinhalese settlement in what is considered by Tamils to be their traditional homeland. Otherwise, "autonomy" will mean only that the Sinhalese will dominate at the national and regional levels. [redacted]

A negotiated political settlement will need to address the question whether Sri Lanka will follow the pattern of Malaysia and attempt to become a fully integrated pluralist society—clearly the Sinhalese aim—or whether traditional Sinhalese-Tamil regional divisions will continue to exist. A third possibility, an independent state sought by Tamil extremists, similar to Singapore's separation from Malaysia, is highly unlikely. Separatism is strongly opposed by the governments of both Sri Lanka and India and by many Tamils as well. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

**Page Denied**



**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Secret**

---

**Secret**