



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

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# **Terrorism Review**



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**18 November 1985**

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18 November 1985*

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**Terrorism Review** [Redacted]

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*Terrorism and Narcotics Analysis Division, DI/OGI*

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**Terrorism Review**

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18 November 1985

Focus

**The Duarte Kidnaping: The Political Impact of Terrorism**

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The September kidnaping of the daughter of El Salvador's President by elements of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was one of the bolder acts of terrorism in 1985, and, despite her release in late October, may carry long-term implications for the Salvadoran regime. Events thus far demonstrate how a terrorist act and its aftermath can seriously affect the politics of a nation.

[Redacted]

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**Fallout**

President Duarte has been hurt politically by his handling of the negotiations to secure his daughter's release and will feel compelled to retake the political initiative quickly and to demonstrate that his government still holds the military advantage against the rebels. Insurgent leaders are likely to try to build on what they see as recent successes by launching dramatic terrorist attacks. Duarte hopes the United States will provide not only increased economic and military assistance but also ringing endorsements of him and his government.

[Redacted]

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Although Duarte won credit for striking a deal that included the release of the hostage mayors as well as his daughter, he also was criticized for being too involved in the negotiations, too willing to sacrifice the national interest for personal reasons, and for setting a precedent that may encourage further kidnapings. Condemnation has been particularly strong from the rightwing parties and press

[Redacted]

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**Challenges for Duarte**

The damage the kidnaping did to Duarte's standing as a political leader and the general impression that the rebels have stymied government military operations will be most troubling to Duarte in the near term.

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[Redacted] the kidnaping brought the government to a near standstill and deflected attention from other pressing problems, including the economy.

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Duarte will have to mend his relations with the military. Although senior officers reportedly have been able to mollify much of the military, dissatisfaction is still said to be running high.

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[Redacted]

The kidnaping on 26 October of a senior Air Force officer who formerly headed the presidential staff can only intensify military frustration and increase demands for a strong military response. At the same time, the military will be watching to see whether Duarte gives as much attention to this case as he did his daughter's.

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**Insurgent Perspective**

The kidnaping and its aftermath have had some adverse effects for the insurgents, but, on balance, they likely see recent events as strengthening their prospects. The kidnaping highlighted the government's vulnerability, renewed attention to El Salvador's checkered human rights record, created conflict between Duarte and the military, and reinforced the rebels' claims that they are still a force to be reckoned with. [redacted]

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On the negative side, the kidnaping brought the insurgents adverse international publicity, and reportedly also caused internal dissension between the political and military wings of the rebel alliance. In particular, it appears to have sharpened the debate over tactics between the political and military factions and confirmed the dominant role now played by the military faction. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

Duarte probably will continue to express willingness to resume the dialogue with the rebels, but, for the immediate future, he will be more concerned with proving that he is in charge politically and ready to strike hard at them. [redacted]

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[redacted] As in the past, economic concerns will take a backseat to more urgent military and political priorities. [redacted]

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The insurgents' increased visibility aside, they still do not have the ability to sustain a prolonged military campaign. Nevertheless, the rebels are buoyed by what they see as recent successes, and they almost certainly will continue their hit-and-run attacks in the countryside and stage more frequent terrorist attacks in the cities. From their viewpoint, keeping their cause in the public eye probably outweighs international criticism of their tactics. The insurgents already have declared their intention to strike at US personnel, particularly military and intelligence officers, and are likely to accelerate such planning. [redacted]

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### Highlights

#### Key Indicators

##### Spain

##### Iranian Presence May Pose Threat to US Interests

The recent opening of an unofficial office in Barcelona by Iran poses a potential threat to US interests in Spain. Spanish authorities closed a previous unofficial Iranian office in July 1984 after they obtained evidence that the Iranians planned to hijack a Saudi airliner. The Iranians also were charged at that time with illegal possession of arms and explosives. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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##### Lebanon

##### Soviet Hostages Released

Three Soviet Embassy personnel who had been kidnaped on 30 September were released in Beirut on 30 October. The body of a fourth hostage who was shot to death had been found on 2 October. Their release may have been due to a concerted effort by Syria, Iran, the Druze, Amal, and Lebanese leftist militias to find them. [redacted]

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##### Sudan

##### Increased Libyan Subversion May Include Terrorism

Large numbers of Libyans—including high-level officials with known ties to terrorism—continue to pour into Sudan. Weapons smuggling—probably to supply the Libyan-backed Sudanese Revolutionary Committees—continues via aid

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convoys and shipments of agricultural equipment and books. Revolutionary Committee-instigated demonstrations do occur at the US and Egyptian Embassies

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[redacted] the Libyans are gearing up to target one of several US facilities, including the Embassy, Ambassador's residence, and Marine house. Libya has refrained from engaging in terrorism in Sudan to date for fear of risking its substantial gains in relations with Sudan. Qadhafi will be tempted, however, to take advantage of anti-US sentiment generated by publicity surrounding the US role in the evacuation of Falasha Jews. The Israeli raid on Tunis and the US interception of an Egyptian plane carrying Palestinian terrorists responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking have also added to the anti-US feeling in the region.

[redacted]

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**Significant Developments**

**Canada**

**Sikhs Arrested in Air India Case**

In the first break in the investigation into the Air India jetliner crash last June that claimed 329 lives, a fundamentalist Sikh separatist leader and another Sikh have been charged with firearms and explosives offenses. The two men were arrested after Canadian police searched a temple and several Sikh homes for evidence. The latest results of recovery operations off the coast of Ireland point to an onboard explosion. There also are reports that physical evidence has been recovered, linking the Air India crash with a bomb explosion at Tokyo's Narita Airport the same night.

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**Belgium**

**New CCC Campaign Shows Disdain for Casualties**

On 4-5 November the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) carried out four attacks in which—for the first time—they fired an automatic weapon at an individual and placed bombs in occupied buildings during daylight hours. Among the group's targets was an American bank, its first US target since January.

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In the first incident, the group placed a car bomb outside the offices of a Brussels bank. A loudspeaker on the vehicle carrying the bomb broadcast warnings to people to leave the area and announced that the CCC was responsible for the attack. When a security vehicle happened on the scene, the terrorists sprayed it with automatic weapons fire, slightly wounding a guard. CCC members previously had never used firearms during their attacks; this incident indicates that they will resort to lethal means to avoid capture. [redacted]

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In the second and fourth incidents, unidentified persons entered banks in Charleroi and Louvain during business hours, chained suitcase bombs to parts of the buildings, and left CCC leaflets warning that the devices would explode in 30 minutes. The buildings were evacuated, and there were no injuries, although damage was extensive in both incidents. The placing of bombs in occupied buildings—carrying, like the firing of automatic weapons to cover an escape, the attendant risk of causing casualties—is a new tactic for the group, and suggests it is growing bolder in carrying out its operations. [redacted]

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In the third incident, the CCC also detonated a suitcase bomb in front of the Charleroi office of the Manufacturers Hanover Bank, causing major damage, but no casualties. The group had proclaimed a “Karl Marx anticapitalist campaign” in October. Its communique claimed these four banks were chosen as symbols of capitalism. We suspect other US businesses in Belgium will be targeted as this phase of the CCC campaign continues. [redacted]

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**France**

**Key Action Directe Member Arrested**

On 20 October, Paris police dealt another setback to the leftwing terrorist group Action Directe (AD) with the arrest of Meyer Azeroual, formerly the group’s “chief financier.” Azeroual had been sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for a bank holdup in Paris on 30 May 1980. For the past five years, he lived in South America, Nicaragua, and in the French provinces. Press reports indicate that, at the time of his arrest, he told police that he was a “salaried member” of Action Directe. He also said he had returned to Paris to reconstruct the AD network in the capital. His apparently voluntary and candid admission of his AD connection and his purpose in Paris surprised the police and could indicate internal problems within the group. [redacted]

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**Spain**

**Links Between Basque and French Terrorists**

New information suggests that ties between the French terrorist group Action Directe and the Spanish Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) may have been recently enhanced. [redacted]

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French group is believed to have supplied ETA with weapons and explosives in the past. [redacted]

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ETA long has claimed to have contacts with every major terrorist group in the world, but its separatist "raison d'etre" has seemed to preclude long-term alignments with Europe's more radical leftist groups. Action Directe, on the other hand, in addition to its ties to ETA, probably has links to the Red Army Faction of West Germany and to both the Prima Linea and Red Brigades of Italy. [redacted]

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**PFLP-SC Responsible for Restaurant Bombing**

[redacted] the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC)—and not a Spanish group as previously suspected—was responsible for the bombing of the El Descanso Restaurant in Torrejon on 12 April 1985. The explosion destroyed the restaurant and killed 18 Spaniards and wounded 82 persons, including 15 Americans. The PFLP-SC allegedly selected the restaurant because it is frequented by large numbers of US servicemen from nearby Torrejon Air Force Base. The PFLP-SC's responsibility for the El Descanso bombing underscores the growing threat from Middle Eastern terrorist groups operating in Europe. [redacted]

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The bombing was originally claimed by several terrorist groups, including the Spanish Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the leftist First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), the Islamic Jihad Organization, and the Armed Organization of the Jewish People. GRAPO, long known for its anti-NATO stance, was originally believed responsible because both the explosives used and the style of the attack resembled other GRAPO operations. [redacted]

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[redacted] GRAPO was severely weakened by a massive police sweep in January and that the group probably could not have carried out the April attack. Moreover, the low level of GRAPO activity during the rest of 1985 argues against its being the culprit in the restaurant bombing. [redacted]

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
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**French Caribbean**

**Terrorists Announce Six-Month Truce**

The Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC)—a leftwing separatist group responsible for many bombings in Guadeloupe since 1983—has decided to halt its terrorist activities for the present. Its announcement follows statements made by the generally nonviolent separatist Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG) that it is willing to begin a dialogue with the French Government. The US Consulate reports that the UPLG is concerned about the effects of continued violence on the island's precarious economic situation. It is also possible that the ARC's truce is a tactical move designed to relieve police pressure and allow it time to regroup and reorganize. [Redacted]

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**El Salvador**

**Guerrillas Kidnap Senior Military Officer**

On 26 October, a group of armed men abducted Col. Omar Napoleon Avalos, Civil Aeronautics director and former chief of the presidential staff, from his family's farm about 200 miles east of San Salvador. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] The abductors probably will seek to exchange Avalos for imprisoned comrades. The military, which supported President Duarte during the kidnaping of his daughter, may be reluctant to support negotiations with the rebels and instead seek military action, especially if kidnapings of high-ranking officials continue. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**Argentina**

**Bombings Continue Despite Detentions**

In response to a recent series of bombings, President Alfonsin on 22 October ordered the detention of 12 suspects, including five civilians, an Army cadet, and six active or retired members of the military. Their jailing, however, did not stop the bombings—six more exploded over the next nine days. The bombing campaign so far has targeted military installations, government officials and buildings, schools, and private property.

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**Chile**

**Increased Terrorist Activity**

Leftist terrorism has increased markedly in recent weeks and could signal a change in leftist tactics. Since mid-October, more than 60 bombings were reported and at least 15 buses were attacked throughout the country. In addition, at least 10

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civilians and five police officers were wounded in four separate attacks on police headquarters or buses. Some of the more significant incidents include:

- *23 October.* A bomb exploded outside the Chilean-American Binational Center in Concepcion, causing extensive damage and seriously injuring a young girl. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claimed responsibility. This marked the ninth bombing of various Binational Centers during the preceding 20 months.
- *23 October.* A device exploded outside the Morgan Bank in Concepcion, causing extensive damage. The FPMR probably was responsible.
- *2 November.* Unidentified terrorists destroyed a bridge on the Pan American Highway 200 miles south of Santiago and damaged a railroad bridge in the same area.
- *2 November.* In Vina del Mar, an incendiary device exploded in a supermarket, killing five persons and destroying a large portion of the building. A second supermarket in Vina del Mar was damaged by an incendiary bomb and the main train station was heavily damaged by a bomb.
- *5-6 November.* Antiregime protests were marked by scattered clashes with security forces, gunfire exchanges, transportation disruptions, and numerous terrorist bombings, leaving more than 30 people injured and about 400 arrested.

[redacted]

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Many of these incidents probably were related to the antigovernment protests in November over the continued imprisonment of six leftist labor leaders for demonstrations held in early September and general public dissatisfaction with the Pinochet regime. These recent incidents have gone beyond the earlier terrorist attacks, which were primarily intended to intimidate and harass. The new attacks, some of which occurred in middle-class areas and were indiscriminate in their targeting, represent a new phase in the violence. [redacted]

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**Zimbabwe**

**Burgeoning Violence in Mataberland**

The recent murder of a white farm couple by rebels is the first killing of whites in that country since May 1984, but is only the latest in a surge of killings that have plagued Zimbabwe recently. The increased violence may be due partly to the redeployment of some 9,000 soldiers to Mozambique—thus thinning local security—or to a reported increase in recruiting by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the major rebel group. [redacted]

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**Lebanon's Hizballah:  
Internal Dynamics and  
Foreign Support**

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Lebanese fundamentalist Shia groups, known collectively as the Hizballah (Party of God) movement, comprise probably the most serious terrorist threat to US interests today. With extensive support from Iran, the movement has grown over the past two years from a handful of small, disparate groups into a large, sophisticated, and increasingly well-organized network.<sup>1</sup> These groups are composed of fanatic, fundamentalist Shias who are determined to eliminate all Western, especially US, presence from Lebanon as the first step to establishing an Islamic republic there. Hizballah militants, often operating under the covername "Islamic Jihad,"<sup>2</sup> have conducted more than 20 significant international terrorist attacks over the past three years, 14 of which have been against the United States.<sup>3</sup> [Redacted]

Hizballah terrorists will continue to pose a much greater threat to US interests inside Lebanon. They are effective at carrying out destructive terrorist attacks in Lebanon largely because they have a well-developed support network in their native country. Most Hizballah recruits are poor, uneducated youths with little or no experience outside Lebanon. Unlike many leftwing Palestinian terrorists, they generally do not speak foreign languages and cannot easily blend into the population of a European capital. [Redacted]

<sup>1</sup> The Hizballah movement is now an important faction in Lebanon's political scene. As the movement has grown in popularity, it has developed an overt apparatus consisting of political, religious, and social welfare offices and a conventional militia. While terrorist elements are often intermingled with the overt units of the movement, this article will focus strictly on the apparatus of the paramilitary apparatus that provides a support structure for those elements involved in terrorism. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that every caller claiming to represent Islamic Jihad does not necessarily represent the Lebanese Hizballah. The covername has been used by other Iranian-backed terrorists to claim responsibility for attacks in which the Hizballah was not involved. In addition, an increasing number of anonymous callers have made bogus claims in the name of Islamic Jihad. [Redacted]

<sup>3</sup> For the purposes of this article, major bombings, hijackings, assassinations, or prolonged kidnappings are considered "significant" terrorist attacks. [Redacted]

As US security precautions are strengthened in Lebanon, however, we believe Hizballah terrorists will pose an increasing threat to US interests elsewhere, particularly in Europe. The Hizballah attempted to blow up the US Embassy in Rome in 1985 and became involved in the TWA hijacking from Athens to Beirut. We believe it is determined to attempt further such attacks and that the group's capabilities almost certainly will improve over time as the organization grows and trains more sophisticated fighters. [Redacted]

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Moreover, the radical Shias may turn to experienced radical Palestinian factions for support in operations in Western Europe. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Origins**

After decades of political passivity, Lebanese Shias are now responsive to extremist ideologies. Shias today comprise the largest religious community in Lebanon—making up over 40 percent of the country's population—but they feel they do not exercise a commensurate share of political and economic influence. The National Pact of 1943—based on the last legal census taken in Lebanon—distributes the major positions in government to Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. Many Shias continue to live in poverty while their Christian and Sunni neighbors prosper. [Redacted]

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Three events have served as important catalysts in finally radicalizing the Shia population in Lebanon:

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
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### Shia Distribution in Lebanon



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- The rise to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s of the Imam Musa Sadr, an Iranian-born cleric, changed the outlook of many Shias. The charismatic Musa Sadr demanded economic and political reforms to aid the Shia, and he founded a political and paramilitary organization—the Amal militia—to motivate the traditionally passive Shias.
- The Iranian Revolution provided a model and a well-formulated extremist ideology for Shia fundamentalist activism. The Ayatollah Khomeini has become a strong leadership figure whom the Shias idolize.
- The prolonged Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon radicalized many formerly passive Shias and increased popular discontent by demonstrating the inability of the central government in Beirut to defend Shia interests.

In the summer of 1982, Husayn Musawi, a prominent fundamentalist Shia, withdrew from the mainline Amal movement when it refused initially to combat the Israeli occupation forces. Musawi then formed the extremist Islamic Amal group in the Bekaa Valley town of Ba'labakk, laying the foundation for the Hizballah movement.

#### **Hizballah Ideology**

Generally speaking, the Hizballah movement espouses a pro-Iranian, fundamentalist Shia ideology. Members of the group revere the Ayatollah Khomeini and adhere to his view of the world. As such, the group has a visceral hatred for the United States, Israel, and France, believing they are the principal oppressors of the Muslim world.

The Hizballah movement is dedicated to bringing about an Islamic revolution in Lebanon and establishing a fundamentalist Shia regime there. Its adherents believe that the elimination of all Western—especially US—and Israeli influence from Lebanon is the first step toward this goal. The fundamentalists see themselves as true believers engaged in a jihad (holy war) to force all Americans, Europeans, and Israelis out of Lebanon. They believe terrorism is the most expedient means of achieving their goals, and they justify the taking of lives and hostages as part of the struggle against the infidels.



*The car bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 marked the beginning of the Hizballah terrorist campaign against US targets.*

Hizballah elements also target US personnel and facilities as a means of indirectly challenging the other factional militias and the Lebanese Government. Successful terrorist attacks enhance local perceptions of the Hizballah's strength and demonstrate its ability to operate with impunity even in areas under the nominal control of other groups. Probably the best example of this was the bombing on 20 September 1984 of the US Embassy Annex, which is located in a suburb of East Beirut controlled by Lebanese Christian forces.

The Hizballah movement presents an increasing threat to Israel as well. Over the past two years, radical Shias have conducted many attacks in southern Lebanon against Israeli military elements or their Lebanese allies, and the Hizballah is increasing its presence in that region. Even if all Israeli troops withdraw from the "security zone," however, the Hizballah is unlikely to end its attacks against Israel. Adherents of the group believe they must "liberate Jerusalem" and return "occupied Palestine" to Muslim control. Hizballah militants consider themselves Islamic warriors who are involved in a long-term struggle against Israel itself. They believe Lebanon's proximity to Israel places them in a unique position to lead the Muslim struggle against Zionism.

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
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The destroyed US Marine headquarters at Beirut airport, in which 241 died—Hizballah's most successful terrorist operation.



Islamic Amal leader Husayn Musawi surrounded by bodyguards at his headquarters in the Bekaa Valley.

Hizballah poses a greater terrorist threat, and its attacks are often more destructive than those of other terrorist groups, because some Hizballah recruits are willing to die in their operations. Martyrdom and self-sacrifice are essential elements of fundamentalist Shia ideology, and it is this fanatic devotion to the cause that distinguishes Hizballah from most other terrorist groups. Shia suicide terrorists are indoctrinated to believe that dying in the name of Islam will guarantee them a place in paradise.

#### The Hizballah Network

Radical Shia leaders since 1982 have transformed this collection of rival factions into a highly structured, cooperative network. The original component groups of the Hizballah maintain close contact with each other and increasingly operate as one organization. The groups comprising the network include:

- *Islamic Amal.* Still led by Husayn Musawi, the original radical Shia organization is now probably the largest group in the Hizballah network. Its membership may total 1,000 to 1,400, but the number of active, full-time members probably is somewhat less at any given time. Islamic Amal quarters and trains its members at several different locations in the Bekaa Valley.

- *Husayni Suicide Forces.* Another member of the Musawi family—Abd al-Illah Musawi (also known as Abu Haydar)—leads this loosely organized subgroup of Islamic Amal. Based in southern Beirut, the Husayni Suicide Forces probably does not function as a permanent organization but consists of individuals recruited for specific operations. The group's membership fluctuates but probably does not exceed 100 at any given time.

- *Muslim Students Union.* Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah controls this overt group based in southern Beirut. We believe it serves as a front organization for the Lebanese branch of the clandestine Da'wa (Islamic Call) Party, which has produced many Hizballah leaders. The Muslim Students Union seeks to spread Hizballah's message among Lebanon's Shias and to indoctrinate Hizballah recruits. We believe the group also selects promising members for terrorist training. The Muslim Students Union probably has fewer than 500 full-time members, although Fadlallah commands the loyalty of far greater numbers of Shias in the southern slums of Beirut.

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Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah attending a funeral for victims of a car bomb near his mosque.

[redacted]



Subhi Tufayli, one of the youngest and most militant Hizballah leaders.

[redacted]

- **Hizballah militias.** Hizballah clerics, such as Subhi Tufayli, Abbas Musawi, and Abd al-Karim Ubayd command distinct Shia militia contingents in the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, and the south. These paramilitary groups, based in the Bekaa Valley and usually just referred to as "Hizballah," probably have a membership in the hundreds.
- **Council of Lebanon.** Iran created this body in 1983 to coordinate radical Shia activities in Lebanon. It is composed of senior Lebanese and Iranian Shias, mostly clerics. Although the council is nominally responsible for all religious, political, and military activities of the Hizballah movement, it almost certainly does not fully control the actions—especially terrorist operations—of the groups under its supervision.
- **Others.** Small cells of Hizballah militants committed to terrorism have coalesced around individual village clerics or local paramilitary leaders, primarily in the southern suburbs of Beirut.<sup>4</sup> [redacted]

<sup>4</sup> It is extremely difficult to estimate the strength of the subunits in the Hizballah network. An individual's affiliation often is based on family ties or loyalty to a local shaykh or militia leader. Relatively few individuals are full-time members of the groups that compose the Hizballah network. The collective membership of the groups has grown from several hundred to several thousand during the past two years. [redacted]

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**Hizballah Strongholds and Facilities**

The Hizballah has succeeded in replacing Amal as the dominant Shia organization in the Bekaa Valley. The central Hizballah headquarters for all of Lebanon is colocated with an Iranian Revolutionary Guard command center in the former Lebanese Army compound known as the Shaykh Abdallah barracks on the southern edge of Ba'labakk. The fundamentalists took over the compound in 1983, renamed it the Imam Ali barracks, and made it the nerve center for Hizballah activity. Here Hizballah operatives receive paramilitary training, religious indoctrination, and material supplies. [redacted] In addition, the radicals almost certainly have planned and staged terrorist operations from the Shaykh Abdallah barracks. [redacted]

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
The Hizballah and the Iranians also operate other command and training facilities in the Bekaa Valley, [redacted]

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### Key Shia-Controlled Neighborhoods in South Beirut



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[redacted] The most important of these centers are a former hotel in Ba'labakk and facilities located in or near the towns of Brital, Janta, An Nabi Shit, and Buday [redacted]

The Hizballah movement also is rapidly expanding its influence—at Amal's expense—in West Beirut and the southern suburbs of the capital. [redacted]

[redacted]

Hizballah leaders are now focusing their efforts and resources on the extensive Shia-populated areas of southern Lebanon from which Israeli forces have withdrawn. Here again, the Hizballah is competing for support in areas traditionally controlled by the mainline Amal militia. Southern Shias have been more affluent and less prone to religious extremism than their coreligionists in the Bekaa Valley or the southern suburbs of Beirut. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Iran's Role Declining?**

Iran continues to provide a wide range of support to the Hizballah movement. Some 300 to 500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards remain at various locations in the Bekaa Valley, and [redacted] the Iranians continue to train Hizballah recruits in paramilitary and terrorist tactics. [redacted]

[redacted]



The two radical Shia hijackers of TWA Flight 847 warn the United States not to retaliate against Lebanon. [redacted]

The former Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashami-pur, was instrumental in Iran's involvement with the Hizballah movement. Until his tour in Damascus ended in mid-September, he presided over the Council of Lebanon from its inception and provided a great deal of guidance and assistance to radical Lebanese Shia leaders. [redacted]

[redacted]

Despite material support to the Hizballah, Tehran often cannot control its Lebanese allies, and the Hizballah increasingly appears to conduct terrorist operations without the knowledge of Iranian officials.

[redacted] Tehran was not involved in planning hijackings of the Kuwaiti airliner in December 1984 or TWA Flight 847 last June. Hizballah operatives almost certainly have not consulted with Iranian officials before conducting other terrorist attacks. [redacted]

Although the termination of Iranian support would hurt the Hizballah and slow its progress, radical Shia leaders can satisfy many of the movement's material

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**Major Hizballah Terrorist Operations***(Selected significant international incidents in which Hizballah members are known or suspected to have participated)*

<b>1985</b>			
14 June	TWA Flight 847 hijacked from Athens; one American killed.	8 May	Presbyterian minister Benjamin Weir kidnaped in West Beirut.
10 June	American University of Beirut (AUB) Professor Thomas Sutherland kidnaped in West Beirut.	16 March	US Embassy political officer William Buckley kidnaped in West Beirut.
29 May	AUB Professor David Hill shot dead.	7 March	Cable News Network bureau chief Jeremy Levin kidnaped in West Beirut.
28 May	American University Hospital administrator Dr. David Jacobsen kidnaped in West Beirut.	5 March	US defense attache in Beirut wounded in assassination attempt.
22 March	French diplomats Marcel Fontaine and Marcel Carton kidnaped in West Beirut.	15 February	French architect Christian Joubert kidnaped in West Beirut.
16 March	Associated Press bureau chief Terry Anderson kidnaped in West Beirut.	10 February	AUB Professor Frank Regier kidnaped in West Beirut.
19 February	Officer in French observer corps shot dead in West Beirut.	18 January	AUB President Malcolm Kerr shot dead in West Beirut.
14 January	Two members of French observer corps assassinated in West Beirut.	17 January	Saudi diplomat Husayn Farrash kidnaped in West Beirut.
8 January	Catholic priest Lawrence Jenco kidnaped in West Beirut.	8 January	Marine guards at US Embassy in Beirut fired upon; one Marine killed.
7 January	Deputy commander of French observer corps shot dead in West Beirut.	<b>1983</b>	
<b>1984</b>		12 December	US and French Embassies in Kuwait and other targets partially destroyed by suicide car bombings.
4 December	Kuwait Airways Flight 221 hijacked from Dubayy and diverted to Tehran; two US officials killed.	23 October	Barracks of US and French Multinational Force contingents simultaneously destroyed by suicide car bombings; 299 soldiers killed.
30 November	AUB librarian Peter Kilburn disappears.	18 April	US Embassy in West Beirut destroyed in suicide car bombing; 17 Americans killed.
25 November	Seven Hizballah members in Italy and one in Switzerland arrested with plans and materials to blow up the US Embassy in Rome.	<b>1982</b>	
20 September	US Embassy Annex in East Beirut destroyed in suicide car bombing; two Americans killed.	19 July	Acting AUB President David Dodge kidnaped in West Beirut. <input type="text"/>
31 July	Air France airliner hijacked from Frankfurt, West Germany, and diverted to Tehran.		

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needs through the open market for arms in Lebanon or from other Lebanese factions. [redacted]

The Hizballah probably could exchange territory for weapons and training with the Palestinian factions trying to reestablish a stronghold in Lebanon. [redacted]

**Growing Syrian Displeasure**

The Syrian Government has tolerated Hizballah activity in Lebanon [redacted]

[redacted] The Syrians have facilitated Hizballah terrorist operations by allowing the radicals to operate training facilities in the Bekaa Valley and move men and materiel through Syrian checkpoints. [redacted]

Syria is gradually moving toward confrontation with the fundamentalists. Disruptive Hizballah activity suited Syrian interests in 1983 and early 1984. Syrian President Assad probably saw the Hizballah as an effective means of forcing the withdrawal of the Multinational Force contingents from Beirut and Israeli military units from southern Lebanon. By mid-1984, however, Syrian and Hizballah strategies began to diverge as Lebanese President Gemayel abrogated the 17 May 1983 accord with Israel and the multinational peacekeeping forces withdrew from Lebanon. Moreover, the long-term objectives of Syria and the Hizballah are fundamentally incompatible. Damascus is determined to stabilize the security situation in Lebanon and strengthen the Gemayel government. Hizballah leaders, on the other hand, want to overthrow Gemayel and replace his government with a fundamentalist Islamic regime. [redacted]

[redacted] During the TWA hijacking crisis, Vice President Khaddam met with Hizballah leaders for 24 hours to pressure them to release the four passengers they were holding, according to the US Embassy in Damascus. Syria also appears frustrated with the Hizballah's refusal to release the US and French hostages it holds. Syrian troops mounted another search for the hostages in the northern Bekaa Valley on 1-2 November, according to a contact of the US Embassy in Beirut. [redacted]

Damascus occasionally has imposed restrictions on Hizballah and Iranian activity in Lebanon—sometimes provoking clashes between Syrian troops and Shia gunmen—but these restrictions have been short lived. More important, Damascus has not stopped the radicals from conducting their training or operational planning in their Bekaa Valley bases. Assad has been reluctant to order a complete crackdown on the radicals for several reasons:

- He does not want to damage the Syrian-Iranian relationship, which provides Damascus with valuable economic benefits, including high-quality oil at very low prices.
- Assad may worry that a crackdown on the Hizballah would provoke terrorist attacks against Syrian interests.
- Damascus probably prefers to co-opt the Hizballah movement and manipulate it to Syria's advantage.

Assad appears confident that the Hizballah does not pose an immediate threat to Syrian policy goals in Lebanon and that Syrian forces or their allies in Lebanon could crush the Hizballah if it becomes a serious problem. [redacted]

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We believe, however, that Assad underestimates the capabilities of the Hizballah network and the dynamics of Shia fundamentalism in Lebanon. Moreover, Syria's ability to clamp down on the Hizballah is limited. While Syrian forces could arrest some Hizballah leaders and close its bases in the Bekaa Valley, it would take a major commitment of Syrian forces to stem the tide of Shia radicalism in Beirut and southern Lebanon.

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**Colombia's M-19: Setback** [redacted]

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On 6 November, an undetermined number of M-19 guerrillas, some disguised as policemen, shot their way into the Palace of Justice in Bogota, trapping more than 300 persons inside and seizing numerous hostages. The Colombian Government's swift military response caught the guerrillas unprepared, and the crisis ended the following day, leaving at least 100 dead, including all the guerrillas and several Supreme Court judges. [redacted]

The M-19 has strengthened its leadership position in the Colombian guerrilla movement at the expense of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest and oldest guerrilla group in Colombia. [redacted]

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The temporary seizure of the Palace of Justice is the most recent demonstration that extremist elements in the M-19 are leading the group toward increased guerrilla violence in Colombia. Activity by the M-19, the second-largest guerrilla group in Colombia, has increased steadily since the group broke a 10-month truce with the government last June. Moreover, press reports indicate that the M-19 has formed a tactical alliance with several smaller guerrilla groups. These developments probably signal the collapse of President Betancur's peace process and may cause him to give the military more leeway in their fight against the M-19 and the other guerrilla groups. [redacted]

[redacted] The M-19 also has ties to the Alfaro Vive, Carajo! guerrilla group in Ecuador. While recent M-19 actions suggest that it is trying to become a leader of Colombian leftist guerrilla groups—and possibly South American terrorist groups—the FARC appears to play it alone and publicly supports the truce and the peace process. [redacted]

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**Background**

Organized in the early 1970s, M-19 officially emerged in January 1974 when members of the group stole the sword of Simon Bolivar from a Bogota museum. Estimates on M-19 membership today range from 800 to 1,000 members. The group operates throughout Colombia, but its traditional strongholds are in the Valle de Cauca and Cauca Departments. The M-19 also has urban support groups in Bogota. It has been the most active guerrilla group in Colombia during the past five years, but the deaths of two group leaders, Jaime Bateman in 1983 and Carlos Toledo Plata in 1984, left the group badly split over the question of leadership and how to conduct its guerrilla campaign. The M-19 entered the government-sponsored truce in August 1984 before militant group members gradually took control and led the group back into armed action in June 1985. The Palace of Justice operation was led by one of the more militant leaders of the group, Andres Almarales. [redacted]

Colombian troops and M-19 guerrillas have skirmished on almost a daily basis since September, and the attempted kidnaping and wounding of Army Commander Samudio by the M-19 in late October reportedly caused alarm in the military over the growing strength and boldness of the group. The current military strategy reportedly is to concentrate its counterinsurgency efforts on M-19 as long as the FARC continues to negotiate with the government. [redacted]

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**Consequences**

The storming of the Palace of Justice represents the most spectacular action by the group to date. The M-19 apparently hoped to replicate its highly successful seizure of the Dominican Embassy in 1980. The M-19 probably planned to use the takeover to garner maximum press coverage for its cause and to spotlight its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the peace process. [redacted]

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The M-19, however, miscalculated. The military's surprisingly quick action and Betancur's low profile during the crisis caught the M-19 offguard. Instead of starting a long, drawn-out process of negotiation that would allow the M-19 to make its demands known and eventually lead to a peaceful settlement, the M-19 suffered a crushing defeat. We suspect that among those killed were some of the M-19's best tacticians and negotiators who almost certainly would have been involved in an operation of this nature.

[redacted]

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**Outlook**

Two courses of action are likely in the wake of the failed takeover. The M-19 could decide to lay low, licking its wounds and rebuilding the organization; or it could strike again, but at a "safer" target, such as an important embassy or the upcoming OAS conference that is to be held in Cartagena in early December. We suspect that, if the M-19 is to maintain its credibility both with the Colombian public and the leftist guerrilla groups, M-19 leaders would opt for a second operation, but one that would handcuff the Colombian military, such as the seizure of foreign diplomats.

[redacted]

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We fully expect that the M-19 will continue and possibly even increase its terrorist operations over the long term, especially if the group begins to lose ground to counterinsurgency efforts by Colombian troops. One of its primary targets will continue to be US interests in Colombia. The M-19 claimed responsibility for a series of bombings on 3 September, against two US-Colombian cultural centers and the US Embassy, and, since mid-September, M-19 threats against US business and diplomatic facilities have increased.

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1985**

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.*

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**August-September**

**Police arrest five members of Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) in Istanbul.** They were wanted for an armed attack on a police station in Karagumruk more than five years ago.

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**16 September**

**Mozambique: RENAMO attacks two state farms near Maputo.** Seven persons were killed and three others wounded when guerrillas of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement overran the 25 de Junho and Olsa citrus units.

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**Early October**

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**8 October**

**Greece: Previously unknown group claims credit for attacks on Libya.** A London press office received a call from the "Libyan Organization of 7 April" claiming responsibility for the Athens bombings of the Libyan People's Bureau and the Libyan Arab Airlines office two days before and announcing the group's goal of overthrowing the Qadhafi regime.

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**Somalia: Explosion damages officers' club in Hargeisa, killing six, wounding 11, and damaging three buildings.**

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**10 October**

**Iraq: Kurdish guerrillas kidnap two Soviets.** Members of the Kurdistan Patriotic Union (KPU) stated that the Soviets will not be released until appropriate authorities negotiate with the KPU leadership.

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- 13 October** *Philippines: Grenade attack in Lanao del Norte leaves 13 dead, 93 wounded.* An ex-policeman and two unidentified men reportedly were responsible for the attack. [redacted] 25X1
- 15 October** *Italy: Unsuccessful attack on Tunisian Embassy in Rome.* According to press reports, unknown persons attempted to set fire to a gas cylinder and an "antiaircraft missile" in front of the building, but the small fire was extinguished before the devices could explode. Prime Minister Mzali was due to arrive in Rome several hours later. [redacted] 25X1
- 16 October** *Burma: Kachin Independence Army assassinates commander of Burmese Army's Northern Command and his aide in Myitkyinya.* Following the murders, senior military and civilian personnel reportedly will receive increased protection. [redacted] 25X1
- 17 October** *Lebanon: Explosion temporarily knocks out Voice of Hope radio station, killing nine persons, including three attackers.* [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] 25X1
- 19 October** *Peru: Disillusioned Sendero Luminoso (SL) group surrenders in Ayacucho.* This defection involved 115 men, women, and children and was the largest such SL surrender since 1980. [redacted] 25X1
- 20 October** *Namibia: Two bombs damage pumps at gas station in Caprivi Strip.* This was the first bombing in the area in several years and was probably the work of the South-West African People's Organization. [redacted] 25X1
- 21 October** *Afghanistan: Head of Saudi Interests Section assaulted.* He reportedly was beaten by members of an Afghan militia unit who accused him—along with the United States, France, Pakistan, China, and West Germany—of aiding counterrevolutionaries. [redacted] 25X1
- 23 October** [redacted] 25X6
- 24 October** *Greece: Handgrenade in car wounds mayor of Rehtymnon, eight other persons on Crete.* No one claimed responsibility for the blast. [redacted] 25X1

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- Mozambique: Civilians taken off train in Maputo.** Six of them were killed outright. The Mozambique National Resistance Movement, which has attacked civilian trains before, is most likely responsible.  25X1
- South Africa: Powerful bomb kills two terrorists at Grosvenor Girls' School in Durban.** The school was to serve as a polling station in legislative elections. The outlawed African National Congress was probably responsible.  25X1
- Peru: Director of Lima's El Fronton Prison assassinated.** The attack, which also wounded his chauffeur, occurred as he left his apartment with his 8-year-old son. Peruvian authorities speculate that the murder was in retaliation for the deaths of 30 Sendero Luminoso inmates in Lima's Lurigancho Prison.  25X1
- 25 October** **Peru: Tupac Amaru teams take over two cafeterias in Cuzco.** The guerrillas urged their audiences to join their group. This was the terrorists' first public appearance since their August declaration to suspend armed activities against the government.  25X1
- 26 October** **Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes near members of Multiracial Cease-fire Monitoring Committee in Trincomalee.** No injuries were reported. The committee was set up to monitor a cease-fire between government forces and militant Tamil separatists.  25X1
- 27 October** **Mozambique: RENAMO raids Maputo suburbs.** Guerrillas killed four civilians and wounded another, and are suspected of killing two off-duty soldiers.  25X1
- 28 October** **Greece: Arson attacks damage two automobiles belonging to US Air Force personnel in Ellinikon and Kypseli.** The recently surfaced group "Wild Geese of the Cities" claimed responsibility for the attacks.  25X1
- 29 October** **Spain: Police break up GRAPO unit in Vigo.** Members of the leftist October First Antifascist Resistance Group were attempting to reorganize in the wake of a severe blow from police sweeps in January.  25X1
- 30 October** **Ecuador: Shootout with Alfaro Vive, Carajo! cell in Quito leaves one terrorist dead, 10 captured.** Both military and police forces took part in the operation.  25X1
- 31 October** **Greece: Explosion on Athens city bus injures 30 passengers.** A previously unknown group, the "Revolutionary Fighting Left," claimed credit for the bomb. It may have detonated prematurely while being transported by an Iraqi citizen to another target.  25X1

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**Japan: Homemade missiles fired at Narita Airport cause minimal damage to two runways, no casualties.** No one has claimed responsibility, but police suspect the leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), which has staged many such attacks on the airport this year. [redacted]

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**Peru: Sendero Luminoso terrorists suspected in bombing of Aprista Party office in Huancayo which wounded 15 persons.** Four suspects were arrested. [redacted]

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1 November

**Peru: Masked members of People's Revolutionary Command attack Coca-Cola truck in Huancayo.** They distributed hundreds of bottles of the beverage to townspeople. [redacted]

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2 November

**Iran: Attempted hijacking aborted.** Security officers reportedly thwarted an attempt to hijack an Iranian passenger plane on a domestic route. No injuries were reported. [redacted]

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3 November

**Iran: Car bomb explodes in Tehran, injuring two persons.** A smaller bomb had been defused near Tehran's bazaar the previous day. No group has claimed responsibility for either incident, the fourth and fifth such bombings in the last two months. [redacted]

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**Peru: Tupac Amaru interrupts Lima broadcast of World Cup soccer playoff between Chile and Peru.** Their transmission denounced alleged human rights abuses in Peru and commemorated the anniversary of a 1790 revolt against the Spanish led by Indian leader Tupac Amaru. [redacted]

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7 November

**Iran: Car bomb explodes in downtown Tehran, wounding 15 persons.** The 10-kilogram device reportedly damaged seven other vehicles as well. No one has claimed responsibility for the incident. [redacted]

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