



Directorate of  
Intelligence

~~Secret~~

**MASTER FILE COPY**  
**DO NOT GIVE OUT  
OR MARK ON**



25X1

138

**Africa Review**



25X1

18 April 1986

~~Secret~~

ALA AR 86-008  
18 April 1986

Copy

385

**Page Denied**

**Secret**

25X1

**Africa Review**

25X1

18 April 1986

		<i>Page</i>	
<b>Articles</b>	<b>Somalia: Waiting in the Wings</b>	1	25X1
			25X1
	President Siad has recently dropped hints that his rule may be drawing to an end. His comments have fueled speculation about succession and prospects for a peaceful transition.		25X1
	<b>South Africa: Kids Who Kill</b>	5	25X1
			25X1
	Despite severe security measures, violence by young black activists is spreading, and adult blacks and some black political organizations are concerned that rising youth militancy is polarizing their community.		25X1
	<b>Angola: Holden Roberto and the FNLA</b>	7	25X1
			25X1
	Holden Roberto, still claiming to be leader of the once-powerful National Front for the Liberation of Angola, recently was in the United States seeking support for the nearly moribund anti-Marxist insurgent group.		25X1
	<b>Algeria: Shifting Stance Toward Chad</b>	9	25X1
			25X1
	The Bendjedid government has not openly chosen sides in the Chadian civil war but appears to be moving away from Libyan-backed rebel leader Goukouni and toward Chadian President Habre.		25X1
<b>Brief</b>	<b>Zambia: Key Economic Personnel Shuffled</b>	13	25X1
		15	25X1

*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,*

25X1

25X1

**Secret**ALA AR 86-008  
18 April 1986

Secret



25X1

**Africa Review** 


25X1

**Articles**


---

**Somalia: Waiting in the Wings** 

25X1

President Siad, who seized power in a military coup in 1969, has recently dropped hints that his rule may be drawing to an end. Although apparently in reasonably good health, Siad is in his seventies and reportedly was ill earlier this year. His comments have fueled speculation about succession and prospects for a peaceful transition. Although Siad has carefully avoided designating a successor, a member of his inner circle initially would probably assume the presidency. Political infighting and tribal tensions, however, could easily erupt into a violent struggle for power. The US Embassy believes that a peaceful change in leadership is unlikely to have a major impact on US-Somali relations. We believe a drawn-out or violent transition could lead to reduced US influence and open the door for Soviet inroads. 


**A Peaceful Transition**

Siad could step down for health reasons or be forced to resign. Some officers in the military and some government officials are disenchanted with the country's military weakness, the perceived paucity of Western economic assistance, and Siad's inability to cope with growing domestic problems. If Siad leaves, the Somali constitution states that the first vice president—in this case Lt. Gen. Ali Samantar—is to assume the presidency for a period of no more than 60 days. Somalia's only political party is to nominate a candidate, who then is voted into office by the National Assembly. 


Samantar, who is also Minister of Defense, would probably face strong opposition to his assuming the presidency. He belongs to the Tumul tribe, an outcast group looked down upon by most Somalis. Samantar has opponents within the military, especially among those who belong to the politically dominant Marehan tribe and its allies. These individuals do not believe he

---

**Somali Tribal Elites**

*Tribalism is endemic to Somali society, and every government since independence in 1960 has included various tribal coalitions. The Siad regime, which officially bans any display of tribalism, is no exception. Power is concentrated in the hands of President Siad's Marehan clan and related clans belonging to the Darod family, which makes up an estimated 20 percent of the population, and elements of the Hawiya family. This cabal controls the nation's political, economic, and military life and generally is resistant to reforms or changes that could affect its interests.* 

25X1

*Most Hawiya and Issak, who number approximately 47 percent of the population, resent their exclusion from key sectors of the political and economic life of the country, dominated by them prior to the coup. Issak disenchantment is reflected in its support—overt and covert—for an anti-Siad insurgent group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), based in Ethiopia. The regime has used a heavy hand to suppress the Issak because of their close identification with the SNM and the group has been purged from many military positions. Most Hawiya are indifferent toward the Siad government, although a small number of dissidents are affiliated with the SNM. The Hawiya and Issaks lack of "friends in high places" would limit their ability to influence events in the immediate post-Siad period, according to most observers, but their power may increase if the Marehan grip on the country is weakened.* 

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

ALA AR 86-008  
18 April 1986

**Page Denied**

Secret

would promote their political and economic interests with the same fervor as Siad, a fellow Marehan. The [redacted] that many other officers resent the Defense Minister's efforts to further the careers of other Tumals in the military and his periodic efforts to crack down on corruption. [redacted]

Samantar, however, is not in disfavor with all in the military and the Marehan tribe, according to the US Embassy. Some reportedly view him as a professional officer committed to the best interests of the country and the military. We believe, on the basis of US Embassy and [redacted]

[redacted] would be an attractive compromise choice for major tribes such as the Issak or Hawiya, long discriminated against by the Marehan clique and in no position to move one of their own into the presidency. Samantar also is an adept infighter who would probably work behind the scenes during the transition period to build up tribal and personal alliances that would allow him to gain and hold power. [redacted]

We believe Samantar would face a serious challenge from Brig. Gen. Hashi Ganni, a longtime opponent. [redacted]

[redacted] has the support of a number of fellow tribesmen and midlevel officers who believe he would defend their interests in the post-Siad era and provide the country with firm leadership. In addition, many Somalis view him as a strong nationalist who could extract more military and economic assistance from the United States in return for military access. [redacted]

Ganni, however, has alienated the large Issak tribe and factions within the military with his arrogant manner and his often brutal suppression of dissent during his tenure as northern sector commander. In addition, other tribes see him as a defender of Marehan interests and, according to the Embassy, some Somalis believe that a Ganni bid for power would split the country and result in bloodshed. Ganni's aspirations, in our view, recently suffered a setback when Siad sent him to the United States for two years of training. The Embassy, however, believes that he will remain an active participant in Somali politics and would still play a significant role in the succession issue. [redacted]

Another serious contender for president is Ahmed Suleiman, the current Interior Minister. Although he belongs to the Dolbanante tribe, Suleiman is related to Siad by marriage, has support in Marehan circles in the military, and reportedly has close personal relations with Issak elders. He has long coveted the presidency and, according to the Embassy, possesses many of Siad's more devious traits. [redacted]

The Interior Minister, nevertheless, faces several obstacles in his bid to succeed Siad. As the former head of Somalia's security service, he has made many enemies in the government and among the population. In addition, his support in the Army is not extensive, and he does not have direct command of military forces to call on in the event of a widespread and violent power struggle. [redacted]

**An Unconstitutional Transfer of Power**

A military coup against Siad is a possibility, in our opinion, despite the President's demonstrated ability to manipulate his rivals and to keep his opponents off-guard. Siad's inability to ease Somalia's economic and military malaise, [redacted] and Embassy reporting, has created discontent in the military and other sectors. [redacted]

[redacted] Moreover, Siad has encouraged rivalries between his potential successors, making an orderly transition more unlikely. [redacted]

A bloody transition probably would thrust a number of senior Army officers onto the political scene. Several of these officers, such as the northern sector commander, Gen. Siad Hersi "Morgan," have close ties to Samantar or the Marehan tribe. We believe commanders of operational Army units in the Mogadishu area or key sector commanders outside the capital could end up on top in a free-for-all struggle. [redacted]

During a period of turmoil we believe power also could be seized by middle-level or junior officers, most of whom would be motivated by tribal or personal loyalties. [redacted] in recent

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

years indicate that some in this group also harbor pro-Soviet or strongly nationalistic ideals. This faction blames the United States for many of Somalia's problems—especially its military weakness—and are critical of the regime's close ties to the West. In addition, [redacted] that several of these officers have commented favorably on the USSR's military support to its allies. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Implications for the United States**

We generally agree with the Embassy's assessment that a peaceful leadership transition probably would not portend any major changes in US-Somali relations. In fact, ties could even improve under Samantar or Suleiman because both probably would be more receptive to economic reform and political liberalization than Siad. In addition, the seizure of power by senior military commanders probably would have little adverse impact. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] that most of them are pro-West and have received some training in the United States or Europe. General Ganni is an exception, however, and we believe a government dominated by him would be less responsive to Washington. [redacted]

25X1

We believe a weak or unstable post-Siad government would give the USSR an opportunity to try to enhance the positions of pro-Soviet or radical officers in the military and other institutions. Moscow probably would attempt to woo a new regime by offering to try to obtain concessions from Ethiopia on the Ogaden issue and with promises of limited assistance in return for a less Western-oriented foreign policy and the termination of US military access. Libya's Qadhafi, with whom Siad has opened a limited rapprochement, almost certainly would attempt to do the same. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

Secret

Secret

## South Africa: Kids Who Kill

25X1

Unlike the 10,000 black youths who fled South Africa during the Soweto riots in 1976 and 1977 as refugees or to join the outlawed African National Congress (ANC), young black activists today appear to be remaining in the townships and continuing to agitate. They are a major force in township unrest and their demands have become increasingly strident. Despite severe security measures, antigovernment activity is spreading, and, according to the US Embassy, adult blacks and some black political organizations are concerned that rising youth militancy is polarizing the black community. [redacted]

### Unprecedented Militancy

Out of school and unemployed for long periods, urban black youths are among the most politically conscious of the country's black population. According to government figures, 201 of 763 blacks killed by security forces in 1985 were children. Militant youths also have been the source of much of the black-against-black violence in recent months, as hundreds of youth organizations—including the multiracial, antiapartheid United Democratic Front (UDF), ad hoc political committees, and street gangs—often clash with one another, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

In many cases, black political organizations are unable to control the actions of militant youths. For example, the recent national black education conference—attended by more than 1,500 representatives from schools throughout the country—was only partially successful in getting students to return to the classrooms, according to press reports. A group of youths firebombed a school in late March, destroying free textbooks and school supplies—a concession recently won from the government by education committees. Many student militants still adhere to the “liberation now, education later” approach. [redacted]

In August the government banned the most influential and militant political group for black youths, the Congress of South African Students, but



Young black militants—a major source of violence.

US News & World Report ©

25X1

many members remain active. They have been prime targets for detention by government security forces, according to press reports, and boycotting students currently list as one of their demands the lifting of the ban on the group. [redacted]

25X1

Gangs of youths calling themselves “comrades” have appeared recently in black urban townships. Extremely militant and violent, they have displayed the flags of the ANC and the South African Communist Party even though we do not believe they are under the control of any organization. Individual comrades probably belong to some hardline groups in the United Democratic Front, although we have little evidence of comrades being organized into groups with formal leadership. [redacted]

25X1

The professed aim of the comrades is to make the townships ungovernable—a goal shared by the ANC—and they often instigate riots. In so-called liberated areas in the townships, where sustained violence and resistance have nearly eliminated

25X1

Secret

ALA AR 86-008  
18 April 1986



Secret

effective government control, comrades conduct kangaroo courts, fine boycott violators, and frequently execute those accused of collaborating with the government. Their methods have become more extreme toward township residents who resist boycotts of white-owned businesses. According to press reports, comrades often confiscate or destroy purchases of boycott violators and, in some cases, have forced violators to eat detergent or drink oil suspected of being purchased in white-owned stores. They also have killed or seriously injured fellow township residents for alleged boycott violations—in the eastern Cape police attributed at least 83 deaths to roving gangs last year. [redacted]

We also believe a strong undercurrent of common thuggery occurs along with the politically motivated violence. Some township murders and executions—one method is called “necklacing,” in which a gasoline-soaked tire is placed around the victim and set alight—probably are the result of gang wars. Looting and robbery have become common byproducts of unrest incidents, and youths have been killed for refusing to join gangs trying to extend their influence. [redacted]

**Alienating the Older Generation**

Parents are indignant that their children are ridiculing them for being passive in the past, according to the US Embassy. They fear their children are breaking with traditional tribal values that allow free expression of views and respect of elders. According to a recent survey, most urban black youths now associate themselves less with their tribal links than with being “black.” [redacted]

Some influential figures and political organizations are beginning to distance themselves from the most militant youths. Spokesmen for the UDF and black opposition leaders—including Bishop Desmond Tutu and Winnie Mandela—have called for a halt to black-against-black violence. The UDF has denied any connection with the “people’s court” executions and is discouraging harsh enforcement of the recently reimposed consumer boycotts in Pretoria and Port Elizabeth, according to press and Embassy reporting. [redacted]

**Outlook**

The rising militancy, in our view, is a strong countertrend to recent gains in organized black political action, such as the current well-planned black consumer boycott in the Pretoria area and the recent success of the national black education conference. We believe that many antigovernment groups—including the ANC and the UDF—are concerned that their lack of control over militant youths will divide South Africa’s blacks, leading many moderates to abandon an activist course because of youth excesses. They also probably believe the extremism of the youths will bring harsher security measures. [redacted]

Pretoria, too, recognizes that the increased black militancy undermines its long-term reform strategy of co-opting moderate blacks into a limited power-sharing arrangement. Moreover, Pretoria fears sporadic attacks on whites and demonstrations in white areas will increase as militancy spreads. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

**Angola:  
Holden Roberto and the FNLA** [redacted]

25X1

Holden Roberto, still claiming to be leader of the once powerful National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), recently was in the United States seeking support for the nearly moribund anti-Marxist insurgent group. His efforts are in response to the Congressional repeal last summer of the Clark Amendment, which halted US aid to Angolan rebels in 1976. Last September, Roberto attended a fundraising conference in Dallas for anti-Communist insurgencies around the world that was sponsored by the World Anti-Communist League. In April, a group of retired US military men—calling themselves Civilian Military Assistance—announced they would provide \$200,000 in nonlethal aid to the FNLA, according to press reports. Before releasing the aid, however, the donors demanded Roberto's assurances that the FNLA remains a viable fighting force in Angola. In our judgment, the FNLA currently poses no threat to the Angolan Government, and Roberto—who lives in exile in France—probably has little influence with the group's few remaining guerrillas.

[redacted]

**Riches to Rags**

In the decade since the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola came to power, external support for Roberto and the FNLA has become almost nonexistent. At its height in 1974, the FNLA was the largest and best equipped insurgent group in Angola, with 2,000 guerrillas inside the country and another 10,000 to 12,000 operating from bases in Zaire, according to academic sources. In March, a spokesman for the FNLA claimed the group has only 1,500 "fighters" operating in northern Angola. According to press reports, the guerrillas remaining in Angola have few weapons and little ammunition, and are not militarily active. Moreover, the nonaggression pact Zaire signed with Angola in 1979 sent Roberto into exile in Paris and cut off Zaire as a base for guerrilla operations into Angola. [redacted]



*Holden Roberto (in sunglasses) with troops in northern Angola in 1975.*

25X1

Luanda's offers of amnesty to guerrillas willing to lay down their arms have been effective in draining the ranks of the FNLA. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] in April

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Secret**

1985, according to press reports, more than 150 former FNLA rebels were integrated into the Angolan armed forces. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

**Roberto and the FNLA Today**

The FNLA appears to be largely moribund today with its traditional areas of operation in northwestern Angola offering few government targets for attack. Moreover, the group is too small and too poorly equipped to sustain a credible campaign against more lucrative targets elsewhere in the country. The FNLA remnants seem to avoid contact with government forces, according to journalists who have traveled with the group. [redacted]

25X1

In our judgment, Holden Roberto's claims of active leadership of the FNLA are doubtful. We believe he has not been to Angola in at least seven years, and judge it unlikely he will return soon to Zaire or Angola. Roberto's absence from the field has diminished his influence within the FNLA, [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

**Secret**

Secret


**Algeria: Shifting  
Stance Toward Chad**



25X1

The Chadian civil war is an issue of longstanding and growing importance to Algeria. Policymakers in Algiers oppose French and Libyan involvement in the fighting, and have attempted through diplomatic means to encourage reconciliation between the two factions in Chad. Algiers, however, now appears to be moving away from Libyan-backed rebel leader Goukouni and toward Chadian President Habre. The reasons center on concern about Libyan leader Qadhafi's aggressive foreign policy in Africa, the potential security threat posed by Qadhafi's adventurism in Sub-Saharan Africa, and doubts about French resolve in Chad. Even so, Algeria is not yet inclined to openly choose sides but probably would do so if the Habre government appeared to be losing control of the military situation.


between Habre and Goukouni.



25X1  
25X1

According to the US Embassies in Algiers and Paris, meetings between Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahim and Mitterrand last February, and a followup visit to Algiers one week later by former French Foreign Minister Dumas, included discussions on Chad. These talks occurred shortly after Bendjedid's summit with Qadhafi in late January,

25X1



25X1

25X1

**Algiers Upholds High Ideals . . .**

Algiers' official policy toward Chad is to remain neutral. Its primary goal is the termination of all outside intervention and the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. The balance in this position is reflected in a claim Algeria has made privately to foreign diplomats that, although Habre represents the "legal" government of Chad, the regime in N'Djamena is not "legitimate." Algeria has been involved in efforts by the Organization of African Unity to facilitate a cease-fire and negotiations between Habre and Goukouni. Although Algeria would prefer a government of national unity including both Chadian leaders, the government has indicated to the United States and other governments that it would support any regime in Chad that held out promise of uniting the country. A settlement of the conflict is vital to Algeria because it traditionally has advocated the status quo in Africa with regard to the international boundaries established in the colonial era.

**. . . While Advancing National Interests**

In fact, however, the government's public position masks shifting undercurrents of favoritism. Until late 1983, Algeria gave discreet support to Goukouni. It hosted Goukouni on several occasions after his fall from power and allowed his faction to maintain a low-level diplomatic mission in Algiers. This treatment was attributable to Goukouni's decision in 1980, when he was President of Chad, to recognize the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic—the government-in-exile of the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas fighting Morocco for control of Western Sahara—and Habre's subsequent ambivalence toward the Polisario. Algiers also was angry at Habre because his successful coup against Goukouni was aided by France, which the Algerians still suspect have colonial ambitions in Africa. The government openly criticized French military support for Habre and refused French requests for military overflights when fighting between Goukouni and Habre intensified in 1982. Algiers even denied air transshipments of UN relief

25X1

Concern over the deteriorating situation in Chad has compelled Algerian President Bendjedid to use his diplomatic resources to find a settlement. He has tried quietly to mediate between Libya and France, and

Secret

ALA AR 86-008  
18 April 1986

Secret

assistance for the Habre regime. Strains in relations spurred N'Djamena to recall its ambassador from Algiers and close each country's diplomatic mission in August 1983. [redacted]

[redacted] They are probably upset with Libya's disruption of last month's proposed Habre-Goukouni meeting. [redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

The Libyan invasion of northern Chad in 1983, as well as Qadhafi's developing ties to Morocco—Algeria's longtime adversary—encouraged Algiers to shift ground on the dispute. Algerian leaders probably believe Qadhafi's involvement in the conflict will prolong the French presence on the continent and encourage further Libyan meddling in the region if Qadhafi is successful in Chad, thus challenging Algerian pretensions of dominance in North Africa. Algerian leaders probably calculate that a Libyan victory in Chad would encourage Tripoli to step up subversion in Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. In addition, the Algerians may have viewed a turn away from Goukouni as a necessary punishment for Libya, given Qadhafi's decision to cease support for the Polisario as part of the cost for the Moroccan union. Algiers also may be concerned that Morocco's King Hassan will use his ties to Libya to mediate an end to the Chad conflict and thus gain international prestige to the detriment of Algeria. [redacted]

**Prudence Prevails**

To be sure, Algiers' shift has been gradual. The US Embassy in Algiers reports that Bendjedid has allowed France to transit Algerian airspace for overflights to Chad. Otherwise, the government has refrained from giving Habre any vocal support, and there is no evidence that it has offered weapons or economic assistance. The government has refrained from mentioning either Libya or France in statements about the last round of fighting between Habre's forces and Chadian dissidents. Both factions in Chad maintain low-level representation in Algiers, although the Embassy reports the government has downgraded somewhat Goukouni's mission and has granted higher status to Habre's. [redacted]

25X1

Algiers' caution probably is attributable to its distrust of all of the parties involved in the conflict and poor relations with Libya and France. The government also appears to be in a quandary over how to proceed diplomatically, even though it appears to view France as the lesser of two evils in Chad. Open condemnation of Tripoli would jeopardize Algeria's attempts to foster rapprochement and cooperation with Qadhafi. Algiers hopes its contacts with Libya will lead to settlement of a longstanding border problem, encourage Qadhafi to cease his attempts to subvert Tunisia, and split Libya from Morocco and thus ease the military threat to Algeria on two of its frontiers.

25X1

During the past year, Algerian disgruntlement with Libyan actions in Chad has increased to the point that Algiers is openly showing its sympathies. Meetings last November between senior Algerian diplomats and Habre and other Chadian officials were followed by an unprecedented summit the next month between Habre and Bendjedid in Algiers. The US Embassy in Algiers reported that Bendjedid afforded Habre full honors as a visiting head of state and that the visit received prominent coverage in the state-controlled media. Although there is no evidence, the two leaders may have discussed Algerian military support. [redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The Embassy believes Algiers purposely used Habre's visit to signal to Tripoli its displeasure over developments in Chad. [redacted]

[redacted] Algiers will look favorably on the firmer policy by France in Chad that is likely to come from the new conservative Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Chirac. A more

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

active policy by France, however, could also exacerbate fears in Algiers of French neocolonialism.

[redacted]

25X1

**Outlook**

As long as the military stalemate continues in Chad, Algeria is not likely to become deeply involved in the dispute, except for diplomatic efforts to engage Habre and Goukouni in negotiations. Algerian perceptions of Libyan and French perfidy is such that Bendjedid will want to avoid any commitments that might come undone by another Libyan-French deal on Chad. Bendjedid, however, might consider rendering some limited covert aid to Habre, such as food and money, and take stronger diplomatic steps to goad Libya into curtailing its activities in Chad, such as private or even public threats to Qadhafi. [redacted]

25X1

Algiers would consider direct engagement in the dispute if Qadhafi were to make military gains and France were to withdraw. Under these circumstances, Bendjedid probably would offer Habre weapons. Algeria might also again reinforce its military units on the border with Libya and issue a strong warning to Qadhafi to pull back in Chad. The government probably would be reluctant to commit its own military personnel to Habre, however. In the event of an imminent military victory in Chad by Goukouni and Qadhafi, Bendjedid might consider asking the United States to intervene and assist Washington's actions behind the scenes. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Secret

**Secret****Kaunda's April 1986 Leadership Changes**

Personality	Moved From	Moved To
Wilted Phiri	President Political Adviser	Unnamed diplomatic post
Paul Lusaka	UN Ambassador	Political adviser
Dominic Mulaisho	Economic Adviser	Private business
James Mapoma	Director General ZIMCO	Economic adviser
Lameck Goma	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Minister of Higher Education
Luke Mwananshiku	Minister of Finance	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Basil R. Kabwe	Minister of Education and Culture	Minister of Finance
David Phiri	Bank of Zambia Governor	Chairman Prices/Incomes Commission
Leonard Chivuno	Chairman Prices/Incomes Commission	Bank of Zambia Governor
Kapembe Nsingo	Party economist	Minister of State for Finance
Leonard Subulwa	Minister of Commerce and Industry	Minister of Mines
Jameson Kalaluka	Minister of Mines	Minister of Commerce and Industry
Uniah Mwila	Minister of State-Industrial Democracy	Minister of Industrial Democracy
Milimo Punabantu	Press relations	Minister of Natl. Guidance, Information and Broadcasting
Naphy Nyalugwe	Editor, <i>Times of Zambia</i>	Press relations
Mavis Muyunda	Minister of State for Decentralization	Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Rajah Kunda	Minister of Higher Education	Minister of Decentralization
Arnold Simuchimba	Minister of Natl. Guidance	Minister of General Education
Cosmas Chibanda	Minister of Information and Broadcasting	Minister of Home Affairs
Ben Kakoma	Minister of Youth and Sports	Minister of Land and Natural Resources
Henry Meebelo	Minister of Decentralization	Minister of Presidential Affairs
Frederick Hapunda	Minister of Labor	Minister of Youth and Sports



25X1

**Secret**

Secret

## Africa Brief

---

**Zambia**
**Key Economic Personnel Shuffled** 

25X1

President Kaunda on 4 April announced several dramatic personnel changes in his top economic leadership, according to the US Embassy in Lusaka. These changes come at a time when Zambia is facing growing parliamentary opposition to IMF-sponsored economic reforms introduced last fall. The measures, which include reduced food and fuel subsidies and a controversial foreign exchange auction system, have resulted in a drastic increase in inflation and a decline in living standards for the average citizen.

25X1

Among those replaced were the main architects of Zambia's economic reform—Minister of Finance Luke Mwananshiku, and Bank of Zambia Governor David Phiri—who the Embassy considers able administrators and pro-American. Mwananshiku's replacement is said by the Embassy to have no experience in economics, and the new Bank of Zambia Governor is reported to have studied economics in the Soviet Union, in addition to having no background in administration, according to the Embassy. Zambia's current UN Ambassador Paul Lusaka—known for his anti-American views at the United Nations—replaces a generally pro-Western presidential political adviser.

25X1

In our judgment, Kaunda has replaced effective, pro-Western officials as his close advisers with weak administrators who are more left leaning. We believe his new advisers are unlikely to support unpopular economic reforms, and probably will counsel Kaunda to return to a more statist-oriented economy. Kaunda is probably trying to gain more personal control over the reform process in order to slow it down. Kaunda has publicly reaffirmed his support for economic reform, but will probably use the confusion resulting from the shuffle as an excuse to slow the process. We do not expect him to abandon the reform process altogether, however, as he probably realizes there is no alternative to the IMF-sponsored program and the Western aid it brings.

25X1

Secret

ALA AR 86-008  
18 April 1986





**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Secret**

---

**Secret**