



Directorate of  
Intelligence

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**Africa Review**



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21 March 1986

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,*

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### Articles

#### Mali: Increasing Libyan Subversion [Redacted]

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Mali's expanding contacts with France and the United States over the past several years apparently have led Libyan leader Qadhafi to target Bamako. Qadhafi probably hopes a pro-Libyan government there would give him a foothold for subverting neighboring moderate regimes in Senegal and Ivory Coast. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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#### New Activity

[Redacted] a major Libyan effort is under way to [Redacted] [Redacted] destabilize the increasingly pragmatic regime of President Traore. Qadhafi's visit to Mali last December almost certainly was intended in part as a signal to Malian dissidents of his personal support.

[Redacted] Libya is expanding contacts among Malian youth groups, workers, and artisans by including them in the Libyan-Malian Friendship Association founded last April. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] In addition, the Libyans reportedly attempted to obtain information on the different languages spoken in Mali and have hinted that they intend to beam radio programs into the country. [Redacted]

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#### The Christmas War

The US Embassy reports that Malians strongly suspect that Libya supplied the Soviet-made equipment captured from Burkina during the Christmas war last December. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Libyan officials in Tripoli reportedly gathered information last spring on Mali's military ties to France.

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The Embassy reports that, after Traore prevailed in the conflict, Qadhafi injected himself into the peace process by proposing a Libyan peacekeeping force for the disputed area. Although a peace plan arranged by Traore and other moderate regional leaders forestalled Libyan intervention [Redacted]

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[redacted] Traore continues to see Libya as a threat to his regime. Traore, however, is unlikely to air publicly his suspicions for fear of Libyan retaliation.

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[redacted]

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**Libyan Motives**

In our view, there are several reasons why Traore has attracted Qadhafi's attention. Mali has broadened its contacts with the United States in the past year and has expressed an interest in acquiring US military equipment. [redacted]

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In addition, Mali maintains good relations with France, whose interests worldwide also are priority targets for Qadhafi. Libyan officials probably were displeased by Bamako's efforts last April to arrange, on behalf of France and without Libyan approval, a reconciliation meeting between Chadian President Habre and Libyan-backed Chadian rebel leader Goukouni. [redacted]

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Libya probably also regards Mali as a base for subversion against other moderate regimes in the region, particularly neighboring Senegal and Ivory Coast. Both governments have what Qadhafi sees as uncomfortably close relations with Washington and Paris and are the leading powers in West Africa along with Nigeria. Moreover, in the case of Ivory Coast, Abidjan recently announced the resumption of relations with Tel Aviv, setting a precedent for similar moves by other African governments. [redacted]

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[redacted]


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**Sierra Leone:  
The Lebanese Community and  
Middle Eastern Influences** [redacted]

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President Joseph Momoh [redacted]

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We believe radical Middle Eastern countries—Iran, Libya, and Syria—may be capitalizing on the public's growing frustration with economic decline and exploiting the large local Lebanese and Muslim communities. [redacted]

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**The Lebanese Community**

According to academic studies, Lebanese first migrated to Sierra Leone around the turn of the century, and became the dominant entrepreneurial class. About half of the present population of 35,000 has arrived in Sierra Leone since the Lebanese civil war began in the 1970s. Embassy reporting indicates that the Freetown regime has not granted citizenship to many Lebanese for fear of provoking antiregime protests by Sierra Leoneans who resent the Lebanese higher standard of living. Anti-Lebanese violence erupted briefly in 1977 and 1984. [redacted]

the government at a profit. [redacted]

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[redacted] Embassy reporting also indicates that he and other Lebanese businessmen provide the government with the funds to purchase rice, Sierra Leone's staple food. [redacted]

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Although Momoh pledges [redacted] to reduce the Lebanese stranglehold on the economy and particularly Jamil's preeminent position, so far he has initiated only limited reforms, fearing that Jamil will end funding for the gold and diamond enterprises and cut off oil imports. According to the Embassy, Momoh has upgraded the capabilities of the government antismuggling squad, and in December he expelled two Lebanese for illegal business activities. Moreover, he claims he will implement IMF-suggested reforms, such as currency devaluations, which will hurt the Lebanese business interests. [redacted]

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Although most Lebanese are small traders, a handful have become multimillionaires and dominate key economic sectors. According to US Embassy reporting, Jamil Muhammed controls Sierra Leone's sale of diamonds and gold through the state enterprises that he manages and funds. He uses his control of these industries to facilitate a lucrative diamond-smuggling business that the US Embassy reports nets Jamil as much as \$25 million annually. The Embassy says that he also brokers the country's oil imports, because the government lacks the hard currency necessary for purchases. Jamil reportedly buys Iranian oil, resells it on the spot market—the crude is unsuitable for Freetown's refineries—and then purchases Nigerian light crude, which he sells to

[redacted] according to the Embassy, Momoh believes that neither the seizure of Lebanese property nor their mass expulsion would solve Sierra Leone's ills. [redacted]

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**Jamil: The Man Who "Owns" Sierra Leone**



Jamil Muhammed

sources reported that, during former President Stevens's rule, Jamil served as the country's unofficial "co-president." According to the Embassy, he frequently engineered cabinet changes, particularly in the Finance Ministry, and blocked IMF agreements by threatening to cut off oil imports and funding for state enterprises. [redacted]

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Jamil has forged fairly close ties to key Momoh administration officials. He is closely linked to First Vice President Minah, [redacted]

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[redacted] and Minister of Finance Development and Economic Plans Amara-Bangali, [redacted]

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[redacted] Embassy reporting also indicates that it was Jamil who proposed that Momoh replace Stevens as president, [redacted]

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[redacted] The Embassy reports that Jamil funded Momoh's presidential campaign last year, although Momoh claims he does not "owe" him for this. [redacted]

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The Embassy reports that Jamil maintains close personal and financial ties to Middle Eastern countries. Besides his links to Iran—which he claims are solely for business purposes—he collects \$50,000 in contributions a month for the Lebanese faction, Amal, is a friend of Nabbi Berri—who attended Momoh's presidential inauguration—and has business interests in Jordan and Morocco. [redacted]

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[redacted] some 150 PLO members serve as his bodyguards, and Jamil's dynamite factory provides the PLO with explosives. [redacted]

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US Embassy and press reporting indicates that Jamil Muhammed is the wealthiest man in Sierra Leone, and dominates almost all economic sectors. Jamil's private holdings include a bank, hotel, construction company, and Sierra Leone Airlines, and he employs some 7,000 Sierra Leoneans. He also has business interests in Europe and Liberia. According to Embassy reporting, Jamil manages two state enterprises, the Precious Minerals Marketing Company and the Government Gold and Diamond Office, which control diamond and gold exports. For the last several years, Jamil has served as the country's "bank of last resort" because the Bank of Sierra Leone's foreign exchange reserves usually are low. [redacted]

Although Jamil has never held an official government position, since the late 1970s he has played an influential role in Sierra Leonean politics. Embassy

**The Middle East Presence**

**Iran.** Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1983, Tehran has forged fairly close ties to Freetown and, as a result of Jamil's influence, provides at least half of Sierra Leone's oil supplies. According to the Embassy, Freetown sponsored an Islamic Unity Conference of the Hajj in 1984, attended by delegates from some 90 countries, which Iran funded and local Shiite leaders

helped to organize. The conference served as a forum for Iranian propaganda and condemned Soviet, Israeli, and Iraqi policies. The Embassy reports that in May 1985 then Sierra Leonean Foreign Minister Kanu condemned Iraqi "aggression" during his five-day visit to Tehran. [redacted]

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Iran is likely to increase its propaganda activities and financial support to Sierra Leone's Muslims—who comprise some 40 to 60 percent of the population—and may attempt to gain influence in the relatively moderate Shiite Lebanese community. Embassy and press reporting indicates that in the past two years Tehran has funded the construction of an Islamic school, a mosque, and has offered trips to Tehran to local clerics. The local Lebanese Shiite leader, Sheikh Chadade, reportedly receives financial assistance from Tehran, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

violence. We also believe Momoh may come under pressure from more reformist officers—such as Force Commander Tarawallie or Freetown garrison commander Lt. Col. L. S. Turay—to move against corrupt Lebanese and introduce substantial economic reform or be overthrown. [redacted]

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**Libya.** Tripoli may also attempt to exploit Freetown's economic decline and seek to cultivate disenfranchised students. The Embassy reports that in January a small group of pro-Libyan students demonstrated against US policies in front of the US Embassy. Although Freetown will not allow a People's Bureau to operate in the country—Libya is limited to a "caretaker" presence—Tripoli probably recruits sympathizers through the Sierra Leone-Libya Brotherhood Society and the "Green Book" study group, which operates a college in Freetown. The Embassy also reports that Libya occasionally recruits Sierra Leoneans to serve in the "Islamic Legion" of the Libyan Armed Forces and to study in Tripoli. [redacted]

We believe Iran and Libya will step up their subversive and propaganda activities in Freetown, including the recruitment of disaffected students and proselytizing among the Muslim community. We believe Sierra Leone will be a fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalism if the country's economic decline continues and Momoh is unable to create jobs for the swelling number of unemployed high school and university graduates. In our view, Momoh is probably unaware of Iranian and Libyan activities and unable to monitor them. [redacted]

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[redacted] Moreover, so long as Sierra Leone is dependent on Iranian oil, Freetown is unlikely to challenge Tehran's activities. [redacted]

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**Syria.** Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister A. K. Koroma—who seeks closer ties to Arab countries—visited Damascus in December in search of financial assistance and petroleum. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Momoh's reluctance to move decisively against Jamil and other key Lebanese businessmen may eventually provoke civil unrest and pressures from the Army. In our view, Momoh will continue to try to placate anti-Lebanese sentiment by expelling a few less influential businessmen and by introducing other token reform efforts. However, as the economy continues to deteriorate—fuel and food shortages are growing—public frustrations may spill over into anti-Lebanese

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**Guinea-France:  
Rebuilding Close Ties** 

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France has reestablished close political ties to Guinea, which had been severed for 26 years under former President Sekou Toure. French assistance is badly needed if President Conte's ambitious and politically risky program to liberalize Guinea's state-controlled economy is to succeed, according to the US Embassy. France has provided modest military supplies and has increased its military training program. The number of newly arrived French expatriates has grown over the past two years—the French community is now estimated at some 2,000—and is likely to increase, according to the US Embassy. Despite these contributions, increased French presence has opened Conte to criticism for relying too heavily on Paris.

**Political Relations**

Official relations are steadily improving, but the French do not enjoy close personal ties they have elsewhere in Francophone Africa, according to the US Embassy. The French diplomatic presence, although still small, is growing, and President Mitterrand has accepted an invitation for a state visit to Guinea at an as yet unspecified date. Embassy officials report that France supports Conte as the best available leader but remains concerned about Conte's indecisiveness and lack of experience in government.

**Backing for the Reform Program**

The French have steadily increased economic assistance, helped reform the banking system, and have increased their private-sector involvement. The US Embassy in Paris reports that French assistance more than doubled from \$33 million in 1984 to \$80 million in 1985. Moreover, Guinea is one of the few African states scheduled for a significant increase in aid this year.

The centerpiece of the aid is a \$25 million grant in support of economic reforms over the next several months, according to the Embassy. Much of this will be used to assure adequate stocks of food and essential

consumer goods to help ease the effects of devaluation and other major economic reforms. A portion may also be used for bridge financing until IMF and World Bank funds come on line later this month. The French Fund for Aid and Cooperation—not welcomed under Toure—accepted an invitation from Conte shortly after he assumed power to open an office in Conakry and has contributed \$2.5 million to support reform of the educational system. Additional aid has been devoted to improving urban transportation, radiobroadcasting, and Conakry's airport.

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The Embassy says the French are particularly visible in the banking sector, with advisers in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, as well as among the IMF and World Bank teams. Last December, Conte began to dismantle the government banking system, which had virtually collapsed under the weight of rampant corruption and the rapid devaluation last fall of the syli. Several European consortiums are establishing a new banking system to be run in large part by the French.

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French activity in the private sector has grown considerably in the past two years, according to the Embassy. French companies are the leading foreign investors in two joint venture bauxite mines—Halco and Friguia—which produce almost 9 million metric tons each year and account for 95 percent of Guinea's total export earnings. In addition, French trading companies are taking over much of the wholesale import-export trade, replacing ineffective and corrupt state-owned companies. Other French companies are involved in the hotel, transport, construction, and fishing industries.

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**Military Assistance**

French military aid has gradually increased over the past two years. Conakry used some \$1.5 million in French funds to buy a helicopter, two small patrol

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boats, engineering equipment and vehicles, and Paris plans to provide an additional \$1.2 million this year for the purchase of a presidential helicopter and two Army trucks, according to the Embassy. [redacted]

the United States, frequently complain about the poor quality of Soviet equipment and training, Guinea's lack of hard currency necessary to shop in the West will strongly curtail Conte's efforts to become less dependent on the Soviets. [redacted]

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**Growing Anti-French Sentiment**

Guineans fear that France is intent on reasserting colonialist control by dominating the banking and commercial sectors. [redacted]

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The Governor of the Central Bank is seeking other nationals as advisers to offset what he views as France's unequal influence on policy decisions, [redacted]

[redacted] The US Embassy reports that Guineans frequently see the French as condescending, while [redacted]

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[redacted] a recent scuffle between a French and Guinean employee of the French Embassy led Conakry to lodge a formal diplomatic protest with Paris. The [redacted] incident represents one of many that could lead to violence against French citizens by resentful Guineans. [redacted]

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French military training of Guinean soldiers has expanded significantly, particularly in the wake of the failed coup attempt last July, according to the US Embassy in Conakry. The Embassy reports that Conte's 40-man Presidential Body Guard was trained in Guinea last year, a 200-man Presidential Guard Company is receiving French training in Guinea, and some 40 officers and NCOs will be trained each year in France. Conte recently approved a plan for Paris to construct three military schools, staffed with French military instructors, to provide general military, cavalry, and naval training to about 200 cadets annually. [redacted]

Senior officials of the Foreign Ministry are concerned over the anticipated increase in French presence expected in coming months. [redacted]

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[redacted] Both governments worry that resentment toward the French community may increase as Guineans begin to feel the bite of IMF-supported austerity measures. [redacted]

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Guinea's suspicion of French intentions stems from its colonial legacy and years of hostility and nationalistic rhetoric under Sekou Toure. Toure, one of the most nationalistic leaders south of the Sahara during the 1960s, broke with France to pursue state socialism and close ties to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Upon Toure's death in 1984 and the quick takeover of Conte, the new leadership—in search of new sources of economic aid—moved to restore close relations with France. A continued increase in French presence and activity and the appearance that Conte is relying too heavily on Paris probably would provoke a backlash of anti-French sentiment among those who prospered under Toure's state-controlled regime. [redacted]

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According to the Embassy, there are no French military advisers or technicians in any regular unit of the Guinean armed forces. Some 50 Soviet military advisers are the only foreign presence. When Sekou Toure declared Guinea independent and severed relations with France in 1958, the Soviet Union became Guinea's major source of military supplies and training. Although members of the Guinean armed forces, particularly those trained in France or

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**Outlook**

The success of Conte's economic liberalization program will hinge on crucial French economic assistance and expertise in the coming months. Conte will seek still greater levels of assistance to counter popular pressure for economic improvement. The French presence is likely to increase as a stronger economy attracts more foreign investors and if plans for a military base and training schools move forward. This increase in French assistance and participation will fan Guinean fears of French neocolonialist intentions. If public expectations for economic recovery are not realized, the French could become a target of Guineans' frustration in isolated incidents of violence or outbreaks of anti-French demonstrations. For their part, the Soviets would try to play upon these sentiments to discredit Western intentions in Guinea.

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**Angola-Spain:  
A Budding Relationship** [redacted]

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The visit of Spanish Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez to Angola in early February successfully promoted commercial ties between the two governments and provided the Spanish with an opportunity to express moral support for Luanda immediately after UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's visit to the United States. [redacted]

Ordonez [redacted] discussed the prospect of Spanish participation in dam construction projects initiated by the Soviets and Cubans. In addition, he expressed a willingness to send technicians and advisers should Luanda ever decide to replace Cubans working in Angola's civilian sector. [redacted]

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**Highlights of the Spanish Visit**

Ordonez told the US Ambassador in Madrid that his visit was requested by Spain's Economics Ministry and motivated largely by Spain's interest in strengthening its position as a leading supplier to Angola. Spain, according to press sources, is Angola's fourth-largest supplier and second-largest market. Madrid provides consumer products and other manufactured goods, while Angola's primary export to Spain is crude oil. [redacted]

The Angolans were no doubt heartened by Ordonez's expressions of support for the MPLA, which Madrid regards as the legitimate government of Angola. In addition, the Angolans used the occasion to put on record their views about Savimbi's US visit. The Embassy reports that Luanda told Ordonez that it would respond vigorously to US aid to Savimbi, if need be with more Cuban and Soviet advisers and arms to meet the threat. The Angolans also told the Spanish Foreign Minister that US aid to UNITA works against the desire of Spain and other Western countries to wean Angola away from the Soviet Bloc. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

During his 48-hour visit, Ordonez met with a variety of senior officials, including President dos Santos, Foreign Minister Van Dunem, Cooperation Minister Fernandes, and Planning Minister da Silva. [redacted]

Political relations between Angola and Spain are likely to remain friendly, and [redacted] the level of trade and commercial dealings probably will increase substantially as a result of Ordonez's visit. The Angolans apparently regard Spain as one of the most sympathetic West European nations in Luanda's struggle against UNITA. Even so, we believe the Spanish will be unlikely to break ranks with their EC partners on broader regional issues in southern Africa involving Angola, such as the Namibia question. Madrid is unlikely to do more than continue to work behind the scenes within the EC to ensure that Angola's concerns receive a hearing. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, the Portuguese are likely to work harder to protect and improve their standing in Luanda. US Embassy reporting from Lisbon indicates that

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recently inaugurated President Soares and Prime Minister Cavaco Silva have been trying to strengthen Portuguese relations with all five Lusophone African states—especially Angola—and recently held separate, much publicized luncheons with the Angolan Ambassador to Lisbon. The new government could have an uphill battle, however, because of Portugal's unwillingness to close a UNITA office in Lisbon—or to curtail its activities there. In addition, the US Embassy reports that the MPLA dislikes Soares and was not eager to see him elected.

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## Africa Briefs

<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>More Hunger in Resettlement Areas</b> <input type="text"/>	25X1
	<p><input type="text"/> much of the land cultivated under the resettlement scheme is unsuitable for agriculture. <input type="text"/> officials estimate that some 69,000 hectares (170,000 acres) are required for current settlers and more than 45,000 hectares (110,000 acres) for anticipated settlers. Suppliers estimate only 50 percent of the needed fertilizers and quality seeds will reach resettlement areas. Several government planners have called the officially projected harvest for the areas—90,000 metric tons—“totally unrealistic.” Although the government has admitted publicly that some abuses and difficulties have occurred in the resettlement program, this is the first indication that the agricultural shortcomings are being recognized. The cost and time involved in reclaiming the needed area make it unlikely that enough land will be ready for spring planting. Food shortages, already found in some resettlement areas will worsen by the end of the year. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1 25X1
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<b>Uganda</b>	<b>Economic Policies Take Form</b> <input type="text"/>	25X1
	<p>President Museveni appears to be charting an economic policy that includes a greater role for the private sector than the statist policies of his predecessors. Museveni claims that economic efficiency is his main priority and has acknowledged the importance of the private sector. He says, however, that the government will continue to play a significant part in the economy. Cabinet members, in discussions with US Embassy personnel, have advocated increases in agricultural producer prices, reductions in government spending, devaluation of the shilling, and a review of all government-owned enterprises. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1
	<p>The Embassy reports increased economic activity and business optimism since Museveni took over in January. Nonetheless, inadequate transport has inhibited coffee exports, which generate about 90 percent of Uganda's foreign exchange earnings. The Army is using most all available trucks in the drive to subdue rebel resistance in the north. Economic recovery is likely to proceed slowly despite the regime's willingness to cooperate with donors and to encourage private enterprise. The return of thousands of displaced persons to their homes, economic rehabilitation of areas savaged by previous governments, and continued northern opposition to Museveni's rule make it unlikely that Uganda's economic woes will soon ease. <input type="text"/></p>	25X1

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<b>Kenya</b>	<b>IMF Standby Not Needed</b> [redacted]	25X1
	<p>Kenya and IMF officials have concluded that Kenya does not require a new standby arrangement this year because of the improving coffee market and declining oil prices. The IMF has revised its 1986 balance-of-payments projections for Kenya from a balance-of-payments financing gap of about \$100 million to a surplus of about \$170 million. Although Kenyan officials have said they will still adhere to IMF stricutures, even without a standby arrangement, this economic boomlet and lack of IMF oversight make it unlikely Kenya will fully implement badly needed economic reforms. Moreover, despite this year's rosy outlook, Kenya faces foreign payments difficulties over the medium term, as well as economic and social pressures brought on by continuing rapid population growth.</p>	25X1
<b>Lesotho</b>	<b>Aftermath of the Coup</b> [redacted]	25X1
	<p>The new military regime headed by General Lekhanya is moving quickly to consolidate power since overthrowing Prime Minister Jonathan on 20 January. The government appears to be taking a hardline stance toward the deposed leaders, and has warned Jonathan not to stir up opposition. Some members of the old regime may be prosecuted for crimes committed while in office. In mid-March, [redacted] Colonel Sehlabo, who led an unsuccessful military mutiny shortly before the coup, died in detention, reportedly of natural causes.</p>	25X1
	<p>[redacted] Brigadier Ramotsekhane, a supporter of Jonathan and a rival of coup leader Lekhanya, has died while in custody. [redacted]</p>	25X1
	<p>The new regime has sought to expand economic and political relations with South Africa. The two governments in late February discussed renewing negotiations on the Highlands Water Project. The project, proposed in 1983, would exploit untapped hydroelectric and water resources to provide energy and water for South Africa and revenue for Lesotho. Lekhanya also may establish resident consular offices in South Africa, according to US Embassy sources. Maseru already has reestablished diplomatic ties to South Korea, after evicting North Korean workers following the coup.</p>	25X1

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