



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Terrorism Review

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4 November 1985

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Terrorism Review [Redacted]

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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor

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Terrorism Review [Redacted]

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Focus

Prospects for Increased Terrorism Against the United States and Israel [Redacted]

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The Israeli bombing of the PLO Headquarters in Tunis on 1 October and the US interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers will even more closely identify the United States and Israel as a common foe in the view of Middle Eastern terrorists. As a result, we can expect attacks against US targets by Middle Eastern groups that previously limited themselves to targeting Israeli or Jewish interests. [Redacted]

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While Iran has not been directly implicated in any terrorist attacks during the past six months, Iranian-backed groups have remained active, and elements of the Iranian regime have conducted operational planning. [Redacted]

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Radical Lebanese Shias have exacted the highest price to US interests from terrorist actions anywhere in the world. The apparent murder of US hostage William Buckley by his Hizballah captors—ostensibly in retaliation for the Israeli airstrike on Tunis—may demonstrate their frustration at their inability to secure the release of Shia prisoners still held in Kuwait. [Redacted]

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Hizballah

Hizballah will remain a potent threat to US and Israeli interests in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and even Europe. The group may well carry out its threat to murder its other American hostages. Even without that threat, all remaining US citizens and the Israeli presence in the south remain vulnerable to terrorist attack. In addition, radical Shias have demonstrated an increased capability to strike in the Persian Gulf countries, particularly in Kuwait. The United States has a heavy economic, diplomatic, and military presence in the Gulf, and US personnel and facilities in the region remain vulnerable. In Europe, the plan to strike the US Embassy in Rome last November indicates the potential for Iranian-supported operatives there. [Redacted]

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Palestinian Groups

Palestinian groups are likely to launch retaliatory attacks against US and Israeli interests. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat probably will have to cope with increasing demands from the PLO Executive Committee to retaliate against the United States. Fatah hardliners have long advocated a more militant posture, and they are now in a stronger position to press Arafat to approve more frequent and spectacular terrorist attacks. [Redacted]

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Palestinian leaders have grown increasingly frustrated with what they view as Washington's unquestioned support for Israel. The PLO may soon conclude that the only way to keep attention on its grievances with Israel—and demonstrate its capability as a national liberation movement—is to step up operations against Israel and to attack Israel's prime benefactor, the United States. [Redacted]

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Arafat probably will sanction an increase in attacks on Israeli interests worldwide in an effort to preserve Fatah unity. He may continue to resist pressure for attacks against US interests—in an effort to avoid further loss of international credibility—but he may not discourage freelance operations by PLO splinter groups. [redacted]

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Some Palestinian groups may be planning attacks to obtain the freedom of the four men who took over the Achille Lauro. Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestinian faction responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking, stated that efforts would be undertaken to free the hijackers. The PLO representative in West Germany predicted that an American or Italian airplane would be hijacked during October or that another American would be killed to force the release of the hijackers.

[redacted]

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Libya

Libya's primary targets continue to be Libyan exiles and the Governments of Egypt, Tunisia, Chad, and Zaire. Although Libyan leader Mu'ammur Qadhafi may continue to avoid targeting US personnel or facilities out of fear of retaliation, he may be willing to work through surrogates to hit US targets if he feels the potential benefits outweigh the risk of discovery. Qadhafi might be tempted to attack the United States in countries where he believes he could exploit a surge of anti-US sentiment—such as Sudan or Tunisia. [redacted]

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Libya has already sponsored terrorist attacks against Tunisian interests this year, and strong US support for President Bourguiba against the Libyans has made the United States a potential target. Zaire, whose President Mobutu has close ties both to the United States and Israel, remains a third-echelon target for anti-US attacks. [redacted]

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Israel's reputation for swift and successful retribution strongly discourages Qadhafi from targeting that nation's interests. Should operational ties between Libya and radical Palestinian groups become closer, however, Libya may consider using Palestinian surrogates to hit Israeli targets. [redacted]

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Syria

Syria has acted as a patron and director of international terrorism, rather than as a direct practitioner, during the past two years. Damascus will encourage attacks by groups it supports if such attacks serve Syrian interests and Damascus's hand can be concealed. Among the groups likely to be encouraged by the Syrians are the anti-Arafat Palestinians and the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP). The Syrians will make every effort to retard progress in the peace process, using terrorist attacks to keep the level of antagonism high among Israel, Jordan, and the pro-Arafat Palestinians. Moreover, Damascus will continue its efforts to make the Israeli presence in south Lebanon as costly as possible. It is providing logistic support and encouragement to the SSNP's car bomb campaign against the Israeli armed forces and their allies in the Army of South Lebanon, for example. [redacted]

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Middle Easterners have already increased their attacks against Israel outside of their home region, chiefly in Europe. Israeli and Jewish targets have been hit six times in the first six months of 1985—twice the 1984 rate. Both the Achille Lauro hijacking and the murders of three Israelis at a yacht club in Cyprus on 25 September indicate this trend will continue.

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The United States has already been threatened, along with Israel, since the ship hijacking. Two Palestinians were arrested in Rome on 15 October carrying explosives they said they intended to use against Israel and the United States. In addition, an unknown caller made a bomb threat against the US section of Sigonella Airbase in Sicily on 15 October.

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US and Israeli interests could also be targeted by indigenous West European terrorist groups. Some of these groups attacked Israeli targets “in solidarity” with Middle Easterners following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

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Highlights**Key Indicators****Italy****Threats to US Interests**

The US interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers has significantly increased the terrorist threat to US and NATO interests in Italy. In recent weeks, US facilities have been the targets of bomb threats and surveillance activity by Middle Eastern individuals. The indigenous Red Brigades terrorist group announced on 18 October that it too would protest the US action by attacking NATO targets. [] 25X1

US and NATO facilities located in Italy remain vulnerable to surreptitious entry and auto bombings, as indicated by the increasing number of military uniforms and base passes either lost or stolen in recent months. We believe the long-term threat posed by Palestinian and other Middle Eastern terrorist groups to US interests in Italy is likely to continue and overshadow that posed by the Red Brigades and other indigenous Italian terrorist groups. [] 25X1

Belgium**Communist Combatant Cells Broaden Target Spectrum**

On 19 October the Combatant Communist Cells (CCC) bombed a Belgian armed forces information office. In claiming responsibility for the attack, the group announced the opening of a "second front" called the "Pierre Akkerman campaign" against bourgeois militarism and pacifism. Akkerman was a Belgian Communist killed in the Spanish Civil War in 1937. This was followed on 20 October—the day of a national antimissile demonstration in Brussels—by an apparent CCC bombing of the vehicle and home of the president of the antinuclear movement. [] 25X1

In its 19 October communique, the group declared that its "second front" is directed against mass public demonstrations protesting missile deployment, which it terms the "usual, useless, ineffective petit bourgeois sterile actions." The antipacifist attack could have been the work of a dissident faction within the group, or the first of several operations timed to coincide with the antimissile protests. [] 25X1

If the CCC is now targeting the pacifist movement—which might have provided it with allies and supporters—it is likely to further isolate itself from leftist segments of Belgian society and reduce its potential pool of recruits. [] 25X1

The attack against the pacifist leader marks the CCC's second change in targeting recently, and the fourth in less than a year. In early October, it announced the beginning of a "Karl Marx" anticapitalist campaign. The group emerged in October 1984 and attacked mainly NATO and defense-related targets in its initial operations. It has also bombed domestic political targets. [] 25X1

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Turkey

Abu Nidal Said Planning Terrorist Attacks

Seven members of the radical Palestinian terrorist group Abu Nidal reportedly are planning to carry out terrorist operations against Turkish security forces. The attacks apparently are intended to retaliate for Turkish successes against the group following the assassination on 24 July of a Jordanian diplomat. The Abu Nidal Group claimed responsibility for the incident under the name Black September—one of several cover names it uses. [redacted]

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[redacted] are particularly concerned that the group has singled out Kuwaiti interests as their primary target and have instructed their personnel accordingly. Another possible scenario involves the bombings of densely populated areas. Authorities have enhanced security at the more likely targets and have circulated the names of the seven terrorists already thought to be in Turkey. [redacted]

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Significant Developments

[redacted]

[redacted]

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France

Five Bombings in Six Days by Action Directe

In its busiest week this year, the leftwing terrorist group this October bombed targets to protest South Africa's apartheid system and the activities of the rightist National Front Party—accused by Action Directe and others of racism. Two bombs severely damaged buildings housing the state-run radio and television stations in Paris on 14 October. On 16 October, in Marseille, the group bombed the offices of Securite et Liberte, an organization related to the National Front, and on 17 October it attacked the offices of the French broadcasting authority. On 19 October the group bombed a French airline doing business with South Africa to protest the execution of black poet Benjamin Moloise on the same day. There were no casualties in any of the attacks. [redacted]

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These bombings were carried out by the "Symbolic Wing" of Action Directe and may portend additional attacks against targets related to the rightist party or South Africa. The "Symbolic Wing" previously bombed four French companies with business interests in South Africa on 5 September. A second hardline international faction has attacked defense-related targets. [redacted]

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West Bank**Palestinian Terrorist Cell Smashed**

Israeli security forces in a firefight wiped out a five-man Palestinian terrorist cell operating near Hebron. Four of the terrorists were killed and one was wounded in the Israeli ambush. The cell was allegedly responsible for killing five Israelis and wounding 18 others over the past year and a half, including murdering a couple near Beit Shemesh on 2 October. An Israeli official said the group began its activities independently and subsequently established links to the PLO in Jordan. Fatah Force 17—Arafat's personal bodyguard—reportedly claimed responsibility for the death of the Beit Shemesh couple.

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Lebanon**Wave of Attacks on SSNP Centers and Officials**

Between 1 and 3 October, five attacks occurred against facilities and personnel of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in Beirut. One bomb exploded near the SSNP main offices, another was thrown near the offices of the party's magazine, and a third was defused near an SSNP local office. Assailants also tossed a grenade at the home of a party official and fired rockets at the home of the SSNP military commander. The attacks caused no casualties and only minor damage. The Arab Struggle Organization and Islamic Jihad both claimed responsibility for three of the incidents. In addition, a third group calling itself "Beirut's Free Revolution," claimed credit for one of the other attacks. The attacks, however, probably were conducted by the Islamic Unification Movement in retaliation for the SSNP militia's participation in the recent fighting in Tripoli.

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Syria**Bombs Linked to Fighting in Lebanon**

A bomb exploded in a shop on the ground floor of a hotel near Martyrs' Square in Damascus on 25 September, killing an unknown number of persons. Four days earlier, two car bombs were discovered at two different locations in downtown Damascus. Neither device exploded, however.

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Syrian officials strongly suspect that either members of the Islamic Unification Movement (IUM) or pro-Arafat Palestinians planted the bombs. The IUM, which is supported by pro-Arafat Palestinians, has been under attack by Syrian-backed forces during recent fighting in Tripoli, Lebanon. One of these groups probably is using the recent bombings to pressure Damascus to end its support for Lebanese militia forces attacking Sunni Muslim units in Tripoli, Lebanon.

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Secret**Iraq****Dawa Party Terrorism Reemerges**

Iraqi security forces on 13 October engaged in a daylong firefight with an undetermined number of Dawa (Islamic Call) Party members in Al-Juzani, a small village on the east side of the Tigris River [redacted].

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The deployment of an entire brigade of Iraqi security forces may indicate that the Dawa group numbered more than the 100 officially estimated by Baghdad. On the same day, Iraqi security forces intercepted five Dawa Party members in Ridhwaniyz, killing three. These incidents were the first inside Iraq since April 1983 involving the Dawa Party. Dawa Party members bombed the US Embassy and other locations in Kuwait in December 1983. [redacted]

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Persian Gulf**Continued Likelihood of Terrorist Attacks**

Iranian-backed Shia terrorists are still planning to launch attacks against Kuwaiti and US interests [redacted].

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Iranian-backed Dawa Party members, teamed up with Lebanese Hizballah, reportedly intend to attack Kuwaiti or US interests in Kuwait—possibly the Kuwaiti ruling family or the US Embassy. The Hizballah members reportedly left Beirut on 27 September. Meanwhile, Kuwaiti authorities have identified four individuals in Cyprus planning to hijack a Kuwaiti or American civilian airliner in the name of the Islamic Jihad Organization. These Iranian-sponsored attacks appear intended to intimidate Kuwait into ending its support for Iraq, obtain the release of the 17 members of the Dawa Party imprisoned in Kuwait, and perhaps remove key Kuwaiti leaders. [redacted]

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United Arab Emirates**Tighter Security After Discovery of Iranian Terrorist Cell**

[redacted] following the discovery of an Iranian-sponsored terrorist cell last July, government officials believe Iran is now willing to conduct terrorist or conventional military attacks against the UAE. [redacted]

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[redacted] the leaders previously believed that the benefits Iran derived from trade with the UAE would restrain Tehran. But the large quantity of weapons and explosives discovered with the cell, combined with the planned targeting of Abu Dhabi leaders and US and French diplomatic installations, convinced them otherwise. [redacted]

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As a result of this, the UAE reportedly has tightened security measures. Nightly patrols of the Gulf coastline and waters have also been instituted to interdict the flow of men and arms. In addition, each individual of Iranian origin seeking government employment must now submit to an extensive background investigation. The Emirates are considering tightening entry restrictions on nonresident Iranians as well. The effectiveness of these measures, however, depends on whether interservice rivalries that have prevented close coordination among the UAE's security forces in the past can be resolved. [redacted]

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El Salvador

Terrorist Use of Mines

On 6 October, guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) announced on Radio Venceremos that they would mine primary and secondary roads to enforce their call for a nationwide traffic stoppage—the first time the FMLN has done this. Calls for such stoppages have been increasingly ignored by the general public. Since the mining began, a Salvadoran Red Cross ambulance was destroyed and two youths were seriously injured. [redacted]

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Colombia

US Missionaries Kidnaped

Three of four US citizens kidnaped on 5 October by Colombian guerrillas remain in their custody. The New Tribes Mission—in which the hostages served—reportedly has received a ransom demand from the Ricardo Franco Front, a splinter group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), but evidence indicates that local FARC members probably conducted the kidnaping on their own. [redacted]

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The group kidnaped two US citizens in 1983 and released them following large ransom payments. The recent kidnappings, however, violate the current truce that the FARC leadership wants to extend and Colombian authorities believe that a political settlement could soon release the hostages. [redacted]

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Peru

People's Revolutionary Command Resurfaces

Four persons claiming to represent the People's Revolutionary Command (CRP) terrorist group briefly took over a Lima radio station on 18 October. The group forced the broadcast of a tape attacking the government's economic policy and demanding amnesty for political prisoners. [redacted]

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The CRP first appeared in mid-July when it took over two radio stations and claimed responsibility for the 14 July attack on a US Consulate building. It is not known to have carried out any subsequent actions. The group's operational similarity to the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA) suggests it could be a splinter faction dissatisfied with the virtual halt in MRTA actions since August. Because of its previous attack against a US installation and its possible links to the MRTA, the resurgence of the CRP may threaten US personnel. [redacted]

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Sendero Luminoso Prison Uprising

Approximately 30 persons died and about 20 were injured on 4 October when violence erupted during a police search of a Sendero Luminoso cell block in Lima's Lurigancho Prison. Nearly all of the victims died in a fire that the government claims was started by the prisoners, but that several leftist groups claim was a government coverup of a massacre. [redacted]

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[redacted] the search of the prison was going smoothly until police came to the cell block housing the Sendero Luminoso terrorists, where [redacted] [redacted] prisoners were making weapons in preparation to escape. Prisoners barricaded the entrances with cement blocks, set fire to their mattresses, and fired arrows at the police, who responded with explosive charges and a bulldozer to enter the building and subdue the prisoners. Police claim they discovered the charred bodies of 28 prisoners killed by other Sendero Luminoso inmates, as well as an array of weapons including bows and arrows, slings, lances, and homemade "flamethrowers." [redacted]

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Several persons, mostly from the United Left political coalition (IU), claimed that the police had killed the victims and then burned their bodies to hide the fact. The government's credibility on such issues has deteriorated following admissions of human rights violations by the military in the South Central Emergency Zone. Sendero Luminoso, however, has a reputation for demanding absolute allegiance and is quite capable of executing members in disfavor. [redacted]

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Argentina**Crackdown on Rightwing Terrorism**

The government claims to have rounded up a gang comprised of active duty and retired military personnel and civilians responsible for a spate of bombings in Buenos Aires during September and October. President Alfonsin has publicly accused the group of attacking military targets to create the impression of leftist terrorist activity. [redacted]

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The group probably wanted to erode public confidence in the president by fostering an atmosphere of lawlessness and an impression of governmental ineptitude. The individuals arrested, however, were discredited extremists who would be especially hard pressed to garner the armed forces and political backing needed to launch successfully any coup they may have been planning. Other rightist groups are almost certainly operating undetected, and a bomb exploded near a military installation shortly after the suspected terrorists were jailed. Such sporadic acts, however, are unlikely to have much impact on Alfonsin's standing.

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Zaire**Plot By Libyan-Backed Dissidents**

Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi—a longtime foe of President Mobutu—has reportedly trained, funded and supplied Zairian dissidents who plan to disrupt November festivities marking the 20th anniversary of Mobutu's takeover. Reports of varying reliability indicate Qadhafi intends to send teams of Zairian dissidents to assassinate Mobutu and to commit sabotage. [redacted] a Libyan trained and supported member of the dissident National Congolese Army was arrested in September for plotting to assassinate Mobutu. As was demonstrated by the September arrest, however, Mobutu's security has been good enough to stop any assassins, despite poor border control and faulty intelligence.

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India**Sikh Violence To Commemorate Gandhi's Assassination**

A recent spate of killings—two local Congress (I) Party officials and two customs officials—may indicate growing Sikh terrorist activity to commemorate the assassination of Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984. This is the first outbreak of violence since the September Punjab elections restoring local autonomy. Sikh separatists have targeted Hindu and moderate Sikh leaders in response to the July peace accord between the Hindu-majority Indian Government and Sikh moderates. According to press reports, Sikh separatists will target the popular Vaisand Devi Shrine, now guarded by paramilitary forces. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Fatah's Security and Intelligence Organizations: Operational Capabilities [Redacted]

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Israel has charged the Western Sector and Force 17, two of Fatah's key security organizations, with responsibility for recent increased terrorist activity in the West Bank. Israel states—and we believe that mounting evidence tends to support Tel Aviv's claims—that Force 17 was responsible for the killing on 25 September of three Israeli yachtsmen at Larnaca, Cyprus. Both Force 17 and the Western Sector have main offices in Amman and would be major targets should Israel carry out its threat to bomb PLO facilities in Jordan. [Redacted]

operational performance and what we can surmise from recent Fatah-inspired operations against Israel and Syria. Several groups within Fatah's security and intelligence apparatus—the Western Sector, Force 17, and the United Security Organization—are specifically assigned the responsibility of carrying out military operations in Israel and the Occupied Territories and, more recently, reprisals against Damascus for attacks by Syrian-supported Palestinians on pro-Arafat Palestinians and Jordanians. [Redacted]

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Fatah's Security Apparatus

Fatah began training selected officers for its security apparatus in 1968 to provide operational intelligence and military support for guerrilla attacks in Israel. By 1970-71, Fatah's intelligence service had developed into an elaborate structure. During the early 1970s, whenever Fatah engaged in international terrorism, it used the covert Black September Organization (BSO), which gained its greatest notoriety by killing Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972 and taking over the Saudi Embassy in Sudan in 1973, killing the US Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission. The BSO has been dormant since 1974, following widespread opposition from senior and middle-level Fatah officials, including Arafat, to the BSO's international operations. Although former BSO leader Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) has tried to revive the organization, [Redacted] he has not found many takers. During its most active period in the early 1970s, the BSO was believed to have approximately 300 operatives. [Redacted]

Arafat maintains control over the various leaders of the security groups by cultivating the internal rivalry and jockeying for power that exists among his subordinates who head these organizations. Arafat's style of management may contribute to a lack of cohesion in the security organizations, but it also promotes competition among them to claim responsibility for certain operations. In some cases this practice has led to exaggerated or false claims. We believe that such rivalries probably have been a factor in the recently increased Fatah-directed terrorism against Israelis on the West Bank. [Redacted]

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The Organizations

Western Sector. The Western Sector, led by Deputy Commander Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), is the Fatah body primarily responsible for military operations in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Several "committees" located in the West Bank are responsible for recruiting operatives and maintaining specific underground networks. We have no specific information about the methods or effectiveness of the committees but judge they would have little trouble finding eager recruits among young West Bank Palestinians impatient with political solutions [Redacted]

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Although Fatah's exodus from Lebanon in 1982-83 and the dispersal of the PLO Fatah leadership have disrupted some Fatah command and control capabilities, we believe Fatah maintains a fairly competent operational ability to collect intelligence and mount operations against its enemies. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Most of our judgments are based on what we know of Fatah's

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Israel charges that the Western Sector's increased presence in Jordan is directly responsible for recent terrorist attacks inside Israel and the Occupied Territories. Abu Jihad has taken credit for two abortive seaborne attacks the Israelis stopped last March and April. Abu Jihad has also claimed his group was responsible for two attacks in August on Israeli citizens living in the West Bank in which one was killed and another wounded. [redacted]

[redacted] what we believe to be Fatah's tendency to claim credit for independent operations undertaken by West Bank Palestinians. [redacted]

In spite of what we believe to be stringent Jordanian efforts to monitor the activities of the Western Sector, it is possible that Sector operatives may have prompted recent attacks. Israel's release last May of 1,150 Palestinian prisoners, including some 600 that Israel allowed to stay in the West Bank, may have contributed to recent attacks by supplying experienced manpower. [redacted]

[redacted] Abu Jihad has been made fully aware of the penalties the Sector faces if it is caught planning or attempting cross-border operations against Israel from Jordan. We believe Amman will be more emphatic in warning Arafat that any efforts to conduct or plan terrorist operations from Jordanian soil will result in the immediate expulsion of PLO leaders. [redacted]

United Security Organization (USO). Controlled by the PLO but staffed primarily with Fatah personnel, the USO appears to be responsible for collecting intelligence in Europe and the Middle East and may be responsible for running the PLO's more "sensitive" operations against anti-Arafat Palestinians. The status and duties of the USO have evolved largely from the influence of its head, senior PLO Fatah official Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad). Abu Iyad's BSO terrorist heritage, a legend that he has neither encouraged nor dispelled, may color some of the information about him and the USO. [redacted]

Abu Iyad's headquarters are in Tunis, but most operational activities appear to be run from the USO office in East Berlin, which was opened in May 1983.

[redacted] that office is responsible for rebuilding an infrastructure to prepare for terrorist activities in Western Europe and to protect Fatah/PLO interests and personnel from hostile terrorist activity mounted by Israel or by radical Palestinian groups supported by Syria. Abu Iyad may have smaller offices in Algeria and Eastern Europe (possibly Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, or Czechoslovakia). [redacted]

[redacted] Abu Iyad has opened a "center" for the USO in Amman where security officials meet to coordinate their work. We have no further information on the plans and activities of the Amman USO office and believe that its purpose is more for prestige than operational use. In early 1982, the USO had a military headquarters in the Beirut area, which we assume closed when Arafat departed Lebanon. [redacted]

[redacted] Arafat transferred some of the duties from Fatah's Central Security Organization to the USO following the assassination of PLO Executive Committee member Fahd Qawasmah the month before by Syrian-sponsored radical Palestinians. The added duties included some operations outside Israel and the Occupied Territories as well as additional security functions in Tunis, Amman, and the Gulf states. Arafat probably intended this shift to unify Fatah's efforts at launching a retaliatory campaign against Damascus, as Abu Iyad is the senior security official for the PLO and Fatah. [redacted]

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As leader of the hardline faction within Fatah, Abu Iyad has often disagreed with Arafat's political strategy, including his ban on international terrorism. Although Abu Iyad supports Arafat's diplomatic efforts, we believe he would be behind any militant push to rescind the ban on international terrorism.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Recently, Force 17 has been linked with attempts against Syrian interests in Western Europe, including an unsuccessful operation in West Berlin last January and another in May in which two Palestinians were arrested in Madrid for planning an attack on the Syrian Ambassador to Spain. Both men arrested in Madrid claimed to be members of Force 17,

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[Redacted] although no conclusive information exists to verify this claim. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Force 17 was responsible for the attack on 25 September in Cyprus in which three Israeli yachtsmen were killed. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Abu Tayyib may be the most prone of Arafat's aides to boasting, but the competition for power and credibility within Fatah probably was a major factor in Abu Tayyib's motives for carrying out the Larnaca attack. [Redacted]

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Outlook

Arafat's security chiefs will press for reprisals against Israel's airstrike on PLO headquarters. Stronger warnings by King Hussein against conducting terrorist operations from Jordan may cause Arafat to urge restraint until Fatah operatives can carry out an operation against Israeli targets that cannot be traced to Fatah operatives in Jordan. [Redacted]

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Force 17. Force 17, headed by Mahmud Ahmad al-Natur (Abu Tayyib), evolved during the mid-1970s into a security organization to protect senior-level PLO and Fatah officials. We judge that over the last few years it has grown into an elite, tightly knit corps that may sometimes act as a strike force against opponents of Arafat and other senior PLO officials. In 1982, Force 17 [Redacted]

[Redacted] We do not believe this group suffered much from Arafat's departure from Lebanon, and the organization may even have grown in the last three years to accommodate its broader operational activities. [Redacted]

Looking ahead, Arafat cannot, and will not, renounce terrorism and still retain leadership over the PLO and the loyalty of Fatah members, his first priority. In our judgment, Fatah operatives would be quite capable of carrying out acts of terrorism against what Fatah considered hostile international interests, including those of the United States. [Redacted]

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Abu Tayyib's new headquarters are in Amman, but only about 30 members reside in Jordan. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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South Korea: Security Preparations for the 1988 Olympics [redacted]

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South Korea is now addressing the special security requirements associated with its role as host of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics. Although it is too early to expect specific threat information, Seoul has already begun to broaden its security focus from primarily intercepting North Korean espionage agents to dealing with attacks by any foreign terrorists intent on disrupting the games.

[redacted]

The National Executive Committee for Antiterrorism, which in effect serves as a working group, is subordinate to this national committee.

[redacted]

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These committees are responsible for police planning and working-level coordination, but the NSP, as the principal civilian intelligence and security organization, retains overall responsibility for antiterrorist activities and for ensuring that other government agencies fulfill their specific counterterrorism responsibilities. To do so, the NSP

[redacted]

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Immediately after Seoul won the competition for the Olympic site, President Chun Doo Hwan established a legal and administrative framework to coordinate security preparations. Early attention has focused on preparing the large and otherwise well-trained police force and Army to deal with terrorist tactics and hostage situations—areas in which Seoul has had limited experience. The current divisions and competition among the security services, however, suggest that bureaucratic wrangling could hamper decisionmaking if a crisis were to arise at the Olympics. So could potential political infighting as the games approach in 1988—a time frame that coincides with Chun’s decision to step down and transfer power to an as yet undetermined successor.

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Counterterrorism Policymaking

South Korea has had 30 years of experience in dealing with the threat posed by North Korean agents and infiltrators, but its officials believe that hosting the 1988 Summer Olympic Games—which probably will attract close to 30,000 participants and over 350,000 visitors—requires a specially focused security effort. To start the process, President Chun Doo Hwan issued Presidential Order No. 47 in early 1982, creating the National Antiterrorism Planning Committee. Chaired by the Prime Minister, the committee meets on an ad hoc basis and includes the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, National Defense, and Transportation, as well as the Director of the National Security Planning Agency (NSP) and the chief of South Korea’s Customs Administration.


Counterterrorist Forces

The primary operational or “on-the-street” responsibility for dealing with security threats rests with the Home Ministry and its associated Korean National Police. The Ministry maintains a team of hostage negotiators and provides command and control for the KNP’s 100-man commando unit. The police commandos form an assault unit to be used only inside South Korea upon the order of the President. The unit is authorized to draw on regular police and combat police forces for additional support.

[redacted]

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Full-size mockup of Boeing 747, Special Warfare Training Center, Maesan-ni, South Korea

modern in the world. There have been reports that the facility will serve as the security operations center for the Olympics, despite its distance from Seoul. [redacted]

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Seoul continues to seek foreign help to improve its counterterrorist skills. [redacted]

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[redacted] early this year that West Germany's elite commando unit was to train six South Korean counterterrorist commandos for a two-month period this summer. We do not know whether this training actually occurred. [redacted]

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The second operational arm of the government is the Special Warfare Command (SWC) under the Ministry of National Defense. It is responsible for responding to terrorist incidents overseas—these troops so far have not been actually deployed abroad—and for retaliating against North Korean attacks. The Defense Ministry has formed a Counterterrorist Commando Group within the SWC's seven 1,800-man commando brigades. The Counterterrorist Group is composed of 140 men and can be augmented as needed by men from the SWC 1st and 5th Brigades. [redacted]

The military and police counterterrorist commandos are proficient in traditional martial arts and have received airborne, ranger, sniper, demolitions, and specialized assault training. Most KNP commandos have been recruited from military explosive ordnance disposal and special forces units and trained at the Special Warfare Training Center near Yongin, about 25 miles south of Seoul. The center also has facilities for teaching various types of airborne operations. [redacted]

In 1983 South Korea began adding counterterrorist facilities to the center, including mockups of buildings, aircraft, and vehicles. [redacted] its equipment is among the most

Security Organizations

In addition to these specialized units, Seoul has other longstanding organizations that will also play roles in Olympic security. These include:

- The Presidential Security Force (PSF), which protects President Chun, his family, and his residence, the Blue House. It could be used to provide VIP protection and might be augmented by police commando units.
- The Defense Security Command (DSC), which is under the nominal control of the Defense Ministry, reports directly to President Chun. It watches senior military leaders, monitors student dissidents, and keeps track of other persons who might threaten the South Korean Government. [redacted]

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Protection against seaborne infiltration and entries through airports are the responsibilities of other units. Presidential Order No. 47 charges the Port and Harbor Security Measures Working-Level Consultative Council with providing protection against surreptitious infiltration into the country. Chaired by the chief of the NSP Airport Office, the council is composed of midlevel officers from the

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Train cars, bus, and part of obstacle course used in counterterrorist commando training, Special Warfare Training Center, Maesan-ni, South Korea [redacted]

security crises involving foreigners that could arise during the games. Seoul, therefore, is focusing both on increased training for the safe rescue of hostages and on the formation of a national-level negotiation advisory team. The team—composed of scholars and officials specializing in psychology, sociology, law, criminology, and security—is supposed to meet at least twice a year to advise the government on nonviolent means of resolving terrorist incidents. [redacted]

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Finally, President Chun has ordered the formation of a special security unit for the protection of athletes staying at the Chamsil Olympic Village. Because Chun regards the regular police force as already overburdened, this unit reportedly will be separate from the KNP. The size of this force has yet to be determined. [redacted]

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Ministries of Home Affairs, Justice, Transportation, National Defense, and Finance (Customs Administration). Immigration officials of the Justice Ministry are responsible for detecting terrorists who may attempt to enter as legal travelers via ports and airports, while the military and police are charged with preventing clandestine infiltration, principally by sea. The Customs Administration is tasked with intercepting equipment that could be used by terrorists. Protection of government buildings falls to the Home Ministry, which can draw on police manpower and expertise. [redacted]

The KNP is responsible for civil security. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Recent press reports indicate that the 120,000-strong regular police force will grow by 16,000 next year—well above the usual annual growth of about 1,000 men per year. The KNP is also scheduled to become independent of the Home Ministry and to be charged with conducting investigations independently rather than under the guidance of the Office of the Prosecutor. [redacted]

The South Koreans' experience has been limited largely to dealing with North Korean infiltrators; it has not included hostage situations or the type of

Threat From the North

South Korea's priority, even in preparations for Olympic security, remains the elimination of the threat from North Korean infiltrators. The primary threat comes from agents who might enter the country and who are charged to carry out a specific terrorist act. Fortunately, the South Korean security services have long experience in dealing with North Korean-sponsored agents and infiltrators. Sea infiltration is now the major means by which North Korea inserts operatives into the South. [redacted]

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[redacted] Despite heavy patrolling, the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea is also vulnerable to infiltration. The 240-kilometer chain link fence that runs the length of the DMZ is checked daily for tampering, and surveillance radars are in place at a number of locations. We suspect that most infiltrators by land are caught soon after crossing the DMZ or shortly thereafter—although a few do manage to penetrate more deeply. [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Seoul not only capitalizes on the average South Korean's strong anti-Communism but also advertises the methods used by spies and saboteurs, gives rewards for information leading to the arrest of agents, and harshly punishes anyone who harbors infiltrators. Moreover, since many assumed agents are native-born South Koreans or have been in place for some years, we doubt that North Korea could count on them to carry out anything more than token disruptive activities. [redacted]

Coordination or Confusion? To date, the largest security effort undertaken by the South Koreans under the system created by Presidential Order No. 47 was for Pope John Paul II's visit in April 1984. The NSP conducted a major effort that involved all the security organizations, as well as regular military units. The SWC deployed units at the airport and provided security during the visit to the National Cemetery. Regular military forces, meanwhile, substituted for regular police forces, who were brought in from outlying areas to enhance security in Seoul. Although there were no reported problems in this effort, difficulties were evident in the coordination of both President Chun's trip to Japan in September 1984 and the return of Kim Dae Jung to Korea in February 1985. Events at Kim Dae Jung's homecoming, in particular, point to some of the major challenges Seoul must tackle. [redacted]

Three issues, in our view, are especially important. First, the South Koreans are conditioned to react to security incidents with a rapid military or paramilitary response. This predisposition makes the escalation to tougher steps attractive and easy when an incident unfolds unexpectedly, such as when Kim Dae Jung did not follow the prearranged scenario for his deplaning at Kimp'o Airport. That incident also seemed to reveal the typical South Korean perspective that regards a tough government posture as an implicit affirmation of control over political and security developments. In the Kim case, as well as the more recent USIS sit-in, Seoul clearly regarded US calls for restraint as threats to its image as a government in control. [redacted]

Second, concerns about international reaction, which further complicated the treatment of Kim, will come into play in any incident associated with the Asian Games or the Olympics that involves non-Korean victims or perpetrators. South Korean security services do not normally accord high priority to Foreign Ministry interests, either in bureaucratic forums or during security incidents. To operate effectively in the environment surrounding the international games, the security services will have to exercise patience, diplomacy, and restraint, controlling their instincts to deal with problems in the most expeditious way possible. [redacted]

Finally, the successful handling of any security incident will require improvements in coordination and cooperation among the many bureaucracies involved, a challenge that goes beyond the mere establishment of a complex management superstructure. Responsibility for handling Kim Dae Jung at the airport was split between the two vice directors of the NSP [redacted] [redacted]. President Chun has since explicitly charged NSP Director Chang Se Dong with responsibility for security concerns associated with the Asian Games and the Olympics. Director Chang already appears to be consolidating responsibility for Asian Games security within the NSP's First Bureau. [redacted]

The Political Imponderables

South Korea's domestic political situation probably will affect security provisions for the Olympics. President Chun has pledged to step down when his term expires in 1988, and pressures are building for him to begin taking positive steps toward political modernization. [redacted]

If Chun attempts to prolong his term of office or otherwise disappoints public expectations, the security services could well become preoccupied with the resultant fallout and the probable widespread domestic dissent. At the very least, in a confused domestic situation, coordination among the services

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would deteriorate as each attempted to influence events. Interservice rivalries could intensify if the military felt forced to take a hand in the succession by backing one of the candidates. Even if the transfer of power is smooth, we see some complications for Olympic security. At the very least, South Korea's new leader would probably name new men to key positions in the security services.

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The Terrorism Diary for December

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Below is a compendium of December dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.

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<i>1 December 1640</i>	<i>Portugal.</i> Independence Day.
<i>1 December 1918</i>	<i>Iceland.</i> Independence Day.
<i>1 December 1918</i>	<i>Yugoslavia.</i> First independent state constituted.
<i>1 December 1942</i>	<i>Thailand.</i> Founding of Thai Communist Party.
<i>2 December 1971</i>	<i>United Arab Emirates.</i> Abu Dhabi National Day (federation of independent emirates took effect).
<i>2 December 1975</i>	<i>Laos.</i> National Day (proclamation of the republic).
<i>2 December 1980</i>	<i>El Salvador.</i> Murder of four American nuns by government troops.
<i>3 December 1934</i>	<i>Peru.</i> Birthday of Sendero Luminoso leader Abimail Guzman.
<i>4 December 1892</i>	<i>Spain.</i> Generalissimo Francisco Franco's birthday.
<i>5 December 1982</i>	<i>Spain.</i> Death of GRAPO leader Martin Luna.
<i>7 December 1920</i>	<i>Burma.</i> National Day (commemorates student uprising against British rule).
<i>7 December 1960</i>	<i>Ivory Coast.</i> Independence Day.
<i>8 December 1974</i>	<i>Greece.</i> Declaration of parliamentary republic.
<i>8 December 1982</i>	<i>Suriname.</i> Execution of 15 opposition leaders.
<i>9 December 1961</i>	<i>Tanzania.</i> Independence Day.
<i>9 December 1962</i>	<i>Tanzania.</i> Republic Day.
<i>10 December 1956</i>	<i>Angola.</i> Founding of Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
<i>10 December 1966</i>	<i>Middle East.</i> Founding of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

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11 December 1958 **Burkina.** Republic Day.

12 December 1963 **Kenya.** Independence Day.

12 December 1964 **Kenya.** Republic Day.

12 December 1979 **Europe.** NATO decision to modernize nuclear forces by installing Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

12 December 1983 **Kuwait.** Bombing of US Embassy, other facilities by members of Iraqi Dawa Party.

13 December 1974 **Malta.** Republic Day.

16 December 1961 **Bahrain.** Accession of Shaykh Isa Bin Salman al-Kalifah.

16 December 1961 **South Africa.** Founding of military arm of African National Congress (ANC), Umkonto we Sizwe.

16 December 1971 **Bahrain.** Independence Day.

16 December 1971 **Bangladesh.** Victory Day (de facto independence).

16 December 1972 **Bangladesh.** Republican constitution becomes effective.

17 December 1907 **Bhutan.** National Day.

18 December 1958 **Niger.** Republic Day.

21 December 1923 **Nepal.** Independence Day.

21 December 1948 **Ireland.** Proclamation of republic.

21 December 1967 **Palestinians.** Founding of Palestine Liberation Organization.

23 December 1956 **Egypt.** Victory Day (Port Said and Suez).

24 December 1951 **Libya.** Independence Day.

25 December 1876 **Pakistan.** Quaid-i-Azam's birthday.

25 December 1979 **Afghanistan.** Beginning of occupation by Soviet troops.

25 December 1985 **Christian world.** Christmas.

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- 26 December 1893** **China.** Mao Zedong's birthday.
- 27 December 1949** **Indonesia.** Transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands.
- 28 December 1985** **Latin America.** Equivalent of US "April Fools' Day"—traditionally sees many hoaxes and bomb threats.
- 30 December 1896** **Philippines.** Execution of national hero Jose Rizal.
- 31 December 1968** **Philippines.** Founding of Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist.
- 31 December 1983** **Nigeria.** Coup overthrowing Shagari regime.



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Chronology of Terrorism—1985

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

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11 September

Sri Lanka: Bomb destroys offices of assistant government agent in northern town. Later the same day, unidentified persons set fire to other buildings in the same complex. No group has claimed credit, but Tamil separatist guerrillas are the most likely culprits.

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14 September

Saudi Arabia: Truck attempts to crash into industrial pipeline in Jubail. The truck stopped short of its target and authorities arrested four Lebanese Shia and the Filipino driver.

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24 September

Japan: Homemade rockets fired at Narita Airport. Four of the five truck-mounted projectiles were launched successfully, but caused no injuries or damage. An anonymous caller later claimed credit in the name of the Revolutionary Workers Party Hazama Faction, but truck mounted flame and rocket launchers have been the trademarks of another group, Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction).

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25 September

Italy: Bomb explodes in British Airways office in Rome, injuring 15 persons. An Arab arrested fleeing the scene later claimed to be a member of the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims. He has been identified as the man who threw a grenade at the Jordanian airline office in Athens last March.

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Late September

West Bank: Israeli authorities arrest eight members of Fatah terrorist cell in Bethlehem area. The group reportedly was responsible for two previous West Bank attacks.

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26 September

West Bank: Seven passengers wounded in attack on Israeli bus entering Halhul. Shortly afterward, several hundred settlers from nearby Kiryat Arba entered Halhul and reportedly set fire to two Arab houses and smashed car windows. Both Fatah Force 17 and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the ambush.

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West Bank: Bomb explodes at Hadassah Hospital bus stop, wounding two people. No group has claimed responsibility.

25X1

New Caledonia: Three bombs demolish top floor of government building after political rally. No casualties were reported. The Radical Front of National Liberation of Kanaky, a splinter faction of the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, claimed responsibility for the attack.

25X1

27 September

Gaza Strip: Israeli security forces raid two Palestinian terrorist cells. Both groups—one based near Khan Yunis, the other in the Jabaliyeh refugee camp—reportedly have mounted attacks on Israeli targets.

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West Bank: Remote control bomb explodes on road from Jerusalem to Maaleh Adumin settlement. No casualties or claims of responsibility have been reported.

25X1

Pakistan: Unidentified gunmen in Karachi shoot prominent tribal chieftain of Iranian Buluchistan. The victim, who had been a member of the Iranian Parliament under the Shah, had maintained active contact with Iranian exile groups and provided some funds to anti-Khomeini elements in Iranian Buluchistan. No group has claimed credit for the murder.

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28 September

West Bank: Thirteen-year-old Arab boy killed by grenade thrown at Israeli soldiers near Hebron. A number of local residents were also wounded; no group has claimed credit.

25X1

India: Punjab police in Gurdaspur find five unexploded bombs. The bombs—four small explosive devices resembling pens and one a transistor radio—were planted in lunch boxes, probably by Sikh terrorists seeking to intimidate voters in the 25 September state elections.

25X1

29 September

Israel: Seven persons reportedly injured in Haifa market explosion. A second explosion minutes later caused no injuries. The General Command of the Palestinian Revolution Forces claimed responsibility for both attacks.

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- 30 September** **Netherlands: Small bomb damages El Al office in Amsterdam.** The Fatah Revolutionary Council—one of several cover names for the Abu Nidal Group—claimed responsibility. 25X1
- 5 October**
- Gaza Strip: Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command claims attack on Israeli vehicle near Al-Shati camp.** The Voice of Palestine radio reported two of the occupants were wounded in the grenade and incendiary attack. 25X1
- West Bank: Israeli citizen found shot through head near Kibbutz Sarid.** His murder may be part of a string of killings by young Palestinians over the last few months; no group has claimed responsibility. 25X1
- West Bank: Small bomb explodes near snackbar outside Civilian Administration headquarters in Beit Al.** The explosion caused some damage but no casualties. 25X1
- 6 October**
- West Bank: Three Israelis killed in machinegun and grenade attack south of Nazareth.** The General Command of the Palestinian Revolution Forces claimed responsibility in a PLO radiobroadcast. 25X1
- West Bank: Police robot defuses bomb at Jaffa Gate bus station.** No group claimed responsibility. 25X1
- 7 October**
- West Bank: At least 10 persons injured in Jerusalem building explosion.** Several groups, including Abu Nidal, claimed responsibility for the blast, but authorities have so far claimed it was due to a gas leak. 25X1
- 8 October**
- West Bank: Bomb explodes in restaurant close to Israeli Military Headquarters in Ramallah.** No one was injured and no group claimed responsibility. 25X1
- 9 October**
- Spain: Two Israeli merchant seamen missing since 6 October found murdered in Barcelona.** Fatah's Force 17 reportedly claimed responsibility. 25X1
- 11 October**
- United Kingdom: Police arrest 15 Sikhs and Kashmiris in Leicester.** Four were later charged with conspiracy to assassinate Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during a state visit to the United Kingdom. 25X1

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- 14 October** **West Germany: Bombs damage Daimler-Benz auto showroom, high-tension electrical tower in Schwabisch-Gmuend.** Extensive damage was reported, but no injuries. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility for both bombings in the name of the Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin Fighting Unit. [] 25X1
- Greece: Three bombs at Athens branches of National Bank claimed by Kristos Kasimis Revolutionary Group.** One bomb exploded, a second was detonated by police in a bomb disposal vehicle, and the third was defused. No casualties were reported. [] 25X1
- 15 October** **Italy: Two Arabs carrying identical suitcases containing plastic explosives arrested at Rome airport.** One of the Arabs told police he planned to attack an unknown American target. A third Arab—suspected of being an accomplice—was arrested a day later and claimed to be a lieutenant colonel in the PLO. [] 25X1
- 16 October** **Greece: Arsonists damage two American-owned automobiles near Hellenikon Air Base in Athens.** The arson attack was claimed by the previously unknown group “Wild Geese of the Cities.” [] 25X1
- Ecuador: Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC) members occupy Mexican Embassy in Quito.** Five young terrorists used the Embassy’s telex to send a communique to two Quito newspapers and a Spanish wire service in which they condemned Ecuador’s break in diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. The AVC also occupied two local radio stations in Quito on the same day. There were no injuries in any of the incidents. [] 25X1
- India: Sikh gunmen kill prominent leader of Punjab branch of Prime Minister Gandhi’s Congress (I) Party.** This was the first such assassination since the 25 September election in the state. [] 25X1
- 18 October** [] 25X6
- 19 October** **Luxembourg: Explosive charge detonates outside Palace of Justice in city center.** The explosion caused extensive damage, but no injuries. No one claimed responsibility. [] 25X1

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19-20 October

Spain: Police arrest nine suspected members of ETA/M in northern Spain and Morocco. An unspecified quantity of arms and explosives were also reported seized.

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20 October

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Israel: Small bomb explodes behind suburban Tel Aviv billboard, slightly injuring one person. No group claimed responsibility.

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Israel: Bomb explodes at entrance to outdoor market in Beersheba. No casualties or damage was reported and no group claimed credit.

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Argentina: Bomb thrown at home of army deputy chief of staff in Buenos Aires. Some damage resulted, but there were no casualties.

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21 October

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Gaza Strip: Bomb explodes outside Gaza Prison shortly before visit by Israeli Public Security Minister. There were no casualties or damage, and no group claimed responsibility.

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Chile: Bombing of police station in Santiago causes minor damage. No group claimed responsibility.

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