



Director of Central Intelligence

~~Secret~~

25X1

Special National Intelligence Estimate

Nicaragua: Support for Regional Insurgency and Subversion

Key Judgments

MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON

~~Secret~~

SNIE 83.3-2-85

March 1985

Copy 37

25X1

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY-	NFIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . . -	This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to . . .
FGI-	Foreign Government Information



STAT

Secret

25X1
25X1

SNIE 83.3-2-85

**NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR
REGIONAL INSURGENCY
AND SUBVERSION**

KEY JUDGMENTS

The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.

Secret

25X1

Secret

25X1
25X1

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

Secret

Secret

25X1
25X1

SCOPE NOTE

This NIE is a follow-on to SNIE 83.3-85, *Nicaragua: Prospects for Sandinista Consolidation*, February 1985 [] and NIE 83.1-85, *El Salvador: The Outlook for the Duarte Government*, March 1985 []

25X1
25X1

Those Estimates examined the future outlook for those countries in detail, as well as the implications of continuing Sandinista support for the Salvadoran insurgency. This Estimate provides additional information on the extent of Nicaraguan support for regional insurgents and subversive groups. []

25X1

Secret

25X1

25X1

KEY JUDGMENTS

Nicaragua's support for insurgents in El Salvador and the rest of Central America remains an integral part of Sandinista foreign policy. Nicaragua also has established ties with other revolutionary groups throughout the hemisphere, developing a more sophisticated network and coordinating its activities more closely with Cuba. []

25X1

Nicaraguan support remains a critical factor in sustaining the Salvadoran insurgency. Nonetheless, there appears to have been some reduction of materiel support over the past year, probably as the result of several factors:

- Managua's growing problems with its own insurgency and continued direct and indirect US pressure.
- The assessment by Castro and the Sandinistas that, in view of President Duarte's election and the increasing capabilities of the Salvadoran military, insurgent prospects for a near-term victory have declined.
- The need for greater discretion created by the Manzanillo and Contadora negotiations, which focused greater attention on Managua's support for insurgents.
- Internal guerrilla logistic problems in El Salvador []

25X1

Nevertheless, convincing evidence of continued shipments from Nicaragua by sea, land, and air indicates that, while Managua may shift its activities and deliveries to minimize its own vulnerability or husband occasionally scarce resources, it has an abiding commitment to the maintenance of the insurgency in El Salvador. Indeed, Managua's role as a communications center and training hub for the Salvadorans has remained constant during the last 12 months. We believe that, over the long run, once the Sandinistas feel more secure, support for the Salvadoran insurgents can be increased. []

25X1

Nicaraguan activities elsewhere in the Central American region provide other examples of training and arms support for radical groups, generally typified by close cooperation with the Cubans. The establishment of communications and broadcast sites in Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984 for Guatemalan guerrilla factions parallels early communications support for the Salvadorans. In Honduras, the Sandinistas have used

25X1

Secret

25X1
25X1

infiltration teams in an attempt to establish an insurgency and pressure the Honduran Government. Nicaragua also has provided arms and training to the orthodox Costa Rican Communist party [REDACTED]

25X1

Nicaraguan training support of other radicals in Latin America has expanded in the last year and, on the basis of reporting from a wide variety of sources, appears to be closely coordinated with Cuban efforts. Training courses in Cuba and Nicaragua are frequently complementary, and leftists from Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and the Dominican Republic have received instruction in the two countries. Many of these contingents receive combat experience in Nicaragua before returning to their home countries. The cooperation extends to training by Cuban instructors of regional insurgents at Nicaraguan facilities. Nicaragua also reportedly acts as an arms conduit to several of the countries cited above. [REDACTED]

25X1

In Costa Rica and Honduras, where support has been more concerted, the Sandinistas probably hope to gain leverage against the governments. In more distant countries, where opportunities for successful revolution are less promising or where Nicaragua has little if any real influence, the Sandinistas have nonetheless maintained contact and, in certain cases, have actively supported radical leftists. In these areas, Sandinista involvement has demonstrated revolutionary solidarity; Managua also probably welcomes foreign radicals as a small but enthusiastic source of troops for their counterinsurgency effort [REDACTED]

25X1

Intelligence gaps on Nicaraguan export activities are of concern to the Intelligence Community [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret