

# Freedom at issue

March-April 1976

Number 35

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# Intelligence, Freedom and the Preservation of Both

## *An editorial*

During the American Revolution, the secretary to the foreign affairs committee of the Continental Congress came to believe that an American representative in Paris was engaging in financial skullduggery with a French agent over secret French arms shipments to the embattled colonies. The French court insisted on maintaining secrecy to avoid risking war with England. The American secretary, having little success in pushing his moralistic crusade in Congress, published his accusations in the Philadelphia press, thus blowing the lid off the operation. By his act, the American risked a cutoff of the very supplies the colonies needed to continue fighting.

Tom Paine—that early American leaker to the press—was fired from the Congressional committee. His suspicions were shown to have been mistaken. The damage he did had somehow to be patched up by others in order to keep the vital supplies flowing.

To be sure, Paine's reputation is secure as a patriot, pamphleteer and mobilizer of public opinion in the cause of the Revolution. However, would history treat him so kindly had his endangerment proved fatal to the struggling new nation? Put in terms of the principles by which representative democracies are governed, does any individual in a responsible position (or, for that matter, a journalist) have the right to substitute his own judgment for the collective judgment of the constituted and responsible authority in matters directly affecting the safety and survival of the entire nation?

This troublesome question has been raised 200 years later, in more ambiguous circumstances, in the course of the several current investigations of irregularities in American domestic and foreign intelligence operations. In the present case there is ample evidence of skullduggery, of abuses of authority, illegal activities and the planning of projects abhorrent to the public philosophy. And the exposure has once again been accomplished with the assistance of private leaks to the public press.

This time it is clear that Chief Executives have put intelligence services to improper uses, at home and abroad. It is equally clear that Congressional overseers of intelligence activities—the constituted and responsible authorities—have systematically dodged their responsibilities (as former Senator Smith points out in her memoir in this issue).

Reforms are obviously necessary, both in Executive regulation and in legislative oversight of intelligence operations. But by what measures, and at what costs to the safety and survival of the Republic in a world in which competent secret intelligence and diplomacy are among the most necessary weapons for survival?

The intelligence community must not conduct itself as if it were outside the law. Neither can the secret services operate effectively if stripped of all secrecy, or if monitored by so leaky a process as to make secrecy impossible.

One of the prices of freedom is the elusiveness of perfect solutions to such dilemmas. The American intelligence effort ought not be in conflict with the morality of the American people. Yet the American people must recognize that their government—like themselves as individuals—must often make difficult choices among goods, and sometimes even more painful choices among evils (a morality which philosopher Sidney Hook elaborates in his article).

Before we can reform the “intelligence community” we must understand the functions of the secret services (Messrs. Cherne and Jacobs describe these, and Dr. Nichols and Senator Smith propose some reforms in accompanying articles).

Such understanding has been speeded by the several congressional investigations. America faces increasingly intertwined economic-political-ideological tensions and paramilitary challenges. Until a few months ago—say, prior to the August days of the Helsinki conference—the preceding sentence might have been considered a throwback to Cold War argument. Not so today. Realities are again in greater vogue—even if Americans seem not yet ready to frame new policies based upon what they suspect are the inevitable limits of détente.

While Freedom House is not here suggesting any particular foreign policy, we do welcome the widening recognition, spearheaded now by our Secretary of State, that détente has a vastly different meaning to our adversaries than it has to us, and that America's greatest weaknesses are its internal uncertainties and a momentarily faltering sense of direction at home and abroad. Reasonable redefinitions of the functions and operations of U.S. intelligence may help restore public confidence in the ability of the government to reform. We therefore regard as essential the full-time monitoring of intelligence services under a clearly defined operational guide, with legislative and executive responsibilities as clearly stipulated. (The public may well play a greater role in monitoring intelligence services through the President's new board of intelligence overseers and the plan for a new commission with public representation proposed by former Senator Smith).

Such reform should be accomplished speedily with no further weakening of our security. “Intelligent intelligence” is vital, Professor Hook reminds us.

Tom Paine's colleagues in the Continental Congress would agree.

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*Silence, secrecy and a choice among evils are dictated by public as well as personal morality, observes Sidney Hook, calling for intelligent intelligence in defense of a free society.*

In the conduct of foreign affairs, as in personal matters, there are situations in which silence or secrecy demonstrates a form of morality. There are also times when secrecy alone is not enough: The defense of a free society or the maintenance of peace in the world may require the uncovering of complex information about the committed adversaries of freedom. If, in that process, abuses develop in the intelligence systems of a free nation, then appropriate methods must be devised for safely counteracting the morally illegitimate activities. We must unquestionably, however, maintain *intelligent* intelligence operations.

There are at least three fundamental questions whose answers have a direct bearing on the conduct and outcome of American foreign policy. The first is whether the normal political process can cope effectively with the problems and perennial crises of foreign policy, or whether this is a domain

negotiations and actions, because the strategies to meet acts of foreign aggression must be initiated before their outcome confronts the nation and limits its choice of alternatives of response, there is great danger to the national interest—to-day even to national survival—in deferring to the vagaries of public opinion that tend to swing pendularly from one extreme to another. De Tocqueville's words are often cited to drive these points home:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient... A democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience.

De Tocqueville's indictment can be substantiated from the historical record. When memories of past wars are faint, public opinion can too easily be aroused in support of armed

## Intelligence, Morality and Foreign Policy

by Sidney Hook



Dr. Hook

in which ultimate decisions must be entrusted to a dedicated corps of trained specialists responsible to the executive power. The second is whether principles of morality can and should operate in guiding the conduct of foreign policy, and to what extent the national interest should be subordinated to such principles when their role is acknowledged. The third is what moral choices are open to a democratic nation like our own in a world in which it is threatened by aggressive totalitarian powers and ideologies.

From de Tocqueville to Walter Lippmann democracies have been faulted because of their inability to conduct intelligent foreign policies. The argument is quite familiar. Where domestic policies are concerned their fruits can be roughly but properly determined by consequences perceived not too long after they have been adopted. If unsatisfactory, they can be corrected or agitation against them developed. But the consequences of a foreign policy are rarely immediate. Critical judgment usually follows only after the experience of bitter fruits of disaster. On the other hand, where the urgencies of a crisis situation require immediate response the democratic process is too slow and unwieldy. It is therefore concluded that because of the delicacy, complexity and sometimes the necessary secrecy of foreign policy

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conflict. This was apparent in 1914. And once hostilities begin, the slogans of total victory or unconditional surrender become extremely popular. Proposals for a negotiated peace are denounced as treasonable. On the other hand, after a costly war popular opinion is apt to become fearful and defeatist and to resist policies which, had they been adopted in time, might have prevented the very outcome that was feared most. The popular opposition to the rearmament of Britain in the 'thirties is a case in point. Another is the failure to act vigorously—urged only by two public figures, Pilsudski and Trotsky—against Hitler's reentry into the Rhineland in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. And although it is often ignored, the capitulation to Hitler at Munich was approved with wild popular enthusiasm as insuring peace in our time.

Other considerations make much of the instability and ignorance of popular opinion. Those who stress them tend to argue that the only alternative to the paralysis of the national will in foreign policy in a nation like our own is not to share the power but to entrust it to the executive branch. In an address delivered in New York in 1963, Senator Fulbright voiced sentiments in this vein which contrast sharply with some of his later pronouncements:

Public opinion must be educated and led if it is to bolster a wise and effective foreign policy. This is preeminently a task for Presidential leadership because the Presidential office is the only one under our constitutional system that constitutes a forum for moral and

political leadership on a national scale. Accordingly I think that we must contemplate the further enhancement of Presidential authority in foreign affairs.

### Whose business is foreign policy?

Granted all this and more, there are overwhelming considerations that make it dubious to entrust the direction of foreign policy (always excluding specific emergency actions whose continuation must be subject to later congressional ratification) to the exclusive purview of the executive power. First, in a democratic community which assumes that those who are affected by basic decisions should have some voice in influencing them, foreign policy must be a matter of high public concern. Especially today in the era of nuclear technology, foreign policy may center on decisions that spell national freedom or enslavement, or the life and death of tens of millions. Foreign policy is everybody's business.

Second, where U.S. foreign policy has been determined by the Executive independently of public opinion, the consequences have not been very happy for the preservation of freedom and the safeguarding of peace. Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1916 to keep the country out of World War I, a year later took the U.S. into war and in all likelihood prevented a negotiated peace. Even if the Central Powers had emerged from the conflict relatively stronger than the Allied Powers, Lenin and his faction would probably not have come to power in Russia. (Kerensky has admitted that the continuation of the war was a decisive factor in their triumph.) Without Lenin, the socialist and labor movements of Italy and Germany would not have been disastrously split and we might have been spared Mussolini and Hitler, not to speak of Stalin and Mao. In any event, no matter who had won, in the absence of American intervention it would be hard to imagine a world worse than the Nazi and Gulag Archipelagos.

Roosevelt during the Second World War regarded the Soviet Union as a genuine ally rather than as a co-belligerent, allaying deep popular distrust of the Kremlin's post-war intentions. Truman expressed Roosevelt's policy in the remark addressed to Senator Wheeler's committee which waited on him, after his accession to the Presidency, to caution against the extension of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe: "Gentlemen, it is not Soviet Communism I fear but rather British Imperialism"—and this on the eve of the grant of independence to India and the disintegration of the British Empire.

Third, in the long run the success of any foreign policy, even when initiated by the Executive in a crisis, as was the case in Korea (a needless war largely precipitated by the withdrawal of American troops and the declaration that Korea was outside the bounds of our national interest) depends upon the understanding and support of the people. The disaster in Vietnam to a large extent flowed from the absence of popular understanding of what justified our continued presence there after the initial error of involvement had been made.

There are good pragmatic grounds therefore for sharing with the citizenry the determination of foreign policy.

### Morality in public affairs

This brings to the fore the second question—one that can be posed in the form of a further criticism of a democratic approach to foreign policy. It is often argued that popular in-

fluence on foreign policy is undesirable because it tends to be naive and moralistic. It assumes that what is good or bad, right or wrong, honorable or dishonorable, in private ordinary life is no less so in the life of nations at peace or at war. But many experts in foreign policy assure us that standards of morality in private and public life are profoundly different. Who does not recall the words of statesmen warning against a too simple identification of personal and public morality? Cavour, the Italian statesman, not the worst of the great unifiers, uttered a sentiment that all of them would have approved: "If we did for ourselves what we did for our country, what scoundrels we would be."

Our former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in an address to those contemplating a career in foreign service, observed "...generally speaking, morality often imposes upon those who exercise the powers of government standards of conduct quite different from what might seem right to them as private citizens."

Although this is a plausible and widely held view, it seems to me to rest on a confusion between moral standards or basic moral values, which if valid, are invariant for all situations in which human beings must act and the specific situations in which the decision must be made. No moral principle by itself determines what action should be taken because, when we are in an agony of doubt about what we should do, more than one moral principle applies. This is as true in the area of personal relations as in public policy. Because we should tell the truth, it does not follow that we should tell the truth to someone intent upon killing or maiming or robbing others, if not telling the truth will tend to prevent such action. There are always other values involved. Even in less extreme situations we may rightly prefer to be kind rather than needlessly truthful if the truth speaking will result in great cruelty and no benefit to anyone else.

It is wrong to steal but we cannot morally condemn the man who steals to provide food for his starving family if no other means exist to alleviate their condition. Every situation of moral choice is one in which the choice is not between good and bad, right or wrong but between good and good, right and right, the good and the right. One good may be overridden by a greater good; one obligation by a more pressing one. Ordinary human life would be impossible if we did not recognize and act on these considerations. It is wrong to kill a human being but *if the only way* to prevent him from blowing up a plane or city was by killing him it would be right to do so. To be sure the weight of experience is behind the moral injunctions and ideals expressed in the testaments and commandments of the great religions and ethical systems of the past. But they cannot all be categorical in all situations because they sometimes conflict. Reflection is required in order to determine which is to be subordinate to which. The only moral absolute is, to use a phrase of John Erskine's, the moral obligation to be intelligent in the choice we make of that course of conduct among possible alternatives whose consequences will strengthen the structure of the reflective values that define our philosophy of life.

This does not justify some current degenerate forms of existentialism according to which individuals are free to decide for themselves what is right or wrong without any appeal to moral principles or ideals but merely on the basis of what they desire. They seem to assume that because principles or ideals do not possess an absolutely categorical character that

therefore they have no validity whatsoever. They thereby overlook the fact that when a legitimate exception is made to a moral rule, this does not destroy the validity and binding character of that rule within certain limits and conditions. They fail to recognize the overriding obligation of another rule that holds when the conditions are different. The better is the enemy of the good, and the bad is preferable to what is worse—when these are the only alternatives.

The situation is quite familiar in the area of civil and political rights. We all know that the right to know may conflict with the right to privacy, the freedom to publish may destroy a person's right to a fair trial, the freedom to speak (falsely to shout Fire! in a crowded theatre) with the right to life. Even the right to worship according to one's conscience may be abridged if it involves human sacrifice or polygamy. In this country it is the Supreme Court which determines the order of priority these freedoms have and under what conditions. In England, it is Parliament. None of these rights can be considered as absolute in the sense that they can never be overridden in any circumstance.

It is when we approach the field of foreign policy that the greatest confusion abounds. A foreign policy must further the interests and safety of the nation. But any nation worthy of the support of moral men and women must be committed to certain moral ideals—freedom, self-determination, peace and human welfare. But no more in this case than in the case of personal morality does that mean that we can deduce what our policy should be in specific foreign policy situations. If we espouse "the right to self-determination" as we should, that will not mean that in any and every circumstance of international affairs, we should support it, regardless of other moral values involved, any more than that we should always tell the truth about everything to everyone, or give alms in any and every circumstance. Self-determination is one value among others and we must evaluate a claim for it in a specific case in the light of its consequences on these other values. Not every province of every country that raises the cry warrants our support any more than the demand for self-determination of the Southern States warranted moral support when they sought to dissolve the Union. If a country or region of a country demands self-determination in order to impose slavery on others or to unleash an aggressive war there is good reason not to support it. No group that raises the banner of self-determination really believes that the principle should be universalized. Indian intellectuals under British rule were eloquent about self-determination but they regarded the slogan as treasonable when raised by the inhabitants of Goa and Kashmir. The same was true for the Greek Cypriots in relation to the Turkish enclaves after independence was won by Cyprus.

### Morality and the national interest

There are those who are impatient with considerations about moral principles where national interest is involved. They take as their guide Lord Palmerton's pronouncement: "We have no eternal allies and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." In the light of American relations with Russia and China in the past sixty years one can certainly agree with this but read a different implication out of it. Why should the national interest exclude moral ideals? Despite the ambiguities and complexities of the concept of

national interest, it presupposes at the very least national survival. Even on the plane of personal morality, survival—except under extraordinary conditions—is integral to the good life. In order to be blessed, says Spinoza, one must at least be. The real question is how narrowly the national interest is to be conceived. We are not talking about national survival under any circumstances but of our survival as a free and open society. To some moral and patriotic Frenchmen the acceptance of Churchill's proposal to Vichy to accept union with Great Britain, even if this meant that France as a separate nation would exist no more, was preferable to the continued existence of France under fascist rule.

Once the survival of our free society with all its imperfections and limitations is regarded as desirable, to what measures are we therewith committed in its defense? Certainly not to any measures regardless of their consequences to our security and the character of the society we seek to defend. The untenability of the doctrine that the end of national security justifies the use of any means to insure it is, first, that often the means employed are *not* the most intelligent means of securing that end; and, second, that the consequences of using some means may adversely and unacceptably affect the constellation of other ends—our institutionalized rights, freedoms and services—whose security we are defending. Nonetheless there are occasions when the ends and values whose presence defines a free and open society conflict, and we must choose between them. There are occasions when freedom of the press does severely prejudice a person's right to a fair trial. There are occasions when speech is used to incite a lynch mob to deprive a person of life or limb. At any definite time the conflict of freedoms is resolved or should be resolved by the action whose consequences are more likely than those of any other action to further the total structure of freedoms in the community. Normally the suspension of freedom of the press for a few days with respect to certain features of a case, with unlimited freedom to comment subsequently, is considered by reflective judgment to be less undesirable than the miscarriage of justice that may result if such freedom remains unabridged. Some of those who protest in the interests of a free press that there is an absolute right to know in such cases do not extend it to the right to know the sources that the press relies on in its investigatory reports.

The great danger, of course, in invoking the sanctions of national security to curb any of the normal traditional freedoms of the market place of ideas is that the national security may not be involved at all, that it may be used as a pretext for arbitrary and illegal personal or factional interest. Measures that under proper safeguards may sometimes be both morally and legally legitimate in times of clear and present danger to the national security of the nation may be abused and misemployed against fellow citizens with whom we differ about policies. This was illustrated in the Watergate episode in which opponents *within* the democratic process were treated as if they were *enemies* of the democratic process.

### How defend the free society?

This makes focal the third question: What moral choices are open to a democratic society faced by an armed and powerful enemy whose declared objective is the destruction of free institutions like our own? If our society with all its imperfections—and with its multiple mechanisms for im-

provement—is worth surviving, it is worth defending. How can it legitimately defend itself?

At this point it is necessary to distinguish between two types of totalitarian powers and ideologies. Although as democrats we are morally committed to condemning both, both are not of the same direct and pressing concern to a culture that seeks to preserve its freedom. The first type has very unpleasant consequences for citizens who live within its borders but such nations do not threaten the peace of the world—for example, Franco's Spain and Tito's Yugoslavia. We need no present defense against them. The other type is aggressive and expansionist. It seeks overtly and sometimes covertly to undermine the strength and security of free countries and their allies. Today that characterizes the policy of the Soviet Union and in lesser measure, Communist China. The nature of the struggle to defend and preserve the free world requires at the very least some measures of secrecy. For example, any agreement on multilateral limitation on nuclear weapons is not worth the paper it is written on unless there exists some method of checking on the performance of the principals. If the U.S. has discovered a method of checking compliance by the Soviet Union, making such knowledge public would invite the Kremlin to devise

methods of escaping detection of violations and encourage it to stockpile nuclear weapons to a point where its predominance would make it relatively invulnerable to any response the U.S. could make if the Kremlin launched a nuclear Pearl Harbor. Secrecy on these and related matters is an axiom of political morality one is tempted to write, of political sanity.

Our secrecy is not enough. We require in the interests of our defense—and of the peace of the world—intelligence information concerning the Kremlin's success in penetrating our secrecy and its progress in devising methods by which it can undermine our defense. What is true for military measures, *mutatis mutandis* is true for some political measures, too.

What this entails is that "intelligence measures" be intelligent. The revelations concerning certain unsavory and foolish CIA operations is not an argument for the abolition of the agency but for its improvement. As well argue that we can remedy defective vision by poking the eyes out of our head, as that the best way of correcting the shortcomings of past intelligence practices is to abolish its functions; or, what is tantamount to the same thing, make the details of its operations known to a large congressional committee whose staffs are in a position to leak secrets to the press. Great Bri-

## *Intelligence cannot help a nation find its soul. It is indispensable, however, to help preserve that nation's safety while it continues the search.*

by Leo Cherne

*Mr. Cherne presented the following testimony, Dec. 11, at the invitation of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Rep. Otis Pike. Mr. Cherne was one of 12 members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On Feb. 17 President Ford named Mr. Cherne to the three-man, independent board of intelligence overseers. He will go on leave as chairman of Freedom House's executive committee.*

I am grateful for the invitation to testify before this committee. When I received the request earlier this week I was told that representatives of both parties concurred and had expressed the hope that I might present some overview and some sense of future needs for intelligence. I will unavoidably repeat some things you know, perhaps some which have been stated a number of times, but I do hope there will be some observations which will be helpful to you in your most important undertaking. May I first salute this committee for the two main thrusts of its investigation. Under your direction, Mr. Chairman, there has been the effort to determine whether our intelligence has been adequate to the needs and dangers we have faced and whether we have proceeded to obtain the intelligence we require with sufficient regard for the rights of the individual and the

obligations of law under the Constitution. Before I expand on those, I think you are entitled to something of my own background against which to measure my observations.

I have been the executive director of the Research Institute of America for nearly forty years. That activity has sharpened whatever capabilities I have as an economist and political scientist. Those forty years have been devoted in good part to the study of the governmental institutions gathered in this city. I confess, at a time when it is fashionable to derogate government, that I have always had a passionate respect for this most difficult, overcriticized, underpaid, and very undervalued activity.

Twenty-four years ago the distinguished theologian, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, urged me to succeed him as chairman of the International Rescue Committee. I have since then occupied that post. That committee was formed days after Hitler came to power for the purpose of assisting the democratic leaders and scholars of Germany whose love of liberty might compel their flight from that country. The IRC has assisted hundreds of thousands of those who have fled fascist, communist, and nondescript forms of totalitarian jeopardy. Those helped have fled the Soviet Union and the military government of Greece, Castro's Cuba and Duvalier's Haiti. We assist those who have been refugees



tain and every other democratic nation in the world has an Official Secrets Act or something equivalent. While such an act has never been necessary in America, our system does anticipate that officials and journalists alike will demonstrate a high sense of responsibility. Each must be aware of the inevitable and necessary tension between governmental secrecy and the need of the public to know; yet each must recognize, in the absence of an absolute demarcation of their respective territories, that *some* secrecy is essential to survival of freedom, and each has the duty to discover where the invisible line rests in each situation.

There have undoubtedly been abuses in CIA activities, particularly in the failure to abide by the restrictions on the field of its surveillance. But these could have been exposed and corrected without destroying the effectiveness of intelligence operations abroad. In other words there is an intelligent way of revealing the inadequacies of intelligence services and an unintelligent way which profits no one but the KGB and other enemies of the relatively free nations of the world.

There seems to be a wilful blindness among some commentators about the necessary role of intelligence services in the defense of a free and open society in an era in which the

sudden death of a culture is possible. The blindness is sometimes reinforced by a smug moral posturing which confuses principles with tactical measures. The same considerations—the health and integrity of the democratic process—that condemn the giving of a bribe to a domestic official *may* justify the offer of a bribe to an official of a foreign country for information—not procurable in time by any other way—that may be crucial to the national safety.

Those who on *a priori* grounds condemn an action without regard for its consequences in preserving the structure of democratic freedoms are guilty at the very least of blatant hypocrisy. This does not give *carte blanche* to any fool to undertake any project because it seems to him advantageous at the moment. Here as elsewhere there is no substitute for intelligence—for intelligence ultimately responsible to the authorized representatives, legislative or judicial, of the democratic community. It is sometimes necessary to burn a house, or to permit it to burn, in order to save a village. This does not bestow a license for arson. We must recognize the evil we do even when it is the lesser evil. But if it is truly the lesser evil then those who condemn it or would have us do nothing at all are morally responsible for the greater evil that may ensue.



Mr. Chernie

## The President's new intelligence overseer assesses his role

from the communist countries of Central Europe and those who safely reach Hong Kong. We have helped resettle more than 100,000 Cubans who have fled to this country, and are helping 18,000 of the Vietnam refugees to resettle in this country—and many, many others throughout the world.

For more than twenty years I have been chairman of the executive committee of Freedom House, an organization which was founded in 1941, with Eleanor Roosevelt, William Allen White, David Dubinsky, Roy Wilkins, Wendell Willkie and others, to advance the struggle for freedom at home and abroad. The present chairman of the Freedom House board of trustees is former Senator Margaret Chase Smith.

Just a couple of final personal notes which I do think relevant to this committee's purposes. I have had the privilege in one context or another to serve each President since 1938. Each of these undertakings has involved an opposition to totalitarianism, left or right. On one occasion, I was told that I had incurred the displeasure of the director of the FBI. I had made myself a determined nuisance to Senator Joseph McCarthy beginning one month after he entered the Senate in 1947 and continued that opposition to the Senator until 1954 when the Senate censured him. My attention was drawn to the Senator because of my own deep concern with the Communist Party. I found it alarming that the party,

through its instruments in Wisconsin, openly and actively supported McCarthy, if only for the purpose of unseating Senator Robert La Follette, who at that moment had launched an investigation into the extent of communist domination of U.S. labor unions. At a later time I thought that the frequent social contact between Senator McCarthy and FBI Director Hoover inappropriate. My saying so was not appreciated. In time my criticisms of Senator McCarthy and of his disregard for personal rights led to a threat being conveyed to me that libel proceeding would be instituted if I did not desist. I said that such an action would serve a purpose I long thought useful—having the Senator in a court under oath. The threat of action subsided.

### Bipartisan protections

Gentlemen, I have not simply recited a personal background, and I do appreciate your indulgence. I hope I am sensitive to the committee's concern for the protection of the right of privacy of American citizens and the conduct of intelligence within the law, and, perhaps most important, for the urgency of assuring the American people that intelligence and personnel of the intelligence community must never again be requested or permitted to perform some service useful to anyone's domestic political purposes. If there

is only one object which I would wish my testimony might reinforce, it would be that one. Neither foreign intelligence nor domestic intelligence, not CIA or FBI, must ever again be requested to perform or acquiesce in an activity which, whatever guise is asserted, actually seeks to serve an individual's ambition or a political candidate's or party's purposes. Even minor political favors—wigs, voice changers, whatever else—simply ought to be impermissible.

It is with a kind of relief that I now know as a result of these investigations that the abuse of and by the intelligence community has occurred during the administrations of both parties. This misbehavior has occurred under Presidents who were held in awe, or admired for their grace and youth, or respected for their candor, or revered for the gratitude we reserve for those who got us out of danger, or were seen as simply ruthless, beleaguered, or ambitious. Gentlemen, this has not been a problem more characteristic of one party than the other.

These abuses are perhaps inherent in the fact of power. And all too much power, for too long a time, was enjoyed—with no restraint by anyone—by a much praised man who held his police post too long and knew too much about too many people, and appeared not at all reticent to convey that fact.

Let me tell you why I am especially relieved to find this a problem not confined to one party. The bipartisan character of these past difficulties means that we can now proceed to a bipartisan set of corrections and protections which even in an election year have a chance of being kept out of partisan politics.

While I am still on the subject of abuses for reasons of personal ambition or political advantage, let me say something about the board on which I serve, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I do not appear here as a representative of that board or, for that matter, as anyone's representative, but simply as your guest at your invitation. I am not free to speak of the deliberations of that board or the recommendations we have given to a succession of Presidents, but I know of no restraint which can keep me from telling you that on not one occasion have I observed a single member of the board bending a judgment or stressing a weight which would advance the political interest of the particular President, his administration, or party. The very privacy which has been accorded to PFIAB has, I believe, sheltered it from the temptation to grandstand, politick, or otherwise bend before the political winds.

I myself was involved in one very reassuring episode in this respect. I was appointed a member of that board at a point when the Watergate investigation already made it quite clear that there had been a serious breach of faith. Days before I learned of my appointment, I made an address critical of the Watergate affair and of responses to it which had been coming from the White House. I thought Admiral Anderson, chairman of that board, ought to know of my views, and I quickly sent him a copy of those remarks. I received not the slightest suggestion that I desist from such expressions.

### **Détente—no limit to many hostile actions**

Gentlemen, when I was invited to testify, I was, in particular, requested to make some comments on our future requirements in the intelligence area. I regrettably see nothing in the foreseeable future likely to change the fact

In the field of limiting arms, intelligence is the sensor assuring our own safety, and a guarantor of whatever prospects for peace we see.

that sovereign nations remain virtually unimpeded by law in all of those areas which involve national security.

I welcome the fact that efforts toward détente have been made and that there is an increasing realization in and outside of Government that détente is a process, not a conclusion, a means of limiting the most frightful dangers of belligerency. I believe some portion of the American people may have made assumptions about détente not shared by the architects of that policy. I also believe that, initially at least, the policy was oversold. But I am sure I say nothing you do not know vividly when I add that the policy of détente does not effectively limit hostility or ideological warfare or local warfare, or organized subversion, or encouragement of terrorists, or many of the other hazards with which we have become all too familiar.

We live in a far more interdependent world than was the case even five years ago, and things now happen so quickly that the reaction time for those who must make decisions is terribly short, and therefore effective intelligence analysis and estimates are so much more critical. The shock of the oil embargo made that painfully clear. But our dependency on foreign petroleum is only one of a number of areas in which we are dependent on other nations, and they on us. The fact of mutual dependency, however, is no assurance that the economic conduct of nations will be benign; that rivalries will not be painful and dangerous; that food, raw materials, national monetary reserves and a host of other things will not be made the subject of dangerous conflict with our adversaries, and even intervals of extreme tension with one or another of our friends.

These pressures which have radically narrowed the world, even as they have enlarged the hazards we face, will continue to press our country into conferences, undertakings, new bilateral and multilateral agreements, all of which have as a common purpose the reduction of unrestrained rivalry in arms, resources, and ideas.

Even if this were a lawful world, the dangers would be great. But it is not a lawful world. It is not a world in which nations have a uniform commitment to ethical or legal concepts, and consequently the policy makers in our nation have no alternative but to rely on the very best knowledge, the most objective analysis, the most careful assessment, the most objective estimates.

Just in the field of limiting arms it is urgent that we know all that we can about our own capabilities and about those of any adversary, and particularly the Soviet Union. We have long ago concluded that mutual inspection is unavailable and therefore obviously hope that it is unnecessary. This places a particular burden on the intelligence community, since it is therefore the sensor assuring our safety and a guarantor of whatever prospects for peace we see. I recognize that this must have been said before this committee a score of times.



And yet I think there are certain fundamental truths, now that these hearings are drawing to a close, that must be reemphasized not for the fact of your understanding but for the fact of public understanding of the role and requirement for intelligence.

### Less dramatic intelligence

But we do tend, when we talk about intelligence, to look at the more dramatic aspects: the October war, the oil boycott, a massive grain purchase, climactic events in Cyprus, or Angola, or Portugal, or Chile. The fact is intelligence may be at least as valuable in much less dramatic areas: the sharp analysis of trends, political, social, military and economic; potential developments, such as the formation of new cartels like OPEC; economic assessments, including assessments of the most unlikely events. What, for example, our policy-makers need to know, would be the result if, for several years, the industrial nations of the West suffered unabating acute inflation? How sturdy would the democratic governments be? How well would our various international organizations function? Would the European Community remain intact? Would we see the beginning of trade wars as countries sought to protect their weakening currencies?

We have needed to know how the member nations of OPEC both intended to and actually used the wealth acquired since the fall of 1973. The simple fact of quadrupling of petroleum prices set into motion the largest transfer of wealth in modern times. The stability of international monetary arrangements depends on that kind of knowledge. And wise decision making, informed by such intelligence, not only assists the economies of Western industrial nations, but enables us better to know the particular problems of the less developed nations as well.

There is all manner of technology about which we need to have the very best of intelligence. Recommendations are made which must be decided by particular agencies in the Executive Branch that advanced computers be sold to countries which are now not eligible for such purchases, that other forms of high technology be made available. We of course wish to enlarge our balance of trade, strengthen the American dollar in the process. We need to know, among other things, whether certain items which are on restricted lists are sold by us to one country only to be resold to countries which are not eligible. But the much more penetrating questions with which intelligence must deal involve the complicated net assessment of all of the radiating results which flow from the transfer of high technology.

I will not go further with illustrations of the various kinds of intelligence which will continue to be absolutely basic to informed decision making because I am already embarrassed to have said so much about things you clearly know. I'd like to look briefly, however, at the means by which this intelligence is derived. All of us would of course prefer to have this information gathered by and confined to researchers functioning in libraries, statisticians pouring over trade data, political and economic scientists providing their reasoned projections—and I have just described the great bulk of the work which is performed within the intelligence community. Both in numbers of people and dollars spent, this is the giant slice of the intelligence dollar.

In addition there is information of the most vital kind, not found in libraries, which we must also understand. There are

## Without intelligence the terrorists would be given an absolutely open field.

on occasion tactical and collusive arrangements which are part of international trade negotiations, or the pricing of raw materials which are vital to us. There is the entire difficult business of knowing as much as we can of someone else's real intentions.

There are those within the world's intelligence community who believe that terrorism may well prove to be the most serious of tomorrow's hazards. It is already among the most brutal and difficult to anticipate of today's dangers. Without intelligence and whatever clandestine means are needed to secure it, the terrorists would be given an absolutely open field. Even with the very best of intelligence, the terrorist finds easier pickings in open societies. If highjackings are commonplace in either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, they have done an effective job in hiding that knowledge from us. And yet I am sure we will all instantly agree we would not wish to pay the price of that form of government to secure whatever safety they enjoy from the terrorist.

In each of the areas to which I have addressed these observations, there is a common thread: intelligence is the basic instrument enabling us to anticipate danger—military, political, economic—enabling us to know the direction from which the threat may come, and enabling us if at all possible to apply unprovocative responses in the hope of avoiding the danger.

Intelligence is the means which enables us to reach a widening net of agreements with some measure of confidence that they will be complied with. There is not the slightest prospect of any arms control measure without the most effective application of the technology and intellect which combine to produce good intelligence. And I'd like to observe that we are talking of this at a time when the problem is still relatively manageable. Not many years into the future we will regrettably be dealing with nuclear capabilities which are widespread and at the possible disposal of some who may be tempted to use that capability to suggest nuclear blackmail.

Now let me say some things about the future of subversive warfare or some more modest activities that are included in the phrase "covert action." The Soviet Union has already made it clear that it does not interpret the Helsinki agreement as in any way moderating the urgency of its ideological efforts. Indeed, leaders of the Soviet Union have been remarkably candid in observing that they think the tide is running in their favor. There *is* no monolithic communist movement, but there *are* communist parties in most countries which are more or less available to advance the interests of one of the centers of communist power. I am doing no more than describing the events which occurred in Portugal, which presently exist in Angola, which hopefully will not threaten a Spain in transition. The Italian Communist Party may be closer to achieving its purposes in Italy today than it was when we were so fearful of that prospect in the late 1940's. Now, shall we eliminate under any and all circumstances the ability of the United States

and other Western democratic nations to try in some modest degree to apply some counterthrust to this otherwise unrestrained subversion? Are we simply to conclude that the very nations which had hoped that Angola might in fact be independent must now sit by helplessly as one form of colonialism is replaced by another?

In a public interview within the past month, Governor Averell Harriman was quoted as saying that his greatest concerns are not with the fall of one city, but rather with the overthrow of countries and governments world-wide by Russian undercover activities. I quote specifically:

The Russians are not nuts, they are not crazy people, they're not Hitler. But they are trying to dominate the world by their ideology and we are killing the one instrument which we have to fight that ideology, the CIA.

Incidentally, I happen to disagree with the bleakness of the Governor's assessment. I do not think these investigations will have that effect. Clearly that is not your purpose. Hopefully, instead, this committee will have added to our understanding of what needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of the intelligence product and the more efficient organization of the community so that it may achieve the ends we require. I do regret, however, that it is in the nature of an investigation, especially one which focuses on inadequacies and misbehavior, that the resulting public understanding will neither be complete nor balanced. You have identified some of the notable intelligence failures. How I wish it had been possible to illuminate some of the very considerable successes! The very fact that they exist is the strongest reason for keeping their nature and their means quite private. I was reminded of this just last week, in seeing an old movie on television, *Tora, Tora, Tora*, that "in the interest of vital security" even a President, Franklin Roosevelt, was for a time taken off the list of those privileged to see the results of the Ultra Machine which broke the codes of our enemies. President Roosevelt was allegedly removed simply because he had been careless.

Unfortunately, an investigation like this one does not provide the opportunity for the public to have the sense of the thousands of decent, able, extraordinarily professional analysts, painstakingly applying research and scholarship, doggedly reviewing prominent and obscure facts and data so that the policy maker may have timely analysis, assessment and recommendations. They are truly an unheralded group of men and women selected from scores of professional disciplines—economists, historians, psychologists, translators, lawyers, monetary specialists, geographers, doctors, military analysts, biologists, cryptographers, optics and communications scientists, and a host of other fields of scholarship working toward a common purpose: that those who must decide have at their disposal the very best of knowledge and understanding to illuminate their decisions.

### Where does the danger lie?

Mr. Pike, on Monday night as I watched television news, I heard you say that it is not the Soviet Union which is our greatest danger. If I correctly quote you, you said that the greater danger is that the people no longer believe what their government tells them. I do agree that we have a serious crisis of belief, of confidence in institutions. But let me dissent on two counts. Whatever the failure of our own government—and those failures include this body as well as the Executive Branch—those failures are within our

capability to control, correct, or change. That, thank our bicentennial stars, is our good fortune. But whatever danger may lie before us from the Soviet Union or any other foreign source cannot be readily corrected by the American people. No ballot box will diminish that danger, no burst of renewed faith among us can altogether deflect that danger—not here, not in Angola, or Portugal, or Central Europe.

I dissent somewhat, Mr. Pike, on other grounds; they are no less serious. There is a crisis of belief in our government, as you have said, but it is not simply that. We are in the midst of a crisis of all authority, of all of our institutions. Those who study the public opinion of the American people agree that our regard for all our institutions—medicine, education, religion, military, the Executive Branch, the Supreme Court, the Congress, business, organized labor—our confidence in each of them is at the lowest point since we have measured these attitudes. In fact, a majority of the American people do not have high confidence in a single one of these institutions—not even medicine or religion.

I suggest, therefore, that when any of us who are leaders in any walk of American life think we can repair our own misfortune by identifying the greater distress of someone else's trouble, we may be deluding ourselves. We may indeed be the architects of our own mutual terminal agonies. We all share the difficulties of what Eric Hoffer calls an "age of disillusionment." A novelist reminded us a number of years ago—it was James Joyce—"History is a nightmare from which we awaken." While there is still time, I urge we end this orgy of reciprocal abuse, escalating disbelief, and profligate accusations. There are sins enough which we have committed, but it is not for these that we seek expiation as much as for the difficulties and frustrations which simply flow from the fact that we are living in the most complex and dangerous time in the entire history of mankind. We must, I think, very soon put aside our denigrations and concentrate once again on the affirmative tasks of protecting liberty, individual and national. Until then, we condemn ourselves to suffer the consequences of each other's misbehavior.

I will conclude, gentlemen, by telling you of a most extraordinary coincidence. I received the invitation to share these thoughts with you on Monday. On Tuesday I was obliged to travel to California. On that plane, sitting directly behind me was an old, tired, stooped and, to me, remarkably small woman. I had imagined her to be taller. Because she is a person whose wisdom is widely conceded, I imposed on her. I told her that I would be testifying today and that I knew that the problems in her country were quite different from ours. I thought nevertheless that she might have some observations which would be useful to me, and asked whether I might put four questions to her. I will recall that exchange as exactly as I noted them immediately after I returned to my seat.

"Mrs. Meir, both of our countries are democracies. We accept ethical and religious restraints on our behavior. Do we have any right whatever, Mme. Prime Minister, to conduct covert programs in other countries, to meddle in their affairs, seek to change their outcomes?"

"Mr. Cherne, we forget that other countries are not like ours. They are not governed by the same restraints. They don't hesitate to do the things which democracies worry about. Look now at Angola. Must we all sit by and watch? Mr. Cherne, I attended a Socialist conference in Berlin last February, and we heard then what would happen in

Portugal. And we did nothing. And it happened as they said it would. But we remain paralyzed by our own doubts and confusions."

"But Mrs. Meir, our Congress understandably feels it must know what is being undertaken. Don't you have the same feelings and pressures in your Parliament, your Knesset?"

"Frankly, no. We have a Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, but they do not expect to be told of things that would be better if they did not know. But perhaps we feel a sense of danger which is not felt in your country. Also our representatives, Mr. Cherne, know that we will not use our intelligence abilities for things which are political, which intelligence people should not meddle in."

"Mrs. Meir, can you tell me, since our countries each have excellent intelligence services, how did we miss the Yom Kippur war?"

"Well, I will tell you this: we should not have missed it. I think we had enough information, but there was obstinacy. It was not read properly. And you know your people did the same thing and helped reinforce our refusal to believe what we should have understood. No, I tell you, we should not have missed that one."

"One final question, Mrs. Meir, do you have problems keeping things secret which must be secret?"

"Sometimes. But not as in your country. But this is a problem of democracies. If you'll forgive me, it's a misunderstanding of democracy. Because a country is

democratic, must everything be known? Must we weaken ourselves and strengthen our enemies? In democracies we think all countries are like ours. Unfortunately, Mr. Cherne, they are not."

Mr. Chairman, I sometimes think we act as though we're a group of honorable men playing poker in a 19th century saloon. There, if someone made an effort to look at another player's cards, he'd run a high risk of getting shot. In the game of nations, if we don't, we run a similar danger.

In 1888 Lord Bryce in *The American Commonwealth* said that America was "sailing a summer sea towards which as by a law of fate the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move." Ambassador Moynihan, in the 1976 *The American Commonwealth* recently said, "Liberal democracy on the American model tends to the condition of the monarchy in the 19th century: a holdover form of government, one which persists in isolated and peculiar places here and there, and may even serve well enough for special circumstances, but which has simply no relevance to the future. It is where the world was, not where it is going."

Mr. Chairman, both comments, a century apart, are eloquent. I believe they were both, at least in part, wrong. We were neither sailing a summer sea then, nor are we about to fall off the edge now. The world's troubles are great and our problems in dealing with them manifest. This committee is devoting its serious thought to some of those problems. Intelligence cannot help a nation find its soul. It is indispensable, however, to help preserve that nation's safety while it continues the search.

## How Margaret Chase Smith Would Monitor the CIA



Mrs. Smith

*The former senator, for years a maverick member of CIA subcommittees, tells why Congress has been derelict in preventing presidential and other abuses of intelligence operations. Her plan for revamping CIA oversight procedures is set forth for Freedom at Issue.*

by Margaret Chase Smith

*The President's Feb. 17 reorganization of intelligence services did not recommend changes in congressional oversight of intelligence. Former Senator Smith discusses this aspect of intelligence reforms.*

As a former member of senatorial subcommittees on the Central Intelligence Agency, I view the congressional investigations and revelations on the CIA with mixed reactions.

**Mrs. Smith is chairman of the board of Freedom House**

I have not the slightest doubt about the justification of the investigations. I have not the slightest doubt that some good can come from the investigations and the revelations. I have not the slightest doubt that this is long overdue. I have not the slightest doubt that Congress has been derelict in its responsibility on the CIA. And I have not the slightest doubt about the right of the American public to know.

I have these feelings because of frustrations and concerns I had as a member of senatorial subcommittees on the CIA. Because of my seniority on the Senate Armed Services Committee and on the Senate Appropriations Committee, I was entitled to go on the Senate CIA subcommittees long before I was admitted to them. I was blocked by the senior

Republican on these committees, because he viewed me as a "boat rocker"—so much so that the second Republican position on the CIA committees was not filled rather than admitting me to the subcommittees. But it finally reached the point at which the chairman of the CIA subcommittees told the senior Republican that it was no longer tolerable for me to be kept off the subcommittees.

It was under these circumstances that I finally went on the CIA subcommittees. Once on, I experienced constant frustration. First, I found it particularly difficult to get responsive answers from CIA Director Allen Dulles. For example, he refused to give the subcommittees, at my request, a comparison of United States and Russian strengths, military and otherwise, throughout the world and nation by nation. Second, when I pressed him to do so none of my colleagues on the subcommittees supported me and so Dulles' defiant refusal stuck.

These experiences were disillusioning. Yet I can understand the attitude of my colleagues who refused to support my interrogation of the CIA director. They displayed the weakness of not wanting to have the responsibility of knowing what was going on in, and being done by the CIA. I cannot condone this in the slightest. But I can understand it—and I will tell you why.

### Consequences of leaking

Leaking to the press is a prevalent congressional disease. Too many congressmen and senators do it for their own political self-promotion for headlines and currying favor with the news media. Some conscientious members, therefore, did not want to know too much lest they be suspected of leaking to the press what some of the headline-hungry and news-media-favor-seeking legislators did, or might, leak to the press. It was very simple—if they didn't know, then they couldn't be suspected of leaking.

The "leakers" in Congress are not hard to spot. And I know the feeling about them. When it was proposed that the CIA subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees be enlarged to include some senators outside those committees and include a senator who was a notorious "leak," I served notice that if he went on the subcommittee I would resign because I would not take responsibility for the probable leaks he would make.

If the congressional committees investigating the CIA were free of subjective partisanship, I would have far less concern about what they are doing. But, in my opinion, there has been distressing subjective partisanship. In some respects, these CIA congressional investigations remind me of the congressional "witch hunts" conducted by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy—and we all know what great damage the McCarthy "witch hunts" did to the State Department. In some measure, what Joe McCarthy did to the State Department in the 'fifties, current congressional investigating committees are doing to the CIA in the 'seventies. Unchecked, these activities will greatly undermine, if not destroy, our intelligence capability so essential to our national and international security.

So often, though, we find the "kettle calling the pot black." In the strident criticism by extreme anti-CIA elements, President Ford was charged with "politically exploiting" the case of the assassinated CIA agent because the President gave him full military honors and burial. The assassination was caused by those who blew the agent's

cover. It hardly behooves critics of the CIA—who have deliberately blown the CIA's cover for their own self-aggrandizing political exploitation—to sit in judgment, cry "foul" and criticize President Ford for honoring a CIA agent who gave his life for his country as surely as any soldier killed in combat.

Such hypocritical criticism comes closely on the heels of the revelation of the cover-up by the Senate committee investigating the CIA. There were strongly indicated intimate associations of the late President Kennedy with an attractive associate of the underworld who might have been contacted by the CIA with respect to political assassination of a foreign leader. The defense of the chairman of that committee that it was the unanimous decision of the committee so to act is not only unacceptable but an insult to the intelligence of the American public. A cover-up decision is wrong—even if it is bipartisan—and unanimity does not bestow sanctity upon it. How ironic for a congressional committee exposing the covert actions of the CIA to be guilty itself of a political cover-up!

If there is a valid distinction—if there is a valid rationalization—if there is a justification—then tell it to the widows, children and parents of the CIA agents slain or about to be slain.

Perhaps the most significant revelation about the CIA has been the flagrant, personal, presidential exploitation of the CIA. Such presidential abuse is in direct contrast to the past congressional dereliction on oversight responsibility. But, in view of the necessarily inherent secret character of the international and national security mission of the CIA, what is the proper and responsible middle ground between the partisan extremes of presidential exploitation (under the guise of national security) and past congressional dereliction and current congressional exploitation (under the guise of "the right to know" and "freedom of information")?

### A plan to monitor the CIA

Only a veritable Solomon could provide the answer—mine is certainly no better than others. Because of the irresponsible leakage that stems from inherent congressional partisanship, I would recommend the abolition of congressional committees on the CIA. Instead, I suggest the creation of a permanent (not ad hoc) five-member joint commission composed of representation from the three branches of government and from the public.

I recommend that the Legislative branch be represented by the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate because they are the elected heads of their legislative bodies. I recommend that the Judicial branch be represented by the most junior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court because that Justice would be chronologically freshest from ranks outside the Supreme Court. I recommend that the Executive branch be represented by the Vice President, rather than the President, to avoid a conflict between prior presidential direction of the CIA and subsequent presidential oversight of the CIA.

My choice for the fifth member and chairman of the commission would be a representative of the public appointed by the President and confirmed by the House as well as the Senate. I would require that the public representative and chairman be a person not of the same political party as that of the President in order to assure some element of political independence. Ideal for such


representation would be an elder statesman of the stature of the late Bernard Baruch or Eleanor Roosevelt.

The first function I would assign to such a commission would be to write the charter for the CIA defining not only its proper areas of activities but, as well, the proper relationship between it and the President, the Congress and other agencies of the government. The commission's second function would be to police the CIA to insure compliance with its charter—to police constantly and not sporadically.

Third, I would require its four government members to accept the grave responsibility and accountability for the actions of those branches of the government they represent.

If these five designated persons could not be trusted as guardians against misconduct by the CIA, against presidential personal and partisan exploitation of the CIA, and against the congressional disease of leakage and partisan exploitation of the CIA in sensational hearings and exposes, then who could?

## Should the U.S. Use Covert Action in the Conduct of Foreign Policy?



Mr. Jacobs

*Why did we create the CIA in the first place? Is secrecy sinister? Can covert actions make up for mistaken foreign policy? Would our suspension of covert acts be tantamount to unilateral disarmament? Some answers by a senior CIA officer.*

by Arthur Lester Jacobs

**T**he question posed for governmental and public consideration is whether the United States government should use covert action in the conduct of its foreign policy.

The ambiance of our times is hardly conducive to objective and sober consideration of this question. Emotionalism and sensationalism are pandemic. The news media have been filled with lurid portrayals of poisoned dart guns, penetration, infiltration, assassination, lacking only a sex angle which may yet come. The use of the pejorative "Department of Dirty Tricks" neither provides facts nor allows for reasoned discussion.

One would think that any discussion of this question would have been preceded by the consideration of the security threats to the United States and whether and what types of action are desirable to meet those threats. It would be pertinent, first, to examine the efficacy of various methods of implementing our foreign policy.

But the opponents of covert action take the draconian position that we should totally abandon our existing capability for a variety of moral, legal and political reasons and dismantle the organization for implementing it. Others condemn such action in principle but grudgingly concede that certain circumstances might justify it, while demanding interdictions in some types of action and stringent

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requirements for authorization and control. The more extreme supporters of covert action oppose any change from present authorization.

I do not write as an apologist or defender of any past covert action, be it real, imagined or distorted. At the same time, I would not, even if permitted, inventory past achievements of covert action, except to voice my conviction that they have served the nation well. I do not represent the CIA or any other agency of government, or any elected or appointed officer. I write as a private citizen on the use of covert action as a legitimate means of protecting national security and implementing our foreign policy, the needs for reaffirming the validity of that means, and to point out the dangers of abandoning it.

I share the concern about the possibility of our government engaging in any unauthorized intervention abroad, and particularly in a war. And I am just as concerned with my civil liberties and those of others because I know how they have been threatened before. As a retired intelligence officer, I have no more or less qualification to speak to the issue before us, which is essentially political. What I do have is a body of experience in covert action that may enable me to separate fact from fiction as to its use, its limitations and its potential for misuse. And, if I can dissipate some common misconceptions and allay some misgivings and doubts, I will have made a contribution.

### Definition of covert action

There is considerable confusion about the terminology of the various types of secret operations and their substance. Such terms as covert operations, clandestine operations, covert intelligence, secret operations, secret intelligence, covert action and others are being used interchangeably.

In defining covert action, we can begin by excluding what may be called, technically, secret intelligence. While intelligence gathering may be done openly or secretly, the collection of intelligence which is secret in nature or is obtained by secret methods is called *secret intelligence operations*. Conversely, *counter-intelligence* is the defense against the collection of and use of our secrets by governments and forces hostile to ours. The distinguishing characteristic of secret intelligence and counter intelligence operations from covert action is that the end product is information.

In positive terms, *covert action* may be defined as acts intended to influence events or attitudes in which governmental interest is concealed through secrecy or a visible facade called cover. The end product in any covert action operation is an act or a series of acts, not information.

Some illustrations of covert action operations may clarify this further. They may range from a one-time publication of a news report to the support of a publication over a longer period of time. They can include sabotage and counter sabotage. They embrace psychological warfare against a pervasive ideology maintained over a long period of time, or efforts directed to influencing the outcome of a single political event.

Covert action may include the support of friendly apolitical individuals or organizations as well as political forces. It does not necessarily involve any monetary inducements. It usually involves a confidential contact and access to an individual in a position of influence or political or apolitical power, based on the individual's confidence and respect for the judgment and advice of the covert action officer.

Covert action is not necessarily concealed from the government of the country where the action is being conducted, when it is in mutual interest that the operation be conducted free from publicity in both countries, as it was in Laos.

Covert action can include economic action to acquire materials vital to our interests and to deny them to those governments and forces which could use them against us, where the acknowledgement of governmental interest could prejudice the success of either action.

Covert action can include acts which are innocent of themselves when governmental interest is thought to be more effective without governmental attribution or a label on them. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe broadcast for years to the communist world when governmental funds and guidelines were concealed because to acknowledge them would detract from their effectiveness. Both radios now broadcast using overt U.S. funding.

Covert action can be a force for peace and against violence by disrupting or blocking unconstitutional and violent acts which can be a disservice to our interests.

Covert action can be used positively to engender and support organizations, individuals, attitudes and events in American interests and defensively to neutralize and counter forces against our interests.

In sum, covert action has as great flexibility and variety in form and substance as can be devised to meet a given task or an assigned requirement.

Most important, in examining past and present critical reviews it has been and is postulated that no covert action should be undertaken without the authority of the policy

making elements of our government. (So far as I am aware, no such operations are being conducted presently without such authority; and during the time of my association with such operations, I knew of no covert action without it.) It is further postulated that the covert action under discussion is that directed solely against foreign forces inimical to American interests. Third, it should be agreed that the covert action agency should be divorced to the maximum extent possible from ultimate policy making.

Whether covert action operations could be better managed by the agency responsible, should be controlled more closely by the policy-making levels of government, should be limited in scope and type, should have closer Congressional oversight, could be conducted more economically, should be divorced from secret intelligence and counter-intelligence operations—all these are important questions and there is a wide range of answers to each of them. However, these answers are beyond the scope of this review since we are fundamentally discussing the validity of a function of government in the long-term interest of the United States and Americans of future generations. For the purpose of this discussion, I accept the disability that the defeats of covert action operations, real or imagined, are orphans laid on the doorstep of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and its achievements and successes must remain unknown. If the cynicism and distrust generated by past misuse and abuse of the governmental processes is to color our judgment for the future, all of us can suffer.

The question we are examining is not new. The Rockefeller Commission report lists ten different official external examinations of the functioning of the intelligence community going back to 1949, some covering the specific question before us. It has been debated extensively in private and public forums and the news media.

In 1974, the Senate considered this question before us and rejected Senator Abourezk's bill, 68 to 17, to bar all covert action and the House rejected Congressperson Holtzman's bill, 291 to 108, to bar specific political action against foreign governments. But the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 in effect required the President to find that funds expended in covert operations in foreign countries are important to the national security and to report a description of such operations to the Senate and House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the other appropriate Congressional committees. The current committee hearings of both houses of the Congress are still in process.

The most recent in-depth study of the question is that of the so-called Murphy Commission, authorized by statute in 1972, in which the question of covert action was discussed within the context of the title of its report, "The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy." The twelve-person committee consisted of two senators, two representatives, two from the executive branch, and six from private life. The committee chairman was former Ambassador Robert D. Murphy and a large staff was headed by two former senior State Department officers. After two years of study and extensive hearings, a report was issued on June 27, 1975. One salient conclusion was that

Covert action should not be abandoned but should be employed only where such action is clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes, and then only after careful high level review.<sup>1</sup>

Leaving aside the interpretation of what is "clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes," I subscribe to that

<sup>1</sup> This and other notes are on page 19



## *Why did we create the CIA in the first place?*

conclusion. The Murphy Commission report in toto and the section dealing with covert action merit particular consideration because they consider covert action as a function of foreign policy.

It is in the interest of all of us that the question before us be resolved by our government quickly after exhaustive inquiry and thoughtful study. Prolonged delay in this process can only serve to exacerbate the damage that has been done to the covert action capability directly and to the national interests indirectly, some of which damage may be irreparable and some of which cannot be corrected for a long time.

### **History of covert action**

There is almost a tacit assumption that covert action is of recent spontaneous origin. A resumé of the history of such operations may dispel this misconception and indicate their potential usefulness in current and future events.

Covert action is as old as the moment when man first believed it desirable to conceal his participation in events. Covert action by governments is as old as governments for the same reason. It was not invented by the U.S. Government or CIA.<sup>2</sup> As early as the fourth century B.C., the Chinese Sun Tzu, author of the classic "The Art of War," wrote basic doctrine on covert action by governments.<sup>3</sup>

It is a well developed technique in current use by nations and forces hostile to us. It is also a method used by democracies allied with or friendly to our own, to protect their own security and to further foreign policy. It is a method employed by Third World governments.

Early in American history, the Continental Congress engaged in covert action in Bermuda to enlist the support of Bermudan citizens in obtaining gun powder and other war materiel for our own revolution.<sup>4</sup> In the same period we engaged in covert paramilitary action in providing arms and otherwise supporting the privateers who were attacking British shipping. In 1847, President Polk instructed his consul in Monterey in covert political action to insure that if California seceded from Mexico it would join the United States and not England.<sup>5</sup>

In World War I, the German government engaged in covert attempts to incite the Mexican government against ours. When this was discovered by the British government through secret intelligence in deciphering a telegram to the German Ambassador in Mexico, the British government used this same information brilliantly in a psychological warfare campaign designed to involve us in the war.

Before World War II, both communist and fascist governments engaged in covert paramilitary action in the Spanish Civil War. Before and during World War II, the Nazi government engaged in an effective covert action against the Czech and Austrian governments and waged an effective campaign of psychological warfare, political subversion and black propaganda to demoralize the allied continental powers.

The American government did not establish a permanent organization for secret foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence and covert action until after World War II. The

failure of intelligence at Pearl Harbor, making it evident that there was a need to establish a permanent civilian intelligence organization, culminated in the organization of the CIA in 1947.

But it was the events that followed World War II that impelled the organization of a covert action arm of our government. When first organized in 1947, CIA had only a very limited covert action charter, which was insufficient to meet the requirements of the historical situation in which we found ourselves. While Russia was fighting for her life on the western front during the war, the satellite communist parties in Asia and elsewhere continued a program of clandestine action. But following the victory of World War II the USSR renewed its goal of communist expansion into Europe. It expanded its political borders by the absorption of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and expanded its political hegemony over Eastern Europe into Poland (through a gross violation of the Lublin agreement), Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and East Germany. This was accomplished with relative ease in those defeated countries with their war-ravaged economies. The continuing Soviet military and civilian presence and, of course, the local communist parties insured de facto control. Any attempt at political independence or democratic government in those countries was ruthlessly suppressed. The Soviets tried and failed to establish satellite states in Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey where they had no military presence, through covert action backing dissident and guerrilla movements. The Soviets tried to expand in the Middle East through setting up a puppet Republic in Azerbaijan. Perhaps the most sickening example of expansion of the Soviets was their ruthless subversion of democratic government in Czechoslovakia by a combination of political pressure and clandestine action culminating in the so-called suicide of Jan Masaryk, and the absorption of that country within the Communist bloc.

The Soviet desire for such controlled buffer states is understandable but not excusable given their methods. The real threat to Western interests and the free world was signalled by the organization of the Cominform in 1947, and a large scale covert action campaign to take over Western Europe, not only for ideological and political authority over those countries but also for their natural resources and industrial capability. Soviet efforts were massive at every level: political, through their satellite parties; military threats and overt political pressure backed by a wide scale covert action program through subversion; and in labor, youth, and student organizations through a number of communist international front organizations, using local communist parties and Soviet clandestine agents. Western Europe was weak and vulnerable to these assaults. The Allies' military presence had been drastically reduced; European economies had been wrecked by the war; and vast rebuilding programs would have to be completed before normal agricultural and industrial life could be restored. The democratic political parties had been liquidated during the occupation, except for those returned from exile. When their leaders returned they found their parties fragmented, and without organization and resources. France and Italy particularly teetered on the brink of communist takeover. The communist efforts were not limited to Europe. Communist clandestine efforts began in strength in the Middle East and the Far East, notably in Malaysia, the Philippines and China.

The first outright Soviet challenge came in the Berlin blockade in 1948. While it is difficult to pinpoint any one event or period as crystallizing American popular and political opinion it is my belief that this was rightly viewed as a threat not only to Western Europe, but to the free world and the United States. We were the only economically healthy nation among the Western allies, and if we were going to take a stand, this is where it had better begin. We had not expended our men and resources to defeat the fascist plan to conquer the free world only to allow that world to be taken over by the communists. The American response was marked by a dogged determination not to be forced out of Berlin as evinced by a remarkable achievement, the Berlin air lift and, perhaps most important, by Marshall Plan assistance to Western Europe.

It was felt that these overt efforts were not enough to meet Soviet clandestine actions all over Europe. In 1948, on the initiative of the policy making agencies of government, rather than of CIA, a mechanism was created within CIA to meet the global clandestine threat and supplement the overt action of our government. The Soviets were already active in the field through their own covert action resources to negate American diplomatic and economic aid. Communist controlled labor unions tried to block the unloading of Marshall Plan supplies at Marseilles.

The CIA was late in the field and, in the vernacular, had to play catch-up ball. American covert action officers had to be trained and deployed in the field. Time was needed to develop agent resources and begin a program of covert action to meet and turn back the Soviet effort. Democratic political structures had to be revived and strengthened and psychological warfare programs begun to revive the democratic spirit in Western Europe.

The covert action component of CIA, already strained, was also asked overnight to counter the communist clandestine action along the perimeter of South Asia, and in North Asia after the outbreak of the Korean War.

Through a combination of diplomatic action, economic assistance and covert action, backed by good intelligence, the communists' expansion was arrested. It is conservative to say that American covert action made a substantial contribution. Given the age of the covert action component, the urgency of the requirements levied on it, and its limited experience, it had made relatively few mistakes and had done well.

Communist expansion in the Northern Hemisphere through overt and covert means having been arrested, the communist powers turned to Africa and Latin America. The unsuccessful Cuban effort for revolution in Bolivia in 1967 through Che Guevara is a conspicuous example in South America. The Soviet/Cuban paramilitary effort to communize southern Africa is evident in Angola.

### **Covert action in foreign policy**

Governmental action between nation-states has traditionally been conducted by the heads of states, directly or through ambassadors, or through war or threat of war. The range of the peaceful relationship between states has broadened in recent years to include economic, technical, cultural, scientific and peaceful military contacts, but these still are subsidiary functions of the foreign policy of the states involved. In the furtherance of national interests with another state or group of states or the protection of the

## *Covert action is no better or worse than the foreign policy on which it is predicated.*

security of the state, the choice remains essentially between the diplomatic and the military.

War or the threat of war is inherently the undesirable alternative. It not only has the potential for enlargement to other states beyond those initially involved, but today it has the almost unthinkable potential for increase from the level of conventional weapons to the nuclear. History has taught us that even a military victory may be Pyrrhic because of the economic and social disruption. Recent history has also shown that conventional military force has a limited capability against guerrilla warfare or terrorist action.

Similarly, peaceful diplomatic action even by a major political power such as our government has distinct limitations. Even the most forceful diplomatic representations can be unproductive and even counter-productive. This has also been true of the proffer of economic, technical or military support or the threat of their withdrawal. Further, where there is no direct or indirect communication channel between our government and the foreign state concerned, the use of diplomacy may be difficult if not impossible.

The choice between force or the threat of force and the diplomatic channel are almost by definition antithetical alternatives, both of which publicly and openly involve the state. Covert action is not necessarily a complete alternative to either force or diplomacy, but it may be a complement or supplement to both. It may provide a flexible optional course of action with a wide range of mutations in expression which cannot be fully or completely satisfied by either course of overt action. It is equally fundamental that covert action is not necessarily a weapon of last resort. There may be international situations that do not lend themselves to any course of affirmative action, and the government concerned must await developments to evolve naturally to the point where no action is needed or desirable, or deteriorate to the point where affirmative action becomes a matter of national necessity.

In any case, the use of covert action is no better or worse than the foreign policy on which it is predicated. Covert action cannot make permanent positive gains or permanently neutralize hostile forces unless the foreign policy involved is enunciated and carried out to back up the covert action which is authorized.

But where the foreign policy is firm and backed by governmental action, covert action has a number of favorable attributes. The techniques employed are not limited by the methodology and conventionality of overt action. Covert action can be limited in size and duration to the requirements of particular situations and are not so susceptible to the application of Parkinson's Law.

By the same token, and possibly more important, the covert approach does not involve a public commitment of the government and its prestige to a position and a course of action from which it may be difficult to withdraw or reduce without damage. The scope and pace of covert action may be enlarged, reduced or terminated as the action develops.

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Covert action is usually more economical in men, money, and materiel than overt action. Costs of covert action are far less expensive than warfare with conventional weapons, and even large-scale paramilitary undertakings are cheaper than conventional or unconventional war. Covert non-violent action is not likely to be more costly than the overt diplomatic channel.

There have been instances, and there are likely to be again, where a government, organization or individual who might be the recipient of overt U.S. support would find this unacceptable and unusable because the beneficiaries' interest would be prejudiced domestically or in its foreign relationships by the identifiable U.S. government connection. The use of the same benefits through covert channels relieves the beneficiary of this disability and avoids the visible image of U.S. government intervention. Thus there may be bilateral agreement of the need to conceal the U.S. government's interest—in the mutual interest of both.

The inherent limitations in the use of covert action in effecting a nation's foreign policy have been stated. We would do well to consider its operational limitations, as well as the objections to the use of covert operations as a legitimate form of governmental action.

At the outset, it must be recognized by the policy makers of government that there can be no guarantee that any covert action which they authorize can be accomplished as planned; even if it is so accomplished that it will have the desired effect; and even if the action is accomplished as planned and has the desired effect, that the cover will stand up and the governmental interest remain concealed. Even the most skilled and experienced covert action operators under ideal conditions can offer no such assurances. The essential resources are human beings working under conditions of secrecy or within the limitations of cover, and performance cannot be predicted mathematically. The results are intangible and the effect desired is at best a judgment, subject to human fallibility. Also, there are the hostile forces who will, if aware of the operation and have the capability, do their best to frustrate the action. But these characteristics are equally true of overt action, whether they be military or diplomatic. It would be a brave diplomat who would predict the outcome of the expression and representation of a governmental policy. And it is characteristic of most military commanders to demand an overabundance of men, money and materiel to support a military action in order to reduce the inherent risk. There can be no assurance that any overt action or covert action in our foreign policy will be executed successfully. These are risks that must be calculated and then assumed in undertaking such an action, or rejected because it is felt the chances and value of the objective are outweighed by the risks.

Perhaps the most universal objection to the use of any covert action is that it is immoral and beneath the dignity of a nation-state. Implicit within this belief is the Wilsonian concept of "Open covenants openly arrived at." However, there are friendly, neutral and hostile nations who have used and do use covert channels even in diplomatic action, and it would be inappropriate for our own nation to moralize and instruct other nations on how they should conduct their foreign relationships, even with our own government. The renewal of a working relationship with China was accomplished through a secret channel, and it is unlikely that

## *Secrecy is not sinister of itself nor is it incompatible with democratic government.*

China would have consented to begin the negotiations openly or that it could have been otherwise accomplished.

As has been pointed out, since time immemorial nations have used covert action to further their interests, and the practice prevails today. This is not to say that other nations believe that the ends justify the means. This is to say that the means are not considered so pernicious or so meretricious as to be foresworn, as is evidenced by the long established custom and practice of nation-states. The comparison of covert action with espionage is apt. Covert action is no more moral or immoral than espionage, and there are few, even today, who would urge the rejection of espionage as a legitimate means of protecting the security of the state.

The indictment of covert action as an immoral and unacceptable form of governmental action is voiced in another way: that covert action is meddling in the internal affairs of other nations, interference we would find unacceptable if done to our own nation. The naked fact is that nations, including our own, do meddle in the affairs of other nations by overt as well as covert means. We do forcefully meddle in the internal affairs of other nations which we war on, both during and after the war. The victorious state invariably imposes or tries to impose its will on the external as well as the internal affairs of the defeated state, e.g. after the defeat of Japan we imposed a constitution on that state which drastically altered its internal structure. "Forceful diplomatic representations," a euphemism for pressure, has been used and will be used by all nation-states (including our own) on nations we think vulnerable to such pressure in order to alter their external or internal policies. It has been plain in recent history that our government has, with public support, used the proffer of economic, technical and military support, or denied such support or threatened to withdraw it in order to shape the domestic and foreign policies of other nations.

Also, it is self-evident that espionage by its very definition is meddling in the internal affairs of the nation being spied on. We face the paradox: a U-2 airplane over the USSR is bad; a U-2 over Cuba is good; and the Soviet and American satellites over each others' air space is an accepted intrusion.

Another common objection to covert action is that the policymakers authorizing covert action maintain the secrecy of such authorization and its implementation. The statement is true, but the statement begs the question and poses the dilemma: if the authorization for and conduct of covert action is not kept secret, covert action would not be possible. This is reasoning in a circle. The need for covert action, and its concomitant secrecy are the responsibilities of the policy making bodies of the government, not of the operating agencies. From the point of view of the operational agency, covert action cannot be undertaken if the secrecy of governmental interest is not maintained. If this indispensable secrecy is not maintained or is so incompatible with our democratic process, then we face a world where both our friends and foes have no such disability.

Secrecy is not sinister of itself nor is it incompatible with democratic government, provided the secrecy is held to be in

the public interest and in the protection of the constitution and the rights which it guarantees to its citizens. Thus, the secrecy of the ballot box is deemed sacred. The secrecy of grand jury proceedings protects the constitutional rights of those who might be injured by public exposure of this pretrial ex parte inquiry. Nobody has suggested that the deliberations of the Supreme Court or the executive sessions of the Congress and its committees or our contingency war plans ought to be open to the public. And the need for secrecy within the Atomic Energy and National Security agencies is understood and accepted.

In American social mores, secrecy is to be avoided, and it is believed that our government should have no secret from its citizens. The paradox is that clandestine services and their work are essentially devoted to maintaining the security of our nation and the protection of the citizens' fundamental rights from those foreign powers which, for ideological or other reasons, wish to subvert both.

In the words of the Murphy Commission report:

Many dangers are associated with covert action. But we must live in the world we find, not the world we might wish. Our adversaries deny themselves no form of action which might advance their interest or undercut ours. In many parts of the world a prohibition on our use of covert action would put the U.S. and those who rely on it at a dangerous disadvantage.

Lastly, we cannot gloss over the potential damage when covert action operations are compromised and the governmental interest exposed. The ultimate question is whether the achievements of such action warrant that risk.

The risk-versus-gain evaluation is essential in every foreign policy operation, both overt and covert. As stated above, diplomatic pressure may be counterproductive, and many diplomats who have been excessive or inept in their diplomatic functions have found themselves on their way home before the end of their prescribed tours of duty. Economic pressure may be counterproductive as we learned in the case of the Aswan Dam loan and in our embargo on scrap iron and oil to Japan before World War II. Espionage operations, however productive, may cause severe damage to the relationship between the nations involved, as they did when Khrushchev cancelled the Paris Conference after Eisenhower refused to apologize for the U-2 shot out of Soviet skies.

Obviously, certain types of covert action operations are potentially damaging if exposed by the target nation. But it should not be assumed that all covert action operations are necessarily self-destructive. Covert action operations can succeed or fail in their objective without exposing governmental interest. And even in cases where governmental interest is exposed to the target nation, the very existence of the cover permits the target nation not to take cognizance of the operation if this is in its own interests.

I do not minimize the risk factor. All aspects of any covert action operation should be carefully weighed: the value of the objective to the nation; whether there are any overt means to attain the same objective; the probability of success or failure; the costs in terms of men, money and materiel; the chances of compromise and the political and other damage that might result should compromise occur. In that calculation, the covert action agency can evaluate the probability of technically executing the operation and the risk of compromise by accident or hostile counteraction. The remainder of the calculation is a matter for the determination of the policy making agencies of government, and not the covert

action operators.

### Present and future need for covert action

Obviously, the world we live in is quite different from the world in which covert action was organized 27 years ago. But it is not a better world; it is not a safer world. We have been through large-scale political, economic, military, and social changes. Communications have shrunk the world to the point where we can travel on peaceful journeys at supersonic speeds and can be destroyed by air ships and missiles traveling at the same speed.

In 1948 our government was the only healthy nation in the free world. We gave of ourselves and our resources to protect freedom for ourselves and those in the free world who wanted to become or remain free. We have been through cold war, hot war, prosperity and depression. At the end of that period we face a world in which the gap between our superior military strength and that of our potential adversaries has considerably narrowed. Our relative wealth and economic capability and its superiority over the rest of the world has shrunk dangerously, as measured by the fact that our share of the world GNP has been cut in half, thus limiting our ability to help ourselves and others. The monolith that we faced in the cold war has been broken, but it would be a brave geopolitician who would say that it could not be restored. Meanwhile, the Chinese and Soviets continue their separate and competitive campaigns of subversion, most recently in Africa. Soviet support for a communist take-over in Portugal is of direct concern to our country.

The number of nation-states in the world has trebled and the Third World constitutes a new factor replacing the polarity that existed before. There are supranational forces such as terrorism and drug traffic, and international combinations that never existed before which are inimical to our national interests.

Our foreign policy must be directed to meet these new problems. Whether they are all susceptible of solution by overt peaceful action is something for the policy makers to determine. In my belief some of them are not. As I have pointed out, guerrilla warfare and terrorism are not susceptible to diplomatic or conventional military or police action. They threaten the peace of nations directly involved and, indirectly, world peace. I do not know whether or what the intelligence collectors or the covert action operators are doing about these threats, but I hope that the appropriate means are being considered or employed.

It has been suggested that covert actions endanger détente. Evidently, the Soviet and its agent, the KGB, do not think so. But détente is not a fact; it is an evolutionary movement in an historical process. Our national security is not packaged in neat, tight time segments. Even wars are no longer susceptible to precise dating. The concept of a war fought by nations against other nations after formal declarations, with soldiers crossing national frontiers to fight other soldiers by an almost chivalric code, has been overtaken by other forms of armed conflict between nations. Undeclared wars are fought by "volunteers" in "wars of national liberation," frontiers are crossed by radio waves from open and clandestine stations; and crossed secretly by clandestine agents to accomplish by subversion what is impolitic or impossible by overt means.

*To abandon or suspend the covert action capability is tantamount to unilateral disarmament.*

Whether and what covert action is desirable and feasible is beyond my competence, but it must depend on the judgment of those who have been elected or appointed to exercise that judgment in our interests. If distrust is to paralyze or limit our action all of us will suffer. The system has built-in checks for those who abuse that trust. The spate of "exposure" by the news media, criminal prosecution and civil suits, legislative action and public discussion sustain my confidence that no misuse of secret power can do irreparable harm before it is discovered, and corrective and punitive action taken. To withhold that trust because of fear and apprehension is to strip us of our capability to meet threats to our well-being. No better example of the necessity of placing that trust in responsible and accountable government officials is the power in the hands of the President of the United States over the secret arsenal having the most destructive force the world has ever known. He can use that power solely on his judgment and decision because there is no successful way that we can limit that power and still protect ourselves against the same potential destructiveness by hostile forces, against whom ours is a deterrent and counterforce.

**Conclusion**

Covert action is an appropriate function of government. Its first mission is the protection of the security of the state. It offers an optional form of action or supplement to overt action which is thought to be unacceptable or ineffectual.

The necessary secrecy of such operations is in the public interest. The scope and methodology of such operations can be delineated. Management responsibility and accountability can be adjusted and specified in the public interest.

The potential for abuse or misuse of covert action is minimal. It provides no real threat to the constitutional structure of our government or the rights of its citizenry that a governmental system of management from within and control from without the operating agency by the executive and through legislative oversight would not detect and correct before any irreparable damage was done.

To abandon or even suspend the covert action capability is tantamount to unilateral disarmament. A nation does not abolish the office of its chief executive because a single incumbent has abused his authority; a municipality does not abolish its police department because a policeman may have violated the laws; and a national army is not disbanded in peacetime.


In the world of today and tomorrow, the retention of the covert action capability is desirable if not essential, if we are to survive and further our interests with other nation-states. We cannot allow the domestic problems of our times to color our judgment on that need, or so restrict that capability that it would be ineffectual.

Some of the newly decolonized infant nation states are unstable economically as well as politically. Some of the heads of those states show definite signs of being mentally unstable. They represent potential threats to themselves and their neighbors. And they have shown a disposition to act by themselves and in concert with others to hold the older and more developed nation-states hostage to economic warfare over natural resources, some of which are essential to the security and well-being of our own country.

The monopoly on nuclear weapons has been broken. The nations moving into the nuclear field have a potential for massive destruction to themselves, their neighbors, our own country and world peace. The supranational forces in terrorist groups and international drug traffic have bases in countries which are unwilling or unable to control them. In all of these new threats to world peace, covert action *may* be able to meet these problems independently of overt action or to supplement it.

**Notes**

1. In this context, the Commission recommended that:  
 "Covert action should only be authorized after collective consideration of its benefits and risks by all available 40 Committee members, and that:  
 "Besides granting initial approvals, the 40 Committee should regularly review the continuing appropriateness of activities still being pursued. \* \* \*
- "PL 93-559 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to the proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any requirement for the personal certification of the President as to their necessity."
2. Francis Dvornik, *Origins of Intelligence Services*, Rutgers U. Press, New Brunswick, 1974; p. 102
3. "Denigrate everything that is good in your opponent's country. Involve the leaders in criminal enterprises and deliver them up to the scorn of their fellow countrymen. Undermine them in every way you can. Use the most vile and execrable of individuals, cause trouble by every means within their government, spread discord and quarrels in the opposing nation. Agitate the young against the old, destroy all their means, all of their weapons and above all the discipline of their armed forces. Cover with ridicule their traditions and values, be generous in your offer of rewards to obtain information and accomplices. Put secret agents everywhere. Never stint on your money and promises; you will reap rich rewards. The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles; the supreme excellence is to subdue your enemies without having to fight them."—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translation by Samuel B. Griffith, Clarendon Press, Oxford U. Press, London, 1963.
4. Helen Atgur, *Secret War of Independence*, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, N.Y., 1955; p. 58 *et seq.*
5. See Henry Merritt Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations*, Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1923; Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1929, and Peter Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1967, pp. 717-19, 767, 775, 823-4.



# Before Reforming the "Intelligence Community," What Questions Must be Asked?



Dr. Nichols

by W. Thomas Nichols

*This article was prepared before the President announced, Feb. 17, a reorganization of intelligence operations. Since the reforming of intelligence services will continue for some time, the central theme of this article—questions to be asked in making changes in intelligence—is no less pertinent.*

With so much attention being focused on the American intelligence community today, it is possible that public concern might be whipped to such a high peak by overzealous reformers that serious harm could be done to one of the most important bulwarks of our national security.

Perhaps reform is in order; however, before we consider reform, we should look at the entire community to see what is being done, and then question whether that work can be done better.

George Washington began the process which grew into the American intelligence community when he hired several espionage agents to report on British troop movements during the Revolutionary War.

From that handful of men the community has grown, especially since the Second World War, to include more than 150,000 workers in seven agencies and the three military services. These people undertake various projects which cost the American taxpayer approximately \$6 billion a year, according to data inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator William Proxmire on April 10, 1973.

## The intelligence structure

At the top of the intelligence community is the President of the United States who as commander-in-chief of our armed services and main foreign policy maker needs the most reliable information upon which to base his estimates of fast-breaking international events. He also needs information with which to study policy alternatives in order to select those which best promote our national interests and security. The President is never more than moments away from a red telephone link with the watch officers of the community so that he can be alerted to any danger or any major international event.

Before the President goes abroad on a diplomatic tour, or receives a foreign dignitary here at home, he is given oral and written background briefings to bring him up to date about the issues likely to be raised in the expected meetings. The President also receives routine briefings and reports in the White House.

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Working for the President as the general overseer of the intelligence community is the National Security Council. Of its several committees, two give the main direction to the intelligence community. The first is its Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) the membership of which includes the President's National Security Adviser (chairman), the Director of Central Intelligence (vice chairman), the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. This committee sets requirements and provides supervision for the overall intelligence gathering and analysis efforts of the entire community.

A second important National Security Council group, the 40 Committee, has the same membership as the NSCIC except that the representative of the Treasury is not a member and the Deputy Secretary of State is replaced by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs. This group approves all covert actions abroad and other special high-risk activities. By approving covert actions this committee serves as a general control over such projects and acts as a buffer for the President who is therefore not directly involved in 40 Committee decisions.

Working below these two committees is the Director of Central Intelligence. Although he is a member of both committees, he serves as their focal point for the day-in and day-out coordination of all community activities. His assistant, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, usually serves as the chief administrator of the Central Intelligence Agency. However, this distinction becomes blurred when the Director of Central Intelligence chooses to run the CIA himself.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created as the successor to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an intelligence agency of the Second World War. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (a law which also created the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and a separate military service for the Air Force). That law authorized the CIA to gather intelligence from the entire community and from its own sources abroad, and to evaluate and piece together bits of information into end-product reports and estimates for the President and other civilian and military leaders.

Also included in the CIA mandate in that 1947 Act is its task "to perform such other functions and duties as the NSC may from time to time direct," in short, clandestine activities approved by the 40 Committee; however, that act specifically denies the CIA any "police, subpoena, law

## A description of the intelligence structure, questions to be asked and reforms suggested—by a former National Security analyst

enforcement, or internal security functions.”

A military version of the CIA was created in 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates the military intelligence operations of the three armed services and produces military reports and estimates for the top leaders of the Department of Defense.

In a semi-autonomous relationship with the CIA, each of the armed services has its own intelligence organization to meet the tactical intelligence needs of the field commanders and Pentagon staffs. Each of the three services also maintains a cryptologic service to protect its own communications and to gather intercepted communications materials for the National Security Agency.

The largest of all intelligence agencies in size of personnel is the National Security Agency, so named in 1952 but created earlier. The NSA is a cryptologic agency which both monitors foreign communications and provides for the security of all U.S. governmental communications. Often the press refers to NSA as the “super-secret” agency because of the sensitivity of its double tasks.

Our most expensive intelligence agency is involved with overhead reconnaissance. It like the NSA is also within the Department of Defense and semi-autonomous. Operated by the Air Force this agency conducts all air and space surveillance missions for the entire community. Although the effort is very costly because of the extreme expense of the vastly complicated technological equipment involved (we spend over one-third of all our intelligence funds in this area, if reports are correct), the cost is justified by the great reliability of this type of information.

Parts of other agencies are formal members of the intelligence community. In the State Department the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) coordinates information from our diplomatic posts abroad with intelligence from other community sources to meet the needs of the State Department. The INR is the smallest of the major intelligence agencies.

Other small parts of the intelligence community are units within the FBI (for keeping track of illegal internal subversive and conspiracy activities, in addition to criminal records), the Treasury (counterfeiting, smuggling, and the personal security of the President and major presidential candidates), and the Energy Research and Development Administration which joined the intelligence community within the past two years. This last agency keeps watch on information relating to oil and other sources of energy.

All of these agencies form the U.S. intelligence community, but any agency of government may become involved if asked to supply the community with any specific information.<sup>1</sup>

Our intelligence system is not perfect, of course. Abuses have occurred and measures should be taken to avoid their recurrence. But reform should have one major objective: the creation of a streamlined system more responsive to our nation's needs.

I worked in intelligence for most of the 1950's. Now from the academic world quite removed from the constant race to

keep our leaders the best informed in the world, let me suggest a few basic questions which are preliminary to any thought of reform.

### **1. Does the vast amount of communications, electronic, photographic, and diplomatic intelligence data which is fed into the system every day produce an overload for the system?**

The channels of communication should be open for both the regular flow of information from the bottom to the top, and for any emergency crisis warning.

Just prior to the Cuban missile crisis Fidel Castro's own pilot was overheard in a Havana bar boasting that Cuba now had long-range missiles and feared the U.S. no more. This was reported without comment and went unnoticed. Later photographs taken of two of the ships en route from the USSR to Cuba showed wide hatches on the side. The photographs also clearly showed that the ships were riding high in the water. Missiles of the Soviet Union at that time were large in size but not heavy in weight. Those ships obviously contained missiles, so an analyst reported. But the photographic report did not reach Washington until *after* the crisis was in full bloom.<sup>2</sup> The system was apparently overloaded with so much other information that these reports could not move up to provide an urgent warning.

### **2. How frequently are the existing priorities for intelligence collection examined?**

The year 1941 was one in which two surprise attacks occurred. Stalin was caught off guard when Hitler attacked the USSR on June 22, 1941, and the United States was completely surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Hence the first priority for all intelligence systems is to prevent another surprise attack. But below this first and most important priority, the lesser items in which we are interested change with the flow of events.

Since our world changes so fast, I wonder if we are seeking information no longer necessary. Do we keep our priorities under constant review?

### **3. Does our ranking of priorities provide enough guidance for intelligence officials who must consider the opportunity costs of using resources for one purpose rather than another?**

In November 1971 the Director of Central Intelligence established a new advisory group called the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee to pull together a community-wide intelligence budget so the President could better see where the money was being spent across the entire community. Even if money were of no concern, and in today's economic condition it certainly is, time alone would force a choice among information requests in the assignment of men and equipment to their specific tasks.

### **4. Would better efficiency be served by having all joint intelligence collection, overt as well as covert, controlled by one agency with analysis and publication dispersed among the various agencies?**

The centralization of collection could produce economic savings, but it could also produce bad results, especially if such a centralized program were to be misdirected. Our present system of dispersed collection and analysis provides a form of checks and balances, one agency against the others. For example NSA in fact warned the Navy that the

1. This and other notes are on page 23.

## How can the intelligence community best be supervised?

intended 1968 Pueblo trip into the North Korean region was in the high risk category. Unfortunately the warning had no effect, and the resulting Pueblo story is too well known for further commentary.

I personally do not see much advantage in centralized control over the collection of intelligence, but I think the question could be studied at length to see if the proposition has any merit.

After collection, the next step is the processing of raw information into intelligence by translation, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation.

**5. How much of each agency's resources is allocated toward the accomplishment of its own basic mission and how much is shared in support of the other agencies within the community?**

The main purpose of the intelligence community is to produce vital information for the President and other top civilian and military leaders of government. In performing their assigned tasks the agencies ask each other for assistance. This lateral transfer in fact makes the arrangement into a community.

However, instead of simply replying to requests for assistance, some agencies duplicate research and analysis in areas mainly assigned to others. Inter-agency rivalry often produces this in-house duplication of effort as one agency does for itself tasks which it considers not being done well or not being fully shared by other agencies within the community.

Some of this duplication is wasteful, but some of it provides a cross check on the validity of the work being done by the agency mainly assigned the basic task at hand. Each agency sees a piece of information in terms of its own perspective, military, economic, or political. Diversity of interpretation provides a variety of aspects for the top decision makers to consider. However, if agency bias distorts its own reports, then decisions may be based on faulty intelligence analysis.

An example was described by Patrick McGarvey in his book on the CIA. In late 1967, military analysts underestimated energy strength in Vietnam. CIA analysts, reportedly not trying to support "victory-is-around-the-corner" statements, estimated a much higher figure. The initial success of the Viet Cong in their Tet Offensive early in 1968 showed that the higher figure was the more accurate.<sup>3</sup>

Our last question deals with the vital issue of control.

**6. How can the intelligence community best be supervised?**

Congress from the outside and the Executive Branch from the inside both have supervisory functions over the intelligence community. In Congress at present there are four subcommittees containing appropriations and military services members. These four subcommittees have a total membership of only 11 senators and 19 representatives. Hence these four subcommittees represent a rather small club. For this club to be enlarged some long-standing committee rivalries will have to be solved. All efforts to add membership to this select group, particularly to add members from the foreign and international relations committees, have been rebuffed since Mike Mansfield's first proposal for a joint watchdog committee was turned down in 1956.

Both the Rockefeller and Murphy commission reports,<sup>4</sup> which were released at about the same time in June 1975, suggest the creation of a joint congressional watchdog committee to provide better supervision by Congress over the intelligence community. However, the first obstacle to such a joint committee is Congress itself because of the internal rivalries among the various committees.

Another obstacle is the intelligence community. A protective instinct produced by years of trying to prevent intelligence leaks to foreign governmental agents and agencies brings many intelligence community leaders to a point of permanent fear that information shared with any larger number of congressmen will be leaked to our press and thus to all foreign intelligence agencies.

It seems to me that the problem could be solved in a three-part process. First, all members of a new joint intelligence watchdog committee could go through the same intelligence clearance as do all others with access to top secret information. Second, congressional watchdogs could waive all immunity and be subject to exactly the same laws which guarantee the security of our classified information. Third, Congress could pass a law providing for the declassification of secret documents and information in addition to the usual executive procedures, by means of a court order. Before such an order, a federal judge could listen to a congressman's arguments for the release of the information, and to arguments against such release by a representative of the intelligence community.

This third process would be slow, but the courts have worked exceptionally well during the Watergate process and judicial settlement of disputes between legislative and executive officials is a long standing (and sometimes the only) remedy.

Perhaps with these safeguards, such a watchdog committee might be at least tolerated, if not exactly welcomed, by members of the intelligence community. Its main work would evolve around budgetary hearings.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution states: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." At present the total intelligence budget is hidden within the general budget, unknown to most senators and representatives except for those in the four subcommittees mentioned earlier. It is very difficult to determine just how to meet the Constitutional requirements and yet keep important developments within our intelligence community from being detected by foreign agents who avidly study all published information from our Congress. Perhaps a general appropriation for each agency could be recommended to Congress by the committee, but this step needs far more study before it is actually implemented.

The President has at least three avenues of control over the intelligence community. About once a month the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board meets to examine intelligence successes and failures. It is a blue ribbon panel of extremely gifted people, like Dr. Land who contributed much to the development of the famous U-2 aircraft, which flew with special Polaroid cameras. Members of



this panel, however, are so busy that it is difficult to see how they could become further involved with time consuming tasks of more intensive supervision. I would guess that the PFIAB will continue to function about the way it does at present, as a trouble shooter for the President.

A second tool of control from outside the community is the Office of Management and Budget which has a small staff of five persons who review budget estimates from the intelligence community. This small OMB office with its tiny staff is simply not able to do more than give the \$6 billion budget a quick going over. If the President wanted to check the community more thoroughly, he could enlarge this office and increase the extent of its review of the entire intelligence budget.

But the most effective tool would be inside the community itself. For years the Director of Central Intelligence has been mainly the director of the CIA. Recently, William Colby has worked very hard on his community-wide activities. However, he was hindered by his rank. He had to try to supervise all the other agencies from about the same level as their own directors. I believe the Director of Central

Intelligence would have more supervisory clout throughout the community if he were elevated to cabinet rank in a position similar to that of the Attorney General, who is above the FBI. The Senate already holds hearings before confirming the person nominated to fill the position of Director of Central Intelligence. I believe elevation in rank would increase the supervisory capabilities of the DCI without interfering with the duties of the National Security Advisor to the President.

These, then, are some of the questions which I believe should be considered in any study of the possibilities of reform of our intelligence system.

#### Notes

1. Most of this section was based on public information contained in the *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, Robert D. Murphy, chairman, June 1975, Government Printing Office, pp. 91-95.

2. Roger Hillsman, *To Move a Nation*, 1964, Delta paperback #8954, pp. 175, 187.

3. Patrick McGarvey, *The C.I.A.*, New York, Saturday Review Press, 1972, pp. 139-144.

4. Commission on CIA Activities, *The Nelson Rockefeller Report to the President*, reprinted in Manor Books #22100, 1975, and *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, Robert D. Murphy, Chairman, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1975, Chapter 7.

## *The End of Indian Democracy?*

Plainclothesmen mix with philosophers,  
reports this participant in an academic meeting at Delhi.  
Fear and tension silence once-free scholars.



Dr. Kurtz

by Paul Kurtz

Is democracy at an end in India, or will Mrs. Gandhi and the ruling Congress Party eventually restore freedom? On June 26, 1975, Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared an "emergency," and as a result summarily threw into prison an estimated 50,000 or more persons (some have said that the figure is as high as 140,000), including the leaders of the opposition, imposed strict press censorship, and banned all meetings of more than five persons. Since that time she has been systematically spreading confusion and terror by destroying civil liberties, emasculating the judiciary, undermining academic freedom, and postponing elections.

It is generally believed that the reason for the proclamation of emergency was Mrs. Gandhi's fear that she would be deposed from power by the courts on the grounds of gross irregularities in her election campaign; and thus to avoid an Indian Watergate, she imposed strong dictatorial measures. But the extent and depth of the measures are far beyond anything anticipated; and those who believe in democracy are fearful that she will continue to use the emergency as a pretext for maintaining herself in power—as the reigning Empress of India—and possibly for establishing a new dynasty, with her son Sanjay as heir apparent. Not only has she moved ruthlessly against her political opponents, but she has virtually nullified the independence of her own Congress Party, which has been rubberstamping her decrees. Indeed,

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there are many observers who have concluded that democracy in India—which at one time was heralded as the largest democracy in the world—is now dead and that it may be a long time before it can be restored. If this were so, it would have devastating repercussions in the entire democratic world, affecting the ideological struggle and direction of development of the third and fourth worlds.

Although there have been accounts in the Western press about recent events in India, I had the opportunity to see firsthand what was happening. I visited India in order to participate in two conferences: a meeting of the All-Indian Radical Humanist Association in Ahmedabad (December 26 to 29) and the World Philosophy Congress in New Delhi (December 29 to January 5). I came away deeply concerned; democracy has been virtually dismantled, and the trappings of a police state are everywhere in evidence.

The Radical Humanist Association had originally planned to meet in Bombay, but was forced to move its meeting to Ahmedabad in the state of Gujarat. Of the twenty-one states, only two, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, were then controlled by the opposition parties. Although strict press censorship prevailed there, as throughout India, it was still possible to hold meetings in these two states. (Since then, the central government has also taken over the state of Tamil Nadu, which leaves only Gujarat relatively free—for how long remains to be seen.)

Some two hundred delegates came from all over India to attend this meeting. They included former Supreme Court

judges, lawyers, professors, student leaders, labor-union officials, editors, and journalists. Strongly committed to democracy, they were in a state of shock at the rapid erosion of democratic rights. Even as we were meeting in Ahmedabad, the Congress Party was holding its own congress in Chandigarh and issuing new edicts and pronouncements daily, which meant yet more repression.

The Radical Humanist Association was founded by M. N. Roy, in 1948. Roy, a prolific author, was an extremely controversial figure. He had the dubious distinction of having founded the Mexican Communist Party in 1918, the first communist party to be established outside the Soviet Union. Later he was invited to Moscow by Lenin. A fervent Communist, Roy worked for a decade as one of the top men of the Comintern. He was instrumental in laying the foundation for communism in India. He eventually broke with the communists because they would not join an anti-communist alliance with the socialist trade unions in Germany. During the 1930s he was imprisoned for six years. He labored within the Indian National Congress for the liberation of India from British rule. He founded the Radical Democratic Party of India in 1940. This was eventually transformed into the Radical Humanist Association; for Roy believed that the problems in India transcended a political solution alone.

The keynote addresses at the Radical Humanist Congress, held at Gujarat University, were delivered by the president of the conference, Mr. J. B. H. Wadia, a well-known film producer from Bombay, and Professor L. S. Joshi, both of whom argued for the need for universal education if India is to progress. The tasks of education are mammoth, they said, since 66 percent of the people are illiterate. I read a paper at the conference in which I maintained that, although the need for universal education is evident, it is necessary to go beyond it, and that if we are to combat gullibility, whether in the advanced countries or in the developing ones, an essential function of education is to develop critical thinking in students.

### Freedom of the individual

The key principle of the Radical Humanist Association is its uncompromising commitment to democracy and freedom. This philosophy is very close to that of John Dewey. It maintains that education not only is essential to the democratic process but that democratic values have to be cultivated as the very precondition for the reformation of society. The Radical Humanists believe that their basic task in India is to contribute to a cultural, social, and philosophical renaissance, which, unlike the Western world, India never experienced. Hence, there needs to be a reconstruction of society, from the rice-roots level up, and a birth of democratic values. The Radical Humanists are disillusioned with political parties, which they believe to be divisive and intolerant. They also hold that there can be no submission to totalitarianism, no abandonment of ethical principles, no appeal to the ends justifying the means. They are especially critical of the religious values of traditional Indian society: the Hindu caste system, which includes untouchability, a philosophy of passive spiritual renunciation, vegetarianism, the Moslem suppression of women, the arrangement of dowry marriages, and so on. They emphasize instead the building of a democratic social order with maximum local control and the need for pragmatic action in order to ameliorate wretched social conditions. They

are emphatic that the ideal of democracy is always the freedom of the individual.

The Radical Humanists are critics of the ruling Congress Party, which they claim is ridden with graft and corruption. They believe that there are major economic tasks to be undertaken in India—particularly in overcoming poverty—in which the Congress Party has been unsuccessful. The RHA is issuing People's Plan II, which emphasizes the need for drastic measures to control population and for the development of a productive agricultural economy.

The Radical Humanists maintain that to achieve genuine democracy there is a dire need to develop a democratic infrastructure in India, which is now lacking. They do not believe that the key to economic development is a capital-intensive technology, as in the affluent Western societies, but rather, they emphasize (like Mahatma Gandhi) a rural economy with small-scale industry. India, they said, could not have both democracy and affluence. Their aim is to achieve a labor-intensive, relatively prosperous, self-sustaining agricultural society with a technology of the middle range. The Radical Humanists do not accept state socialism—the nationalization of all industry—fearing its totalitarian implications. They focus instead upon the need to develop cooperative organizations in which there is self-management, participatory democracy, autonomy, and shared decision-making, though this could be concomitant with centralized planning.

### Political fraud

The present political situation in India, they said, is based upon a fraud. In effect, the proclamation of emergency guarantees that Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress Party will continue in power with no effective program to democratize the country or eliminate poverty. It has had twenty-eight years to achieve its goals. Now, it will be immune to criticism and dissent. The Congress Party is not sincere in its promises, even though it issues slogans to the effect that it believes in democracy (it has just abandoned it), secularization (it has done little to overcome religious superstition), and socialism (a ruse, for it is still dominated by the wealthy landowners and industrialists). There are those who maintain that needed economic reforms and bureaucratic efficiency will come out of the emergency; but we know from bitter experience that suspending freedom in order to get the trains to run on time is dangerous business.

The meetings of the conference were filled with drama. What could the Radical Humanists do, they asked, with enforced press censorship and the opposition leaders in prison? How can sincere democrats operate to save democracy? In 1974, many humanists had formed an organization called Citizens for Democracy, headed by J. P. Narayan, the distinguished political leader who had been imprisoned and subsequently released because of ill health, and V. M. Tarkunde, former Supreme Court judge in Bombay and now the president of the Radical Humanists. They would work in the open, they affirmed, to do what they could to promote democracy. They passed resolutions deploring the emergency and the destruction of democracy. But there was no way that their statement could be published in the Indian press because of the press censorship, although it might be published in the association's small-circulation journal, *The Radical Humanist*, not yet suppressed.

The high point of the conference for me was the eloquent

statement by Maniben Kara, which was warmly applauded. A dignified woman in her seventies with long-flowing robes and dazzling gray hair, and former head of the railway union, she was an important figure in the Indian labor movement. Mrs. Gandhi had used the Indian army to break the railway strike earlier in the year and had imprisoned the leaders of the union. Maniben told everyone of her recent letter to Mrs. Gandhi, in which she expressed grave concern about the deteriorating political situation. Mrs. Gandhi had replied that she wanted to do whatever she could to preserve democracy, but Maniben found the explanations given for the emergency to be inadequate.

During the meeting the respected constitutional attorney, C. T. Daru, general secretary of the Radical Humanist Association, and V. M. Tarkunde reported new arrests daily. Those arrested were not informed of the charges against them. Two humanists had been imprisoned, M. V. Rammurty and Gour Ghosh. Given heavy press censorship and government control of radio (TV still has a negligible influence), it was difficult to know what was going on in India. Those who attended the conference, however, feared that they too might be arrested when they returned home; for a member of the Indian Central Bureau of Intelligence was present at some of the meetings.

That week, Mrs. Gandhi had issued charges of violence in Gujarat and elsewhere to justify the emergency. Babubhai Patel, chief minister of Gujarat, had denied this and accused her of being "power hungry." Under the guise of the emergency, he said, she has nullified the constitutional rights of citizens to apply to the courts for enforcement of the "seven freedoms" provided in the Indian Constitution, which include freedom of speech and expression, the right to peaceful assembly, the right to form voluntary associations and unions, freedom of movement, the right to acquire and dispose of property, and the right to practice a profession or carry on an occupation or trade.

Even more ominous were suggestions by Congress Party officials that India's Constitution needed to be drastically overhauled. They proposed to establish a strong presidential form of government. This would only further weaken democracy, said the Radical Humanists; moreover, proposals to change the judicial system would ensure that individuals would be deprived permanently of their democratic rights.

My visit to Ahmedabad was preceded by two days in Bombay, where I was overwhelmed by the contrast of modern skyscrapers and Western hotels with incredible poverty. Some two and a half million people are living either on the streets or in hovels scattered throughout the area. The hunger and living conditions were unbelievable. I was followed everywhere by pleading beggars, including crippled children. One morning there were eight or nine children on one corner asking for money. I gave some rupees to the tallest when he said that he would divide them with the rest, but he immediately pocketed them and disappeared; and more children appeared. One child, missing an arm and a leg, followed me everywhere I went, like a puppy looking for scraps.

I visited Makarba, a model village of 2,000 people 12 miles south of Ahmedabad, to which Unesco had donated hatching ovens for a poultry farm in order to introduce eggs into the diet of the villagers. The director of the farm told me

that there was considerable opposition in the village to eating eggs; for many of the people were vegetarians, and it was a slow process to convince them to do so. The poverty in the village was oppressive. The beautiful children with brown eyes again followed me wherever I went. The caste system is still in existence, blocking off the untouchable harijans from the others. The failure of birth-control efforts to make a significant dent in population was also apparent. Population continues to grow at an annual rate of 2 percent. There are 12 million new mouths to feed every year. I was told that even though the birthrate had fallen from 42 per thousand a decade ago to 35 per thousand today, it is still a massive problem. It was hard to get the villagers, especially the men, to accept family planning. Sex seemed to be the main source of recreation, and children were considered old-age insurance. The point is that 35 to 40 percent of the Indian population lives below the subsistence level, and 40 to 45 percent barely above it, with per capita income of under \$100 a year.

It is distressing that population control does not appear on Mrs. Gandhi's twenty-point economic program; though as we were leaving India the Punjab government had introduced a measure for compulsory sterilization of those who had more than three children.

India has made economic progress since independence, doubling her food production and tripling her industrial output. Yet, because of the population explosion, though India is moving ahead, it seems to stand still. The recent increase in the price of oil and fertilizer and a runaway inflation rate of 32 percent last year dealt a devastating blow to its economy. The landless peasants, when they work, earn only three rupees a day (about thirty-three cents) barely enough to buy bread—which is the reason that so many children do not attend the schoolhouse I saw in Makarba. They have to work in the fields, we were told, in order to earn money to prevent starvation. Education is compulsory in theory, but not in practice. Health care is still beyond the means of the average peasant, and the most elementary sanitation is absent.

One gets a deep sense that there is little hope for a better future. I met with university students at Gujarat, who told me that few had opportunities for getting a job when they graduated. Life seemed to be a desperate struggle just to find enough to eat. One often encountered graduates with B.A.'s, M.A.'s, and even Ph.D.'s working as busboys in the hotels.

My Indian colleagues impressed upon me the fact that the middle classes comprise only 8 to 10 percent of the population and that the rest of the people really do not fully understand or care about the meaning of democracy and freedom. Although there have been numerous reports of satyagraha (passive protests and demonstrations) against the emergency—and they will no doubt continue—this does not seem as yet to affect the vast mass of the people. In addition, I was given underground leaflets and *Samizdat* literature. They seemed largely written for the intellectuals and professionals, not the ordinary man. Whether a serious resistance movement could be mounted, remains to be seen.

### Philosophers and plainclothesmen

The Philosophy Congress at the University of Delhi was held in an atmosphere of tension. There were Indian Central Bureau of Intelligence plainclothesmen everywhere. Professors in the departments of Sanskrit, political science, and philosophy had been arrested prior to our coming, as

were several hundred students. Moreover, I heard reports of constant questioning and harassment of professors by intelligence agents. The Congress went on—it would have been difficult to cancel it at this late date—but our Indian colleagues were fearful of saying anything against the government. At the congress, I read a paper on humanism and the ethic of freedom, in which I argued that any ideology that abandons freedom for other goals, however humanitarian, really compromises humanism. I was cut off by the chairman at the end of my paper and no one in the audience was permitted to discuss it. It was considered too controversial. Later, I raised with colleagues the question of whether or not a resolution should be introduced from the floor protesting the destruction of academic freedom in the university; but I was told by a grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, Ram Chandra Gandhi, who had himself been arrested for being outspoken against the emergency, and subsequently released, that its only effect would be to ensure the arrests of the organizers of the congress after we left. It seemed scandalous to debate philosophical issues while the very basis of philosophical dialogue was being undermined.

The day I left India, Mrs. Gandhi announced the postponing of elections to the Lok Sabha (the parliament). Will they ever be held again? Every day since has brought forth new controls of the press and new acts of repression. What can be done to save the situation? My colleagues said that, given the press blackout, their only hope was to get the full story about what was happening to the Western press. Mrs. Gandhi constantly attacks the Western press, saying it is infiltrated with "foreign agents." She is now using it as a whipping-boy to justify the emergency. Nevertheless, she reads the Western press; and if there were any hopes of restraining action, said my Indian colleagues, it might come only from the influence of world opinion.

Some Indian humanists were disturbed by the fact that India was moving rapidly into the Soviet orbit. The Soviet Union has provided massive economic aid to India over the years—for example, Soviet aid accounts for an estimated 30 to 50 percent of India's steel-making capacity (though per capita steel production is the same as it was in 1962, due to the vast population increase). There are three communist parties in India. The only party leaders besides those of the Congress Party not in prison are members of the pro-

Moscow Communist Party of India; and the only newspapers and journals not suppressed are organs of this party. India is allied with the Soviet Union against China and Pakistan, and there is considerable resentment of U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis India. The government daily attacks the United States, although it says it wishes to maintain good relations. It would be relatively easy for the CPI to extend its influence on the Indian subcontinent. With Mrs. Gandhi effectively destroying the opposition, a coup d'état might be simple, though most thought that what was emerging was not a Soviet-style dictatorship but a Brazilian-type quasi-fascist system.

How to achieve modernization is the great issue for India. I visited the Jantar Mantar Observatory, a huge astrological monument in the center of New Delhi, constructed in 1725, that enables one to plot the position of the planets and other heavenly bodies and to determine one's horoscope rather precisely. When I observed that many Westerners still believe in astrology, my Indian colleagues told me that, regretfully, 99 percent of Indians do. The Indian press had covered the September/October issue of *The Humanist*, which attacked astrology, and it was still being debated when we were there. They laughed when I said that many Americans today are disciples of Indian spiritual gurus and that the mystic cults of unreason are in vogue. If India needed anything, they said, it was to break loose from its religious orientation. For here was a society hidebound in tradition, overwhelmed by a reactionary value system of spiritual renunciation and dominated by irrational religious taboos. How break out of the fatalistic view of the universe and cultivate self-reliance and a sense that one's problems can be solved?—this is the great task for India's future, and it is formidable.

I had the feeling that the Radical Humanists, however beleaguered they are, are the group in India most sensitive to the country's needs. They are committed to the use of science and reason, economic development, and population control, and to the fundamental transformation of society by democratic methods of education and persuasion. However, that their viewpoint will prevail and that democracy can be restored is highly doubtful at the present juncture.

## Letters

### The Red Guard Mind

This is to express my appreciation for your publication of "The Shaping of the 'Red Guard Mind.'" At the same time, I should like to urge you to draw special attention to the deplorable lack of freedom in Communist China. Ever since our rapprochement with China has begun, our news media have gone out of their way to extol the virtues of the present regime and to deemphasize its repugnant features. That is, of course, what was done during World War II when the USSR became our ally. A rapprochement may be necessary in the interest of Realpolitik, but not at the price of concealing the unpleasant truth about China. Furthermore, it is known that leftist in-

tellectuals who have become disillusioned with the USSR have found the pure, ideal communist society in Maoist China. The myth of that ideal communist society is disseminated by means of "U.S. China People's Friendship" societies springing up on our university campuses. In the interest of the preservation of freedom, it therefore seems to me essential to correct our China image. A Solzhenitsyn, an Amalrik or a Sakharov cannot even exist in China. The Chinese "Gulag Archipelago" may not be written for a long time.

Alexander Lipski  
Professor of History  
Long Beach, CA

### The Cold War Revisionists

In the Sept.-Oct., 1975 issue of your magazine, Prof. Oscar Handlin commented on the reaction to the attacks made on left revisionist historians by Robert Maddox. I shall not repeat my argument that Maddox failed to make a case against the historians he attacked. My views have been published in "The Cold War Warmed Over," (*American Historical Review*, Oct. 1974, pp. 1119-36), and persons interested in pursuing this dispute can start there. I do, however, want to respond to some of Handlin's remarks and insinuations about my motives and arguments as set forth in that essay.

Handlin claims that I have "preached the

# The Helsinki Watch—II

*Two sharply differing conceptions of détente have emerged.  
The USSR believes "world forces" favor it  
and the U.S. should act accordingly.*

by Gerald L. Steibel

*Our Nov.-Dec. 1975 number discussed standards for testing the fulfillment of pledges made at the Final Act of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, concluded in Helsinki Aug. 1. We announced The Helsinki Watch—a continuing effort to evaluate the progress of détente. Our first update follows.*

Seven months after the 35-country European Security Conference at Helsinki, there is progress on some of the approved principles, retrogression on others, and most of those closest to the hearts of people, East and West, remain words on paper.

On the positive side, negotiations on strategic arms limitation (SALT) and troop reductions in central Europe are continuing. A SALT agreement amplifying the weapons ceilings set up at Vladivostok, in 1974, is probable this year.

Trade between the Soviet bloc and the West is substantial; Rumania and Poland have increased their volume, and the USSR itself is buying in large quantity from the West, including the United States.

Despite its arms and other supply efforts in the Middle East, the USSR is observing considerable discretion in the complex search for peace there. Its advice to the Arabs has been to avoid the kind of action that would precipitate a general Big-Power intervention.

These currents keep the détente process alive, and are therefore to be welcomed as helping fulfill the so-called "Baskets One and Two" of the Helsinki accords. But they are not, unfortunately, the whole of the story, as the discussions between Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev revealed in January.

**Dr. Steibel is chairman of Freedom House's public affairs committee and a member of its board of trustees.**

The strategic arms ceilings of Vladivostok have not kept either the numbers of weapons or their technological sophistication in check. New Soviet multiple-warhead systems are being deployed that could eventually place Russia far ahead of the U.S. in deliverable nuclear warheads. New U.S. cruise missiles—a highly accurate pilotless airplane—and an advanced Soviet bomber, the Backfire, will open a quality arms race, if not brought under control. The somber prospects are reflected in increased military spending by both countries. And charges of cheating and faithlessness on both sides forecast how difficult the negotiations will be.

The picture is no less grim on "Basket Three" of Helsinki. Insisted upon by the West Europeans and agreed to by the Soviet negotiators, Basket Three calls for the freer movement of people and ideas between the two halves of Europe. But it has been all but ignored by the USSR, and in fact denounced as totally unacceptable.

The USSR has made a few token concessions. It compelled East Germany to withhold gunfire against West Germans attempting to rescue people who have fallen into a Berlin canal. Boris Spassky, the chess champion, was allowed to marry his French fiancée. Physicist Leonid Plyusch was permitted to emigrate to the West.

Against these concessions, physicist Andrei Sakharov was forbidden to go to Oslo to receive the Nobel Prize awarded him in 1975. Emigration, especially of Soviet Jews, has been drastically reduced. Throughout the Soviet bloc, even in the countries trading more with the West, the internal repressions have been noticeably tightened. Western journalists have had greater difficulties getting their exit and re-entry visas extended.

academic cover-up" by arguing that it is improper to attack the left revisionists, even if they may be incorrect. That is arrant nonsense! To quote my article: "The left revisionists can and have been effectively and searchingly criticized, but the Maddox book is not an example of how to do it." (p. 1134) Moreover, Handlin conveniently ignores my criticisms of the left-revisionist book, *The Limits of Power*, written by Joyce and Gabriel Kolko; even though those criticisms appear in the same essay in which I reviewed the Maddox book.

More troubling is Handlin's sarcastic innuendo: "In a touching plea for a return to the genteel tradition, Kimball explains that we've all got a good thing going; let's not splatter each other's wash." I read that statement as a variation on a theme which Maddox in his book and Handlin in this magazine have previously brought forth—that revisionist historians and persons like myself have either lied or covered up such lies in order to achieve success and academic advancement. Perhaps the best answer to such accusations is to quote

the final paragraph of my article:

We can hardly expect our students to understand or believe in the importance of civility and respect for the opinions of others if their teachers and intellectual leaders ignore it. Historiographical warfare is no substitute for scholarship; dark hints of conspiracy should not replace the awareness that our opinion might be wrong; name-calling and sarcasm must never be confused with careful criticism. (p. 1136)

Warren F. Kimball,  
Rutgers University,  
Newark College;  
Senior Fulbright Lecturer  
University of Madrid, 1975-1976

## Professor Handlin responds

Professor Kimball's quotation relieves me of

the necessity for a reply. Q.E.D.

Still, very few readers will go scurrying off to the October 1974 American Historical Review for evidence of his critical treatment of a revisionist book. The negative passages of his article conclude that "thus the Kolkos suffer from the same limited horizons as the liberal historians they argue against." Having thus covered up the charge of misused evidence by blanketing it along with liberal interpretations, Kimball sums up with the following paragraph: "Even with these faults the book adds much to our knowledge. Their investigation of those motives they find important is thorough, and their evidence forces us to integrate the economic and social drives that underlay much of our foreign policy with the more traditional treatments of power and politics. As a bibliographical guide alone the book provides a definitive compilation of the primary sources available for studying American foreign policy from 1945 through 1954." So much for evenhandedness.

Oscar Handlin

### Basket Three, Soviet style

The Soviet leaders have taken great pains to explain that Basket Three was not to be taken as the Westerners at Helsinki had envisioned it. French President Giscard d'Estaing pleaded with Brezhnev to loosen the bindings, last fall, but Brezhnev replied with a lengthy and firm refusal, stressing that these questions are "internal affairs" not to be interfered with by outsiders, a position echoed throughout the bloc. East Germany, for example, says that "security" is paramount in the accords, and that means security of people and ideas as well as military.

These restrictions are backed up by a drumfire of theoretical support from Soviet and other East European media. *Pravda* criticized the French TV network for interviewing people "deliberately hostile to our socialist society." Its leading commentator, Yuri Zhukov, also attacked the "masters of the capitalist press" for failing to understand the "necessary conclusions" of Helsinki, and trying to convert the event into "psychological warfare."

The USSR's chief Americanologist, Georgi Arbatov, summed up the Soviet view of Helsinki, last September, defining it as friendly cooperation at the state-to-state level, and continuous ideological struggle at all other levels, especially in the realm of the international class struggle. Arbatov laid down the theorem that "just wars" and the "liberation struggle" were outside the boundaries of Helsinki, and that the USSR would give all support to them.

What this means in practice has been all too evident. Soviet help in all forms has flowed to the Portuguese Communist Party, whose leader, Alvaro Cunhal, is sworn to pursue nothing short of a full Marxist-Leninist victory. The determined stand of the moderates has thwarted Cunhal, but many of them, like Melo Antunes, still believe in cooperation with the Communists, and the Soviet stake in Portugal is by no means ended.

The really deep shock has been in Angola. Tanks, trucks, MIG fighter planes, 36,000 pistols, rifles and machine guns, clothing for 30,000 troops, and 90,000 gallons of diesel fuel have gone to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Over one hundred 122 mm. rocket launchers have been instrumental in decimating the other two Angolan factions, whose U.S. aid is far less and entirely inadequate. Most disturbing of all, some 9 to 10,000 Cuban regular troops are fighting for the MPLA, with a good deal of advice and support from Russia's Asian ally, North

Vietnam.

Within the top Soviet leadership, there are signs that at least one faction believes that even the appearance of accommodation with the West is a mistake. Strong voices are demanding that the West European Communist Parties abandon their flirtation with constitutional governmental processes, and these voices are getting a hearing. For them, the Cunhal "model," not the Italian or French, is the only proper course for Western Communists to follow. In the future, especially if Brezhnev retires or is ousted, these voices may become the dominant factor in Soviet behavior, and the promises of Helsinki will be more remote than ever.

### Two views of détente

It was widely recognized at Helsinki that good intentions could be translated into operational good will only slowly. What has emerged clearly after Helsinki is at least two sharply differing conceptions of détente. Even without the more militant pressures, the Brezhnev leadership sees détente as a concord limited to the more dangerous aspects of the U.S.-USSR rivalry, in arms especially. It has stood firm on its present military advantages in Europe, and expects the U.S. to accept the imbalance as "normal." Its spokesmen repeat Brezhnev's declaration that "the balance of world forces has turned in the USSR's favor." Americans who do not understand are described as "cold warriors" who oppose détente and who are out of touch with the American people.

The U.S., it should be noted, never took Helsinki as seriously as the West Europeans. Kissinger was particularly unenthusiastic about Basket Three, acceding to its inclusion only at the urging of the allies. In some ways, he tends to agree with the Soviet assessment of Helsinki—that the so-called "human" considerations cannot be enforced, and only get in the way. He also sees the process of détente as more important than this or that specific agreement or lack of agreement.

Perhaps the process will gain momentum in the future, despite Soviet interpretations of it. There is no doubt, however, that Kissinger, the President, and the American public are at the moment considerably disenchanted with Helsinki and what it has wrought. On balance, therefore, Helsinki has clarified the problems and the measures required to deal with them. The Helsinki Watch has just begun.

### The CIA, the *Times* and Freedom House

Following the President's Feb. 17 appointment of Leo Cherne, long-time board member of Freedom House, to the new three-man intelligence oversight board, the New York *Times* in a news story raised the question of CIA channelling of \$3,500 to Freedom House through a private foundation.

The fact: Freedom House has *never*, overtly or covertly, received funds or any other assistance from the CIA or any other intelligence agency. The *Times* ascertained this fact from its own sources *before* it published the account linking the name of Freedom House with the CIA. Yet the *Times* mentioned

Freedom House in the Feb. 20 story.

Freedom House immediately wrote the director of the CIA demanding explicit proof that no CIA funds had ever gone to Freedom House by any channel, overt or covert. At the same time, Freedom House told the *Times* that "in 35 years" Freedom House had never "accepted CIA funds for any purpose."

The *Times* reported, Feb. 21, that Freedom House sent the letter to the CIA but *again* excluded from its story our denial that CIA funds had ever been received by Freedom House.



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# BIG STORY

## How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet-1968 in Vietnam and Washington

by Peter Braestrup

with special opinion poll analysis  
by Burns W. Roper

introduction by Leonard R. Sussman

Hanoi's dramatic Tet offensive of February-March 1968 had a significance far beyond any military gains or losses by either side, for its impact on the American public helped to topple a President, Lyndon Johnson, and led to the fading of support for the Vietnam War. Thus it becomes absolutely crucial to examine how American journalism—both print and broadcast—covered this historic event, what perceptions it conveyed to the readers and viewers at home. Using Tet as a case history in depth of the press portrayal of the war in Vietnam, Peter Braestrup—who covered the war himself for both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*—has compiled a remarkable document that reflects the analysis of millions of words published in newspapers and news magazines and broadcast over radio and television, the examination of thousands of feet of TV film, and interviews with scores of participants. Reportage by leading journalists (some of whose reputations were created in Vietnam) appears in the work, and their reports and commentaries are matched—not against official claims or a critic's polemics—but against the facts and resources available to news organizations at the time the original accounts were written. The key question Braestrup persistently asks is: What were the available "facts" at the moment when a particular event occurred, and how were those "facts" reported? The answer is inescapable: First news reports are always partly wrong; in the reporting of Tet—which included some courageous, thoughtful coverage—*much* was wrong. The book also includes an appraisal by Burns W. Roper, the noted public opinion analyst, of all the pertinent polling responses before, during, and after the Tet offensive; Roper's finding is that President Johnson (and his critics) thoroughly misread the initial public reaction to Hanoi's coordinated assault on South Vietnamese cities in 1968. Altogether, this is a landmark work—the first dispassionate analysis of the role of the U.S. press in the Vietnam War, and the most extensive study ever made of how print and electronic newsmen cover a major event.

Peter Braestrup has been an investigative reporter for the *New York Herald Tribune*, a Nieman Fellow at Harvard, and a member of the Washington Bureau of the *New York Times*. After covering Algeria, Paris, and Southeast Asia for the *Times*, he joined the *Washington Post* in 1968 as Saigon bureau chief. He is now editor of publications for the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars at the Smithsonian.

# Extensive radio, TV, press coverage of Survey of Freedom

## LIBERTY IN WORLD DECLINED IN 1975

### A Freedom House Survey Reports New Curbs in 8 Lands, Especially India

Over the last year, "freedom declined for 743.2 million persons in 81 countries," according to a "comparative survey" by Freedom House, a nonprofit organization based here.

The findings are in a report to be released next Saturday by the organization, which describes itself as an association of liberals and conservatives united to strengthen freedom throughout the world.

"India's severe restrictions of press and civil rights reduced by 40 percent the number of people in the world living in a democratic society," the report says. "That decline represents the worst loss since the organization began assessing political and civil liberties 24 years ago."

Such conclusions and findings are basically those of the organization's director, Dr. Raymond D. Gastil, a fellow at the Battelle Seattle Research Center for Freedom House. Dr. Gastil is assisted by three specialists selected by the organization, said Leonard R. Bassman, executive director of Freedom House.

### U.S. in Top Rank

On a table that ranks countries on a scale from the highest level of political freedom and civil rights to 7, the lowest, the United States, Britain, France and other Western European countries got the highest marks. The United States receives a 1. The Soviet Union gets the low mark, 7. On the same scale, North Korea gets a 7; South Korea, 5; Egypt, 6; Israel, 2; Lithuania, 4, and Venezuela, 2.

Among other Freedom House survey findings are these:

In Asia except for Thailand, a diminishing United States presence contributed to a decline of freedom. In the Middle East the Palestinian issue increasingly became the focal point of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement in Sinai divided the Arab world.

In Sweden political freedom moved down one category, to 2, compared with last year because political rights were "somewhat hampered" and the country was governed by an "intruncated bureaucracy."

Constitutional dilemmas retained the top ranking, awarded to the United States, were cited by the report as stemming from overrepressive reforms relating to the Water-gate scandal and the Vietnam conflict such as the Freedom of Information Act and the campaign financing law.

Freedom House concluded that only 18.8 percent of the world's population lived in freedom, with 35.3 percent partly free and 44.9 percent not free. One year ago it stated, 35 percent of the world's people were free.

"Around the year, foreign governments ask us for explanations of our judgments—some disputing the levels at which we place them," said Mr. Solomon. "But usually academics, clergies and political scientists take us to task with never more than one point one way or the other," he added.

Most important to the organization, he said, is the increased use of the Freedom House reports by policy-making officials in the United States Government.

Freedom House will distribute 4,000 copies of its 32-page report in a special issue, to be sold for \$2 and distributed by mail to members of the organization, scholars and political activists in the United States and abroad.

The organization is in the Wendell Willkie Memorial Building at 20 West 40th Street, which was purchased and renovated by Freedom House when the organization was established in 1941.

Its board of directors includes Margaret Chase Smith, chairman; Harry Goldhamer, president, and Roscoe Drummond, vice chairman.

### VOICE OVERSIGHT

## Human Rights? The World-Wide Picture Is Dismal

### 743.2 MILLION AFFECTED, '75 SURVEY CLAIMS

## Freedom House Notes Loss of Liberties in 8 Nations

### Report cites India events as blow to world freedom

## Less freedom for 743.2 million during last year, study indicates

### Millions lose liberties, says Freedom House

## Freedom House tells sad tale on democracy

## Global Freedom Loss Cited

## Report shows world freedom down

Freedom House, a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., today announced that the number of people living in freedom in the world has declined by 743.2 million during the last year, according to a survey released here today.

The survey, which is the 24th annual report of the organization, shows that the number of people living in freedom in the world has declined from 1.1 billion in 1974 to 356.8 million in 1975.

The report says that the number of people living in freedom in the world has declined in 81 countries, with the largest decline in India, where the number of people living in freedom fell by 40 percent.

The report also notes that the number of people living in freedom in the world has declined in 17 of the 24 nations in which the organization has conducted surveys.

The Journal's Opinion

## U.S. News & WORLD REPORT



### ONLY 1 IN 5 IN THE WORLD LIVES IN FREEDOM

Based on a new survey by Freedom House, a nonpartisan voluntary organization that ranks a nation's degree of freedom according to the political and civil rights it gives its citizens—

## FREEDOM—AN ENDANGERED SPECIES?

The year just ended was a disastrous one for people striving for freedom. At the start of 1976, only one in five individuals in the world's 158 nations and 31 territories enjoyed full political and civil rights. A year earlier, one in three had been considered free.

ALL TOLD 403.8 million people in 40 nations and 17 dependent territories— 19.8 per cent of the world's population— live in virtually complete freedom. Most of these people are clustered in North America and Western Europe.

- 436 million people in 53 nations and 31 dependencies live in only partial freedom— 35.3 per cent of the world's population.
- By far the biggest group— 1.823 billion in 85 nations and 3 dependencies or 44.9 per cent of total population— live under dictatorships or other forms of government that deny people most or all political and civil rights.

radio-TV freedom, and the ability of the citizen to speak freely, sue the government—and win in court.

Freedom House said that the major setback to democratic societies occurred in India where 619.6 million people lost many of their rights when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed a "state of emergency." As a result, only 19.8 per cent of the world's 4.06 billion people now live in freedom. 35.3 per cent are partly free and 44.9 per cent are not free.

Some countries where freedom suffered steadily: Lebanon, Sri Lanka and the newly independent Comoro Islands. The three have a total population of 17 million. Another 106.6 million people in Angola, Bangladesh, Laos and South Vietnam lost what partial freedoms they had enjoyed.

Gains were noted in five nations with a combined population of 60 million: Thailand, Peru, Senegal, the Seychelles and the Solomon. The last two recently won autonomy from Britain.

The survey made these points about regional conditions:

Asia—U.S. withdrawal contributed to a decline in freedom.

Middle East—The Palestinian issue and inter-Arab rivalries kept the area at a high level of instability.

Latin America—Only Venezuela, Colombia, Surinam, El Salvador and Costa Rica are democracies. Prospects for greater freedoms are slim elsewhere.

Africa—Freedom declined in many parts of the continent.

### FREE

- Australia
- Austria
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belgium
- Botswana
- Canada
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Denmark
- El Salvador
- Fiji
- Finland
- France
- Gambia
- Greece
- Ireland
- Israel
- Italy
- Jamaica
- Japan
- Luxembourg
- Malta
- Mauritius
- Nauru
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- San Marino
- Sunnam
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Thailand
- Tinidad and Tobago
- Turkey
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Venezuela
- West Germany

### PARTIALLY FREE

- Andorra
- Argentina
- Bahrain
- Bhutan
- Belize
- Cameroon
- Cape Verde Islands
- Commonwealth
- Congo Republic
- Cyprus
- Dominican Republic
- Ecuador
- Egypt
- Ghana
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Honduras
- India
- Indonesia
- Katya
- Kuwait
- Lebanon
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Lichtenstein
- Malagasy Republic
- Malaysia
- Maldives
- Mexico
- Monaco
- Morocco
- Nicaragua
- Nigeria
- Pakistan
- Papua New Guinea
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Philippines
- Portugal
- Sao Tome & Principe
- Senegal
- Serra Leone
- Singapore
- South Africa
- Spain
- South Korea
- Sri Lanka
- Swaziland
- Tonga
- Upper Volta
- Uruguay
- Western Samoa
- Zambia

### NOT FREE



# Editorials in more than 70 newspapers

# A Few Words for Freedom

Every two months the postperson brings to our office a copy of a publication called Freedom at Issue.

Every two months it provides a new instalment in a 33-year-old chronicle of the continuing battle to keep freedom alive in the world.

Every two months it offers exclusive reports and informed opinions about how the battle is going; from both headquarters and field comes information about advances and retreats in the never-ending struggle to preserve the ideals of Western liberal democracy.

Freedom at Issue is published by Freedom House, an organization founded by Wendell Willkie, Eleanor Roosevelt and others to uphold free men and free institutions and undermine despots of both right and left. One of its main tasks today is to try to restore the confidence of Americans in the viability and responsiveness of their democratic system of government.

It is a hard task at a time when human liberty is being constricted in country after country around the world.

Freedom House supports equal opportunity for all but opposes violent dissent which undermines the democratic process. It keeps tabs on the

status of political and civil liberty in every nation, and the comparative report it issues each year receives wide attention.

Executive director Leonard R. Susman said recently, "For 35 years we have been freedom's advocate. We wish we could report great success, the wide conversion of repressive societies to free. But we cannot. Instead, we reluctantly verify the decline of freedom around the globe.

"We believe such analyses, as well as our recommendations for strengthening free institutions, provide an essential service—particularly for those still living in lands of freedom."

We agree. The accomplishments of Freedom House and its staff, and of other organizations and individuals devoted to the same and similar goals, may not be as tangible as those of the International Red Cross, UNICEF, UNESCO or even the Society of Friends.

But the accomplishments are no less important, for they help to guarantee a climate in which those latter organizations can function.

Freedom House deserves the support of all who cherish liberty. It accepts contributions at its headquarters, the Willkie Memorial Bldg., 20 West 40th St., New York, N.Y. 10018.

## The Denver Post

## The 19 'most free'

Once free, always free — if only this were the way of the world. But the past year's record of freedom around the globe emphasizes how dramatically freedom can decline in one place even as it inches upward in another. It needs appreciation and protection where it is found if the circle of freedom is to widen once again.

Freedom — compared to what? That is the question which complicates judgment. Measured against the past of no more than 50 years ago, the gains for women's rights, especially in the already "free" countries, add greatly to freedom's ledger. So do the gains against official racial discrimination. And how should the world weigh the increment of freedom granted Soviet citizens since the Stalin days?

Where does this much emergence from total repression rank beside, say, Britain's new women's rights laws in an already free society?

Despite an overarching trend toward freedom — or at least the demand for it — the recent ups and downs in political and civil rights are not encouraging. Freedom House, an organization which has long studied the subject, uses criteria that might not be exactly those of other observers of freedom. But it seeks to apply them consistently to all countries for a "comparative survey of freedom." By these criteria, "the movement in 1975 was generally, dismally down," says Freedom House.

In civil rights, for example, those who take freedom for granted would not expect anything less than living where "there is a free

press and the rule of law, and few persons walk in fear of expressing their opinions." But Freedom House found only 19 countries in this "most free" category of civil rights, and they are worth listing: Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, West Germany, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Do the people in these countries realize how few they are?

India's turn away from democracy last year was counted a setback for the freedom of hundreds of millions. In Freedom House's general categories of "free," "partly free," and "not free," these were some details:

Where 1,366 million persons were found to be free in 1974, only 803.6 million — less than 20 percent of the world's more than 4 billion population — were so designated in 1975. Four countries dropped from the category of free to that of partly free — India, Lebanon, Comoros Islands, and Sri Lanka. Four went from partly free to not free — Angola, Bangladesh, Laos, and South Vietnam.

Heart can be taken from the few instances of progress: Thailand, the Seychelles, and the Solomons bringing their 40.3 million persons from the partly free to the free category; Peru and Senegal bringing their 19.7 million from not free to partly free.

But clearly the warning sounds louder than the comfort in the latest Freedom House message, and it behooves us all to heed it.

### Editorial Freedom's Flame Dimmer

Freedom House's Map of Freedom — which depicts partly free and not-free areas — shows that the world's freedom is in a state of decline. In 1975, India's severe political repression was the most significant factor in the decline.

### Decline of Freedom

Freedom House, which describes itself as a non-profit, non-partisan organization, has published its annual survey of freedom in the world. The survey shows that freedom is in a state of decline in 1975.

### End to freedom

Two news organizations, the London and the New York Times, have reported that the Soviet Union has ended freedom in the world.

### Dictatorships replace colonialism

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that dictatorships have replaced colonialism in many parts of the world.

### Lamp of freedom fading for many

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that the lamp of freedom is fading for many countries.

### Freedom Slips

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom has slipped in many countries.

### Where Freedom Takes a Beating

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom has taken a beating in many countries.

### Our times Freedom on decline

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom is on decline in our times.

### Freedom a rarity

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom is a rarity in many countries.

### Freedom's ashes

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom's ashes are scattered in many countries.

### Decline of freedom

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom is in decline in many countries.

### Freedom shrinks

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom has shrunk in many countries.

### Less freedom

Freedom House's Map of Freedom — which depicts partly free and not-free areas — shows that the world's freedom is in a state of decline.

### Freedom's scorecard

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom is in a state of decline.

### Shrinking Political Freedom

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that political freedom is shrinking in many countries.

### The Decline of Freedom

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom is in decline in many countries.

### Freedom's Fading Glory

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom's glory is fading in many countries.

### Freedom Took A Beating In 1975

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom took a beating in 1975.

### Freedom Declines

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom has declined in many countries.

### Democracy in India Takes More Blows

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that democracy in India has taken more blows.

### Bad Year for Freedom-Lovers

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that 1975 was a bad year for freedom-lovers.

### Liberty on the decline

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that liberty is on the decline in many countries.

### A Decline of Freedom

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom is in decline in many countries.

### Freedom Torch Dimmer

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that the torch of freedom is dimmer in many countries.

### Freedom's scorecard

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### Freedom Torch Dimmer

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that the torch of freedom is dimmer in many countries.

### Freedom Is Fragile: 1975 Was Sad Proof

Freedom House's annual survey of freedom in the world shows that freedom is fragile and 1975 was sad proof.

## Moscow criticizes Freedom House Survey

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 76 p 9 LD

[L. Larisin article: "Double-Entry Bookkeeping of 'Freedom House'"]

[Text] The various kinds of "voices" broadcasting to the Soviet Union decided to sum up one or two results and weigh the pros and cons of what we experienced last year. What curious information did they give their listeners?

"The Voice of America" [VOA] said: "The private, nonpolitical and nonprofitmaking New York organization 'Freedom House' has published the results of a public opinion poll on the question of political and civil liberties throughout the world." (It is a curious organization which, although "nonpolitical," deals with the problem of "political liberties"--L.L.) "The results of the poll show that less than 20 percent of people on earth enjoy liberty and this is 15 percent less than the poll conducted last year showed." (That obviously also confirms that "Freedom House" is indeed a nonprofitmaking organization. In any event, the "free world" is taking a loss--L.L.)

"The report goes on to say," VOA continued, "that more than 740 million inhabitants of eight countries were deprived of their civil rights in 1975."

In general, it would be curious to hear who was "polled" about this by "Freedom House's" bosses and how they were "polled"--either the bosses discovered the opinions of the above-mentioned 740 million, or they confined themselves to the opinions of the notorious 20 percent who "enjoy liberty." The data on that question was not broadcast. However, one fact was pointed out: 'Freedom House' regards the restriction of civil rights and press freedom in India as the chief reason for the sharp reduction in civil liberties...."

And so something clear emerged: The measures by Indira Gandhi's government aimed at curbing reactionary, pro-imperialist forces in the country also signify, from the viewpoint of New York's "Freedom House," a "restriction of liberty."

True, the question as to which are the other seven countries referred to remains open. Perhaps they are Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau? Or South Vietnam (what a loss for "civil liberties" is the elimination of the "tiger cages!"), or Laos (what kind of political liberties exist with out a monarchy!)....

We have not counted some countries here, but it is not altogether simple to grasp "Freedom House's" calculations if you are guided merely by common sense.

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