



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Terrorism Review



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7 October 1985

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*GI TR 85-020
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Terrorism Review [Redacted]

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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor

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Focus

Soviet Responses to Hostage Situations [Redacted]

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Information is sparse on how the USSR or its close allies deal with hostage situations because the number of recorded incidents is low and the government-controlled media in these countries rarely divulge details of what does occur. Examinations of the limited number of case studies available indicate that the response varies with the circumstances of the incident. The Soviets and their friends tend to apply a pure "no-negotiations" line when challenged on their own turf, although they will show indulgence toward those with whose political and ideological goals they sympathize. When dealing with a situation where geographical constraints make action impossible, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and make political concessions. [Redacted]

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In situations where the Soviets or their Bloc allies have access to the hostage takers, the favored tactic has been a quick frontal assault with little attempt to negotiate or to minimize casualties, regardless of the nationality of the hostages:

- In February 1979, a small group of gunmen, whose identity has never been clearly established, seized American Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs on a Kabul street and took him to a nearby hotel. They then barricaded themselves inside one of the rooms. Soviet officials quickly arrived at the scene and appeared to take charge. It soon became clear that, instead of an attempt at negotiations, storming the room was to be the first option. Despite the strong urgings of an American Embassy officer to show restraint, Afghan police charged the room. Ambassador Dubs and all of the gunmen were killed in the subsequent shootout.
- In November 1983, a group of eight persons hijacked an Aeroflot flight between Tbilisi and Batumi and demanded to be flown to Turkey. The pilot instead landed the plane in Tbilisi. Several hours later, Soviet security forces stormed the plane. All of the hijackers were killed or captured and as many as seven of the passengers also died. In an interesting sidelight, present Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, then the party boss for Georgia, reportedly went to the airport to take charge of the crisis.

[Redacted] in 1981 near Timosoara, a group of dissidents attacked a police station and seized a bus carrying about a dozen passengers. They then demanded an airplane and safe passage out of Romania. The bus was stopped at a roadblock on its way to a nearby airport. After the hijackers shot the driver, Romanian security forces opened up with automatic weapons, killing the hijackers and all of the hostages. [Redacted]

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**International Terrorist Incidents
Against the Soviets,
1979-85**

Type of Event	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Total
Total	21	33	18	7	12	17	7	115
Armed attack	10	16	5		2	3	2	38
Arson	4	5	1	1	2			13
Assault						1		1
Bombing	3	10	11	5	7	13	5	54
Terrorist skyjacking	1							1
Kidnaping	1	1		1	1			4
Other	2	1	1					4

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Where the hostage takers have been accessible but ideologically compatible, force has been avoided:

- In March 1981, a Pakistani airliner flying to Peshawar was hijacked and diverted to Kabul. The hijackers, members of the Pakistani Al-Zulfikar terrorist group, killed a Pakistani diplomat who was aboard. During the several days the plane remained in Kabul, a number of Al-Zulfikar members were released from Pakistani jails. Afterwards, the hijackers were allowed safe passage to Syria and several were later seen in Kabul. No attempt was made to storm the plane in Kabul. Such restraint on the part of the Afghans and their Soviet "advisers" was probably due to the close relationship between Al-Zulfikar and Afghan intelligence.

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When geographical constraints make the hostage takers inaccessible, a surprising willingness to negotiate and make political concessions has been demonstrated:

- In 1983 a large group of Czechoslovak technicians and their families were captured by UNITA guerrillas in Angola. The hostages were held in remote areas and frequently moved. To obtain their release, the Czechoslovak Government was forced to deal with UNITA as if it were a sovereign government. A UNITA delegation was given "royal" treatment in Prague and the Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister later went to Angola to finalize an agreement. The hostages were then released. While one can be sure that dealing with UNITA as an equal caused Prague a great deal of grief, it did not stand in the way of a pragmatic solution.

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- In 1983 the antigovernment organization RENAMO in Mozambique seized a group of 26 Soviet technicians north of Maputo. The Soviets, in cooperation with Mozambican forces, reportedly made a number of attempts to locate the site at which the technicians were being held, preparatory to a rescue attempt. Eventually, several of the hostages were either rescued or escaped, [redacted] [redacted] But RENAMO claims the Soviets were forced to negotiate, and that talks were held in Europe between the two parties on a number of subjects, including the release of the remaining hostages. The Soviets have never acknowledged that such negotiations took place. [redacted]

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Highlights**Key Indicators****Middle East****Israel Retaliates for Terrorist Attacks**

Israel's stated policy of retaliating for terrorist attacks led to an unprecedented attack by Israeli jets against PLO headquarters in Tunisia on 1 October. Initial casualty reports said that some 50 persons were killed or wounded and the headquarters building severely damaged. This attack came less than a week after an incident in Larnaca, Cyprus, on 25 September. Two Palestinians and a Briton seized control of a yacht in the harbor and killed three Israeli citizens on board before surrendering to police. The gunmen, reportedly linked to the Fatah wing of the PLO, had demanded the release of Fatah members who were captured at sea by the Israelis in August.

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The Israeli action comes after a monthlong period during which Israeli Government officials have expressed serious concern about a PLO buildup in Jordan and repeatedly threatened that they would not allow Palestinian terrorist operations emanating from Jordan to go unanswered. The strike in Tunis may be intended to carry a message to Jordan's King Hussein that he is vulnerable to Israeli action should he not effectively curtail Palestinian operations from Jordan.

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Lebanon**American Hostage Released Unharmed**

On 14 September the Rev. Benjamin Weir was freed by his abductors in Beirut; he had been kidnaped on 8 May 1984. At a press conference on 18 September, Weir stated that he had been held in solitary confinement for more than a year and confirmed that at least four of the other six American hostages were still alive. He reiterated his captors' demand for the release of Shia terrorists held in Kuwait and cited their new threat to kidnap other US citizens or execute those they already hold.

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Significant Developments**Portugal****Ten Members of FP-25 Escape From Prison**

Ten alleged members of the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) escaped from prison on 21 September. Their escape could cause a second delay in the trial of other FP-25 defendants and could lead to a resurgence of attacks against state witnesses. Three of the escapees are believed to be operational members of the group and one is a Popular Unity Front (FUP) candidate in the upcoming parliamentary elections. This is the second such escape this year—the first took place in March 1985—and it represents a further blow to the government's efforts to control terrorism. A key prosecution witness against the group was mortally wounded on 19 July, seriously impairing the state's case.

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Italy

Prima Linea Comeback Thwarted

Italian police thwarted a planned return to terrorist activity by members of the leftist terrorist group Prima Linea when they arrested nine members last July. [redacted] the group planned to rob an armored car in the Naples area to obtain funds for terrorist operations. Prima Linea was one of the most violent terrorist groups in Italy in the late 1970s, but has been inactive since 1982. In June, [redacted] several Prima Linea leaders met with Red Brigades' members in Naples—possibly to coordinate the robbery. [redacted]

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Libya

Possible Assassination Attempt Against Qadhafi

[redacted] a car bomb exploded on 14 September near the site of an economic fair in Tripoli, destroying a warehouse. Libyan leader Mu'ammarr Qadhafi reportedly was scheduled to attend the fair. Security measures—including nightly manhunts and car searches—have been increased in Tripoli since the incident. No one has claimed responsibility for the explosion, but Libyan exiles or disaffected members of the military probably were responsible. [redacted]

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Panama

Mysterious Terrorist Group Surfaces

An obscure group known only as "F-8" apparently was responsible for the death of Hugo Spadafora, the former Minister of Health under Gen. Omar Torrijos. Spadafora's headless corpse was found in Costa Rica on 15 September with the acronym "F-8 Terrorist" carved in its back. According to press reports, Spadafora was seeking permanent political exile in Costa Rica because of death threats he received from the Panamanian military after criticizing Defense Forces Commander Gen. Manuel Noriega. Spadafora's relatives said that he had been detained at the Costa Rica-Panama border by members of the Defense Forces while on his way to Panama City. [redacted]

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The F-8 group also claimed responsibility for the kidnaping on 21 August of Dr. Mario Zuniga, one of the leaders of the political opposition group Coordinating Board for National Civilianization (COCINA). Several days after the kidnaping, Marcos Alarcon, another COCINA leader, received death threats from F-8 indicating he would be its next victim. Many opposition groups have accused the Defense Forces of being responsible for the F-8's crimes. [redacted]

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Colombia

M-19 Plans for Bases in Brazil

[redacted] Colombian guerrillas of the 19th of April Movement (M-19) are planning to set up bases in Brazil near the Colombian border. [redacted] the M-19 may have decided to intensify its guerrilla actions in the southeastern border area near Leticia. It is apparently searching for safehavens beyond the reach of Colombian authorities. [redacted]

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M-19 Behind Attack on Ecuadorean Embassy

The Colombian guerrilla group 19th of April Movement (M-19) claimed responsibility for the bombing and shooting attack on the Ecuadorean Embassy in Bogota on 11 September. The group said the attack was in retaliation for the deaths of two imprisoned M-19 guerrillas during an abortive attempt to rescue them in Guayaquil. The two had been arrested for their part in the kidnaping and the slaying of an Ecuadorean banker, apparently a joint operation of the M-19 and the Ecuadorean terrorist group Alfaro Vive, Carajo.

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India

Terrorist Attacks Mar Punjab Elections

Sikh extremists attempted unsuccessfully to derail state elections, held in Punjab on 25 September, in which the moderate Akali Dal Party scored an apparent landslide. They continued their recent campaign of violence there with several minor terrorist attacks leading up to the election, including:

- On 23 September a boobytrapped transistor radio bomb killed three Hindus and wounded another. The device was similar to those detonated by Sikh extremists in New Delhi and other cities last May that killed more than 80 persons.
- Later the same day, seven more bombs exploded in four Punjab districts, killing three children and injuring an adult.
- Also on 23 September, a party worker for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) Party was wounded in the leg after an election rally near the town of Sangrur.
- On 24 September, two Congress (I) campaign organizers died after eating some poisoned Sikh holy bread.
- Later that same day, two bombs placed in lunch boxes in a market and in the main police station in Ludhiana injured three persons.

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The elections themselves were largely peaceful, as security forces detained hundreds of suspected terrorists in the two days prior to the voting.

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**Libya Hedges Its
Bets in Sudan** [redacted]

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Since the coup in Sudan on 6 April, Libya has employed both diplomatic and covert methods to influence events there. Libyan weapons and money smuggling, intelligence collection, and covert action have gone hand in hand with legitimate aid programs, diplomatic initiatives, and propagandizing. This two-track policy is likely to continue as long as the operating environment in Sudan remains hospitable. We believe Libya will refrain in the near term from using terrorism to pursue its goals unless Sudanese-Libyan relations sharply deteriorate or a Sudanese domestic political crisis arises that is too opportune to ignore. [redacted]

Libya's Subversive/Terrorist Infrastructure

Libya has devoted considerable resources to the establishment of a covert infrastructure in Sudan:

- Tripoli helped set up Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, providing funding and weapons and placed Libyan-trained personnel at the helm.
- Tripoli staffed the People's Bureau, Libyan Arab Airlines facilities, and political liaison groups with known terrorists (see inset).

[redacted]

- It smuggled large quantities of arms and funds into Sudan. [redacted]

The establishment of the Revolutionary Committees is likely to have the greatest impact. The Committees, modeled on the internal Libyan system, are led by Sudanese who opposed the Nimeiri regime and forged strong ties to Tripoli. Their early goals were to recruit supporters from the government and the military, to collect intelligence, and to prepare and execute terrorist operations. [redacted]

[redacted] soon after their founding, the Revolutionary Committees moved quickly to establish a headquarters and operations center, distributed thousands of Green Books—Qadhafi's vision for a greater Pan-Arab nation—and surveilled Sudanese military and US and Egyptian diplomatic facilities. [redacted]

Early Successes

The new government's recognition of Libya shortly after the coup gave Tripoli the foothold it needed. The Sudanese decision appeared to be based primarily on domestic considerations. Most important, the Transitional Military Council hoped to entice Tripoli into shutting off aid to the southern rebels, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. In addition, the new regime viewed relations with Libya as a repudiation of the detested Nimeiri regime. By removing sources of irritation along its northwestern and southern borders, the Council hoped to buy time to deal with its domestic problems. [redacted]

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Libya benefited in several ways from these early policy decisions. The release of a large number of political prisoners—designed to mollify domestic opponents of Nimeiri—included convicted terrorists with known ties to Tripoli. Of greater import was the Council's abolition of the Sudanese Security Organization. The new regime jailed officers of the old Security Organization—considered corrupt and tainted by association with Nimeiri—including those experienced in countering Libyan subversive activity. This left only an understaffed and poorly trained security force to contend with the threat just when Libya was pouring men and money into the country. In addition, the Council decided to reduce support for the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, an opposition group Qadhafi believes threatens his regime. [redacted]

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Limiting Factors

The Libyans, however, committed several errors in the early days. Both Qadhafi and his deputy Jallud misgauged their audience during official visits to Khartoum. Their criticism of Egypt, talk of unification, and artless promotion of the Revolutionary Committees as a form of government offended many Sudanese. Libya—steadily pouring more people into Khartoum—was also indiscreet in its subversive activity. When the government became aware in mid-June of alleged Libyan involvement in terrorist plotting against high-level Sudanese—and

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**Major Libyan and Sudanese
Figures Involved in
Libyan Operations in Sudan**

Libyans**Muhammad 'Ali Nayil**

Unpredictable and dangerous chief of liaison with the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees since his May 1985 arrival in Khartoum . . . alienated Sudanese Government officials with his [redacted]

[redacted] disregard of protocol and has defied persona non grata action . . . previously assigned to recruit and train young Sudanese for anti-Nimeiri terrorist operations . . . during mid-1970s was a civilian intelligence "special operative" targeting Libyan exiles for assassination . . . tried and found guilty in 1975 by Tunisian Government for attempting to assassinate the then Prime Minister . . . later released. [redacted]

Juma Muhammad Fazzani

Secretary, Khartoum People's Bureau, since May 1985 . . . wields little influence. . . leftist . . . former newspaper editor . . . Ambassador to Tunisia before his arrival in Sudan. [redacted]

Sa'd Mas'ud

Second-in-command to liaison chief Nayil . . . in 1977 was a member of Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi's personal bodyguard unit . . . has been linked to spring 1984 bombings in London and Manchester. [redacted]

'Umar Sudani

Favors replacing older leaders of the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, such as Abdallah Zakariya, with younger Sudanese revolutionaries . . . advocates infiltration of Egypt by Sudanese

Revolutionary Committee members. . . monitors Libyan exile activity in Sudan . . . was expelled from Britain following April 1984 shooting of a policewoman and, in April 1985, from Belgium for suspected involvement in the shooting of a Libyan exile in Bonn. [redacted]

Muhammad Ati

Libyan Arab Airlines representative . . . reports directly to liaison chief Nayil . . . uses daily visits to Khartoum airport to recruit officials able to provide assistance in moving material, including contraband, through the airport. [redacted]

Sudanese**Abdallah Zakariya**

Nominal chairman of the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees (SRC) . . . longtime opposition figure . . . based in Libya from the mid-1970s until April 1985 coup . . . formerly described as brilliant and possessing good leadership qualities, [redacted] . . . regarded by Libyans and many SRC members as a liability to the organization . . . in June, SRC members and Libyans stripped him of his SRC operational authority. [redacted]

Salah Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa

General Coordinator for the Committees . . . assumed operational authority of Committees from Abdallah Zakariya in June 1985 . . . former head of Revolutionary Committees office in Tripoli, Libya . . . received military and sabotage training in Libya. [redacted]

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against the Egyptian and US missions—it decided to expel Libyans who lacked proper documentation and to refuse entry to those arriving without visas. [redacted]

Committee members had been surprised by the cold reception they received from the Sudanese people. As a result of this meeting, Tripoli apparently established new goals and tactics and redefined the role of the Committees:

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Top Sudanese officials claim to be concerned about the Libyan threat. In late July, the Council responded to evidence of Libyan-promoted bombing and assassination plots by approving the arrest and deportation of the most dangerous Libyans, although these orders have not yet been implemented. The Council has also moved to counter Libyan activity by forming a new security organization that obtained the records and some of the equipment of the old security organization. [redacted]

- Revolutionary Committees were no longer to be involved in terrorist planning. Instead, they were to establish links with legitimate Sudanese organizations and tout the virtues of the Committee system and the Libyan revolution through countrywide seminars.

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[redacted]

- Revolutionary Committee members were to broaden their base of support among Sudanese. They were to forge links with unions, political parties and other popularly based organizations, and recruit members of the middle class. Contact with the masses was to be a high priority. Committee members were to emphasize Sudanese nationalism, in order to overcome the Committee's image of the Committees as Libyan puppets. While Zakariya was to remain the nominal head of the Committees, he was to turn over actual control to a less controversial figure.

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[redacted] Security forces received permission to search incoming aircraft for weapons, propaganda, and subversive materials. The government has not yet searched aid convoys, but may choose to do so now that it has received reports of weapons being smuggled in among those shipments. Khartoum has also resumed contact with the anti-Qadhafi National Foundation for the Salvation of Libya, [redacted]

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[redacted]

- Libya was to locate its covert activity within commercial enterprises and aid projects, and not within the Committees. Front companies would supply operational funds and serve as sites for dead drops, meetings, and recruiting. Transportation companies would smuggle military equipment and agricultural projects would serve as cover for training pro-Libyan Sudanese. [redacted]

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Differences among Libya's supporters in Sudan on the utility of using terrorism has also impeded Libyan efforts to increase Tripoli's influence. Some feared that the use of terrorist violence would result in expulsions and endanger their progress, while others believed it would hasten the establishment of a pro-Libyan regime. Leadership problems in the Revolutionary Committees compounded strains between the Libyans and Sudanese members. The debauchery and corruption of Abdallah Zakariya, a well-known longtime dissident with strong ties to Libya (see inset), offended many Committee members and resulted in efforts to remove him as head of the Revolutionary Committees or confine him to a figurehead role. [redacted]

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Outlook

Libya's campaign to insinuate itself into the Sudanese political process has benefited from the changes made at the July meeting. Divorcing the Committees from terrorist activity has calmed the Council's budding security concerns. Indeed the Committees have since joined the left-of-center alliance of political parties and unions known as "The Gathering" and a Committee leader has met with senior governmental officials. The security environment has remained relatively permissive, and several front companies already have been established as part of the

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Remedial Policymaking

As their fortunes showed signs of fading, key Libyans and Sudanese Revolutionary Committee members traveled to Tripoli in July for an extended series of policy meetings. [redacted] the

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subversive infrastructure. If Khartoum grants Tripoli's request to establish an additional official mission, a Cultural Center, and a JANA news agency office, each organization would provide more berths for Libyan subversives. Countrywide seminars and links with domestic interest groups will also enable Libya and the Revolutionary Committees to broaden their base of support and popularize their ideas. The Committees have already become a significant factor: US Embassy in Khartoum reports that 3,000 Sudanese consider themselves members. [redacted]

The possibility that Libya will resort to terrorism in the near to medium term cannot be excluded, however. Although diplomatic progress has discouraged its use to date, contingency planning is likely to continue, awaiting only a policy decision.

[redacted]

Tripoli could be compelled to turn to terrorist activity if the reviving security service—eventually expected to absorb 80 percent of the resources of the old organization—appears to threaten Libya's position. If evidence of Libyan subversion were to accumulate to the point where the Council felt impelled to close some facilities and order mass expulsions, Tripoli could turn to terrorism as its only recourse. [redacted]

Libya might also turn to terrorism in the event of a domestic Sudanese political crisis. The assassination of key individuals or bombings of important installations would further heighten disorder, providing an excuse for a Libyan-backed coup, which would restore calm. Alternatively, Libya may exploit controversial issues to stir up anti-US or anti-Egyptian feeling and then take advantage of that sentiment by staging terrorist attacks against the personnel or facilities of those countries. For example, if Egypt were to refuse a Sudanese request to extradite Nimeiri, Libya would likely launch a critical press campaign to set the stage for anti-Egyptian attacks. Similarly, the upcoming trial of a former high-level official could result in a public airing of US involvement in the airlift of Falasha Jews to Israel. Libya would likely exploit any resulting anti-US sentiment by sponsoring terrorist operations. [redacted]

[redacted]

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South Africa: The ANC's Role in the Recent Unrest [redacted]

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The African National Congress (ANC), which has operated from exile since the mid-1960s, has shifted its tactics in recent months in an apparent effort to intensify unrest, shake white confidence, and make itself a leading force in the antigovernment protests. It has had little influence over the black unrest that began last year but has begun to adopt some new tactics. Despite its recent call for violence in white areas, however, the group is not yet prepared to commit itself to a campaign of indiscriminate attacks on whites because of fear of South African retaliation.

The ANC has generally avoided inflicting casualties on white civilians, even though many nonwhites approved of the ANC car bombing of the South African Air Force Headquarters in 1983; 19 people died and 219 were injured in that incident, including many white civilians.

Following a conference in Zambia in June, however, ANC Acting President Oliver Tambo said that the group would not try to prevent white civilian casualties when it attacks government targets and that it would begin attacking off-duty white security personnel. There is no evidence so far that these new directives have influenced ANC operations.

In early September, an unprecedented ANC radiobroadcast urged nonwhites to shift the violence to white areas. Two days later, groups of nonwhites attacked houses in white residential areas in western and eastern Cape Province, the first such attacks during the current unrest.

Playing Catchup

For the most part, the ANC has been trying to catch up with the new black militancy during the past year of violence in the townships. Because its activities and policies have lagged behind internal developments, the ANC has failed to take full advantage of world media attention on South Africa.

Attacks against nonwhite "collaborators" appear to have started spontaneously last September. Four

African National Congress Relations With Regional Countries

Angola

Some 4,000 guerrillas in camps in central and northeastern Angola . . . military headquarters and political office in Luanda. [redacted]

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Botswana

Does not permit ANC military activity, but has been unable to prevent clandestine buildup in last year.

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Lesotho

Important recruiting center . . . Pretoria unhappy with Maseru's lackluster efforts against group.

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Mozambique

ANC military activities circumscribed since signing of nonaggression pact with Pretoria last year . . . some guerrillas probably operate clandestinely.

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Swaziland

Crackdown on group has persisted since signing of security pact with Pretoria in 1982 . . . group continues to operate clandestinely.

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Tanzania

Took in many guerrillas expelled from Mozambique last year . . . ANC has political office and camps and runs college.

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Zambia

ANC political headquarters in Lusaka . . . several small camps . . . hosted recent ANC conference.

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
Zimbabwe

Refuses to allow attacks from its territory . . . ANC political figures frequently visit.

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African National Congress Relations With Regional Countries



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Angola Some 4,000 guerrillas in camps in central and northeastern Angola . . . military headquarters and political office in Luanda.

Botswana Does not permit ANC military activity but has not been able to prevent clandestine buildup in last year.

Lesotho Important recruiting center . . . clandestine military presence . . . Pretoria unhappy with Maseru's lackluster efforts against group.

Mozambique ANC military activities circumscribed since nonaggression pact with Pretoria signed last year . . . some guerrillas probably operate clandestinely.

Swaziland Crackdown on group has persisted since security pact signed with Pretoria in 1982 . . . group continues to operate clandestinely.

Tanzania Took in many guerrillas expelled from Mozambique last year. . . ANC has political office and camps and runs college.

Zambia ANC political headquarters in Lusaka . . . several small camps . . . hosted recent ANC conference.

Zimbabwe Refuses to allow attacks from its territory . . . ANC political figures frequently visit.



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The ANC at a Glance

History: Black reformists establish group in 1912; young black nationalist members spearhead adoption of civil disobedience program in 1949; government bans group in 1960 following Sharpeville incident; military wing—"Spear of the Nation"—formed in 1961, launches campaign of sabotage bombings; mass arrests in 1963-65 cripple leadership and force group into exile; military wing recruits thousands of young blacks fleeing country during 1976-77 Soweto riots and renews campaign in late 1970s.

Structure and strength: 30-member National Executive Committee oversees political and military wings. Political wing, headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia, has several hundred members; military wing, headquartered in Luanda, Angola, consists of 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas, most in Angola.

Support: Soviet Bloc supplies almost all military training and equipment and provides limited funding; most financial and nonmilitary support comes from Scandinavian states, OAU, and UN.

Orientation: Mildly socialist political goals outlined in 1955 "Freedom Charter"; long history of ties to the South African Communist Party (SACP); pro-Soviet Communists, including some whites, well represented in ANC leadership and exert considerable influence; majority of rank and file composed of nonideologues, anti-Communist nationalists, and moderate socialists; no evidence that ANC President Mandela, jailed since 1962, is Communist, although he worked closely with the SACP before his arrest.



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months later, Tambo announced that the group was going to begin targeting collaborators. [redacted]

[redacted] ANC officials admit the group has organized only a small percentage of the attacks on collaborators in recent months. [redacted]

From mid-September 1984 through last February, the group had staged only two bombings against government targets, well below its average since 1981 of about three operations per month. Bombings increased again around the June anniversary of the Soweto riots of 1976, but none occurred during the first two months under the state of emergency declared on 20 July. [redacted]

Late last month, the dry spell ended when the ANC bombed three supermarkets in Durban, causing little damage and no casualties. An ANC official told the press that the attacks were intended to show support for an ongoing black consumer boycott of white stores in the area. The bombings probably were timed to steal local news headlines from Chief Buthelezi—head of the powerful Zulu organization Inkatha—who is strongly opposed to the ANC and was scheduled to deliver a major speech the next day at a Zulu rally in Durban. [redacted]

Holding Back

Despite the new policy, ANC officials stated publicly in September that they were not planning a campaign of bombings aimed at white civilians. [redacted]

[redacted] Tambo recently rejected a plan proposed by militant elements in the ANC calling for attacks against whites in the Johannesburg area. Recent ANC broadcasts have also returned to their usual rhetoric, and there has been only one additional attack in a white residential area [redacted]

Communist members of the ANC, a white minority, reportedly have joined with Tambo and other cautious veterans in the ANC leadership in restraining young black nationalists in the rank and file who are eager to engage in random terrorism against whites. ANC chief military planner Joe Slovo—a white

The ANC at a Glance

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History

Black reformists establish group in 1912; young black nationalist members spearhead adoption of civil disobedience program in 1949; government bans group in 1960 following Sharpeville incident; military wing—"Spear of the Nation"—formed in 1961, launches campaign of sabotage bombings; mass arrests in 1963-65 cripple leadership and force group into exile; military wing recruits thousands of young blacks fleeing country during 1976-77 Soweto riots and renews campaign in late 1970s. [redacted]

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Structure and Strength

Thirty-member National Executive Committee oversees political and military wings. Political wing, headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia, has several hundred members; military wing, headquartered in Luanda, Angola, consists of 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas, most in Angola. [redacted]

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Support

Soviet Bloc supplies almost all military training and equipment and provides limited funding; most financial and nonmilitary support comes from Scandinavian states, OAU, and United Nations. [redacted]

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Orientation

Mildly socialist political goals outlined in 1955 "Freedom Charter"; long history of ties to the South African Communist Party (SACP); pro-Soviet Communists, including some whites, well represented in ANC leadership and exert considerable influence; majority of rank and file composed of nonideologues, anti-Communist nationalists, and moderate socialists; no evidence that ANC President Mandela, jailed since 1962, is Communist, although he worked closely with the SACP before his arrest. [redacted]

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ANC Leaders



Oliver Tambo

Age 67 . . . Acting President since 1967 . . . National Executive Committee member . . . in exile since 1960 . . . a realist who understands the ANC's dependence on Communist aid, but who sometimes resents having his authority undercut by Communists . . . has become more militant in recent years . . . strongly critical of US regional policy . . . does not have the influence of imprisoned ANC head Nelson Mandela.

[redacted]



Alfred Nzo

Age 60 . . . Secretary General since 1969 . . . National Executive Committee member . . . in exile since 1964 . . . member of South African Communist Party . . . acts primarily as a spokesman and as main contact with Bloc countries . . . declining influence.

[redacted]


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Joe Slovo

Age 59 . . . chief military planner . . . only white on National Executive Committee . . . in exile since 1963 . . . member of South African Communist Party . . . son of Lithuanian immigrants . . . lawyer.

[redacted]



Thabo Mbeki

Age 42 . . . Director, Department of Information and Publicity since 1983 . . . National Executive Committee member . . . in exile since mid-1970s . . . suspected member of South African Communist Party . . . son of Govan Mbeki, an imprisoned ANC and South African Communist Party leader . . . extremely militant.

[redacted]

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Communist—is the leading opponent of terrorist actions against white civilians. [redacted]
[redacted]

and businesses or, conversely, a sudden lull in the unorganized violence. It may come unbidden with the rise of young militants within the ANC, which probably will be a gradual process, but one that is consistent with the leadership's view that the prolongation and spread of violence in South Africa is serving the ANC's purposes. [redacted]

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The reluctance to target white civilians probably stems mainly from a fear of the likely South African response: intensified attacks against ANC members throughout southern Africa. In addition, the group probably would lose the financial support it depends on from the Scandinavian countries—Sweden in particular—if it were to wage a bloody terrorist campaign. [redacted]

A sustained pattern of attacks against white civilians—whether spontaneous or conducted by the ANC—would strengthen the resolve of many whites, while others would flee the country. For most of the 3 million Afrikaners, who make up about 60 percent of the white population, racial civil war has become a dread but not daunting possibility; they have no other homeland, and they will stand and fight. Many of the 800,000 English-speaking white South African nationals holding British passports, however, might choose to emigrate if the security situation were to deteriorate rapidly. [redacted]

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Outlook

In response to the recent ANC broadcasts and bombings, South Africa probably will strike at ANC outposts in Zambia, Lesotho, or Botswana. Pretoria has warned these states that the presence of ANC members within their borders is unacceptable. The strong international reaction to the raid against the ANC in Botswana in June will not deter Pretoria from mounting further strikes. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Nonetheless, it appears inevitable that at some time the ANC will begin bombing attacks in white civilian areas. The catalyst for the order might be spontaneous attacks by young blacks on white homes

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Uruguay: The Return of the Tupamaros [redacted]

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The far left Movement for National Liberation, generally known as the Tupamaros, has been reorganizing since jailed members were freed by a presidential amnesty shortly after Uruguay returned to civilian rule in March. Some Tupamaros say they now intend to pursue their goals within the framework of the country's newly restored democratic political system, but, [redacted] others remain committed to a return to guerrilla violence. Although they currently appear too weak in numbers and organization to mount a major threat to law and order, the Tupamaros could gain wider backing if the new government is unable to halt Uruguay's continuing economic decline. A resurgence of Tupamaro violence could eventually lead the armed forces to intervene again in the political arena.

[redacted]

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Factionalism

Differences between those Tupamaros who for now want to work within Uruguay's political system and those who advocate early resumption of the armed struggle are impeding efforts to reinvigorate the movement. [redacted]

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members of two minor factions favor resuming the armed struggle as soon as possible. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Background

The Tupamaros, named for an 18th-century Inca rebel, emerged as an urban guerrilla organization in the 1960s. Their activities progressed from bank robberies, purportedly for the benefit of the poor, to kidnappings and murders designed to undermine the democratic political system and pave the way for creation of a radically socialist society. By the early 1970s, the Tupamaros' strength had reached between 300 and 1,000 with an additional 2,000 to 5,000 collaborators, according to open sources. When the civilian government proved unable to combat the movement, the armed forces assumed power in 1973 and cracked down harshly. Most of the Tupamaros were either killed, jailed, or driven into exile. [redacted]

[redacted] the majority of Tupamaro factions believes the movement should join the leftist Broad Front coalition, one of Uruguay's three main political parties. [redacted] while they were in prison many Tupamaros came under the influence of the pro-Soviet Communist Party, which participates in the Broad Front. [redacted]

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Shortly after civilian rule was restored in March 1985, President Julio Sanguinetti granted amnesty to Uruguay's approximately 300 political prisoners, including some 80 Tupamaros, according to US Embassy reporting. Since then, members of the movement have been holding meetings, planning strategy, and trying to recruit new adherents. The new government's police intelligence unit has been surveilling the activities of key Tupamaros, [redacted]

Organizational and Recruiting Efforts

Top Tupamaro leader Raul Sendic and other ranking cadre have taken a number of steps to rebuild the movement. Shortly after their release from prison, [redacted]

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they called on members to organize committees in neighborhoods and workplaces and to begin preparing for a Tupamaro "national convention" later this year. A number of organizational and planning meetings have already taken place, [redacted]

[redacted] Some of the emphasis evidently has been on economic issues. According to press [redacted] reporting, the movement is calling for renunciation of Uruguay's foreign debt, as advocated by Cuba's Fidel Castro for all Latin American debtor countries; nationalization of the banking system; and expropriation of large landholdings. [redacted]

The Tupamaros have also launched a recruiting campaign, aimed primarily at younger people residing in the interior of the country. [redacted]

[redacted] Tupamaro leaders believe that discontent over Uruguay's economic troubles—particularly over continuing inflation—is creating opportunities for recruitment in a number of interior areas. [redacted]

Military Attitudes

[redacted] Uruguayan military officers are disturbed by the reemergence of the Tupamaros, whom they regard as subversives.

[redacted] moreover, some officers fear the Tupamaros will take violent action against selected military personnel for human rights abuses committed when the armed forces were in power. Sendic has said that he will seek prosecution and punishment of all officers who were involved in the military regime's antsubversive campaign, [redacted]

Military leaders have generally supported Uruguay's transition to civilian rule, and they do not appear inclined to take any independent action soon against either the Tupamaros or the Sanguinetti government itself. This could change, however, in the event of a resurgence of Tupamaro violence. The Army Commander, General Medina, has stated publicly that, while the military has no intention of staging another takeover, neither will it permit the forces of democracy to be overwhelmed by "enemies of the state." [redacted]

Outlook

Even if the radical position were to be adopted, the Tupamaros, in our judgment, currently lack sufficient popular support to challenge the government's maintenance of political control. We also believe that the factions favoring an early return to the armed struggle lack the capability to do so any time soon. Over the longer term, however, if Sanguinetti fails to improve Uruguay's economic situation, we expect the Tupamaros will gain wider support, become more unified, and engage increasingly in the kinds of violent activities that disrupted Uruguay's political and civil liberties in the 1970s. If the civilian government proves unable to deal effectively with a growing Tupamaro threat, the military could be tempted to seize power again. [redacted]

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The French Caribbean Departments: Proindependence Terrorism [redacted]

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French Caribbean separatists, after 20 years of unsuccessful and sometimes violent, proindependence activities, are demonstrating a broader approach that portends a more active and militant independence movement. Separatist violence in France's Pacific territory of New Caledonia last fall and France's willingness in its wake to support independence there, appear to have inspired separatists in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, according to the US Consul General. Since then, French Caribbean separatists have increased their use of violence, tried to strengthen their organizations, and attempted to attract more popular support in order to increase pressure on the Mitterrand government. Their more sophisticated approach was underscored by the success of recent protests in Guadeloupe, where separatists exploited the island's racial tensions and high unemployment rate to mobilize proindependence sentiment. The separatists may also be trying to improve their capabilities through closer ties to Libya. So far, senior French officials have said publicly that France will not compromise with the Caribbean independence groups. [redacted]

Strategies and Tactics

The inability of separatists since the 1960s to achieve independence through the political process has fostered the establishment of numerous clandestine terrorist groups. These groups have remained small, however. The US Consul General in Martinique reports that only about 50 separatists have used violent tactics and that Guadeloupe groups tend to have overlapping memberships. Most proindependence terrorist bombings of French official and commercial property have occurred in Guadeloupe. Moreover, according to the Consul General, 80 percent of the citizens of the French Caribbean oppose independence, although many favor increased local autonomy. All these factors have meant that proindependence activities in the Caribbean departments until a few years ago posed little threat to security. [redacted]

In 1983, however, a series of 17 coordinated bombings in all three departments and in Paris by the newly formed Revolutionary Caribbean Alliance (ARC) suggested that radical separatists had developed a more sophisticated organizational network. The ARC has conducted more spectacular operations than earlier separatist groups and over the past two years has shifted from bombing unoccupied government property to targeting tourist facilities. Local officials believe that the ARC has been responsible for over 60 bombings that have left seven dead, numerous injured, and caused extensive property damage, mainly in Guadeloupe. [redacted]

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Luc Reinette, the leader of both ARC and its political arm, the Movement for the Independence of Guadeloupe (MPGI), had been active even before establishing the ARC; he is said to be responsible for a wave of bombings in the late 1970s and early 1980s. [redacted]

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Paris responded last year by substantially increasing counterterrorist forces in the Caribbean departments, outlawing the ARC, and arresting nearly 20 ARC activists, but isolated terrorist incidents have continued. According to the US Consul General, local officials believe that other separatist groups increasingly are adopting violent tactics. For example, although the Guadeloupe Communist Party publicly opposes independence, the US Consul General reports that members of that party's youth arm support terrorist tactics, and [redacted]

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[redacted] nearly all independence groups in the Caribbean now contain some radicals who advocate violence. The ARC has drawn members from all these groups. In the past year, two Martinique independence groups, the Martinique Independence Movement and the Socialist Revolutionary Group, have been linked to separatist violence. A small extremist group in French Guiana, the Anti-Colonial

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French Overseas Departments in the Caribbean Area



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and Anti-Imperialist Guianese Nationalists Party (PANGA), espouses militancy, and an official of the Union of Guianese Workers recently commented publicly that "violence could not be excluded from the struggle to end French rule." The US Consul General reports that many terrorists lead double lives as respectable middle-class professionals who publicly condemn violence but covertly promote it—a factor that has complicated the ability of French officials to identify those responsible for bombings. [redacted]

Libyan involvement has promoted increased contacts among French separatist groups. [redacted] French Caribbean separatists have met with Libyan officials in Panama, Suriname, and Tripoli in recent months. [redacted] in April Libya funded a conference of independence groups from French territories in Guadeloupe. The Libyans have also agreed to finance the establishment of secretariats for the various independence groups in Paris and Guadeloupe. [redacted]

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[redacted] after the crackdown on the ARC, the youth wing of the Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG) emerged as the main subversive group in the area. Although it is willing to use violence, it relies less on terrorist tactics than the ARC did. UPLG leaders appear to be concentrating on trying to build popular support at home and abroad. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] they are trying to unify independence groups in the French Caribbean and to improve relations with members of the Guadeloupe Communist Party. [redacted]

Outlook

The growth of ties between Libya and French Caribbean separatists and the comprehensive strategy initiated by the UPLG portend the development of a more active and sophisticated independence movement. We believe that the UPLG's recent efforts to broaden popular support and promote proindependence unity may encourage Tripoli to increase its assistance. Libyan funding and training would improve the separatists' organization and amplify their capabilities for violence. [redacted]

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[redacted] UPLG separatists are also concentrating on cultivating support among youth and workers hurt by Guadeloupe's depressed economy and the 3-percent unemployment rate. The US Consul General reports that local officials believe some labor strikes in Guadeloupe and Martinique in recent months were instigated by the UPLG and other separatists. [redacted]

Libyan Meddling

We believe that the increasing militancy of the separatists has fueled Libyan leader Qadhafi's recent interest in contacting proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean departments. [redacted]

[redacted] independence groups from French territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific are planning to intensify their campaign of violence over the next few years. Although we believe the radical minority among the separatists will attempt more terrorism, UPLG and other separatist leaders will remain cautious about being associated with such incidents to avoid jeopardizing their public relations effort. We believe the separatists instead probably will increasingly adopt confrontational tactics, such as demonstrations, and stimulate greater labor unrest in the coming months. [redacted]

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[redacted] Tripoli, with the help of leftists from Dominica and St. Lucia, has focused primarily on developing ties to the UPLG. In our judgment, Qadhafi hopes to exploit the separatist movement in order to further his own objectives of undermining US and French interests worldwide. [redacted]

[redacted] Tripoli wants to promote unity among the separatist groups, broaden their domestic support, and improve their capabilities for militant action. [redacted]

[redacted]

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A Chronology of Terrorist Activity in the French Caribbean Departments

January 1983–Present

1983

- 18-19 February** Two bombs damage Public Treasury and Maritime Affairs buildings in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe; no casualties. No one claimed responsibility, but 500 kilograms of explosives were stolen from the Central Depository for Explosives on the same day.
- 28-29 May** Seventeen bombs extensively damage several governmental and private properties in all three departments and in Paris; one person killed. The Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC), a previously unknown group, claimed responsibility. This represented the first coordinated attack in all three departments.
- 23 June** Four bombs damage Air France offices and a monument in Paris; no casualties. The ARC claimed responsibility and demanded Paris release Guadeloupe political prisoners.
- 23 July** Bomb damages supermarket in Basse-Terre; second device defused in Gosier, Guadeloupe; arsonists damage supermarket in Point-a-Pitre. There were no casualties. The ARC claimed responsibility.
- 7 August** Four bombs damage Department of Public Works in Schoelcher, Martinique; no casualties. The ARC claimed responsibility.
- 1 November** Bomb damages US Consul General's office in Martinique; no casualties. The ARC stated that the attack was in retaliation for the US intervention in Grenada in October.
- 14 November** Six bombs damage governmental and private properties in Point-a-Pitre and Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe; 23 people hurt. The ARC did not claim responsibility but did announce the beginning of an armed struggle against France and its local supporters. This represented the first bombings that caused indiscriminate casualties.
- 16 November** Car bomb explodes in Marie Galante, Guadeloupe; no casualties. The ARC claimed responsibility.
- 6-7 December** Two bombs disarmed near car of subprefect of Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe, and a military vehicle. No claims were made.
- 23-24 December** Bomb damages government building in Fort-de-France; another destroys television relay station in Grand Riviere, Martinique. No casualties were reported and no claims were made.

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1984

- 20 January** Bomb dismantled at Telecommunications Center in Guadeloupe. No group claimed credit.
- 2-4 February** Two bombs explode, three others disarmed at commercial buildings in St. Francois, Gosier, and Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe; five people injured, including two tourists. The ARC claimed responsibility, abandoning its former policy of avoiding attacks that endangered lives; these were its first attacks on tourist facilities and the local economy.
- 5 April** Bomb destroys police car in Riviere-Salee; another destroys garage at golf course in Les Trois Islets, Martinique. A third bomb damaged a supermarket in Fort-de-France. No casualties were reported, and no group claimed responsibility.
- 26 April** Fifteen bombs damage government offices and three businesses in Basse-Terre and Grande-Terre, Guadeloupe. There were no casualties, and no group claimed credit.
- 21-22 May** Five bombs destroy police car, two private yachts, shop, and tennis club in Guadeloupe; no casualties. No claims were received, but the bombings occurred on the anniversary of the 1848 uprising that led to the abolition of slavery in Martinique.
- 24-25 July** Four bombs in Basse-Terre and Point-a-Pitre explode prematurely, killing four terrorists. At least three of those killed were members of the Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe.
- 26 September** ARC letter threatens lives of Aime Cesaire, deputy mayor of Fort-de-France and leader of People's Party of Martinique (PPM); Camille Darsieres, PPM member; and Emile Maurice, president of General Council.

1985

- 3 January** Three bombs damage several businesses; fourth destroys car of acting Procurator General Bec in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe. One person was injured. Bec was the prosecutor in the case against Luc Reinette, reputed MPGI and ARC leader arrested in November 1984 in connection with the bombing of a radio station a year earlier.
- 5 January** Bomb destroys police motorcycle in Gosier; another device disarmed at shop in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe. On 11 January, Justice Nouvelle, a previously unknown group, claimed responsibility for several recent bombings. The group claimed to be acting in response to the police use of tear gas and armored cars in December 1984 to disperse 3,000 to 4,000 demonstrators who were supporting seven ARC terrorists then on trial.
- 12-13 January** Firebomb destroys boat in Gosier harbor; two others burn autos in Abymes and St. Anne, Guadeloupe. There were no casualties.

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- 5 February** Home of French comedian Coluche destroyed by arson on Guadeloupe; no casualties.
- 7 February** ARC terrorist leader Luc Reinette convicted, along with six other separatist defendants, for bombings committed during 1983. Reinette received three separate convictions for a total of 19 years.
- 23 February** Firebomb damages discotheque in Gosier, Guadeloupe; no casualties. There were no claims of responsibility.
- 3-4 March** Six firebombs explode, one directed at offices of *France-Antilles* newspaper in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe; no casualties. Riposte Populaire, a previously unknown group, claimed responsibility.
- 5 March** Firebombs destroy six cars; time bomb near police headquarters defused in Moule, Guadeloupe. There were no casualties, and no group claimed responsibility.
- 7 March** Lucette Michaux-Chevry, President of Guadeloupean General Council, survives assassination attempt. No group claimed responsibility.
- 9 March** Bomb damages police station in Gosier, injuring five persons. Another bomb damaged a restaurant in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe.
- 13 March** Bomb at restaurant in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe, kills three (including one US citizen), and injures nine (including three US citizens). The bomb was left by a black Antillean couple, but no group claimed responsibility.
- 16 June** ARC leader Luc Reinette and three others escape from prison in Guadeloupe. Officials claimed his escape received "inside help."
- 24 June** Gunman misses local magistrate investigating Reinette's escape from prison. This was the first incident, terrorist or criminal, directed against a local magistrate.
- 24-27 July** Proindependence demonstrators in Guadeloupe mine at least four barricades during protests over imprisonment of separatist leader. Gendarme vehicles and a helicopter were hit by heavy caliber gunfire. One person was wounded.



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The Terrorism Diary for November

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Below is a compendium of October dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.

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- 1 November 1981** *Algeria.* Revolution Day.
- 1 November 1981** *Antigua and Barbuda.* Independence Day.
- 2 November 1917** *Palestinians.* Balfour Day (anniversary of declaration committing Britain to set up a Jewish homeland in Palestine).
- 3 November 1903** *Panama.* Independence Day.
- 3 November 1918** *Italy.* National Unity Day.
- 3 November 1929** *South Korea.* Students Day (student protests against Japanese rule erupt in Kwangju).
- 3 November 1978** *Dominica.* Independence Day.
- 4 November 1963** *Iran.* Exile of Ayatollah Khomeini to Turkey.
- 4 November 1979** *Iran-United States.* Seizure of US Embassy by student radicals.
- 4 November 1983** *Ecuador.* Founding of Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).
- 5 November 1605** *United Kingdom.* Guy Fawkes Day (Catholic plot to bomb Parliament thwarted).
- 6 November 1979** *Morocco.* Green March (anniversary of march by unarmed Moroccan citizens into Spanish Sahara).
- 7 November 1917** *Communist world.* Great October Socialist Revolution.
- 9 November 1938** *Germany.* Reichskristallnacht "Crystal Night" (outbreak of anti-Jewish violence).
- 9 November 1974** *West Germany.* Death of RAF terrorist Holger Meins from hunger strike.
- 10 November 1938** *Turkey.* Death of Kemal Ataturk.
- 11 November 1957** *Colombia.* Declaration of war on central government by People's Liberation Army (EPL).
- 11 November 1965** *Zimbabwe.* Independence Day.
- 11 November 1975** *Angola.* Independence Day.

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11 November 1984 **Mauritania.** Coup that brought current regime to power.

12 November 1918 **Austria.** Republic Day.

13 November 1970 **Syria.** Hafez al-Asad assumes power.

14 November 1935 **Jordan.** Birthday of King Hussein.

15 November 1889 **Brazil.** Proclamation of the republic.

15 November 1983 **Cyprus.** Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence.

17 November 1973 **Greece.** Student uprising at Athens Polytechnic University. (Terrorist group "17 November Movement" takes its name from this incident.)

18 November 1918 **Latvia.** National Day.

18 November 1940 **Oman.** Birthday of Sultan Qabus Bin Said.

18 November 1955 **Morocco.** Independence Day.

19 November 1798 **Ireland.** Death of Wolfe Tone, first Irish revolutionary (annual nationalist pilgrimage).

19 November 1968 **Mali.** Liberation Day.

20 November 1910 **Mexico.** Anniversary of the revolution overthrowing Diaz regime.

20 November 1936 **Spain.** Death of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera (founder of the Falange).

20 November 1975 **Spain.** Death of Gen. Francisco Franco and accession of King Juan Carlos.

20 November 1983 **Colombia.** Passage of amnesty law and legalization of M-19 Movement.

20 November 1983 **Saudi Arabia.** Occupation of Grand Mosque in Mecca by conservative Muslims inspired by Iran.

21 November 1949 **Libya.** Proclamation Day (UN resolution on Libyan independence).

21 November 1973 **Grenada.** "Bloody Sunday" (deaths of New Jewel Movement members).

22 November 1943 **Lebanon.** Independence Day.

22 November 1975 **Spain.** Proclamation of Juan Carlos as king.

24 November 1965 **Kuwait.** Amir Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah ascends to the throne.

24 November 1965 **Zaire.** Revolution Day (anniversary of Second Congolese Republic).

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<i>25 November 571</i>	<i>Muslim world.</i> Birth of the Prophet Mohammad.
<i>25 November 1973</i>	<i>Greece.</i> Coup leading to end of military rule.
<i>25 November 1975</i>	<i>Suriname.</i> Independence Day.
<i>26 November 1924</i>	<i>Mongolia.</i> Founding of the republic.
<i>26 November 1984</i>	<i>United States-Iraq.</i> Renewal of diplomatic relations.
<i>27 November</i>	<i>Philippines.</i> Birthday of slain opposition leader Benigno Aquino.
<i>28 November 1821</i>	<i>Panama.</i> Independence from Spain.
<i>28 November 1912</i>	<i>Albania.</i> Independence Day.
<i>28 November 1936</i>	<i>Lebanon.</i> Founding of Phalange Party.
<i>28 November 1944</i>	<i>Albania.</i> Liberation Day.
<i>28 November 1958</i>	<i>Chad.</i> Proclamation of the republic.
<i>28 November 1960</i>	<i>Mauritania.</i> Independence Day.
<i>28 November 1966</i>	<i>Burundi.</i> Proclamation of the republic.
<i>28 November 1975</i>	<i>Indonesia.</i> Fretilin declares East Timor independent.
<i>29 November 1945</i>	<i>Yugoslavia.</i> Republic Day.
<i>29 November 1947</i>	<i>Israel.</i> Proclamation Day.
<i>29 November 1947</i>	<i>Palestinians.</i> "International Day of Solidarity With the Palestinian People." (anniversary of partition).
<i>30 November 1966</i>	<i>Barbados.</i> Independence Day.
<i>30 November 1967</i>	<i>South Yemen.</i> Independence Day.
<i>30 November 1970</i>	<i>South Yemen.</i> Constitution promulgated.
<i>30 November 1975</i>	<i>Benin.</i> National Day.



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Chronology of Terrorism—1985

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included. [redacted]

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Mid-July

Saudi Arabia: Several Lebanese Shias arrested for smuggling weapons and explosives into Taif. [redacted] the men had crossed the border from North or South Yemen disguised as Saudi women [redacted]

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21 August

North Yemen: Grenade attack injures two at Soviet Embassy in Sanaa. No group has claimed responsibility, but the government suspects Muslim fundamentalists.

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4 September

Zaire: Zairian dissident arrested for plotting to kill President Mobutu. The suspect reportedly has admitted receiving terrorist training in Libya. [redacted]

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5 September

Western Sahara: Polisario releases two West Germans captured after it sank their boat. The two, who had been held since 22 August, were returned to a representative of the West German Government. [redacted]

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8 September

West Bank: Incendiary bomb damages police station near Nablus. The General Command of the Palestinian Revolution Forces claimed responsibility for the attack. [redacted]

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9 September

West Bank: Bomb explodes inside Israeli military transportation station in Jerusalem, injuring demolitions expert. The General Command of the Palestinian Revolution Forces took responsibility for that incident and for a second bomb it claimed went off in another transportation station later that same afternoon. [redacted]

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10 September

El Salvador: President Duarte's daughter, companion kidnaped on San Salvador university campus. One security guard was killed and another mortally wounded. The Pedro Pablo Castillo Front, a leftwing group formed in July, later claimed responsibility. [redacted]

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11 September

West Germany: RAF safehouse discovered in Tuebingen. The apartment had been used primarily by Red Army Faction members Barbara and Horst Meyer, as recently as late July or early August. Documents found included papers pertaining to a vehicle used in an attack on a financial messenger near Tuebingen in June.

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Lebanon: Attempt to kidnap Portuguese Ambassador at Beirut's green line fails. Units of the Lebanese Army foiled the attempt; the Ambassador and his wife were unharmed.

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Iran: Car bomb explodes in Tehran city park, injuring three. No group has claimed responsibility. This was the ninth such explosion in Tehran this year.

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Chile: Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front creates widespread blackouts in central region. An FPMR communique claimed that the blackouts were intended to commemorate the 12th anniversary of the death of President Salvador Allende and to protest the past 12 years of military rule under the Pinochet regime.

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12 September

Iran: Bomb outside National Bank branch injures two in Tehran. The government has blamed unspecified oppositionists.

25X1

14 September

Spain: Bomb explodes under police car in Vitoria, killing a policeman and wounding another person. No group claimed responsibility for the incident, but the Basque separatist group ETA is suspected.

25X1

El Salvador: Honduran Embassy in San Salvador struck by grenade hurled from passing vehicle. There were no casualties and damage was minimal. The urban leftwing group Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front claimed the attack was in retaliation for a Honduran Army operation against the Colomoncagua refugee camp in August.

25X1

Sri Lanka: Tamil separatists detonate landmine under train near Trincomalee. Three crewmen and a passenger were injured and four railcars were damaged.

25X1

Sri Lanka: Three Sinhalese civilians reported killed near Trincomalee by 12 gunmen. Although no group has claimed credit for the attack, the killers probably were Tamil separatist guerrillas.

25X1

15 September

Denmark: Bombs explode outside two Jewish-owned shops in Copenhagen, injuring 12. Police suspect local anti-Jewish groups—rather than Middle Eastern groups—may be responsible.

25X1

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16 September

Italy: Grenade attack on Rome sidewalk cafe injures 38 tourists, including nine Americans. Police arrested a Palestinian in connection with the attack. On 19 September, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) claimed credit; ROSM is believed to be a covername used by the Abu Nidal Group in attacks on UK targets.

25X1

El Salvador: National Police capture five members of Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front in San Salvador. Police believe that evidence found at one of the suspect's homes may link them to the murder of a military spokesman on a San Salvador tennis court on 7 March and the assassination of Gen. Jose Medrano on 23 March.

25X1

17 September

25X6

Argentina: Bomb does extensive damage to Buenos Aires replica of Britain's "Big Ben" clock tower. No group claimed responsibility, but anti-UK graffiti was found at the scene. The attack came 24 hours before a meeting in Paris between President Alfonsin and a UK opposition leader to discuss sovereignty over the disputed Falkland Islands.

25X1

18 September

Greece: Jordanian publisher assassinated in Athens. Michel Nimri reportedly was a personal friend of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and had recently published in his magazine "Annaskra" details of an alleged plot to overthrow Syrian President Assad. The Black September group, which opposes Arafat, claimed credit for the murder the next day.

25X1

19 September

Lebanon: Unidentified gunman assassinates Palestinian guerrilla Kamal Hussein in Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp. This incident was the latest in a string of attacks that have killed seven supporters of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and wounded another.

25X1

Iran: Bomb in Tehran bus terminal kills one person, wounds 36. No group has yet taken credit for the explosion, the third in the capital in nine days.

25X1

20 September

Peru: Sendero Luminoso blacks out Lima and neighboring cities. Dynamite attacks against power pylons resulted in a 30-minute blackout in the city center, but it took authorities longer to restore power to the surrounding areas.

25X1

Peru: Naval airbase at El Callao attacked by truck bomb. The driver leaped from the truck moments before it hit a wall at the entrance gate and exploded, seriously wounding a Navy officer. No group has claimed credit, but two suspects were apprehended at the scene.

25X1

Secret

- Western Sahara: Polisario guerrillas sink Spanish fishing boat, killing at least two fishermen and capturing six others.** The group has frequently attacked Spanish fishing vessels, as well as ships from other countries. [] 25X1
- 21 September**
- Spain: New group claims credit for bombs planted several months ago.** "Andecha Obrera" took responsibility for a bomb in Oviedo that damaged the former center of the Asturian Employers' Federation and several cars. Police were able to defuse the second bomb, which was planted at an employment office in Gijon. [] 25X1
- Western Sahara: Polisario attacks Spanish patrol boat sent to search for survivors of previous day's attack.** This is the first time the group has attacked a Spanish naval vessel. [] 25X1
- 22 September**
- [] 25X6
- France: Prime Minister acknowledges government role in sinking of "Rainbow Warrior" protest ship in New Zealand.** The Defense Minister and the chief of France's external intelligence service resigned. Two French intelligence officers are being held in New Zealand for the 10 July bomb attack that killed one crewmember. [] 25X1
- West Bank: Police defuse car bomb in Jerusalem neighborhood of Mea Sharim.** Fatah's Force 17 claimed responsibility for the abortive attack. [] 25X1
- West Bank: Premature explosion kills Palestinian preparing bomb in Dehaishe refugee camp near Bethlehem.** No other casualties were reported. [] 25X1
- 23 September**
- West Germany: Bomb damages NATO pipeline near Limburg.** No casualties were reported, but 25,000 gallons of oil spilled from the ruptured pipe. No group has claimed responsibility. [] 25X1
- [] 25X6
- 26 September**
- Lebanon: Israeli Air Force bombs two Bekaa Valley terrorist bases belonging to Abu Musa organization.** The Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus claimed the strikes—which reportedly caused material damage but no casualties—were not related to the murder of the three Israelis in Cyprus the previous day. [] 25X1

Secret

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