



Director of
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22 February 1984

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
22 February 1984

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Contents



25X1

France-Lebanon: Changing Tactics 2

USSR: New Ballistic Missile Submarine 3

USSR-Southern Africa: Soviet Concern 4

East Germany: Improved Financial Outlook 5

Nicaragua: Election Date Set 6

Libya-Jordan: Relations Deteriorate 6

USSR: New Move on Chemical Warfare 7



25X1

India: Religious Riots in the Northwest 8




25X1

USSR-Norway: Soviets Retaliate for Expulsions 9

Honduras-US: Controversy Over Expropriation Case 10

Bolivia: Increasing Opposition to the President 10



25X1

Japan: Budget Increase for Robot Development 12

Special Analysis

Argentina: Regional Reactions to Alfonsin's Election 13

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

22 February 1984

25X1

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

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FRANCE-LEBANON: Changing Tactics

France is shifting its tactics in Lebanon in response to recent events there. [Redacted]

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The US Embassy reports the French are mainly concerned about reaching a settlement that will keep Lebanon united and reduce civil conflict. As a result, Paris may drop its support for President Gemayel, who it believes has failed as a promoter of national reconciliation. The French believe the agreement of 17 May is dead, and, according to the Embassy, they are willing to concede Syria some influence. [Redacted]

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The French want a UN force in Beirut as an initial step, and they would be willing to exclude the MNF countries from participation. They hope to maintain their own influence through their fleet and role in the UN contingent in southern Lebanon. [Redacted]

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A shift of French forces in southern Lebanon—which is already partially completed—would free neutral UN troops for possible assignment to a UN force in Beirut. The French believe that reducing their troops in Beirut to a token force guarding their Embassy also would reduce their exposure and the need for military reprisals if they were attacked. [Redacted]

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Paris still hopes to obtain Moscow's cooperation on the arrangements for a UN force in Beirut. At the same time, however, President Mitterrand believes too close an association with the USSR would threaten the domestic political consensus for his policy. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Comment: The French do not accept Soviet demands that the MNF countries withdraw their fleets and promise no further intervention. If the Soviets and the Syrians were included, however, Paris might be willing to accept a mutual pledge of nonintervention. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

The French clearly believe that, by taking a more independent line, they will be in a better position to protect their own interests in Saudi Arabia and other moderate states in the region. Quick progress on a UN role, however, is unlikely. [Redacted]

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USSR: New Ballistic Missile Submarine

[Redacted]

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a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that is a variant of the Soviet D-III SSBN and that probably will carry 16 SS-NX-23 missiles. [Redacted]

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The submarine is about 170 meters long, 14 meters longer than the D-III. It has about 4 meters of the extra length forward of the sail and about 10 meters aft of the missile bay. [Redacted]

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The new submarine is approximately the same length as the Typhoon SSBN. Its submerged displacement, however, is likely to be only slightly more than half as great. [Redacted]

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The missile bay appears to be about the same length as that of the preceding D-III SSBNs, the 14th unit of which was first seen at Severodvinsk in December 1981. [Redacted]

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Comment: The submarine is a further modification of the Y-class SSBN design, which was developed into the D-I, the D-II, and the D-III. This is the first time that the basic design has been lengthened forward of the sail, probably to improve torpedo handling and storage and to provide more space for command and control functions. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The length of the missile bay indicates that the submarine probably will carry 16 missiles. These are likely to be the three-stage, liquid-propelled SS-NX-23 now under development. Although the canvas covering over the missile bay prevents direct observation, the increased size of the upper rudder suggests that the missile bay may be somewhat larger than that of the D-III in order to accommodate the SS-NX-23. [Redacted]

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USSR-SOUTHERN AFRICA: Soviet Concern

Moscow appears concerned that South Africa's recent negotiations with Mozambique and Angola—while reducing the threat to Maputo and Luanda—could endanger Soviet influence in southern Africa. 

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


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 Recent Soviet media coverage on Angola continues to highlight alleged plans by the US and South Africa to undermine the regime in Luanda and force it to negotiate with UNITA insurgents. 

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Comment: Despite misgivings about the US-brokered negotiations with South Africa, Moscow presumably sees some merit in reducing the security threat to the regimes in Luanda and Maputo. Last year, for example, the USSR sent more military assistance to Angola than at any time since the original Soviet-Cuban intervention in 1975-76. 

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Moscow also recognizes that such accommodations with South Africa could diminish Soviet influence in the region and hinder its efforts to support insurgents in Namibia and South Africa. The Soviets probably will try to create new suspicions in Luanda and Maputo about US and South African motives in the hope of preventing other concessions that undercut the USSR's interests. 

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
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East Germany: Financial Position


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22 February 1984

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EAST GERMANY: Improved Financial Outlook

East Germany's financial prospects have been improved by East Berlin's success in running trade surpluses and by bankers' strengthened confidence that Bonn will serve as a lender of last resort.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Last month the regime announced a "considerable" surplus in trade with nonsocialist countries in 1983, its third consecutive annual surplus after deficits throughout the 1970s.

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[Redacted]

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Comment: This year East Berlin should be able to cover estimated debt repayments of \$3.6 billion, which is less than repayments in either of the last two years. The reliance on short-term credits, however, means that any erosion of banker confidence could pose liquidity problems. [Redacted]

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The regime seems committed to reducing its debt further. It probably will be able to increase exports enough to accomplish this, while increasing imports of key industrial products. East Berlin may consider future economic deals with Bonn a good source of additional funds, despite its fears of becoming overly dependent on West Germany. [Redacted]

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
NICARAGUA: Election Date Set

The Sandinistas are portraying the announcement made yesterday to advance elections to 4 November as a move to preempt an expected increase in "US aggression." They also say it reflects their commitment to pluralism. In addition, the junta announced that the voting age should be lowered to 16 and that the period for insurgents to accept amnesty would be extended to 4 May. Meanwhile, Eden Pastora's insurgent group renewed its offer to participate in the elections if the regime accepts international supervision of them and separates the Army from politics.



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
Comment: The Sandinistas worked hard to make the anniversary a major media event, and the announcement probably was timed to gain propaganda mileage. A lowered voting age would please young Sandinista supporters who have campaigned for a change in the official election law proposal. The opposition, however, would see it as additional evidence that the regime will use all available means to win, and it is likely to continue to complain that the amnesty does not include insurgent leaders. The Sandinistas will almost certainly reject Pastora's election offer, but they will stress that individual insurgents are welcome to vote.



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LIBYA-JORDAN: Relations Deteriorate


Libya claims Palestinians angry with King Hussein for meeting with Egyptian President Mubarak in Washington last week are responsible for the burning of the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli on Saturday. Libyan leaders met with visiting Palestinian radicals before the incident.



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Comment: Libyan leader Qadhafi is out to scuttle any possible cooperation between Hussein and PLO chief Arafat. He probably is coordinating his efforts with Syria, and he may seek to sponsor other operations by radical Palestinians against Jordan. Hussein will respond to this latest incident by taking an even more cautious approach to peace negotiations. He will point to the coordinated Syrian-Libyan campaign as further evidence of Jordan's need for advanced US weapons.



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USSR: New Move on Chemical Warfare

The chief of the Soviet delegation at the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva announced yesterday that the USSR would agree to the principle of continuous on-site verification of chemical weapons destruction by a combination of international inspectors and sensors. Until now, the Soviets have agreed only to international inspection by a quota system, not by continuous inspection. The announcement also indicated that Moscow would accept the principle of inspection on challenge but said this must be voluntary. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Soviets have been on the defensive since last year, primarily because of their verification position, and may be trying to preempt a forthcoming US draft treaty. The announcement indicates some movement in the Soviet position, but its significance will become evident only in the course of detailed negotiations. Even if adequate international verification of destruction sites could be agreed upon, the omission of verification of production facilities would severely limit monitoring of Soviet chemical warfare capabilities. Moreover, Soviet refusal to accept mandatory challenge inspection will probably remain a major stumbling block to a chemical warfare agreement. [Redacted]

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States with Religious Disturbances



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
22 February 1984

Top Secret




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
INDIA: Religious Riots in the Northwest

Nine days of mounting Hindu-Sikh violence in Punjab and Haryana States have left at least 33 dead and 200 wounded. Last weekend Sikh dissidents defying curfew orders fought national police from the sanctuary of Punjab's holiest Sikh temple. US diplomats report that leaders of Punjab's principal Sikh party, the Akali Dal, have now ruled out participating in talks with the government on Sikh demands for greater autonomy for Punjab. 

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Comment: Opposition parties are trying to make a major issue of New Delhi's failure to control turmoil in Punjab and to resolve Sikh demands before the national elections that have to be held by next January. The renewed violence defies Prime Minister Gandhi's imposition of direct rule from New Delhi. As a result, she is unlikely to call for early elections in the next three months as many political observers have speculated she might. 

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


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USSR-NORWAY: Soviets Retaliate for Expulsions

The Soviets probably calculate that their decision to declare two former members of the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow personae non gratae will not do serious damage to bilateral relations. Officials in the Soviet Foreign Ministry told Norway's Acting Chief of Mission in Moscow on Monday of the action against an interpreter and a former first secretary, both of whom left the USSR some time ago. The officials also protested Norway's expulsion of five Soviet diplomats early this month. The Norwegian Foreign Minister publicly termed the unexplained Soviet action "unreasonable." 

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Comment: The move against the two Norwegians almost certainly is in retaliation for Oslo's expulsions of the Soviet diplomats. The USSR's limited response probably will not prompt additional action by Norway or further damage the existing cool but businesslike bilateral ties. 

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
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HONDURAS-US: Controversy Over Expropriation Case

A political controversy has developed around the issue of compensating a US citizen for land expropriated for use by the Regional Military Training Center, the US-built training site near the northern coast of Honduras. According to the US Embassy, some members of the opposition National Party object to compensation and have raised technical arguments to deny the landowner legal claim to the property. President Suazo's administration says that its negotiations concern remuneration for improvements made by the owner to the property but not for the land itself. Meanwhile, the Honduran Congress is investigating Suazo's letter of accession to the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which commits Honduras to negotiating just compensation.



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
Comment: Members of the National Party are using the issue to discredit the ruling Liberal Party and to increase their popular appeal. Their arguments probably will win some nationalistic sympathy, which already has led to criticism of the center's role in training the Salvadoran military. Suazo will have to stand firm on the issue or risk jeopardizing his country's eligibility for new investment aid under the Caribbean Basin Initiative.



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BOLIVIA: Increasing Opposition to the President


President Siles's delay in ratifying promised wage increases is contributing to widespread strikes and antigovernment demonstrations.



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Comment: Siles's indecisiveness in the face of labor pressures has weakened his credibility with the left and with moderate opposition groups, and it will complicate efforts to broaden his government through a cabinet shuffle.



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
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JAPAN: Budget Increase for Robot Development

Japan's National Project to develop robots for hazardous environments has been allocated a substantial budget increase this year, according to Japanese press reporting. The project will get nearly \$5.5 million, up from \$170,000 in FY 1983. Last month a new research association for the project, consisting of 17 robot manufacturers and two industry associations, was formed. Areas of research include robots for use in marine oil exploration, nuclear power plants, and areas hit by fires or earthquakes. 

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Comment: The technologies being developed—including vision, sensors, mobility, and control—will improve Japan's existing industrial robots and its competitiveness in electronics and other key areas. Moreover, the robots designed to operate in extreme conditions may have important military applications. For example, a marine robot could be used for minesweeping. 

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Special Analysis

ARGENTINA: Regional Reactions to Alfonsin's Election

The pledge of Argentine President Alfonsin to promote democracy and human rights in South America is affecting domestic politics in Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil, where military governments are in various stages of returning to civilian rule. The tougher positions that the armed forces in those countries are taking on transition matters are directly influenced by antimilitary sentiments and the trials of former government leaders in Buenos Aires. Alfonsin's moves have already encouraged like-minded politicians in the region and, over time, he may be inclined to move from low-keyed diplomatic and moral backing to more overt support, at least in Uruguay and possibly in Chile. For now, he has not openly backed dissidents, in order to avoid jeopardizing important regional policy objectives.

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[Redacted]

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Argentina's neighbors are sensitive to any signs that Alfonsin is meddling in their internal politics.

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[Redacted]

Regional opposition groups have been elated by Alfonsin's preelection promises of aid and support and by the open political environment in Buenos Aires following his election.

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[Redacted]

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Reaction in Uruguay

President Alvarez has taken diplomatic steps to try to blunt the impact of Alfonsin's actions on domestic politics.

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Leading political figures in Uruguay believe the civilian attacks on the Argentine armed forces have contributed to the hardening position of the Uruguayan military toward the transition process. Alvarez has repeatedly sought military support to extend his term in office. He probably will use events in Argentina to try to persuade his colleagues to be tough on conditions for civilian rule, if not to postpone it. [Redacted]

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Chile and Brazil

US Embassy and defense attache reporting indicates that Chilean military officers fear investigations by civilians similar to those taking place in Argentina. As a result, they have set aside differences and rallied behind President Pinochet's protracted schedule for returning to civil rule. One hardliner even suggested to the defense attache that the military would have to retain influence into the 1990s to allow memories of its war against subversion to fade. [Redacted]

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Opposition leaders in Chile have told US officials in Santiago that they have linked their hopes for a political opening to Alfonsin's victory. [Redacted]

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Brasilia has been searching aggressively for common ground with the Alfonsin government, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] At the same time, the Brazilians have publicly and privately warned the Argentines to respect political differences and the pace of Brazil's transition. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Alfonsin's policies have unsettled many Brazilian military officers.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Outlook

Alfonsin has toned down his initial strong public support for neighboring opposition groups. [Redacted]

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The President eventually may become more inclined to renew overt support for dissidents, especially in Uruguay, where antiregime sentiments are high and Alfonsin's foreign policy stake is low. Alfonsin is a personal friend of presidential candidate Ferreira, who is disliked by the military. Montevideo's crackdown on labor and the press could make Ferreira and his allies increasingly dependent on foreign support. [Redacted]

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In Chile, delays in finding a settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute could encourage Alfonsin to risk Santiago's good will in favor of strengthening democratic forces. [Redacted]

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Alfonsin is likely to be especially wary in his dealings with Brazil. He has the most to risk there, ranging from important international policy initiatives to nuclear cooperation. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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