

27 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Media Highlights Recipients

SUBJECT: Available Transcriptions of Broadcasts  
and Notice of Upcoming Program

1. We have on file the following transcriptions of broadcasts.  
If you need to see them, please notify us  and we will  
make them available to you.

STAT

18 May, 10:15 AM, CNN-TV, DAYWATCH, Subject: Embassy Bombing/Ties to Iranian Government. Comments by David Wise, CNN's intelligence analyst.

19 May, 7:30 AM, WASH Radio, NEWS, Subject: Russian Tranquilizer Machine.

21 May, 10:00 PM, WRC-TV, MONITOR, Subject: Interview with Soviet defector Stanislav Levchenko.

22 May, 11:30 AM, CBS-TV, FACE THE NATION, Guest: Senator Barry Goldwater discusses Central America.

22 May, 12:30 PM, WRC-TV, MEET THE PRESS, Guests: Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Adm. Stansfield Turner discuss the MX. Panel: Mary Lord of Newsweek, Bruce Neland of Time and Bill Monroe of NBC News.

22 May, 11:30 PM, WJLA-TV, ABC WEEKEND REPORT, Subject: Report on New York Times article concerning alleged DCI statement on Nicaragua.

23 May, 7:00 AM, WJLA-TV, GOOD MORNING AMERICA, Subject: New York Times/William Casey/Nicaragua.

23 May, 7:00 AM, WRC-TV, THE TODAY SHOW, Subject: New York Times/William Casey/Nicaragua.

23 May, 7:00 AM, WDVM-TV, CBS MORNING NEWS, Subject: New York Times/William Casey/Nicaragua.

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2. Word has been received of the following upcoming program:

29 May, 11:30 AM, CBS-TV, FACE THE NATION, Guests: Alan Greenspan, member of President Reagan's Economic Policy Board and Robert Hormats, former Senior Economic official for presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan.

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# RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Daywatch

STATION CNN TV  
CNN Network

DATE May 18, 1983 10:15 AM CITY New York

SUBJECT Embassy Bombing/Ties to Iranian Government

HOST: There's been some speculation about the Iranian terrorist group that claimed responsibility for last month's bomb blast at the American Embassy in Beirut and its ties to the Iranian government.

On his way out of the news conference last night, Mr. Reagan said, if those reports prove accurate the executive branch would take action.

REPORTER: Mr. President, if it turns out the Iranian government...

(Confusion of voices)

RONALD REAGAN: I tell you that we will see what we're going to do about it.

HOST: There have been some new reports this week that the United States government might have had advance word about the bombing of some building in Beirut at the time that the Embassy was blasted. In that, 63 people died, including 17 Americans.

Senior correspondent Daniel Shorr told us about this possibility several weeks ago. And this morning, former State Department official, Joseph Cisco, told me that embassies and the State Department get information about possible incidents of violence all the time. CNN's intelligence analyst, David Wise, is with us to talk about this. David, I know you've talked to your sources as recently as today about this situation. What do you know? Was there -- were there advance reports? Did the Embassy tighten security? Did they not tighten it enough?

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DAVID WISE: Well, the sources that I've talked to say that there were cables intercepted indicating that the Iranians might be involved; but there was no specific and conclusive evidence because the Embassy wasn't named as a target. It seems clear and obvious that the security was not tightened up or it wouldn't have happened.

What we know is that there was some cable traffic, perhaps, from Iran to Syria which said, in effect, something in Beirut may be bombed in the next couple of days. And it happened. There's reports that a paymenet of \$25,000 was to be made.

HOST: Well, David, with the Middle East being such a hot spot these days of terrorist activity, would it not seem logical to conclude that the American Embassy would, perhaps, be a target if they intercepted those cables?

WISE: Certainly, and, as I said, the evidence wasn't conclusive. There's a double irony in the failure to act on the evidence because the NSA, the National Security Agency would have been the agency that intercepted the cables between Tehran and Damascus; and they share their information with the CIA. And in the blast the entire CIA station was destroyed, including Robert Ames, the top CIA Middle East expert.

HOST: I don't understand it. How could this have happened? Did it slip through the cracks?

WISE: Well, NSA gets a great mass of information from their big ears, thousands of listening stations around the world. And this information comes in and tapes and occupies rooms. It's not always processed in time to do any good. That's one of the problems with intelligence. Too much is obtained and not enough acted upon.

HOSTESS: Mr. Wise, at the time of the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran, there was some speculation that the American intelligence had failed because we should have known that was coming, too. Do you see any connections?

WISE: Well, there's no direct connection. The CIA definitely did not have sufficient evidence that Khomeini was going to take over, at least that the Shah would be deposed. That's a well known fact. And that is one of their failures of prediction that was institutional. This is a more specific tactical kind of intelligence.

HOST: Dr. Joe Cisco said this morning -- we were just talking -- he did an interview on an earlier program today. But he said that when he was running the Middle East division of the State Department, he would sit there every day and go over cable after cable that had information about potential trouble. And he said, getting the intelligence wasn't the problem; deciding what

was real and what was not real and what the purpose of this stuff coming in was was often more difficult.

WISE: I think that's also true, yes.

HOST: What should the United States government do to prevent things like this from happening again? Is there a way to speed up the process of getting information? For example, the National Security Agency, as you say, they've got these big satellite dishes everywhere and they probably know most everything that's going on. What can speed up the process if something like this happens again somewhere?

WISE: Well, Congress has some interlocking problems here. Congress has criticized the intelligence agencies for failure to act on information. For example, when the Liberty was bombed during the Six Day War in 1967, the message warning the American ship away from Israeli's coast -- Israel's coast -- was never received. It got lost. We're dealing with big bureaucracies. But also, there's an element of hindsight here. After all, the Embassy was not named as a target. The bottom line is security at the Embassy was very poor, and obviously that is what is has to be tightened up. There's no way that a truck should be able to drive right in -- in the snackbar and result in 64 people's being killed.

HOST: The solution, I guess, is that everybody work together and beef up security most everyplace.

David Wise, well, thanks for being with us today.

WISE: Thank you.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM News

STATION WASH Radio

DATE May 19, 1983 7:30 A.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Tranquilizer Machine

JOE CONNALLY: The Russians have invented a tranquilizer machine. They've loaned it to a California hospital. It uses radio waves to relax people instead of drugs. American doctors put a cat into this box, they turned on the 40 megahertz radio waves, just above the CB frequency, and in three minutes the cat was sitting there calm as could be because of the radio waves pulsating through the box.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Monitor STATION WRC-TV  
NBC Network

DATE May 21, 1983 10:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Stanislav Levchenko

STANISLAV LEVCHENKO: I spent the best years of my life doing wrong things on the wrong side for the wrong cause.

LLOYD DOBYNS: His name is Stanislav Levchenko. He's Russian. And what he was doing for all those years was being a KGB spy.

This is Monitor.

DOBYNS: Major Levchenko started as a spy in 1965, when he was 24. His first job was minor. His last job was not. From February 1975 until October 1979, he was the KGB political intelligence officer in Japan. He has finally begun to talk about that in public, and it is a fascinating story.

We'll start in a moment.

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DOBYNS: Late this week, a delegation from the Japanese Diet, or parliament, began talking to Stanislav Levchenko about his work in Japan and about the Japanese who helped him, some of them politicians, some of them journalists. We talked to Levchenko last week in Washington.

LEVCHENKO: I came to the United States to fight for my people. And as long as my health will permit me, I'll fight for that cause.

DOBYNS: Six years ago in Tokyo, Stanislav Levchenko is a correspondent for the Soviet weekly magazine New Times. He regularly files reports that are well-written and well-read. His

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employers are pleased. But his employers are not the editors of New Times. Levchenko is a KGB political intelligence officer, and one of his jobs is to recruit Japanese for the KGB. A successful officer will recruit one.

LEVCHENKO: I did recruit four Japanese people while I was stationed in Tokyo.

DOBYNS: He rose from lieutenant to major. But in October 1979, he asked the United States for political asylum because, he says, he was just sick of it.

LEVCHENKO: I came to this conclusion, not overnight, naturally, but the whole experience of my life brought me to that conclusion, to the conclusion that I really cannot stand it anymore. It's one thing. And the other thing, that the socialist system is evil, and there is nothing which can change it.

DOBYNS: In one way, it got no better. In 1981 a Soviet court sentenced Levchenko to death in absentia. He chose to ignore it.

LEVCHENKO: I did have two choices. The first choice, yes, I did have an option to go into hiding. But the reason why I came to the Free World country was not that. The reason was to fight the Soviet socialist system.

I don't think too much, even, about the possibility that, you know, KGB assassins can get me somewhere or can put poison in my coffee, although I don't drink coffee. Probably they know that I drink tea. Or whatever other method they can use to exterminate me. I'm thinking about what I'm doing, and that's the main thing for me.

DOBYNS: One of the things he does is identify Soviet propaganda, like the stories that Soviet leader Yuri Andropov is a pro-American liberal with a love of Scotch whiskey and jazz music. Andropov is the former head of the KGB. And that's only one part of it.

LEVCHENKO: His life story shows that he's not a suave close liberal at all. Because one of the very important points in his career was his job as Ambassador to Hungary exactly during the Hungarian uprising. And as the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, he showed that he's not only a ruthless person, but he's a very devious person.

Shortly before most of the Hungarian leaders were arrested, and then some of them were just banished, which means the KGB murdered them, he met many of them, was very nice to



then, and even waved his hand saying good-bye to them. And there is no doubt whatsoever that he knew what kind of tragic end was awaiting these members of Hungarian government.

DOBYNS: Yet the man you picture as the ruthless head of the KGB wrote the letter to the little girl in Maine promising that there would never be nuclear -- is that just part of the campaign to make him a nice guy?

LEVCHENKO: Absolutely. Absolutely. There is no doubt about that.

[Clip of demonstrators]

DOBYNS: And he says there is no doubt that Soviets are trying to influence public opinion in other areas, taking advantage of legitimate public concern.

LEVCHENKO: I personally have no doubts whatsoever that the people whom you call average guys, entirely sincere people who are fighting for the cause which they think is proper to fight for, the thing is that a handful of people in certain organizations and in certain movements are being manipulated by the Soviets.

For instance, the Soviets were very heavily involved in influencing the anti-neutron-bomb campaign in Europe. They mobilized every possible resource which they had, all agents with influence. They spent enormous amounts of money on [unintelligible] black propaganda things, disinformation, forgeries.

In the United States, there was certain Soviet involvement in the preparation of the June 12th, last year, demonstration in New York. They were using certain fronts upon which they do have certain influence.

DOBYNS: But there is more than just influence. There is the problem of keeping the Soviet Union current in high technology.

LEVCHENKO: The smartest way to go is to steal high technology from the Free World countries. It saves them enormous amounts of money. Because, okay, for instance, KGB recruits a certain engineer working for a certain company which produces high-technology products, electronics, semiconductors, optical equipment, or whatever. And they would pay this agent, let's say, for his services \$10,000, sometimes \$100,000, sometimes \$500,000. But through that kind of person, they can steal technological process the cost of which, sometimes, will be \$100 million or \$200 million.

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So, the Soviets know that that kind of stealing business is probably one of the most profitable businesses which ever exists.

DOBYNS: Do you have any idea how many KGB officers there are stationed in the United States?

LEVCHENKO: It would be -- it won't be exaggeration to say that about 40-45 percent of all Soviet officials stationed in the United States are either KGB or GRU. Another half of the Soviet citizens stationed in the United States, or any other country, are KGB, either, informants or co-optees.

DOBYNS: The KGB is also heavily involved in gun running, drug smuggling, terrorist activities, and guerrilla training worldwide.

LEVCHENKO: The KGB does provide guerrilla-type training for certain so-called national liberation movements or to PLO officers and soldiers. Sometimes they would use the satellite services for the purposes to train certain individuals. Bulgarians are definitely [unintelligible].

DOBYNS: The attempted assassination of the Pope. It is now widely believed that it was a KGB operation run by the Bulgarians. Do you think so?

LEVCHENKO: Let's put it in this way. If the investigation which is being run now by Italian government will provide evidence that Bulgarians had been directly involved in the attempt against Pope's life, then you read it that's KGB, because Bulgarian intelligence service is under total, absolute control by KGB.

DOBYNS: The American Communist Party has always said it is not under Soviet control. But Levchenko says it gets its money from the Soviet Union, probably passed to it by the KGB.

LEVCHENKO: American Communist Party gets financing from the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But the actual operation in passing money to individuals in American Communist Party, I would assume, goes through the KGB hands. Because International Department officers are not intelligence officers. They don't have skills in spy trade craft.

DOBYNS: Levchenko did have skills in what he calls spy trade craft, and he was successful in Japan.

So, why did he quit?

LEVCHENKO: I had all kinds of experience in the Soviet

Union. My career was successful and I had chance to try almost everything I could try in my career. And everything was immoral and everything was bad.

I spent the best years of my life doing wrong things on the wrong side for the wrong cause. And I could not stand it anymore.

DOBYNS: Report from a Soviet spy, part two, in a moment.

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DOBYNS: After he defected, Stanislav Levchenko worked first as a journalist, then as a private consultant to businesses.

LEVCHENKO: No IRS calls me self-employed person, which, in my understanding, means that I am a private consultant. I do things for a few think tanks. I do lecturing. And now I started to write a book about my personal life and personal experience.

DOBYNS: His biggest worry is the safety and future of his wife and son. His son is now 18.

LEVCHENKO: Shortly after I came to United States, I started to get certain news about the situation around my wife and son back in Moscow. And in spite of the fact that, even by the Soviet laws, they're entirely innocent people, KGB started to viciously interrogate them and started to try to force them to make all kinds of derogatory statements on me in public. My wife flatly refused to cooperate with KGB. They then started to work hard on my son. They were forcing him to write compositions in the school on people who leave their country and things like that, forcing him to denounce me, also. More than that, they were forcing my son to change his last name. He flatly refused to do that thing.

DOBYNS: Do you know how your wife and son are doing now?

LEVCHENKO: I didn't heard anything from them for last three or four months. But what I do know is that last August, when my wife was coming back home in the evening, she was beaten up badly by, in quotes, mobsters. So she was beaten up so bad that she had to spend four or five days in hospital.

I personally have no doubts that that so-called mob were KGB counterintelligence officers who were punishing her for not cooperating with them.

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My son had to go to different school because of intimidation which he had. And when he tried -- he's 18 years old now. And when he tried to become a college student, the commission, the board in that college refused to accept him.

DOBYNS: You've been out now for 4 1/2 years.

LEVCHENKO: Uh-huh.

DOBYNS: Do you still do the kinds of things you were trained to do?

LEVCHENKO: Thank God, I'm not doing anything which I was trained to do. But once you've been intelligence officer, you develop certain instincts, some of which are looking funny for a commoner in the street, you know. For instance, I eat fast. You know, in America people eat slowly, thoughtfully, they chew the food all right, or whatever. And I had hard times, you know, for instance, when I invite some of my friends to restaurant, or whatever, because I will eat the whole dish within five minutes. Because when I was a KGB intelligence officer, I did have many meetings in restaurants, but food was not the main thing. The main thing was to extract information, to instruct the agent, and things like that.

Another example. When I go to some public place, a cafe, restaurant, I hate to sit with my back towards the entrance. I want to watch the entrance. And I can't help it.

And there are a few things like that which is really very hard to get rid of.

DOBYNS: Do you look around?

LEVCHENKO: It's instinct. Sure, I look around. And thank God, normal human being, common sort of human being, you know, he doesn't care what's going on around himself, or whatever. But again, it's another in-built instinct, you know.

For instance, if I go to certain place, some public place, I will remember face of everybody around myself. It's instinct.

DOBYNS: You don't really care, though.

LEVCHENKO: I don't really care. But just automatically, I would remember all faces around myself.

When I'm driving car, again, instinctively, sometimes I will look what is going on behind my car. I don't need it at all, but still sometimes I will do it.

DOBYNS: Have you gotten so that you could pick up the paper and take a pretty good guess on whether something was planted or whether it's true?

LEVCHENKO: Yes. You know, I'm glad that I'm out of this business. But unfortunately, I think till the rest of my life I would be deprived of the chance to read newspaper normally. Every morning, whatever newspapers I subscribe to, I read between the lines. And it is a kind of side effect of my former profession.

DOBYNS: A final question. You're a young man. What do you see as your future?

LEVCHENKO: My dream is to become a teacher in some university or college. I like to be with young people. And I think that I can become a good teacher, because I like to communicate with young people, to give them message; and at the same time, to get their own point of view, their own opinion on the topics of discussion. And it is a very challenging thing, I think. And then, I think that it is probably one of the most noble professions.

DOBYNS: Stanislva Levchenko no longer works for the KGB. But it is not short of personnel. In the six weeks beginning April 1st, Western governments expelled 53 accused Soviet spies, and that's a record.

Of course, Yuri Andropov, former master of the KGB, now heads the Soviet government.

MEDIASCAN TRANSCRIPT

CBS Face the Nation

22 May 1983 (11:30 A.M.)

Sunday

Sen. Goldwater, General Wallace \*Nuddig who is in charge of our troops in Central America, said that, like it or not, we are engaged in the war, the United States is engaged in the war that's going on down there, and he says we have not done what is required of us. What do you think? What is required of us and shall we do it or not? GOLDWATER (Chairman, Intelligence Committee): I think the first thing that's required is for the president to make a new statement of his position, which would be the country's position, on Central America. Now I think this is such an important part of our foreign policy that it's only become really important in the last two months, that if I were the president preparing this paper, I would say if it becomes necessary to save Central America, we will use our troops, our aircraft, our forces. It's that important. And as I say, it's only become that important lately, and I agree with General Nuddig. I read his report, and I think he's correct.

From CBS News, Washington, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview on Face the Nation with Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Sen. Goldwater will be questioned by CBS News congressional correspondent Phil Jones, by Elizabeth Drew of New Yorker Magazine and by the moderator, CBS News correspondent George Herman. Face the Nation is produced by CBS News, which is solely responsible for the selection of today's guest and panel.

HERMAN: Sen. Goldwater in your first answer you suggest that President Reagan state a policy of American, United States' willingness to go in with troops into El Salvador. That immediately brings up two questions, one military one political. Let me start on the military one first. You're an old time soldier, Army, Air Corp and Air Force. You remember the Armed Services Committee. What would it take, what would it cost the United States in terms of men and equipment, to go into a place like El Salvador where we might face an unfriendly populous who is not overly fond of Yankees? What would it take for us to go in and solve the problem, clean it up? GOLDWATER: I think the mere threat, if made in a strong way, if made in a way that people will believe, the mere threat would suffice. Now we've lived long enough in this country offering to help other countries and then not helping, failing to help, that our friends around the world very much believe that we're a paper tiger, that I think if the president made it abundantly clear that the Carribean is our problem now, starting with Cuba, and we would use what forces necessary to maintain Central America, I have a strong feeling we would not have any further trouble. If we had trouble, it's very difficult to answer the question you've asked, because we really don't understand now, at least I don't, the number of plans that would be required, the number of troops or ships. I think we could start with a quarantine, for example, a ship quarantine to make it possible to completely stop supplies going into Nicaragua and San Salvador. We could use aircraft if that became necessary, and you have to keep in mind that they are just completing, I think, a 10,000 foot strip in Nicaragua, where the Russians can land their own equipment.

DREW: Sen. Goldwater, you said the president should make a new statement. He made a speech before Congress not very many weeks ago in which he said, among other things, 'We will never use.... We will not use American troops,' to which he got great applause. Do you think he should not have said that, or has the situation changed

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dramatically since he did say that? GOLDWATER: Yes, the situation changed almost immediately.

DREW: Should he have not said that? GOLDWATER: No, I think he had the right to say that. He's the commander and chief, but I'm urging him now. Let me go back just a space. I'm chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and we passed a little doodad that told him that he has until the end of this fiscal year, October first or the end of September, to come up with a new statement, or he might have trouble getting more covert funds approved by us. And I think that he's in the process now of forming that statement. It will be a different statement, I hope.

JONES: Sen. Goldwater, what has occurred since the president made this statment that makes it so much more critical? GOLDWATER: I think we've finally begun to realize, and I'm not going to stand here and argue the truth or untruth of what I'm going to tell you, I think the Soviets have reached sort of a stalemate in Europe. They're facing tremendous forces in Red China. They're not doing well in Afghanistan. Yugoslavia has not made up their mind, and they have Poland to contend with, and that's quite a bit to contend with. Now, having reached an impasse over there, if I were a member of the Politburo or head of it, I'd be looking someplace else. And the natural place I would look would be Cuba and the Caribbean. That's a natural place for the Soviets to start moving equipment, troops and influence.

JONES: Well, are they? GOLDWATER: Yes. JONES: More in the last month or two? GOLDWATER: Well, we apprehended four aircraft just about a month ago, just after, I think, the day of the president's speech and they were Russian aircraft. They have the ability now to land in Nicaragua unless we prevent them from doing it. They have vast supplies in Cuba. Cuba is really the trouble spot down there, and I have often said, and not too facetiously, it would make a good 51st state.

JONES: Senator, one of your former colleagues, Jacob Javits, used to say during foreign policy debates, 'Great nations don't bluff.' Do you think the American people are ready to send American boys into Central America? GOLDWATER: Well, great nations do not bluff, and great nations don't go to war. Had we been ready to tell Hitler in the 1930s, 'You put a foot on the soil of this country and we're going to be at you,' there never would have been a World War II. Had we been willing to allow the military to use the forces we had in Vietnam, we would have won in Vietnam, the same in Korea. I think the American people are far, far ahead of what you hear around Washington. I travel out across this country, and I think the general consensus that I've come to is that the American people are ahead of us, that they're willing to take a chance to keep peace, and I think that by a strong statement relative to Central America, we can keep peace.

HERMAN: Do you think something is afoot there? I noticed that when your committee said until October first or until the end of September, somebody interviewed a guerrilla spokesman in Nicaragua or on the edge of Nicaragua, and he said, 'That's time enough because we'll be in Managua by that time.' Is this problem going to take care of itself without American, U.S. intervention? GOLDWATER: It can. Now we won't get into an argument like the words covert and overt.

HERMAN: I was sort of looking forward to that. GOLDWATER: We are pretty much overt now. Without that we can't operate overtly without really going to war. So I think we're beginning to make progress. I remember when that fellow made that statement, and up until that time, I'd say up until two weeks ago or even a month, we had no positive proof that our efforts were producing any good results. Now, we get almost

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daily reports, not of a gigantic nature, but we are getting reports, encouraging reports that we are stopping the flow of arms. We are making headway, but again, the nature of the conflict down there being so diversified, it's hard to make a flat statement that we're winning. We might be here. We might not be here.

HERMAN: Let me ask you then, the October first date which your committee set, which you announced, is that engraved in stone, could you slip that a little bit if it seemed as though progress were being made and the situation might take care of itself? That's the cutoff point. GOLDWATER: The press if not too informed of how we operate. Our Intelligence Committee approves or disapproves everything, requests for covert action, whether it's made now, the next fiscal year or when. So whether we pass that little resolution or not, come October the first they would have to come back up and ask for approval or disapproval of covert action.

HERMAN: But you've announced the conditions. GOLDWATER: We've made.... Yes, we've announced some conditions. We might change that, but I have my doubts. The votes were there.

DREW: Senator, you've given us both an optimistic and pessimistic view, and I wonder what really reflects your thinking. One is you answered George by saying yes, the situation, at least in Nicaragua, might take care of itself, and you began by saying that you thought the situation was deteriorating, but maybe you meant El Salvador and that we might need to use troops. Could we just clarify which it is that you really think? GOLDWATER: I'm on the optimistic side now. A month ago I was a little more pessimistic, but I think that our covert action is beginning to take hold. We're beginning to get better reports, not just from Nicaragua, but from observers down there for that purpose.

DREW: Isn't it maybe time to drop the term covert? And we're all talking about it. We see it on television. Isn't it a little silly to keep that pretense up?

GOLDWATER: Yes, I'll agree with you. But here we have a problem.

HERMAN: Are you saying the president was silly when he said in the news conference that they could do covert activity, but they couldn't do overt because it was against the law? GOLDWATER: Well, I'm the one that said that. Just off hand, you violate nine different laws if you go overt. In fact, I think we're violating some right now. But to go overt, and there are ways to get around it, you can give aircraft, tanks, you can sell them to this country and swap around, but eventually it means war if you're going to maintain an overt position of helping this particular government in this particular country. And that's something we have to make up our minds before we finally pass an overt resolution. Even though I have to admit with television covering everything that's going on down there and newspapers covering everything that's going on, under the dictionary definition of overt and covert, it's overt action.

DREW: I'd like to ask you one more question. You said you're not entirely facetious when you suggest that Cuba should be a 51st state. Do you think we should invade Cuba? GOLDWATER: I think we should have.

DREW: What about now? GOLDWATER: I'm not opposed to it. If they continue to try to take over the entire Caribbean, try to Cubanize our friends in South America, I think if we want to have peace, long peace, you have to face up to these things. Now we don't like them. I don't like them. Anybody who's been to war can see that's par for



the course no more. But I want to prevent wars, and I think we're heading for trouble as long as Cuba can be a warehouse for Soviet arms and Soviet men and equipment.

HERMAN: Let me broaden your scope a little bit, Sen. Goldwater. Prevent wars theory has always been we have to have a good defense posture. Now we're engaged in a seemingly endless brouhaha over the defense budget. Is there enough money in it? Is there enough money in it as cut? What is your view of the defense budget? GOLDWATER: Well, if you want to look at it in an arithmetic way....

HERMAN: Well, I hope not to get bogged down in details, but.... GOLDWATER: No, I don't want to get bogged down in details, but I'll jsut tell you, we don't have enough money. If we spent it all on arms to match the Russians.... Let's forget that. We can strengthen ourselves more than we're strengthening ourselves, to present a constant trouble to any enemy that might want to take us on. Just one little fact. We haven't bought enough aircraft in I forget how many years just to meet normal attrition. Those are airplanes that get wrecked, catch on fire and so forth. I think the budget that we're working on now, even with the cuts that have been made, if they don't go too far, we can live with, and we can build a much better defense than we've had. The big thing in our defense going for us now is the change in personnel. We have a very, very fine collection of men and women making up our armed forces, and as long as you have people working under command, equipment is not the major factor.

JONES: Senator, there are reports today that the Air Force is thinking about eliminating some procurement for certain programs and research for others, including the possibility of discontinuing the AWACS, the surveillance plan. Do you think there are major systems that can be eliminated? GOLDWATER: Yes, I think we can go through the military budget and make reductions. I'll give you a quick example. I objected to the price of the AH-64 helicopter last year, and they finally knocked \$2.4 million off the price of the helicopter. That's about an \$800 million saving. Now we can do that. AWACS, we have enough AWACS, in my opinion, to do the work that we have to do. We have the RS-71. I see they want to do away with the new Lockheed replacement for the U-2. That's all right. We have a much better observation aircraft in the SR-71 that you can't hit. I think this is a very, very wise move on the part of the Pentagon. I think it's time. This is one of the reasons that I had asked again the president to come up with a national strategy. We don't have one. I want to have a national strategy so that we cna plan how many of these things do we need?

JONES: What's going on then? Is the White House not organized on this? Several times you've said this during the broadcast. GOLDWATER: Well, it comes down really to the Joint Chiefs of Staff telling the president what I've just recited, because every chief you talk to will say, 'We need a national strategy.' Now from a national strategy you get into tactics. Now what are we going to do with tactics you've just been talking about on Central America? The tactic of Cuba?

JONES: Well, who isn't performing here? Is it the joint chiefs? Is it the White House? GOLDWATER: The White House has to determine, has to come up with a strategic statement. Now the president may not like that, but somebody has to put it together so we can have a national strategy just as the Soviets have a national strategy. We have a general strategy in NATO, but we are not equipped now, to get back to the original question of cutting equipment, to be able to say, 'Well, we don't need this many tanks because,' or 'We don't need this many plans because.' It's very difficult for those of us on the Armed Services Committee. Well, I've spent most of my life in and out of the military. It's difficult for me to argue, and especially when you realize today that the great makeup of the Congress has never had a uniform on.

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JONES: Have you communicated this to the president? GOLDWATER: Yes, I wrote a letter to him. I thought it was a beautiful letter, but nobody else did. I told him we were in a welfare state, which we are, and we better start palnning how to conduct ourselves, and we needed a national strategy.

DREW: Senator, I'd like to clarify one thing. You said earlier about the size of the military budget that even with the cuts that have been made you think it can be lied with. Does that mean that you think it is the level that the Senate agreed on this week, in other words a 6% real growth increase, as opposed to the 10% increase that the president requested, is enough? GOLDWATER: I would have preferred more money. But I can say as a memeber of the committe that we can find places to cut it that will not raise havoc. We have to.... You know what we have to put up with as well as I do. We have a parochial situation in this country. Last year in my subcommittee on tactical warfare, I said, 'We don't need anymore A-10s. We have 740 of them.' We've never sold one to a foreign.... Well, who tries to put it back in? The senators and congressmen in the districts of the state where it's built. And I finally had to say, 'Who are we fighting, who are we fighting for? The United States or Long Island or Arizona or Timbuktu. Now when we all get together and decide that we will eliminate this weapon system, like John Tower has said, 'I want each senator to write me a letter and tell me what facility they have in their state they don't want.' He didn't get a damn letter.

HERMAN: Senator, I don't treavel around as much as you, but the little traveling I do people say to me, 'What are those people on the Hill doing with this budget? They vote this plan up in the Senate. They vote that plan down. It goes back to committee.' What are you people doing, and does it make any sense? GOLDWATER: I can't answer that question that it doesn't make any sense, and you may ask why didn't I vote. I was the only guy that didn't vote the other night. I have to admit I goofed. I was there from 7:00 in the monring until about midnight and I said to Howard Baker, 'This is the first time I've felt a little bit tired after my operation.' I said, 'Do you need me?' He said, 'No, go home.' So I went home, and I found out the next morning I was the only jasper that wasn't there. Had I been there it would have lost, but you have to keep in mind that this is only a resolution. The president has no veto power over it. I think it's a bad way to raise money. It's a bad way to legislate, and I have a bill that I'm going to introduce, I hope next week, that will do away with the budget process.

JONES: Senator, what do you think of these, this so-called Gang of Five, moderate Republicans in the Senate who are held fast to the argument and did win on the budget resolution, that the deficits are the biggest problem, and they want taxes raised. GOLDWATER: Well, that's their opinion, and while I have probably worried more about deficits than anyone there because I'm one of the few businessmen in the place, the American people want their taxes cut, and frankly the average Amercian couldn't care less about deficits. But if we're going to get this economy going, it's not going to be cutting that deficit. It's going to be releasing more money that people earn to spend to build new factories, buy new equipment and create new jobs. Then we can worry about the deficit. In fact, I think a 20% increase in employment would take the deficit away.

JONES: What's going to happen to those Republicans in 1984 who are quoted for large tax increases? GOLDWATER: I don't think any of them are running. If they are, they're going to have trouble.

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DREW: Speaking of running and raising money, are you concerned with the amount of time that members of Congress have to spend raising money for their campaigns?

GOLDWATER: It's absolutely ridiculous. I've been racking my brain to figure out ways that we might cut this money need down. But every time I get going on it, the constitution sticks its head up. I have some ideas that we're working on, my legal staff and I. Not only are they getting too much money to run on, but we have companies now in the very profitable business of raising money, and they keep more money than they give to the candidate. I want to stop that kind of foolishness.

JONES: Senator, do you have any doubts about whether or not Ronald Reagan will seek reelection, and should he? GOLDWATER: I kept saying for years that I didn't think he would, but now I have to say I think he's going to run. And I'll follow that up by saying that he'll beat any Democrat on the board.

HERMAN: What makes you think all of the sudden, what makes you change your mind and think he's going to run? GOLDWATER: I had a conversation the other day with a gentleman from Nevada.

JONES: Mr. Laxalt? GOLDWATER: Something like that.

JONES: Head of the Republican Party? GOLDWATER: Probably the shepherd.

JONES: And what did he say? GOLDWATER: I think that the president's going to run, but I don't know when he'll say anything about it, and if I were the president, I'd keep my mouth shut.

JONES: Did Mr. Laxalt tell you that he was going to run? GOLDWATER: He didn't say so in so many words, but when you get certain questions, you know, and a duck flies by, you've got to think, goddamn, there goes a duck.

HERMAN: Senator, with a minute left, what do you think at this point are going to be the major issues at that campaign that will enable Mr. Reagan, as you say, to win very easily to beat any Democrat? I'll soften that a little. GOLDWATER: I think the major issue, frankly, is that the people like the president's honesty. They may disagree with the things that he does, some of the things that he says, but you cannot point your finger at this man and say that he's not basically honest. And I've found that the American people respect that more than anything else. I remember old Harry Truman. I didn't agree with Harry Truman, but by God you knew where he was when you woke up in the morning. And we haven't had many presidents like that since Eisenhower.

HERMAN: We had one candidate like that named Goldwater. GOLDWATER: Well, I got the hell beat out of me. If I had it to do again, I'd do it the same.

HERMAN: I'm sure. Thank you very much, Sen. Goldwater, for being our guest on Face the Nation.

L'Yana Batts, Transcriber

MEDIASCAN TRANSCRIPT

NBC MEET THE PRESS

22 May 1983 (12:30 P.M.)

Sunday

KALB: I am Marvin Kalb, inviting you to Meet the Press with two military men who have two different views on the need for an MX missile, Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Adm. Stansfield Turner. Meet the Press, an unrehearsed press conference, is a public affairs presentation of NBC News. Our guests on Meet the Press both come from the military, but they do not agree on the controversial MX missile, whether the United States really needs one. Congress is expected to vote yes or no, probably with qualifications, within the next several days. Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft now retired, headed a presidential commission which recently recommended deploying 100 MX missiles. He was President Ford's National Security Adviser. Adm. Stansfield Turner, also retired, headed the Central Intelligence Agency in the Carter administration. He opposes the MX deployment, feels the U.S. ought to rely on Cruise missiles. Our reporters today are Mary Lord of Newsweek, Bruce Neland of Time, and to open the questioning, Bill Monroe of NBC News.

MONROE: Gen. Scowcroft, your commission has recommended we first build 100 new MX missiles with 10 warheads each, then a few years later move toward a different strategy based on a small so-called Midgetman missile with only one warhead. If small missiles are better for the long run, why put \$17 billion now into new big missiles?

SCOWCROFT: Mr. Monroe, the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces had three parts. You've discussed two of them. The third part is to integrate arms control with our strategic weapons programs and to move both in the direction of greater stability. We think that the three parts of that program are each essential to the success of the program, and we feel that, in order to have a small missile which has the environment most compatible with it, that the MX, for a number of reasons, is an essential part of that program.

MONROE: Why is the MX essential? If we're going in the long run toward a long-range strategy of small missiles, why build the MX now at a cost of \$17 billion? What does it do? SCOWCROFT: It does several things. Prominent among those are: first, it demonstrates U.S. national will and cohesion. We have now had four presidents who have said that the MX is important, if not essential, to our national security. To step back from that now, as a country, would send signals which could undermine one of the two essential aspects of deterrence, that is, national will. Whatever, you think about the overall strategic balance in addition, there is an asymmetry in ICBM forces. That is, the Soviet Union, because of their large numbers of ICBMs, the large warheads and their accuracy, are able to put our strategic forces at risk in a way that we cannot in any way reciprocate. We believe that's an element of instability.

MONROE: In view of the gap, admiral, that Gen. Scowcroft has mentioned -- the Soviets have much more striking power in their land-based missiles, and that threatens our land-based missiles -- why wouldn't it help for us to even that gap by building our own, big, new modern missiles. TURNER: I don't think there is a real gap. The general made a slight error in his statement as he talked about our strategic forces are vulnerable. Only our ICBM, our land-based strategic missiles, are vulnerable. We have been much more farsighted than the Soviets. We've only put 25%, roughly, of our total strategic forces in land-based missiles. The Soviets have put 75%. Yes. All of our 25% of land-based missiles is vulnerable today. But we can make an equal amount of the Soviet missiles vulnerable today too. If the president decided to pull

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the trigger this afternoon, 25% of the Soviet's total force would be dead. So we don't have a real gap here.

KALB: Mr. Neland?

NELAND: Gen. Scowcroft, even leaving aside the question of the vulnerability of the missile, are 100 MX missiles really sufficient to make any difference? Do they really threaten the Soviets in any significant way that would make them behave differently? SCOWCROFT: Well, that's one of the last elements of the need for the MX I was going to address, was its use in bringing the Soviets to negotiation in a way which would permit us and hopefully facilitate them, encourage them to move in the direction of a small, single warhead missile. Now, there is nothing magic about the number 100. We wanted a number that was less than what I would call a full first-strike capability against the Soviet Union, but a number great enough that its deployment would be seen as a gesture of confidence, not of weakness.

NELAND: Is it essentially a political, or a negotiating ploy, then? I'm resisting the term bargaining chip. SCOWCROFT: I think it is not a bargaining chip or negotiating ploy as such. I don't think we ever should deploy weapons which we do not feel we need simply in order to trade them away. Nevertheless, I think for any of our weapon systems, if we can achieve a degree of security by getting rid of them on agreement with the Soviet Union, as by keeping them, then certainly any one of them ought to be available for negotiation.

KALB: Miss Lord?

LORD: Adm. Turner, the general has just made a good point about the need for national unity, and the need to bring the Soviet Union around to looking at single warheads. How do you then say that the MX is not necessary? TURNER: I think it's inconsistent, Miss Lord, to say we want to drive the Soviets to a single warhead small missile and we go out and build a large multi-warhead missile. I don't know how that connects. I just think that there are such risks in building the MX that it may go the opposite direction. Mr. Ustinov, the defense minister in the Soviet Union, said just the other day, 'If the White House challenges us by beginning deployment of the MX missile, then the Soviet Union will respond to this by developing a new missile of the same class.' We run the risk of starting a race in these big missiles rather than driving the Soviets to drop these big ones and go to small ones.

\*NELAND: General, let me interrupt here. Isn't it true that the Russians are already....LORD: Yeah. NELAND: ...testing at least one or possibly even two new missiles? SCOWCROFT: That's absolutely correct, and I think that we will almost force them to deploy and build those missiles if we go to this direction.

LORD: But isn't there a perverse incentive there? I mean, if we built up a little bit, couldn't we then both build down, rather than having a mismatch which people say is so destabilizing? TURNER: I just doubt that you're going to get much in trade from the Soviet Union, for a paper missile which we have not deployed when they've got these big missiles they've already deployed. It's not a very good bargaining chip.

LORD: General, how would you respond to that? SCOWCROFT: I would respond that it is essential. We're not talking about a paper missile. We're talking about a determination to deploy it. One does not have to have a malevolent view of the Soviet Union to feel that, in view of the favorable posture they have in ICBM forces, that they're unlikely to give that up without some incentive to do so.

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KALB: Mr. Monroe?

MONROE: I'd like to ask each of you, starting out with Gen. Scowcroft, to what extent is the MX a first-strike missile? Does it give us the capacity to wipe out most or all of the Soviet's land-based missiles, and is that a good idea for us to have a capacity that is first-strike or something close to first-strike? SCOWCROFT: The United States procures its strategic forces for the purpose of deterrence. The MX, in large numbers, could be a first-strike weapon. We feel that a hundred clearly is not a first-strike weapon. And, under most kinds of scenarios of the initiation of nuclear war, very unlikely under any scenario that those forces would be available and not in a first-strike call.

MONROE: Admiral? TURNER: Well, the problem is that because we have not been able to find any way to deploy the MX that won't leave it vulnerable, you can only use it in one of two forms. You can use it as a first-strike weapon. You can initiate the war. I don't think the United States ever will. Or you can use it as what we call a counter-punch weapon, that is you can try to launch it in that 30 minute interval while the Soviet weapons are en route to you if they initiate the war. That's very dangerous. So therefore, whether we actually build a first-strike capability with a hundred MXs or not, the Soviet Union is going to interpret it as our wanting a capability for a first-strike. That's going to put their finger on the trigger so they can counter punch. And if we build the MX, we're going to be on a hair-trigger response, also, because it's vulnerable. And we'll be worried that it will be knocked out. I think it's very dangerous for both superpowers to be sitting there with their finger on the trigger, so to speak.

MONROE: You seem to be agreeing with the General that 100 MXs do not constitute a first-strike capacity? TURNER: Added to our existing force, they begin to come close to it, but not a real first-strike capability in themselves.

MONROE: General? SCOWCROFT: I would just like to add that at the present time and for some time in the future, our bomber forces and our ICBM forces contribute what I would call synergistic survivability to each other in that the Soviets have to attack those forces with different forces of their own, and therefore, for some time in the future cannot attack them simultaneously, so that they add, each to the other, a substantial measure of protection.

MONROE: General, when you talked about a hundred, as a number, that sounds to me like a compromise figure. Why not 75 or a hundred and fifty? And if it's a compromise, it means that you had politics in mind when you came up with the number of a hundred? Isn't that right? SCOWCROFT: No. As I said, there's nothing particularly magic about a hundred. We did not want to recommend a sufficient number that would or could constitute a full first-strike capability nor a number low enough that it would demonstrate weakness rather than strength. A hundred happens to be the number that the administration proposed in its last recommendation for deployment of the MX. It's down from 200 proposed by the Carter administration.

MONROE: Yeah, but maybe the Russians think of 100 as the destabilizing number, and you're applying a kind of American logic to the Kremlin. Will it work? SCOWCROFT: I think it will. I think the Soviets can calculate what can be done with those warheads as well as we can.

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KALB: Mr. Neland?

NELAND: Adm. Turner, we're sometimes warned by our European allies that if we don't deploy MX, they will not permit the deployment of Pershings and Cruises on their territory. Is this a significant calculation for us to make? TURNER: I think you have to consider it. But I would suggest that it was the Europeans who first asked for Pershings and Cruise missiles on their territory. If today, because of what we do with our strategic force, they decide they don't want to be defended by Pershings and Cruise missiles, we would be very foolish to deploy them. It's the European decision, not dependent upon what we do here. If they want to defend themselves, and they think that's the way to do it, we've offered to help. We certainly don't want to offer that help if they don't want it. It's their Europe, not ours.

NELAND: You wouldn't see that as a double loss for the U.S., then? No MXs here, and no Cruisers and Pershings there? TURNER: No, I wouldn't see that as a double loss at all. The Pershings have one great value though. They are the big bargaining chip for the Soviet Union. They are one of the things the Soviets really fear. And I think that's where we should concentrate on giving the president leverage, not by giving him an MX for bargaining purposes.

KALB: Miss Lord? LORD: All this wrangling, commission forming, problem solving seems to deal with the vulnerability of our land-based forces. What is wrong, as some experts have said, with going to a totally undersea or bomber force, de-emphasizing land base to the point of extinction, and then going from there? SCOCROFT: The multiplicity of our forces, the so-called triad of bombers, submarine forces and ICBMs, exists for several reasons. The fundamental need for different kinds of forces is in the event of a breakthrough against any one of them, we would not simply be paralyzed. I think we're extremely fortunate at the present time, for example, to have a submarine fleet that is essentially invulnerable to Soviet attack. If it were not so, our present problems with the MX would be much more serious. TURNER: I agree very much with the general that we must keep a mix of forces. But we have our submarines, and I would not increase the reliance on those because you have to worry about their future. We have our bombers, but we're now coming into a new era of the Cruise missile. We're putting Cruise missiles on bombers and in submarines and on land-launchers in Europe. We can put it on ships. We can put it in all kinds of other modes. And therefore we can maintain a varied base, a very largely varied base from which to keep our strategic forces.

LORD: But if the land-based systems are vulnerable, and your sea systems get vulnerable, I mean, how is that a hedge against anything? I mean you've got two vulnerables, and that's worse, isn't it? SCOWCROFT: What we've done, Miss Lord, is to divide the ICBM problem into two parts--the near term part, deploying the MX missile for the reasons which I earlier described, and over the longer run, turning to a small single warhead missile, probably in a mobile configuration which will provide the kind of survivability for the land-based systems over the longer term, we feel is essential.

KALB: Mr. Monroe?

MONROE: Admiral, some Congressman now favor developing and flight-testing the MX on a sort of skeptical basis. They want to reserve judgment on whether to go ahead and build it, depending on how they see the president going in the direction of arms control and that sort of thing. What do you think about this sort of two-phase congressional approach--skeptical, saying okay, let's develop it and flight test it,

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but let's hold on building it? TURNER: I think it's the worst of both worlds, in many ways. As Marvin said in his opening remarks, the Congress is likely to pass the MX with conditions. Well, that just means we haven't shown any resolve like the general wants us to show. We don't come down and say yes, we're going this way. And yet, we leave that threat dangling over everybody that we're heading for a first strike. We look irresponsible, I believe. I think it's time for the Congress to say to the president, we want a deterrent strategy, not a war fighting strategy. The MX only fits into a war fighting strategy. Let's get going on building up our Cruise missiles, our bombers, and our submarines in a purely deterrent form.

MONROE: General, what do you think about congressional approval on an iffy basis? They might not want to really build it later. SCOWCROFT: I think that the program deserves to go forward on its merits. I think that the Congress has expressed some skepticism about the administration's sincerity in supporting all parts of the commission's recommendations. I think some prudent milestones which would enable us to review our progress in arms control, progress in development of the small missile, I think could be quite acceptable.

MONROE: You'd rather, you'd like to see the Congress go ahead, presumably, unconditionally, but you'd rather see them go ahead conditionally than not at all? SCOWCROFT: I think some kind of milestone development which would enable to review the program and its effectiveness, both in arms control and development of the small missile would be quite (inaudible)....

MONROE: Why couldn't the Congress...? KALB: Mr. Neland? Mr. Neland, please?

NELAND: Gen. Scowcroft, your commission's report put heavy emphasis on three aspects, and the third would be on arms control. In theory, though, would it be possible for the United States to build a secure and invulnerable force, even without an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. SCOWCROFT: I think it might, in theory. I think without some kind of an arms control regime, a small missile would become a very much more difficult operation. With unconstrained numbers, with the Soviets, for example, being able to deploy a SS-18 follow on, for example, with 10 warheads for every small one we deploy, you get into numbers that drive the costs up very, very substantially. I wouldn't say it would be impossible, but we think that an arms control regime is important to provide the best environment for deployment of the small missile.

KALB: Admiral, did you want to comment? TURNER: With modern technology, there are only three ways you can achieve relative invulnerability. You can try to conceal your force, like the submarines. You can put out lots of them so they're hard to hit all at once, like Cruise missiles. Or you can make the mobile, like ships and submarines and bombers. Unfortunately, the MX just doesn't fit any of these. It's an obsolete dinosaur, in effect, that deserves to be replaced by new technology, new generations of weapons.

NELAND: Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown is noted for saying, 'We build. Then the Russians build. We don't build. Then the Russians build.' So does it really make any difference how we go about our programs? Does it make any difference whether we build the MX, in that sense? The Russians will still build. TURNER: The Russians are going to build what they think is necessary for them. We build what.... We should build what we think is necessary for us. And we have no need for this missile because we're not going to start a war, and we don't want to have a

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counter-punch launch under a 30-minutes notice capability either. That's very dangerous.

KALB: Miss Lord?

LORD: General, I'm curious. In the move to de-MERV or to reduce the numbers of warheads, did the commission ever look at the possibility of upgrading Minute Man III so that we would have the capabilities of taking out hardened, or military facilities in the Soviet Union? That would accomplish one thing, which is to get rid of the 10-warhead MX and we would already have the silos ready built. SCOWCROFT: Yeah. We feel that, that that is insufficient in several respects. First of all, it would take considerably longer, a couple of years anyway, than deploying the MX. You could make, warhead for warhead, make them virtually as accurate. The numbers are not the same. And in addition, you end up still with an aging missile with no, what I would call, flexibility to respond to the Soviets in any way they will. We still, if the Soviets prove absolutely obdurate, and we need more forces, you cannot do it by that route.

LORD: Uhm. Another thing. The Midgetman missile. It's touted as sort of savior for the next decade. How practical is it to build, when recent congressional Budget Office studies show that it would be three times less expensive to just simply build more Trident submarines and put our forces under sea? SCOCROFT: We believe that it's very practical, but to develop and not to proceed ought to proceed with deliberation. If one has to deploy these in the thousands, there's no question that a single warhead missile, warhead for warhead, is more expensive than a MERV, than a many warhead missile. And a mobile missile is more expensive than one which simply sits in silos. But with the development which we think is possible, for the hardened mobile vehicle, which would enable these to be deployed on some of our larger military reservations and still not permit the Soviets to destroy them all by barraging the whole area with just a few weapons is quite practical, at reasonable cost.

KALB: We've got two minutes to go. Mr. Monroe?

MONROE: Starting with Adm. Turner, I'd like to ask each of you, if you were confined to a question that one congressman says he regards is the essential question.... This is Mr. Glickman. The question is: will the funding for MX help or hurt our own ability to reach an ultimate reduction in nuclear weapons arsenals? TURNER: I don't think it will help at all because we simply are going to be tempting the Soviets into a race. They are 75% dependent on large land-based missiles, 75% of their total nuclear force. When we start to challenge that by appearing to want to make it vulnerable, we're going to get them to build even more of those so that they will stay relatively invulnerable, I think.

(REMAINING PORTION OF BROADCAST PREEMPTED BY LOCAL PROGRAMMING)

Betty Turner, Transcriber

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM ABC Weekend Report

STATION WJLA-TV  
ABC Network

DATE May 22, 1983 11:30 P.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT The Sandinista Regime

TOM JARRIEL: CIA Director William Casey reportedly has told some congressmen that U.S.-backed Nicaraguan rebels have a good chance of overthrowing the Sandinista regime before the end of this year. Casey's prediction appears at odds with the Reagan Administration's claim that U.S. support for the rebels is aimed primarily at cutting off the flow of arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Good Morning America STATION WJLA TV  
ABC Network

DATE May 23, 1983 7:00 AM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT William Casey: Nicaragua

STEVE BELL: In other news this morning, CIA Director William Casey is quoted as saying that the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua may fall by the end of the year.

Several congressmen have told the New York Times that Casey's view undercuts the White House assertion that American support for anti-Sandinista rebels is aimed only at ending arms shipments to rebels in El Salvador.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Today Show

STATION WRC-TV  
NBC Network

DATE May 23, 1983 7:00 A.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT CIA Report

JOHN PALMER: The CIA reportedly feels the overthrow of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is near. According to the New York Times, CIA Director William Casey believes U.S.-backed rebels have a good chance of bringing down the Sandinistas by the end of the year.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM	CBS Morning News	STATION	WDVM-TV CBS Network
DATE	May 23, 1983	7:00 A.M.	CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT	CIA/Sandinist Government		

BILL KURTIS: Nicaragua's Sandinist government could soon be on the way out. According to the New York Times, CIA Director William Casey, an Administration official, and congressional officials all believe that U.S.-supported rebels have a good chance now of overthrowing the current regime in Nicaragua by the end of the year.