



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Terrorism Review



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17 June 1985

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*GI TR 85-012
17 June 1985*

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Terrorism Review [Redacted]

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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor

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Terrorism Review [Redacted]

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Focus

Libya in the Caribbean: Qadhafi's Expanding Activities [Redacted]

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Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has recently sought to increase his influence in the eastern Caribbean. His efforts will probably meet with limited success, perhaps opening the door to Libyan involvement with terrorist groups in the region. Libyan backing probably will lead to increased militancy among French Caribbean separatists, but we expect English-speaking leftists to continue to reject violent actions. [Redacted]

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Qadhafi's immediate objective appears to be to undermine US and French interests in the region. He regards the United States—and, to a lesser extent, France—as the principal obstacle to achieving leadership in the Third World, including the Caribbean. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Libyan Tactics

[Redacted] Libya's Caribbean program is aimed at [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the use of a variety of tools to obtain political influence, including financial aid and economic projects, intimidation, indoctrination and propaganda, and the exploitation of local Muslims in the region. Tripoli is trying to establish regional bases of operation in order to implement this program. Large official Libyan representations in Panama City and Caracas may indicate these People's Bureaus are being used to coordinate the overall effort. [Redacted]

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Libya is cultivating Suriname in order to gain similar freedom to operate in Paramaribo, although officials of the two countries reportedly distrust each other's motives. This mutual suspicion is likely to slow the growth of the budding relationship and may limit Libyan activity there. [Redacted]

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The Regional Threat

In our judgment, Libya's traditional contacts—leftist leaders from the English-speaking islands of St. Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua—are basically opportunists who pay lipservice to Qadhafi's ideology in exchange for financial handouts. They are resisting Libyan demands for violent action, however, because they do not want to damage their political standing or risk government retaliation. Many English-speaking Caribbean leftists are also trying to broaden their appeal by playing down their radical rhetoric and forming alliances with political moderates. So, for the moment, Tripoli has toned down its calls for violent action by these groups.

[Redacted]

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
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Libya's apparent failure to increase militancy among the English-speaking leftists will likely fuel Qadhafi's determination to strengthen ties to proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean. [redacted]

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Prospects

Libya's aggressive policies in the Caribbean will likely continue to meet with mixed results. Although Libya and Suriname probably will proceed with some aspects of cooperation, Qadhafi's efforts to use Paramaribo for regional activity will be hampered by mutual suspicions. We believe English-speaking Caribbean leftists almost certainly will continue to resist any renewed Libyan call for violence. [redacted]

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Qadhafi will probably increase his support for French separatists in the hope they will step up terrorist operations and, perhaps, encourage English-speaking leftists to follow their example. The French separatists have little hope of achieving independence through the political process, and increasing desperation may drive some to further militant action. Most French Antilleans oppose independence, and only a few local leftists openly support terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, the more deeply Qadhafi becomes engaged with dissidents in the Caribbean, the more opportunities he will have to develop assets that he could use for terrorist forays in the region. [redacted]

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
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Highlights

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
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Key Indicator

El Salvador

Targeting of Air Force Personnel

The recent assassination of a Salvadoran Air Force pilot in the capital may presage further terrorist attacks against the military.



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This assassination, the second attack against Air Force elements in the last month may reflect the rebels' desire to intimidate and impair that branch of the Salvadoran military which has been most effective against insurgent operations. The military's growing reliance on the Air Force to prosecute the war against the insurgents is putting an additional strain on its limited number of pilots and ground support personnel, who require extensive training. The loss of only a few men could reduce Air Force capabilities until additional personnel complete the training.



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Significant Developments

Canada

Sikh Separatists Jump Bail

Four Sikhs, suspected supporters of a separate state of Khalistan, were arrested in Vancouver earlier this year while trying to enter Canada on forged Malaysian and Swiss passports. Three of them were subsequently released on bail, have gone underground, and may have fled to the United States on the eve of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's visit. The fourth, still in custody, [redacted]

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[redacted]

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France

Police Net Action Directe Arms Cache, Suspects

French police in Nice discovered an arms cache in an apartment that had been rented by Action Directe (AD) militant Regis Schleicher, now in prison. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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**West Germany-
Netherlands**

Kurds Occupy Swedish Missions in Europe

Members of the National Kurdish Liberation Front (ERNK) occupied Swedish diplomatic missions in Hamburg, Frankfurt, West Berlin, and The Hague on 28 May. The protestors demanded the release of a Kurdish lawyer arrested in Sweden in connection with a murder case—a demand Stockholm reportedly will not meet. Police had to evict the petitioners in Hamburg and The Hague forcibly. [redacted]

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The ERNK is believed to be dominated by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), a violent secessionist group. The PKK is blamed for the deaths of several Kurds in Europe since last summer, when it apparently began trying to consolidate its leadership role in the ERNK. The Kurdish lawyer arrested in Sweden is being held for his alleged involvement in one of those murders. [redacted]

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Romania

Syrian Student Union Officials Targeted by Car Bombs

A car bomb killed three Romanian militia officers and wounded another as they were attempting to defuse the device outside the foreign students' dormitories in Bucharest on 26 May. A second bomb attached to another union official's car was safely removed. Police apprehended two suspects, tentatively identified as Iraqi nationals. The bombing attempts represent an escalation in ongoing violence among Arab student factions. [redacted]

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Turkey**Martial Law To Be Lifted in Ankara**

The National Security Council will recommend that the government lift martial law in six more provinces, including Ankara and Izmir, on 19 July. Martial law would be replaced by a state-of-emergency rule, a largely cosmetic change. Provincial authorities, who will assume the powers that martial law commanders now have, should have little trouble maintaining control. [redacted]

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25X1**Libya-United States****Qadhafi Renews Anti-Exile Activity in the United States**

A Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata and 16 unofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury for plotting to kill anti-Qadhafi dissidents. After a two-month investigation, the FBI on 28 May rounded up the suspects in Virginia, Colorado, Michigan, and North Carolina. In addition to the Libyan UN facility, the Libyan Student Center in McLean, Virginia, was also implicated in the plot. [redacted]

While a Libyan student was shot in Colorado in October 1980 by a former Green Beret hired by the Libyan Government, this recent campaign appears more ambitious—targeting many oppositionists in various locations around the United States. Press accounts claim pro-Qadhafi Libyans have established a network of support for terrorist activity. The scope of the plan and the fact that Libyans—rather than foreign mercenaries—were involved probably indicate Qadhafi's increasing determination to strike at his opponents. [redacted]

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Lebanon**Another American Kidnaped**

On 9 June unidentified gunmen kidnaped Thomas Sutherland, Dean of Agriculture at the American University of Beirut (AUB), as he was leaving Beirut International Airport. According to the US Embassy, five carloads of gunmen intercepted the convoy in which Sutherland was riding. The gunmen took Sutherland, the only American, but did not harm any of his Lebanese escorts. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, but we suspect Sutherland will end up in Hizballah hands. [redacted]

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The US Embassy reports AUB President Calvin Plimpton may have been the actual target of the kidnaping. Plimpton had a confirmed ticket for the flight on which Sutherland arrived, but, at the last minute, decided to stay in the United States. The convoy reportedly had been arranged for Plimpton. [redacted]

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Middle East**Islamic Jihad Denies Responsibility for Recent Attacks**

On 4 June Beirut newspapers published a communique from the Islamic Jihad Organization denying responsibility for two explosions in Riyadh on 18 May, the attack on the Amir of Kuwait on 25 May, and the murder of British lecturer Denis Hill in West Beirut on 29 May. Separate callers had previously claimed credit for all three attacks in the name of Islamic Jihad. The communique—delivered to a Western news agency in Beirut with a photograph of recently kidnaped American David Jacobsen—blamed “American and Zionist imperialism” for conspiring to

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harm Islamic Jihad's reputation, and warned the United States that "our heroes are capable of undertaking all types of operations in the most farflung corners of the world." [redacted]

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The terrorists holding the US and French hostages in Lebanon may have issued the communique to dissociate themselves from operations they did not conduct. We believe a variety of pro-Iranian Shia groups—such as the Hizballah factions in Lebanon; the Dawa Party elements in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon; and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia—all use the nom de guerre "Islamic Jihad" to make threats or claim credit for attacks. [redacted]

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West Bank-Gaza Strip

Israelis Uncover Terrorist Cells

Last month, Israeli security forces arrested 30 members of a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine cell whose members reportedly were responsible for the murder of an IDF soldier and for a grenade attack against a truck transporting gas cylinders in the Ramallah district. Authorities also arrested 13 members of another cell responsible for several political murders in the Gaza Strip and a grenade attack against a bus in Tel Aviv. The suspected leader of the Gaza Strip cell is reportedly a member of Fatah. The cell was uncovered five months ago, but the arrests were not reported until this month because investigations were still in progress. [redacted]

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
Malaysia

Three Bombings in Sabah State

One person was killed and at least four injured in three separate bombings on 25 May, 28 May, and 4 June in and around the capital of Kota Kinabalu. Local press reports suggest the attacks were the work of a Muslim opposition party that has protested the appointment of the state's new Christian chief minister following elections last month. About one-quarter of Sabah's 1.3 million population is Christian Kadazan; the rest are Chinese, Muslim Malays, or from various tribal groups. Sabah has not experienced violence on this scale since the 1976 elections sparked a series of bombings. [redacted]

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Angola

UNITA Changing Timeworn Hostage Policies

Following UNITA's kidnaping of a British technician on 10 May, leader Jonas Savimbi declared that all expatriate technicians working for the Luanda regime were in danger. He added that UNITA would stop using the International Red Cross as an intermediary in hostage situations. This statement follows Savimbi's announcement last March that Westerners would no longer be routinely freed if they were captured in the course of insurgent activity. These public statements and the breaking of "relations" with the Red Cross indicate an increased risk to Western personnel.

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Sudan

Ethiopian Rebels Kidnap Three British CARE Workers

Three food monitors were ambushed on 24 May while traveling in their well-marked CARE vehicle on the Sudanese side of the border with Ethiopia. Their captors, seven members of the Eritrean People's Liberation Forces (EPRLF), drove them in their damaged truck into Ethiopia. Following negotiations with CARE representatives, the EPRLF released them and escorted them back into Sudan on 2 June.

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French Extradition: Policy and Procedure

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Extradition is contrary to all the traditions of France.

*Interior Minister Defferre
July 1981*

Despite the unprecedented extradition of three Basques to Spain last fall, the French Government has been at pains to discourage any idea that it will grant extradition for accused terrorists. Indeed, Spain's failure to secure convictions in two of these three cases will only reinforce France's traditional reluctance to extradite "political" criminals. This policy has long been a source of frustration to other countries, and the Italian Government has become increasingly critical of the French failure to act on more than 100 extradition requests. The outcome of these requests and the French reaction to the Basques' acquittal will provide clues to any new directions in French extradition policy.

19th-Century Treaties, 20th-Century Crime

The French often point to their legal system as the reason—or excuse—for their approach to extradition. France pioneered many of the important provisions in modern extradition treaties such as the nonextradition of a country's own nationals, the concept of speciality (limiting a trial to offenses for which extradition is granted), and exceptions for political offenders. Indeed, many French extradition treaties date from the 19th century, including those with Italy (1870), Spain (1877), and the Netherlands (1895). Not only have the mobility and methods of modern criminals outdated these treaties, but the practice of enumerating offenses in those treaties has resulted in such anomalies as extradition for bigamy or robbery but not for drug trafficking or hijacking. Nor are the French eager to modernize. The United States, for instance, has failed to make progress in updating its extradition treaty with France. When Foreign Minister Dumas was urged recently to move negotiations beyond the technical level, he said the treaty must have served reasonably well if it had lasted since 1909.

Laws and Guidelines

The French Government has always stressed the judicial nature of the extradition process.

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The Extradition Statute of 10 March 1927 governs extradition procedures if there are no treaty provisions. According to the statute, extradition will not be granted "when the crime or offense has a political character or when it is clear from the circumstances that the extradition is requested for a political end." A "political offense" is nowhere defined, and the French courts must, in effect, weigh the political motivations of both the accused and the requesting state.

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France is one of the few Western countries that does not make certain terrorist-associated activities illegal under the penal code, and the 1927 statute says extradition will not be granted "if the act is not punished under French law." For example, membership in a terrorist organization such as the Red Brigades—a criminal offense in Italy—is not grounds for extradition from France.

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The Council of Ministers communique of November 1982, issued following the arrest of several Spanish Basque terrorists in 1982, purports to define the limits of "political" offenses in extradition cases. Any one of four criteria can be the basis for refusing extradition:

- The nature of the political and judicial system of the requesting state.
- The political character of the offense.
- The political motive of the extradition request.
- The risk of "aggravating" the situation of the person accused because of his opinions, political actions, and so forth.

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The communique also determines that an offense, such as murder or the taking of hostages, cannot be considered political if committed in a state that

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respects liberties and fundamental rights. When the courts disallowed the political exception defense in the case of the Basques last fall and the government signed the extradition decree, Prime Minister Fabius noted that he did not want France to be a sanctuary for those committing "blood crimes." In the case of some Italian terrorists wanted for extradition, President Mitterrand has also attempted a somewhat muddled distinction between those who have "broken with terrorism" and are now "embedded in French society," and those guilty of "blood crimes" who should be extradited "if French justice so decides."

[REDACTED]

How French Justice Decides

Governments that request extraditions from France face a daunting process. More than 30 French magistrates may examine each case. A request for extradition must be presented to the French Government through diplomatic channels, accompanied by a decree of conviction or an arrest warrant that contains a precise indication of the charge and a copy of the text of the law applicable. In the past, Italian requests have been said to list offenses not included in the 1870 extradition convention or in French law. The few Italians who have been extradited since 1981 were charged with common law offenses.

[REDACTED]

After the defendant has been identified and informed of the charges, he appears before the appellate court (chambre d'accusation of the cour d'appel) in the district in which he was arrested. During the next several weeks, the examining magistrate considers the detailed extradition request and satisfies himself that all the legal conditions are met. Should the court of appeals rule against extradition, the decision is final. Should the accused be found extraditable, he may appeal to the Court of Cassation in Paris, the highest judicial authority in France, which rules only on points of law. The court may reverse a decision only because of a misinterpretation or misapplication of the law; it has no jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits of the case.

[REDACTED]

Even if the Court of Cassation determines that technically the accused can be extradited, the executive branch has the final word and the Prime Minister may elect not to sign the extradition decree.

The accused also has one last appeal to France's highest administrative tribunal, the Council of State, which rules on both evidence and form. The Council verifies that the different phases of the extradition procedure have conformed to the law and that the rights of the defendant have been observed.

[REDACTED]

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How the Government Decides

Extradition decisions generally have reflected the political opinions of the French Government. In 1975, the United States requested extradition for two Americans who had hijacked a plane and extorted \$500,000 from the airline. The French courts allowed the political exception defense, although the only evidence of political motivation presented was that initially the hijackers ordered the aircraft flown to Hanoi. On the other hand, in 1977 the government agreed to extradite to West Germany Klaus Croissant, a lawyer for the Baader-Meinhof gang, without benefit of proper appeal procedures. In line with the concept of speciality, however, the West Germans were allowed to try him on only one of the charges against him.

[REDACTED]

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Mitterrand, a frequent critic of interference with judicial processes by the Giscard government, came to power promising an independent judiciary.

[REDACTED]

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In 1984, the Mitterrand government faced a particularly thorny extradition decision in the case of seven Basque fugitives sought by Madrid. Spanish Basques in France traditionally have based their defense for crimes such as armed robbery and murder on "political" motivations, and, during the Franco era, French courts generally agreed as a way of permitting the accused to escape an authoritarian regime.

[REDACTED]

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The Mitterrand government wanted to make a gesture of support for Spanish democracy and the Spanish Socialist government while also discouraging vigilante activity by the Spanish Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) in France. Paris decided to

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extradite three of the Basques, and the government moved swiftly to have the case reviewed by the Council of State and to deliver the Basques to Spain within three days. As one magazine put it, the Socialists "lost a little of their soul but he [Mitterrand] went to the defense of Spanish democracy." [redacted]

The French may now consider the extradition to have been a mistake. Although Madrid had insisted that the evidence against the three was overwhelming, Spanish courts acquitted two of them. French Government officials have been quick to cite this as proof of the impartiality of Spanish justice, but no further Basques have been—or are likely to be—extradited, although more than twenty-five have been expelled to Third World countries. [redacted]

Instead, the French are likely to continue their policy of internal control. While reluctant to extradite long-term residents who claim to have "disassociated" themselves from violence, French authorities nevertheless monitor their activities and now require monthly renewal of residence permits. Many Basques (and Italians) are in a status of "administrative asylum"; they are tolerated but not officially recognized. Nor is it likely the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) will grant many of them political refugee status, which does not shield an individual from expulsion or restricted residence but does protect him from the danger of extradition to his country of origin. On occasion, an appeals commission or the Council of State has overturned an OFPRA decision. One of the Basques deported to Togo last September, for instance, subsequently was granted refugee status because he once had been tortured by the Spanish police. [redacted]

The Italian Extradition Requests

With the Spanish extradition to point to, Italian Prime Minister Craxi and Minister of Interior Scalfaro have voiced their exasperation at Paris's failure to respond to Rome's numerous requests for the return of known terrorists. Five Italian terrorists currently in French custody are at varying stages of the extradition process. The courts have found two of these—Enrico Fedele and Gianni di Giuseppe—extraditable, but instead they were expelled to

Burundi in May. Three others, wanted for "blood crimes," are two leftwing terrorists, Massimo Sandrini and Sergio Tornaghi, and one rightwing terrorist, Fiorenzo Trincanato. The French refused recently to extradite Sandrini because the charge against him—"moral complicity"—has no equivalent in French law, but Tornaghi or Trincanato may be extradited to blunt criticism that France is a refuge for terrorists and to dissipate some of the bad feelings the issue has engendered between the two countries. [redacted]

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Land of Asylum . . . Sometimes

In the final analysis, decisions in extradition cases are largely made on political grounds. The Socialists came to power in 1981 firmly committed to the right of asylum and opposed to the extradition of political refugees. The upsurge of terrorism in France and the activism of some political refugees altered the outlook of the government to the extent that more stringent internal control measures were enacted and guidelines on extradition adopted, but these guidelines have been selectively ignored. [redacted]

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The publicity given pronouncements by French leaders on the "blood crimes" criterion will make it more difficult to refuse extradition in cases which successfully run the judicial gauntlet. Extradition may be granted in a few compelling cases where the seriousness of the offense is coupled with a scrupulously prepared extradition request, but the process will never be automatic and political considerations will remain paramount. [redacted]

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ETA's 1985 Spring Offensive [redacted]

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Spring offensives by the Spanish Basque group Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) have left 11 people dead and at least 19 wounded. ETA has mounted a two-front campaign. One part of the campaign consists of bombings against tourist facilities along the Costa del Sol. While these beach bombings, which began in April, have caused no injuries, they probably have hurt the tourist industry because they have been accompanied by a highly publicized increase in street crime. The number of tourists, especially those from Great Britain, has declined this year. The other, more violent part of the campaign, which has caused the casualties, consists of six bombings and six armed attacks. These attacks have been aimed mainly at policemen in the Basque Provinces themselves. [redacted]

The spring campaign probably indicates that the ETA leadership has been able to restore at least some of its operational effectiveness lost after the 1984 crackdowns by France. ETA may now be trying to build an appearance of strength in response to press speculation that the government might again attempt to negotiate a cease-fire. Following the murder on 21 May of two policemen, for example, ETA declared in a communique that the program it calls the "KAS Alternative"—withdrawal of the Basque Provinces' security forces, the inclusion of Navarra (the border zone) into the Basque region, and self-determination—must be accepted as the basis for negotiations with Madrid. Continued ETA violence in the Basque country, however, seems just as likely to diminish what little popular support remains there for the terrorists and could undercut the government's inclination to make even more modest gestures toward them. [redacted]

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This second offensive, however, may already be proving counterproductive. Following the accidental killing of a 14-year-old boy by an ETA car bomb on 30 May, ETA's popular image plummeted in the Basque Provinces—something that has often happened in the past in Spain after particularly outrageous terrorist acts.¹ Thousands of angry Spanish Basques in Bilbao and Pamplona rallied to protest the group's continuing resort to violence. [redacted]

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¹ Public opinion in the Basque provinces has been shifting away from ETA, but it remains volatile. For more than two decades, terrorist outrages have produced dramatic shifts in opinion against ETA. Almost invariably, however, excessive government countermeasures have erased the gains made against the group. [redacted]

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Chronology

- 24 April-12 May** *Costa del Sol.* Eight low-yield bombs detonated in separate locations. No injuries, little damage.
- 16 April** *Pamplona.* Three policemen injured by car bomb.
- 7 May** *Pamplona.* Policeman loses both legs and one arm as a result of car bomb.
- 9 May** *Cestona.* Two civil guards injured by car bomb.
- 12 May** *San Sebastian.* Policeman shot and killed.
- 16 May** *Basauri.* Two policemen killed and 11 others wounded by car bomb.
- 17 May** *Bermeo.* Taxi driver accused of being police informer shot and killed. Claimed, but later denied by ETA.
- 19 May** *Vitoria.* Police deactivate car bomb containing 25 kg of plastic explosive and 100 kg of loose hardware outside a packed soccer stadium.
- 22 May** *San Sebastian.* Two off-duty policemen shot and killed.
- 27 May** *Bilbao.* National police inspector shot and killed.
- 30 May** *Pamplona.* 14-year-old boy and policeman killed and two policemen injured by car bomb.
- Bilbao.* Factory guard murdered.
- Bilbao.* Factory official shot and killed.

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31 May *Bilbao.* Renault showroom bombed.

6 June *Vizcaya.* Citroen dealership bombed. No injuries. Little damage.

8 June *Valencia and Alicante.* Two bombs planted at El Saler Beach, Postitguet Beach and Altea Pleasure Port explode. No injuries.



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**Egypt Foils Another
Libyan Plot** [redacted]

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A Libyan-sponsored attack against the US Embassy in Cairo was averted when, according to Egyptian authorities, Egyptian intelligence learned of the plot

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[redacted]

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[redacted] The Egyptians failed, however, to trick the Libyans into believing the attack had occurred and taking credit for it. [redacted]

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Tripoli's sponsorship of such a plot against the US Embassy, if true, would indicate a departure from Libyan leader Qadhafi's past practice of not directly targeting US personnel and facilities. The Libyan leader has only rarely planned such direct attacks, probably fearing military reprisals. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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The Plot

According to statements in the Egyptian press, the Libyans—acting through the radical Palestinian group Abu Nidal in Damascus—planned to infiltrate a vehicle loaded with explosives into Alexandria and drive it into the US Embassy in Cairo. The Egyptians,

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[redacted]

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[redacted] were able to locate and remove the explosives from the vehicle when it arrived at the port of Alexandria. [redacted]

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Terrorism in Latin America: Patterns and Prospects, 1984-85

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In contrast to the case for Western Europe and the Middle East, distinguishing precisely between acts of terrorism and other forms of political or criminal violence in Latin America is often quite difficult. In many Latin American countries, it has long been common for persons who believe their goals cannot be satisfied through the political process to resort instead to violence—to insurgency, if they are strong, resolute, and numerous enough and if the circumstances permit. While some of these insurgent groups have engaged in terrorism, few, however, use it as a principal tactic.¹ Consequently, there are only a few “pure” terrorist groups in Latin America, and even most of these aspire to graduate into full-scale insurgent groups. Finally, of the terrorist acts that occur each year, most are purely indigenous—a Peruvian attacking a Peruvian target, for example—and not international.

Moreover, in some Latin American countries—Colombia is a notable example—it is often difficult to determine whether an act of violence has been committed by political activists or by common criminals. Insurgents and terrorists sometimes try to conceal their responsibility for crimes such as kidnappings or bank robberies; other times they take credit for crimes—particularly bombings—they did not commit. Further complicating the picture, Latin American criminals, especially narcotics traffickers, commonly engage in terrorist-type acts to dissuade or impede government officials from suppressing their criminal operations.

The pattern of terrorism and related political violence in Latin America in 1984 was little different from that of recent years. The leftwing insurgency in El

¹ Nowhere in Western Europe do the circumstances permit dissidents to mount bona fide insurgencies. Nevertheless, the prototypes of the modern leftwing urban terrorist groups now so prevalent in Western Europe originated in South America. The *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, written by Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighela in 1969, served as a bible to a generation of West European terrorists (such as the members of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, founders of the Red Army Faction) who modeled their groups after the seemingly romantic and sonorously named Tupamaros of Uruguay and Montoneros of Argentina.

Salvador continued to produce terrorism, as did a lesser insurgency in Peru. In contrast, most of the Communist insurgent groups of Colombia signed truces, albeit ones that often proved temporary, with the government. Leftwing urban terrorist groups were active last year in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador. Rightwing terrorist groups were active in a number of countries, including Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador. Narcoterrorist violence afflicted Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, among other countries. Anti-US terrorism composed only a small portion of the total terrorism in Latin America in 1984.

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Colombia

Colombia has long been plagued by societal violence. Hundreds of thousands of persons are estimated to have died violently there during the past two or three decades. Much of this violence has been rooted in banditry, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of criminality. Nevertheless, some has been an outgrowth of political conflict, especially efforts by leftwing extremists to seize political power. According to a recent local press estimate, for example, over the past 20 years more than 70,000 persons have died in Colombia as a result of subversive violence and efforts to combat it.

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Currently, most of the estimated 4,000 to 5,000 Communist insurgents are divided into four major guerrilla organizations, some of which are among the oldest active insurgent groups in the world: the 2,500-member Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), established in 1966; the 1,000-member 19th of April Movement (M-19), established in 1970; the 500-member National Liberation Army (ELN), established in 1963; and the 400-member People's Liberation Army (EPL), established in 1967.

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On 28 May 1984, after protracted negotiations, the Colombian Government and the FARC signed a cease-fire agreement under which the FARC agreed

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not to attack government forces or installations or engage in kidnappings or extortions. In return, the FARC would be allowed to organize politically, and the administration would try to institute political and agrarian reforms and facilitate the establishment and functioning of worker and peasant organizations. The FARC refused the government demand that it lay down its arms permanently, while the government refused the FARC demand that it withdraw its troops from FARC operating regions. The government subsequently concluded similar truce agreements with the M-19 and the EPL. The ELN refused to deal with the government. [redacted]

After the cease-fire agreements, the number of armed confrontations between insurgent forces and government troops declined and has remained at a relatively low level into the middle of 1985, even though the ELN and dissident rebels associated with newer groups such as the Ricardo Franco Front (composed largely of FARC dissidents) refused to honor the truce. And, despite the truce, a number of bombings were conducted in Bogota, mainly against government and military installations. In May 1985, for example, the Ricardo Franco Front bombed a bridge, some government buildings, and a police academy. [redacted]

Moreover, a record 215 kidnappings were reported in 1984; many other kidnappings and threatened kidnappings (extortions) probably went unreported. Of the 215 reported, 132 were attributed to various guerrilla groups (69 to the FARC alone) that continue to obtain their funds the traditional way. Popular pressure is mounting on the government to take action to counter the guerrillas' extortion and kidnaping activities, but the Betancur regime is loath to acknowledge that the peace process has failed. [redacted]

Narcoterrorism. The government also increased its pressure on narcotics traffickers in 1984. The traffickers reacted in April by arranging the assassination of Justice Minister Lara. Almost immediately thereafter, in a reversal of longstanding government policy, President Betancur approved the extradition of four drug traffickers to the United States and agreed to consider US requests for further extraditions. The US agreement to extradite to

Colombia US nationals accused of crimes there undoubtedly contributed to this turnaround. [redacted]

Narcotics traffickers, probably those associated with cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar, threatened a wave of terror, vowing to kill five Americans for each Colombian extradited. In response, both Colombian and US officials instituted intensive security precautions. Since the lives of US Ambassador Tamba and his family were specifically threatened, they left the country for a period of time. These precautions may have prevented some terrorist attacks; in any event, the only actual attack against US interests was a primitive car bombing near the US Embassy in Bogota in November. Drug trafficking interests were probably responsible. More recently, the US Embassy has been the target of numerous anonymous bomb threats and hoaxes, but no actual bombing attempts have been observed. [redacted]

Peru

Sendero Luminoso. Since 1980 the Sendero Luminoso (SL), or Shining Path, a brutal Maoist insurgent group composed mainly of Indians, has operated with near impunity in Ayacucho Province in south-central Peru. Unique in its insularity, the SL refuses assistance from all foreign governments. The guerrillas repeatedly have been implicated in the slaughter of uncooperative peasants and the murder of village officials who cooperate with the government. Several such atrocities were reported in 1984. [redacted]

Sporadically, the Sendero Luminoso has also conducted attacks in and around major Peruvian cities, especially Lima. It concentrates on actions that have high public impact, such as the destruction of electrical facilities. In December 1984, for example, the group celebrated the birthday of its founder and leader, Abimael Guzman, with a series of bombings of transmission towers near Lima—blacking out the city for nearly 10 hours. On 5 February 1985, as Pope John Paul II was arriving at Lima airport, the Sendero Luminoso blew up enough power facilities to cut power to the entire city; then it ignited a huge hammer-and-sickle display on a nearby mountain. [redacted]

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The government has designated the Ayacucho region as an emergency zone, placing it under a form of military law. In 1984, government forces mounted a major counterinsurgency campaign there. Subsequently, several mass graves filled with the corpses of peasants bearing marks of torture were discovered in territory where government troops had been operating. The government accused the Sendero Luminoso of having murdered the peasants, but some human rights groups have blamed government forces. There is evidence the peasants were known or suspected SL sympathizers who had been tortured for their information and then killed as object lessons to the rest of the citizenry. [redacted]

Despite combat losses, or perhaps in an effort to relieve government pressure, in mid-1984 the Sendero Luminoso opened a separate operational front in the north-central highlands of the upper Huallaga River valley. The government responded by establishing a new emergency zone there. As of mid-1985, the group seemed to be drawing little support from the local peasants, who apparently hoped the terrorists would leave before they attracted government counterinsurgency forces that might interfere with their growing of the profitable coca crop. [redacted]

In April 1985 Sendero Luminoso vowed to disrupt Peruvian national elections but failed to do so. Possibly in an effort to refurbish its credibility, the group then stepped up its urban terrorist attacks. In early May, for example, the group assassinated a newly elected congressman. On 16 May, two days before the fifth anniversary of the beginning of the Sendero Luminoso's armed struggle, a dozen SL bombings were reported in and around Lima; targets included the Chinese Embassy,² the residence of the US Ambassador, a US-Peruvian cultural center, an election board office, a civil guard post, and electric power facilities. The hit-and-run bombings caused no casualties and in most cases only slight damage, although two-thirds of Lima was blacked out. In its search for the perpetrators, the government rounded up more than 2,000 persons. [redacted]

² The Sendero Luminoso has conducted nuisance bombings of the Chinese Embassy on several occasions to protest China's de-Maoization programs. [redacted]

Tupac Amaru. A lesser threat to Peru's security comes from the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA). Named after an 18th-century Indian leader, Tupac Amaru probably numbers a few dozen leftwing activists, most of them probably associated with universities. It operates in the Cuzco and Lima areas. The group surfaced in September 1984, when it claimed responsibility for a number of rather minor terrorist attacks in Lima, including a bomb explosion outside the residence of the US Marine security guard detachment in November 1983. According to its manifesto, Tupac Amaru was organized to respond to what its members viewed as the long history of corruption and injustice in Peruvian politics, and to combat "imperialist"—especially US—influence in Peru. Because it casts its demands in populist terms and operates chiefly in the cities, Tupac Amaru potentially has a broader public appeal. The group, however, is far from reaching the level of threat posed by the Sendero Luminoso. [redacted]

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Chile

Leftwing Terrorism. Beginning with the assassination of Santiago's military governor in August 1983, leftist terrorism grew steadily throughout 1984, leading the Pinochet regime to declare a state of siege in November. The most active terrorist groups during 1984 were the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), composed of former members of several radical leftist organizations and associated with the Pro-Soviet Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), and elements of the 20-year-old Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), headed by Andres Pascal Allende, the son of the former Chilean leader. [redacted]

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There were about 700 bombings in 1984, a fivefold increase over the previous year. Most of the bombings were directed at public utilities and police and security facilities. On the night of 28 October, for example, some 14 bombs exploded in Santiago. Targets included telephone terminals, electrical facilities, buses, and banks. Demonstrating their increasing sophistication, the terrorists have also begun to use remote-detonated devices. On 2 November, a national police unit was hit near

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Valparaiso by a remote-controlled, claymore-type bomb that killed four carabineros and injured 12. [redacted]

The leftist terrorist campaign has continued into 1985. On 14 May, for example, a series of bombings against the railway from Santiago to Valparaiso halted service for several hours. Bombs also exploded in several government offices in Santiago, killing two persons. One of them went off next to an elementary school, injuring about 20 children. Both the FPMR and the MIR claimed responsibility for some of these bombings. [redacted]

Rightwing Violence. In combating the terrorists, the government appears to have committed numerous violations of human rights, with the security services frequently implicated in instances of brutality, torture, and the mysterious deaths or disappearances of suspects. The National Information Center (CNI), which is run by military officers, attracted the most accusations in 1984. For example, after the regime reported that 14 extremists had been killed and four wounded in shootouts with government forces, CNI was accused—in most cases by families or associates—of murdering several while they were trying to surrender or after they had already surrendered and were in custody. More explicitly, the “Chilean Anti-Communist Action” (ACHA) claims to have killed one leftwing extremist and has threatened several human rights activists with death if they do not cease their antigovernment activities. ACHA probably has links to Chilean security services. [redacted]

Under the state of siege, judicial review and press coverage of government actions have been restricted. Nevertheless, the government is known to have conducted several mass sweeps of poorer neighborhoods, temporarily detained some 8,000 persons, sent more than 400—mainly accused of petty crimes—to a remote detention camp without trial, and internally exiled nearly 300 others without charges or trial. [redacted]

³ Eloy Alfaro was a heroic Ecuadorean patriot around the turn of this century who led an abortive revolution against an oppressive military government. *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* roughly translates as “Alfaro Lives, Dammit!” [redacted]

Ecuador

Alfaro Vive, Carajo! A new subversive leftist group calling itself *Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* (AVC)³ has appeared in Ecuador. Although the group claims to have been established in 1981, most of the present members reportedly joined in early 1984 after defecting from the Revolutionary Leftist Front. Certainly, the AVC expanded its activities considerably in 1984 and the first half of 1985. The AVC espouses many of the standard anti-oligarchy, anti-US, and anti-“imperialist” views held by radical leftist groups in many Latin American countries, but it prescribes populist rather than Marxist remedies, possibly in order not to frighten away prospective supporters. [redacted]

In 1984, most AVC operations were bloodless and geared to obtaining media attention rather than causing damage per se. For example, the group detonated a leaflet bomb outside the US Embassy, briefly seized several radio stations in order to transmit manifestos, and occupied the Costa Rican Embassy in order to force it to send a message to San Jose about some AVC personnel who had been arrested there. Late in 1984, however, group members reportedly began discussing more serious terrorist activities, including ways of acquiring hostages to swap for imprisoned comrades. [redacted]

In March 1985, about 25 persons raided a Quito police arsenal and made off with some 800 weapons. In May, about 10 persons infiltrated a small Ecuadorean naval base and seized a substantial quantity of weapons before escaping in a hail of bullets. The government says the miscreants were AVC members, although [redacted]

[redacted] the AVC has denied it—and has denied as well persistent allegations that some AVC members have developed ties with the Colombian insurgent group M-19 and undergone guerrilla training in Colombia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In April four AVC prisoners, including the second-ranking leader, escaped from captivity via a 300-meter tunnel. The sophisticated escape operation seriously embarrassed the government and highlighted the growing capabilities of the group. If [redacted]

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the most serious allegations against it are correct [redacted]

[redacted] the AVC is likely to present a serious insurgent or terrorist problem in the coming months.

El Salvador

Most of the terrorism in EL Salvador is a byproduct of the leftist insurgency that began there in the late 1970s. Government authorities have officially acknowledged that, since January 1981, more than 10,000 civilians have been killed for political reasons by leftwing or rightwing extremists. President Duarte has estimated the actual number of civilian deaths since the beginning of 1980 at more than 40,000, with the right implicated in many more deaths than the left. Left-leaning human rights groups have made even higher estimates of the carnage. In 1984 the death toll from political violence was much lower than in previous years; still, some 750 Salvadoran civilians were killed last year for political reasons. [redacted]

Leftwing Terrorism. In 1980, at Cuban prodding, most of the leftwing Salvadoran insurgent groups emulated the Nicaraguan example and united in an umbrella organization called the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The insurgents have received both ideological and materiel support from Cuba and from Nicaragua, where their leaders are based. The FMLN fields about 9,000 armed combatants and is divided into various military fronts operating in different parts of the country. Although these guerrilla groups have engaged mainly in paramilitary conflict with units of the Salvadoran Army, they have also conducted kidnappings, sabotage, and other terrorist actions and most of them have "metropolitan" components to bring the conflict to the cities. [redacted]

For the past year and a half, the FMLN forces have been divided into small units assigned to ambush and sabotage missions in what Joaquin Villalobos, commander of the largest FMLN group, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), has termed a war of attrition. Reportedly, the FMLN has now made attacks against civilian personnel and installations a formal part of its program. Since April 1985, for example, the FMLN has kidnaped more than 10 elected mayors, mostly in the eastern part of the

country where the ERP is most active. In addition, in 1984 and the first half of 1985, there has been a substantial rise in the number of killings of prominent persons in San Salvador. One recent victim was former National Guard commander General Medrano, widely regarded as the father of the rightwing death squads. Members of FMLN front groups assigned to urban areas are believed to have been responsible for these killings. The rise in such urban terrorism has occurred while—and possibly because—the insurgents have become increasingly frustrated by their lack of progress on the battlefield. [redacted]

The Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front. The most active and, for US citizens, the most dangerous of the leftwing urban guerrilla groups is the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CERF), named after a deceased guerrilla heroine. The CERF came to public attention in mid-1983 when it murdered US Navy Lieutenant Commander Schaufelberger. [redacted]

[redacted] this terrorist group is a dissident faction of the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the second-largest Salvadoran insurgent group. Its members apparently propound an urban-oriented strategy and a primary reliance on violence, in contrast to the mainstream FPL position, which advocates a two-pronged military and political struggle in both rural and urban areas. Although most of the Salvadoran guerrillas avoid attacking US targets, the CERF continued to be an exception in 1984. CERF operatives murdered at least two Salvadoran employees of the US Embassy, including, in October, the supervisor of the Embassy guards. In November a CERF team strafed the US Embassy with machinegun fire from a speeding car. [redacted]

In March 1985 the CERF assassinated Salvadoran military spokesman Lt. Col. Ricardo Cienfuegos. The CERF also took credit in May for murdering a Salvadoran military judge who had overseen the trials of numerous captured guerrillas. [redacted]

Rightwing Terrorism. In 1984 rightwing political violence declined considerably compared with previous years, despite partisan maneuvering during

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the spring presidential campaign and the election of President Duarte, a moderate. The reduction probably stemmed from several causes—warnings from Washington, disciplinary measures by military leaders against certain human rights abusers, and the government's search for ways to make violent rightists more accountable for their actions. [redacted]

Nevertheless, rightwing extremist leaders continue to view the establishment of democratic procedures and institutions as inimical to their interests and the use of violence as their most effective tactic. The rightists distrust President Duarte and doubt he can pursue peace initiatives without conceding more to the insurgents than the right could tolerate. If the rightwing extremists decide the government is being too soft on the insurgents, they may try to resurrect their death squads and renew their assassination campaign. [redacted]

The Role of Nicaragua

Nicaragua promotes and supports subversive activities throughout Central America to further its primary objectives of preserving its own revolutionary gains and destabilizing non-Marxist regimes in the area. Members of many current and former subversive and terrorist organizations—including Palestinian groups, the Argentinian Montoneros, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, the Chilean MIR and PCCh, and the Spanish Basque ETA—are resident in Nicaragua.

[redacted]

The Sandinista regime does, however, provide advice, training, and safehaven, and channels Soviet Bloc arms and ammunition to members of various Latin American insurgent groups that engage in terrorist acts. The FMLN forces have been the primary recipient of Nicaraguan aid. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] In recent months, however, the flow of supplies and ammunition from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas has apparently been greatly

reduced, owing mainly to interdiction operations by the Salvadoran Army. The political leaders of the Salvadoran insurgent movement are based in Nicaragua [redacted]

[redacted]

The Role of Cuba

Salvadoran guerrilla leader Joaquin Villalobos has said that, "we have to recognize that the Cubans are the fulcrum of the revolution in Latin America." Despite Cuban overtures early this year indicating that the Castro regime was interested in improving relations with the United States, Cuban spokesmen have made it clear Havana would never sever its ties to, or halt its support for, revolutionaries in any part of the world. [redacted]

The Castro regime maintains a large and complex subversion support apparatus that provides backing for all types of leftist revolutionaries and terrorists, from insurgents in El Salvador to assassins in Chile. This support includes everything from guns and funding to asylum and training. Several accused Basque terrorists, for example, currently enjoy safehaven in Cuba. Many of the guerrillas infiltrated into Honduras in 1983 and 1984 were trained in Cuba. The training courses offered there run the gamut of skills needed by terrorists: underwater demolition, document falsification, communications and cryptography, secret writing, urban and rural guerrilla tactics, bomb fabrication, small arms handling, marksmanship—virtually any kind of expertise useful in insurgent or subversive activities. [redacted]

Cuban President Fidel Castro has recently been courting several South American nations as part of an effort to ease US pressure on Cuban interests in Central America, to garner support for Havana's position on regional issues, and to gain access to new economic markets. Nonetheless, Havana has not ended its support for subversives in the region. Throughout last year and into early 1985, Cuba reportedly has been supplying arms, materiel, and training to insurgents from El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and Colombia. [redacted]

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about 70 young members of the PCCh were reported to have reentered Chile clandestinely after having received terrorist training in Havana. Some of these youths may have joined the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Cuba also continues to provide training and possibly arms to the Colombian M-19, while reportedly advising the group to abide by the cease-fire for the time being [redacted]

The Caribbean

The only significant terrorist problem in the Caribbean in 1984 lay in the French Caribbean departments, where 29 terrorist bombings were recorded—26 in Guadeloupe and three in Martinique. They caused four deaths and a number of injuries, along with considerable property damage. The Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC), a clandestine separatist movement, is believed responsible for most of the violence. Government and police buildings were the primary targets. [redacted]

The ARC announced early in 1984 that it would no longer try to avoid attacks that endangered lives. In response, the French Government increased counterterrorist forces in the islands, outlawed the ARC, and arrested nearly 20 ARC activists. By mid-1984 the authorities seemed to have the situation in the islands under control, but then, perhaps spurred by the ambiguous French responses to the sporadically violent independence movement in New Caledonia, the Caribbean terrorists renewed their relatively low-level bombing activities. The violence has continued into 1985. About a dozen ARC activists are believed to remain at large in Guadeloupe and another dozen in Martinique. [redacted]

Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi seeks to undermine US and French interests in the region. He regards the United States—and, to a lesser extent, France—as the principal obstacle to achieving leadership in the Third World, including the Caribbean. Qadhafi's efforts to increase his influence will probably meet with only limited success. He may succeed in prompting increased militancy among French Caribbean separatists, but English-speaking leftists will probably continue to reject violent actions, because they fear either damage to their political standing or government retaliation. [redacted]

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Chronology of Terrorism—1985

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included. [redacted]

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23 April

France: In Bastia, a bomb exploded in the debating chamber of Upper Corsica's General Council, causing damage but no injuries. The banned National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) is suspected. [redacted]

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25 April

Uganda: Two North Korean agricultural technicians abducted by rebels. They were released later the same day by the National Resistance Army (NRA). The NRA is suspected of killing a Ugandan policeman captured at the same time.

[redacted]

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27 April

Turkey: Unidentified terrorist carrying explosives and weapon arrested near Izmir. He is reportedly part of an as yet unidentified group that committed five robberies in Istanbul and was planning more in Bornova. [redacted]

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28 April

Japan: Police arrest Chukaku-ha terrorist. Fujii Takahiro is suspected of driving the truck in a flamethrower attack on the headquarters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party last September. [redacted]

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Mid-May

Iraq: South Korean workers kidnaped by Kurdish dissidents. The two men were abducted from a gasoline station by several armed men in the Sulaimaniya area. Kurdish guerrillas are currently holding two Japanese, one Chinese, and one Italian. [redacted]

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Japan: Airport attack probably not work of Chukaku-ha. [redacted] the leftwing terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), originally suspected in a 7 May attack on Narita Airport, apparently is not the culprit. The homemade rockets used in the attack—beer bottles filled with a powdered explosive—were not comparable in sophistication to devices seen in other Chukaku-ha attacks; another group, the Battle Flag Faction, is now suspected.

[redacted]

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12 May

Philippines: New People's Army (NPA) kills US citizen in Pangasinan Province. A retired US Army major of Philippine extraction was killed on his farm by seven NPA members for refusing to pay protection money. [redacted]

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14 May

South Africa: Limpet mines damage police station, two court buildings in Brakpan. The early morning blasts caused no casualties. [redacted]

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- 15 May** *Portugal: FP-25 bank robbers arrested in Praia de Rocha.* After robbing a bank, four members of FP-25 were arrested by Portuguese police following a shootout in which they were all wounded. 25X1
- 17 May** *Philippines: Three unknown gunmen kill priest in Polanco during mass.* The killers of Father Alberto Romero were probably members of the New People's Army. 25X1
- 18 May** *Pakistan: Australian couple kidnaped in Baluchistan.* Dr. Robert Williamson and his wife were abducted while working on a World Bank-sponsored forestry project. The Baluchi kidnapers are demanding that the government release their imprisoned tribal chief. 25X1
- Late May** *Turkey: Ankara police arrest 18 members of the separatist Kurdish Workers Party who were trying to reorganize the group.* Pistols, ammunition, and organizational materials were confiscated. 25X1
- 22 May** *South Africa: Gasoline bomb thrown through window injures black couple.* They probably were targeted because of their membership in a Grahamstown student organization. A third member of the organization escaped injury in a similar attack when a bomb bounced off a barred window and exploded in his yard. Grahamstown has recently been the scene of other attacks on student leaders. 25X1
- 23 May** *Lesotho: One killed, two injured in bombing of home.* The dead man reportedly was an ANC member who had been expelled from Lesotho in 1983. Authorities do not know if he blew himself up while making a bomb or if a visitor he received earlier that evening was responsible. 25X1
- 24 May** *Chile: Several bomb attacks against electrical pylons cause blackouts throughout country.* The power outage, which lasted about 40 minutes, affected nearly 1,400 km of powerline between the cities of Concepcion and Copiapo. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front claimed responsibility. 25X1
- Colombia: 30 National Liberation Army guerrillas attack Cravo Norte oilfields near Venezuelan border.* The dynamite attack did an estimated \$250 million in damage but caused no injuries. 25X1
- Ecuador: US-Ecuadorean Binational Center in Guayaquil bombed.* The blast resulted in minor damage. The leftist subversive group Alfaro Vive, Carajo! is believed responsible. 25X1

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- 25 May** **Greece: Bomb explodes outside New Democracy campaign headquarters in Iraklion, Crete, causing minor damage.** No group claimed responsibility. The incident probably was related to the 2 June national elections. 25X1
- Colombia: National Liberation Army guerrillas shoot down helicopter chartered by Occidental Petroleum.** The guerrillas told the pilot that they downed the helicopter near the Venezuelan border in protest against the foreign company's control of Colombia's oil reserves. No injuries were reported. 25X1
- 26 May** **Angola: UNITA kills French priest going to mass and abducts wounded Irish colleague.** UNITA claimed the two were traveling with a military convoy that it ambushed about 90 kilometers from the capital. 25X1
- South Africa: Confessed ANC member receives 15-year sentence from Supreme Court.** He was convicted of setting up six arms caches in Johannesburg. 25X1
- 28 May** **Colombia: M-19 supporters end occupation of Bogota Red Cross building.** The group began the occupation on 22 May in hopes of persuading the government to investigate clashes between the Army and M-19 during the year-old truce. 25X1
- South Africa: ANC claims credit for daylight bombing of Johannesburg Army medical center, injuring as many as 17 persons.** The bomb, which also caused considerable damage, was discovered 10 minutes before it detonated, allowing for a partial evacuation of the building. In the past, the ANC usually has bombed facilities at night in order to avoid casualties. 25X1
- 29 May** **Costa Rica: Unknown gunmen fire several shots at presidential palace, causing minimal damage.** Although no group claimed credit, the attack may be related to recent leftwing protests against the arrival of about 20 US military advisers to train Costa Rica's new infantry battalion. 25X1
- Morocco: Syrian Embassy car explodes outside ambassador's residence in Rabat.** The blast shattered several windows but caused no casualties. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, but the PLO office in Rabat alleged that it was carried out by Syrian security operatives in order to justify Syrian attacks against Arafat supporters. 25X1
- 30 May** **West Bank: Small bomb explodes in garden near bus station in 'Afula.** No casualties were reported. The Voice of the PLO in Baghdad claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of the recently surfaced Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command. 25X1

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Niger: Government claims two soldiers killed by Libyan-backed Nigerien dissidents. One attacker was killed and 11 others captured when 14 raiders tried to storm an administrative office northeast of the capital; two others escaped. Government gendarmes suffered two killed and one wounded in the assault. At least four of the attackers were reportedly trained and armed in Libya. [redacted]

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South Africa: ANC bombs offices of Southern Cross Fund in Johannesburg. The early evening blast caused no casualties and only minor damage. The ANC claimed credit for the attack. [redacted]

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31 May

France: Corsican militant receives seven-year prison sentence in Ajaccio. Manuel Luciani, a leading member of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), was imprisoned on charges of involvement in bomb attacks and illegal possession of explosives. [redacted]

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West Germany: NATO pipeline bombed, causing minor damage. The explosion blew off the valve pit cover. A local clergyman received a phone call warning of the bomb by a man claiming to represent the Revolutionary Cells. [redacted]

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Northern Ireland: Londonderry police defuse car bomb containing 272 kilograms of explosives. The police later arrested three men near the scene. [redacted]

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Sri Lanka: Tamil attacks leave at least five dead in eastern villages. A government spokesman originally announced that more than 50 Sinhalese farmers near Trincomalee probably were killed, but later scaled that figure down. Colombo usually minimizes casualties from terrorist attacks, and the initial figure may be more accurate. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were probably responsible. [redacted]

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1-2 June

Philippines: Two journalists killed. In Cebu, an outspoken progovernment radio commentator and his bodyguard were killed while attending a beauty pageant. The next day, in Davao City, another journalist was shot dead while attending a movie. [redacted]

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2 June

France: Bombs damage Corsican vacation camp belonging to French Atomic Energy Commission. There were no injuries from the blasts, which are believed to be the work of the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC). [redacted]

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Switzerland: Bomb shatters windows at Geneva's main railway station, but causes no casualties. The previously unknown Martyrs of Tal al Za'tar claimed responsibility for that blast, and for placing other, unprimed explosives the same day at Geneva's Cointrin Airport. [redacted]

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- Japan: Another Chukaku-ha member arrested.** Japanese police announced the arrest of Fumito Ogata, a member of the leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) wanted for 11 years. Police suspect he was most recently involved in the 1 January rocket attack against the US Consulate General in Kobe. 25X1
- 2-3 June** **Belgium: Belgian police arrest seven persons suspected in 1 May bomb attack against Employers Federation in Brussels.** Five suspects, arrested as they were digging up arms near Leuven, had copies of Communist Combatant Cells communiques in their car. Two other persons were arrested in Brussels and Liege the following day. 25X1
- 3 June** **United Kingdom: Bomb partially explodes outside Syrian Embassy.** London police detonated the remainder of the 5-kilogram bomb concealed in a travel bag. No casualties resulted and no group has claimed responsibility for the attack. 25X1
- 4 June** **India: Home of ruling party official bombed.** In Punjab, five persons were slightly injured when a bomb was thrown into the residence of the president of the Hoshiapur City Congress-I party organization. No group has claimed credit, but Sikh extremists probably are responsible. 25X1
- France: Breton terrorist killed while planting bomb outside courthouse in Guingamp.** A short time later, two bombs damaged the offices of the deputy mayor and the National Employment Agency. Police suspect members of the Breton Revolutionary Army are responsible. 25X1
- 6 June** **Spain: Bomb damages Citroen showroom in Durango.** No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but ETA is suspected. 25X1
- 9 June** **New Caledonia: Two French settlers charged in 13 May bombings.** Four persons were hurt in a Kanak school, but there were no casualties in attacks on a yacht and a courthouse. Police found rifles, pistols, and ammunition, including three homemade bombs ready for use in the suspects' houses. 25X1

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