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## USSR Review

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*In this issue:  
The USSR and China*

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**July-August 1986**

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SOV UR 86-004X  
July 1986

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# USSR Review

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**July-August 1986**

The *USSR Review* is published by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome.

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**China: Trying To Beat the Odds Along the Soviet Border**

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Beijing has adopted a forward-defense strategy designed to deter a Soviet attack by raising the costs of an incursion into northeastern China. The Chinese intend to meet Soviet thrusts close to the border where they hope to shock Moscow into reassessing its attack. However, it will take years for China to field enough advanced weapons to adequately equip its forces for this mission. We have seen no signs that Moscow considers recent Chinese modernization efforts an immediate threat.

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**Moscow's View of China's Economic Reforms**

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Since Mikhail Gorbachev's election as General Secretary, the Soviets have increased the frequency and the objectivity of their media commentary on the reforms under way in the Chinese economy. This shift, however, reflects the leadership's desire to widen the boundaries of permissible domestic debate on economic reform and to improve Sino-Soviet ties, rather than approval of China's actions. Most Soviet officials and scholars are disturbed by the political riskiness and ideological unorthodoxy of the Chinese reforms, dismiss their applicability to the Soviet economy, and see them as posing an implicit challenge to Soviet leadership of the Communist camp.

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	The Gorbachev regime's most visible move to promote women to leadership positions was the appointment of Aleksandra Biryukova to the CPSU Secretariat. To some extent, this move has been echoed by the increased participation of women at many levels of party leadership. These are token gestures for now, although perhaps the beginning of a more significant trend. Because it is one means for Gorbachev to revitalize party cadres, we can expect the trend of increasing the role of women in party leadership to continue. The pace, however, is likely to be slow, consistent with the low priority that this issue probably holds on the Gorbachev agenda. [redacted]		25X1
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**Viewpoint**

**Moscow's Stake in the Berlin Access Challenge**

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The Soviets have exploited, in our judgment, the GDR's challenge to Western access to Berlin even though they apparently did not initiate it. Its timing, the diversion of attention from recent Soviet setbacks in Chernobyl' and Libya, and the fit with the Soviets' objectives in both their German and overall European policies suggest to us that Moscow gave the East Germans a contingent go-ahead for the challenge. By doing so, Moscow probably also hoped to avoid Soviet-East German friction and to compensate the GDR somewhat for Gorbachev's evident refusal to let Honecker visit Bonn this year. We believe Soviet willingness to "intercede" with the East Germans to modify some of the proposed control measures was intended to seize the high ground of reasonable compromise and portray the three NATO occupying powers as being inflexible.

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## The USSR and China

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**Perspective**

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When China's leader Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Soviets made a bid to improve relations that was quickly rejected by the Chinese as an attempt to meddle in the uncertain domestic situation. The tables turned when Chernenko died in 1985 and Gorbachev came to power: the Chinese signaled their interest in improved relations by calling the USSR a "socialist" state for the first time since 1966.

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The relationship has evolved into a broad range of exchanges in the trade, economic, and scientific fields. The two sides signed a long-term trade agreement last summer, for example, and, despite the Chernobyl' incident, China apparently sent a delegation to the USSR this summer to see whether Soviet nuclear power facilities might be suitable for China's need. Although the eight rounds of regularly scheduled discussions about "normalization" of bilateral relations have gone nowhere, the two sides have opened a separate set of discussions on international issues that so far have covered Asia and disarmament. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu has accepted an invitation to Moscow, and each side will be reopening consulates in the other's country.

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The Soviets have consistently exaggerated the pace of progress in the relationship, while the Chinese have just as consistently expressed a gloomier view—both sides with an eye on Washington's reactions as they jockey for position in the Sino-US-Soviet triangle. Despite Soviet overstatements, however, Moscow has good reason to be pleased with the progress to date, especially because it has cost the Soviets next to nothing. The Soviets have shown no give on China's "three obstacles" to normalized relations—the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Moscow's support to Vietnam for the Cambodia intervention, and the military buildup along the border and in Mongolia. The Soviets have long contended that the obstacles were

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artificial barriers that the Chinese would ignore when it suited them, and events to date have proved them right. The Chinese will undoubtedly continue to cite the three obstacles as a statement in principle of their concerns, as a way to reassure Washington that they remain wary of the Soviets, and as a means of letting the Chinese domestic audience know that they have not sold out to the Soviets. But the Soviets are confident that the "obstacles" will not stand in the way. [redacted]

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In any case, the Soviets undoubtedly believe the costs of making a major move on any of the three obstacles would be too high. It is unlikely, for example, that the China factor alone would lead the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan without securing a regime that is both receptive to Soviet direction and capable of containing the insurgency. They would not damage their important relationship with Vietnam—and risk losing their base at Cam Ranh Bay—by stopping support for Hanoi's venture in Cambodia without a political arrangement in Phnom Penh that is acceptable to Hanoi and that brings an end to the resistance. Vietnam ties down Chinese troops along China's southern borders, and the Soviets have no interest in letting Cambodia's Heng Samrin regime fall to the resistance. [redacted]

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On the issue of Soviet troops and missiles along the border with China, there is some room for maneuver, but this room is narrowing as China improves its own forces in these regions. The Soviets could withdraw a small number of troops, or pull them back farther from the border, with relatively little risk. But the Chinese are modernizing their forces along the border and are deploying them closer to the border rather than relying on their old strategy of luring the enemy in deep. They have also improved their capability to monitor Soviet activity along the border, reducing somewhat the element of surprise. If the Soviets ever considered making some adjustments along the border to placate the Chinese—and we have no evidence that they did—there is less incentive for them to do so now that the Chinese are becoming a more credible threat. [redacted]

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In fact, the Soviets have continued to modernize their own forces along the border. Since the late 1970s, when the Soviets sharply increased the number of troops in the area to coincide with China's invasion of Vietnam and its establishment of relations with the United States, the troop buildup has been gradual but steady. The Soviets continue to send better quality equipment to the Sino-Soviet border after it has first been used by Soviet forces in the west. The pace of Chinese force modernization along the border will dictate to some extent the rate at which Soviet forces are modernized, but for now the Soviets seem satisfied to modernize gradually. [redacted]

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With China not raising the three obstacles as consistently as in the past, the prospects for the relationship would seem brighter. It is fair to ask, however, what "normalization" would look like and whether in fact it would be very different from the situation that obtains today. It might be argued, convincingly, that for all intents and purposes, relations have been "normalized," even if they are not cordial. Economic relations are improving, with the Soviets set to help modernize a number of plants that they built in China in the 1950s and the Chinese prepared to enter the Soviet market with textiles and other products. Two sets of regularly scheduled meetings at the deputy-minister level allow the Soviets and Chinese to discuss numerous economic and political issues. Both sides publicly acknowledge one another as "socialists," thus muting the fierce ideological war-of-words of the past. [redacted]

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For the Soviets, however, "normalization" would include several objectives still not within reach:

- Establishing party-to-party relations with China, while more important symbolically than substantively, would give Moscow an avenue that the United States cannot duplicate in its relations with Beijing.
- Resolving the longstanding border dispute would reduce the need for the military buildup on both sides of the border and could help lower tensions in a concrete, rather than atmospheric, sense.
- Getting a formal commitment from China, in some sort of treaty, not to engage in strategic cooperation with the United States at Soviet expense is perhaps the least realistic objective, as the Soviets in effect are asking the Chinese to abandon their "independent" foreign policy and limit their maneuverability within the Sino-US-Soviet triangle. [redacted]

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For the short term, both the Soviets and the Chinese seem satisfied with the current state of relations. The Soviets, recognizing that the Chinese have eased back from the three obstacles, can afford to be patient, waiting for Beijing to make another move toward improving ties when it is ready. In Moscow's eyes, Deng Xiaoping poses perhaps the most important obstacle to further movement by Beijing, as the Soviets believe he is the least enthusiastic of China's top leaders about better relations. Being well satisfied with the progress in the relationship to date, the Soviets can wait for Deng to leave the scene. [redacted]

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Personalities are an obstacle on the Soviet side as well. Some individuals in the policymaking apparatus in both Beijing and Moscow probably see Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa, a leading China expert,

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as an impediment to improved relations. Kapitsa has repeatedly antagonized the Chinese and other Asian interlocutors with his arrogance and heavyhandedness and has been rumored to be on the way out as Moscow pays more attention to Asia. [redacted]

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Soviet patience is probably reinforced by a realization that China is likely to be an adversary for a long time to come, regardless of the formal state of relations. Distrust and suspicion are deep rooted on both sides, fueled only partly by ethnic animosities. The Soviets and the Chinese are competitors for influence, particularly in Asia, and with China's modernization program taking a path that breaks sharply with Soviet practice, the two offer starkly different models for socialist development. [redacted]

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Since Gorbachev came to power, however, Soviet media commentary on the Chinese reforms has been more frequent and less critical. The Soviets probably intend this as a signal to China of their desire to improve relations. More important, it is a signal to the domestic audience that the range of permissible discussion of the USSR's own economic modernization program is getting broader. Indeed, the Soviets since Brezhnev's time have sought to improve ties to China but did not see fit until launching their own economic program to comment positively on China's reforms. Although the Chinese undoubtedly believe their program could be a model for the USSR, most Soviets find the Chinese approach too politically risky and not suitable to conditions in the USSR. The interest that both sides have in building their domestic economies, however, plays a large role in their efforts to reduce the military tensions between them, to put their relationship on a more sound economic footing, and, at the same time, to reach out to Western countries that can be of help economically. [redacted]

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Moscow's revitalized interest in Japan, for example, fits into the latter category and also could help to advance Soviet interests vis-a-vis China. The Soviets want to show the Chinese that they have other options in Asia, and their efforts to improve relations with Tokyo and with P'yongyang are intended, in part, to serve that end. The Chinese, for their part, are improving relations with Moscow's East European allies, also with the same goal in mind. The Sino-US-Soviet triangular relationship, still critical in the calculations of both Moscow and Beijing, has nevertheless become only one of several triangular relationships that both the Soviets and Chinese are trying to set up as they seek to put pressure on one another even as they move closer together. [redacted]

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**Sino-Soviet Relations:  
The Gorbachev Policy** [ ]

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There has been considerable speculation during the past year about the possibility of a major shift in Soviet policy, with the new Gorbachev regime making a more determined effort to improve the USSR's position in Asia. The replacement of Foreign Minister Gromyko by Shevardnadze helped fuel thinking along this line last summer, as did the hopes and aspirations of a number of Moscow's would-be negotiating partners in Asia. Recent personnel changes and rumors of more to come at several offices dealing with Asian affairs suggest that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have indeed started to assemble a new "Asia team." In the meantime, the Soviets have already become more outspoken in expressing their unhappiness with the extent to which they have been frozen out of the action in East Asia and the Western Pacific, despite their growing military presence in that part of the world. The Soviets also have begun to deal with some of their Asian neighbors in a smoother and, at the same time, more dynamic manner. [ ]

[ ] Gorbachev called for a more flexible and pragmatic approach, better relations with all countries, and an improved style of work in Soviet embassies. [ ]

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[ ] Gorbachev had specifically stressed the need for better relations with the Chinese and had warned his audience against unrealistic expectations that the relationship could return to the golden days of the 1950s, observing that the Soviets must accept China as it is today. A Chinese diplomat in Moscow told the US Embassy that, according to his sources, Gorbachev also had spoken about the importance of recognizing that mistakes had been made and must be corrected. [ ]

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By then, the Soviets had already shown a heightened awareness of Chinese sensitivities on one or two occasions. For example, the Soviets had a Central Committee member—rather than a candidate member of the Politburo—head their team at the first session of the joint committee on economic cooperation, held in Beijing in mid-March. The Chinese had already turned down an invitation to the 27th CPSU Congress, and Gorbachev and his colleagues must have realized that to proceed with their original plan to send First Deputy Premier Talyzin, who had become a candidate member of the Politburo last October, was likely to reinforce Beijing's opposition to a resumption of formal party-to-party ties. First Deputy Premier Arkhipov, who is only a member of the Central Committee, was a much safer choice, and he seems to have made a conscious effort to avoid making any public statements that would add to Chinese irritation over the way the Soviets have exaggerated the progress that the two sides have made on key political issues. [ ]

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***New Approach to the China Problem***

Soviet behavior toward China is a case in point. After years of trying to force the pace at which their relations with Beijing improved, the Soviets have recently become somewhat less heavyhanded in their courtship. This may be partly due to general Soviet satisfaction with the extent to which the two sides have expanded their contacts and their dialogue without any concessions on Beijing's "three obstacles"—Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Soviet military buildup along China's northern border. But it also suggests that the Soviets now recognize that they have made some mistakes with the Chinese over the past few years and believe that a more subtle approach will be more effective in getting Beijing to make the next move. [ ]

***More Adroit Management of Bilateral Relations.***

Gorbachev reportedly made precisely that point in a wide-ranging critique of Soviet foreign policy at a conference held at the Foreign Ministry in late May.

The Soviets have displayed similar caution while taking advantage of an agreement reached while Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa was in Beijing early

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last December for more bilateral consultations on international issues. Igor Rogachev—chief of the Foreign Ministry department responsible for relations with China, Mongolia, and North Korea—accompanied Arkhipov to Beijing in March without any fanfare. Both sides announced that Rogachev had two meetings with the head of the International Organizations Department at the Chinese Foreign Ministry to discuss the UN General Assembly session last fall, and the Soviet media added that their talks had focused on arms control issues. Neither side has said a word about any other talks that Rogachev might have had in Beijing, but he must have asked some questions about Sino-US cooperation, especially in the military sphere. He also would have been a logical choice to explain any new Soviet “ground rules” for Chinese relations with Mongolia or with certain East European countries, or to answer any Chinese questions about Soviet–North Korean relations. [redacted]

*Maneuvering With Third Parties.* A second aspect of the new approach toward Beijing has been the increased attention Moscow has devoted to third parties in triangular relationships that include China and the USSR. The Soviets have worked hard to improve relations with Japan, for example, and have stated publicly that their current goal is to convince Tokyo to put Soviet-Japanese relations on a par with Sino-Japanese relations. Moscow also has taken additional steps to strengthen its ties to P’yongyang. While these contacts can be beneficial in their own right, they remind the Chinese that Moscow has other options in East Asia and that Beijing could be left behind if it continues to drag its feet in dealing with Moscow. They are, in that respect, part of a broader effort aimed at getting the Chinese to move forward on relations and not just an attempt to isolate and encircle China, as the Soviets tried to do during the 1960s and 1970s. [redacted]

Moscow has adopted a more balanced approach in its maneuvering within the Sino-Soviet-US strategic triangle, instead of just focusing on the development of a “China card” to play against the United States. This is clear from the Soviets’ willingness to reopen the Geneva arms talks in January 1985, to meet with President Reagan in Geneva last November, and to hold out the prospect of another Gorbachev-Reagan

meeting this year despite increased criticism of the United States over the past few months. Moscow’s contacts with Washington go well beyond those that the Soviets and Chinese have resumed to date, and thus help underscore the extent to which relations with the United States remain at the top of the Soviet foreign policy agenda, with China a distant second at best. The Soviets probably hope this strategy will help them convince Beijing that, to maintain its leverage in the triangle, it will have to move forward in its dealings with Moscow. [redacted]

The Soviets also are trying to appear more accommodating and flexible, and for this reason have made additional positive gestures within the past six months. Although still determined to keep the Chinese from acquiring too much influence in Eastern Europe, especially with their ideas on economic reforms, Moscow has allowed the Chinese dialogue with the East Germans and Hungarians to go as far as Beijing wishes. The dialogue has even included a discussion of the resumption of party-to-party relations, which the Chinese have not been willing to explore with the Soviets. Moscow also apparently has given the Mongolians a “green light” on seeking further improvement in their relations with Beijing, judging from the recent reports that the Chinese plan to send a deputy foreign minister to Mongolia in August, the first visit by a Chinese official at that level in more than 20 years. [redacted]

*Working Around the “Three Obstacles.”* Gorbachev probably had several motives in receiving Vice Premier Li Peng at the Kremlin in late December. He reportedly restated to Li his interest in party-to-party ties and a Sino-Soviet summit. Gorbachev also apparently used the occasion to make it clear that “third country” issues such as those raised by Beijing’s three obstacles have nothing to do with Sino-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, his session with Li underscored the Soviet leader’s interest in improved relations with Beijing and readiness to get directly involved in the dialogue. [redacted]

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Kapitsa and a number of Moscow's other top experts on China still insist in private discussions that Beijing's three obstacles to improved relations are merely artificial devices that Beijing uses to slow the normalization of Sino-Soviet ties. Few experts seem to question the prevailing Soviet wisdom that the Chinese will abandon those issues in time and that Moscow, in the interim, should try to work around them rather than offer Beijing significant concessions. That attitude may change to some degree now that Gorbachev has said his piece to the foreign policy professionals, but Kapitsa and many of the other top experts on China probably will have to be replaced before Moscow will offer Beijing more than rhetoric or token gestures. [redacted]

#### *The Chinese Response*

Chinese frustration with Gorbachev's smooth style but inflexibility on the issues that matter to them has become increasingly evident. Over the past several months, Beijing has once more turned up the volume of its criticism of Soviet policy and reemphasized its demand for progress on the so-called three obstacles as a precondition for normalizing relations. The downturn on the political side, however, has not slowed the expansion in economic cooperation. This fact alone demonstrates, in our view, that the Chinese are determined to keep Sino-Soviet tensions within manageable limits to give themselves as much breathing space as possible to pursue their economic reform program. [redacted]

*Initial Courtship of New Soviet Leadership.* China's approach to the new Soviet regime has gone through a number of phases. Beijing, anticipating a change in the Soviet leadership last spring, was clearly anxious then to give new impetus to Sino-Soviet relations, in part, we suspect, to avoid losing ground in the Sino-Soviet-US strategic triangle. Indeed, even before Gorbachev's accession, the Chinese had welcomed Arkhipov to Beijing in December 1984 for talks on economic cooperation, had begun playing down the three obstacles, and had resumed referring to Soviet leaders as "comrade" for the first time since the 1960s. Once Gorbachev had assumed power, the Chinese expanded their efforts to ameliorate relations—agreeing to resume long-suspended trade union and parliamentary relations and to exchange visits by

Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Wu this year. We think Beijing offered such inducements to encourage Gorbachev to reassess Moscow's hardline policies toward China's security concerns. The Chinese undoubtedly also saw an opportunity to increase their leverage with Washington, especially if they succeeded in inducing Moscow to be more accommodating. [redacted]

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*Return to a Tougher Political Stance.* The Chinese probably have been disappointed—but not surprised—by the continued Soviet intransigence. As best we can determine, the discussions at the last three rounds of Sino-Soviet consultations—which the Chinese use as a forum for raising the three obstacles—have been as sterile as previous rounds. Moreover, the Chinese probably are chagrined about the way Moscow has tried to use the improved atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations to enhance the Soviet position vis-a-vis the United States. Chinese officials appear to have been particularly upset by Kapitsa's efforts to do so in early January, a month after his most recent visit to Beijing, by leaking a Soviet proposal for a nonaggression treaty. Foreign Minister Wu subsequently denounced Kapitsa as a "liar" before a group of West European diplomats for prematurely announcing that the two sides had agreed on a date for Wu's visit to Moscow this year. [redacted]

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By then, the Chinese were almost going out of their way to single out one or another aspect of Soviet foreign policy for criticism. Wu, for example, took Moscow sharply to task over Afghanistan and Indochina in a speech at the Chinese National People's Congress in mid-January. Chinese foreign ministry officials subsequently dismissed Gorbachev's renewed expressions, at the 27th Congress, of a desire for better relations with China, characterizing them as nothing new and mainly "tactical." [redacted] the Chinese privately turned down an invitation to the 27th Congress from Gorbachev himself—calculating, we believe, that their presence would be seen as a major concession to the Soviets and only encourage the Kremlin to continue to refuse to discuss their security differences. [redacted]

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The Chinese have been equally negative in responding to Soviet overtures for a summit of some kind without any preconditions—that is, without Soviet concessions in advance on the obstacles, especially on the Cambodian problem. At a press conference in Beijing only one day after Deputy Foreign Minister Qian had returned from the April round of political talks, a Chinese official said it would be “unrealistic” to hold such meetings while the obstacles to a normalization of relations remain. The Chinese have taken the same line on a number of occasions since then, both publicly and in their private talks with US representatives and officials of other interested third countries. [redacted]

Meanwhile, the Chinese still refuse to be pinned down on Foreign Minister Wu’s visit to the USSR. [redacted] the two sides did agree in early December on a general time frame for the visit this spring, and on a Shevardnadze visit to China toward the end of this year. We believe the Chinese subsequently backed out of the deal for a number of reasons—involving leadership politics as well as Beijing’s position within the Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship. In late December, soon after Gorbachev had seen Li at the Kremlin, Chinese officials began to insist in private that Wu would not go to Moscow until there had been some Soviet movement on the three obstacles, and General Secretary Hu Yaobang made the same point in an interview in late January. The Chinese have stuck to that position over the past few months and apparently plan to hold the exchange of foreign minister visits hostage until they believe the visits will serve Chinese as well as Soviet purposes. [redacted]

In our view, the Chinese have adopted a tougher stance to try to disabuse Moscow of the notion that China will eventually drop its political demands and move incrementally toward a normalization of party-to-party as well as state-to-state relations. Even more important, perhaps, the Chinese do not want to jeopardize their growing economic links to the West, and thus feel compelled periodically—in our view—to reassure the United States and its allies that Beijing is not prepared to cut a deal with Moscow at the expense of Western security interests. The Chinese also want to encourage their Pakistani and Thai allies to continue to resist the Soviets and their Afghan and Vietnamese clients. [redacted]

*Keeping the Doors Open in Other Channels.* Beijing has not, however, let the impasse in political relations stand in the way of expanding economic ties. Bilateral trade increased to almost \$2 billion last year—the highest level since the late 1950s. (This figure still represents less than 3 percent of China’s total foreign trade and slightly more than 1 percent of Soviet foreign trade.) Beijing also welcomed Arkhipov for the first session of the new joint commission on economic cooperation. At the same time, however, the Chinese received a group of Cambodian resistance leaders and endorsed their latest negotiating offer in an obvious display of solidarity with the resistance forces against the Vietnamese and their Soviet patron. [redacted]

The Arkhipov visit reflects Chinese as well as Soviet interest in keeping the relationship on track. Indeed, we believe the Chinese—despite continued Soviet unwillingness to address their main security concerns—see the steady expansion of economic ties to the Soviet Union and its East European allies as serving their interests in several ways. It helps to reduce Sino-Soviet tensions somewhat, and thus makes it a bit easier for top Chinese leaders to subordinate military modernization to their broader economic modernization drive. It leaves open the possibility at some point of a breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations, in part so the United States does not take Chinese hostility toward the USSR for granted. Finally, it gives China access to Soviet and East European markets and technology. [redacted]

The USSR and China have already agreed to work together on modernizing 17 factories built with Soviet help in the 1950s and on the development of seven new projects—including coal mining, thermal energy production, and possibly railroad electrification. The Chinese also sent some of their experts to Moscow this summer to look at Soviet nuclear power technology, despite the accident at Chernobyl’. An agreement to double the civilian flights between Moscow and Beijing might be even more significant, if there is any basis to the story—said to have originated with East European diplomats in Beijing—that the extra Soviet flights will continue to Hanoi and Vientiane, while the Chinese flights will go on to Warsaw and Berlin. [redacted]

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Moreover, the Chinese—according to one Soviet diplomat in Beijing—were already pushing in early May for yet another visit to China by a Soviet deputy premier, to reciprocate Vice Premier Yao's trip to the USSR in July 1985. The Chinese position reportedly was that Arkhipov had not paid the debt with his visit in March, because that was strictly in connection with the first session of the joint economic committee. The Soviet diplomat also told the US Embassy that the most likely candidates to visit Beijing this fall were First Deputy Premier Aliyev, a full member of the CPSU Politburo, or First Deputy Premier Talyzin, a candidate member. The Chinese have said nothing about the possibility of such a visit, but they might see it as a way to raise the level of the Sino-Soviet dialogue without abandoning their terms for a visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Wu, a resumption of formal party-to-party ties, or some kind of summit.

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**China: Trying To Beat the Odds Along the Soviet Border** [redacted]

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Beijing has discarded the Maoist strategy of luring Soviet forces deep into Chinese territory—trading land for the time needed to organize large guerrilla assaults on overextended Soviet forces—in favor of a more forward, conventional defense plan for industrialized northeast China. This change in strategy was apparently driven by the impressive buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East and Chinese determination not to yield readily key industrial areas to the Soviets in wartime. Prior to 1964, 11 active Soviet ground-combat divisions with fewer than 3,500 tanks and armored vehicles were positioned opposite China. Today, there are 49 active Soviet ground-combat divisions and over 30,000 tanks and armored vehicles along the Sino-Soviet border. [redacted]

- Strengthening border-defense forces by creating more divisions and increasing their armor and artillery holdings.
- Renovating defense industries by acquiring foreign technology to build more advanced weapons.
- Acquiring selected advanced armaments from the West.
- Trimming the armed forces by dismissing at least 2 million redundant personnel from military payrolls.
- Promoting younger officers with recent combat experience against Vietnam to prominent positions in regional and national commands. [redacted]

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***The Active Defense Takes Shape***

Eleven of the 17 field armies in northern China were reorganized into group armies in 1982 and 1983. Notably larger than the field armies, group armies added previously independent artillery, armor, and garrison divisions. This change enhances combined-arms operations and training, and forces infantry commanders to learn to use armor and long-range artillery support effectively. In the 1979 war with Vietnam, infantry commanders often failed to take objectives because they lacked contact with, or were unaware of, available fire support. [redacted]

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[redacted] Beijing now labels the Maoist strategy as inadequate and unworkable, and today's strategy of "active defense" holds that any invasion must be met early and repulsed to preserve the national government and prevent the occupation of Chinese cities. By embracing active defense, China's leaders have abandoned the long-held belief that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could stage a strategic retreat from the northeast and form a new defensive perimeter south of the Huang He River in the initial stages of a conventional war with the Soviet Union. [redacted]

In 1985 Beijing completed the transition to group armies, disestablishing some field armies and redistributing their manpower and equipment to group armies. In northern China, four of the 17 armies were abolished, and those not converted to group armies in the period 1982-83 were upgraded to group army status. Although still in the formative stages, most of the 15 group armies in the north now have over 70,000 men—compared to some 50,000 prior to reorganization—and control four instead of three infantry divisions. [redacted]

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Aware that Soviet strength and China's new strategy require far greater levels of readiness in the standing army, Chinese military leaders—led by Military Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping—have moved decisively to restructure the PLA for modern combat by:

- Reorganizing maneuver armies into more powerful combined-arms armies—called group armies.



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On the basis of [redacted] geographic considerations, we expect that the group armies would fight as cohesive units. If a Soviet attack appeared imminent, group army divisions would probably move forward to prepared defensive positions, blocking likely avenues of approach—such as those opposite Soviet troop concentrations near Vladivostok or along the rail line from Mongolia. Forward deployment of other group armies would depend on the scope, direction, and success of a Soviet incursion.

[redacted]

**The Need for New Weapons**

Hardware shortcomings add to the significant risks imposed by a more aggressive defense posture, and Beijing is attempting to solve them with largely indigenous weapon programs and some foreign assistance. In order to redirect the limited defense budget into research and development, Beijing has ceased production of many obsolete weapons and trimmed the PLA from perhaps 7 million soldiers in 1980 to about 5 million today. Over the past six years, many defense plants have produced almost exclusively for export, reaping sizable profits from over \$6 billion in sales. [redacted]

[redacted] this emphasis on weapons development is paying dividends in areas of greatest need:

- The most critical deficiency the Chinese face is the inability to counter Soviet tanks and armored vehicles arrayed against China. [redacted] in mid-1985 the Chinese began producing an improved tank. It is equipped with a British-designed 105-mm main gun and an advanced fire-control system—both probably acquired from Israel. If, in the next three years, China builds some 1,000 tanks as expected and begins to retrofit its remaining 6,000 Type 59 tanks with the new systems, it will help to reduce some of the qualitative armor edge now held by Soviet forces along the border.

**Stronger Border Defenses, Rapid Striking Power**

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*Before 1978, 11 poorly equipped and severely under-strength border-defense garrison divisions provided a first line of defense in the mountain passes along the most likely Soviet invasion corridors. Today there are 15 such divisions, and most have been converted into five-regiment divisions—with a tank and artillery regiment as well as three infantry regiments—similar to firstline, main-force divisions. In the past, Soviet forces could expect to meet only token resistance in northeastern Shenyang until they reached Harbin. Now there are garrison divisions at Bei'an and Jiamusi with well-constructed defensive positions just south of the cities.* [redacted]

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*Strengthening border garrisons and consolidating units into group armies have not, however, redressed the glaring imbalance in combat power between Soviet and Chinese units. The Chinese thus are beginning to mechanize their armies to give them a rapid striking power. In 1980, China created its first mechanized infantry regiment, armed with 120 armored personnel carriers. Since then, Beijing has mechanized another full division, as well as other selected units deployed in the border region. According to articles in China's military newspaper, the Chinese envision using these elite units to isolate and annihilate a single Soviet unit, hoping to shock Moscow into reassessing its attack. Completely equipping one group army with mechanized infantry divisions, however, will require over 1,400 armored personnel carriers—more than China now produces in two years. The majority of Chinese main-force units, therefore, will continue to plan to fight from positional defenses in advantageous terrain.* [redacted]

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- With severe weaknesses in fighter-interceptor, fighter bomber, and ground attack aircraft, the Chinese are hard pressed to overcome Soviet air superiority. In 1985, however, Beijing stepped up production of its best fighter aircraft, adding 60 F-7s (MIG-21s) to the 190 F-7s based at airfields opposite the Soviet Union. [redacted]




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Even if we can have 10 to 20 years to modernize our armed forces, our weapons and equipment will remain inferior to those of our enemies. For this reason, if war should break out, we must continue to defeat the strong with the weak. It has always been our experience to defeat a superior enemy with inferior equipment, for we wage a righteous war and a people's war. In this, we must have full confidence.

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*Military Commission Chairman  
Deng Xiaoping  
December 1977* [redacted]

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- Beijing also needs to upgrade its ground-based air defenses and improve its early warning capabilities. By 1984 the Chinese placed their copy of the Soviet SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile in series production, providing some protection to group armies from attack helicopters and slow-flying aircraft. [redacted] Beijing also is trying to develop a mobile surface-to-air missile based on a French Crotale battery acquired from Pakistan in 1981. [redacted]

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***Improving Deterrence Without Increasing the Risk of War***

Even in the best of circumstances, however, it will take years for the Chinese to acquire the needed quantities of advanced weapons to ensure that they can halt a Soviet assault before Beijing is overrun. China's leaders acknowledge this weakness (see inset) and continue to see talks with Moscow as the key to managing tensions. Indeed, Beijing faces a major balancing act in bolstering its deterrent—in part through military cooperation and arms acquisition from the West—without unduly increasing friction with its powerful adversary. To this end, we expect Beijing to continue to exchange visits and sign economic and technical agreements with Moscow—without fundamentally altering its assessment of the Soviet threat or significantly slowing the pace of military modernization. [redacted]

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In addition to these programs, Beijing is shopping for Western technology to produce more advanced military hardware. Last fall, the Chinese held an armed helicopter flyoff near Beijing to compare US and French attack helicopters and helicopter-borne anti-tank missiles. The Swiss recently conducted live-fire demonstrations of their mobile, radar-guided anti-aircraft guns in China as well. This summer the Chinese are expected to sign a foreign military sales agreement to equip 50 of their F-8-2 fighter aircraft with a US avionics package and are exploring the possibility of mounting the Italian Aspide 57-km-range, radar-guided, air-to-air missile on this aircraft as well. Although funding for foreign purchases is severely constrained, China's dealings with the Israelis show that Beijing will spend to procure selected advanced systems from the West, particularly if the sales include transfer of the production technology. [redacted]

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China clearly believes that the possibility of a major conflict with the Soviet Union is small and will remain so for at least the 10 years needed to modernize its armed forces. In the interim, we believe Beijing has made an impressive start, implementing a new military strategy that adds to the deterrence value of China's large but dated ground army. Such a strategy ensures that the Soviet Union would be faced with a

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protracted conflict if it made any incursion into northern China. The strategy has already revitalized the discussion of tactics in the PLA and forced officers to think realistically about war on the modern battlefield. Moreover, the strategy and new force structure are well suited to the incorporation of new weapons as they become available, and ongoing training will ensure that units understand the combined-arms requirements of modern warfare. [ ]

### *The Soviet Reaction*

The Soviets probably have a reasonably accurate view of China's progress toward modernizing its armed forces because the Chinese have publicly announced their plans to increase the war-fighting abilities of their army and have openly displayed their new weapons developments for the export market. Still, we have not detected any shift in Soviet force trends in response to these developments, nor is there any evidence that Moscow perceives these Chinese programs to be a grave threat to its security in the immediate future. The Soviets have recently tried to avoid direct confrontation over military issues in their foreign policy toward China, and are attempting to accelerate their rapprochement with the Chinese by calling for meetings between high-level officials and greater economic cooperation. Although Moscow has been critical of the military aspects of China's "Four Modernizations" in the past, it is currently directing its attacks mainly at the United States—alleging that Washington is promoting anti-Soviet sentiment in China and aiding Chinese military modernization for economic gain. [ ]

The Soviets have viewed the Chinese as a potential offensive threat throughout the past 20 years and have structured their forces in the Far East accordingly. Their forces opposite China are positioned to protect the territorial integrity of the USSR and to deter the Chinese from attacking developed areas and lines of communication (LOCs) near the border. Given the proximity of Soviet LOCs and other important installations to the border, the fact that most LOCs run parallel rather than perpendicular to the border, and the vast length of the border itself, defense in depth is not a viable strategy. Thus, Soviet strategy in the Far East probably is to respond to any Chinese offensive with a counteroffensive. Because the Chinese forces lack mobility, the Soviets have been able

to rely upon having early warning and a relatively long reaction time to mobilize their forces before any Chinese attack. Until now, they could also expect weak initial Chinese opposition to Soviet offensive operations in northern China because of China's "luring deep" strategy. Therefore, Moscow will seek, at a minimum, to maintain forces along the border strong enough both to mount effective counterattacks to push back any surprise Chinese incursions and to launch preemptive attacks into Chinese territory to destroy offensive troop concentrations and secure buffer zones near the border. [ ]

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The Soviets would react more dramatically toward Chinese military modernization if they believed the Chinese were becoming more offensively oriented—through the positioning of large numbers of mobile units closer to the border where they would pose a greater threat to Soviet LOCs or strategically important population centers such as Vladivostok. They also would perceive the situation in the Far East as more threatening if the Chinese began to modernize their military forces at an accelerated rate that threatened the effectiveness of Soviet border defense strategy. Chinese plans do not currently call for garrisoning new divisions near the border, only for strengthening the few that are already there. Despite recent progress, Chinese modernization programs also have not yet placed large amounts of modern equipment in the hands of Chinese soldiers. Thus, the Soviets have been able to maintain their overwhelming offensive superiority over the Chinese in recent years. If current Chinese equipment production programs proceed at the relatively slow rate we project, Moscow should be able to prevent the balance of forces on the Sino-Soviet border from being radically altered. Given their continuing qualitative superiority, plus their manpower and equipment constraints, the Soviets probably will defer any further major buildup of their forces opposite China—at least for the next 10 years—and instead continue to follow the pattern of moderate growth and equipment modernization that has characterized their force development in the Far East in the 1980s. [ ]

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## Moscow's View of China's Economic Reforms

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Since Mikhail Gorbachev's election as General Secretary, the Soviets have increased the frequency and the objectivity of their media commentary on the reforms under way in the Chinese economy. This shift, however, reflects the leadership's desire to widen the boundaries of permissible domestic debate on economic reform and to improve Sino-Soviet ties, rather than approval of China's actions. Many Soviet economists privately express admiration for the ambitiousness and determination of the Chinese reform effort, but few advocate Beijing's actual policies. Most Soviet officials and scholars are disturbed by the political riskiness and ideological unorthodoxy of the Chinese reforms, dismiss their applicability to the Soviet economy, and see them as posing an implicit challenge to Soviet leadership of the Communist camp.

### "Socialism With Chinese Characteristics"

The Chinese leadership has described its reform program as an effort to "bring the superiority of the socialist system into full play" by aligning it more closely with conditions unique to present-day China. The reform effort's primary focus initially was on the agrarian sector. In late 1978, a "contract responsibility system" was introduced that gave farmers effective control but not ownership of most of the land. By the mid-1980s, communal farming had disappeared in China. The same period witnessed a revision of state procurement practices that allowed farmers to sell above-quota production at negotiated prices to the state or in free markets. Because of such changes, agricultural production grew at an average annual rate of 8 percent between 1979 and 1983.

After this initial success, the Third Plenum of the 12th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 1984 instituted a broad set of measures aimed at similar improvement in industrial performance (see inset). Greater use of wage and bonus incentives, partial decentralization of the foreign trade apparatus, and reform of the banking system to allow state banks greater autonomy in lending decisions have also been important facets of the reform program.

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### Measures To Improve Industrial Performance

Measures approved at the Third Plenum of China's 12th Party Congress included:

- *Reduced use of mandatory production plans and more emphasis on "guidance" plans that enable enterprises to respond to changing market conditions.*
- *Reduced use of administered prices and the introduction of floating prices for some products to bring supply and demand into balance.*
- *Less involvement of the government and the party in day-to-day business operations.* 25X1
- *Encouragement of many enterprises to compete against each other for profits, but with the state still controlling production and distribution of essential commodities and making major investment decisions.*
- *Allowing enterprises to retain a larger share of their earnings and giving the management of industrial enterprises greater control over wages, bonuses, and investment spending.*  25X1

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The initial results of China's industrial reform effort have been mixed. Growth in output and productivity have been impressive. Figures on last year's economic performance released by the State Statistical Bureau show a spectacular 18-percent growth in industrial output and a 12-percent rise in national income.  25X1

But this economic success has exacted a price. The yearend statistical report also acknowledged 9-percent inflation (triple the rate in 1984) and, according to

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CIA estimates, China had an \$8.2 billion trade deficit in 1985. The drive to make the economy more efficient has resulted in widening income disparities and consumer grumbling over rising food prices. Relaxing economic controls and opening the economic system to foreign trade and investment have sparked widespread economic corruption. [redacted]

All of these "negative phenomena" have been meticulously chronicled by "in-house" critics of the reforms and openly acknowledged by Deng and his fellow reformers. But self-criticism and periods of retrenchment have not been allowed to obscure the ultimate goal. The current throttling-back of the reform drive was decreed late last year to allow the economic system to adjust to the reforms already introduced, but Beijing has made it clear that further reforms are in the offing. The session of the Sixth National People's Congress that ended on 12 April endorsed further ambitious reforms to be implemented from 1987 to 1990 and generally enhanced the political position of proreform party leaders. [redacted]

**The Soviet Perspective**

Gorbachev's election as General Secretary brought a qualitative and quantitative change in Soviet media treatment of the Chinese economy. According to a noted Soviet political commentator, predominant "conservative thinking" under Chernenko had led to a virtual ban on publishing assessments of the Chinese reforms. The new General Secretary's calls for improvements in the Soviet economy and his evident interest in economic changes made by other Communist countries effectively lifted that ban. [redacted]

Soviet commentary on the Chinese reforms since March 1985 has been comparatively plentiful and fairly balanced, at times noting with apparent envy the impressive growth figures of Chinese industry and agriculture. On occasion media comment has gone even further—to draw vignettes of a happier and more prosperous Chinese population or to treat controversial subjects such as the growth of the private sector without negative comment. [redacted]

Usually, however, Soviet media focus on inflation, unemployment, and the other "negative phenomena" produced by Beijing's sweeping economic reform

drive. Widening income disparities, in particular, have figured prominently in Moscow's appraisals; one article even warned of imminent "kulakization" (unjust enrichment of certain peasants at the expense of others) of the Chinese countryside. [redacted]

In appraising the Chinese scene in their media, the Soviets employ the familiar tactic of quoting indigenous critics rather than expressing criticism themselves. In this way, Moscow can register a negative opinion without incurring risks to the bilateral political atmosphere. The Chinese leadership's willingness to permit open debate on economic and ideological issues provides Soviet critics with much grist for their mill. [redacted]

The private views of Soviet officials, economists, and scholars on the Chinese reforms, not surprisingly, cover a far broader range than those presented in the media. Some are openly enthusiastic about the profound changes taking place in China. Last December, for example, Fedor Burlatskiy, a Soviet journalist well known for his reformist stance, made a trip to China and afterwards gave US Embassy officials a "glowing" description of the results of the reforms, noting the candor with which Chinese officials acknowledged problems and their strong commitment to pursuing reform. Other Soviet scholars, however, have been scornful of the Chinese reform program. Last October, for example, a Soviet sinologist described it as "a mad rush into an unmanageable economic mishmash." [redacted]

[redacted]

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Recently, however, most Soviets [redacted]

economic reform and, if successful, could further discredit the Soviet model of a planned, centralized economy. [redacted]

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have stressed the gulf between the two countries' levels of economic and social development (China's population is still 60 percent rural, for example, compared with the USSR's 35 percent) and other significant differences. A China scholar at the USA Institute in November 1985 noted that while China had too little land and too many workers, the Soviet Union had the opposite problem in land and too few workers in areas where they were most needed. Other experts have referred to the less highly skilled Chinese work force, the predominance of the agricultural sector in the Chinese economy, and other obstacles to borrowing directly from the Chinese. [redacted]

Chinese believe Gorbachev is afraid that if China gets ahead of the Soviet Union on economic reform, the confidence of other "socialist" countries in Soviet "socialism" will be weakened. [redacted]

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The Soviets clearly are unwilling to make the psychological leap of granting China's reformed economy the status of a "model" that they or other Communist countries might emulate. From the Soviets' viewpoint, the scope, speed, and nature of the changes in China, the world's most populous Communist state, and the attention given these changes by foreign media must make Beijing's reforms appear a more formidable challenge to their own economic model and to their role as the leading Communist state than Hungary's 20-year-old reform program. [redacted]

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Historical and cultural differences between the two societies and the political risks posed by Chinese-style reforms are also frequently cited as barriers to Soviet emulation of China. A prominent Soviet journalist told US Embassy officials, shortly after Gorbachev's accession, that reforms of the type introduced by Beijing were possible only because China was a "relatively new socialist country." [redacted]

Another aspect of Moscow's attitude toward Beijing's reform program may be fear. The possibility that the Chinese could make a great success of their experiment, not only discrediting Moscow's more measured approach but also building up even more formidable economic and military strength and moving closer to the West, almost certainly is disquieting to the Soviets. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

Indeed, adapting Chinese reforms to Soviet conditions would require a significant reduction in political control over economic decision making, overhaul of official ideology, restructuring of key institutions, and a radical change in managerial attitudes and behavior. Any one of these would be a tall order for such a well-entrenched, essentially conservative elite. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Many Soviet sinologists, [redacted] have contended that, given the "backwardness" of China's economy, the Chinese would profit more from following the Soviet example than vice versa. Soviet diplomats and other officials have also made this point, in part apparently out of irritation that the Chinese may have stolen the Soviets' thunder on

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## Other Topics

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### Neoglobalism: New Soviet Formulation on the United States and the Third World

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Since mid-December Soviet journalists, international affairs specialists, and, on at least two occasions, General Secretary Gorbachev have used the term "neoglobalism" to describe what they assert is a new American philosophy and doctrine for the Third World. Neoglobalism is defined as the US administration's design to promote its interests by exploiting and initiating regional conflicts using a variety of political, economic, and military instruments. Extended discussions of neoglobalism have focused on the challenge that a more activist US Third World policy poses for Soviet efforts to consolidate their own Third World gains.

relative decline of US ability to influence events in the Third World due to growing military, economic, and domestic political constraints. More recent discussions have focused on the difficulties affecting Soviet prospects for exploiting openings in the Third World and on the challenges presented by a US administration intent on building its military strength and playing an active role in regional disputes. Such shifts in the Soviet line usually result from a variety of factors, including changes in Soviet views of the outside world, internal political debates, and the desire of new leaders to put their own stamp on theory and policy. The last of these factors probably played an important role in the recent gestation of "neoglobalism."  25X1

The Soviets use ideological formulations of this kind for several purposes, including integrating separate propaganda themes, defending positions staked out in internal policy debates, rationalizing policy decisions for internal and external audiences, and explaining their assessments of the outside world. In this instance, the concept of neoglobalism is, at the very least, a useful propaganda vehicle and an explanation of recent developments in the Third World. Taken more seriously, it could be intended as an argument for a cautious Soviet external policy designed to complement domestic economic revitalization and lower growth in military spending.

#### *Neoglobalism Defined*

According to Soviet commentators—who suggest that the term was taken from *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis—the basis of neoglobalism is a renewed US insistence on defining the US sphere of interest as the entire world. To promote its "imperialist" interests, the Reagan administration is said to be ready to prolong existing regional conflicts that threaten "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" governments, such as Angola and Afghanistan, and to initiate new confrontations with countries that do not suit US preferences, such as Libya and Syria. The administration is said to justify these activities in terms of supporting democracy, antiterrorism, and anti-Communism.  25X1

#### *Evolution of Soviet Assessments*

Over the past decade, Soviet formulations describing the US approach to the Third World have gradually evolved away from the generally optimistic assessments of the late 1970s, which emphasized the

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Soviet propagandists have produced a steady stream of articles picturing the United States as ready to use a wide variety of instruments in pursuit of its neoglobalist objectives, including:

- Economic leverage that exploits Third World underdevelopment and debt to increase dependency on the West.
- Political pressure intended to remove rightwing dictators who have become counterproductive to US purposes in favor of more respectable, but still pliable, leaders who may be able to deflect pressure for revolutionary change.
- Covert and open military assistance for "bandits, terrorists, and counterrevolutionaries."
- Direct US military intervention with Rapid Deployment Forces, "light divisions," and other power-projection forces. [redacted]

#### **Expanded Discussions**

*Izvestiya* political observer Aleksandr Bovin has used the notion of neoglobalism as a point of departure for an extended political analysis of specific international situations that create openings for US policy. He notes that a variety of factors, including economic backwardness, the strength of tradition and religion, and the errors of vanguard revolutionary leaderships, have nurtured counterrevolution against "socialist-oriented" Third World states and pushed a proportion of the "workers and peasants" into the counterrevolutionary camp.<sup>1</sup> Bovin claims that these developments provide the United States with opportunities to exploit the difficulties of the socialist-oriented states through propaganda, psychological and economic warfare, and military backing for counterrevolutionary forces. [redacted]

Bovin repeats the obligatory argument that US efforts are ultimately futile "in principle" since the forces of history cannot be reversed. However, he points out that US strength can, in some circumstances, retard or even roll back revolutionary gains, as occurred in

<sup>1</sup> Moscow's list of "socialist-oriented" states changes from time to time but currently includes among its most prominent members Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Cambodia. [redacted]

Chile and Grenada, and warns that "we cannot yet exclude the possibility of its happening again." A socialist-oriented state must thus be vigilant and "know how to defend itself," a process that will be difficult and drawn out. He concludes optimistically that over the long haul imperialist interference will promote the consolidation of revolutionary forces and the buildup of internationalist aid, leading to the ultimate defeat of counterrevolution. [redacted]

Another extended treatment of neoglobalism was provided by Maj. Gen. (Reserve) F. Gontar in a March 1986 article in the Soviet military newspaper *Red Star*. Gontar observes that US security aid for reactionary regimes and counterrevolutionary forces is "one of the most effective and cheapest ways" of promoting imperialist interests. He claims that to cover its "aggressive" regional policies the United States seeks to blame the USSR for promoting regional tensions and then uses these charges as an excuse for lack of progress in bilateral relations with the USSR on disarmament and other critical East-West issues. He asserts that the USSR believes that any local conflict "is fraught with the danger of escalating into a clash on a major, even global, scale" and calls on the United States to abandon its neoglobalist policy and join in a collective search for settlements to regional conflicts. [redacted]

#### **Gorbachev and Neoglobalism**

General Secretary Gorbachev has publicly mentioned neoglobalism on at least two occasions. First, he used the term in a speech during the March visit of Algerian President Bendjedid to tie together criticism of US policy in Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Libya. The second reference appeared in an interview in the Algerian publication *Revolution Africaine*, in which he defined neoglobalism as a "hastily devised" doctrine used by the United States to "crush the liberated countries and halt the forces of history." He noted that neoglobalism "in general terms" represents nothing new, reflecting rather an attempt to return to the "classical brigandage" of imperialism. [redacted]

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**Significance of Neoglobalism**

At one level, the concept of neoglobalism offers the Soviets a useful vehicle for integrating many of the propaganda themes they have been using in recent months to try to discredit US policy in the international arena, notably accusations against Washington of promoting "state terrorism" and the export of "counterrevolution." Gorbachev's speech on the occasion of the Algerian President's visit to Moscow is one example of how the charge of neoglobalism is used in this context. Also, recent Soviet press coverage of US actions toward Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Libya has prominently featured neoglobalism as an explanation of alleged US aggression against these states.

[redacted]

The timing of neoglobalism's advent as a propaganda theme suggests it is in part a counter to the US emphasis on regional issues before and during last year's Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. Moscow has used the theme to castigate the alleged insincerity of US proposals on Third World issues, portraying Washington's underlying policy as one of interference and aggression. Moreover, at least one Soviet commentator has used the concept to criticize the United States specifically for elevating Third World issues to the same level of importance as arms control on the US-Soviet agenda and for claiming that there should be linkage between progress in these areas.

[redacted]

While Soviet commentators have dealt with various aspects of these themes individually in the past few years, collecting them all under the neoglobalism rubric may, in part, reflect Soviet responses to several relatively recent developments in the international arena. For example, the intensification of Third World debt problems, especially in Latin America, has presented Moscow—as well as Havana—with a lucrative target for political exploitation. Soviet perception of US adroitness in preempting radical change in Haiti and the Philippines, the high-profile American debates over military aid to antigovernment forces in Nicaragua and Angola, and the growth of official US interest in the problems of low-intensity conflict in general also probably contributed to the focus on the instruments of neoglobalism.

[redacted]

Against the background of these developments, Soviet discussion of neoglobalism may also reflect a measure of genuine concern over US intentions and capabilities to challenge Soviet interests in the Third World. By contrast with more optimistic Soviet writings on the Third World from the 1970s and early 1980s, current analyses keyed to US neoglobalism paint a more problematic picture for Soviet interests. They:

- Portray the United States as holding a high degree of initiative in the Third World, as opposed to previous analyses that showed "progressive forces" to be in the ascendance.
- Acknowledge the growth of US military forces that could be used in Third World conflicts, where earlier writings focused on post-Vietnam limitations on US use of force abroad. 25X1
- Say relatively little about the domestic constraints on the US administration noted by many commentators in the 1970s: "realistic elements" of US ruling circles, public opinion, and Congress, for example.
- Fail to depict the Third World economic crisis as a source of easy opportunities for Soviet gains, a theme previously sounded by some Soviet observers of the debt problem. 25X1

Between the lines, writings on US neoglobalism suggest that, at least for the moment, the global correlation of forces may not be running in Moscow's favor and that the Third World is going to be a difficult and potentially treacherous arena for Soviet interests for the next few years.

[redacted]

This image of the United States and the Third World may serve Moscow as a useful rationalization of Third World policy in a period in which, as evidenced by the recent 27th Soviet Party Congress, Soviet leaders have apparently decided to concentrate on domestic economic revitalization and East-West relations and have warned of the limits to Soviet economic aid. In this context, "neoglobalism" could be used to justify

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to both internal and external audiences a relatively low-profile Soviet approach to the Third World—an approach that would not demand a major increase in military or economic outlays or cut across Soviet efforts to appeal to Western opinion on SDI, arms control, and other issues. [redacted]

**Implications for Soviet Policy**

Neoglobalism probably will continue to be a central theme of Soviet propaganda activity in coming months. Soviet comments both on US policy toward particular countries or regions and on US foreign policy in general will play up alleged US neoglobalist intentions and the threat they supposedly pose to both Third World stability and progress in East-West relations. This message will be aimed not only at Third World audiences, but at European and American ones as well. Moscow will try to use the theme to influence Western debates on aiding anti-Soviet insurgents and on the relative priority of regional, as opposed to arms control, issues. In addition, we expect the Soviets and their Cuban allies to feature the concept prominently in their attempts to influence Third World organizations, including this summer's meetings of the Nonaligned Movement in Zimbabwe, and in materials they seek to place in the Third World media. Finally, Moscow will probably continue to put forward regional proposals of its own from time to time to polish its image and influence Western deliberations on Third World questions, contrasting its initiatives with alleged US neoglobalist behavior.

[redacted]

The implications of neoglobalism for Soviet operational policy in the Third World are as yet unclear: the concept is still quite "young" as a theoretical formulation, and the positions of Bovin, Gontar, or, for that matter, Gorbachev in any internal debates that may be under way over Soviet Third World policy cannot yet be fixed with precision. We believe, however, that the following preliminary conclusions can be drawn:

- The Bovin analysis echoes the arguments of one school of Soviet theorists that the securing of Soviet gains in the Third World is likely to be a lengthy process subject to occasional reversals.

- The image of a US administration currently bent on belligerent assertion of US interests implicitly cautions against near-term Soviet risk-taking in the Third World.

- There is no implication that the USSR ought not try to exploit Third World opportunities should they arise, particularly if risks are perceived to be low and payoffs substantial. There seems to be a warning, however, that the benefits of new interventions in the Third World should be carefully weighed against the expected costs of defending new clients.

[redacted]

On a broad scale, the neoglobalist focus on the problems of defending the revolution in "socialist-oriented" regimes against an activist Western challenge suggests that at least some Soviet leaders believe that Moscow's Third World policy should presently be keyed to consolidation and incremental advancement rather than militant expansion. Implicit in this argument is the tactical prescription that the USSR concentrate its material resources on the military defense of existing Third World allies such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia, while deflecting Western involvement in these areas by trying to influence international organizations and Western political processes.

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### Work Position Certification: Seeking Hidden Labor Reserves

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The Soviet Union is experiencing an abrupt decline in labor force growth. The average annual increment to the civilian labor force fell from 2.1 million in the 1970s to 1.2 million during the period 1981-85 (see graph). During the 12th Five-Year Plan period (1986-90) the labor force is expected to increase by only 4.1 million workers, or an average of 0.8 million per year. Moreover, much of this increment will come from the Central Asian republics, which have a labor surplus, rather than from the highly industrialized western regions of the country with the greatest demand for new labor.

Despite declining labor force growth, the Soviet leadership maintains that there is an adequate supply of workers and the problem is poor utilization of labor. In his report to the CPSU Central Committee on 26 February 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev criticized "planning and economic bodies that permit creation of excessive numbers of jobs" as well as enterprises that have "the same volume of work as similar organizations abroad [but] have a significantly larger number of workers." According to an estimate recently published by the State Committee on Labor and Social Problems (Goskomtrud), in 1985 the number of job slots in industry exceeded the number of available workers by 12 percent. A new policy attempts to discourage the creation of excess job slots and to curtail the pervasive practice of hoarding labor and obsolete equipment. This policy—work position certification—will compel enterprises to carefully and systematically document their workers' jobs and equipment.


#### *Why Soviet Managers Hoard Labor*

Enterprise managers hoard labor as a hedge against steadily rising plan targets and normal disruptions in work activity associated with erratic supply of materials and equipment, a problem inherent in the Soviet system. When overdue supplies finally arrive at production facilities, surplus workers are needed to make up for lost time. They also help in meeting requirements to supply labor for the harvest or special civic projects.

#### USSR: Average Annual Increments to the Civilian Labor Force, 1971-95<sup>a</sup>

Million persons

2.5



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<sup>a</sup> The estimates for 1986-95 assume that labor force participation rates remain roughly constant and that military manpower increases gradually from 6.1 million persons in 1985 to 6.3 million in 1995.

<sup>b</sup> Projected.

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The resulting high labor costs generally are not viewed with concern by managers. In practice, any savings in labor achieved by an enterprise is likely to be taken back by planners the following year. Moreover, since the number of workers partly determines the size of wage and bonus funds, management has another incentive to hoard labor. An experiment aimed at easing this problem, begun at the Shchekino Chemical Combine in 1967, has achieved only limited success (see inset on next page).

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To justify high staffing levels, enterprise managers often hold on to obsolete equipment, as well as compete for new machinery and construction. This

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**The Shchekino Method**

*In 1967 an experiment was initiated at the Shchekino Chemical Combine. Under the terms of the experiment, the combine was allowed to cut its staff while maintaining a fixed wage fund and was given the right to use a percentage of wage fund savings to reward workers who participated in laborsaving practices such as combining jobs or taking on more machines. The Shchekino method scored quick successes. Hundreds of jobs were eliminated, productivity and output increased, and wages rose above the national average. The experiment enjoyed official favor and spread to hundreds of other enterprises, albeit often in diluted form.*

*After these initial gains, the Shchekino Combine ran into problems. The ministries began to change the rules. New instructions were issued a number of times, and some of the wage fund savings were taken back. Bonus money dwindled, and workers began to leave the plant on their own accord. A decade after the start of the experiment, the Shchekino Combine failed to meet its planned targets. Nevertheless, the Shchekino method and new variations of the method continue to be promoted by the leadership and offered as an option to all enterprises.*

tendency to accumulate plant and machinery to justify holding on to labor is reflected in several key indicators:

- Declining capital productivity.
- A doubling of the capital-labor ratio since 1970.
- A decline in the shift coefficient of equipment—the average number of shifts worked on a piece of machinery in 24 hours. (Because of the relative shortage of highly skilled workers, the more sophisticated the machinery, the lower its level of utilization.)
- The increasing gap between new work positions and increments to the supply of labor.

**An Early Attempt To Curtail Labor Hoarding**

Rising Soviet concern over poor utilization of labor in the 1970s led to remedial measures under a comprehensive 1979 decree on planning and management. First, ministries and enterprises were given personnel ceilings and targets for the reduction of manual labor positions. Second, regional authorities were tasked with drawing up balances in supply and demand for workers. Soviet press reports indicated, however, that the effectiveness of these measures was minimal, largely because reliable, detailed information on labor resources and labor requirements was not available. In large part, the work position certification program is designed to fill the information gap.

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**Work Position Certification**

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After several years of preparation, including experimental application in the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building, a decree on work position certification was issued in August 1985 by the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Council of Trade Unions. The decree tasks enterprises with preparing a comprehensive inventory and evaluation of every “work position”—defined as the work area, materials, and equipment associated with the labor of one or more workers. The worker’s skill level and the technical level and condition of machinery are to be evaluated along with health and safety conditions in the workplace.

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Enterprises themselves are tasked with carrying out the actual survey, evaluation, and upgrading of work positions. Certification committees, composed of enterprise, party, and trade union representatives, are to be set up within each enterprise for this purpose.

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The decree envisions that certification data will:

- Allow identification of obsolete equipment that can be scrapped to free up valuable floorspace, lowering requirements for future construction and making it harder for managers to justify overstaffing.
- Give republic-level government and party officials the data needed to plan regional labor balances.
- Allow identification of work positions that could be converted to part-time or home work for pensioners, women with children, and the handicapped.

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- Provide information to be used in planning new construction and reconstruction to match plant capacities with future labor availability.

Existing placement bureaus are to relieve the enterprises of much of the burden of retraining and placing workers. While workers are not required to accept the services of the bureaus, the number of workers placed through this system has increased steadily in recent years. If successfully implemented, work position certification should accelerate this trend.

#### **Implementation**

We have only limited information about the process of implementing the work certification program. According to Goskomtrud, it was to be extended first throughout the machine-building industry, reflecting the sector's increased priority under Gorbachev. The program was then to move on to other industrial enterprises and be fully applied throughout the rest of the economy by the end of 1987. According to the decree, enterprises must conduct the certification process at least twice during each five-year plan period.

In February 1986 Goskomtrud reported that 38 percent of industrial enterprises had completed, or nearly completed, work position certification. According to the same report, the program has been successful in enterprises where certification "is conducted in a businesslike fashion, and not as a mere formality." It is not clear what percentage of enterprises fit into this category. No other figures have been given to indicate the overall progress of the program.

The Soviets have published information on the progress of implementation within some ministries. The Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building was cited as a positive example for having eliminated 25,000 work positions, released 35,000 workers, and retired 60 million rubles' worth of equipment. The Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production achieved far less success. Only 25.5 percent of the work positions in this ministry were surveyed, and of the 22,500 positions surveyed, only 250 were eliminated. Moreover, some press articles charge that many of the workers reportedly "freed up" by the elimination of work positions were moved to another shift or to other jobs within the same factory.

#### **Problems in Implementation**

The work certification program has run into a number of administrative problems, including foot-dragging by managers and poor communications. There have been several complaints in the Soviet press about the failure of enterprises to conduct work position certification properly. Some enterprise managers have falsely reported completion of the process. Others have skipped over auxiliary work positions, which are difficult to certify because such workers often do not use equipment or have a fixed work station.

Enterprise managers find it disadvantageous to carry out the certification process properly for a number of reasons. The process itself is labor intensive. The inventory and evaluation, if done according to the rules, takes weeks to complete. Workers serving on certification committees are taken away from their regular duties. Once the inventory is complete, there are further problems. Substandard work positions must be upgraded, new equipment and parts ordered, and construction workers and assemblers engaged. Here, again, there are delays and shortages of materials and equipment.

According to press articles, the flow of information on the certification program between enterprises, ministries, departments, and research institutes has been anything but smooth. There have been complaints of confusion, conflicting and incomplete guidelines, and missing documents. Plans to improve communication and ease the administrative burden by automating the processing of certification data are not likely to be realized in the near future. Finally, there has been a lack of coordination between the planners who are supposed to use the results of certification and the administrators who draw up guidelines for the program in each industry. The specifics of how planners are to use certification data have yet to be worked out.

#### **Prospects**

The work position certification program will continue to face substantial implementation problems, which may even increase as the program spreads into work

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activities inherently difficult to define, such as those in consumer services and agriculture. Although enterprises can be denied access to investment funds if they do not certify work positions, the absence of effective penalties for failure to conduct the process properly threatens not only the pace of implementation but also the quality of the information collected. Clearly, unreliable data would be of little use to planners in determining labor requirements and could even lead to decisions that would increase the misallocation of labor. Moreover, even if the program were to lead to the release of substantial numbers of workers, it is not clear that they could be effectively reallocated. The workers released are likely to be the least skilled and least motivated. Placing them in new jobs may be difficult without extensive retraining and an improved system for matching jobs with workers.

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## More Women in the Soviet Leadership?

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*Many new, energetic workers of the modern mold have recently been put forward into responsible posts . . . Women are being more actively brought forward into leadership positions. There are now more of them in party and soviet organs.*

*Mikhail S. Gorbachev  
at the 27th CPSU Congress*

### **Historical Legacy**

Since the revolution, Soviet women have made up an increasing percentage of the work force and the party apparatus; they have not, however, managed to play more than a token role in the top leadership. Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya, was the first Soviet woman to hold a position of power, serving briefly as a member of the Secretariat of the Bolshevik Party. Krupskaya remained essentially an adjunct of Lenin during his lifetime, and, after his death, retained prestige but little power. Yekaterina Furtseva, a favorite of Khrushchev, was the only woman ever to serve on the Politburo, and she was relegated to the less vital duties of the ministry of culture. Her career ended ignominiously with charges of corruption and her sudden death.

### **A Matter of Policy**

The issue of promoting women to leadership positions has been raised as a matter of policy by the Gorbachev regime in a series of official documents and speeches. The CPSU Program adopted at the 27th Congress called for the party to "more actively nominate women for leadership work." This phrase put an official stamp on a concern that Gorbachev had expressed previously at the April 1985 plenum, namely the need to engender "more active movement of leading cadres" by means that would include promoting women "to responsible posts with greater boldness." In the February 1986 Political Report of the Central Committee, Gorbachev again addressed this matter in speaking of "invigorating the party leadership," claiming that "women are being more actively brought forward into leadership positions" and adding that "there are now more of them in party and soviet organs."

### **Biryukova: A Member in Her Own Right**

The regime's most visible move to expand the number of women in the leadership was the promotion to the Secretariat of Aleksandra Biryukova.<sup>1</sup> Although Biryukova will undoubtedly be expected to serve as a spokesperson on women's issues, she also has an important portfolio. Her responsibilities appear to include light industry and the production of consumer goods, domestic trade, and labor affairs.

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In addressing women's issues, Biryukova breaks no new ground. She praises Soviet women for their progress and achievements to date. She promises no more than what already has been outlined in the latest five-year plan. She compares favorably the conditions faced by Soviet women with those faced by women in other countries, specifically lauding the Soviet woman's supposed equal opportunity in education, her right to work, and her right to equal pay. Finally, as befits Soviet tradition, Biryukova reserves her greatest praise for the Soviet woman in that "lofty and fine mission—to be a mother."

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Since her appointment to the Secretariat, Biryukova's only public speeches have been made on International Women's Day and, therefore, have centered around women's issues. However, she has taken part in a fairly wide range of public activities. In a recent Moscow radio interview, Biryukova credited herself with a role in the development of a "new economic mechanism" designed to dramatically improve the quality and assortment of consumer goods and services but described her main task in the Secretariat as overseeing the "technical retooling of the sector."

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<sup>1</sup> It is possible that Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, has influenced her husband in his deliberations regarding the appointment of women to leadership positions. She herself has a doctorate in philosophical science from the prestigious Moscow State University. Also, since Gorbachev became General Secretary, she and the wives of other Politburo members have enjoyed greater visibility.

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**Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova**

*Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova (Phonetic: beeryooKOVah) Secretary, Central Committee CPSU (since March 1986)*

*Biryukova has boasted of her humble origins, saying that her ancestors for many generations were "peasants of the lowest rank." She herself grew up learning farm work.*

*Her future took a more urban turn as she graduated from the Moscow Textile Institute, wrote her doctoral dissertation, and joined the ranks of the engineering profession. In 1964, at the age of 35, Biryukova became chief engineer at the Trekhgornaya Moscow Cotton Combine. In 1968 she became a secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), and in 1985, its deputy chairman.*

*Biryukova was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1971, and a member in 1976. She has participated in many conferences on women's issues, including a 1984 meeting in New York of the UN Commission on Elimination of Discrimination Toward Women and the 1985 UN Decade for Women Conference in Nairobi.*

**Competition for the Top Spot**

There were apparently few contenders for the top spot accorded to Biryukova. According to the US Embassy in Moscow, a Soviet correspondent claims that Gorbachev demanded that a woman be represented in the Secretariat, and Biryukova was his choice. There were

reportedly two other candidates: Valentina Shevchenko and Valentina Tereshkova. Before the 27th Congress, Shevchenko was the highest ranking Soviet woman because of her position as chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Tereshkova's claim to fame was her role as cosmonaut, a role to which she was propelled on the basis of her experience as an amateur parachutist. According to the correspondent, Gorbachev personally picked Biryukova over Shevchenko and Tereshkova because Biryukova was more "dynamic and aggressive." [redacted]

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**Getting the Numbers Up**

The regime also has taken steps below the level of the Secretariat to demonstrate that it intends to fulfill its promise to place more women in senior positions. In a report to the CPSU congress, Georgiy Razumovskiy, the new CPSU secretary in charge of personnel appointments, described the increasing number of women in party leadership positions:

*The number of women in the party increases from year to year, from congress to congress; there are more of them within the elective party bodies; more of them are rising to the leadership of various sectors in the building of Communism. Their number among the delegates of the party congresses, too, is increasing constantly: 1,352 women have been elected to the 27th Congress; this is 27 percent of all delegates. This is the highest number—in absolute as well as in percentage terms—in the whole history of the CPSU.*

On the basis of figures cited at the 26th Congress by Ivan Kapitonov, then secretary for party personnel, the number of female delegates shows an increase of 1.7 percent from the 1,329 female delegates in 1981, barely enough to justify the claim of progress. [redacted]

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This increase in the number of female congress delegates reflects in part the expanding but still limited number of women in the party. According to published data, 8 percent of party members in 1920

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**Female Full Members of the Central Committee**  
(Elected at the 27th CPSU Congress)

Biryukova, Aleksandra Pavlovna  
*Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU*

Pereverzeva, Nina Vasil'yevna  
*Team leader, Kolkhoz Put' Lenina (Rostov Oblast)*

Cherkashina, Valentina Nikolayevna  
*Spinner, Kamyshinskiy Cotton Combine (Volgograd Oblast)*

Pletneva, Valentina Nikolayevna  
*Presidium member of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions*

Golubeva, Mariya Arkhipovna  
*Brigade leader, State Breeding Farm Khatun (Altay Krai)*

Shevchenko, Valentina Semenova  
*Chairman, Presidium, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet*

Golubeva, Valentina Nikolayevna  
*Weaver, Ivanovo Worsted Combine imeni V. I. Lenin (RSFSR)*

Tereshkova, Valentina Vladimirovna  
*Cosmonaut; Chairman, Committee of Soviet Women*

Gromova, Mariya Sergeyevna  
*Milkmaid, Kommunarka, Leninskiy Rayon (Moscow Oblast)*

Udalaya, Raisa Silant'yevna  
*Riveter, Novosibirsk Aviation Plant (RSFSR)*

Karpova, Yevdokiya Fedorovna  
*Deputy Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers*

Yershova, Neli Mikhaylovna  
*Toolsetter, Perm' Machine Building Plant imeni F. Ye. Dzerzhinskiy Production Association (RSFSR)*

Kruglova, Zinaida Mikhaylovna  
*Chairman, Presidium, Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries*



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were women, 15 percent in 1934, 19 percent by the end of World War II, and 20 percent two decades later, in 1965. As of 1983, the share of women in the party stood at 27 percent, although women represent 51 percent of the national labor force (excluding collective farmers) in the economy.

13 of the 307 full members are women. Six of those female full members are newly raised from their 1981 candidate status or from their role in the Central Auditing Commission. Since all six of these are workers—milkmaids, spinners, riveters—the promotion of these women to full membership status suggests a hasty effort to show results.

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Closer to the center of power, the new Central Committee also shows an increase in the number of women. Indeed, Razumovskiy might have boasted of the 63-percent increase in the number of female full members of the Central Committee in 1986 over 1981; by doing so, however, he might have drawn attention to the fact that, even in the new body, only

At the regional level as well, there is evidence of a similarly hasty effort to promote women. Looking at the representation of women at the republic bureau and secretariat levels for example, we find, first of all,

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**Table 1**  
USSR: Higher Educational Attainment by Sex

	Number With Higher Education (per 1,000 population 10 years of age or older)		Female-to-Male Ratio
	Females	Males	
1959	20	27	0.74
1970	37	48	0.77
1979	62	75	0.83
1986	83	92	0.90

very few women: eight in 1981 and nine in 1986. For the most part, the same women who held positions at this level in 1981 continued to do so in 1986, the difference being that in 1981 most of the women were simply candidate bureau members, whereas in 1986 most became full bureau members and/or members of the secretariat. [redacted]

#### **Women in the Labor Force**

The dearth of women of substance at various levels of the party structure or in management positions in the labor force is a reflection of the role of women in Soviet society. Soviet women have enjoyed substantial achievement in terms of education and participation in the labor force. About 85 percent of women 16 to 55 years old work, probably the highest rate in the world. However, despite the achievements, there tends to be an inverse relationship between rate of pay and the proportion of women in a particular occupation or sector. Women tend to predominate in sectors with relatively low pay. [redacted]

Soviet women are expected to be mothers first and foremost, and to work all the while. Party propaganda reinforces the characterization of women as mother-workers, with the purpose of fostering an increase in the labor supply. Statements on the rewards of motherhood, in particular, are much more voluminous than the few references to women in leadership. Moreover, the persistence of traditional male attitudes toward women is likely to restrict their advancement. Soviet

**Table 2**  
USSR: Pay in Selected Sectors, 1985

	Females as a Share of Salaried Workers (percent)	Average Monthly Salary (in rubles)
<b>All Workers and Employees</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>190</b>
Of which:		
Education	75	142
Culture	74	116
Trade and public dining	83	145
Health, physical culture, and social security	82	131

males generally expect women to take full care of the home and the family, while holding less prestigious and less powerful positions in the work force. [redacted]

#### **Outlook: Tokens at the Top**

The regime has taken concrete, if limited, measures to expand the role of women in the leadership. If the issue of the promotion of women were being raised simply in the context of improving the lot of women, we might easily assume that the talk was propaganda. But the fact that the promotion of women is described as one means of achieving a revitalized party cadre, a cadre that is to invigorate the economy, suggests that we may be seeing the beginnings of a new policy approach. [redacted]

Biryukova conceivably could be moved up further, to the Politburo, if Gorbachev wants to show he means business. There are few women at the top, however, in a position to ride on her coattails. Outside of Shevchenko and Tereshkova, the only other women who are full members of the Central Committee and whose jobs have some political substance are Yevdokiya Karpova, Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and Valentina Pletneva, a Presidium member of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), Biryukova's former workplace. [redacted]

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At the Central Committee level, we have so far witnessed largely token efforts to increase the participation of women. If the regime is to take up the banner of the advancement of women, it will need to do something more substantial than adding a few milkmaids and spinners. After all, membership in the Central Committee is largely contingent on holding leadership positions in the ministries of the regional government/party apparatus.

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If Gorbachev were seriously to tackle the issue of promoting women to the leadership, he would need to address the root of the matter, which is societal in nature. Constrained by the demands of work, family, and household duties, Soviet women have little time or energy left to devote to the party. One recent Soviet survey shows that working women spend more than 30 hours a week on shopping and housework, while on average men spend only 15 hours a week on household chores. Two steps which could be taken to alleviate some of these burdens would be to increase the availability of consumer goods and foodstuffs and improve child care facilities. However, the signs point in the opposite direction. The yardstick for the economy continues to be that traditionally male bastion, heavy industry, while light industry and consumer matters are left in the hands of a woman, Biryukova. As for child care, rather than lessening the demands on women by improving child care facilities, the new five-year plan promises more maternity leave to allow women to stay with their newborn a little longer, thereby providing only a temporary respite from a long-term problem.

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Overall, the prospects for moving beyond the tokenism of women in the leadership are limited by the relatively low position that the issue probably holds on Gorbachev's agenda. Gorbachev's priority is to improve the economy, and he can be expected to promote women only where it serves that purpose.

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## Viewpoint

*The views expressed in the following article are the authors' and do not necessarily represent a CIA consensus.*

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### Moscow's Stake in the Berlin Access Challenge

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The Soviets have traditionally welcomed, if they have not initiated, GDR probes to erode Allied rights in Berlin, granted in wartime, in immediate postwar agreements, and under the Quadripartite Agreement (QA) of 1971. Nevertheless, they have customarily avoided letting events approach a crisis.

at Berlin sector crossings, nonexempt NATO diplomats began to take circuitous routes through recognized East German territory to enter East Berlin. The Soviets stated that they had interceded with the East Germans to the extent they were able and that the GDR was competent to decide the documentation it required for travel into East Berlin.

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The current challenge to Western rights in Berlin began on 21 May 1986, when the East Germans announced that as of 26 May accredited diplomats crossing to and from West Berlin would have to present their passports instead of identity documents ("red cards") from the GDR Foreign Ministry. All diplomats not accredited to the GDR entering East Berlin after the 26th would have to have an East German visa unless there was a prior agreement it was not needed. Ambiguous wording in the GDR announcement left open the possibility that the three Western QA military missions in West Berlin and their embassies in East Berlin would be exempt from the new controls. On 23 May, in response to a US demarche, a Soviet spokesman noted that "military administrations" would not be affected.

On 7 June, in a major retreat, the East German Foreign Ministry announced that it would issue new "forgery-proof" diplomatic ID cards to replace the red cards and would drop the passport requirement. The announcement, however, did not explicitly rescind the visa requirement for Allied officials other than US, British, or French traveling from West Berlin—most notably from military missions and consulates accredited to the Allies there. Recently the East Germans allowed military officers from Denmark and Belgium to cross sector points without visas, a concession that suggests they will also compromise on these remaining controls. The GDR announcement, however, continued to refer to the sector crossing sites as "border crossing points," upholding the East German view that East Berlin is part of the GDR rather than part of a greater Berlin subject to the QA.

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The new controls went into effect on the 26th. Western military mission access was not affected, and US, British, and French diplomats accredited to the GDR were allowed to cross sector boundaries in Berlin using their red cards. They were warned, however, that they would have to show passports in the future. All other diplomats were turned back unless they showed passports. On the 29th the East Germans formally exempted US, UK, and French officials stationed in both East and West Berlin from the new passport controls. To avoid showing passports

We do not yet have sufficient evidence to reconstruct Soviet-East German handling of the Berlin access challenge. Privately, representatives from both countries provided the disingenuous explanation that the new controls were only an effort to meet Western

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concerns about terrorists crossing between the sectors. It is more likely that the GDR seized the opportunity offered by the La Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin and intense US pressure regarding Libyan activities in East Berlin to assert its long-claimed sovereign right to demand formal travel documentation at the Berlin crossing points. We believe the East Germans received approval for a challenge during talks between Gorbachev and Honecker during the latter's visit to East Berlin in late April. We also believe that the decision to act on the access question became increasingly attractive in both Moscow and East Berlin because of their growing isolation on the terrorist issue as West European states took action against the Libyan People's Bureaus. [redacted]

**Moscow and the Germanies**

The timing of the recent challenge, following earlier Soviet willingness to defuse a dispute involving management of the Berlin traffic air corridor in February 1986, supports [redacted] that the East Germans took the lead in instigating the current confrontation. Embassy [redacted] reporting [redacted] also indicates a growing sense of East German assertiveness in the Bloc, which the Soviets themselves have inadvertently fed with public praise of Honecker's economic policy. East German self-congratulation reached a new peak at the East German Communist (SED) Party Congress in April, which Gorbachev attended. [redacted]

Gorbachev's presence signified Moscow's strong support for Honecker and the East German "model." Nevertheless, Gorbachev's harsh public criticism of the FRG at the party congress suggests he also carried the deflating message that the Soviets had decided not to permit Honecker to visit Bonn this year. Such a message would have deprived Honecker's regime of a politically important gain and would have diminished the impact of Gorbachev's visit to the GDR. Further, by implication, Gorbachev's criticism of the FRG suggested that Honecker, whose criticism had been much milder, had been too friendly with the other Germany. By pushing the new controls, the East Germans may have hoped to convince Moscow that they too could be hard on Kohl. [redacted]

We speculate that, to placate ruffled East German feelings, the Soviets probably gave Honecker the green light to push for recognition of East German sovereignty by the West at a traditional pressure point—West Berlin—even though Moscow was not going to take the lead. [redacted]

[redacted] We doubt, however, that Honecker and Gorbachev would have discussed the actual details of this challenge, and almost certainly neither anticipated an evolution leading to a significant GDR retreat. A general discussion, however, would fit well with Gorbachev's new leadership style in Eastern Europe, which combines firmness in laying down markers in face-to-face bilateral talks with restraint regarding micromanagement of detail. He probably also told Honecker that, while the Soviets would rhetorically support the GDR, they wanted no crisis in Berlin that could call into question their own privileges under the QA. The implication would have been that the GDR would have to take the political consequences of its action. [redacted]

Moscow probably also saw the GDR challenge as a chance to create mischief for the Kohl government. The Soviets had already stiffened their criticism of Kohl for support of SDI and the US binary chemical weapons program. They undoubtedly welcomed a new opportunity to embarrass him by underscoring West Germany's lack of leverage in Berlin and by forcing him to choose between rigid support for the QA or a "reasonable" position on control of terrorism. [redacted]

Moscow might also have calculated that the challenge had the potential to create political problems for Kohl during an election campaign. He is already under fire by the opposition SPD for an unimaginative German policy. Moscow must indeed have been cheered by public assertions by senior SPD opposition politicians—principally Egon Bahr—that the current passport issue could have been resolved, essentially on GDR terms. Thus, from Moscow's view, the current challenge in a single stroke promised to bring discomfort to Kohl while permitting the SPD to line up on the side of the "angels," in opposition to the CDU and

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its US "sponsor." Furthermore, while not threatening to cut off the intra-German dialogue so important to the East Germans, the challenge enhanced the importance of the SPD as East Germany's principal interlocutor. [redacted]

**Moscow's West European Policy and the Berlin Question**

Under Gorbachev the Soviets have emphasized to the West Europeans that they share a common home—with continental interests, apart from those of the United States. Moscow, however, remains aware that the Berlin question is a two-edged sword and, if allowed to develop into a crisis, tends to solidify NATO in defense of the status quo. By emphasizing "technical" issues during the challenge rather than fundamental principles governing Berlin's unique status, East Germany sought to avoid a crisis while attempting to undermine NATO's position on movement within Berlin. In the past such "technical" challenges have indeed caused disarray in NATO. Doubtless, both the USSR and the GDR thought they had a similar chance this time to slice away at Allied claims and drive wedges into NATO. [redacted]

The current challenge has magnified the status differences between most NATO members and the three NATO occupying powers. The latter were initially "exempted" from the new passport controls, thus creating awkward "hierarchies" for NATO. Travel hardships were greatest for nonexempt NATO members—those who traditionally have had little stake or input in codifying the technical rites embodying the "Berlin theology." Meanwhile Moscow's intercession to exempt US, British, and French personnel from the use of passports was portrayed by the Soviets as a reasonable attempt to find a compromise that would uphold respect for the QA—but one which, nevertheless, would underscore Moscow's position on GDR sovereignty within the divided city. [redacted]

The challenge also has reminded the West Germans how uniquely vulnerable they are in Berlin. Indeed, since the GDR actions, some prominent West Germans have advocated the use of passports for "identification" purposes only, illustrating the extent to which some elements in the FRG view their Berlin interests as divergent from those of the three Allied

powers. The challenge also reminded the three powers how vulnerable they are to an Eastern probe designed to divide them from Bonn. Both the USSR and GDR apparently misjudged the potential depth of a split between West Germany and the other Allies over the challenge. Had either the Soviets or East Germans realized the extent of Bonn's apparent wavering, they might not have backed off so quickly or so far. [redacted]

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**Implications**

The recent Berlin access challenge apparently sought to harmonize separate Soviet and East German interests in the transcendent objective of weakening NATO solidarity over Berlin and dividing West German opinion. Moscow probably meant to provide a demonstration, for the Bloc, of Gorbachev's ability to dovetail competing Soviet-East European interests rather than to simply ride roughshod over East European sensibilities. [redacted]

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For the Soviets, the GDR challenge apparently combined opportunity with low risk. They probably made it clear to Honecker that any East German equities in a challenge could not threaten Moscow's broader East-West concerns. This would explain both Moscow's rather low-key backing of its ally during this challenge and its efforts to convince the West that it was not responsible for East German actions in the GDR's "sovereign" capital. The Soviets probably also remained wary of appearing too supportive of East German assertions of sovereignty that ran counter to Moscow's own demands for increased Bloc unity on foreign policy matters. While appearing to moderate the most extreme of the GDR's original demands by securing exemptions for the three Allied powers, the Soviets still subtly reminded Washington that they retain leverage at Berlin and can create or ameliorate troubling challenges there to the West almost at will.

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