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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Security Committee**

SECOM-M-269

29 June 1983

Minutes  
Two Hundred and Sixty-ninth Meeting  
Wednesday, 29 June 1983, 1000 - 1135 Hours  
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building

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Chairman  
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy  
Mr. Maynard Anderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Mr. James Callahan, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency  
Col. George J. Mercuro, Department of the Air Force  
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency  
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice

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ALTERNATES PRESENT

[redacted] National Security Agency  
Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army  
Mr. Dan Downum, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency  
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Roger D. Smith, Department of the Air Force

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ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Gerald L. Berkin, Department of the Navy  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. W. Kenneth Crosher, Department of State  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency  
[redacted] National Security Agency  
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State  
[redacted] Executive Secretary  
[redacted] SECOM Staff

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

1. Welcomed [REDACTED] as the new DIA member, and noted that he brought extensive experience to the assignment. [REDACTED]

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2. Advised that the DCI spoke to the Armed Forces Policy Council on 20 June about damaging consequences of and measures to be taken to prevent unauthorized disclosures of intelligence. A similar presentation to the White House staff on 21 June was the subject of a "leak" in the Lou Cannon report in the 27 June issue of the Washington Post. [REDACTED] said he spoke to Mr. Casey on 23 June about further steps in educating Government officials to the critical need to stop disclosures. Plans are underway to videotape Mr. Casey's presentation as a lead-in to a live talk by senior security officers who would field any questions. [REDACTED] said several SECOM members had expressed interest in having Mr. Casey's presentation delivered to their departments and agencies. [REDACTED]

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3. Reported that efforts to draft nondisclosure agreements required by NSDD-84 continue. [REDACTED] said draft agreements were circulated for comment after the 19 May ISOO meeting, and another meeting was held on 28 June to discuss changes to those drafts. He advised that we seemed to be losing ground during the process, as the latest draft seemed weaker than the existing Form 4193 that most of the Community uses. He noted that political equities were probably an unavoidable consideration in this effort. [REDACTED]

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4. Said Fred Wood, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) action officer responsible for their study of the polygraph, called him earlier in June seeking assistance. [REDACTED] noted that Mr. Wood volunteered comment that several persons he spoke to expressed the opinion that the Administration wants to use the polygraph to choke off undesired "leaks," but wouldn't use it in cases where information was "leaked" to support an Administration objective. He assured Mr. Wood that SECOM's objective was to prevent the disclosure of legitimate national security information. A copy of the 1980 Personnel Security Survey done under SECOM auspices was sent to Mr. Wood in response to his request for data. [REDACTED] mentioned the DDCI's wish to be kept abreast of developments concerning this or any other polygraph study, with particular regard to contacts on the subject with Community agencies. He asked members to bring pertinent information to his attention. [REDACTED]

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5. Noted that the Personnel Security Subcommittee was still on the hook to complete for SECOM consideration a draft set of parameters for a validity study of the polygraph by the Community. [REDACTED] said the actual study probably could not be complete while the OTA study was in progress. [REDACTED]

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6. Stated his appreciation for the forthcoming attitude on the part of several members that resulted in nominations to fill all three of the vacant subcommittee chairmanships. [ ] noted that three officers were nominated to chair the Physical Security Working Group, and that he had selected Jerry Berkin, of Navy, who brought an exceptionally broad background in security to the task, to serve as chairman. [ ] thanked the State member for proposing two experienced officers for this post, and for offering support for the conduct of the physical security officers seminar. He next advised that [ ] had nominated [ ] to chair the Security Awareness Subcommittee, and that [ ] had nominated [ ] to chair the Personnel Security Subcommittee. [ ] said both nominees had impressive experience in the fields involved, and stated that he would like to designate them as chairmen of these subcommittees unless members wished to offer other nominations or had objections. There being none, the designations were made. [ ] concluded this discussion by noting that he had called [ ] to express appreciation for his service with the Security Awareness body. He asked the incumbent chairmen of the Personnel Security and Security Awareness Subcommittees to arrange the transition with their successors and advise the SECOM staff. [ ]

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7. Reported that he and [ ] met with Miss Page, Deputy Director of the IC Staff, to discuss the FY 1984 SECOM budget request which the SSCI proposed to cut severely (leaving us with only about [ ]). She agreed to support the SECOM reclama. [ ] said he hoped the Senate Committee would reconsider its position and agree with the HPSCI to fund our full request. [ ]

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8. Noted that he had asked members at the April meeting to review and comment on the proposed FY 1985 budget submission. [ ] said members supported our request, totaling [ ] in base level items and [ ] in new initiatives. He stated that the IC Staff had instructed us to reduce the request to a total of [ ] - a cut of 68% - with the revised request due to the IC Staff by 11 July. He invited attention to copies at members' places of our proposed submission, and asked members to provide timely comments on those items which they would like to see included in the reduced [ ]

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9. Said we had provided the IG/CM secretariat our comments on the second draft of their countermeasure organization study. [ ] noted that, as was the case with the first draft, most of our comments were on technical security matters. He invited attendees who held copies of the two drafts, and who would like copies of the SECOM responses, to contact the staff and request copies of our responses. [ ]

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10. Advised that the draft revision of DCID 1/7 had been sent to Walt Elder with a request to issue it as a DCID rather than as an implementer. Mr. Elder agreed, and will send the document, reformatted as a DCID, back to the staff for proofreading. The result will probably not bear a number until a new numbering system is developed. The exception for us will be DCID 1/14, which Mr. Elder agreed should retain its original designation because of its established status in litigation and other uses outside the Community. [ ]

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11. Noted that a new group on computer security, called the ELINFOSEC Minimum Standards Ad Hoc Group, was established on 24 June at the instance of [ ] and Dr. Ruth Davis. The group, chaired by [ ] of the IC Staff with Gene Epperly of OSD as deputy, is tasked to review electronic information security standards, safeguards and requirements in Government and industry (e.g., bank safeguards for electronic fund transfers), and develop a set of standards as a preliminary policy for minimum application to Community computer networks. These standards will focus on "critical" systems that process, store or transmit intelligence. Part of the ad hoc group's effort will be to identify systems considered to be "critical." [ ]

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12. Stated that [ ] of the staff was in California reviewing and evaluating a contractor's demonstration of a technique developed under an Office of Research and Development contract to help identify sensitive documents which have been misused. [ ] said the technique's applicability is one aspect being reviewed by [ ]

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13. Reported that this was Col. Mercuro's last SECOM meeting, he being reassigned to Florida to serve as Inspector General at Patrick Air Force Base. [ ] asked that the record show his special thanks to Col. Mercuro for his active and constructive support of the Committee as a member, and particularly for his outstanding performance as chairman of the Compartmentation Subcommittee. Col. Mercuro said he had enjoyed his association with SECOM. He hoped to ease the disappointment of departure by organizing the first annual Mercuro Open Golf Tournament next December.

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#### ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

In the absence of requests for change, the minutes of the 25 May 1983 meeting were approved as written. [ ]

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#### ITEM 2 Subcommittee Reports

A. Physical Security - [ ] reported that the Physical Security Working Group (PSWG) met on 15 June to complete arrangements for the first seminar for Community physical security officers, scheduled for 8-12 August at [ ] working group members as the first "class." Four seminars are programmed for calendar 1984. [ ] said most speakers have been lined up, with the remainder to be arranged shortly. He said the members would critique the presentations at the first running, and make adjustments as needed. He stated the working group will cover physical security matters for intelligence in general, not just SCI. The Community will be invited to nominate attendees at subsequent runnings of the seminar.

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B. Personnel Security - [ ] reported on the Personnel Security Subcommittee 22 June meeting. They discussed the tenth running of the adjudicators' seminar, scheduled for 15-19 August. Nominations are to be provided the SECOM staff [ ] in writing no later than 15 July, and are to give each nominee's name and title, SSN, work address and clearance status. [ ] said they also discussed arranging one or two short (i.e., two

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or three days) conferences for personnel security managers on behavioral sciences and legal issues bearing on personnel security, as suggested by [redacted] said subcommittee members believed there was a need for and interest in such a conference. The members indicated agreement with the concept. He asked [redacted] for guidance on how to proceed. [redacted] described the results of subcommittee deliberations on the proposed addition to the draft revision of DCID 1/14. [redacted]

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C. Security Advisory Group [redacted] reported that he had returned from Moscow the previous evening. He said the Department of State had established an Embassy Construction Coordinating Committee (MC<sup>3</sup>) to address matters such as space allocation, secure rooms and moving of equipment in the new embassy. He advised that brickwork on the chancery building was up to the sixth floor, but that utility lines were far behind schedule. Work on the housing units is almost finished. He said he doubted that the scheduled 1985 completion date would be met. [redacted] summarized the stop-work order, the Soviet walk-off and return and actions concerning technical security inspection equipment. He advised that the technical countermeasure effort for the new building has been well supported by the Community (especially CIA and NSA), and he expressed his appreciation for the rapport developed between mid-level personnel from the agencies involved. [redacted] noted his concern about possible responses to requests from friendly countries for advice from the U. S. on what they should do and not do to secure their own buildings. He stated that this issue had been referred to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration for consideration. In response to questions from members, he advised that about 25 SeaBees were on-site in Moscow, and that an average of eight to ten security specialists would be there for at least another year.

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D. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures [redacted] reported that most of their recent meeting was taken up with discussions on the response to be made to the second draft IG/CM countermeasure study. [redacted] complimented [redacted] for the quality and timeliness of his work on that response. [redacted] summarized negotiations with GSA about construction of the expanded ITC facilities. He noted that GSA's cost estimate had been unacceptably high, and that they were now out of the picture. He advised that arrangements had been made with the architect GSA had originally retained to carry the project forward. The current estimate calls for construction to cost about \$400,000 plus about \$56,000 for the architect's fee (includes construction monitoring). The design review is scheduled for mid-July, with construction to start in October. [redacted]

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### ITEM 3 DCID 1/14 Revision

[redacted] noted dissemination to members of four alternatives on language to be added to the DCID revision to address the SCI access eligibility of persons determined to have disclosed classified information to those not authorized to receive it. He advised that Air Force, Army, CIA, DIA, Energy, FBI, NSA, Navy, SAFSS and Treasury had voted for the SECOM version; Mr. Anderson had voted for the OSD version, but advised that if his

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alternative was not supported by the majority, he would vote for the SECOM staff version. State voted for the CIA alternative, and Justice for the UDIS proposal. [REDACTED] said he would like this matter to go forward as an agreed position so the NFIC could concentrate on the policy division concerning duration of investigative coverage. Messrs. Stigers and Rubino said they would support the SECOM staff alternative, thus making the action unanimous. [REDACTED] complimented Col. Press for the clarity and specificity with which he supported the SECOM alternative for the Army.

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#### ITEM 4 Proposed Security Awareness Subcommittee Charter

[REDACTED] noted that copies of the proposed charter had been sent to members with the agenda. He advised that NSA had suggested minor changes requested by [REDACTED] the chairman-designate of the subcommittee. Members agreed to [REDACTED] recommendation that SECOM action on this charter be postponed until [REDACTED] has had a chance to discuss it with subcommittee members.

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#### ITEM 5 New Business

1. [REDACTED] invited attention to copies at members' places of a unanimous recommendation by the Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee that SECOM members nominate a person to spend a month with the SECOM staff to conduct a limited study of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence. [REDACTED] said the proposed method was to take information available in Community agency logs of "leaks" to try to determine (1) where classified information leaks came from; (2) which media vehicles were principally involved; and (3) what subjects were most frequently subject to disclosure. The object would be to use the results to ensure that security resources are applied to the areas of greatest risk. The results would provide hard facts to validate or change "conventional wisdom" on the three areas involved.

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[REDACTED] said this effort would support such efforts as the package being drafted now to request Justice to cause the FBI to investigate a "leak" in Aviation Week, with the seriousness of the situation to be demonstrated by a listing of the numerous other "leaks" of intelligence in the same magazine during recent years. Col. Mercuro spoke in favor of the proposal as a useful start. [REDACTED] and others indicated their support. In response to Mr.

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[REDACTED] request for provision of an officer to do the work, Mr.

[REDACTED] said he thought he would be able to do so. [REDACTED] and Mr.

[REDACTED] aid they would consider providing officers from their agencies.

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2. [REDACTED] asked for guidance on whether the National Security Council Staff should be invited to sit on the UDIS. Mr. Anderson and [REDACTED] noted potential problems involved in doing so. No members supported this, and the issue was dropped from consideration. Members also discussed and rejected possible representation on the UDIS by the ISOO staff. Mr. Stigers noted that any needed ACDA representation probably could be arranged through the Department of State on an adhoc basis.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Security Committee**

13 July 1983

NOTE FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee  
Chairmen, SECOM Subcommittees

SUBJECT: SECOM Minutes

Please replace page 7 of SECOM-M-269, dated 29 June 1983 with  
corrected version as attached.

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SECOM Staff

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated  
From Attachment

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3. [REDACTED] advised that all 11 responses received on the proposed data elements to be used by Community agencies to record in their files common items of information on unauthorized disclosures were supportive, but Mr. Anderson's concurrence was highly qualified. Mr. Anderson replied that the OSD element which would be involved had asked him to state the qualifications. He stated that OSD could use the data elements proposed.

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4. [REDACTED] noted that the IG/CM Chairman, Gen. Stilwell, had asked him and Mr. Snider of OSD to collaborate on developing common data elements for use by the Community in recording damage assessments. He further noted that the IG/CM wanted these elements to be used for data on all disclosures, including press, defectors, technical surveillance and espionage cases. Mr. Anderson commented that program managers were the only ones who could meaningfully state how they had been damaged by espionage or other means causing loss of sensitive data. [REDACTED] said the UDIS didn't seem to be the proper body to address this matter. He asked members to comment on how they thought SECOM could be responsive in this damage assessment project. Mr. [REDACTED] suggested that SECOM advise the IG/CM that we cannot participate in this project as it involves matters beyond our jurisdiction and within the jurisdiction of others. Mr. Anderson said he agreed. The other members indicated their assent to this suggestion. [REDACTED]

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5. Mr. Rubino asked which, if any, members could provide him information on the nature and extent of their agencies' practices on sharing narcotics intelligence with the Drug Enforcement Agency. Several responses were provided for later follow-up by Mr. Rubino. [REDACTED]

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6. Mr. Anderson advised that the Senate had attached a rider to the Defense Appropriations Bill to limit use of the polygraph in Defense. The rider would also require the President to report annually to the Congress on the validity and reliability of the polygraph. Mr. Anderson said this would make it impossible for Defense to comply fully with NSDD-84. He said Defense would ask the White House for guidance. He noted that another rider to the same bill, however, provides desired relief from FOIA requirements. [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED] said part of the DCI's concern about "leaks" focused on the security of the National Intelligence Daily (NID). He described a recent DCI letter to NID recipients stating ground rules for use of the document - the NID is intended for use by only the single addressee for each copy; each copy is to be returned in 24 hours; and NIDs are not to be reproduced. The letter, sent to 172 recipients, noted flagrant violations of all three rules, and asked for responses on recipients' practices by 16 June. About a third of the addressees made no response. Those responses received suggest that the 24-hour rule is not wholly reasonable (e.g., weekends, TDY by executives).

[REDACTED] said an analysis of responses was being prepared for the DCI. He asked members knowledgeable of any nonrespondents to try to get them to answer the letter. [REDACTED]

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ITEM 6 - Next Meetings

[redacted] advised that the next two regular meetings were scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on 3 August and 14 September, both Wednesdays. He said that would put us in line for the annual, overnight SECOM seminar scheduled for the 11th and 12th of October 1983. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
Executive Secretary