



Director of
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LIBYA-SUDAN: Bombing of Radio Station

Khartoum remains calm following the attack yesterday by Libyan aircraft on Sudan's main broadcasting facility.


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Sudanese officials claimed at least one Libyan aircraft,

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made the strike.

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Damage to the station was minor, although bombs falling nearby caused several casualties. The US defense attache said an unexploded bomb appeared to be of Soviet origin.

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President Nimeiri publicly accused Libyan leader Qadhafi of masterminding the attack, and he alleged that Ethiopia was colluding with Libya to undermine his regime. The Libyan news agency denied the charges and said the attack was carried out by dissident Sudanese Air Force elements.

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Egypt placed its forces on alert and moved a scheduled visit to Khartoum by Defense Minister Ghazala from Saturday to Friday. Cairo called the attack a "serious aggression" and requested that the US send AWACS aircraft to Egypt to provide radar coverage of Libyan airfields.

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Comment: Qadhafi may have ordered the attack to demonstrate Nimeiri's inability to protect Sudan against external threats. He also may have hoped to encourage domestic opposition, especially by southern Sudanese dissidents, and to increase Libyan influence among the various groups opposed by Nimeiri. The airstrike, however, does not appear to be part of a larger, coordinated action.

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The radio station would be a target easily recognized by bomber pilots. In addition, it is the source of the increasingly vitriolic broadcasts Nimeiri has directed at the Libyan regime recently. Qadhafi's use of conventional military forces for what amounts to a terrorist attack is a radical departure from his past preference for using assassination teams, paramilitary operations, and support for dissidents.

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


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EL SALVADOR: Insurgents' Military Plans

The guerrillas apparently are planning to seize temporarily a major city before the presidential election on 25 March. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] San Vicente, Usulután, and San Miguel in the east are the insurgents' primary targets and that Chalatenango in the north also may be attacked. A soldier who recently escaped from the guerrillas claims that San Miguel will be attacked soon, according to the US defense attache. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the insurgents have been moving forces into Cuscatlan Department since early this month, in order to launch attacks against nearby government garrisons and to control the territory north of San Salvador. [Redacted] the insurgents plan to disrupt all traffic on the Inter-American Highway and the Littoral Highway between now and the election. [Redacted]

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Insurgents attacked Suchitoto in Cuscatlan Department yesterday. Preliminary reports indicate that three national policemen and 25 insurgents were killed. [Redacted]

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The Army, meanwhile, is continuing a large sweep operation in northern Morazan Department. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Comment: The government hopes its operation in Morazan Department will deal a severe blow to insurgent military capabilities in the region. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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By committing some 5,000 troops to the operation in Morazan, however, the Army might be hard pressed to reinforce its garrisons in central El Salvador if they were to come under strong attack. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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ARGENTINA: Opposition to Alfonsin

President Alfonsin faces growing discontent in the military and more determined opposition from key civilian groups. [Redacted]

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Officers reportedly are upset about organizational changes and proposed budget cuts, as well as press attacks on the military for human rights abuses. Several retired generals recently have been punished, and a commander on active duty has been retired for criticizing government policies. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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On the labor front, Alfonsin's proposal for reforming the unions was defeated in the Senate by a coalition of Peronists and conservatives, according to press reports. The proposal would have forced the heads of the Peronist-dominated unions to face new internal elections. [Redacted]

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Comment: Opposition to Alfonsin is beginning to coalesce as indictments and trials of officers accused of human rights violations move forward, reforms are debated, and summer vacations end. The President probably realizes that the euphoria from his election victory is dissipating and that the success of future legislative initiatives will require greater concessions. The Peronists are encouraged by the defeat of the labor reform bill, and they are likely to take a strong stand in congressional debates, the budget, IMF negotiations, and other sensitive issues. [Redacted]

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In the military, the service chiefs and most officers remain committed to civilian rule. As a result, they probably will countenance convictions of the 12 or so former commanders under investigation or detention. Unrest will spread among the military, however, unless the President can ease public criticism and prevent human rights investigations from reaching the middle-level officers. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
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African Refugee Movement



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[Redacted]

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AFRICA: Increasing Refugee Problems

Drought and insurgent activities are adding to the refugee burden in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. [Redacted]

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Between 100,000 and 180,000 Mozambicans have crossed into Zimbabwe during the past few months, according to sources of the US Embassy in Harare. They are suffering from malnutrition caused by three years of drought and by disruptions in food distribution resulting from the insurgency. [Redacted]

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The flow of refugees accelerated after a storm in late January destroyed crops and further impeded Maputo's already inadequate relief effort. Zimbabwe is troubled by its own drought-related food shortages. [Redacted]

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Drought conditions also are causing some of the 700,000 ethnic Somali refugees in Somalia to return to Ethiopia's Ogaden Region. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa believes, however, that the Ethiopian claim that 300,000 have returned is highly exaggerated. [Redacted]

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Many of the ethnic Somalis are nomads who cross the border to follow the seasonal movements of livestock. The US Embassy in Addis Ababa says that Somali military conscription efforts have prompted others to cross the border. [Redacted]

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Anti-Ethiopian sentiment in Sudan has led to a decrease in the influx of Ethiopian refugees during the past few weeks, from some 300 per day to about 200 per week, according to the US Embassy in Khartoum. Some 40,000 drought victims and refugees from the insurgency in northern Ethiopia have entered Sudan in recent months, however, adding to the nearly 700,000 refugees already straining its resources. [Redacted]

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Comment: The refugees are competing for scarce food and sometimes for jobs in the countries where they are staying. All of the host countries have substantial internal economic problems and cannot care for the refugees without considerable external assistance. They are getting help from UN agencies and international voluntary organizations, but some are likely to appeal to the US and other Western countries for additional aid. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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KUWAIT: Continuing Security Concerns

Kuwait remains vulnerable to Iranian-inspired terrorism or military attack, despite increased security precautions. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Kuwait has expelled over 1,000 Iranians since the bombings in December. Tehran has denounced the deportations and continues to threaten reprisals if any of the bombing suspects now on trial are executed. Verdicts are to be announced and sentences passed on 27 March. [Redacted]

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The US Embassy reports that Kuwaitis fear that an Iranian push against Al Basrah will spill over into Kuwait. Embassy sources say that National Guard units have reinforced regular Army units on the border and that an ammonia and phosphate plant has been closed to prevent the release of toxic fumes. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
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
NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA: More Border Clashes

Attacks by anti-Sandinista insurgents on Nicaraguan towns along the border with Costa Rica continue to aggravate relations between Managua and San Jose. Press reports state that the latest attack on the border post of Penas Blancas was staged from inside Nicaraguan territory, although the Sandinistas claim it was launched from Costa Rica. San Jose was quick to deny this charge. Meanwhile, the US defense attache in Panama reports that Costa Rican border guards continue to crack down on insurgent activity in the north-central border region. 

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Comment: Government officials from both countries appear anxious to reduce border tensions. The Sandinistas' protest note apparently is intended only to publicize the continued presence of the insurgents in the border area without holding San Jose directly responsible. The Costa Ricans probably hope their security crackdown will demonstrate they are trying to enforce their neutrality. A renewed dialogue between high-level officials from the two countries and increased security measures on both sides of the border are likely in the weeks ahead. 

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
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AFGHANISTAN: Attacks Cause Fuel Shortage

[Redacted] Afghan insurgents hit a petroleum storage area in the USSR with rocket fire from Jeyretan in Afghanistan. Sources of the US Embassy in Kabul say insurgent attacks on fuel convoys to Kabul have been intense in recent weeks, and the city is suffering an acute shortage. Long lines have appeared at gasoline stations, prices have gone up on the black market, and many private vehicles and taxis are out of use. [Redacted]

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Comment: The reported cross-border incident would be the most serious to date, and probably would cause the Soviets to mount more intensive sweep operations in northern Afghanistan. Winter weather and attacks on convoys may prompt the Soviets to divert some fuel supplies from military storage to keep the Afghan Government functioning. The shortages also may limit Soviet and Afghan military operations, as they have in the past, and they probably will improve insurgent morale. [Redacted]

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USSR-US: Reentering the Grain Market

The director of the Soviet grain purchasing agency told a Western news service during his recent visit to the US that the USSR probably will buy several million more tons of grain than it already has purchased from the US. He also said that Soviet purchases in the current market year are unlikely to exceed 12 million tons. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Comment: Purchases of the magnitude implied by the Soviet official suggest that Moscow anticipates Argentina, because of its port congestion and shipping delays, will be unable to meet the rest of the USSR's corn requirements during the marketing year that ends 30 June. Soviet grain officials had said in the past few months that the USSR would purchase only the minimum amount required under the grain agreement with the US. This amount was fulfilled in January. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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NETHERLANDS: Luns's Remarks on INF Deployment

NATO Secretary General Luns, a former Dutch Foreign Minister, said on Thursday that the Netherlands would lose most of its influence in NATO by rejecting INF. He also said that the Allies would be surprised by a Dutch decision to deploy less than the full 48 cruise missiles called for but that they would accept such a decision. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Dutch have long sought to serve as a bridge between NATO's major powers and its smaller members. Luns probably hopes his remarks will increase support for a positive decision, which is due by July. His statement on cutting the number of missiles to be deployed, however, almost certainly will hurt the chances for full deployment in the Netherlands. The failure of the Dutch to hold out at least the possibility of full deployment would make it more difficult for the Belgians to accept all 48 of their allotted cruise missiles. [Redacted]

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POLAND: Strategy on Debt Negotiations

[Redacted] some high-level Polish officials are urging the regime to discontinue dealing with Western governments as a group on debt and to strike separate deals with individual governments. They believe that Warsaw should begin making debt service payments to those governments that are more willing to accommodate Polish concerns. These officials want to put this strategy into effect if Polish negotiators fail to reach agreement with Western government representatives at the meeting scheduled to begin next Wednesday. [Redacted]

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Comment: The Poles have tried unsuccessfully in the past two years to break up creditor unity, and they may be eager to exploit what they see as a growing rift between the US and other creditor governments. Consequently Warsaw may appear more conciliatory at the meeting next week in hopes that the West Europeans will urge the US to accept a West German proposal for multiyear rescheduling. Although the West Europeans want to break the impasse over Polish debt rescheduling, none seem eager to extend large, new credits immediately or to deal with Warsaw on a bilateral basis. [Redacted]

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
GUATEMALA: Opium Poppy Cultivation

Customs police destroyed three opium poppy fields, one of them allegedly as large as 21 hectares, near Guatemala City in late January, according to a report by the US Drug Enforcement Administration. A Mexican trafficker arrested during the raid said that for the last two years he had supervised 50 local farmers who cultivated the crop. After harvesting, helicopters were used to transport the opium to heroin laboratories in Guatemala. The trafficker also reported that the Mexican organization which employed him had similar poppy-growing operations in other Central American countries. 

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Comment: This is the first report of large-scale poppy cultivation in Guatemala. The size of the poppy field, which is more than 300 times the average size of similar fields in Mexico, has not been confirmed. The number of farmers involved, however, is consistent with an operation of this scale. Mexican traffickers probably are attracted to Guatemala because it does not have a systematic antinarcotics program and much of its terrain is ideal for poppy cultivation. 

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ANGOLA-CUBA-USSR: The Troop Withdrawal Issue

Angolan President dos Santos will arrive in Havana today, and Angola's ruling party secretary Lara was scheduled to arrive in Moscow earlier this week. The trips probably are intended to bring the Cubans and the Soviets up to date on Luanda's negotiations with Pretoria and to explore the possibility of withdrawing Cuban troops from Angola. Dos Santos recognizes that he needs the Cubans to protect his regime against the UNITA insurgency. Nonetheless, he and Lara may seek agreement from the Cubans and the Soviets on a limited withdrawal and a broader timetable for a complete pullout, hoping that this would sustain Angola's talks with South Africa and the US. Havana appears troubled by the discussions between Pretoria and Luanda, and it recently has displayed signs of a less rigid position on a troop withdrawal. Before undertaking any withdrawals, however, the Cubans would seek Soviet approval.

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Angola continues to insist publicly and privately that it will address the Cuban troop issue only after South Africa removes all of its troops from Angola, ends aid to UNITA, and begins implementing the UN plan for Namibia's independence. Luanda appears determined to follow through with the disengagement of forces in southern Angola. The Angolans probably believe that a reduced South African threat to southern Angola would allow them to concentrate on the fight against UNITA insurgents.

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Luanda may seek the approval of Havana and Moscow for a partial Cuban withdrawal for now and an extended timetable for a complete pullout as a negotiating card in its talks with Pretoria and Washington. As a result of the increasing threat from UNITA, however, Angola is unlikely to push for an early substantial reduction in the Cuban presence.

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Cuba's Current Position

Cuban Vice President Rodriguez recently told a US journalist that prospects for bringing Cuban troops home from Angola have improved. Rodriguez conditioned a troop withdrawal on assurances for Angola's security and for Namibia's independence, but he clearly departed from Havana's standard line that Cuban troops would leave when asked to do so by Luanda.

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Rodriguez also told a Western diplomat in Havana that he takes a positive view of the agreement reached at the talks in Zambia last month among Angola, South Africa, and the US. He indicated that, if an acceptable agreement is reached on Angola's security, Cuba would be likely to recall its troops. 

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Reports from the US Interests Section in Havana 

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 indicate that the Cubans, in recent conversations with other Western diplomats, appeared to be resigning themselves to a withdrawal. Moreover, the Cuban press seems to be preparing the public for such a move. 


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Cuba's statements may represent nothing more than tactical maneuvering. There are no reports, however, that Cuba is trying to upset the negotiations between Angola and South Africa. 

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There are other sources of friction between the Angolans and the Cubans. Some Angolan diplomats, for example, see the Castro regime as blatantly racist. Cuban military leaders have displayed anger about the inability of the Angolan military to measure up to Cuban standards. 

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Domestic Discontent

In Cuba, popular support for continued military involvement in Angola has waned. Much of the euphoria created by Cuba's "liberation" role in the late 1970s has been replaced by frustration over the seemingly endless flow of casualties. The Interests Section believes that, by suggesting the possibility of a withdrawal, Havana risks raising public expectations to dangerous levels. 

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Moreover, withdrawal of Cuban troops would increase substantially the number of unemployed in Cuba. It also would reduce—perhaps by as much as \$150 million per year—the hard currency Havana has been charging Angola for the services of Cuban troops. 

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The Soviet Role

Havana's cautious new flexibility on the issue seems aimed at allowing President Castro to avoid the role of spoiler in the process of rapprochement in southern Africa, while giving him the option of reverting to a harder line if Moscow requires him to do so. Although

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
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
Castro has pledged publicly to withdraw his troops at Angola's request, he cannot afford to ignore the massive military and economic leverage the USSR has on Cuba's policy. 

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The Soviets would oppose a US-brokered settlement that undercut their position in Angola, and they would put pressure on Luanda not to go along. If Luanda persisted, however, the Soviets would make the best of the situation. They would presumably maintain a military assistance relationship with Luanda and seek to establish a similar relationship with a SWAPO-dominated government in Namibia. If the Soviets believed the Angolans were determined to proceed on the Namibia question, they might view a constructive tack as more conducive to their long-term interests in Angola and elsewhere in Africa. 

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
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