





Director of
Central

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

OCPAS/CIG

CY# 285



25X1

National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
29 March 1984

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 84-074JX

25X1

29 March 1984

Copy 285

25X1


Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

Contents



25X1

Chile: Implications of Day of Protest 3

Guinea: Making the Transition 4

Africa: Reaction to Negotiations in the South 5



25X1

Vietnam-Kampuchea: Increased Vietnamese Attacks 7




25X1

Sweden: New Approach to Export Controls 9



25X1

Iran: Khomeini Under Pressure 10



25X1

Sri Lanka: Increase in Tamil Terrorism 13

Special Analysis

USSR-Southern Africa: Views on Diplomatic Developments 14

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

29 March 1984

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

CHILE: Implications of Day of Protest

The national day of protest on Tuesday gives the opposition movement new momentum and could place the government on the defensive. [Redacted]

25X1

The middle and working classes participated extensively, according to press reports. There were few violent clashes with the police—most of which involved slumdweller and university students. The Communist-dominated Popular Democratic Movement was unable to mobilize workers to challenge the police. [Redacted]

25X1

Comment: The Communists' failure will indirectly benefit the moderate Democratic Alliance and the broad-based National Labor Command. Extensive violence could have persuaded many in the middle class that moderates are unable to control the protest movement. There were enough disturbances, however, to underscore the widespread dissatisfaction over the slow pace of political liberalization and continued high unemployment. [Redacted]

25X1

The protest probably will encourage the Alliance and its centrist labor allies to call for a general strike within a few months. Opposition labor forces are expected to meet on 14 April to set a date. [Redacted]

25X1

The failure of the state of emergency, the curfew, and press censorship to contain the demonstration may cause some rightist politicians and military officers to question this hardline approach. These elements have already complained that President Pinochet is seeking to expand his authority and that his refusal to make even minor concessions is raising social tensions and deepening political polarization. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

GUINEA: Making the Transition

Prime Minister Beavogui has been sworn in as interim head of government, as preparations continue for the funeral tomorrow of President Toure. [Redacted]

25X1

Numerous African leaders and representatives from Western, Middle Eastern, and Communist countries will attend the funeral. The USSR and Libya have not reacted publicly to Toure's death. [Redacted]

25X1

Comment: After the funeral senior officials will begin to discuss the selection of a successor. Some French officials suggest that Beavogui may be the next elected president and that key members of the government will cooperate to keep the country functioning smoothly in order to forestall factionalism and tribal bickering. Beavogui's health reportedly is fragile, however, and he might not withstand the pressures of a declining economy, any political infighting, and possible foreign meddling. [Redacted]

25X1

Libyan activism, the future of the OAU, and regional economic deterioration will be topics of primary concern to African moderates gathering in Conakry. The US delegation is likely to receive requests for help in these matters. Togo is being proposed by some West Africans as a possible alternative to Conakry as the site for the next OAU summit. [Redacted]

25X1

Beavogui may request direct US financial help and further private investment to reverse the effects of the drought, a recent earthquake, and the deteriorating economy. He also may ask about the status of a \$1.5 million US program to provide Guinea with coastal patrol boats and naval training. [Redacted]

25X1


Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



701963 3-84

Top Secret

25X1

29 March 1984

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

AFRICA: Reaction to Negotiations in the South

South Africa's negotiations with Angola and Mozambique have been favorably received by African countries outside the region, although most doubt that the talks will lead to a lasting settlement. [Redacted]

25X1

Some of the strongest support has come from the other Portuguese-speaking countries—Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome. Their leaders will join Angola and Mozambique at a summit in Maputo on Sunday to take a joint stand in favor of the negotiations, according to the US Embassy in Cape Verde. [Redacted]

25X1

Some senior officials, including a Nigerian and a Malawian, have expressed appreciation for the US role in facilitating the negotiations. Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister told the US Ambassador last week that his government commends the US for its persistence. [Redacted]

25X1

On the other hand, Zairian President Mobutu and others have expressed concern that the interests of SWAPO and the ANC will be sacrificed. Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs told the US Ambassador that he opposes any agreements that tend to sanction South African aggression. [Redacted]

25X1

The Foreign Ministers of OAU countries, who met in Addis Ababa earlier this month, expressed their belief that severe security and economic problems led Angola and Mozambique to enter the negotiations. According to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, however, they agreed to change their original draft from a statement of "full support" to an expression of "sympathy and understanding." They apparently acted at the behest of SWAPO, the ANC, and the more radical states. [Redacted]

25X1

Comment: Most African countries would like to see the negotiations in southern Africa succeed, but they want to avoid the appearance of giving too much support to a process that they fear could easily collapse. They are also reluctant to say anything that might be interpreted as approving South African behavior, lest they indirectly relieve international pressure on Pretoria to reform its domestic policies. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Increased Vietnamese Attacks

Vietnamese forces have substantially increased their attacks against Communist guerrillas over the past week. [Redacted]

25X1

Two Vietnamese regiments supported by tanks and artillery attacked a major Democratic Kampuchean base in northern Kampuchea over the weekend, and some of the fighting spilled over into Thailand. The Thai have sent several companies of irregular troops and a rifle company to the area, and they have shelled the Vietnamese. Press reports of clashes between Thai and Vietnamese troops are unconfirmed. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

some

25X1

Vietnamese troops were still holding positions in Thai territory on Tuesday. Thai Army Commander General Athit claims, however, that the Vietnamese have been pushed back across the border. [Redacted]

25X1

Fragmentary information suggests both Vietnamese and guerrilla losses are heavy. Between 5,000 and 10,000 civilians have fled into Sisaket Province in Thailand. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Large Redacted Block]

Comment: The Vietnamese apparently delayed any major border operations until Foreign Minister Thach had completed his recent visits to Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Hanoi will now try to set back resistance gains in the interior before the rainy season begins in May [Redacted]

25X1

Vietnamese assaults on the large non-Communist bases along the western border do not appear imminent. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

SWEDEN: New Approach to Export Controls

The government is reviewing its export control procedures with the aim of giving greater protection to COCOM-controlled technology.

[Redacted]

25X1

A special group has been established in the Foreign Trade Department to decide what measures Sweden should take to tighten export controls. There appears to be a consensus in the government that the country's export control list, which now is confined largely to war materiel, will have to be expanded to include a large number of dual-use technologies that are imported from the COCOM countries. The group is expected to make a report in June or July.

[Redacted]

25X1

Comment: Swedish sources have described the new approach as conforming to the COCOM list without joining COCOM. The new procedures probably will include a certification system for importing and reexporting COCOM-controlled items. The government, however, apparently is still debating whether the new procedures will be legally enforceable and what provisions for verification—including end-user checks—should be made.

[Redacted]

25X1

The review of export control policy is an effort to erase the perception in the US that Sweden is an easy route for the diversion of high technology to the USSR and East European countries. Sweden is increasingly concerned that this view could jeopardize access to US technology that is crucial to modernizing its armed forces and key industries.

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Large Redacted Block]

25X1

IRAN: Khomeini Under Pressure

25X1

[Redacted] Ayatollah Khomeini's health has deteriorated considerably, possibly in reaction to recent setbacks in the war. In recent broadcast speeches, Khomeini has begun to sound short of breath. Khomeini's heir apparent, Ayatollah Montazeri, Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, and other prominent clerics have differed publicly with Khomeini's guidelines on war policy in recent weeks.

25X1

[Redacted Block]

25X1

Comment: Khomeini may be suffering from stress as a result of his growing isolation over his insistence on continuing the war. He apparently fears that ending the conflict without toppling the Iraqi regime would undermine the Islamic Republic and its appeal abroad. He may now recognize, however, that his decision to continue the fighting in Iraq has produced only minor military gains at the cost of increasing domestic dissatisfaction.

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1


Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret



25X1



25X1

SRI LANKA: Increase in Tamil Terrorism

Tamil terrorists have claimed responsibility for killing seven Sinhalese police officers in Jaffna, on the northern end of the island, during the past week.

25X1



25X1

The government is tightening security, and it recently captured over 1,000 pounds of illegal explosives in Jaffna. President Jayewardene has created a new Ministry of National Security to monitor terrorist activities.

25X1


25X1

Comment: The recent killings and new rumors of Indian support for the Tamil terrorists suggest that the country may experience communal violence over the next several weeks even worse than that of last summer. Jayewardene's inept negotiations with Sinhalese and Tamil leaders to resolve the ethnic conflict have failed. Security forces are inadequate to contain more intense and widespread violence.

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1



701955 3-84

Top Secret

25X1

29 March 1984

Top Secret



25X1


Special Analysis

USSR-SOUTHERN AFRICA: Views on Diplomatic Developments

Moscow is apprehensive that South Africa's recent agreements with Angola and Mozambique could jeopardize the USSR's position in southern Africa and its support for insurgents in Namibia and South Africa. On the other hand, the Soviets' recognition of the Angolan-South African cease-fire will help to shore up Luanda's deteriorating military position. They still expect that the Angolans will continue to require the Cuban military presence. They probably believe that it would be premature to try to sabotage the talks, in view of their conviction that South Africa is not willing in any case to relinquish its hold on Namibia. Moscow evidently was more dismayed about the extent of President Machel's turn toward Pretoria. Despite this setback for their interests, the Soviets will use Maputo's need for arms to maintain a role in Mozambique.



25X1



25X1

Soviet media have not denounced the cease-fire, but they have criticized the US and South Africa. Moscow is using the media to raise doubts about Washington's motives as the broker and about Pretoria's reasons for agreeing to the cease-fire.



25X1

Moscow, however, may see little reason to try to disrupt the bilateral talks. The cease-fire and the South African withdrawal from southern Angola have reduced the security threat that prompted record Soviet arms deliveries to Angola last year.



25X1

If the cease-fire holds, moreover, Angolan and Cuban forces could focus on combating UNITA. Although the Soviets may have misgivings about temporarily abandoning SWAPO, preserving the regime in Luanda is the more important immediate task.



25X1



25X1

Cuban Troop Withdrawal Issue

The Soviets, presumably pleased with the statement issued earlier this month by Angola and Cuba, reaffirmed that a withdrawal

continued

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

of Cuban troops would occur after South Africa ends its support of UNITA, withdraws from Angola and Namibia, and implements the UN plan on Namibia. [Redacted]

25X1

Moscow's major concern is that a Cuban withdrawal from Angola would substantially undermine Soviet influence in Luanda. In view of the deep-seated regional tensions, the threat from UNITA, and Moscow's conviction that South Africa will not relinquish Namibia, the Soviets probably believe the current talks are unlikely to lead to a Cuban withdrawal. [Redacted]

25X1

Relations With Mozambique

The USSR has only belatedly acknowledged the nonaggression pact between Mozambique and South Africa. The delay probably reflects Moscow's displeasure with President Machel's rapprochement with Pretoria, which undercuts Soviet interests and prestige, tarnishes Maputo's revolutionary credentials, and opens up new opportunities for Western inroads in Mozambique. [Redacted]

25X1

The improvement in relations also reduces the already limited capabilities of the ANC insurgency. This obstructs the USSR's long-term objective of toppling the regime in Pretoria. [Redacted]

25X1

The Soviets do not have the degree of access and influence in Maputo that they enjoy in Luanda, and Machel's about-face almost certainly has caused them some anxiety. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Prospects

The USSR will continue to use its influence with hardliners in Angola to keep the regime there suspicious of the US and South Africa. If the Soviets conclude that President dos Santos's diplomacy might seriously threaten their position in Angola, they are likely—as they have done in the past—to put direct pressure on him. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Moscow has not written off Mozambique. The account in *Pravda* of Machel's meetings with Premier Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev at Andropov's funeral noted that prospects for the further development of bilateral relations are favorable. To maintain their presence in Maputo, the Soviets will exploit Machel's continued need for military assistance. [Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



Top Secret