





Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
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EL SALVADOR: Political Opinion Polls

Two recent polls show Christian Democratic candidate Duarte still ahead of ultrarightist D'Aubuisson in the presidential race, but many voters remain uncommitted. [Redacted]

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The US Embassy reports that a nationwide sampling taken by a firm associated with Duarte's Christian Democrats shows him leading D'Aubuisson by better than 2 to 1. In a poll conducted at the Jesuit-run Central American University, Duarte also ran ahead of D'Aubuisson. Nevertheless, both polls indicate that more than 30 percent of the voters are still undecided and that Duarte is well short of the majority needed to win the election. [Redacted]

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The three leading parties are directing their campaigns at the uncommitted voters, according to the Embassy. Duarte and moderate rightist leader Guerrero campaigned last weekend in the strife-torn eastern part of the country, with both drawing crowds of about 4,000 in San Miguel City. Christian Democratic officials are charging that local military officers harassed their supporters in an effort to hold down attendance. [Redacted]

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Some 15,000 members of the democratic labor front also turned out to support Duarte during a demonstration in San Salvador over the weekend. The Embassy reports, however, that there are continuing indications that labor support for Duarte is flagging. [Redacted]

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Comment: The only consistencies in these and other recent polls are the positions of Duarte and D'Aubuisson as first and second among the candidates, and the apparent inability of either to win a majority. The armed forces are still committed to remain neutral, but the charges by the Christian Democrats will add a new irritant to the party's uneasy relationship with the military. [Redacted]

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The labor demonstration may have been an effort to reunite the democratic unions behind Duarte. They had split last week over the issue of work stoppages, which coincided with attempts by the leftist labor front to foment a general strike. Although the strikers returned to work, the dispute remains unsettled and a resurgence of strike activity could hurt Duarte's chances in the election. [Redacted]

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NICARAGUA: Reaction to Insurgent Attacks

The Sandinistas are trying to line up political support before calling for a meeting of the UN Security Council. [Redacted]

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Nicaragua wants the Security Council to discuss its claim that the US helped insurgents to mine the port of Corinto. It is trying to mobilize support among the seven other Third World countries who sit on the 15-member Council. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega charged on Tuesday that the US is organizing increased sea and air attacks and an economic blockade as steps leading to direct intervention. He asked foreign governments to put pressure on the US to withdraw its troops from the region, halt attacks on Nicaragua, and seriously pursue solutions to its problems with Nicaragua and to the conflict in El Salvador. [Redacted]

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Sandinista leaders have suggested that Salvadoran and Guatemalan revolutionary groups might retaliate for recent sabotage attacks against Nicaragua by taking similar action in their own countries. Guatemalan insurgents recently issued a communique threatening to acquire mines as an act of revolutionary solidarity, and the Salvadoran guerrillas also have publicly supported Nicaragua. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Sandinistas are sensitive to the complaint that they are overusing the Security Council, and they are consulting nonaligned nations to ensure that they have support. If they do, they are likely to offer a resolution along the lines of Ortega's speech. They also may push for a UN investigation and more active involvement by the UN Secretary General in the region. [Redacted]

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The Sandinistas probably will emphasize that US actions, including Congressional discussion of covert aid to anti-Sandinista insurgents and deployment of naval forces to Central America, are undermining regional peace talks. They are unlikely to supply insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala with mines because this would compromise their diplomatic efforts and their ability to deny responsibility. [Redacted]

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POLAND: Church-State Problems

The regime may be trying to break the impasse over the hanging of crucifixes in public buildings by linking the issue to a more general agreement regulating the legal status of the church. [Redacted]

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On Tuesday the government press spokesman said that, as a result of the student protests over the removal of crosses from a state agricultural school, the joint government-church commission will examine the legal principles that guide the functioning of the church. He said these talks could lead to a "joint declaration" on church-state relations and, eventually, to a law outlining the church's rights and obligations. Senior church officials admit that such a law has been on the agenda of church-state talks. [Redacted]

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Cardinal Glemp told an interviewer in Rome last weekend that the passage of such a law could open the way for diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Warsaw—a step the regime has been pushing for since January 1983. Glemp dropped his earlier insistence, however, that the law be the prerequisite for establishing relations. [Redacted]

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Comment: Church leaders probably are anxious to avoid a showdown and are interested in strengthening the church's position in the long term. They may use the prospect of more serious negotiations as a way to calm the current protests. [Redacted]

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Negotiations for a law or even a less ambitious church-state declaration would be long and difficult, partly because of pressure from party militants who would resist improving the standing of the regime's strongest opponent. Moreover, some churchmen would point to the quick abrogation of similar declarations concluded with the regime in the 1950s as proof that the authorities cannot be trusted. [Redacted]

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GREECE: Government Floundering

Prime Minister Papandreou's overreaction to the recent naval incident with Turkey probably reflects his anxiety over what he sees as the government's declining popularity. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The US Embassy believes that most Greeks are skeptical of the government's account of the naval incident and that it has hurt Papandreou's credibility. [Redacted]

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Some opinion polls and recent conservative gains in trade association elections indicate that the Socialists are losing support.

[Redacted]

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Comment: The government does not appear able to cope with intractable foreign and domestic problems, such as the Cyprus issue, labor strife, an acute shortage of foreign investment funds, and many other economic problems. The Socialist leadership is increasingly hampered by a lack of talent in the cabinet, Papandreou's autocratic administrative style, and self-imposed ideological constraints. [Redacted]

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Papandreou's assertion during the naval incident that Turkey's alleged hostile action was in part a consequence of US military aid, together with his renewed criticism of the terms of US military aid for Greece, suggests that he is looking for a scapegoat. His behavior is consistent with his past performance in difficult situations, and, if problems mount, his actions are likely to become erratic again. [Redacted]

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CHAD: Military Developments

A dissident force of 1,000 men plans to attack the government garrison at Ito in the next few days [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Meanwhile, some 200 Zairian troops performing garrison duty near N'Djamena returned to Kinshasa last week. Zaire and Chad also have agreed that the three Zairian battalions will be withdrawn, possibly by the end of the month, and replaced by two fresh battalions. [Redacted]

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Comment: The dissidents are likely to seize Ito, which is held by 300 government troops. Ito is north of the 16th parallel, the declared limit of French operations. As a result, the French probably would be unwilling to go to the aid of President Habre's forces. The main value to Habre of the Zairian troops has been symbolic, but any withdrawal without replacement would require him to spread his forces thinner.

[Redacted]

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CYPRUS-GREECE: Results of Summit Meeting

The US Embassy in Nicosia reports that Cypriot Foreign Minister Iacovou has said that President Kyprianou and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou decided last week that the deployment of Greek troops to the island would be "inopportune" at this time. Iacovou also stated that the two governments would again take their case on the Cyprus problem to international forums. He said this move and possibly severing "all links" between the two communities would occur if the UN Secretary General fails in his current efforts to achieve progress.

[Redacted]

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Comment: Kyprianou and Papandreou probably will not undertake any action until they learn the results of the Secretary General's meeting tomorrow with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. Iacovou's remarks could presage a Greek move to curtail low-level exchanges across the "green line" or possibly a cutoff in electricity and water supplies to the Turkish side. [Redacted]

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JAMAICA: Possible Election Postponement

Jamaican officials say that Prime Minister Seaga soon will ask parliament for legislation empowering him to postpone for up to a year local parish elections scheduled for this month. Seaga reportedly wants more time to negotiate a standby loan with the IMF, to deal with economic repercussions of the shutdown of Reynolds bauxite mining operations, and to persuade backers of his party to resume their financial contributions.

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[Redacted]

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Comment: By postponing local elections until the economy improves, Seaga presumably hopes to forestall opposition leader Manley's demands that a general election be held when updated voter registration lists are ready—probably in June.

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
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
DENMARK: Security Debate in Parliament

The two political parties on the extreme left are reviving the debate on security issues today in parliament. The US Embassy reports the Left Socialists and Socialist People's Party are trying to force Prime Minister Schlueter's minority government to declare its position on a number of security and defense issues, including keeping no nuclear weapons on Danish soil under any circumstances, the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapons-free-zone, and no-first-use of nuclear weapons.




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Comment: The pro-NATO government is likely to face a difficult parliamentary session this spring. Schlueter almost certainly will fight any resolutions that would undermine Denmark's membership in NATO, but he will continue to try to avoid pushing the opposition Social Democratic Party closer to the left's extreme views. Although the Social Democrats are split more deeply after their election defeat in January, they probably will still push the government to consider a nuclear weapons-free-zone and other issues.



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Special Analysis

FRANCE-US: Mitterrand's Agenda in Washington

President Mitterrand, who visits the US next week, evidently wants to emphasize agreement on fundamentals and to avoid contentious subjects. He will stress France's political solidarity with the Atlantic Alliance and try to show that his country is a worthwhile partner in the development of advanced technology. Mitterrand also will want to push plans to reform the international monetary and financial systems. Differences could emerge, however, on international economic questions and other issues. 

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Mitterrand's trip comes at a time when his policies increasingly are under attack at home. His government's efforts to restructure the economy recently have caused strikes by auto workers, coal miners, and civil servants as austerity measures begin to take effect. There also have been large demonstrations against the government's plans to increase its control over church-run schools. As a result, Mitterrand's leftist coalition may suffer a symbolic setback in the election in June for representatives to the European Parliament.



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The President will arrive in Washington directly after an EC summit meeting in Brussels. He has staked much of his political prestige on trying to reach an agreement on EC reforms, and he may be preoccupied if the summit goes badly. 

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Security Issues

Members of Mitterrand's staff have told US Embassy officials that Paris favors increased cooperation with the Alliance. The French are participating discreetly in NATO exercises and developing a Rapid Action Force that would enable them to join in a forward defense of West Germany. Nonetheless, the Embassy reports that the French are not considering a full reintegration into NATO's joint command.



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Mitterrand will assert that his recent efforts to revive the Western European Union and improve defense cooperation with West Germany will increase the contribution that the West Europeans make to their own defense and thus strengthen NATO. French military analysts have admitted for many years that the long-term US commitment to Western Europe can be maintained only if the Europeans make a serious defense effort. 

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In discussing revitalization of the Western European Union, Mitterrand is likely to play down its potential problems. The Europeans could use the the Union to challenge Washington's leadership and to push for a larger share in providing arms for NATO.

[Redacted]

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Paris publicly supports a resumption of US-Soviet arms control talks, but Mitterrand believes that it is unwise to make concessions just to get the Soviets back to the bargaining table. He continues to insist that the nuclear forces of the superpowers have to be cut before the French can consider reducing their own limited nuclear arsenal. Paris is opposed to including its nuclear forces in the agenda on arms control talks and to restricting its plans for modernizing these forces.

[Redacted]

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Technological and Economic Cooperation

Mitterrand's aides say that he sees this trip as an opportunity to explain Socialist economic policies and his commitment to modernize the economy. He has requested a trip to "Silicon Valley" to underscore his interest in advanced US technology and investment. The French responded favorably to the President's invitation to cooperate on building a space station, and they also have expressed interest in convening an international conference on high technology.

[Redacted]

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At the same time, however, the French remain concerned that the US budget deficit and high US interest rates will continue to attract capital from Western Europe and to slow French investment. Mitterrand probably will argue against US controls on high technology exports, which many West Europeans believe are protectionist measures.

[Redacted]

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Mitterrand also may express his concern about subsidized sales of agricultural commodities by the US in established EC markets. In addition, he is likely to reassert that the US should share the costs of agricultural reform in the EC by accepting limits on US farm exports to the Community.

[Redacted]

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The President's staff also says Mitterrand will raise again the proposal he made last year to study reforms of the international monetary and financial system. Paris argues that world economic recovery requires more stable exchange rates, increased flows of economic aid to the Third World, and a decline in US interest rates. Mitterrand probably recognizes that progress in these areas requires lengthy negotiations, but he wants to keep his initiative alive.

[Redacted]

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Foreign Policy Cooperation

Mitterrand may want to discuss a number of other issues where French interests overlap with those of the US. In Chad, the French want the US to continue its aid to President Habre's government. On the other hand, they want Washington to avoid actions that would complicate France's diplomatic efforts to obtain the withdrawal of both French and Libyan forces. [Redacted]

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Paris plans to increase economic aid to Africa, especially the countries affected by drought. Mitterrand will encourage the US to do the same and to coordinate closely with Paris. [Redacted]

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Mitterrand also will want to consult closely on the next steps in Lebanon. Although he believes US participation is essential for any Middle East peace settlement, he is concerned that the US might become preoccupied with domestic demands in an election year. Mitterrand is trying to improve France's ability to be an intermediary with neighboring Arab states, the Lebanese factions, the Soviets, and the Palestinians. [Redacted]

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In discussing the war between Iran and Iraq, Mitterrand may be wary of joint contingency planning with the US. As in Lebanon, Paris fears that being too closely identified with US policies could backfire and could provoke attacks by Iranian terrorists. [Redacted]

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As for Central America, Mitterrand is likely to regard favorably the Kissinger Commission's recommendation to increase economic aid to the region. He may be critical, however, of the recommendations for more military assistance. He will continue to endorse the Contadora group's emphasis on seeking a negotiated solution. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis**SOUTH AFRICA: Regional Policy Developments**

South Africa is having some success in its efforts to reconcile its differences with its neighbors, including the negotiation of a nonaggression pact with Mozambique. In southern Angola the cease-fire is holding, although recent activity by SWAPO insurgents has caused a suspension in the disengagement of South African forces. On the other hand, Luanda has rejected Pretoria's proposal for an all-party meeting on Namibia. Successful negotiations with Mozambique and Angola would help South Africa achieve legitimacy for its minority white regime and a reduction in the threat posed by SWAPO and the ANC. The agreements reached thus far are prompting other states in the region to initiate efforts to improve relations with South Africa.

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Since Prime Minister Botha took office in 1978, South Africa has pursued a strategy that combines promises of regional economic cooperation and an aggressive policy of undermining hostile governments. In the past three years, Pretoria has used economic pressure, direct military action, and support to insurgents to punish neighbors who harbored anti-South African guerrillas.

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Negotiations With Mozambique

South African and Mozambican negotiators held further talks earlier this month in Cape Town and issued a communique agreeing that neither side would allow its territory to be used for acts of violence against the other. Prime Minister Botha and President Machel are scheduled to sign a formal nonaggression pact tomorrow. Although the ANC and the main Mozambican insurgent movement may still try to disrupt the agreement by staging major terrorist incidents, their chances of doing so appear to be declining.

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Mozambique badly needs an agreement in order to obtain relief from the insurgency and to secure economic assistance. South Africa views the treaty as a major diplomatic victory that improves its security situation, and it would be unlikely to abandon it lightly.

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Relations With Angola

The cease-fire between South Africa and Angola remains fragile. On 6 March South Africa halted the scheduled disengagement of its forces from southern Angola, because the Angolans had failed to halt the deployment of SWAPO forces from that region into Namibia.

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Pretoria claims that, since the disengagement began on 16 February, several hundred insurgents have infiltrated into Namibia. It says SWAPO units have carried out mortar and rocket attacks on military bases and have sabotaged a strategic railway. [Redacted]

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Despite the suspension of the disengagement process, senior South African officials remain optimistic and report improving cooperation between their personnel and the Angolan members of the Joint Monitoring Commission. Over the weekend the Angolans agreed to a South African airstrike against a concentration of SWAPO forces in southern Angola. [Redacted]

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Some small South African units are still in southern Angola, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Pretoria believes that reconciliation in Angola has to accompany settlement in Namibia. This view presumably lies behind the proposal made last weekend by Foreign Minister Botha that talks should be held among South Africa, SWAPO, the political parties in Namibia, Angola, and UNITA. Luanda, however, does not appear ready to negotiate with UNITA. [Redacted]

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Responses From Other Neighbors

South Africa's other neighbors also are responding to overtures for better relations. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Prospects

A successful disengagement in southern Angola could build mutual confidence and facilitate progress toward an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia. South Africa, however, almost certainly will continue to insist on linking the withdrawal of Cuban

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combat troops from Angola with such a settlement. Moreover, the intensity of UNITA military operations throughout most of Angola will force Luanda to continue to rely on Cuban forces. [Redacted]

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A durable cease-fire in southern Angola would benefit both Luanda and Pretoria. Reduction of the South African military threat would allow Angola to concentrate its beleaguered forces against UNITA. Luanda's continued willingness to limit SWAPO military activity and the demilitarization of southern Angola would reduce the costs Pretoria is paying in both money and lives. [Redacted]

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South Africa's improving relations with Mozambique and Angola may encourage other regional states to negotiate security arrangements with Pretoria. To persuade its neighbors to cooperate, however, South Africa is likely to continue to mix threats with promises of economic assistance. [Redacted]

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