

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE 5

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH  
23 APRIL 1979

## AFTER SALT-2 PACT

# CAN AMERICA KEEP TABS ON RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS?

By ROBERT MOSS

THE latest contribution to the debate on the proposed Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Salt-2) between Russia and America comes from Amrom Katz, former head of the verification section of the American Arms Control Agency.

That job gave him a ringside seat when it came to assessing how far the Russians could be trusted to honour their treaty undertakings.

His conclusions are sobering for those who persist in the naive hope that, because Western governments are ready to respect an agreement, the Soviet leadership is bound to act the same way.

Mr Katz's findings can be studied in a monograph entitled *Verification and Salt* that has just been published by the Heritage Foundation in Washington.

His basic argument is that "we have never found anything that the Russians have successfully hidden" and that to be less cautious than this in assessing the chances of policing a new arms limitation treaty would be the height of folly.

### Warnke challenged

He takes issue with Paul Warnke, America's chief Salt negotiator until his resignation in a political storm late last year, who retains important influence as a consultant, and who recently assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the anticipated Salt-2 agreement is adequately verifiable."

The problem is not merely that it is all-but-impossible to check on possible Salt violations like the upgrading of weapons (for example, the conversion of intermediate-range SS-20 missiles into strategic-range SS-105) or the fitting of more warheads than agreed on existing missiles.

Mr Katz points out that even at the time the Salt-1 treaty was signed in 1972, it was accepted that the Americans had no way to count the numbers of missiles the Russians have—and therefore no way to check up that the Russians respect limitations on the numbers that might be agreed.

### Launcher scheme

At that time, the Americans tried to get round the verification problem by concentrating on the number of fixed missile launchers available to the Russians.

The Soviet launchers then involved thick-walled concrete structures protecting underground silos—in other words, they were fairly conspicuous.

But there is no reason to assume that the Russians are not capable of great deviousness in concealing new missile launchers as well as the missiles themselves—which, until actually deployed, are undetectable anyway.

Mr Katz gives a thought-provoking example which, in the view of some analysts, has already been put into practice by the Russians.

He points out that it would not be difficult to camouflage a large covert force of strategic missiles under structures that would appear from aerial photographs to be light manufacturing industries—anonymous buildings, say, 150 ft by 300 ft.

The missiles in the silos beneath would not have the same degree of "hard" protection as those in the identified silos; the compensation would be the secrecy.

I think Mr Katz is on the right track. But he leads us to a further question that may give pause to the Salt enthusiasts. What would be the response of Washington to evidence that the Russians had massively and systematically violated a new Salt

Would Washington tear up the treaty? Would it even make the facts public?

### U.S. reaction

These are worrying questions, not least because the gathering and distribution of intelligence in Washington today has become highly politicised.

There is great bureaucratic pressure to report or circulate only what conforms to current Administration policies—which is, of course, a recipe for poor intelligence and weak defences.

In relation to monitoring Salt, some of the symptoms were obvious even under President Ford, when considerable efforts were made—as we now know through the public testimony of former CIA analysts like David Sullivan—to hush up a mounting body of evidence of Soviet Salt violations.

The situation is infinitely worse today. This is one more reason not to rush into the Salt-2 deal that the Russians would like to wrap up at a summit meeting with Mr Carter next month.

While Salt is being debated, another issue of more immediate relevance to European defence is being neglected.

### Europe issue

That is the possible deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe as a counter to the Soviet weapons systems targeted on Europe—notably the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber.

Here the influence of the Left-wing caucus within the ruling SPD in Bonn—on whose activities I have reported fully in this column—has made itself felt, and there seems little prospect (in the absence of a change of heart by Herr Schmidt) of deployment of the Pershing

Indeed, some defence analysts regard the setting-up of a new group within Nato to