

JOHN V. HINKEL

2 April 1975

Handwritten initials: GH, H, M

Dear Angus:

Many thanks for your gracious note of March 28. We know you're very busy, so you don't have to take any of your precious time to write any acknowledgements.

It goes without saying that we're happy to pass on any information that we think may be of interest.

Enclosed is some poop in that category.

Cordially,

Handwritten signature of John V. Hinkel

Enclosures

John V. Hinkel

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Copy

JOHN V. HINKEL

2 April 1975

Dear

Herewith latest "directive: from the Coalition to Stop Funding the War.

Looks like this crowd still wants to get blood from South Vietnam.

((See "Proposed Peace Through Zero War Aid" being organized for 4-12 May. A copy of announcement of this ploy is attached.

The FCNL also is working overtime to cut the D/D budget. See enclosed March, 1975, FCNL Newsletter.

Cordially,

Enclosures

John
John V. Hinkel

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001

*ORCA Coalition to
Stop Funding
the WAR*

coalition to stop funding the war

110 maryland ave., n.e. washington, d.c. 20002

- Action for World Community
- American Ethical Union
- American Federation of Teachers AFL-CIO
- American Friends' Service Committee
- American Humanist Association
- Americans for Democratic Action
- Business Executives Move for New National Priorities
- Church of the Brethren
- Clergy and Laity Concerned
- Disciples of Christ, Department of Church in Society
- Episcopal Peace Fellowship
- Friends, Committee on National Legislation
- Indochina Mobile Education Project
- Indochina Peace Campaign
- Indochina Resource Center
- Jesuit Conference, Office of Social Ministries
- Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Section
- National Council of Churches
- National Student Association
- Network
- Peace and Justice Committee,
- Leadership Conference of Women Religious
- Resource Center, United Methodist Office
- for the United Nations
- SANE
- Union of American Hebrew Congregations
- Unitarian Universalist Association
- United Church of Christ, Center for Social Action
- United Methodist Board of Global Ministries,
- Womens' Division
- United Methodist Church, Board of Church and Society
- United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.
- War Resisters' League
- Womens' International League for Peace
- and Freedom
- Women Strike for Peace
- World Federalists, U.S.A.

*Hinkel, John V.
Co-ordinator ORCA*

Return to Sender

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-1 from your mailing list

— Legislative update —

March 31, 1975

CONGRESS STALLS AT INDOCHINA CROSSROADS!

Haven't we been here before? -- The sad scenes of frightened refugees streaming down dusty roads, the same headlines splashed across our front pages, the same old rhetoric of "bloodbath," "moral commitment," and "domino theory."

But now there is one enormous difference. After twenty long years, the futile policy of US intervention in Indochina is now on the verge of being repudiated by the US Congress. Twenty years -- but the lesson has been learned. As CBS commentator Eric Sevareid recently remarked, we are witnessing the "death rattle of a failed foreign policy."

The American people have helped to make it happen. The anti-war activity of the last ten years -- and particularly of the last two years -- is finally coming to fruition. In the past six weeks Congressional offices have literally been flooded with thousands of letters, mailgrams, phone calls, and personal visitations. (Mail in some Congressional offices is reportedly running 200-1 against aid.) Eight out of every ten Americans are opposed to the Administration's policy in Indochina. The message has been loud and "perfectly clear."

In response to this overwhelming public pressure, the Administration has intensified its own pressure campaign on the Congress. A Presidential press conference and almost daily statements by Defense and State Department officials have spotlighted the desperate plight of the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes. It is no secret that they are trying to blame Congress for the failure of their twenty-year-old war in Indochina.

coalition to stop funding the war

110 maryland ave., n.e., washington, d.c., 20002 202/546-8400

The torrential outpouring of anti-war sentiment and the Administration's pressure tactics have created a serious dilemma for the Congress. The apparent demise of the Administration's Indochina policy has created a "policy vacuum" which can only be filled by a Congressional initiative. The main issue is responsibility for the US role in Indochina -- a responsibility that now clearly belongs to Congress.



That institution, however, has never been noted for strong leadership. In this case the tensions are overwhelming. The Administration is accusing Congress of "abandoning an ally." The American people, on the other hand, are blaming their representatives for squandering money and perpetuating bloodshed. Seldom have the political stakes been so high. The Congressional reaction to this situation has been to flee.

The Thieu and Lon Nol regimes may be falling, but on March 27, the United States Congress recessed for two weeks without taking any decisive action on either the Vietnam or the Cambodian supplementals.

There were, however, several preliminary votes in House and Senate committees and subcommittees.

(See chronological chart on opposite page.) As a result of these actions, an \$82.5 million emergency military aid package for Cambodia will go to the Senate and possibly the House floor soon after the Congress re-convenes on April 7.

There were probably two factors influencing this development. The first is the misguided fear among many moderates and liberals that a complete cut-off of aid would result in a bloodbath in Phnom Penh. An appropriation of \$82.5 million would, they believe, serve to avoid such a scenario.

A second factor is simply the reluctance of a handful of committee and subcommittee members to assume complete responsibility for such a monumental decision. Compromises within these small committees permit the issue to go to the House and Senate floors --

ACTIONS ON CAMBODIA SUPPLEMENTAL

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>SIGNIFICANCE</u>
3/4 House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee defers action until Supplemental goes through normal authorization process.	Desperate Administration hopes of short-cutting legislative process fails, creating at least a two month delay before final passage.
3/11 Humphrey Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee passes \$125 million military Supplemental Amendment by a 4-3 vote.	Close surprise vote keeps open the prospects for an Administration compromise. Moderate and liberal Republicans (Javits, Percy) receive high-level pressure from Ford, and are greatly influenced by McCloskey's "Bloodbath" testimony. Clearly indicates that liberal votes can no longer be taken for granted.
3/12 House Democratic Caucus passes resolution calling for no further military aid to Cambodia and Vietnam for Fiscal Year 1975 (189-49)	Resolution drawn up by 50 new Members of Congress. Resolution is NOT binding, but it shored up support against Congressional-initiated compromises. Administration sees that original request for \$222 million is doomed, and begins compromise offers of its own to entice support.
3/12 Subcommittee of House International Relations Committee* accepts 4-3 the \$82.5 million military aid compromise with a June 30, 1975 termination of all aid to Cambodia.	Again, McCloskey report induces offer of compromise to Administration. Moderates balk at zero-aid proposals.
3/13 Senate Democratic Caucus duplicates House resolution by overwhelming majority.	Compromise drift has another setback; lines are drawn more clearly against Administration position.
3/13 House International Relations Committee rejects zero-aid proposal 24-6, but defers final action on Administration request.	State Dept. adamantly rejects cut-off date idea, and angers liberals/moderates. Delay is obvious tactic to shift decision to Senate. Caucus Resolutions' impact become visible.
3/17 Senate Foreign Relations Committee passes \$82.5 million military aid compromise. (9-7)	Administration reluctantly accepts this compromise in order to force the issue to full Senate debate.
3/25 Congress recesses, taking no definitive action in either House or Senate.	The Big Stall...

*formerly Foreign Affairs Committee

where all 535 members of Congress will have the opportunity to debate and take a stand on war or peace in Cambodia.

It is extremely difficult to keep pace with events in South Vietnam and even more difficult to predict the exact course of their development. Nonetheless, it would probably not be too far-fetched to say that the situation which exists in Phnom Penh today may exist in Saigon several months or even weeks from now. It is no longer so much a question of what will happen in South Vietnam but rather how and when. How many people will have to die? How much suffering will have to be endured?

Once again, those questions can only be answered by the US Congress. It will have its next opportunity to do so late April when it acts on the Vietnam supplemental request.

The Thieu regime's latest setbacks will undoubtedly have an impact on Congressional attitudes toward further aid. The question that each legislator must now ask is "How are we to avoid another Phnom Penh?" The answer to that question is clear -- through the implementation of the Paris Agreement. But the only way to implement the Agreement is to end all war aid now.

Strong bipartisan support for this position is now developing within the Congress. Senators Charles Mathias (Rep., Maryland) and Adlai Stevenson (Dem., Illinois) have announced that they will offer an amendment to the FY 1976 Department of Defense Authorization Bill which would terminate all military aid to South Vietnam on July 1, 1975 -- with the proviso that the President could suspend the aid cut-off for 120 days if he felt that progress was being made toward a political settlement.

Many legislators, however, are impatient with this 120 day grace period. Senator James Abourezk has indicated that he may introduce legislation which would terminate military aid July 1 -- with no conditional clause.

Floor votes on aid cut-off legislation will probably come in late May or possibly June. Passage depends on widespread public support.

Here's how you can help to build it --

REFUGEES FEAR AIR BLITZ

by Ed Block

As a result of the latest setbacks for the Thieu regime, large numbers of civilians are abandoning their homes in different parts of south Viet-Nam. Such movements have usually been described by the U.S. and Sai Gon governments as refugees "voting with their feet " because of their abhorrence to living under Communist control. There are many here in the U.S. who may find the flow of civilians into Sai Gon-controlled areas difficult to understand, or may even accept the Administration's explanation of why people do not remain in Provisional Revolutionary Government zones.

Based on my own personal experiences working with refugees as an A.I.D. official in south Viet-Nam, I discovered that this notion of a political motivation for the movement of refugees was pure propaganda, contrived to win U.S. public support for Administration policies in Indochina. In fact, after speaking personally with hundreds of refugees over a period of close to two years, I met very few who had left their homes due to a fear or dislike of the Communists.

A major reason for such massive civilians movements is fear of the fighting and a desire to find relative safety within the Sai Gon-controlled enclaves. Refugees are afraid that once the Sai Gon forces are gone, the PRG-controlled areas will be subjected to massive bombing attacks and artillery fire. Indeed, in the past few days, their fears appear justified. Earl Martin, a Mennonite missionary, reports from Quang Ngai that two-thirds of Ban Me Thuot, the capital of Dar Lac province, has been destroyed by Sai Gon bombing. Press reports indicate that Pleiku, Kontum, and other former Sai Gon areas are receiving the same treatment.

The PRG and north Vietnamese have no air force to bomb or burn villages and cities -- and never have. It is primarily the impact of massive air bombardment in rural areas by the U.S. and Sai Gon air forces which has caused the huge population displacements we have witnessed over the past ten years. And it is this fear that Sai Gon will destroy Hue, Pleiku, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Da Nang and other areas from which its troops are withdrawing that is now causing people to flee.

In the past, the U.S. and Sai Gon governments have frequently bombed or shelled populated cities and villages after their troops have been removed. The continuous Sai Gon air raids over the PRG city of Loc Ninh is one of the most recent examples of this strategy, but there are many other instances which can be cited.

In Tet 1968, much of the city of Hue was destroyed during the U.S.-Sai Gon counter-attack to recapture areas they had lost in the initial fighting. Thousands of civilians who had stayed in their homes when the U.S.-Sai Gon forces retreated were subsequently killed or injured during this counter-attack. Certainly, the people of Hue have not forgotten that tragic experience, and are now leaving the city to escape from being caught in another Sai Gon air blitz.

In 1972, Quang Tri was completely destroyed by U.S. B-52 bombs and Sai Gon artillery fire, killing more than 25,000 civilians who had remained in the city when it was taken over by the PRG/NVA. Those who were able to escape were not running from the Communists, but from the rain of death and destruction that was being poured on them by the U.S.-Sai Gon military forces. After inspecting the rubble of what had once been his home, the Quang Tri Red Cross Director told me that many people from his province firmly believe the Americans are attempting to commit genocide in Viet-Nam.

Also in 1972, a picture was internationally published showing a young girl running away from her village with her back aflame from burning napalm jelly, that had been dropped by the Sai Gon air force. That girl was somehow brought to a Sai Gon hospital for treatment. Do we then infer that she was "fleeing from Communist aggression to the south," as the U.S. and Sai Gon governments have so often described the movement of refugees?

Numerous studies, mostly carried out under the sponsorship of the U.S. Embassy in Sai Gon, indicate that a great majority of refugees have not fled out of fear of the Communists, but from the dangers of war. This was confirmed once again in a New York Times (March 26) survey of hundreds of refugees now fleeing into Da Nang. According to the article, refugees "appear to be fleeing in panic rather than for political reasons Not one (refugee) said it was because he or she feared or hated the Communists."

Another reason for the current refugee movement is the destruction of food supplies and fresh water facilities by retreating Sai Gon troops. Recent news reports tell of a "scorched earth" policy, whereby Sai Gon military officials ordered everything destroyed prior to their withdrawal. Much of the city of Pleiku for example, was reportedly burned to the ground as the Sai Gon troops retreated.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that there is good reason to be skeptical of the refugee figures now being cited by the Sai Gon government. The Sai Gon estimates of 900,000 refugees are based on a false assumption that the entire population of cities from which it is withdrawing has now become "refugees from Communism." However, the New York Times reports that approximately 70,000 people or one-third of Hue's population still remains in the city. Observers in Quang Ngai report that most residents of the province capital are not moving to Da Nang but rather to safehaven areas in the mountains and villages controlled by the PRG.

In the Central Highlands, press accounts indicate that the mountain tribesmen have joined forces with the PRG/NVA to drive the Sai Gon government out of their territory. It is primarily the Vietnamese officials, troops and collaborators of the Sai Gon government who are now making a hasty retreat from the Highlands. Most of the original inhabitants, over one million Montagnards, are staying behind to recover their homelands, brutally taken from them by U.S.-Sai Gon forces during the Sai Gon "pacification" program of 1968-1972. The Vietnamese "convoy of tears" along Highway 7 is, for most Montagnards in the Central Highlands, a "convoy of hope."

I have found through my experiences that the U.S. and Sai Gon governments have never really attempted to deal with the plight of refugees in Vietnam; rather, civilian war victims have been manipulated to suit governments' own military, political, and economic objectives. The myth of refugees "voting with their feet" is a perfect illustration of this type of activity. If the Administration is truly sincere about providing humanitarian aid rather than political aid, then it should be made available to all refugees, including those who choose to remain in or return to PRG areas. I urge you to write your Congresspeople suggesting that this be required for any future U.S. humanitarian aid appropriation to Viet Nam.

action agenda:

"Peace Through Zero War Aid"

In one month, we must make "Zero War Aid in 1975" a household term. In one month, we must mount a nationwide campaign with such a magnitude of public support that Congress has no choice but to vote for Zero War Aid to Viet-Nam in 1975.

National Campaign May 4-12:

Preparation must begin now and it must begin with us. A three-step strategy is proposed:

- 1.) MOUNT BROAD, VISIBLE, PUBLIC SUPPORT. Urge community, business, labor, religious and academic leaders and organizations to publically support an end to Viet-Nam War Aid in 1975.
- 2.) PUBLICIZE THESE ENDORSEMENTS THROUGH LOCAL MEDIA. Organize press conferences and interviews, issue press releases, meet with local editors.
- 3.) PRESS REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS TO SIGN BEFORE OR DURING THE WEEK OF MAY 4 - 12:

THE PLEDGE TO END VIET NAM WAR AID

I pledge to vote for all legislative efforts (i.e. Mathias-Stevenson Amendment, Abourezk Amendment) to end all U.S. military aid to south Viet Nam in 1975.

Congress is at home ...

Take the opportunity to press your representatives on the pending Cambodia and Viet-Nam Supplementals by:

ARRANGING VISITS or statewide conference calls between community leaders and members of Congress. Bring along the local press.

WRITING LETTERS-TO-THE-EDITORS quoting the positions taken by your representatives. This could provide an incentive for others. The already committed should be commended, the uncommitted urged to make a firm, public decision now on the Supplementals.

ENCOURAGING EDITORIALS -- sure to be read by Congress during recess.

ATTENDING REPRESENTATIVES' PUBLIC ENGAGEMENTS. Speak out. Leaflet.

Torrent of Refugees in South Vietnam, Laid to Fear of War, Not of Communism

PANIC IS BELIEVED TO DOMINATE FLOW

People Seem Afraid Mostly
of Being Left Behind as
'Everyone Else' Goes

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 25 —The hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese streaming from their homes to the rapidly shrinking Government-controlled areas appear to be fleeing in panic rather than for political reasons.

Some Western observers are comparing the movement with that of 1954, when the division of Vietnam into a Communist north and a non-Communist south resulted in the flow of a million or so people. Now, as then, it is being said that they are voting with their feet.

In the last few weeks, New York Times correspondents in South Vietnam have interviewed hundreds of refugees

from different parts of the country. Each refugee has been asked why he or she chose to join the human tide, abandoning home, possessions and livelihood.

"Because everyone else is going," was a typical reply. Not one said it was because he or she feared or hated Communism.

Minority Stay Behind

Many are afraid that to stay behind would mean exposure to killing and destruction. Some—including probably almost one-third the population of Hue—chose to stay, but most have been fleeing.

"My people stayed back at Quang Tri last time, in 1972," a woman said as she nurse a baby. "There was bombing and shelling all the time, many killed. It's better to go to the Saigon side, because the Communists have no airplanes."

But fear of the unknown appears at the moment to be a greater driving force than fear of any specific physical danger.

The evacuation of Hue seemed to typify this.

"We began to realize that government offices were moving away and that the army was moving out, an elderly woman said. "So the people just started to move, too —

government and soldier's families first, and then many others. People just didn't want to be left behind, with everyone else going.

"We don't know what will happen, but there are rumors that the former Vietnamese Emperor is returning to the throne in Hue. Maybe that's good, maybe it's bad. Who knows. But whenever things change, poor people suffer."

The former Emperor, Bao Dai, lives in exile in France.

'No Good to Be Caught'

"I think the Communists maybe will be all right," a fleeing taxi driver said. "But it's no good to be caught in the war zone between one side and the other. That's where you can be killed."

Some are afraid that if they stay behind they may starve or run out of water. Some cannot face the prospect, if they stay behind, of never being able to see relatives and friends in the government zone.

For the rich and the middle class, for storekeepers and businessmen, and especially for those who appreciate the Western-style urban luxuries, there has been a special incentive to flee the Communists.

Said a businessman from Da Lat after he arrived in Saigon:

"Life in Hanoi and in Communist Vietnam generally may efficiently protect the poorest people from disaster. But it is brutally controlled, it is as closed-in as a vacuum flask and it is drab, drab, drab."

Communist Permission

In some areas, Communist authorities have been permitting some residents to leave. Such has apparently been the case at Ban Me Thuot, which fell two weeks ago, and at northern towns in South Vietnam this week.

"I don't think people would care very much about leaving if they knew they could move from one side to the other," a farmer said. "In fact it would be better to stay, to take care of my house and fields. But right now nobody knows whether we could continue to move."

People do not talk much about why they are moving, unless asked by outsiders. They seem caught up in the chaotic momentum of escape, in which families are divided, children are lost and life is changed forever.

"Since I left my village I have been putting one foot in front of the other for four days," a man said as he dragged his cart into Da Nang. "Why do we go? We go because it is time to go, that's all."

* * * * *



By Auth for the Philadelphia Inquirer

~~Original Contribution for~~
*Peace Through
Strength*

Washington Roundup

Hard-Line Gain

American Security Council has analyzed the results of the November elections to the U. S. Senate and concludes that there is a marked shift toward a more defense-minded and harder-line Senate, according to Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, retired chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency. His group—Coalition for Peace Through Strength—contends the 20 new senators-elect will swing toward stronger defense and foreign affairs actions since the “dovish wing” lost, including its “key spokesman for the anti-defense, soft-line point of view,” Sen. Dick Clark (D.-Iowa), who had a council defense rating of zero, along with the late Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D.-Minn.).

Sen. Clark's successor, Roger W. Jepson (R.-Iowa), is considered a hard-liner, as are the two new Minnesota Republican senators, Rudy Boschwitz and David Durenberger. The council considers two other losers as weak on defense matters—Sen. Floyd K. Haskell (D.-Colo.) and Thomas J. McIntyre (D.-N. H.), even though Sen. McIntyre supported the Rockwell International B-1 bomber program—although their replacements get high defense marks. Gen. Graham, speaking for the council, considers that the “[Paul] Warnke-negotiated SALT 2 agreements now face much more certain and serious opposition” in the new Senate.

~~Original Copy of Mt.
St. Vincent~~

13 July 1978

Ms. Judith Hard
Co-Editor, PARAPET 1979
Box 1126
College of Mount Saint Vincent
Riverdale, New York 10471

Dear Ms. Hard:

Admiral Turner has asked me to thank you for your letter of June 30th. In answer to your question, the Admiral would offer the following advice:

"Plan carefully. Opportunities are rarely accidental. They may surprise you, but generally they come to those who are prepared."

"Think in terms of contribution. The greatest rewards, peace and satisfaction, come from serving your fellow man. Help others to realize their best potential, through your example and your willingness to open opportunities to them."

"Always do your best. Here is the real key to success. Set high standards for yourself, then exceed them. Look for new challenges. Believe in yourself and accept nothing short of the best you know you can do."

The Admiral Very much appreciates your thinking of him and sends his very best wishes to the staff of PARAPET, to the students of the College of Mount Saint Vincent and to you.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Herbert E. Hetu
Director of Public Affairs

78-1987



College of Mount Saint Vincent

ON-HUDSON

RIVERDALE, NEW YORK 10471

PARAPET 1979
Box 1126
June 30, 1978

Dear Admiral Stansfield Turner,

The 1979 yearbook staff from the College of Mount Saint Vincent, a small private college in the Riverdale section of New York City, would greatly appreciate your answer to the following question: If your son or daughter were graduating from college in 1979, what advice would you give them to prepare their lives for the eighties?

We feel that being the last class of the seventies is significant to our being as a body. We are not a product of the rebellious sixties, but of the transitional seventies, and we hope to reflect this throughout our yearbook, *The Parapet*. We have selected from every walk of life, people who have been prominent in this past decade, those who have aided in a particular field, or those who have excelled in a field.

We believe that you are one of these people. As we go to press in the near future, we would appreciate your answer as promptly as possible.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Judith Hard

Judith Hard
Co-Editor
PARAPET 1979

JH/ams

DENVER POST
4 September 1977

CIA 4.01 MK ULTIM
ORG 1 University of
Colorado
Colorado State
Univ.
University of Denver

CIA Funding Study at CU, CSU Doubted

Officials at the University of Colorado and Colorado State University said Tuesday that they haven't been told whether any research on their campuses was funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, but they don't think any was.

The two schools attract the overwhelming majority of dollars for research in the state. Their funding from federal sources, much of it for research, placed CU 25th nationally and CSU 47th, based on 1975 data.

IT WAS DISCLOSED recently that a

graduate student at the University of Denver was subsidized in the 1950s through a foundation which, itself, was subsidized by the CIA. The former student Alden Sears, said Tuesday he didn't know where the money was coming from, but his studies were academically legitimate, anyway.

DU Chancellor Maurice Mitchell said Tuesday that the letter from the agency informing him that it had supported research at the school was mimeographed, which led him to believe other schools received a notice also.

BUT CU PRESIDENT Roland Kautenstrauss said he hasn't seen any similar document and Jim Brown, director of the office of research at CSU, said he hasn't either.

Both schools forbid secret research. The rule of thumb at both campuses is, "If you can't publish about it, don't do it." Sears did publish his findings, however.

DU Assistant Chancellor William Key is to go to Washington next week to examine the information the agency has made available.

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

A-BINDER, DAVID

COMMISSION ON
U.S. - LATIN AMERICAN
RELATIONS

Ford Gets Report Urging End to Cuban Embargo

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29—

Major changes in United States policies toward Latin America were recommended today by a group of prominent American businessmen, scholars and former Government officials in a report that was welcomed by President Ford.

Among the 33 recommendations of the privately financed Commission on United States-Latin American Relations was a call for an immediate and unconditional end to the 12-year-old American economic sanctions against Cuba.

The commission also called on the United States to halt covert intelligence operations in Latin-American countries, to terminate military supply grants and to stop sending military-adviser groups to the region.

The 23-member commission was established five months ago with about \$80,000 in support from the Ford and Clark Foundations and from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. It is headed by Sol M. Linowitz, former United States delegate to the Organization of American States.

On receiving a copy of the report from Mr. Linowitz this morning, President Ford said that he appreciated the "con-

structive" work of the commission and that he would ask Mr. Kissinger to meet with the members.

A high United States official concerned with Latin America said the report was the best ever produced by a private American group on the subject.

"It can only be a plus for the State Department," he said, adding, "These guys are leaders and they will be listened to."

At a news conference, Mr. Linowitz, who is a partner in the Coudert Bros. law firm, said that while the Administration might find most of the commission's proposals compatible, it was sure to have difficulty with its suggestions on economic policy. These include:

¶ Abandonment of coercive measures toward Latin-American countries that expropriate American-owned companies or bar commercial fishing by American vessels as far as 200 miles from their coasts. This would mean repealing a number of restrictive amendments attached to legislation passed by the Congress.

¶ Elimination of the United States veto power in the Inter-American Development Bank, which receives more than one-third of its funds from Washington.

¶ Greater United States tariff preference for Latin-American goods.

The commission said that the objective of United States policy toward Cuba should be to facilitate her participation "in a constructive pattern of inter-American and international relations." The Administration, it declared, should act now to end the trade embargo against Cuba and, "regardless of progress or a Cuban response," move to drop restrictions on travel and cultural exchanges.

Then, the commission said, if Cuba responded appropriately, the United States could discuss the resumption of diplomatic ties.

On another controversial question, the commission called for the signing of a new Panama Canal treaty that would recognize that Panama should

ultimately have sovereignty over the waterway.

The members of the commission are:

Sol M. Linowitz; W. Michael Blumenthal, chairman, Bendix Corp.; Harrison Brown, professor of science and government, California Institute of Technology; C. A. Costanzo, vice chairman, First National City Bank; Albert Fishlow, chairman, department of economics, University of California (Berkeley); J. George Harrar, former president, Rockefeller Foundation; Rita Hauser, attorney, former United States representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission; Alexander Heard, chancellor, Vanderbilt University; Henry J. Heinz 2d, chairman, H. J. Heinz Company; Andrew Heiskell, chairman, Time, Inc.; the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, president, University of Notre Dame; Lee Hills, chairman, Knight Newspapers, Inc.; Samuel P. Huntington, professor of government, Harvard University; Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, general counsel, I.B.M., former Under Secretary of State, former Attorney General; Thomas Messer, director, Guggenheim Museum; Charles A. Meyer, vice president, Sears Roebuck & Co., former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Arturo Morales-Carrion, president, University of Puerto Rico, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Peter G. Peterson, chairman, Lehman Bros., former Secretary of Commerce, former executive director, Council on International Economic Policy; Elliot L. Richardson, fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Attorney General, former Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, former Under Secretary of State; William D. Rogers, attorney (resigned after appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs); Nathaniel Smuels, partner, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Kalman Silvert, program adviser, International Division, Ford Foundation; and Clifton Wharton Jr., president, Michigan State University.

P-Duiguid, Lewis
Commission
ON U.S. - LATIN
AMERICAN RELATION
Linowitz, Sol W

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Linowitz Unit Bids U.S. End Covert Acts

By Lewis H. Duiguid
Washington Post Staff Writer

A private commission largely representing traditional U.S. interests in Latin America called yesterday for this country to cease all covert activities in the hemisphere.

Sol M. Linowitz, former ambassador to the Organization of American States and chairman of the 22-member commission, acknowledged that the group's position on CIA activities was in direct conflict with President Ford's position.

In a press conference Sept. 16, Mr. Ford defended CIA funding of opposition newspapers and political parties in Chile during the government of Marxist President Salvador Allende—which was overthrown Sept. 11, 1973.

The 54-page report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations condemned past military interventions in the area such as in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and then stated:

"Covert U.S. involvement in the domestic politics of Latin America, such as occurred more recently in Chile, is indefensible and should be ended."

It called on the President and the Congress to ensure "that all agencies of the U.S. government fully respect the sovereignty of the countries of Latin America."

Linowitz said some members favored calling for a worldwide end to CIA intervention but the commission decided to keep the focus on this hemisphere.

The commission presented its report to President Ford yesterday at the White House. He said he favored improved Latin relations, would read the recommendations and would bring the report to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's attention when he returns to Washington.

Linowitz estimated the cost of the study, begun in May, at \$80,000. It was financed by the

Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Clark Foundation and the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York.

Among the members was William D. Rogers, who resigned last month after his appointment as assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs. The commission includes G.A. Costanzo, vice chairman of the First National City Bank, which has extensive Latin interests; former Assistant Secretary of state Charles A. Meyer, now with Sears, Roebuck, and former Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson.

"We strongly believe, the commission said "that the policies which the United States has inherited from the past . . . are inappropriate and irrelevant to the changed realities of the present."

It called for an end to "special relationships" that carry a connotation of paternalism. "Any new U.S. policy must, of course, reflect national interests, but such interests will be served by collaborating with Latin America."

The commission also recommended U.S. initiatives to end the trade embargo on Cuba and to seek normal relations with the Communist government.

Further, the report asked for an end to restrictions on travel to and from Cuba and for cultural, educational and scientific exchanges with the island.

The commission made a strong recommendation for support of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, saying the United States should publicize the OAS group's findings on human rights violations.

Though the human rights commission has documented, for instance, the United States

keeping discussion of the findings off the agenda of hemispheric meetings.

Where human rights violations occur, the report said, U.S. policy should be adjusted accordingly. Commission member Rita Hauser, former U.S. representative on the U.N. Human Rights Commission, said such a policy would not constitute intervention because all the Latin countries and the United States have accepted the human rights codes in question.

Other recommendations include:

- Signing of a new Panama Canal Treaty giving Panama jurisdiction over the waterway, and withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces Southern Command from the Canal Zone.
- An end to grant military aid and cutback of military advisory groups in Latin America.
- Repeal of congressional amendments requiring economic reprisals against countries confiscating private American investments, and passage of tariff preference for goods of developing countries.
- Elimination of the effective U.S. veto over many loans by the Inter-American Development Bank.

P - Knap, Ted
CIA. of Helms, Richard
CIA. of Drug Traffic
Org. of Committee on International Narcotics Control

New narcotics sources pop up

By TED KNAP
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

While the flow of illicit narcotics out of Turkey has been curtailed sharply, it has increased substantially out of the "golden triangle" in Thailand, Laos and Burma.

While Iran and India have begun effective controls over their narcotics traffic, new sources of supply are developing in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have not.

Altho France has beefed up its narcotics police force, the gendarmes have not been able to knock off any of the several heroin processing laboratories known to be operating in secret places around Marseilles.

These developments in narcotics control efforts were described today by the executive director of President Nixon's newly established cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. The White House announced formation of the committee yesterday.

Egil "Bud" Krogh, White House aide named to head the

committee staff, said in an interview that emergence of Southeast Asia as an important source of heroin is the "most disturbing" new development in the effort to curb the flow of hard drugs to Americans, both here and in South Vietnam.

Mr. Krogh, just back from a tour of the area, said the increased export of illicit narcotics from Thailand, Laos and eastern Burma has been "substantial" in the past year.

"CONSUMER MARKET"

"We are concerned," Mr. Krogh said, "about the United States becoming the consumer market for the golden triangle."

Turkey announced in June that it would ban all growing of opium poppies and, in the meantime, would purchase more of the 1971 crop so as to reduce its flow into illicit channels. With U.S. aid, the Turkish government has bought up 140 tons of opium so far this year compared with 63 tons all of last year.

Mr. Krogh said the early, but not yet conclusive, indications are that Turkey is

"drying up" as a source of opium, which is processed into morphine for medical use and heroin for illicit use. Turkey has been the main grower of opium poppies.

The White House official said intelligence sources report that between three and nine processing laboratories are in operation in the Marseilles area of southern France. Secretary of State William Rogers, who heads the cabinet committee, said France is cooperating, but so far all the laboratories have escaped detection.

91 EXECUTED

Mr. Krogh said Iran, which has executed 91 persons for narcotics smuggling since it passed a death penalty law in 1969, and India have instituted effective monitoring of opium fields in those countries. He said similar controls will be sought in Afghanistan and Pakistan, either thru the United Nations or by separate agreements with the United States.

In addition to Mr. Rogers, the cabinet committee consists of Atty. Gen. John Mitchell,

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, Treasury Secretary John Connally, Ambassador to the United Nations George Bush and CIA Director Richard Helms.

While the cabinet committee concentrates on curbing the supply of narcotics, another White House group headed by Dr. Jerome Jaffee focuses on the demand side, including detection and treatment of addicts.

Dr. Jaffee's office said today it cannot claim that there has been any reduction in the rate of addiction among American servicemen in South Vietnam since Mr. Nixon ordered a "top priority" campaign against it in June. The program has detected that 5.3 per cent of the 70,000 home-bound GIs given urinalysis tests had been recent users of heroin. They are given some treatment before being discharged.

With Americans leaving South Vietnam, Mr. Krogh said that the use of heroin is spreading now among the Saigon government troops and Vietnamese students.

GULF OIL CORPORATION

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

CIA by Roosevelt, Kermit

CIA 4 - Iran

Org 1 - Committee of Returned

Volunteers


- Gulf Oil Corp.

orig. under

Org Comm

GULF OIL

Corporation



A REPORT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Continued

GULF OIL
corporation:
a study in exploitation

FOREWORD	1
INTRODUCTION: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION	3
PART ONE:	
THE RAPE OF ANGOLA	5
OPERATION CABINDA	7
GULF IN THE AMERICAS	10
VENEZUELA-50 YEARS OF WASTE	12
BIG STICK IN BOLIVIA	17
CANADA ON A LEASH	21
BUENA VISTA?	23
PART TWO:	
RIGGING THE MACHINE	25 ←
OILING THE WAR MACHINE	29
MELLONOIL	30
FOUNDATION FACADE	32
MEET THE MANAGEMENT	34
FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY	35

This booklet was prepared by the members of the Africa Committee of the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV) New York Chapter. CRV is made up of people who have served overseas, mainly in the Third World, and who have witnessed U.S. involvement in these areas. They have come to realize that this involvement works for forces that maintain the status quo of wealth and privilege for the few and poverty and ignorance for the many. U.S. policy, both corporate and governmental, must be radically changed, both at home and abroad. Our booklet is one of many steps toward the building of a movement toward such change.

Committee of Returned Volunteers/New York
Africa Committee
65 Irving Place
New York, N.Y. 10003

Copyright © 1970 by Committee of Returned Volunteers/New York

rigging the government

"Most of my income is from oil and gas. I don't regard it as any conflict of interest...If I didn't represent the oil and gas industry, I wouldn't represent the state of Louisiana."

-Senator Russell Long, chm. Finance Committee

"The spotlight here belongs more on lawmakers and respectable men with bulging brown briefcases entering the portals of government than on lawbreakers and furtive men with little black bags using side entrances of hotels. Government policy on oil has increasingly become indistinguishable from the private policies of oil..."

- Robert Engler

Robert Engler has referred to the oil industry as "the first world government." The preceding examples illustrate how domination of resources and markets by Gulf and the corporate economy degrade governments and societies throughout the world. Now, we must bring the analysis home and examine the basis and rationale of this corporate power and the consequences it holds for our own society.

If oil is the first world government abroad, it is also, as some critics state, "the fourth branch of the government" in the United States.³⁰ Through control of the executive and legislative branches of our government and manipulation of public opinion, oil has rooted its power in the most favorable system of tax exemptions accorded to any industry. In 1968, American oil companies paid less than 8% of their income in Federal income taxes. Gulf Oil paid less than 1% of its income in Federal

income taxes, less than taxpayers in the lowest income bracket! The twenty largest oil companies had profits of \$8.1-billion in 1968 and paid only 7.7% of that amount in Federal taxes.³¹ To assure the continued flow of these profits, oil executives contribute generously to the campaign funds of those who can be depended upon for an "enlightened" vote. Such contributions are not limited to conservatives. Eugene McCarthy raised \$40,000 for his presidential campaign by lunching with oil magnates at the Petroleum Club in Houston.³²

The most visible of the tax avoidances is the oil depletion allowance, a subsidy which costs the Treasury \$1.3-billion a year.³³ The oil lobby allowed Congress to reduce this allowance from 27.5% to 22% of gross income in 1969, in hopes that this would pacify the public outcry against exorbitant profits. This means that com-

panies now deduct only 22% of their gross income (provided that the deduction does not exceed 50% of the taxable income). The change in percentage, however, is one of degree, not of kind; it avoids the question of privilege which such subsidizing of private industry by the public represents. The depletion allowance was originally granted to cover the investment involved in drilling. It was to cease once total amount allowed was equal to investment. The depletion allowance has since been modified to cover the value of the oil and gas being exploited. Pressured by the industry, congress set the arbitrary figure of 27 1/2% to cover capital depletion. The benefits

of double taxation, foreign taxes can be written off dollar for dollar against the U.S. corporate tax.³⁴ U.S. oil companies operating abroad have been largely successful in having the charges of foreign governments for the privilege of extracting their peoples' oil imposed in the form of income taxes, rather than royalties. Under the foreign tax credit provisions, the so-called foreign income taxes are charged against U.S. corporate tax.

In addition, overseas and domestic facilities which are being built, but have not yielded profits, can be written off as losses. The companies are also granted a depletion allowance on


"Oil men are a major source of campaign funds. The former head of the Independent Petroleum Association of America said he gave \$90,000 in one year in political donations."
-Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1970.

of this treatment allow the industry to recover its investment many times over, making depletion itself profitable! More important, it grants private industry the privilege of treating oil and gas, a resource rightfully part of the heritage of every American, as their own capital assets for the purpose of tax avoidance.

Another mechanism for tax avoidance is the foreign tax credit, which allows reduction of U.S. corporate income tax in the amount of de facto royalties paid to foreign governments. Under a 1918 tax law meant to encourage foreign investment of United States capital by eliminating any threat

foreign oil. One fine day all the world's oil and all the world's men will be counted capital assets of Gulf and its friends so that they might better evade the I.R.S.

Tax avoidance is only part of corporate privilege; the industry also fixes the prices of oil and its many derivatives. The rationale behind this monopolistic action is that production and consumption must be balanced while assuring continuous profits to the industry. The cartel sets the prices, and the smaller independents follow. Any attempt to undersell the big companies would get them driven out of business. Avoiding such conflicts is in the interest of the whole.



*for the environment:
pollution*

*for the capitalists:
depletion allowance
& profits*

*for the 3rd world:
starvation
& malaria*

industry, as an Esso vice-president said, such competition creates a situation where "the consumer has...an undeserved break in his price."³⁵

Any government official who tries to tamper with the price structure is removed through the influence of the oil lobby. They are branded as incompetents whose lack of understanding endangers the public good. It is often enough to drop a few well-placed hints about their socialist sympathies.

The fat pillar that holds prices aloft is the oil import

quota, a system restricting importation of foreign oil to 12.2% of domestic production in states east of the Rockies. Middle eastern crude oil, including transport to the U.S., costs about \$1.50 a barrel as opposed to \$3.00 for a barrel of domestic crude. This subsidizing of domestic crude costs the American consumer between \$5.2 billion and \$7.2 billion a year, an enormous and inflationary subsidy to private industry by the public. For a family of four in New York, the import quota system costs an average of \$102.32 in extra costs for gasoline and heating oil. In

Wyoming a similar family pays \$258 more for the privilege of using price-controlled American oil.³⁶

National security, i.e. avoiding dependence on foreign supplies is cited as the reason for the import quota. If this rationale is weak generally, it moves to the absurd when one justifies the oil quota for Canada on the likelihood of war with that country.

The results of the recent Presidential Task Force appointed to study the import quota illustrate the power and hypocrisy of this industry. That Task Force, headed by Secretary of Labor Schultz, proposed that the import quota be replaced by a protective tariff cutting into industry profits by about 20% and urged closer ties with oil-producing countries in the western hemisphere as a means of realizing greater security.

Oil representatives thereupon conferred with Mr. Nixon, and a presidential aide assured leading oil men that the President would come up with a solution "in the public interest." Sure enough, the Task Force was dismissed, its recommendations ignored, and a new Oil Policy Committee formed for further studies with Attorney General Mitchell replacing Schultz.

If the power of the private government of oil is founded upon a system of privilege embodied in artificial high prices and a perverted tax structure, the exercise of that power pervades our society and its institutions. The Federal government is treated as a useful appendage for obtaining control over foreign resources while assuring the continuance of the privileged status of the industry at home.

Acceptable candidates are backed by large contributions; key congressional committees are stacked, and Washington's most powerful lobby is kept busy determining the course of congressional legislation. Under its political action program, for example, Gulf maintains a Washington office, which was once headed by Kermit Roosevelt, formerly of the C.I.A. (see last chapter for more details on Kermit!)

While its Washington lobby manipulates the Congress, the industry manipulates public opinion through a contrived mythology of free enterprise. Public relations literature published by the companies and organizations like the American Petroleum Institute perpetuate a myth of individual competition with companies vying with each other to 'serve' the public. This myth is further embroidered by claims that the industry is progressive, ever concerned with new developments. No mention is made of the patents applied for and left unused, killing competition before it is born, or the discoveries abandoned because they seemed unlikely to yield profit.

In transmitting the corporate mythology to the public the companies do not limit themselves to public relations propaganda and the media. They also furnish films (such as "Power for People")

to schools, geology kits to Boy Scouts, and speakers to civic groups, farmers' and women's organizations. In attempting to lend local character to corporate behavior, "even the Cub Scouts, ages eight to eleven, have been recruited, with oil perhaps expected to join God and country as objects of duty of the nation's youth."³⁸


continued

MEET THE MANAGEMENT

Richard K. Mellon --- Overseer of the family fortune, estimated at \$4 to \$8-billion, Richard is former Chairman of Mellon National Bank and Governor of T. Mellon & Sons, director of ACTION-Housing, Alcoa General Motors (Mellon interest), Gulf Oil, the Pennsylvania Co. and Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (both Mellon interests). He is also former State Director of Selective Service in Pennsylvania! He is a former director of Koppers Co., General Reinsurance Corp., Pittsburgh Plate Glass and Westinghouse Air Brake Co.

Charles M. Beeghly - Chairman of the Board of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (a concern linked with the Mellons through the marriage of their daughter Margaret into the Laughlin family). Charles is a director of Gulf Oil and other Mellon-dominated companies including the Mellon National Bank & Trust, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. and Dollar Savings Bank & Trust Co. He is a former director of Columbia Gas System, Inc., a trustee of Carnegie Institute of Technology and Ohio Wesleyan University, and a director of the American Iron & Steel Institute among many, many others.

B. R. Dorsey --- President and a director of Gulf Oil and a director of Goodrich-Gulf Chemicals, Inc. He is a trustee of the University of Pittsburgh, a member of the Allegheny Conference of Community Development, and a director of the American Petroleum Institute, the National Petroleum Refiners Association, and the National Industrials Conference Board. In addition, he chairs the board of Pittsburgh's United Fund and belongs to at least six private clubs, including the infamous Duquesne Club where the elite meet.



Kermit Roosevelt --- Kermit engineered the overthrow of the Iranian government by the C.I.A., paving the way for investment by the International Oil Cartel (Gulf). After the affair, Roosevelt (grandson of Teddy "Carry a big stick") resigned from the C.I.A., became Government Relations director in Gulf's Washington office, and in 1960, Vice President of Gulf.

Arthur Trudeau - Arthur was President of Gulf Research & Development, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil, and is a trustee of Gulf Oil Corp. Foundation. He is a General and the former chief of U.S. Army Intelligence and Research and Development, Department of the Army. He is also a member of the Armed Forces Mgmt. Assn., the Industrial Research Institute, the American Petroleum Institute, and several private clubs, including the Duquesne Club. He has been decorated by numerous countries including Japan, Ethiopia, Belgium, Colombia, Korea.

*Org 1 - Committee
on Foreign Relations*

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

Deputy Director of CIA, Frank Carlucci

Committee on Foreign Relations


Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

January 19, 1979

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7



Yergin, Daniel
~~original on the~~
Present Danger
CIA 2-01 N10 (NIE)
(originator Yergin)

THE ARMS ZEALOTS

Arms Coalition
A group called the Committee on the Present Danger constituted itself last year to awaken us to the "present danger." The names of its 141 founding board members provide a good cross section of the personalities and interests in the AC (as well as a couple of surprises)—Saul Bellow, William Colby, John Connally, Lane Kirkland (secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO), Clare Boothe Luce, Norman Podhoretz (editor of *Commentary*), David Packard (head of Hewlett-Packard), Gen. Matthew Ridgway (Ret.), Eugene Rostow, Dean Rusk, Gen. Maxwell Taylor (Ret.), Edward Teller, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt (Ret.). The chairman of its policy studies is Paul Nitze, who has been involved in almost every major effort to jump up the defense budget since 1949. The committee has consciously modeled itself on groups of distinguished laity that campaigned before World War II for preparedness and, after, for the Marshall Plan. It describes the "present danger" as follows: "The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup."

Those who would expand "defense capability" are prepared to sell America short
by Daniel Yergin

AS HAS BECOME customary when an old administration departs and a new one marches in, we are in the midst of a loud and passionate debate about arms. Some of the relevant questions have become familiar over more than three decades of such debates. Are the Russians getting ahead of us? Are they actively seeking world domination? Should we spend more money on arms? Should we rush headlong into new military technologies? Some of the questions are more recent, the result of nuclear parity between the two superpowers and halting steps toward arms control. Is there or is there not a new Soviet military buildup? Is real and secure arms limitation possible with the Russians? Or are they taking advantage of such agreements to achieve nuclear superiority? While the debate is easily fogged in by the special codes used by those who talk about arms (MX, MIRV, PGM) the issues are clear—budgets, jobs, prestige, weapons systems, the structure of Soviet-American relations, the next spiral in the arms race, and that most basic of all matters—survival.

The argument in Washington and throughout the nation is between two "parties." On one side is the arms lobby or what might be called the arms coalition (hereafter to be abbreviated as the AC). Its members are those people, both inside the government (particularly in the Defense Department and the Congress) and outside, who believe that the Soviet Union is an ever-expanding menace. They believe that we are still living in the Cold War, a confrontation emanating from, as they see it, the predatory character of the Soviet Union.

On the other side is the arms-control lobby.

Its members believe that the common interest

between the Soviet Union and the United States in avoiding conflict, particularly nuclear war, outweighs their differences, and makes arms control not only possible but necessary.

It seems clear to me that these days the public argument is going in favor of the AC. The Carter Administration has already found itself hampered in its efforts to work out further proposals for the strategic-arms-limitation talks. Before negotiating with the Russians it must negotiate with the AC, and that does not leave much room for flexibility. Meanwhile, the propaganda campaign of the AC is growing. For instance, an organization called the American Security Council has produced a film dwelling on Soviet strength, *The Price of Peace and Freedom*, which has been on television stations around the country 225 times. Another 1,250 prints have been dispatched throughout the land. The Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament got forty Senators to vote against Carter's nomination of Paul Warnke for arms-control negotiator.

At the same time, various versions of intelligence reports, meant to strike fear into the national heart, regularly find their way into the press. Generals retire from active duty to carry their message to a wider public. The Central Intelligence Agency, usually thought to be beset by critics from the Left, is one of the agencies that does not have a direct vested interest in an expanding defense budget, and its analyses of Soviet strength have, until recently, been the most balanced. But the CIA has been subjected to a powerful assault from the Right, in the course of which it has virtually been charged with purveying Soviet prop-

IN FOCUS

Trying to Awaken Us to

Russia's 'Present Danger'

A big-name group frets over arms buildup

By William Delaney
Washington Star Staff Writer

The sign is a small one, neatly handlettered and taped to the rippled glass door of Suite 1103 in the old LaSalle building at Connecticut and L.

It reads: "The Committee on THE PRESENT DANGER."

Inside the suite, in a two-story, balconied conference room with a fireplace and antiques, past glory is far more evident than present danger.

In what is said to have been the living room of Sen. Tom Connally in the 1930s stands the committee's boomerang-shaped conference table, its edges brass-plaquet with such

names as statesman Dean Acheson and economist J. K. Galbraith and military analyst Paul H. Nitze and banker Henry H. Fowler, people who met in this very room as the Democratic Advisory Council during Eisenhower's second term.

Today Nitze and Fowler and a bipartisan dozen or so of their friends — with the public support of a long list of such celebrities as Saul Bellow and John Connally, Bess Myerson and Clare Boothe Luce — meet regularly around the table to discuss what they view as the present danger.

It is not pollution or crime or pornography. It is the military strength of the Soviet Union, in relation to our own.

"TIME, WEARINESS, and the tragic experience of Vietnam have weakened the bipartisan consensus which sustained our foreign policy between 1940 and the mid-60s," declares the committee's manifesto.

"The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup."

If you haven't yet heard of the Committee on the Present Danger, stick around.

It burst on the Washington scene right after the presidential election,

barely six months ago. Its latest report, "What Is the Soviet Union Up To?" — the first of four it envisions this year — was released today.

How the committee came into being, how it assembled its list of supporters — including such diverse figures as Dean Rusk and feminist Estelle Ramey, former CIA Director William E. Colby and teachers' unionist Albert Shanker — is illustrative of the interlocking nature of American power structures.

Washington has long been familiar with such committees, the use of big names to push a cause or point of

view, and in many respects the Committee on the Present Danger is pretty typical. In some ways it is not.

Pinpointing its origin is as difficult as pinpointing the birth of an idea.

Charles E. Walker, who was deputy Treasury secretary in the Nixon administration, remembers being impressed by then-Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's remarks on Soviet military power at the economic summit conference here in September 1974.

AMERICA'S DEFENSES needed beefing up, Walker was convinced. But with the country just extricated from the agony of Vietnam, and "détente" the key word in Foggy Bottom, nobody much was talking about combating Soviet military strength, apart from Schlesinger and the usual — and usually ignored — voices on the right.

"About that time," Walker recalls, "I met and became friendly with (Eugene V.) Rostow," the Yale law professor who had been an undersecretary of State in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations.

From his experience as foreign policy chief of the post-1972 Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Rostow was convinced that nothing short of a distinguished bipartisan committee — like the William Allen White committee that helped sell Americans on the Marshall Plan to aid war-devas-

tated Europe — would awaken the nation from its apparent new apathy toward the designs of Soviet Communism.

"Gene and I kicked it around," says Walker, "and found that Paul Nitze had been having a similar idea."

Nitze, who quit in mid-1974 as a key Nixon arms-limitation negotiator, was indeed toying with the idea. He talked with David Packard, Nixon's former deputy Defense secretary, and with former Johnson Treasury secretary "Joe" Fowler.

Fowler was discouraging. He told Nitze he had tried to start such a group around 1971, but "just couldn't find the money."

In the spring of 1975, with Rostow and Walker freshly enthusiastic, these half-dozen men began discussing the idea in letters and phone conversations.

"We're all friends," Rostow explains.

Finally, on Thanksgiving Day 1975 at his home in Connecticut, "inspired by a couple of bloody Marys before lunch," Rostow sat down and fired off a memo to Walker and Nitze. "I said we'd had preliminary discussions long enough. By God, why don't we just do it?"

Some of their varied friends were already interested: AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Lane Kirkland, Schlesinger, Nixon foreign policy adviser Richard V. Allen, Washington attorney and Hubert Humphrey associate Max M. Kampelman, foreign policy scholar Charles Burton Marshall.

IN MARCH 1976, over lunch at the Metropolitan Club here, a dozen of these men agreed to launch the committee.

Money was, of course, a problem. The participants decided to chip in what they could. They limited each donor to \$10,000 a year. For the sake of credibility, they ruled out funds from people or firms with substantial income from defense activities, and excluded from membership all public officials and candidates (Elmo Zumwalt joined only after his defeat by Virginia's Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr.).

"There was a great sense of urgency to get this started," recalls Charles Tyroler II, who ran a research and development firm in the LaSalle suite which had served as the Democratic think tank in the 1950s (with Tyroler as its staff director). Invited to the lunch by Nitze, he became the committee's director.

But countering their sense of urgency was the still-wide-open presidential campaign. Nobody wanted the committee to be seen as partisan.

Continued

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7
"We decided to wait until the convention to go public," says Tyroler. "But then Reagan made his resurgence in North Carolina. It became clear we'd have to wait until the election was over. In August we set the announcement for Nov. 11 — but because of people's schedules, not because it happened to be Armistice Day."

The group picked the energetic Rostow as chairman of its executive committee — in effect, president — with Fowler, Kirkland and Packard as co-chairmen, Nitze as head of policy studies, Walker as treasurer and Kampelman as counsel.

Executive committee members were Allen, Marshall, Rusk, Dean Edmund C. Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, New York Republican lawyer Rita C. Hauser, columnist John P. Roche and author Richard J. Whalen (joined in recent months by Zumwalt and Harvard Russian scholar Richard E. Pipes).

Following the Metropolitan Club lunch, six to 10 of these people would get together before noon every few weeks around the boomerang table to go over Rostow's latest draft of the committee manifesto. They sent out for sandwiches or lasagna, struggling word by word on the drafts.

There were other struggles:

- What to call themselves. Rostow remembered a Committee on the Present Danger in the Korean War era, an influential group concerned with preparedness. The name was borrowed from Justice Holmes' famous opinion (freedom of speech doesn't give one the right to yell "Fire!" in a crowded theater unless there is "a clear and present danger").

Others, however, thought Present Danger would sound entirely too shrill to some of those whose names they hoped to enlist. They studied 16 other name suggestions but eventually bought Rostow's. As Kampelman puts it:

"If there is a present danger — as we all agreed there was — there's no sense in pussyfooting about it."

- How to "go public."

"If we had done like most committees," says Tyroler, "we would have taken out ads in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and the international Herald-Tribune in Paris.

"There was some support for that, but fortunately it was overruled. As of now we have spent two-third of what those ads would have cost us."

Instead, the committee scheduled a news conference at the National Press Club, letting the media deliver their message at virtually no cost to them.

- Costs had become more of a concern than some members had anticipated at the initial meeting. "We thought we had \$160,000 in sight," says Tyroler, but by the time of the November news conference, \$70,000 had been raised.

Virtually all of it came from individuals — "people we knew," says Walker. (Incidentally, two of the three co-chairman of last fall's League of Women Voters presidential debates project were Present Danger officers: Walker and Hauser.)

To date, says Tyroler, the committee has raised about \$110,000 and spent \$45,000, mostly on printing, postage, office rent and payroll for Tyroler and three associates. Officers — not staff — write the policy papers, on their own time.

the committee hopes to conduct regional forums to broaden discussion of "the present danger."

As it turned out, that name apparently failed to offend the people — liberals, conservatives, businessmen, scholars, blacks, women — who were asked to become founding board members of the organization.

"We picked the people as carefully as we could," Tyroler says. "That was very time-consuming."

ON OCT. 27, with the election almost over, some 200 form letters from Rostow, on Yale Law stationery and labeled "PRIVATE," were sent out to the invitees, along with statements on the committee's aims and operations. If you agree with us, Rostow wrote, please tell us promptly on the enclosed postcard.

The committee had hoped to get 100 names. But as Nov. 11 dawned, it had 141 — novelist James T. Farrell, President Steven Muller of Johns Hopkins University, Reader's Digest chairman Hobart Lewis, Evelyn DuBrow of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, industrialist J. Peter Grace, Washington attorney Hobart Taylor, Stanford political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset, retired Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, New York intellectual Norman Podhoretz of Commentary and his wife, writer Midge Decter.

Talk to a number of these people about why they lent their prestige to the committee and you'll get remarkably similar answers:

One or more of the organizers is my personal friend or professional colleague or served with me on something-or-other. And while I may not agree with every word in their manifesto, I agree that we should be worrying more about the Soviet Union.

"Normally I don't get involved in this sort of thing because I'm so busy with my feminism," says Ramey, a Georgetown medical professor who was a pacifist before Hitler changed her views.

"WHEN I WAS 19 I walked around my college with a sign that said, 'Butter, not Battleships,' and when I was 20 I was walking around with a sign that said, 'Where Are the Battleships?'"

"I'm not for all-out, blockbuster defense spending and I don't think the committee is either, but there are fashions in the country," and she feels the pendulum needs to swing toward a more critical view of both Soviet military aims and U.S. defense expenditures.

"I thought about it a good bit," she says of Rostow's letter. "I know so many of the people involved. It did give the names of other people I respect and agree with." She mentions Kampelman, Decter. "I wouldn't join an organization that just had John Connally."

The Committee on the Present Danger is "not the most felicitous name in the world," observes Podhoretz. "But I think there is a present danger . . . We're in 1936, 1937, and the Churchillian role needs to be played by someone. I don't normally join organizations but this is possibly the most important issue of our time."

He and Decter knew Kampelman, Kirkland and Rostow through the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. As editor of Commentary he had published an article by Rostow.

"All of us fairly well know one another," says Hauser. "We on the executive committee sat around thinking of people. It's an extraordinary list, with far more names than we imagined we'd get."

The founding board members were told in the Rostow letter that "there is no obligation on your part," and thus far there has been no general meeting.

TYROLER SAYS the group plans more policy-paper news conferences in coming months, and hopes they get better play from the media heavies than did the initial press conference in November.

"We were a little taken aback," he says, when the networks — each of which sent a crew and correspondent to the session — failed to mention the committee on the evening news. And there was "not a line in the New York Times . . . Here was a very distinguished group of people saying, 'Things are not right,' and it's not news?"

"Well, the Star had a damned good editorial that pepped us up, but then the reaction started coming in from out in the sticks, beginning in Baltimore, and it was good."

Oh, there were criticisms: "New Jeremiads From Old Jeremiahs?" wondered The New Republic, surprised to find Saul Bellow in such company. James Wechsler in the New York Post called it "a front organization" for discredited Cold Warriors who had managed to suck in a few "innocent" intellectuals. Columnist Tom Braden said the only Cold Warrior missing from the committee was Nixon. In mid-January The New York Times ran the committee's manifesto on its op-ed page.

So its message is beginning to stimulate discussion — increasingly, Tyroler hopes, on radio and television.

WHILE THE COMMITTEE wants to be judiciously non-partisan, its members take individual

stands — as Nitze did in opposing the nomination of Paul Warnke as President Carter's arms-control chief.

Any policy paper must have the near-unanimous support of the committee's officers. On the BI bomber, for example, Tyroler says "my impression is that there would be overwhelming support" for it among his group.

Wary that such committees often outlast their usefulness, keeping on largely due to institutional habit, Tyroler sees the group's impact perhaps diminishing after three to five years. But then again, perhaps not.

"I think the present danger will continue indefinitely."

CIA 503.2
cells with the Present
15 JAN 1977 Danger

A-18

WASHINGTON POST

Two Calls for Joseph Kraft to 'Repent'

Two years ago, Henry Kissinger urged a national debate on "detente," to which the issue of strategic superiority is centrally relevant. This debate has never really got underway because those holding the view that the Soviet Union is not seeking strategic superiority and that, in any case, strategic superiority is meaningless, have been unwilling seriously to address the evidence. Their technique has been either to ignore the statements of those who advance views opposed to their own, to attack their motives, or as a last resort, to accuse them of being unhelpful and of offering no alternative. On the Jan. 4 Op-Ed page of The Post, in a column entitled "Righteous Concern," Joseph Kraft goes even further. He suggests that those prosecuting the opposing side of the debate are engaged in a concerted effort to place the Carter administration under threat of political reprisal.

Many of us believe that this country is in danger and, unless we bestir ourselves, that that danger will increase. Joe Kraft does not discuss whether the available evidence supports that assessment; in fact, he agrees that Soviet military strength is increasing. His attack, and that of many of the others on his side of the debate, is largely directed against the motives of those who believe we should take such assessments seriously and do something about them. Being one of those who take a serious view of our strategic problems, I feel called upon to say a few words in defense of myself and those similarly situated, and, in particular, of the Committee on the Present Danger.

The work to create such a high level, bipartisan committee goes back to 1974 and 1975. The first draft of the Committee's initial statement was circulated to its members in March 1976. On August 23, shortly after the conventions, it was decided to issue that statement on November 11 regardless of who won the election. This we did. A determination to persist in analyzing the evidence and in bringing before the executive, the Congress, and the public, where appropriate, those judgments that the evidence appears best to support cannot justly be said to pose a political threat. On the contrary, the absence of people with such a determination could, in fact, constitute a threat to the essence of the democratic process.

It has been suggested by others—not Joe Kraft—that those holding views such as mine are motivated by venality in being financially interested in increasing armaments or in a search for office. Ever since I first became associated with the Defense Department 15 years ago I have owned no securities of companies doing business with the Defense Department, whether in or out of office. I have never sought office in the executive branch; I have served when asked. I have resigned whenever to continue to serve loyally under direction appeared to me to be inconsistent with my oath of office.

I also consider the complaint to be unwarranted that those who hold views similar to mine have failed to come up with constructive alternatives. In each of the articles I have written on the strategic balance, arms control and related subjects, I have recommended those courses of action that I judged to be prudent and wise.

Since I was one of the earliest opponents of our increasing military commitment in Vietnam, when many of our now leading doves were our leading hawks, Joe Kraft's tag "repenter" is hardly applicable, but neither do I think the tag "righteous" to be fair or illuminating. More importantly, I do not think these pejorative tags are helpful in describing the new top foreign policy, defense and intelligence appointees to the Carter Administration, whom, from long association, I know to be men of character and judgment.

As the reader can by now judge, today I am angry. Tomorrow I will relax and go about the business of continuing as politely and reasonably as possible to support those propositions I believe both to be true and to merit consideration by those who are called upon to concern themselves with U.S. foreign and defense policies appropriate for the future.

PAUL NITZE

Arlington

(The writer is former Secretary of the Navy and Under Secretary of Defense.)

Joseph Kraft's column of Jan. 4 suggests that I am one of a "righteous" group that has suddenly raised "undiscriminating alarms" to block the easing of tensions with Moscow. Instead the "group" should be making "long term constructive proposals" to meet what he recognizes as a growing Soviet military capacity. Specifically he states that I supplied staff support for Dean Rusk, Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow of the recently formed Committee on the Present Danger; and that articles by me in Foreign Policy started the recent examination of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the Soviet threat. The results of that inquiry by an independent team picked by the CIA director, he says, have been leaked in a way to exaggerate the menace. He contrasts this "righteous group" with the "repenters" (such as Harold Brown, Theodore Sorensen and Cyrus Vance), whose appointment by Carter, he believes prompted the "righteous" suddenly to go public. In the new administration the only "right" name in any important spot he says is Zbigniew Brzezinski.

I doubt that any of the serious men he mentions fit such simple minded opposites as righteous-repenter, hawk-dove, good guy-bad guy or the like. If there are two "groups" that contrast less starkly and in different terms they are far from tightly linked and uniform internally. Harold Brown, for example, cautioned us recently about declining U.S. defense budgets and the large and increasing Soviet defense effort. As for myself, Mr. Kraft was simply wrong in saying that I supplied staff support to Mr. Rusk, Mr. Rostow, or Mr. Nitze. Nor am I a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. I had no part in the team that recently took an independent look at past and present national intelligence estimates. Nor have I seen their report.

Nitze, Paul
Wohlstattee, Albert
CIA 2.01 (NIO/NIE)

1 of 2

oicy 1

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE

Date. 13 Jan²⁷
Item No. 13
Ref. No. _____

DISTRIBUTION I
FBIS 51

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

TASS REPORTS ON "HAWK-DOVE" STRUGGLE IN U.S.

LD131737 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1502 GMT 13 DEC 77 LD

(TEXT) NEW YORK, JANUARY 13 TASS--A BITTER POLITICAL STRUGGLE IS GOING ON IN THE UNITED STATES. IT INVOLVES, ON THE ONE HAND, THE FORCES LINKED WITH THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WHICH SEEK TO TORPEDO THE RELAXATION OF TENSION AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURES, REPRESENTATIVES OF BUSINESS CIRCLES, TRADE UNIONS AND PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS WHO CLEARLY SEE THE DANGER OF AN UNRESTRAINED ARMS RACE AND AN URGENT NEED FOR STOPPING IT.

THOSE IN FAVOUR OF STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE LAUNCHED A BROAD CAMPAIGN OVER A MYTHICAL "SOVIET MILITARY MENACE" TO THE UNITED STATES. USING THEIR NON-EXISTENT "MENACE" AS AN EXCUSE THEY DEMAND A FURTHER INCREASE IN ARMS SPENDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NEW SYSTEMS AND TYPES OF ARMS.

THESE FORCES ARE LED BY SUCH "WAR HAWKS" AS FORMER CIA DIRECTOR W. COLBY, MULTI-MILLIONAIRE D. DILLON, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENCE P. NITZE, GENERAL M. RIDGEWAY, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE E. ROSTOW AND OTHERS. THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED MADE RECENTLY A STATEMENT WHICH WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO WHIP UP WAR PSYCHOSIS AND TO OBTAIN A FURTHER INCREASE IN OUTLAYS FOR THE PENTAGON.

THE UNITED STATES, THEY SAID IN THEIR STATEMENT, HAS MOVED INTO A PERIOD OF DANGER AND THIS DANGER IS GROWING.

AFTER REPEATING THEIR USUAL INVENTIONS ABOUT A "SOVIET MILITARY MENACE" MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE SET FORTH FRANKLY THEIR DEMANDS. THEY SAID IT IS NECESSARY NOW TO INCREASE STILL MORE SPENDING

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the CIA Operations Center and of the appropriate analytic component in the Agency.

[Handwritten signature]

TOP SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE

Date. 13 Jan
Item No. 13
Ref. No. _____

DISTRIBUTION I

FBIS 51

TASS REPORTS ON "HAWK-DOVE" STRUGGLE IN U.S.

LD131737 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1502 GMT 13 DEC 77 LD

(TEXT) NEW YORK, JANUARY 13 TASS--A BITTER POLITICAL STRUGGLE IS GOING ON IN THE UNITED STATES. IT INVOLVES, ON THE ONE HAND, THE FORCES LINKED WITH THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WHICH SEEK TO TORPEDO THE RELAXATION OF TENSION AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, PROMINENT POLITICAL FIGURES, REPRESENTATIVES OF BUSINESS CIRCLES, TRADE UNIONS AND PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS WHO CLEARLY SEE THE DANGER OF AN UNRESTRAINED ARMS RACE AND AN URGENT NEED FOR STOPPING IT.

THOSE IN FAVOUR OF STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE LAUNCHED A BROAD CAMPAIGN OVER A MYTHICAL "SOVIET MILITARY MENACE" TO THE UNITED STATES. USING THEIR NON-EXISTENT "MENACE" AS AN EXCUSE THEY DEMAND A FURTHER INCREASE IN ARMS SPENDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NEW SYSTEMS AND TYPES OF ARMS.

THESE FORCES ARE LED BY SUCH "WAR HAWKS" AS FORMER CIA DIRECTOR W. COLBY, MULTI-MILLIONAIRE D. DILLON, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENCE P. NITZE, GENERAL M. RIDGEWAY, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE E. ROSTOW AND OTHERS. THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED MADE RECENTLY A STATEMENT WHICH WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO WHIP UP WAR PSYCHOSIS AND TO OBTAIN A FURTHER INCREASE IN OUTLAYS FOR THE PENTAGON.

THE UNITED STATES, THEY SAID IN THEIR STATEMENT, HAS MOVED INTO A PERIOD OF DANGER AND THIS DANGER IS GROWING.

AFTER REPEATING THEIR USUAL INVENTIONS ABOUT A "SOVIET MILITARY MENACE" MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE SET FORTH FRANKLY THEIR DEMANDS. THEY SAID IT IS NECESSARY NOW TO INCREASE STILL MORE SPENDING

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the CIA Operations Center and of the appropriate analytic component in the Agency. Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

pg 23

11 JAN 1977

Original on Present Danger (orig under CIA/Colby, Wm. (reg))

NEW YORK TIMES

On U.S. Dealings With the Soviet Union

Following are excerpts from a statement by the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet relations. Among those who signed are John Kenneth Galbraith, the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, Donald M. Kendall, George Kennan, Wassily Leontief, Eugene McCarthy, Edwin O. Reischauer, David Riesman, Robert V. Roosa, Terry Sanford, Thomas Watson Jr., Jerome B. Wiesner and Leonard Woodcock.

For the past year or two American policy toward the Soviet Union has been in the main neglected, adrift and devoid of initiative. During the recent electoral campaign, U.S.-Soviet relations suffered from much misinformation and misleading rhetoric.

The American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations, concerned only to promote American security and world peace through those relations, urges the new Administration to turn its back on past timidities and to restore both balance and initiative to American policy in this field.

The committee recognizes that there are realistic limits to the improvement of relations between Russia and the United States. We recognize that the Soviet leadership will have to make a contribution no smaller than our own. Unilateral concessions are not a real issue. To our knowledge, no such concessions have been responsibly proposed, nor do we favor any. We are under no illusions about the seriousness of the differences that divide the two governments, particularly in the field of policy toward third countries and regions.

The committee believes that, despite our disagreements, the relationship can be improved in important ways. We urge the incoming Administration to take advantage, wherever possible, of all openings for progress, including outstandingly in the SALT talks. First priority should be given to halting the suicidal proliferation of nuclear and other weapons. The security of our country, as well as of our friends and allies, must always be a prime motivation in our relations with the Soviet Union. But security in today's world cannot be achieved by expanding armaments.

What is at stake here is the ultimate issue of international life today. We must make every effort to probe such possibilities as do exist. This will require not only discussion and negotiation, but a considerable measure of restraint, courage and initiative on both sides. Indeed, the dangers of restraint are less than those of an all-out weapons race. We can demand mutuality of the Soviet Union if the United States is prepared to match

whatever it may ask of others.

The many misstatements and exaggerations of the recent electoral campaign should be consigned to the past and their place taken by a sober scrutiny of the real situation in Soviet-American relations. It would be idle to underestimate the seriousness of the remaining problems. But it is simply not true that the United States in recent years has given everything and received nothing in return in its relations with Russia, or that the Soviet side has never lived up to its undertakings. A number of agreements arrived at in earlier years are working to the benefit of both parties. There is no reason to despair of reaching further agreements that would also reduce international tensions. What is needed, in the first instance, is a resolute abandonment of the stale slogans and reflexes of the cold war, a recognition that this is a new era, with different problems and possibilities; and a determination not to be governed by the compulsions of mili-

tary competition—compulsions which have seldom failed to lead to war in the past, and which in terms of the weaponry of this age are pregnant with the possibility of utter catastrophe.

Beyond these measures of restraint of the development of weaponry we should pursue constructive purposes such as mutually beneficial exchanges in trade, science and culture; preservation of our common environment; raising living standards worldwide; and promoting the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Declaration.

The committee will support and encourage the liberalization of emigration policies and the recognition of human freedoms, including the movement of individuals in all countries.

The American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations stands prepared to give the new Administration every possible help and support in any efforts it may make in the spirit of these considerations.

Following are excerpts from a statement on United States-Soviet relations by the Committee on the Present Danger. Signers include Saul Bellow, William E. Colby, John B. Connally, C. Douglas Dillon, Lane Kirkland, Clare Boothe Luce, Paul H. Nitze, Norman Podhoretz, Matthew B. Ridgway, Eugene V. Rostow, Dean Rusk, Maxwell B. Taylor and Elmo R. Zumwalt.

Our country is in a period of danger, and the danger is increasing. Unless decisive steps are taken to alert the nation, and to change the course of its policy, our economic and military capacity will become inadequate to assure peace with security.

There is still time for effective action to ensure the security and prosperity of the nation in peace, through peaceful deterrence and concerted alliance diplomacy. A conscious effort of political will is needed to restore the strength and coherence of our foreign policy; to revive the solidarity of our alliances; to build constructive relations of cooperation with other nations whose interests parallel our own—and on that sound basis to seek reliable conditions of peace with the Soviet Union, rather than an illusory détente.

Only on such a footing can we and the other democratic industrialized nations, acting together, work with the developing nations to create a just and progressive world economy—the necessary condition of our own prosperity and that of the developing nations and Communist nations as well. In that framework, we shall be better able to promote human rights, and to help deal with the great and emerging problems of food, energy, population, and the environment.

The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup. The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a world dominated from a single center—Moscow. It continues, with notable persistence, to take advantage of every opportunity to expand its political and military influence throughout the world. The scope and sophistication of the Soviet campaign have been increased in recent years, and its tempo quickened.

For more than a decade, the Soviet Union has been enlarging and improving both its strategic and its conventional military forces far more rapidly than the United States and its allies.

The process of Soviet expansion and the worldwide deployment of its military power threaten our interest in the political independence of our

11 JAN 1977

Secret Dealings

friends and allies, their and our fair access to raw materials, the freedom of the seas, and in avoiding a preponderance of adversary power.

To sustain an effective foreign policy, economic strength, military strength, and a commitment to leadership are essential. We must restore an allied defense posture capable of deterrence at each significant level and in those theaters vital to our interests. The goal of our strategic forces should be to prevent the use of, or the credible threat to use, strategic weapons in world politics; that of our conventional forces, to prevent other forms of aggression directed against our interests. Without a stable balance of forces in the world and policies of collective defense based upon it, no other objective of our foreign policy is attainable.

As a percentage of gross national product, U.S. defense spending is lower than at any time in twenty-five years. For the United States to be free, secure and influential, higher levels of spending are now required for our ready land, sea and air forces, our strategic deterrent, and, above all, the continuing modernization of those forces through research and development. The increased level of spending required is well within our means so long as we insist on all feasible efficiency in our defense spending. We must also expect our allies to bear their fair share of the burden of defense.

From a strong foundation, we can pursue a positive and confident diplomacy, addressed to the full array of our economic, political and social interests in world politics. It is only on this basis that we can expect successfully to negotiate hardheaded and verifiable agreements to control and reduce armaments.

If we continue to drift, we shall become second best to the Soviet Union in overall military strength; our alliances will weaken; our promising rapprochement with China could be reversed. Then we could find ourselves isolated in a hostile world, facing the unremitting pressures of Soviet policy backed by an overwhelming preponderance of power. Our national survival itself would be in peril, and we should face, one after another, bitter choices between war and acquiescence under pressure.

We have established the Committee on the Present Danger to help promote a better understanding of the main problems confronting our foreign policy, based on a disciplined effort to gather the facts and a sustained discussion of their significance for our national security and survival.

2072



STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

7 JULY 1977

CIA 104 Agee, Phil

OPG 1
to the FBI

Ad Axed In Atlanta

WASHINGTON — The Committee to Help the FBI has run into trouble in trying to exercise its First Amendment right of freedom of speech in Atlanta, Georgia.

The Committee tried to place an ad in the Atlanta Constitution criticizing the Justice Department and Attorney General Griffin Bell for launching the prosecution of former FBI officials and agents for such actions as undertaking wiretaps or secretive entries without warrants in their efforts to track down dangerous criminals. One former FBI supervisor, John Kearney, has already been indicted, and there is a possibility that many others will be indicted if those in the Justice Department who are eager

to prosecute have their way.

The Committee to Help the FBI submitted an ad titled, "Enough of This Nonsense," to the Atlanta paper. It pointed out that ex-CIA agent Philip Agee had been informed recently by the Justice Department that he could return to the U.S. without fear of facing prosecution even though he had spilled U.S. secrets and fingered CIA agents around the world. His activities had endangered many lives and had cost the U.S. government millions to transfer and try to protect agents fingered by Agee.

Agee was living in England until recently. He had feared to come to the U.S. because he was afraid

he would be indicted. The British recently ordered him to leave the country on the ground that he had been in contact with foreign intelligence agents and had been involved in activities that could be harmful to the security of the United Kingdom.

At this juncture, Ben Civiletti, the new head of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, informed Agee that he did not need to worry about being prosecuted under the Espionage Act. Only a few months earlier, Civiletti's predecessor had advised Agee that he might be prosecuted.

At the same time the Justice Department was letting Agee off the hook, they were planning the prosecution of FBI agents and officials who had been involved in warrantless wiretaps and mail surveillance. The committee's ad pointed out that what the FBI had done was similar to some of the less spectacular deeds of such popular heroes as TV's "Mission

Impossible" team. They had done these things in an effort to try to track down such dangerous terrorists as Bernardine Dornh of the Weather Underground.

The committee certainly made a good point in citing the fact that the American public had relished and applauded all kinds of questionable and illegal deeds carried out by the "Mission Impossible" team and other similar TV heroes. The Man From Uncle, To Catch a Thief, and a wide variety of private eye shows come to mind. What are known as "black bag" jobs, surreptitious entries to get the goods on the crooks, were standard fare in these programs. It apparently never occurred to anyone that such entries were in violation of the law. Indeed, there is some question whether they were, since the courts regularly ruled on the admissibility of evidence obtained by searches made without benefit of a warrant without ever suggesting that the searchers should be jailed. At the time, such actions by the authorities were not condemned, as the popularity of the TV shows indicates.

But the Atlanta Constitution did not look with favor on the committee's ad. First, they made the reasonable request that substantiation of the statements about Philip Agee be provided. Mr. Agee's notoriety apparently had not spread to Atlanta. The documentation was provided, mainly in the form of clippings from The New York Times and The Washington Post, plus a reference to Agee's book, Inside the Company.

The Constitution still balked, indicating that no documentation would really make the ad acceptable. One might conclude that they did not like the criticism of Attorney General Griffin Bell, who hails from Atlanta. Clearly, the Constitution does not guarantee freedom of speech, even if you offer to pay for it.

M - 1,000,866
S - 1,227,377

FEB 4 1977

P-Kirsch, Robert
P-Bachrack, Stanley D
Soc. 01.2 The Ctte of One
Million: "China Lobby"
Politics, 1953-1971

THE BOOK REPORT

China Lobby: 50-Year Mystery?

BY ROBERT KIRSCH

Times Book Critic

The Scholar's Shelf:

Stanley D. Bachrack's **The Committee of One Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971** (Columbia University Press: \$14.95) leaves some central questions unanswered, but it is not through lack of trying by its author. The major question is whether or not the CIA played a role in organizing, just after the Korean War, the Committee for One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

The committee, which went on to influence this country's China policy for many years, was the brainchild of a mysterious Frenchman, Count Nicholas de Rochefort. Dr. Bachrack, working with the files of the organization donated to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University by Marvin Liebman, the group's longtime secretary and publicist, tracked the original idea of the Committee to a letter sent by De Rochefort to an aide to President Eisenhower.

This aide, C.D. Jackson, did not discourage De Rochefort, though he made it clear he did not deem it appropriate for the Administration to get involved in the organization of a group which would propagandize and lobby against Red China's admission to the U.N.

A second letter from De Rochefort indicated he had made contact with Rep. Walter Judd of Minnesota, chairman of the subcommittee on the Far East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Rep. Judd, a former medical missionary to China and a dedicated supporter of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, undertook to head a public appeal.

In the White House files Dr. Bachrack found a memorandum from Jackson to then Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, director of the CIA from 1950 to 1953: "Count N. de Rochefort, who has been quite active in anti-Communist work but who for some reason unknown to me did not enjoy particularly good standing in your former outfit, is spearheading . . . a public petition drive against the inclusion of Red China in the United Nations." Jackson said the drive was directed to Western European public opinion. He asked Bedell Smith for his advice. Handwritten across the bottom of the document was: "9/9 - Smith advised best not to get W. H. (White House) involved in any way."

This aroused Dr. Bachrack's curiosity. Could this De Rochefort have been a CIA agent? Could it have been an early instance of a covert CIA domestic political operation?

He asked the CIA to provide information under the Freedom of Information Act. The agency refused, claiming it had statutory exemption, and "neither confirmed nor denied" De Rochefort's possible affiliation. Dr. Bachrack sued the CIA but lost. He sought to get transcripts of De Rochefort's testimony in executive session before Judd's subcommittee but that was denied him five times. The documents remain locked away for 50 years, perhaps to the year 2003, under a House secrecy rule.

De Rochefort, who had given up his French citizenship after World War II, died in 1964 at the age of 62. He was identified as a writer, linguist, professor at American University and "expert on psychological warfare."

Perhaps this careful, scrupulously fair study will help

build up some pressure to reveal the CIA involvement, if any, with the China Lobby's most effective public organization. Though the CIA question is unresolved, the book itself is a case study of potent public relations, propaganda and political influence on the national level.

The China Lobby had promulgated its myth that we somehow "lost China." It found scapegoats among the old China hands in the State Department, besmirched reputations and managed to suppress dissent and discourage alternatives for American policy on China.

Dr. Bachrack points out that China was never "ours" to lose—"China policy, on the other hand, was." The Committee led by Rep. Judd and Liebman (until they fell out because Liebman had used Judd's name on letters to newspapers without securing Judd's permission) managed to achieve a bipartisanship by recruiting both liberal and conservative figures to the Committee. Its propaganda was brilliant, never failing to link its positions with other emotional issues, such as drug smuggling, and it carried on drives within Far Eastern countries where its influential members had contact with high government officials.

Gradually the Committee lost its bipartisan makeup as some prominent Republicans and Democrats resigned from the steering committee. President Nixon's China trip ended the effectiveness of the committee.

But it had zealously promoted its defense of the Chiang regime and had perpetuated an hysteria which made it difficult if not impossible to speak out with equal effect on the side of relations with Red China. So powerful was it at one point that it was able to deflect several initiatives by Red China in the direction of opening contact with the United States.

This scholarly and eminently fair account is a refreshing contrast to the usual blare and exaggeration of the China Lobby's defenders and attackers.

~~Org. Ctte for One
Million Against the
Admission of Communism~~

CIA & China

ARTICLE APPEARS
ON PAGE 4

HUMAN EVENTS
7 MAY 1977

Badillo, Herman

Liberals Press Bill to Wreck Intelligence Agencies

House liberals are pushing legislation that would outlaw all "political surveillance" and shut down the intelligence gathering activities of both the FBI and the CIA.

Introduced by Herman Badillo (D.-N.Y.) and a dozen of his colleagues, the bill has the all-out support of such anti-internal security groups as the American Civil Liberties Union, the Committee for Public Justice and the Center for National Security Studies.

To a significant extent, the legislation incorporates the major provisions of a proposed piece of legislation unveiled in the Nation's Capital in February by former Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark. The thrust of that measure, as HUMAN EVENTS noted in its March 19 issue, was said to be looked upon with some favor by various persons in the Justice Department and on the President's Domestic Council. The Badillo proposal would:

- Prohibit all electronic and "political" surveillance. What the proponents mean by this, however, is no surveillance of virtually any organization, whether or not it advocates violence or swears allegiance to a foreign country.
- Prohibit the "covert collection of foreign intelligence information abroad during peacetime...."
- Prevent the FBI from collecting information on any person unless there was evidence that the individual had already committed a crime or was about to commit one.
- Repeal the Riot Act, which permits the federal government to prosecute persons crossing state lines to promote violence, and the Smith Act, which makes it illegal to advocate the violent overthrow of the government.

"If this legislation as presently drafted is enacted into law, it will destroy the effectiveness of the FBI," says W. Raymond Wannall, who retired last year as assistant FBI director in charge of the intel-

ligence division. In an interview with Kingsbury Smith of the Hearst Newspapers, Wannall said:

"It would put the bureau out of business in intelligence-gathering, and that applies to organized crime as well as surveillance of radical political organizations and terrorist groups. It would make it impossible for the bureau to function effectively in the foreign intelligence field."

Under the Badillo bill, the FBI could not investi-



Rep. Ronald Dellums (left) (D.-Calif.) and Rep. Badillo are pushing for legislation designed to virtually destroy the intelligence gathering activities of the FBI and the CIA.

gate any individual or group unless there was evidence the person or group "has committed, is committing, or is about to commit" a federal crime. That would virtually cripple the FBI's drive against the Mafia.

"Combatting organized crime is to a great extent gathering information to prevent the commission of a crime," Wannall notes. "Under the proposed legislation, the FBI would also be prohibited from maintaining records on a suspect unless you could prove he had committed a crime or was about to commit one. This would make preventative action virtually impossible."

The Badillo bill provides that once an investigation is completed, the file will be sealed by the attorney general. Six months later, the subject would be informed that he had been under investigation and the government must give him a complete accounting of what it had learned about him.

Thus, if insufficient evidence is developed to provide an indictment, organized crime figures or potential saboteurs must nonetheless be notified that they were under investigation and precisely what the FBI had learned of their activities.

The Justice Department informs HUMAN EVENTS it has made no comment on the legislation, and even Badillo's office admits it may go too far for the department. But a lot of knowledgeable legal experts in the Justice Department and over at the White House who would like to see this bill—

Org, ACLU
L. C. for
Public Justice
Org, Center
Natl. Sec
Studies

Dellums, Rep

3

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

February 22, 1977

Public Justice
(Orig under McDonald)

ORGI ACLU

ORGI Center For National Security
E 861 Studies

ports concerning grand jury investigations and the use of immunity orders. Requires reports in eight specified areas, set forth according to judicial district.

EVIDENCE

Requires the government to introduce all evidence in its possession tending to prove the innocence of a potential defendant.

Prohibits the grand jury from returning an indictment on the basis of hearsay evidence alone.

UTILITY BILLS SQUEEZE CONSUMERS

HON. TOM HARKIN

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 22, 1977

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Speaker, we must not forget the consumer in our discussions of the present energy crisis. Many consumers who have heeded the pleas to conserve energy have done a magnificent job only to find that their utility bills continue to climb.

One of my constituents, Mrs. Mary Ellen Godbout of Red Oak, Iowa, has written a most eloquent letter to President Carter about the need to give consumers a break.

The Godbouts have taken many steps to conserve energy, such as adding insulation and storm windows to their home and lowering their thermostat. The proof of their success is that last December they consumed 13 percent less electricity and 49 percent less natural gas than they had 3 years earlier—all this in the face of a severe winter.

Despite their heroic efforts, their energy bill was higher in 1976 than it was in 1973.

Mrs. Godbout's letter speaks for itself. I commend it to the attention of my colleagues:

DEAR PRESIDENT CARTER: I have never before written to a President but I feel so strongly over my concern about our natural gas crisis that I'm praying you will give this letter much consideration. When is somebody going to start looking at the consumers' side of this crisis? I realize we need to seek new ways and means for new energy and this takes money, but the consumer can't pay for it all. Why can't some Federal money be made available for this? The average and below income families cannot continue to pay prices such as we are now for gas much longer. From all indications the price of gas will go even higher and it will soon be impossible to pay our bills—what do we do then? Another year or so like this and I'm sure many people will have to consider going on welfare rolls or have some assistance available to keep warm. We have no choice as to where to buy gas other than from monopolies such as Iowa Power & Light and they continue to impose rate increase upon rate increase upon us. Plus they are allowed to pass along to the consumer energy cost adjustments.

This hardly seems fair to me. Seems to me that when something is sold to me at a set amount that's what I should be expected to pay, but this energy cost adjustment varies from month to month and is passed along to the consumer. I'm very depressed over the future outlook. I feel like I'm backed in a corner with nowhere to turn or help so I'm taking this means in writing to you and other heads of Energy who are constantly being asked to conserve (and

believe me we have conserved) and for our efforts and sacrifices we are thanked by having to pay these high prices for gas and told it will go even higher.

We have done everything possible in our home to conserve energy and I don't know of anything further we can do. Is it fair that I have to continue to pay even higher prices for gas? Listed below are some of the means we have taken.

1. Insulated attic, all side walls and put on storm windows in 1974.
2. We have caulked around all window and door casings.
3. We have gradually dialed down—as of this winter (76-77) the thermostat is set at 64-66. (your pleas to the nation to dial down to 65 didn't affect us—I already know how uncomfortable that temperature is)
4. At night we dial down to 53.
5. I pull shades and close drapes at the windows at night on days the sun doesn't shine.
6. We have steam heat and we shut off upstairs radiators when we get up in the mornings and turn them back on at night.
7. We have shut off and don't heat rooms we don't need.
8. I dry about half of our laundry on lines in the basement and I wash in cold water.
9. We keep high humidity in our house because we have health problems that require this.
10. I don't have a dishwasher or self cleaning oven, etc.

What more can be expected from a consumer? Next are some facts and figures which will prove that I have conserved. This is taken off our Iowa Power and Light bills.

December 1973 (before we took steps to conserve):

- Used, 912 kwh; cost, \$25.37.
- Used, 635 ccf; cost \$68.83.
- December 1975:
- Used, 913 kwh; cost \$36.13.
- Used, 320 ccf; cost, \$48.16.
- December 1976:
- Used, 791 kwh; cost \$32.26.
- Used, 323 ccf; cost, \$61.79.

You can see that we used nearly half as much gas this December as we did in 1973 but the cost is nearly the same. It would be impossible for me to pay the bill if I had used the same amount as I did in 1973 at the current rates. Also notice that we used only 3 ccf of gas more this December than in 1975 and the Iowa Power representative commented to this fact that we had conserved because this December 1976 was 20 percent colder than December 1975. I also paid a difference of \$13.63 for those 3 ccf in a year's time. When I see increases like that on 3 ccf it makes me shudder—what justifies increases like that? How can anyone be expected to keep up with rising costs such as these? My combined bill with sales tax was \$98.87 for this past December. I have to cut down on food in order to pay it and I cannot continue to pay such prices. Mr. President, what am I to do if gas continues to rise?

For these reasons, President Carter, I plead with you to set up some kinds of programs that would give the consumer that conserves a break in the cost of gas. I don't see how it is humanly possible for me to conserve much more or for my husband to increase our income anymore. He is a teacher and he supplements our income by coaching during the school year and painting houses in the summer. Yes, there are people who have not done their part in conserving but as a whole most families have taken means to conserve, so why not introduce a program that would benefit the conserver and let those who don't, pay the consequences.

Excuse this poorly typed letter but I typed it on a typewriter that I had to type on for years and I've lost my touch and it is difficult to type with cold hands.

I am praying for some action to benefit families across the nation such as us. May God direct you, Mr. President, to help people like us—your people. I must say I am happy about the steps you have taken to cut energy cost and consumption since you've taken office. I'm disturbed with our local state in the fact that they say they will not dial down to 65 in the State Office Building. Why should the householder then? I pray God will send some answers to this problem.

Yours truly,

Mrs. Mary Ellen Godbout.

BLINDING JUSTICE: THE CAMPAIGN TO OUTLAW THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 22, 1977

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, on February 15, three organizations working to extinguish America's foreign and domestic intelligence-gathering capability held a Capitol Hill press conference to publicize proposed Federal legislation which they drafted to outlaw domestic intelligence-gathering. The three organizations are the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU, the Fund for Peace's Center for National Security Studies, CNSS, and the Committee for Public Justice, CPJ.

The three groups were presented in the media account of the press conference as "civil liberties" organizations. In fact the three are civil liberties groups only in the sense that they are working to set up conditions under which the civil rights guaranteed under our Constitution will be destroyed. The draft legislation, for which congressional sponsors are being sought, will be considered separately. First, a review of the organizations and individuals sponsoring it is in order.

The ACLU was founded by socialists who, though preferring nonviolence themselves, cooperated for decades with totalitarian Marxist-Leninist organizations under the direction of the Soviet Union. Although professing concern for individual liberties, the ACLU continues to have among its leaders and membership Communist Party, U.S.A. activists, and other Marxist-Leninists who can under no circumstances be considered civil libertarians.

In its 1970-71 annual report, the ACLU announced:

The ACLU has made the dissolution of the Nation's vast surveillance network a top priority. . . . The ACLU's attack on the political surveillance is being pressed simultaneously through a research project, litigation, and legislation action.

The ACLU's Project on Privacy and Data Collection, called more accurately the "antisurveillance project" by activists, is headed by Frank J. Donner, identified in sworn testimony by three witnesses as a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A. For 20 years, Donner has been a leader of the Communist Party's efforts to end all investigation of subversive activities.

The Committee for Public Justice was founded in 1970 by Lillian Hellman who

CIA 4.01 Academic
~~CIA 4.01 Concerned Academics~~
CIA 4.01 Bush, George
(orig under 4.01)

76-7890

May 5, 1976

Mr. George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Concerned Academics
c/o N.S.E.F.
Suite #305
2000 P St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Bush,

By severing covert contractual relationships with missionaries and at least some members of the media, you have demonstrated your concern in protecting the integrity and independence of those institutions which are so vital to a democratic society. As representatives of the academic community, we feel the same guarantees against misuse and subversion are needed to insure that our institutions of higher learning are totally free of secret and often unknowing participation in CIA covert operations at home and abroad. The following CIA practices are of great concern to us.

CIA funded research at universities. The CIA has secretly funded individual professors and entire departments to carry out its research and gather intelligence. We strongly condemn this secret relationship between the CIA and the academic community, which we feel undermines free and independent scholarly work. In his Executive Order of February 18th, President Ford not only authorizes these secret research contracts on campus, but limits knowledge of the CIA relationship to "appropriate senior officials of the academic institutions and to senior project officials." This practice has broad implications for the academic community. In addition to the violation of ethical standards, this practice means that many scholars, researchers and students may be working on projects which they would find morally untenable if they were aware of the funding source and possible application of their research. Further, the CIA has been given the authority to put past and present contractors or employees under physical surveillance. Thus a professor who is knowingly or unknowingly working on a CIA contract may be the target of a CIA investigation -- a grave infringement on his or her right to privacy.

We therefore request that all CIA contracts or relationships with individual professors, researchers, or students for the purpose of research be publicly acknowledged.

Use of academic cover. In the past, CIA funding of academic groups such as the National Student Association and Michigan State's Vietnam program has caused great alarm on American campuses. In addition, the CIA is known to have made use of academic exchange programs; has sent operatives overseas under cover as students and faculty; and secretly hired students and faculty to provide services for the CIA. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report reveals that academics

P - Foley, Tom
 Computer Sciences Corporation
 CIA 4 Vietn
 S.

Pickets get computer firm to pledge no aid to Thieu

By TOM FOLEY

WASHINGTON, April 5 — A computer firm in the capital area has agreed to end its work for the Saigon police as a result of protest activities by Women Strike for Peace.

The announcement came from the Computer Sciences Corporation in Falls Church, Va., after its offices were picketed yesterday by 20 members of WSP.

CSC has 56 computer specialists in Saigon working with President Nguyen Van Thieu and his police state apparatus to maintain an automated data system. The system is a direct continuation of the notorious Phoenix program run by Saigon and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency under which 45,000 South Vietnamese were murdered as alleged supporters of the National Liberation Front.

After the WSP group had picketed for about 20 minutes, John E. Frank, CSC director of program development, called in four of the women and informed them that CSC would phase out its Saigon program and terminate it in June.

Frank assured the WSP group that CSC will no longer train any Saigon personnel in computer technology.

Hatfield amendment

Edith Villastrige, spokeswoman for WSP, told the Daily World today that the CSC decision was evidently based on the realization that its activities might violate the Hatfield amendment.

The amendment, sponsored by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore), and passed last December, prohibits the expenditure of U.S. funds for military operations in Vietnam. CSC could well be violating the amendment by helping Thieu maintain a reign of terror through his army and police.

To get around the Hatfield amendment, the computer program contract was administered by the State Department, although its funds came from the Defense Department. The State Department ran the program through the Agency for International Development (AID), which maintains a so-called Public Safety Office in Saigon.

When questioned by WSP representatives, Frank said defensive-

ly, "It is not the responsibility of CSC to read the data cards the Vietnamese police put through the computers."

Challenged on this by the WSP group, he replied lamely, "If you live in this environment, you are not allowed intellectual curiosity."

He did not discuss the report that Thieu still has an estimated 200,000 political prisoners in his prisons.

Ms. Villastrige was elated by

the Falls Church victory.

She linked the end of U.S. aid to the Saigon police computerized data system with last night's surprise action by the House of Representatives on Vietnam. The House voted 177 to 154 to reject any increase in military assistance money to the Saigon regime.

Both actions, she said, represented "great victories for the U.S. peace forces."

Computer parley hears the voice of peace

By RICK NAGIN

ATLANTIC CITY, May 19—The Computer People for Peace held an anti-war rally here today on the boardwalk in front of Convention Hall where the Spring Joint Computer Conference (SJCC) was holding its annual meeting.

The SJCC brings together members of all computer professional societies to discuss latest developments and examine displays of new machinery.

About 10,000 people, nearly all white men representing the corporations, universities, various police and governmental agencies, the CIA and the FBI, attended the conference. The theme of the conference was "Responsibility."

Speaking at the anti-war rally, attorney Flo Kennedy quoted the SJCC program and stated that the responsibility referred to was obviously responsibility to the military-industrial complex establishment (MICE).

Hundreds at rally

Several hundred people at the rally cheered as speakers exposed the involvement of the computer industry in racism, repression and war.

The Computer People for Peace (CPP) yesterday demanded the right to speak at the SJCC session on "computers in law enforcement," and to expose the repressive threats posed by police use of advanced computer technology. They were refused but won the right to ask questions at an expanded session, after speeches by Lt. Daniel Cawley of the New York City Police Department, and by Herbert Avram, who discussed a computer system he developed for the CIA.

Avram refused to discuss the CIA's interest in his system, when asked by the CPP.

Lt. Jerome Daunt of the FBI had been scheduled to discuss the National Crime Information Center, a central computer connecting local police departments in all states with the FBI, but he did not show up. The CPP had prepared a warrant to seize him on a citizen's arrest for conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the American people.

The CPP also won the right to hold its own session, which included panels on data banks, minority groups and women in the industry, computers in the military, unemployment and health systems.

19 Sept 1970

P-Zwerdling, Dan
Internal Officers
Movement

Concerned Brass

The Concerned Officers Movement (COM), a Washington-based group formed after the November moratorium, is the first organization to give officers a platform against the Indochina war. It's unsettling top Pentagon brass.

COM was originally called Officers Resistance. The name was discarded as too radical. In July, the Navy prematurely discharged the Secretary of the Navy's two top intelligence briefing officers, who belonged to the antiwar group. Since then, press coverage has spread the COM name; letters are pouring in from officers stationed around the world, and chapters are forming in Norfolk, Pensacola, San Diego, and Grand Forks Air Force base, home of the ABM.

So far, COM functions as little more than a weekly political discussion group which meets in one of the officers' apartments. COM has published three newsletters (the first declares "the officer corps is not part of a silent majority") and is trying to raise funds to purchase a full-page ad in *The New York Times*, to proclaim its existence to the nation. COM members are considering sending active duty officers to speak with community groups, and to seek support from congressmen and retired officers. Members would like also to turn to issues beyond the war, issues such as military reform.

Rank-and-file GIs have been dissenting from the military for years, in coffeehouses and underground newspapers. COM wants to function purely as an officers' organization unaffiliated with GI groups, which are generally more radical. "Officers have a unique position, which should be used to advantage," says Navy Lt. Phil Lehman, a COM organizer discharged early this summer. "We want to convey to Middle America that there are people very much against the war, whose loyalty can't be impugned." COM's tactics and rhetoric will stay moderate. "We can't indulge in rhetoric like 'smash the brass' and 'off the pigs,'" Lehman declares. "We want to influence moderate Americans, and the higher reaches of the military."

To the Pentagon, any kind of dissent poses a potential threat. Defense Department regulations forbid service personnel from lobbying "in combination," or publicly complaining about specific grievances -- which would apply to COM members taking any stand as a group on military or political issues -- and from conduct "prejudicial" to good order and discipline. Navy

officials say that so far, COM hasn't breached military regulations: "but if they keep going in the direction they have been, we'll have to take account," says Navy spokesman, Capt. W. S. Busik. "It's one thing for individuals to express their private opinions, but when they go public and take advantage of the uniform, it's another."

Pentagon officials claim they have taken no disciplinary measures against COM members. A commanding officer in Norfolk, however, recently stripped a COM member of his security clearance, and his authority to give orders. Navy officials deny that the two briefing officers in Washington were discharged as a result of their COM activities. When the Secretary of the Navy discovered they belonged to COM, they were first transferred to routine jobs in a division which didn't even have job openings; then they were discharged, with 1200 other nonessential personnel, to facilitate budget cuts. "They set themselves up for it," says Busik, who argues that if the officers hadn't joined COM in the first place, they wouldn't have been transferred to insignificant jobs, and consequently, wouldn't have been dumped.

Members of COM want to know just how far they can go and still remain within the protective limits of the First Amendment. The group is considering asking a federal court to issue a declaratory judgment, defining the rights of officers and all servicemen to speak their minds in public. Some officers are testing new ground -- 19 junior officers aboard the aircraft carrier *Hancock* signed an antiwar letter and leaked it to the press in June, and a new group is Concerned Graduates of the US Military, Naval and Air Force Academies. But, "most officers," says Lehman, "are afraid to stand up and say what they believe, for good reason. If you're a career officer, it's suicide."

Dan Zwerdling

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 541,086
S - 697,966

OCT 22 1970

*Paul Galloway, Paul
Livingston, Gordon
CIA 3.03 Vietnam, S.
Org. 1 Concerned Academy
Graduates*

3 West Point graduates urge speedier Vietnam withdrawal

By Paul Galloway

Three West Point graduates who saw combat in Vietnam criticized President Nixon's recent peace proposal Wednesday and urged the prompt withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia on a specific timetable.

"The President's proposal for a cease-fire, while desirable in humane terms, is merely another effort to find a military solution to an essentially political conflict," said Dr. Gordon Livingston, who received a Bronze Star for valor while a regimental surgeon in Vietnam in 1968-69.

"Unfortunately, much of the peace proposal is based on the assumption that our policy of 'Vietnamization' has been a success. Clearly it has failed," Livingston said in a press conference at Sage's East Restaurant, 181 E. Lake Shore.

Appearing with Livingston, a 1960 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, were Robert Johnson, a 1965 West Point graduate who served as a company commander with the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam in 1968-69, and Steven Perryman, who was graduated from the academy in 1964 and commanded an engineer detachment in 1967-68 in Vietnam, also receiving the Bronze Star.

The three veterans, who have left the service, are members of the Concerned Academy Graduates, an organization formed three months ago and composed of more than 200 graduates of the country's five service academies who oppose further U.S. military involvement in Indochina.

They said their first-hand view of the failure of Vietnam-

ization was supported by a recently published account of a Central Intelligence Agency report which estimated that 30,000 members of the Viet Cong have infiltrated the Saigon government.

"Our view is that Vietnamization retards our disengagement rather than hastens it because it presupposes the continued existence of a government that has shown little capacity to sustain itself without our assistance," the three men stated.

They expressed concern that the administration is engaging in "systematic attempts to isolate dissenters" and depict them "as somehow unpatriotic."

"Our dissent is an affirmation of our belief in our political system," the former officers said.

Describing the official version of the war as "misinformation channeled through wishful thinking," they said their experience contrasted sharply with what many Americans believe about Vietnam.

"Members of the silent majority have been misled about their young men in Vietnam," Perryman said. "Our soldiers have become brutalized and they brutalize the Vietnamese,

whom most GIs regard with disgust."

Johnson said the My-Lai incident was not "an isolated aberration, but a logical consequence of our policy," which, he said, encourages high-kill ratios.

"I can understand the resentment of Americans when some soldiers are singled out as scapegoats," he added.

Perryman said he found "great enthusiasm" for the war by senior officers.

APO48D
(ADVANCE FOR USE TUESDAY, AUGUST ELEVENTH &
LISTEN LADIES
BY MARTHA BUCKWALTER

*Org / Concern, Inc.
11 Aug 1970*

A GROUP OF WOMEN IN WASHINGTON HAS STARTED AN ORGANIZATION
TO ADVISE WOMEN WHO ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT....

TODAY'S LISTEN, LADIES BRINGS YOU SOME TIPS FOR GARDENERS....

AND A RECIPE FOR A BASIC DISH YOU CAN WORK YOUR OWN VARIATIONS
ON.

-DASH-

(WOMEN IN THE NEWS)

THE INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS HAS FOUND
RECEPTIVENESS IN MANY WALKS OF LIFE. ONE OF THE LATEST GROUPS
TO ORGANIZE IS MADE UP OF WOMEN WHO MOVE IN THE TOP GOVERNMENT
AND SOCIETY CIRCLES IN WASHINGTON.

THE GROUP IS CALLED CONCERN INCORPORATED. ITS CO-FOUNDERS
ARE MRS. PAUL IGNATIUS, WHOSE HUSBAND WAS THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, AND MRS. RICHARD HELMS, THE WIFE OF THE CIA
DIRECTOR. CONCERN INCORPORATED IS STRICTLY A VOLUNTEER OPERATION,
AND THE WOMEN HAVE INTENTIONALLY KEPT IT SMALL--ABOUT WORKERS
ALTOGETHER. THEIR OFFICE IS A CUBBYHOLE IN THE URBAN COALITION
HEADQUARTERS.

(MORE)

DM430AED 8-10

16 AUGUST 1970

P- Peter, Viviane
P- Walker, Connect-
icut

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

CYNTHIA HELMS.

CIA Helms,
Richard
Org / Concern, Inc

Her Concern Is CONCERN

Original on
CIA

by Viviane Peter & Connecticut Walker

WHAT does a woman do when she is married to Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Does she lead a purposely obscure, quiet, furtive existence, or does she set out to make a normal life for herself? Two years ago when lovely, red-haired Cynthia McKelvie, 46, a divorcee with four children, was ever so quietly married to handsome Richard Helms, also divorced, she decided that his vital work would not impinge upon hers. She would pursue her own career and actively cultivate her own interests.

The result is that Cynthia Helms works three days a week at the Smithsonian Institution, founded in 1846 in Washington, D.C., from funds left by James Smithson "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men."

"I interview for a radio transcription series," she explains, "anyone connected with the place—artists, scientists, visiting professors. I also take off one afternoon a week to get in some tennis with Dick, and I devote the rest of my time and energy to CONCERN."

CONCERN is a new environmental action group organized by a handful of prominent capital wives to alleviate the nation's pollution problems. It addresses itself to the American housewife and attempts to answer her oft-asked question, "What can I do to help?"

"I was talking about the problems of environment at a dinner party last winter with a friend, Nancy Ignatius" [wife of Washington Post president Paul Ignatius], Mrs. Helms explains, "and we decided that it was no good thinking that other people would do something to solve our ecological miseries. We had to do it ourselves."

"Word got around and soon the telephone started ringing—people wanted to help. So we carefully chose a small

conscientious staff of knowledgeable women who had already done some research on pesticides, conservation, and consumer habits. We incorporated as a non-profit organization and began to study the problems.

"Somebody offered us free accounting service, and somebody else donated an office they weren't using. We now have a lot of volunteers, many teen-aged, so our bills are minimal."

Women of wealth

The basic difference between the leaders of CONCERN and the leaders of any other women's group is that at CONCERN most are married to influential, wealthy, and prominent men. In addition to Cynthia Helms and Nancy Ignatius, the board of directors includes Mrs. Russell Train, whose husband serves on the President's Council on Environmental Quality; Mrs. Robert Kintner, wife of the ex-president of NBC; Mrs. William Gravson, wife of the ex-president of the Audubon Society, and Mrs. Clyde Shorey Jr. and Mrs. Paul Mickey, both married to prominent Washington lawyers.

The group's first product is *Eco-Tips*, a purse-size leaflet for housewives to use when they go shopping. This handy information sheet is designed to guide the consumer away from life-destroying products and practices.

"What we're trying to do," Mrs. Helms points out, "is to educate and encourage women to use their power. As consumers they've got lots of it. They can influence manufacturers by refusing to buy products that are biologically destructive or wastefully packaged."

"Since we've published *Eco-Tips* we've had at least 30 letters from industry—aluminum companies, drug companies, soap manufacturers, supermarket chains, all supporting our efforts."

(To obtain a free copy of *Eco-Tips* and to join the CONCERN mailing list for future fact-sheets, write to CONCERN, Inc., P.O. Box 19287, Washington, D.C. 20036.)

Commitment to public service is nothing new for Cynthia Helms. Born in Mauldin, England, she served as a WREN (the British equivalent of our WAVES) in World War II, soon after came to the U.S. with her first husband, an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Allan McKelvie, who accepted a fellowship at the Mayo Clinic. For five years they lived in Rochester, Minn., where Cynthia helped raise their four offspring of whom she now speaks with justifiable pride.

Pipeline to youth

"Our children," she says, "not only keep us honest but in tune with all sections of the country. Dick has one son, Dennis, by his first marriage [to the former Julia Bretzman Shields of Indianapolis]. Dennis is a lawyer in Washington."

"My four are scattered. My eldest daughter, 25, a graduate of Connecticut College, works as an economics researcher. The other three attend college—one son at the University of Chicago Law School, another at Hobart College, and the youngest, 19, at Ohio Wesleyan."

Cynthia and Dick Helms occupy a small apartment in Washington, D.C., but have a larger country place in Lewes, Del.

"The kids love it down there when they can make it, and we try to go down almost every weekend."

Hush-hush on husband

Of her husband's work or of how it feels to be married to a super-sleuth, Cynthia Helms will say relatively little.

"Life with Dick is not trying. It's daily. We live just as you do, a busy life. Dick has been in the CIA and involved with

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Continued

Langway, Lynn
Helms, Richard
P - Alsop, Joseph
Org: Concern, Inc.

HOUSTON, TEX.
CHRONICLE

NOV 1 1970

E - 279,608
S - 333,807

Capital Capers

Writer Alsop Is at the Helm Of Happenings

BY LYNN LANGWAY


Chicago Daily News-Sun-Times Service

Washington — National columnist Joseph Alsop should be getting some really inside information soon.

It seems that several newspapers ran a story about the current Mrs. Richard Helms, wife of the CIA director, who heads an environmental action group called "Concern, Incorporated." Trouble was that the wire service photo accompanying the article, labeled "CIA Director and Mrs. Helms," was only half right — it actually showed columnist Alsop and the first Mrs. Helms, named Julia.

The second and present Mrs. Helms, named Cynthia, says she's planning to write Alsop and joke that "any state secrets he gets because of the publicity still belong to us."

The CIA wasn't amused, however, and spent a day terrifying reporters and photographers by telephoning their desks with the ominous opening line, "This is the CIA calling for . . ."



RICHARD HELMS
Wifely Mixup

SRG1 Concerned Citizens

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Concerned Citizens of California
182 Diamond Street
San Francisco, Calif. 94114
Marjorie D. Martin, President



May 20, 1977

C.I.A.

The enclosed poster was found on Castro Street at 1:30 p.m. May 20, 1977 taped to the door of the Georgina Bakery, 420 Castro Street.

Since the information concerned mentions your office, I felt that the United States Gov't should be informed.

M. Martin

MAY 23 7 59 AM '77

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

CIA Killed JFK AND MLK

HANDS OFF CUBA!



E.H. HUNT 1975 | "Tramp" 1963 | E.H. HUNT 1973

This CIA ASSASSIN Killed JFK - SEE the Evidence

SLideshow:

40 slides of hard photographic EVIDENCE
Suppressed by the media, CIA, & Gov. 14 years!

FRI 3 JUN Army &
534
Precita 8pm Mission

TO FIND TIME & PLACE OF NEXT
SHOWING CALL OUR 24 HOUR TAPED
PHONE CALENDAR:

415- 567-1651

OR WRITE US TO ARRANGE A SLIDESHOW
IN YOUR COMMUNITY, SCHOOL OR UNION.
COST IS BASED ON BUS FARE
N.W.A.R.C. (NORTHWEST ASSASSINATION
POB 42644 RESEARCH COMMITTEE)
S.F., CA. 94101


MOVEMENT LABOR DONATED

FROM THE "BAY OF PIGS" TO DALLAS, TO
WATERGATE, TO MEMPHIS, WE HAVE
TRACKED, HUNT, STURGIS & NIXON
TO PROVE HOW THE SAME PEOPLE
KILLED JFK & M.L. KING.


JOIN US. WE NEED TO ENLARGE OUR
STAFF TO PRESS THE INVESTIGATION
CAMPAIGN UNTIL EVERYONE HAS SEEN
THE EVIDENCE. ONCE WE HAVE
HUNT, STURGIS & NIXON ON TRIAL WE
WILL BE ABLE TO EXPOSE THE ASSASSINS
OF MALCOM X, FRED HAMPTON & KING.

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7



San Francisco, CA 94126



1909

Mr. Herbert Hetu
Public Affairs Office
CIA
Washington D.C. 20505

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7



STAT

10 Apr 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD



checked with Security. They had one reference to the Conference on American Civilization. It was involved in the Woman's Strike for Peace. It has to do with major problems facing high school students, mainly Vietnam on the home front. It is peace-oriented.

In the Congressional Record, 19 October 1965, he was mentioned as a member of W. E. B. Dubois. He led the anti-war protest at the University of Wisconsin in February 1965.



STAT

ORGI CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 19, 1976

CIA-1-04 MILBANK, DAVID L.

CIA-4-01 TERRORISM

SAVE
(orig under ORGI)

Mr. David Milbank
Office of Political Research
Room 3858
Central Intelligence Agency

Dear Mr. Milbank:

You are cordially invited to attend a Conference on International Terrorism which will be held in the Department of State March 25-26.

The objectives of the conference are (1) to gain a better understanding of the nature, causes and consequences of international terrorism as a distinctive form of violence; (2) to identify those factors which are likely to promote or inhibit international terrorist activities in the years ahead; and, (3) to assess the implications of these findings for US and other nations' interests and policies. We hope to stimulate open and original thinking on these matters and to have your active participation in the discussion. A copy of the agenda for the conference is enclosed.

In addition to the individuals cited in the agenda, we anticipate that approximately 150 persons from government, private business and the academic world will be in attendance. In general, those invited will all have a practical or scholarly interest in the field of international terrorism.

I would appreciate your letting me know at your earliest convenience whether you will be able to attend. If you have any questions I suggest that you call either Mr. Robert P. Myers, Jr. or Ms. Marilyn Williams of my staff (202-632-7796 or 3311).

We hope to see you in March.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fearey

Robert A. Fearey
Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Coordinator
for Combatting Terrorism

S/CCT - Room 2238
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Enclosure: As stated

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 25, 1976

Welcome to our Conference on International Terrorism.

Enclosed in this packet you will find your plastic name badge, which will serve as your pass to the building and to the eighth floor luncheon area; it should be worn at all conference sessions.

Also enclosed are papers prepared by the principal speakers which we received in time for reproduction. The remaining papers will be mailed to you after the conference. The packet further includes a paper on "International and Transnational Terrorism" prepared by David Milbank for this conference, and a copy of a speech on "International Terrorism" which I gave at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on February 19.

If messages are received for you during the conference sessions, they will be posted at the registration desk. There are telephones in the registration area where you may make outgoing calls.

If you need information during the conference please go to the registration desk. Should you require special assistance of any kind, Robert Myers or Marilyn Williams of my staff, or Carolyn Duignan of INR/XR, can be contacted through the registration desk.

Welcome again. The conference should be a fruitful and informative experience for us all.

Robert A. Fearey

Robert A. Fearey
Chairman

AGENDA

March 25, 1976

0900 Welcome (Main Conference Room - 1315)

Mr. Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to
the Secretary and Coordinator for Combating
Terrorism, Department of State (S/CCT)

0905 Introductory Remarks

Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Under
Secretary for Management, Department
of State

0915-1205 Session I: Analytical Overview

This session will focus on analytically useful
definitions and typologies as well as on the
human and environmental determinants of inter-
national terrorist activity.

Chairman: Dr. Thomas P. Thornton
Member, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

Speakers

Dr. Thomas P. Thornton
Policy Planning Staff

Dr. Paul Wilkinson
University College, Wales

Dr. Ted Gurr
Northwestern University

Discussants

Dr. Martha Hutchinson
Wesleyan University

Mr. Eugene H. Methvin
Readers Digest

Dr. Irving L. Horowitz
Rutgers University

1205-1400 Luncheon - Benjamin Franklin Room - 8th Floor
Department of State

1400-1700

Session II: The Phenomenon in Perspective
(Main Conference Room - 1315)

This session will cover: (1) trends and patterns in the nature and intensity of international terrorist activity (including transnational linkages); (2) a value free assessment of the impact of terrorism; and (3) an analysis of the problems involved in formulating and implementing effective national and international counter-measures.

Chairman: Dr. Brian Crozier
Institute for the Study of Conflict
London

Speakers

Dr. Brian Crozier
Institute for the Study
of Conflict, London

Dr. Hans Josef Horchem
Office for the Protec-
tion of the Constitu-
tion, Cologne

Dr. Gaston Bouthoul
Institut Francais de
Polemologie, Paris

Discussants

Dr. Paul Jureidini
Abbott Associates

General Yehoshafat Harkabi
Center for Advanced
Studies in Behavioral
Sciences
Stanford University

Dr. Bert B. Lockwood
World Peace Through
Law Center

1730-1900

Terrorism in Europe (Main Conference Room)

Panelists: Dr. Crozier, Dr. Horchem

2000-2130

Terrorism in the Middle East (Main Conference Room)

Panelists: Dr. Jureidini, General Harkabi

2000-2130

Terrorism in Latin America (Room 1107)

Panelists: Dr. Moss, Dr. Jenkins

0900-1150

Session III: The Decade Ahead (Main Conference Room)

The first part of this session will be devoted to gauging the effects that likely changes in the over-all political, social, economic and technological environment may have on the nature and intensity of international terrorist activity. The remainder of the discussion will deal with the specific problems posed by weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of surrogate warfare.

Chairman: Dr. Brian Jenkins
RAND Corporation

Speakers

Dr. Brian Jenkins
RAND Corporation

Dr. Robert Moss
The Economist

Dr. Joseph F. Coates
Office of Technology
Assessment
US Congress

Discussants

Dr. Boyer Bell
Columbia University

Dr. Andrew J. Pierre
Council on Foreign
Relations

Dr. Robert H. Kupperman
Department of State
ACDA

1150-1250

Lunch

1250-1350

Seminar - International Terrorism's Challenge
to the International System
(Main Conference Room)

Moderator: Prof. Richard Lillich
University of Virginia Law School

Panelists: Prof. Burns H. Weston
University of Iowa Law School

Prof. A.A. Fetouros
University of Indiana Law School

1400-1650

Session IV: Implications of Terrorism for the
Policy Maker (Main Conference Room)

Chairman and Moderator: Mr. Robert A. Fearey

Report by Conference Rapporteur

Dr. Chalmers Johnson
University of California

A panel discussion in which conclusions emerging from the preceding sessions and the rapporteur's report will be examined and their implications for the US and other nations' anti-terrorism policies will be debated. A question and answer period will terminate the session.

1650

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Robert A. Fearey

1700-1830

Farewell Reception - The Foreign Service Club - 2101
E Street N.W. (Cash bar).

New York Times 27 March 1976

U.S. Is Said to Plan a New Approach on Terrorism

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 26—

The Ford Administration is planning a thorough revision of its program for dealing with international terrorism, including consideration of more flexibility on ransom demands, Government officials have reported.

The Administration has been committed up to now to rigid refusal to accede to any demands for money or other concessions by terrorists holding hostages.

The new approaches to terrorist problems emerged at the close of a confidential two-day conference on international terrorism sponsored by the State Department, which drew almost 200 specialists from four countries.

Expanded Office Considered

State Department officials said proposals were under study for expanding its office for combating terrorism to include emergency teams of psychiatrists and police specialists familiar with that is termed "coercive bargaining" in situations involving terrorists.

"There is going to be a big change," an official said. "But we haven't decided yet whether to do it over a period of four or five months or over a period of a year."

At present the office, under Robert A. Fearey, who is special assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger as coordinator for combating terrorism, functions mainly as a headquarters for information gathering and policy direction, drawing on the resources of other Government agencies.

The officials said they believed Mr. Fearey would be replaced later this year by a former Central Intelligence

Agency officer who has had considerable field and operational experience.

The critical issue on terrorism confronting the Administration, they said, was how to modify the policy of simply refusing to bargain with terrorists.

Tanzanian Case Cited

They noted that last summer, W. Beverly Carter Jr., Ambassador to Tanzania, became involved in bargaining with terrorists who had kidnapped a group of Stanford University researchers.

The officials said that Ambassador Carter's negotiations, in defiance of the standing order, appeared to have been going quite successfully until a relative of one of the hostages offered to pay ransom.

Although Mr. Carter was later reprimanded by Mr. Kissinger, his action provoked fresh thinking about bargaining, the officials said.

The bargaining question came up again and again at the conference, at which Mr. Fearey presided.

I think the American con-

cept is totally inapplicable," said Martha Hutchinson, assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University. "I think we need to study the possibility of bargaining with terrorists."

Another participant, Seymour D. Vestermark, consultant to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, remarked that the New York Police Department had trained officers who are now experienced in coercive bargaining and had had successes in dealing with terrorists.

Data Bank Developed

The conference themes included attempts to define terrorism, a review of terrorist actions over the last 15 years, policy planning, international law and regional reports from the Middle East, Europe and Latin America.

A C.I.A. official disclosed that his agency completed development of a pilot data bank last summer for rapid retrieval of information on terrorist actions.

Statistical studies prepared for the conference showed that of 951 terrorist incidents from 1965 to 1975, 333, or more than a third, took place in Western Europe. Latin America had 260 and North America 126. There were 122 terrorist incidents recorded in the Middle East and North Africa during this period.

Reporters were barred from the conference on the ground that the participants "could talk more frankly then," a State Department official said after ejecting a reporter. However, two journalists remained as participants. They were Robert Moss, an editor of The Economist of London, and Eugene H. Methvin, a Reader's Digest editor.

- Draft Working Paper -

INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

by

David L. Milbank

NOTE: This draft working paper was prepared by the International Functional Staff of the Office of Political Research of the Central Intelligence Agency as a contribution to the Department of State's 25-26 March 1976 Conference on International Terrorism. The views presented represent only those of the author, and the draft is not for publication, quotation, or citation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	
THE DISCUSSION	1
I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY	1
II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK	3
III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT	6
What, Where, and When?	6
Why?	9
How Cost Effective?	18
How Disruptive?	19
What International Constraints?	21
IV. THE OUTLOOK	23
Transnational Terrorism	23
International Terrorism	28
APPENDIX A: Significant Variables	
APPENDIX B: Statistical Trends and Patterns in Terrorist Activity	

FOREWORD

The author owes a special debt of gratitude to Edward F. Mickolus who, while serving with Office of Political Research as a summer intern, designed and inaugurated the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) data bank that was used to develop the statistics presented in this study. Nonetheless, several words of caution about these figures and statistical inferences are in order. In the first place, there are many significant gaps in our knowledge about specific incidents and groups -- and even those terrorist organizations and actions on which there is considerable reliable information do not always fit neatly into the typologies that have been created for them. Moreover, the universe of incidents under review is small enough that unintended omissions (of which there are undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification of borderline events could have a statistically significant impact. Finally, not only are the group actors in question most diverse, but the environmental variables that might have affected their behavior at any given time are legion.

Even in its pilot version, however, ITERATE represents a potentially valuable research tool. And while the Office of Political Research lacks the resources to sustain it beyond the end of the fiscal year, it is exploring the feasibility of transferring ITERATE to a new institutional sponsor with a view to insuring its continued refinement and maintenance for the benefit of the government community and to making as much of the data as possible accessible to interested scholars and businessmen as well.

INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

THE DISCUSSION

I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY

Despite historical precedents and parallels, modern-day terrorism is very much a function of our times. Advances in technology and growing world "interdependence" have afforded terrorists new mobility, new targets, new weaponry, and the near certain prospect that their more dramatic acts will receive prompt and world-wide publicity. At the same time, changes in the overall political and economic climate over the past decade have provided terrorists with a somewhat more hospitable environment in which to operate.

Indeed, there has been such an upsurge of terrorist activity in recent years that some observers have warned that we may be entering a veritable age of terrorism. Among other things, there has been a marked increase in the number of active terrorist groups as well as in the number of countries in which they are operating. Internal and international cooperation among terrorist groups has also risen notably. There has been a trend toward bolder and more dramatic actions, with an accompanying escalation of casualties, damage, and demands. And most importantly, perhaps, there has been a quantum jump in terrorist incidents affecting the interests of more than one state.

Not surprisingly, these developments have generated unprecedented interest in terrorism as a subject for serious research and analysis. In sharp contrast with the situation which prevailed only a decade or so ago, existing literature -- both open and classified -- now offers a wide range of useful insights into the root causes, logic, and characteristic attributes of political terrorism as well as a substantial number of detailed case studies.

The trouble is that the picture which emerges is still confused and incomplete. For one thing, there is as yet no generally accepted definition of terrorism per se, much less of its international or transnational variants. For another, much of the work that has been done on terrorism suffers from the limiting effects of narrowly focused tactical concerns or of particularistic institutional and personal biases. And, largely because of these differing perspectives and priorities, little progress has been made toward development of a comprehensive and readily accessible data base. In short, we are still hard put to explain the current state of affairs or to venture firm predictions about the future.

Of necessity, therefore, this study is an exercise in both synthesis and innovation. It is confined to an examination of international and transnational terrorism as defined in Section II below (with primary emphasis on transnational terrorism as, in the short term at least, potentially the more injurious to US interests). Its principal underlying assumptions are three. The first is that the basic societal problems and tensions that can give rise to political violence -- and thus to terrorism -- are likely to prove particularly intractable in this era of rapid change, growing nationalism and ethnicity, and world-wide economic strains. Such irritants may, in fact, be treated as "givens" in the global environment for many years to come. The reader is forewarned that because of this, and because these factors have already received considerable scholarly attention, they will not be subjected to extensive analysis here.*

* These factors include weak and inefficient government, societal rivalries and inequities, social and economic dislocations stemming from the process of modernization, and high levels of frustration born of social immobility or feelings of relative deprivation. (The term relative deprivation is defined by its originator, Professor Ted Robert Gurr, as a "perceived discrepancy between the goods and conditions of life which members of a group believe are their due, and the goods and conditions which they think they can in fact get and keep.")

Corollary to the above, it is assumed that the potential for domestic, international, and transnational terrorism will remain high in the decade ahead and that the scope of the problem will therefore depend primarily on factors affecting the opportunities, alternatives, and behavioral constraints faced by the group actors involved.

Finally, it is postulated that it is not reality but man's subjective perception thereof that is the most important determinant of his political behavior. Hence, without neglecting the many factors that have affected -- or that may affect -- the objective capabilities and options of terrorist groups, this paper repeatedly draws attention to those variables (e.g., cultural heritage, credo, and changes in the overall political environment) that can shape or alter the prisms through which the terrorists concerned view the world around them.

Broadly stated, the objectives of the study are to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and consequences of international and transnational terrorism since 1965, to identify those factors likely to promote or inhibit such activity in the years ahead, and to assess the implications of these findings with respect to future trends and developments. Such goals preclude any effort to gauge the extent of the threat posed to US interests and world order by any particular terrorist group or consortium. Given the host of variables that would have to be considered, that task must remain the province of traditional and painstaking case-by-case analysis. It is hoped, however, that the substantive generalizations and methodological techniques that are set forth below will provide a valuable frame of reference for more definitive treatments of specific aspects of the terrorism problem.

II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As may be inferred from these introductory observations, the need to devise a sound multi-disciplinary approach was one of the most challenging problems faced in connection with this research project. As a first step, international and transnational

terrorism were defined, for the purposes of this study, as follows:

- Common Characteristics: The threat or use of fear-inducing extranormal violence for political purposes when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims and when -- through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution -- its ramifications transcend national boundaries.
- International Terrorism: Such action when carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state.
- Transnational Terrorism: Such actions when carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states.*

Next, in view of the fuzzy boundaries that separate terrorism from other forms of violence as well as of the myriad of factors which bear on terrorist activity, it was necessary to construct a relatively detailed framework for screening and ordering the available information. Briefly, a number of working hypotheses

* Given the element of governmental patronage that is common to both, the boundary line between transnational and international terrorism is often difficult to draw. To the degree that it can be determined, the key distinction lies in who is calling the shots with respect to a given action or campaign. Hence, groups can and do drift back and forth across the line. For example, even a one-time "contract job" undertaken on behalf of a governmental actor by a group that normally acts according to its own lights qualifies as international terrorism.

derived from a survey of the existing literature on both terrorism and political violence per se were used to generate a list of (1) key group and environmental variables that appear to have, affected the scope, nature, and intensity of international and transnational terrorism in recent years, and (2) analytically useful event characteristics.*

The resultant tabulation is presented in somewhat abbreviated form at Appendix A. It will be noted that, in addition to fulfilling their primary (and distinctly traditional) disciplinary function, most of the variables listed therein are amenable to machine processing and manipulation. And while, as suggested in the Foreword, few of the statistical inferences that are highlighted below warrant a high degree of confidence, they can -- and did -- serve to weaken or reinforce some of the author's preliminary assumptions and hypotheses and to suggest other trends and patterns that could be significant.

* Particularly useful general analyses of political terrorism are to be found in Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation" in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, Harry Eckstein, ed. (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1964); Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, Research Paper N. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975); Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas (London: Temple Smith, 1972); Brian Crozier, ed., Annual of Power and Conflict, 1972-73 and 1973-74 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict); Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1974); Martha C. Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume XVI, Number 3, September 1972, pp. 383-396; and Philip A. Karber, "Urban Terrorism: Baseline Data and a Conceptual Framework," Social Science Quarterly, Volume 52, December 1971, pp. 521-533. The last-named author stresses the symbolic qualities of political terrorism and suggests that it can be analyzed in much the same fashion as other mediums of communication.

III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT

What, Where, and When?


As previously indicated, international and transnational terrorism were not yet matters of much official or academic concern in 1965. In contrast to other forms of political violence, there simply had not been very much of either since the close of World War II -- at least not of the sort that made headlines. Moreover, much of what there was had been associated with -- and overshadowed by the more important consequences of -- clear-cut adversary relationships stemming from either the Cold War or the anti-colonial struggle. For the most part, noncombatant third parties had been left unmolested.

It is true, of course, that two brief flurries of skyjacking had already drawn attention to a potential new problem area. But, for the most part, neither had involved more than a few actions that would be classified as terrorism under the definition employed here. The first, in the early 50's, had been comprised almost entirely of Eastern European aircraft commandeered for the sole purpose of escape to the West. And while the second, which extended from the late 50's to the early 60's, had been climaxed by the first postwar hijackings of American airliners (thereby prompting the US to press for a comprehensive international convention covering crimes committed on civilian aircraft engaged in international aviation), it too had been attributable primarily to individuals seeking personal advantage -- e.g., expedient transport to or from Cuba or outright extortion -- rather than political leverage or impact.

In any event, skyjackings tapered off again in 1963. The overall level of international and transnational terrorist activity remained relatively low through 1966, then turned upward against the backdrop of intensified Palestinian guerrilla activity that preceded the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Admittedly, the record up to that point is sketchy. For one thing, the mass media still lacked either the incentive or the technical means for systematic and comprehensive coverage of terrorist incidents -- and many

undoubtedly went unreported. But even if Figure 1 below substantially understates the number of international and transnational terrorist incidents that occurred in the 1965-1967 period, the international impact of this activity was negligible. Indeed, when the qualitative dimension is added in, 1968 emerges as

Figure 1



a watershed year. At that juncture, a combination of Palestinian initiatives and the cumulative impact of the broader environmental trends discussed below seems to have finally sensitized dissident groups throughout the world to their latent and growing potential for effective transnational terrorist activity.

From 1 January 1968 through 31 December 1975, there were at least 913 recorded international and transnational terrorist incidents.* Of these, 123 were kidnappings; 31 were barricade and hostage episodes; 375 entailed the use of explosive devices of one type or another; 95 were armed assaults or ambushes; 137 involved the hijacking of an aircraft or other means of transportation; 59 fell under the category of incendiary attack or arson; 48 constituted assassination or murder; and 45 were characterized by other forms of violence. All told, more than 140 terrorist organizations -- including a number of fictional entities created to shield the identity of the true perpetrators of some particularly shocking or politically sensitive acts -- from nearly 50 different countries or disputed territories (e.g., Palestine) have thus far been linked to this activity, and there may have been more.**

* This figure excludes terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and installations in Indo-China. It also excludes most of the mutual assassination efforts and cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only exceptions in this regard are incidents that either victimized noncombatant nationals of states outside the principal arena of conflict or were of such a nature that they became the object of international controversy.

** There are relatively few political groupings in the world that are totally dedicated to terrorist violence. As used here, the term terrorist organization simply denotes a group that has employed terrorist tactics.


When these global statistics are broken down by geographic area and type of event (see Figure 2 and Appendix B) the picture which emerges reveals a number of general trends as well as some marked regional and time-related variations in the frequency and nature of transnational terrorist incidents. The former is illustrated by the general popularity of American targets. The latter category includes the distinctive behavioral patterns exhibited by Latin American terrorists, on the one hand, and by extremist formations from the Middle East, Europe, and Japan on the other; the relative quiescence of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviet/East European region, and large parts of Asia; the dramatic decline in the popularity of sky-jacking since 1970; and the partially offsetting rise in equally unsettling barricade and hostage episodes.

Why?

Together with the trends towards bolder actions and greater cooperation among terrorist groups that were cited as particularly

Figure 2

Geographic Distribution of International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents, 1965-75



588581 2-78

significant at the outset of this study, the commonalities, differences, or changes in patterns of behavior that have been described thus far are, of course, attributable to the interplay of a host of variables. Only a few of these, i.e., the ones that seem to have had the greatest direct bearing on the timing, scope, and nature of the internationalization of terror, are addressed at any length below. No attempt is made to develop some sort of model or overarching theory with respect to this phenomenon. Far more modest, the objective here is simply to ascertain to what extent the current rash of transnational (and, to a lesser degree, international) terrorist activity is attributable to broad regional and global trends and developments as opposed to unique and possibly transitory local problems and circumstances.

While some of them may seem to be self-evident, a few general observations are needed here to set the problem in perspective and to lay the groundwork for further analysis. These may be summarized as follows:

- Transnational terrorism, is by nature more congenial to urban than to rural-based groups and is thus characteristically spawned by societies at a mid to advanced stage of socio-economic development. International terrorism, on the other hand, being equally a function of a lack of national resources and of calculations as to the relative efficacy of alternative methods of bringing latent national power of whatever potential to bear in a given situation, is not the special province of any particular category of state.
- Modern-day practitioners of transnational terrorism have benefitted from a generally permissive international environment -- a point which will be expanded upon below. For the most part,

therefore, the constraints on their behavior have either been a function of local environmental factors affecting their objective capabilities, opportunities, and alternatives or have been self-imposed for tactical or philosophical reasons.

- These latter restraints are, of course, uncertain, for personal predilections can be overshadowed by frustration or desperation. Moreover, the inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist violence are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate over time. Nevertheless, both cultural heritage and credo have clearly been key factors affecting individual terrorist groups' perceptions of the limits beyond which the level or intensity of violence is likely to become counterproductive.

- Since the efficacy and extent of repressive internal security controls is probably the single most important local environmental variable affecting the frequency, form and domestic impact of transnational terrorist incidents in any given country, the proliferation of this form of political violence has both contributed to and fed upon the recent trend toward more widespread experimentation with various forms of authoritarian rule. On one hand, open societies and weak or permissive authoritarian regimes are particularly vulnerable to such activity -- and to its domestic ramifications. On the other, rigid and effective authoritarian rule can foster transnational terrorism by forcing dissidents to operate abroad.

Like the earlier references to the basic societal problems that can give rise to various forms of political violence, the foregoing observations focus on the human and local environmental factors affecting the extent, nature, and domestic impact of transnational or international terrorist activity in different parts of the world. The question remains, however, as to just why we witnessed such a marked and enduring upsurge in transnational terrorism over the past eight years. In part, of course, this phenomenon is attributable to a war-punctuated regional conflict affecting the interests of a large number of nations and attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But it would not have grown to its present dimensions were it not for the concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number of changes in the global environment that had begun to take shape much earlier.

These trends are difficult to disaggregate. Moreover, the summary nature of this presentation precludes much in the way of elaboration. Nevertheless, the following broad environmental factors merit individual comment:

- Growing Interdependence: Broadly construed, the concept of interdependence embraces both the dimensions and the consequences of the thickening web of political, economic, and technological dependencies and obligations which, among other things, has steadily eroded the autonomy (i.e., freedom of maneuver) of decision-making bodies of all types throughout most of the postwar period. It is invoked here because the growth in both numbers and importance of international, transnational, and (as a consequence of localized modernization efforts) subnational linkages over the past decade -- together with a markedly greater awareness thereof -- has had at least a two-fold impact on the world-wide potential for terrorism. On the one hand,

it has created a host of new, vulnerable, and potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist attack (e.g., commercial and communications centers, transportation hubs, international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo aircraft). On the other, it has generated a sort of identity crisis which has been reflected in a troublesome countervailing upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity.

- For their part, the many other strains and dislocations associated with the process of modernizing change have swelled the ranks of the alienated in many parts of the world. They have also added millions of emigre workers to the international pool of political exiles and refugees on which terrorists can draw for manpower and other forms of support.

- The impact of new technology on terrorist capabilities with respect to weapons, mobility and tactical communications has already been cited. But whatever the nature of a terrorist act or the means of its execution, it must be remembered that the role of the media is critical to the spreading and intensification of its psychological impact. Hence, among all the technological advances in recent years, the development of satellite communications, and in particular, their upgrading in 1968 to include a television capability have unquestionably been among the most important in making transnational activity seem attractive to terrorist groups.

- The upsurge in transnational terrorism has also been aided, and abetted by a "revolutionary"

turn in the overall political environment somewhat reminiscent of that experienced about 200 years ago. The postwar order is under challenge from all sides: from the developing nations of the Third World; from "maverick" Communist regimes; from dissatisfied second rank powers; and from a broad array of social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility, by a new sense of "social conscience." Terrorists have benefitted from this state of affairs in many ways. Among other things, it has:

- Accorded an aura of legitimacy to the acts of any terrorist group claiming leftist revolutionary or national liberation movement status;
 - Frustrated efforts to develop more effective international countermeasures;
 - Facilitated transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups;
 - Fostered a significant increase in the number national, transnational, and international organizations providing national liberation movements and other "progressive" dissident formations with various forms of direct and indirect support.
- The attitudes and behavior of supportive states -- ranging from those willing to provide little more than kind words and occasional safehaven

to those that regularly furnish practicing or potential terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other operational support -- have, of course, constituted another key global environmental factor affecting the scope and nature of transnational terrorist activity during the period under review. Variable might be the better term, however, for the extent of such assistance has tended to fluctuate with changing appreciations of broader interests on the part of the state actors involved. 1975, for example, witnessed a distinct downward trend in such support.

-- In any event, if one excludes the simply indulgent or indifferent (including those liberal Western European states like France and Switzerland that, because of their strategic location and the extensive protection they accord to democratic rights and freedoms, have become involuntary hosts to all manner of foreign dissident groups) the list of nations in question dwindles to less than a score. Counting a few states that have recently retired -- or partially retired -- from the business, these "activists" include (but are not limited to) Libya, Cuba, the USSR, China, North Korea, Algeria, Southern Yemen, Tanzania, Congo, Zaire, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Chile, and,

however reluctant it has been to engage in such activity, Lebanon.

- In some of these states, most of the support rendered to foreign revolutionary or guerrilla formations has been directed toward influencing the course of developments in one or two neighboring countries or territories. And for many, perhaps a majority, the actual promotion of terrorist violence has been no more than a largely unintended byproduct of their activities. Nevertheless, in one way or another, most of these countries have directly contributed to the recent rise and spread of transnational terrorism.

- The overall economic environment can impact on the problem of terrorism in a number of subtle and, in some cases, countervailing ways. For example, extra-cyclical world-wide economic strains -- such as those generated by the sudden quadrupling of oil prices -- can so overtax the capabilities of local regimes as to invite domestic violence of a sort that could easily spill over national boundaries.

- The social and political effects of cyclical fluctuations in the overall economic climate tend to be delayed and uneven. Nevertheless, medium to long-range trends

can affect both the propensities and opportunities for transnational terrorist activity in any given area. A prolonged and general economic upturn, for example, can increase local potentials for political violence by causing popular expectations to far outpace governmental capacities to deliver. And in more affluent societies, at least, the attendant emphasis on materialistic values can alienate significant segments of the student and intellectual communities.

-- Conversely, a prolonged economic decline (something which a number of observers predict the world will experience for the next twenty years or more) has generally tended to dampen revolutionary ardor. Popular expectations decline, and people everywhere are preoccupied with the exigencies of day-to-day existence. But the world has much changed since its last broad economic slide. Whether the numbing effects of generalized adversity will be felt as strongly in the future is thus open to question. Their potential impact on the level of transnational terrorist activity is even more uncertain. The actors engaged therein are scarcely representative of the general population. They are few in number and elitist by nature.

And given the proven strength of their convictions, they are likely to be among the most resistant to the psychological effects of untoward changes in the overall economic environment.

How Cost Effective?

The answer to this question depends on the vantage point of the observer. The achievement of disproportionately large effects from the employment of minimal resources is, of course, what political terrorism is all about. Its most serious drawback is that its consequences are, to a certain degree, unpredictable. It can alienate those groups whose sympathy is sought. Rather than disorient the masses, it can rally them to a previously unpopular government. It can galvanize a weak or wavering regime into forceful counteraction. In short, tactical successes can, as in Uruguay and Jordan, lead to strategic reverses of major proportions.

This risk is, however, easily accepted by those who dispose of no effective alternative methods for achieving their goals. Moreover, despite a number of disastrous episodes, the overall balance sheet so far provides current and would-be practitioners of transnational terrorism with grounds for considerable optimism. Briefly put, the record shows that transnational terrorists have generally been rather successful in avoiding capture (or, if caught, in escaping punishment) and in meeting at least some of their proximate objectives. In the latter regard, their chances of garnering extensive publicity when that is desired are, as previously indicated, near certain.*

* Insofar as they relate to kidnapping and barricade operations, these points are strongly made in the unpublished RAND Corporation study that is cited and excerpted on page 240 of (footnote continued on following page)

How Disruptive?

The human and material toll exacted by transnational and international terrorism over the past eight years has been relatively low. But the disruptive impact of this activity has been magnified by the publicity it has received and by its interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces. Thus, while the terrorists have made no revolutions and, by themselves at least, toppled no governments, they have:

- Embarrassed several governments and contributed to the downfall of a few;
- Added an abrasive new dimension to both North-South and East-West relations;
- Contributed in no small way to the growing international status and fortunes of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO);*

(footnote continued from previous page)

Terroristic Activity - International Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session; Part 4; May 14, 1975 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975).

* The PLO is a political umbrella organization embracing several Fedayeen commando groups. It was accorded recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (at the expense of Jordan) by the 1974 Islamic non-aligned and Rabat summit meetings. In November of that same year, it was granted observer status by the UNGA. All told, some 50 states have allowed the PLO to open offices in their capitals. In addition, five UN-affiliated international agencies (ILO, WHO, UPU, ITU, and UNESCO) have granted it observer status.

- Compelled some nations to temporarily abandon their law enforcement function out of fear of future retribution;
- Aggravated and accentuated the dilemmas generated within the existing international system by the emergence of a growing company of powerful non-state actors;
- Introduced strains in relations among those members of Western alliances or non-military groupings who, because of divergent national interests, feel constrained to adopt differing positions with respect to specific incidents or broader terrorist-related issues;
- Reinforced the currently pervasive sense of global flux and disorder;
- Caused a large number of nations, including the US, to divert substantial resources to defense against terrorist attacks;
- Adversely affected the quality of life in many open or formerly open societies.

In short, while scarcely cataclysmic, the cumulative impact of modern-day transnational and international terrorism has been more disruptive than most of us would like to admit. Harking back to earlier discussion, this state of affairs is both a measure and, in large part, a consequence of increasing global interdependence. As the dimensions and complexity of the web of interstate and transnational linkages that together comprise the functional core of the international system have grown under the impact of technological advance, the reverberations of events -- including terrorist attacks -- which disturb or threaten its more important intersections have tended to become increasingly widespread and sharply felt. At the same time, the limits within which individual states can attempt to cope which such problems

through unilateral action without risk of adversely affecting the interests of others have steadily narrowed. But, as previously observed, rather than encourage increasing interest in supranational solutions, the frustrations born of this de facto shrinkage of sovereignty have generated an unhelpful backlash of nationalism. And this, of course, has been one of the key factors that have affected the nature and effectiveness of the international community's response to the terrorist threat.

What International Constraints?

With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements providing, inter alia, for a greater exchange of intelligence and technical assistance or, as in the memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels that was signed by the US and Cuba in 1973, for the prompt extradition of specified categories of terrorists, the international response to terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective.

For its part, the United Nations General Assembly has compiled a singularly unimpressive record. In 1970, for example, it clouded and weakened the prohibition (in any case largely exhortative) against state participation in -- or support of -- terrorist activity that was included in its sweeping Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States by attaching overriding importance in the same document to the obligation of states to assist peoples struggling for the realization of their "right to self-determination and freedom and independence." Three years later, a 35-member ad hoc UNGA committee convened for the sole purpose of hammering out a common position on political terrorism was unable even to agree on a definition of the phenomenon, much less on its root causes or appropriate countermeasures. And while the UNGA did manage to give birth to a convention covering the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomats in December 1973, only nine countries have ratified this agreement to date, and it has yet to come into force.

This last was the most recent of the five international conventions adopted over the past twelve years that have dealt

with one or another aspect (in all cases rather narrow) of the terrorism problem.* These agreements do reflect international concern and at least a slim and fleeting majority consensus that something should be done. But they presently do not, singly or in combination, constitute much of an effective constraint on terrorist activity. In the first place, many states -- including a high percentage of those that have been particularly active in supporting revolutionary or national liberation groups -- are not yet parties thereto. Secondly, the conventions lack teeth in that all make extradition or prosecution of terrorists subject to discretionary escape clauses and none make provision for the application punitive sanctions against states that simply refuse to comply at all. Finally, their exclusive focus on the safety of aircraft and diplomats leaves a good deal of terrorist activity outside the cognizance of international law.

But this, it would seem, is all the traffic will bear. The US has tried repeatedly to correct some of these deficiencies and has run into a stone wall of opposition on each occasion.

The obstacles which have blocked more effective international action are, in fact, formidable. They have, as previously indicated, included the controversy over justifiable versus illegal political violence and a broad resistance to such further infringements of national sovereignty as would be implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political asylum. On a less lofty plane, they have also included a reluctance on the part of many nations otherwise ill-disposed toward terrorist activity to commit themselves

* The other four are the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1973 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, and the 1971 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance.

to any course of action that might either invite direct terrorist retribution or provoke the application of sanctions by states -- particularly by oil-producing states -- that happen to be sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.

IV. THE OUTLOOK

Transnational Terrorism

On balance, the outlook with respect to transnational terrorism is not particularly encouraging. On the positive side, the decline in the number of states willing to provide terrorists safehaven gives promise of being lasting. It seems most doubtful that the currently shrinking aggregations of emigre workers will soon -- if ever -- regain their former size, and this will probably have some small impact on the security and resources of terrorist groups operating in Western Europe. More importantly, political developments of a sort which presently seem to be at least possible could significantly reduce levels of terrorist activity in such current trouble spots as Northern Ireland, Argentina, and the Middle East.

But overall, the potential for domestic, international, and transnational terrorism is -- as asserted at the outset of this study -- almost certain to remain high. Furthermore, most of the broad environmental factors that have contributed to the feasibility, efficacy, and popularity of transnational terrorism in recent years will continue to operate with at least equal force in the decade ahead. The salience of some, in fact, seems bound to increase.

- Barring some cataclysmic event that reduces mankind to a more primitive order of existence, technological advance, modernizing social and economic change, and growing global interdependence are, for example, essentially irreversible phenomena with an urgency and momentum that seem more likely to increase than to decline in the coming decade. While their political consequences can, to a certain degree, be controlled

by carefully tailored policy decisions (and while technological advance is obviously a two-edged sword) these processes thus bode well to continue to aggravate the terrorism problem by generating further increases in (1) divisive ethnicity and nationalism, (2) urban unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities, and (4) societal vulnerabilities.

- In the political field, the widespread erosion of authority that has both invited and facilitated terrorist activity in recent years shows no signs of abatement. For its part, the postwar international order seems likely to remain under challenge -- and thus in flux -- throughout the decade ahead. The phenomenon will, however, continue to be most evident at the national level where the increasing difficulties of governance hold forth the prospect of a further proliferation of ineffective and unstable regimes.
- The chances appear strong that (1) national liberation and leftist revolutionary formations will continue to receive both moral and material support from a wide variety of transnational and international organizations and (2) the trend toward greater transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups will gain further momentum.
- Ominously enough, therefore, the wave of the future seems to be toward the development of a complex support base for transnational terrorist activity that is largely independent of -- and quite resistant to control by -- the state-centered international system.

The last trend does not, however, provide grounds for concluding that the behavior of supportive state actors will become

increasingly irrelevant. On the contrary, it suggests that unless the principal patrons of subversion and revolutionary violence cut back on the assistance they are furnishing to practicing or potential terrorists more drastically than any currently available evidence gives reason to expect, the deleterious impact of their behavior may be considerably greater than in the past. The hard fact is that it is difficult to translate such aid into leverage or control when there are other readily available sources of support. Indeed, any assistance provided to an extremist group under these circumstances risks simply increasing the recipient's potential for autonomous action.

For its part, the problem of extensive and sometimes sympathetic publicity seems likely to persist in most parts of the world. Moreover, there is a second aspect of the information explosion that promises to continue to be troublesome: the diffusion of terrorist-adaptable technological know-how and -- to a lesser degree -- of possibly inspirational speculation about new and potentially ultra-disruptive terrorist tactics. Although the objectives of such literature may be -- and most often are -- above reproach, it can all too easily aggravate the problems posed by the development and wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases, man-portable) weaponry; the world-wide proliferation of nuclear installations; and the race, motivated by both political and economic considerations, to sell nuclear technology and modern armaments to developing countries. And these problems are serious enough as it is. Indeed, despite the attention that has been paid to nuclear safeguards and the physical security of sensitive installations and depots, the world seems to be moving toward a state of affairs in which the limits of any "technological escalation" of terrorist violence could depend more on the self-imposed restraints affecting the behavior of the groups involved than on lack of capability or opportunity.

It is, of course, the upper limits of the potential scale of terrorist violence that are of most concern to us. Individual terrorist groups already have the capability of manufacturing

or otherwise acquiring a wide variety of weapons or agents of mass destruction. More will be in a position to exercise this option in the future. Just how likely is it that they will do so?

That the threatened employment of such awesome ordnance would have profound political and psychological effects is undeniable. But it must be emphasized that there are major hazards that would be involved for the terrorists as well -- not the least of which is the high risk of a disastrous public backlash, particularly in the event that the group involved were to end up in a position where it felt compelled to make good its threat. After all, terrorists are generally in business to influence people, not exterminate them. Moreover, those that aspire to some sort of political legitimacy -- and this means most of them -- are generally quite sensitive to the need to take care to avoid alienating local and international opinion.

The fact remains, however, that weapons of mass destruction cannot help but hold considerable temptation for militants whose basic strategy of violence centers on wringing maximum political leverage from publicity and fear. Hence it seems prudent to assume that sooner or later some group is almost bound to take the plunge.

Firm predictions as to how, when, or by whose hand this may come to pass are not possible. But an appraisal of the factors that would probably bear on such a decision suggests the following general observations:

- While the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists roaming at large can no longer be dismissed, the acquisition, storage, transport, and effective employment of nuclear devices still pose practical problems of no small magnitude. Furthermore, if worst comes to worst, the destructive effects of such weapons are not manageable. Hence, a more likely scenario -- at least in the short term -- would seem to

be a terrorist seizure of a nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant in a straightforward barricade operation. Such a group need not threaten a nuclear holocaust (although that possibility would be in the back of everyone's mind), just the destruction of the bunker or reactor with the attendant danger of radiological pollution.

- An even more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. In contrast to nuclear devices, many of these are presently relatively easy to acquire. Hence the danger that they could turn up in the hands of the sort of ultra-radical or psychopathic fringe group that would have the fewest compunctions about using them is very real. Moreover, since small -- sometimes minute -- quantities are usually all that are needed for potentially devastating effects, such agents also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to transport, and easy to introduce into the target area.

As once again demonstrated by the world-wide reaction to the recent assault on the OPEC ministerial meeting in Vienna, any dramatic escalation of terrorist violence is likely to touch off a new flurry of efforts to devise international countermeasures. The sort of contingencies suggested in the foregoing brief weapons of mass destruction scenarios would, of course, be virtually certain to do so. But since the net balance of forces operating within the international community promises to remain more disintegrative than integrative, it seems doubtful that such broadly based endeavors will prove much more effective than in the past. The picture is not altogether bleak, however, for the recent stiffening of a number of nations' policies toward terrorists holds promise of opening up new possibilities for bilateral and limited multilateral counter-terrorist undertakings of proven utility.

In sum, although it is unlikely to trigger a collapse of world order, transnational terrorism promises to pose a troublesome problem for the world community until such time -- possibly years hence -- that the international system gels into new and generally accepted contours. The frequency and intensity of violence will decline in some areas. The cast of characters will be constantly changing. In all likelihood, technological and organizational innovations in the security field will make terrorism a more risky affair. Yet at best the overall number of terrorist groups seems unlikely to decline -- and the number of countries in which they are active appears destined to grow. Furthermore, because of their symbolic value, their availability, and the embarrassment they can create, the popularity of American targets will probably remain high.

It seems likely that the constraints on terrorist behavior will, through international default, continue to depend primarily on (1) the terrorists' subjective orientation and (2) the policies and resources of the countries in which they operate. Of necessity, however, the impact of these will be uneven. Remember, too, that the inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist violence are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate over time. Moreover, all but the most isolated terrorists groups will dispose of a common and cumulative media-fed pool of experience and inspiration. Hence, even if the cited constraints do result in some tapering off in the frequency of transnational terrorist incidents during the next few years, we should expect to witness steadily greater and more widespread sophistication in targeting, execution, and weaponry. And while, as suggested earlier, most groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a fanatic few may ultimately resort to weapons of mass destruction is, in fact, very real.

International Terrorism

International terrorism seems unlikely to pose much of a threat to world order or US interests during the next few

years. Even in its presently weakened state, the international system subjects states to a host of legal obligations and practical constraints that they can ignore only at considerable risk. The continuing force of these considerations is evidenced by the fact that international terrorism is no more prevalent today than it was in 1968.

No change in this general state of affairs appears imminent. But the sporadic employment of government-controlled terrorist groups against Israeli targets both within and outside that country's borders raises some troublesome questions about what the 1980's may hold in store. And while their true sponsorship has yet to be firmly established, so do the recent operations in Madrid and Vienna through which hardlining elements associated with the Fedayeen's "rejectionist" wing sought to bring pressure on moderate Arab regimes.

These questions center on the kind of adjustments in international behavior that may flow from ongoing changes in the distribution and component elements of national power and, no less important, from the growing array of economic, political, and technological restraints affecting the ways in which latent power can be translated into effective leverage. Are Arab actions a precursor of things to come? Is it, in fact, likely that, lacking or despairing of more conventional means for defending or advancing their international interests, an increasing number of states will employ terrorist groups to wage "surrogate warfare" against other nations?*

The case for increasing resort to some form of surrogate warfare -- in itself scarcely a new phenomenon -- is, however, far stronger than for the corollary argument that this development is likely to be characterized by widespread adoption of

* A thought-provoking treatment of this question is provided in Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

terrorist tactics. For one thing, the safety of deniability would all but disappear if a state were to engage in such activity on a regular basis. For another, barring total collapse of world order and consequent international anarchy (something that no state actor has reason to promote), international terrorism is highly unlikely to gain acceptance as an admissible form of behavior.

All told, in fact, it seems likely that the employment of terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will continue to be more the exception than the rule for some time to come. And if this proves to be the case, it follows that while there may be a slight upward trend in the annual total of international terrorist incidents, the scope of the problem in 1985 should not be much more serious than it is today.

APPENDIX A

INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:

SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

Group Characteristics

- Name of the organization or, if none, of the political, military, or bureaucratic entity controlling the actors
- Country of origin
- Relationship to the government of that country
- Size and organization
- Leadership
- Composition (the occupational and educational qualifications of the members and their age range)
- Credo/Ethos

Elementary Typology*

Particularistic (ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional)

Nationalistic (irredentist or anti-colonial)

Ideological

Anarchism

* Major categories are not mutually exclusive

Radical Left (revolutionary socialists, Trotskyites, Maoists, Guevarists, Castroites, and other ultra-left fringe groups)

Orthodox Communism

Extreme Right

Other

Pathological

- Domestic base (extent of popular sympathy and support, links with legitimate social or political organizations, and links with other domestic dissident groups)
- Foreign links (with other terrorist organizations, with international or legitimate transnational organizations, and with foreign governments)
- Life cycle (date of formation, period or periods of transnational or international activity, and, if applicable, date of demise)

Event Characteristics

- Location of incident
- Nature of act

Elementary Typology

Kidnapping

Barricade and hostage

Bombing (any type of explosive charge or device, including letter and parcel bombs)

Armed assault or ambush (with or without
sophistical weapons)

Hijacking (aircraft, ship, or other)

Incendiary attack or arson

Assassination or murder

Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological
pollution

Other

- Number, status, and nationalities of human victims
- Nature and national association of physical target
- Number, nationality, and organizational affiliation of the perpetrators
- Nature of demands (publicity, prisoner release, ransom, political action or change, arms, or safe passage)
- Targets of demands (governments, corporations, or international organizations)
- Outcome (duration of incident, identity and posture of governmental and transnational actors participating in its resolution, extent to which terrorists' demands were satisfied, fate of human victims, fate of terrorists, extent of property damage, and, if applicable, identity of nations granting or facilitating safehaven)

Local Environmental Characteristics

- Type, repressiveness, and effectiveness of government (representative democracy, authoritarian, or totalitarian)

- Societal traditions and attitudes with respect to authority and violence
- Homogeneity of the population
- Current levels of popular malaise and internal strife
- Current level of socio-economic development (including per capita GNP; levels of industrialization, urbanization, and literacy; and the proportion of the population possessed of higher education)
- Recent and current socio-economic growth rates (as above)
- Societal inequities (markedly unequal distribution of income, discriminatory practices, and systemic limits on social and political mobility)

Global Environmental Characteristics

- Technological Advance
 - Sophisticated man-portable weaponry (development, deployment, and international trade in such weapons)
 - Proliferation of nuclear facilities
 - Communications advances (developments affecting both media coverage and tactical communications)
 - Mobility-related developments
- Interdependence
 - New vulnerabilities (those links binding our increasingly interdependent

world -- e.g., commercial and communications centers, transportation hubs, international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo aircraft -- that presently, or that may in the future, offer feasible and potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist attack.

- Reactive upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity
- Modernizing Social and Economic Change
 - Destabilizing local effects
 - Large emigre worker concentrations
- Political Environment
 - The "revolutionary" atmosphere highlighted by the challenge to the existing world order raised by the "have not" nations
 - The controversy over illegal versus justifiable political violence
 - Shifts in priorities and values and the emergence of a strong sense of "social conscience"
 - The dispersion and erosion of political authority
 - The proliferation of non-state actors and the parallel increase in the number of international and transnational organizations providing moral or material support to national liberation or leftist revolutionary formations

- International agreements, treaties, and conventions relating to terrorist acts
- The behavior of states providing direct and indirect support to terrorist groups
- Transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups
- Significant international economic trends and developments
 - Extra-cyclical events
 - Cyclical fluctuations

APPENDIX B









STATISTICAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS

IN

TERRORIST ACTIVITY

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-75


Total: 913



*Includes 2 non-air hijackings.

568582 2-76

Geographic Distribution of Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-75



*Mass letter bomb mailing.

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents Directly Affecting US Citizens, Corporations, or Institutions

	Kidnap	B & H	Bomb	Ass't	Hijack ¹	Assass.	Incend.	Other	Total
1968-1975									
Total incidents	123	31	375	95	137	48	59	45	913
US citizens or property known to have been victimized	59	4	136	37	29	15	33	17	330
US government target of terrorist demands	4 ²	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
1968									
Total incidents	1	0	24	2	6	4	0	0	37
US citizens or property victimized	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	5
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1969									
Total incidents	3	0	17	5	25	2	2	1	55
US citizens or property victimized	2	0	9	1	1	1	1	1	16
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970									
Total incidents	26	1	17	6	47	6	2	9	114
US citizens or property victimized	15	0	12	4	16	3	1	5	56
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971									
Total incidents	10	1	15	8	14	3	6	6	63
US citizens or property victimized	4	0	12	4	7	0	5	6	38
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972									
Total incidents	11	3	38	6	16	4	3	5	86
US citizens or property victimized	1	0	18	2	3	0	1	1	26
US government target of demands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973									
Total incidents	34	8	81	29	15	12	20	12	211
US citizens or property victimized	18	2	34	14	0	3	12	2	85
US government target of demands	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1974									
Total incidents	12	9	95	24	9	8	11	11	179
US citizens or property victimized	5	1	32	6	2	2	7	2	57
US government target of demands	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1975									
Total incidents	26	9	88	15	5	9	15	1	168
US citizens or property victimized	13	1	18	6	0	3	6	0	47
US government target of demands	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

¹ Excludes numerous non-terrorist skyjackings, many of which victimized US planes or citizens.

² This figure does not, of course, reflect more than a score of cases in which ransom demands were levied on—or were eventually at least partially satisfied by—U.S. corporations or private citizens.

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Regional Origin of the Perpetrators—1968–1975

	Kidnap	B & H	Bomb	Ass't	Hijack	Assass.	Incend.	Other	Total
North America	4	0	21	4	5	0	3	0	37
Western and NATO Europe	10	1	61	10	5	3	4	4	98
Middle East and North Africa	5	17	41	31	25	12	2	15	148
Sub-Saharan Africa	16	1	1	5	6	1	0	0	30
Asia	6	5	2	4	11	3	5	0	36
Latin America	53	5	45	8	12	10	5	12	150
USSR/Eastern Europe	0	1	3	1	15	3	0	0	23
Uncertain or Mixed	29	1	201	32	58	16	40	14	391
Total	123	31	375	95	137	48	59	45	913

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents—Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen by Category of Event: 1968–1975

	Kidnap	B & H	Bomb	Ass't	Hijack	Assass.	Incend.	Other	Total
Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related	8	18	48	35	19	13	3	15	
Non-Fedayeen	102	13	249*	53	79	29	37	22**	584
Unknown	13	0	78	7	39	6	19	8	170
Total	123	31	375	95	137	48	59	45	913

*Includes the sole transnational terrorist attack on a nuclear installation during the period under review—the 1975 bombing of a nuclear power facility in France by the Puig Antieh-Ulrike Meinhof Commando. It bears note, however, that Argentina's ERP did briefly occupy an unfinished Argentine nuclear power plant in March 1973, an act which falls in the category of domestic terrorism.

**Includes the only two incidents in which a chemical, biological, or radiological agent has been used to induce terror to date (the radio-active iodine employed by the self-styled "Justice Guerrilla" in Austria in 1974).

International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents—Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen by Year: 1968–1975

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related	3	10	21	10	19	46	33	17
Non-Fedayeen	31	28	60	28	40	112	137	148
Unknown	3	17	33	25	27	53	9	3
Total	37	55	114	63	86	211	179	168

P-GRAHAM, Katharine
Orig Conference
on the Media &
the Law
P-Friendly, Fred W.
(orig under
Graham)



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 March 1975

Mrs. Katharine Graham, Publisher
The Washington Post
1150 Fifteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Kay:

Thank you again for inviting me to the Washington Conference on the Media & the Law last weekend. The discussions of the various case studies were fascinating and most worthwhile as we face these problems today. It was great fun.

Sincerely,

Bill
W. E. Colby
Director

Identical letter to:

Mr. Fred W. Friendly
The Ford Foundation
320 East 43rd Street
New York, N. Y. 10017

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- ✓ 1 - Mr. Thuermer
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DCI

P-UNNA, Warren
C.I.A. 109 Scoville

Herbert Jr.

8 Members of Congress Form Panel to Plan New U.S. Priorities

Org. of Conference on Planning of New Priorities

By Warren Unna
Washington Post Staff Writer

A bipartisan group of four Senators and four Representatives yesterday announced a Conference on the Planning of New Priorities to focus on this country's future, which they find threatened more from within than from abroad.

The legislators, in sponsoring the conference, are deliberately circumventing the Senate and House Armed Services and Defense Appropriations committees. They are creating an unorthodox forum on Capitol Hill which will be more critical of the military-industrial share of America's resources.

Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-N.Y.) told a press conference yesterday that he did not think either committee on the House side, at least, "has done the kind of job that should have been done in controlling military expenditures. Over the years, a majority of the members have become close to the military and tend to do what the military thinks and wants."

'We're All Junior'

Sen. William B. Saxbe (R-Ohio), speaking for the four sponsoring Senators, seemed to share Bingham's criticism and added: "We're all junior and we feel it is up to us to have some influence."

Sen. Marlow W. Cook (R-Ky.) said those of his colleagues who had to face the electorate last fall were "impressed with the enormity of the discontent in this country, almost inevitably traceable to an expanding uneasiness over

our seeming preoccupation with military ventures.

"We found the American people confused and disillusioned with growing escalation of the arms race and continuing foreign intervention, to the neglect of our great domestic ills," Cook explained.

Sen. Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa) added: "Many believe that this country can be destroyed more rapidly by failing to meet the domestic needs. . . . In the simplest language, the priorities for our military are to spend and keep spending. The priorities for our cancerous domestic problems are neglect, postponement and tokenism."

Not 'Isolationists'

Hughes emphasized that none of the sponsoring legislators were against a proper national defense, nor were they new "isolationists," the term President Nixon recently used in criticizing the military's critics.

Bingham also made it plain that the conference Friday and Saturday is not going to limit itself to underlining the cost of just one big new weapons system like the proposed Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile.

He itemized two "much larger" items now under consideration: 15 aircraft carrier forces, complete with escort vessels, at a cost of \$1½ billion each; and the proposal to spend \$25 billion by replacing the F-4 fighter, which costs \$4 million per plane, with the F-114, which costs \$14 million per plane.

Bingham said, one matter

the conference might look into was how the military decided to assign a priority for 15 carrier forces instead of, say, five or ten. He said the "best guess" was that 15 was the figure permitted for U.S. battleships in the 1921 disarmament conference and the Navy was still sticking by it.

Hunger Hearings

Saxbe suggested that one way to help Congress gain a better understanding of the country's real priorities would be to have the senior members of the armed services and appropriations committees sit in on a hunger hearing for a change.

Other legislators sponsoring the weekend conference are: Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and Reps. Seymour Halpern (R-N.Y.), George E. Brown Jr. (D-Calif.) and Richard L. Ottinger (D-N.Y.).

The conference, which will be a follow-up to an exploratory one in March, will have the same chairman: Arthur Larson, director of Duke University's World Rule of Law Center and head of the US Information Agency during the Eisenhower Administration.

Among the participants will be Herbert Scoville Jr., a former top official for both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; James Killian, science advisor to President Eisenhower; Derek Shearer, last year's president of the Yale student body; and Barry Weisberg, a University of California (Berkeley) graduate who now is a fellow at the Bay Area Institute.

WOODWARD, Bob
Letelier, Orlando
CIA 4 Cuba (exiles)

P A 1
WASHINGTON POST

12 April 1977

Ex-CIA Aide, 3 Cuban Exiles Focus of Letelier Inquiry

By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former CIA explosives expert and three Cuban exiles will soon be sought by federal authorities for questioning in the investigation of last year's Embassy Row bomb-murder of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier, according to informed sources.

Edwin P. Wilson, the former Central Intelligence Agency operative, and the three Miami-based Cuban exiles came to the attention of federal officials when they learned that Wilson was under FBI investigation in an unrelated assassination plot abroad.

Wilson allegedly sought to recruit the three Cubans to kill a political opponent of the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, last year, according to the sources.

Wilson heads a small consulting firm here called Consultants International. It is involved in the arms export business. Wilson was out of the country yesterday and could not be reached for comment.

In reviewing information developed in the Libyan investigation of Wilson, investigators have established these possible connections with the Letelier case:

- Wilson had a secret contract with the Libyan government to provide detonation devices called "timing pencils"—a tube filled with chemicals that can be remotely controlled to trigger explosions. Such a "timing pencil" is believed to have been used to detonate the bomb that exploded beneath Letelier's car.

- The three Cuban exiles arrived in the Washington area just three days before the Sept. 21, 1976, bombing of Letelier's car.

- One of the Cuban exiles, an explosives expert believed to have been trained by the CIA in the 1960s, met in Miami recently with a close associate of other Cuban exiles who have been chief suspects in the Letelier case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper, who is in charge of the Letelier investigation, met with officials last week and asked for all files and information on Wilson and the three Cubans, the sources said.

The three Cubans are not among the 10 anti-Castro Cubans who have reportedly been questioned already by the grand jury investigating the Letelier murder.

"These are new Cubans and a completely new direction for the case," said one source familiar with the investigation. The sources said, however, that the extent of Wilson's involvement, if any, could not be learned until Wilson is questioned.

In the Libyan investigation, the sources said that Justice Department attorneys are not sure if any U.S. law has been violated because the department has no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed abroad.

The Libyan case is now in the Justice Department Criminal Division for review.

That investigation began last year when CIA officials learned that a former employee was allegedly recruiting Cubans for terrorist activity.

According to the sources, Wilson was acting under a contract with the Libyan government and wanted the Cubans to assassinate a Libyan who had exiled himself to Egypt much like Letelier had exiled himself to the United States after the September, 1973, coup in Chile and a year of imprisonment there.

The Cubans turned down the job offer, which was made by Wilson at a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, according to the sources.

Upon learning of this, the CIA requested the FBI open an investigation of Wilson. This case was so sensitive that President Ford was personally informed of it.

Wilson's contract with Libya included a promise to supply thousands of timing pencils. "It is one of the most alarming things I've ever seen," one source said. "There were enough [timing pencils] contracted for to support terrorist activity for the rest of the century."

The Libyan government has in the past supported terrorist activity. At a news conference last July 19, President Ford said, "We do know that the Libyan government has in many ways done certain things that might have been done better."

In addition, the sources said that there is some evidence that Wilson may have had contact with one or

more current CIA employees who have access to supplies of timing pencils.

It is not clear from the investigation how many, if any, timing pencils Wilson actually supplied to the Libyan government.

The sources said Wilson also tried to recruit other former CIA employees to be explosives instructors in Libya.

One former CIA employee was offered \$100,000 a year but turned it down. Wilson himself had contracts valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars with Libya, according to the sources.

Wilson has declined to answer questions from FBI agents in the Libyan investigation, the sources said.

Consultants International is located at 1425 K St. NW. An official there said yesterday that the firm was not involved in any questionable activity.

According to the firm's own promotional literature, Consultants International could supply an army with equipment including patrol boats, par-

continued

CIA 104 Wilson, Edwin
QADDAFI, Muammar
Propper, Eugene M
Ford, Gerald
~~ORG Consultants~~
INTERNATIONAL
Coig under Woodwa

How Weak Is the CIA?

Arnold Beichman

KNOWE, KLAUS

CHAL. OY Miller, Winton

CIA 902 CIA

In March-April 1976, almost an entire issue of this magazine was devoted to a broad consideration of the ongoing controversy over the role of intelligence agencies in a free society. Investigations of irregularities in American domestic and foreign intelligence operations had revealed considerable evidence of official abuse of authority, illegal activities, and improper use of intelligence services. At that time, we concluded that regulatory reforms, as well as some form of continuing, efficient monitoring of the intelligence complex, were essential, not only to insure the national welfare, but to protect the civil rights of Americans. Papers by five scholars and experts published in that issue explored how respect for the law might be reconciled with the concurrent need for intelligence secrecy. Included were proposals for monitoring systems and reform by Senator Margaret Chase Smith, and former NSA intelligence research analyst, Dr. W. Thomas Nichols.

As the intelligence controversy continues, we here present another, now burgeoning aspect of the problem: Has the reform of our intelligence services, and the measures by which we have sought to implement the "right to know," in fact destroyed the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence operations, to the point where the national safety is at serious risk?

I once wrote a "spoof" article which was published in the *Washington Star* under the headline: "NOW THEY WANT IT TO BE TOLD: The CIA, It Turns Out, Is a Front for SUBMAG."

My revelation purported to be based on "a bulky work about a phase of American intelligence activity which I am certain few people know anything about." What I provided was an "introduction" to this "bulky work" in which I "disclosed" that behind a Central Intelligence Agency which was continually being attacked was the real intelligence agency, SUBMAG, an acronym for "submerged agency." The CIA's *raison d'être* was to have its activities exposed and debated while SUBMAG, unobtrusively, did the real work of intelligence. Its existence was to be known only by three persons—the president, SUBMAG's director of operations, and the author of the introduction, "a middle-echelon New York State political leader."

The then editor of the *Washington Star*, Jim Bellows, thought the article was hilarious, and in dead-pan fashion put it on the front page of the Sunday editorial section on February 16, 1975. On the same day the story ran, I was telephoned by a prominent Washington journalist specializing in intelligence matters. (For obvious reasons, he shall be nameless.) He congratulated me on my "scoop." Since my story referred to "unpublished appendices and the report of a committee," his news organization, he said, was prepared to purchase the appendices and the report.

Thinking he was pulling my leg, I replied with mock stuffiness that they were not for sale. He snapped that money was no object. Suddenly I realized that my journalist friend thought the "scoop" was true. I blurted out that the report,

the appendices, everything, was a big joke. There was a second's silence, and then:

"My God, I just put a story about SUBMAG on the wire! Wait a minute—!"

He returned in a few moments to the phone. He had tried to kill it, but the story had gone out already. He said to me:

"The damn thing made so much sense, we all believed it."

And, of course, it *did* make "sense." For eight years, the CIA had been exposed in newspapers and magazines—1975 has been dubbed the Year of Revelations—although the really big exposés came later when the White House and congressional investigations began. Was it conceivable, a KGB executive might well ask, that a superpower like the United States would so hamstring itself that its secret intelligence work—covert action, clandestine collection of information, counterintelligence—would be paralyzed?

The problem with writing and thinking about intelligence in an open, democratic society is that everything in this nether world, this world of non-secret secrecy, is plausible. Anything you want to say about intelligence activity and its practitioners is "true." The more improbable, the more probable. The accusation is the verdict. Denial is really affirmation, affirmation equals suspicion, suspicion equals indictment, and indictment raises the unanswerable question:

Are secret intelligence agencies and their activities compatible with democratic values and aspirations?

The late Jean Monnet had an answer. He once told James Reston that "a democratic country as open as America can never really run a secret service and, if it tries to do so, in the end probably its losses are really greater than its gains."

Some might agree with Monnet; others might agree with Professor Sidney Hook who, in arguing for the necessity of strategic intelligence, said: "Every situation of moral choice is one in which the choice is not between good and bad, right or wrong, but between good and good, right and right, the good and the right. One good may be overridden by a greater good; one obligation by a more pressing one."

Planning for the future

Some months ago I was in Washington at a colloquium on "intelligence requirements for the 1980s," arranged by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence and consisting of a group of academics—law professors, international relations professors, historians—who have decided to act on the belief that intelligence is too important to be left in the hands of a much beleaguered intelligence establishment.² Participants in the colloquium also included formerly high-ranking CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation executives, senior staff members of the Senate and House Committees on Intelligence, and staff assistants of several senators.

The meeting in part reflected a growing disquiet in Washington, particularly on Capitol Hill, that the entire intelligence controversy perhaps had gone too far, and that the time had come to re-examine the significance of past reforms and those proposed in Senate Bill 2525, comprising a new charter for the intelligence agencies. The colloquium also arose out of a concern that, while the congressional

P-Godson, Roy

Org 1 Consortium for
Study of Intelligence
Soc. 4.01.2 Intelligence
Requirements for the
1980's

Consortium for the
Study of Intelligence

Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's:

Elements of Intelligence

Edited by:
Roy Godson

EVENING - 606,842
WEEKEND - 352,297

JAN 30 1974

P-Rosenthal, DAVID
CIA 1.04 Hunt, Howard
CIA 4 US-NY.

ORG 1 NATIONAL

Rifle Assn.

ORG 1 FIRST NATL. CITY

BANK

New York Life Ins.

CONTINENTAL INS.

RCA

Hunt's Life As a Spy

NEW YORK STATE DRIVER'S LICENSE	OPERATOR WARREN, EDWARD J	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	NEW YORK STATE IDENTIFICATION CARD	IDENTIFICATION CARD NO. WARREN, EDWARD J	ISSUE DATE 3/31/73
IDENTIFICATION CARD NO. 401657-53072	IDENTIFICATION CARD NO. 401657-53072	ISSUE DATE 3/31/73	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	ISSUE DATE 3/31/73	ISSUE DATE 3/31/73
CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00
CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00	CLASSIFICATION 3.00

Driver's license made out to Edward J. Warren, the identity used by E. Howard Hunt.

By DAVID ROSENTHAL

Edward Joseph Warren is a well-dressed man, a music lover, a gun enthusiast, a resident of Manhattan's least exclusive hotels. He is 55 years old and has only one real problem — he doesn't exist.

He is a figment of the imagination of the CIA. Theoretically, Edward Joseph Warren is what a properly disguised spy should resemble on a clandestine mission.

Convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt lived the few and only weeks of Edward Joseph Warren's "life" in the summer of 1971. In need of a cover for his work as a White House "plumber," Hunt requested and received from the CIA paraphernalia designed to conceal his true identity while providing him a new one. With the help of CIA technicians, Everett Howard Hunt Jr. became Edward Joseph Warren.

Published Documents

The details of how Hunt became Warren can be traced from documents on file with the Senate Watergate committee in Washington. The documents were published by the committee as part of the transcript of its hearings.

One document on file is a phony New York State driver's license, with West Side address. This

license was forged," said a Dept. of Motor Vehicles spokesman. "It was never issued by our agency." He denied any department cooperation with the CIA.

Acting Manhattan District Attorney Alfred Scotti, while unsure whether he had jurisdiction, said if his office could it would consider prosecuting those who falsified the license. "A forgery is a forgery," said Scotti, "even if committed by the government." A spokesman for Attorney General Lefkowitz said his office had no jurisdiction in forgery cases.

Wallach's was apparently Edward Joseph Warren's favorite clothier. A spokesman for the store was unable to explain how Hunt obtained one of its cards. "The CIA," he said, "has never requested any assistance from Wallach's."

The CIA also issued Hunt a life membership in the National Rifle Assn. An NRA spokesman was disturbed about the forged document.

"It certainly doesn't make us look good," he said. "We wouldn't want to be involved in anything like Watergate."

Other companies whose identification cards were forged, including First National City Bank, New York Life Insurance Co., Continental Insurance and

and helplessness when informed of the frauds.

A New York Life official could remember no similar incident in the insurance company's history. "But what can you do," he asked, "take the CIA into court?"

'Wouldn't Cooperate'

While saying that "no legal action was anticipated," a high Citibank official—who asked that his name not be used—emphasized that "we did not and would not cooperate with the CIA." Sounding annoyed, the official added: "Noboy likes to get mixe up in anything like this."

The quality of the CIA forgeries is readily apparent to experts. The code number on the driver's license, derived from a secret formula involving the registrant's birth date and name, so closely resembled the authentic version that State Motor Vehicle Depts. authorities originally thought the license was real. The state claims it did not give the code to the CIA, but says the information is known to state troopers and is on file with the FBI.

The CIA's knowledge of codes apparently extends beyond those in the public sector. On all but one of the other cards, the correct combination of numbers and letters was meticulously faked.

An Inconsistency

The phony Continental policy card was numbered 11-AF-654092. A Continental spokesman quickly spotted an inconsistency, however, noting that AF refers to an auto policy, which would have seven final digits, not six as on the Hunt version.

A spokesman for the CIA declined to comment, when asked if the state and private firms had cooperated in preparing the falsified documents. He also refused to disclose the name of the CIA section which prepares forgeries of this nature. "Everything we've had to say about Watergate," said ready told Congress. Any questions have been already answered."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C19THE WASHINGTON POST
24 MAY 1977R ANDERSON, JACK
P-Whitten, Les
CIA 40552 (Computer-
Cyber 76)
CIA 402 Computers
Org: Control DataJack Anderson and Les Whitten

A Super-Computer for the Soviets

Control Data is preparing to sell the Soviets a \$13 million electronic brain, which could be turned against us to track U.S. missiles, planes and submarines. It is also capable of decoding sensitive U.S. intelligence transmissions.

The miracle machine is the Cyber 76, which will soon be on its way to the Soviet Union unless there is a last-minute stop order. It not only will be the largest computer ever delivered behind the Iron Curtain, but it is more than a decade ahead of the Soviets' own computer technology. It operates at least 20 times faster than anything the Soviets produce.

A top-secret, interagency study warns tersely that the Soviets can convert the Cyber 76 to military use. Not only can it be used for tracking and decoding, but it could also improve the production of nuclear warheads, multiple-headed missiles, aircraft and other military hardware.

There is no sure safeguard to prevent this, the study declares. An intelligence source put it more bluntly. "For a few bucks," he told us, "we're willing to give the Soviets the means to destroy us. We're becoming our own executioners."

Government officials, citing the strict secrecy, refused to show us a copy of the study. But sources with access to the original draft have told us of its warnings. They fear it may be softened in order to make the computer deal more palatable.

Control Data executives, in repeated meetings with U.S. officials, have insisted that the Cyber 76 will be used by the Soviets strictly to study the

weather. The company kept hammering at Washington to get an export license. Final Commerce Department approval of the deal, according to our sources, was imminent until our inquiries caused some hesitation.

The sale of computers to Russia was pushed originally by ex-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Eager to promote detente, he overruled military objections to earlier computer sales. Now that the Soviets have already received lesser computers, they will be enraged if the Cyber 76 is withheld from them, say our sources.

One high official source, talking to us in confidence, related how a mysterious Soviet official showed up in the United States a few years ago. The Central Intelligence Agency immediately spotted him as a man with a purpose. He had come here, the CIA warned, to seek strategic U.S. computers.

The State Department, under Kissinger, persuaded the CIA to soften its warning and to pass off the visitor as merely the house guest of Soviet Ambassador Anatoli F. Dobrynin.

This helped lead to computer sales not only to Russia but also to China and Hungary. In return for these sophisticated computers, according to an International Trade Commission report, the Soviets have offered the U.S. "horses, asses and mules" at favored prices. Russia's famous vodka will also be sold to the United States at a tariff of \$1.25 a gallon, instead of the present \$5.

Frustrated U.S. officials complain that the Soviets are getting the best of the deal. They have gained strategic

advances from the computers that have already been delivered, these officials assert. But the Cyber 76 would give them a technological boost that no amount of vodka could justify, they say.

The secret study declares categorically that the wonder machine both could and would be misused by the Kremlin for military purposes. Those officials who favor the sale contend, however, that the Soviets will use the Cyber 76 to increase their participation in a world meteorological network. The result, they say, would be better international weather data, larger crops and fewer unexpected natural disasters.

A spokesman for Control Data assured our reporter John Schuber that the computer can be set up in Moscow in a way to prevent any misuse. Any diversion to military use, he said, could be detected immediately. Then Control Data would pull out its technicians and refuse parts to the Soviets, thus crippling the electronic monster.

But other computer experts told our reporter Tony Capaccio that Control Data's arguments are spurious. One former Control Data executive, referring to the alleged safeguards, said derisively: "That's a joke." Other experts agreed that the Soviets could train their own technicians, and eventually locate parts from other countries.

Footnote: At the Commerce Department, spokesmen confirmed that the secret study disclosed "some problems" relating to safeguards against the misuse of the Cyber 76. But the draft report, said the spokesman wasn't final.

CIA 2.06.8 (Senior
Management Seminar)
ORCA Control Data
↳ Burlington Northern
Railroad

10B

Minneapolis Tribune
Thurs., April 14, 1977

CIA will send 20 'students' to area

Associated Press

The CIA will send about 20 people to study management practices in Minneapolis-St. Paul area companies as part of its training courses for CIA employees.

A spokesman for the intelligence agency said it has sent middle-management executives on such trips around the country for several years.

The names of the participating firms were not disclosed by CIA sources, although it was learned that Control Data Corp. and Burlington Northern Railroad are among them.

A spokesman for Control Data said the computer company would explain theory and practice of human resources development

techniques. These would explain methods used in classroom instruction, multimedia and computer presentations and textbooks.

Among Burlington Northern officials who will speak to the CIA group will be about half a dozen corporate executives, including Louis Menk, chief executive officer.

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 October 1975

P-Morgan, DAN

CIA 3.03 USSR
- grain

~~ORGI Cook~~
INDUSTRIES

Grain Data Collected By CIA

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has been collecting detailed information from private U.S. companies on their sales of grain to the Soviet Union and other countries, even though the same data is gathered by the Department of Agriculture.

The grain export information — obtained by the agency's domestic collections branch, which often debriefs businessmen who travel abroad — is used to make assessments of the strategic balance in grain supplies.

CIA officials have indicated in the past that they consider grain supplies to be an important element of national security, and possibly a useful gauge of international behavior of the Soviet Union, a major grain importer.

A recent series of detailed CIA inquiries to grain companies includes requests for information on worldwide Russian demand for grain, and estimates of world sales to the Soviet Union, or East Europe, including American grain sales on a weekly basis. A Department of Agriculture spokesman said yesterday that he had no idea why the CIA was collecting the information. In 1973, Congress gave the department responsibility for compiling weekly reports of all grain sales abroad. In addition to those weekly reports, U.S.-based firms are now required to inform the department within 24 hours of any sale exceeding 100,000 metric tons. Referring to the duplicate commercial export intelligence gathering of the CIA, the chief of one major grain company said this week: "They stay in touch with us all the time."

Edward W. Cook, chairman of the board of Cook Industries, Inc., of Memphis, said in an interview that he often reports the same information to both

said. "It could be Brazil, could be Russia, or it could be France." Cook said the CIA gets no more information about the sales than the Agriculture Department gets, adding, "There doesn't seem to be much coordination in Washington." A department official said recently that it sometimes seemed that the CIA's export data was reaching top officials of the Agriculture Department before the department's own. CIA officials could not be reached for comment yesterday.

Department. "They stay in contact with people who are doing business with areas in which they export."

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

7

Org Council on Religion & International Affairs
Satanic
William III
SOC. 4.01 of the Right
to Know to withhold
& to lie

"If a government is going to lie, it can probably do so for a short period, and when that period is over it should generally admit what it did and why. For it is continual exaggeration and distortion rather than the individual lie that are really damaging to a society."

—WILLIAM O. BARNDY

CIA & Vietnam S.
N. Cuba - Bay of Pigs
CIA 4.01 Special Forces
P - Blackstock, Paul W.
Org Council on Foreign Relations

Original under
Barndy

Charge Nixon defies people and constitution

NEW YORK, May 1—The following statement condemning U.S. aggression against Cambodia was issued today on behalf of the National Committee of the Communist Party by James Jackson, international affairs secretary, and Daniel Rubin, national organizational secretary:

In launching his criminal aggression against Cambodia, following the bombardment of Laos, President Nixon is violating the Constitution of the United States and defying the expressed will of the American people. He is violating Cambodia's sovereign rights and is recklessly gambling with moving to a world nuclear war. He tries to cover up the deed and the danger by a series of lies and false promises. That disastrous course must be reversed.

The most massive and militant response by millions of our people must be mounted to the new, criminal expansion of aggression in Cambodia. The mask has been removed. The policy pursued by Nixon is the continuous expansion of the brutal aggression in Vietnam, Laos and now Cambodia. Thousands of U.S. ground troops as well as planes and supporting units have invaded Cambodia together with Saigon puppet troops.

The inevitable result will be intensified fighting throughout the entire area and a grave new threat to world peace. To the 325,000 admitted U.S. casualties will be added new thousands in the stepped-up war. The toll of Vietnamese, and now Cambodians and Laotians, predominantly non-combatant women and children, is of genocidal proportions. Song My's will increase

In the U.S. the mass of workers, particularly black, Chicano and Puerto Rican, will pay the heavy

costs of the escalating war in lives and broken families. Runaway prices and taxes will increase further. Paychecks and contract settlements will be cut, even as unemployment grows. Programs for schools, hospitals, welfare, etc. will suffer even sharper slashes.

Jingoism, racism and repression will be further stimulated. In our country where racism has been the main tool of reaction for so long, it is not possible for President Nixon to rattle the saber jingoistically in justifying the slaughter of darker peoples in Southeast Asia, treating them as mere pawns of U.S. imperialism, without promoting racism at home.

It was no accident that at the moment U.S. troops were being sent into Cambodia, other federal troops were being sent to Connecticut. They were sent there to intimidate and provoke a mass rally opposing a repression which has especially singled out the Black Panther Party and the black community for victimization.

Such a course requires President Nixon to couple his announcement of expanded aggression with threats not only to university students but even to the Senate and Supreme Court. It requires lying about U.S. involvement to the country in the TV speech ten days before and to the Senate two days before the April 30 announcement. It requires acting contrary both to the will of the people expressed in actions and polls and to the opinion of Congress and, thereby, violating fundamental principles of the Constitution he has sworn to uphold.

The new aggression arises out of a crisis in the policy of so-called "Vietnamization." U.S. ruling imperialist circles have sought to maintain control of South Vietnam which can only be done by mili-

tary means. Having failed to force such a solution at the conference table or in fact on the battlefield, it has sought to exhaust the Vietnamese in a war of attrition.

A rising tide of opposition at home and around the world forced the Nixon Administration to try to achieve the same results by scaling down U.S. ground forces, with puppet troops increasingly taking over the ground fighting and casualties. The attempt is to deceive public opinion and reduce the massive popular opposition, while pursuing the same aims.

Such a policy was bound to fail, for it does not recognize that the Thieu and Lon Nols can achieve no stable popular support because they serve the interests of U.S. imperialism and not those of their own people. "Vietnamization" was, therefore, both immoral and doomed to failure because the Provisional Revolutionary Government represents the popular will for national freedom and the Thieu-Ky regime is nothing but a fascist, dictatorial creature of the CIA.

"Vietnamization" immediately required military buttressing of the Thieu clique to have any hope of success. These steps included stepped up bombing in South Vietnam, increased bombing and military action in Laos and the CIA-engineering coup in Cambodia.

But the CIA coup in Cambodia rapidly suffered the same fatal weakness. The Lon Nol regime, a tool of the CIA, had no popular support and was rapidly collapsing before the wrath of the Cambodian peoples. A new crisis then confronted the military preparations for "Vietnamization"; the next logical step in its pursuit is being taken, military action to save the Lon Nol puppets.

President Nixon acknowledged that the military support had to be U.S. forces and Saigon puppet troops because Lon Nol could mus-

ter no army to be massively armed."

Thus, in six months the deception of "Vietnamization" and troop withdrawals has become clear. It is obvious that the same policy can only be pursued by increased U.S. military involvement.

There is no doubt of the reply which the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia will give. They will close ranks even more firmly and raise the level of political, diplomatic and military mass struggle against expanded aggression. The "six to eight week" operation in Cambodia could not succeed even in six to eight centuries.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and all progressive forces in the world will step-up every form of support to these peoples.

Nixon's arbitrary criminal action has incurred the wrath and condemnation of the peoples of all continents. The only course for the United States is in the opposite direction.

Truly, there is only one possible way to end the war. That is on the just basis set forth by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, proposals which in no way violate the interests of the people of the U.S.

This requires an end to the support for the Thieu regime, the establishment of a popular coalition

government of neutrality, and the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces. The U.S. must get out immediately.

Such a fundamental change in policy may be a defeat for certain imperialist groupings but it will be a victory for our people and country, as well as for the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and of the whole world.

Among our own people there is already the widest cry of outrage yet heard against what is becoming the longest and most dishonorable war in U.S. history. The task is to give that mass sentiment, especially among workers, black, brown and white, and in the black community, organized and effective expression. It will need to take many forms — all kinds of mass demonstrations and marches, petitions and pressures on those seeking election. There must be a demand for all public personalities to speak out against the escalation. To the millions in labor who spoke out previously against the war must now be added the entire labor movement.

There are those who express tiredness at demonstrations, express defeatist sentiments.

Some excuse inaction by arguing other issues are more important than the fight to end the war, while others substitute individual terror for mass action, and attack non-Left and even Left sectors of

the peace movement as though they were enemies.

Now is not the time for anyone, under whatever cover, to abandon the responsibility to act and to organize the widest possible opposition to the stepped-up aggression. This is the highest responsibility to the people of the U.S., to the Vietnamese and other peoples of Southeast Asia and to the peoples of the world. By this history shall judge us.

There is every possibility of victory.

President Nixon's moves reflect weakness and crisis of policy as well as grave danger. The retirement at the polls of all war supporters and the defeat of Nixon and his running-dog Agnew, after one term are fully realizable. The possibility of defeating racists and anti-labor candidates, and electing representatives of peace forces, labor, the black community, youth and women, who represent advanced democratic and even Left positions, exists.

Not only does President Nixon deserve to be retired after one term, he deserves impeachment for his violations of constitutional government and of the best interests of our country. Mass action alone can decide!

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

P- O'Leary Jeremia
Letelier, ORLANDO
CIA 4 Chile (DINA)
Bosch, ORLANDO
CORU
CIA 4 Terrorism
CIA 4 Cuba (crash)

By Jeremia O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

Investigators probing the bomb murder of Chilean exile Orlando Letelier are operating on the theory that the slaying could have been carried out by Latin extremists of either the right or left and may even be part of a much larger conspiracy.

It has been assumed by many partisan spokesmen since Letelier was killed here by a dynamite charge in his car on Sept. 21 that the former defense minister in the Marxist Allende government was the victim of the Chilean military junta's DINA secret police organization.

But officials investigating the murder are far from ready to make that assumption. FBI officials refused to comment on the investigation but it was made known yesterday that the probes are not ruling out the theory that Letelier might just as well have been killed by leftist extremists to create a martyr as by rightist conspirators.

It was pointed out by several officials, however, that Chile's rightist junta had nothing to gain and everything to lose by the murder of a popular and peaceable Socialist leader at a time when Chile's financial problems were coming up for review in Washington.

SOME LATIN EXPERTS consider that the Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario, the activist wing of Allende's government before the 1973 revolution, must be as much suspected as the strong-arm DINA organization of the Chilean military regime.

But suspicion also has been focused on a relatively new and violent Cuban right-wing organization, CORU, whose principal leader is Orlando Bosch, 49, currently a fugitive from American justice because of his activities in Miami.

Probe Includes Martyr Theory

Left Is Also Suspect In Slaying of Letelier

CORU, the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations, is an umbrella organization of five anti-Castro groups that came into existence last June and has been a source of apprehension to the State Department ever since.

A U.S. official said some time before Letelier was killed that Washington is deeply disturbed about CORU's bombings and terrorist activities inside and outside the United States.

CORU IS MADE UP of five cooperating groups: Accion Cubana, a small Miami-based group which claimed credit for bombings of several Cuban embassies in 1974; the National Liberation Front of Cuba, also based in Miami and headed by Frank Castro, which similarly has claimed credit for bombings; the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs, a Miami group headed by Roberto Carballo; the Movimiento 17 de Abril, a splinter group of the Brigade 2506 which was formed last April and is led by Juan Perez Franco; and the Movimiento Nacionalista Cubana, another Miami group led by Felipe Rivero Dias which has been involved in bombings and other terroristic acts within and outside the United States.

U.S. sources say the five groups joined in CORU have agreed that the organization will never claim any terrorist activities in the United States and will publicly condemn such actions in order to avoid being identified by Americans as a terror organization. Frank Castro has allegedly formed satellite terrorist cells to carry out operations in the United States under the name of Jovenes de Estrella (Youth of the Star) in Miami and as F14 in the New York area.

Intelligence sources have attributed several recent terrorist acts to CORU members including the Sept. 1 bombing of the Embassy of Guyana in Port of Spain, Trinidad; an explosion at the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City on Sept. 1 and other bombings in Barbados and Jamaica.

THESE SOURCES SAY the Guyanese embassy was bombed in retaliation for Guyana allowing Cuban planes to refuel there en route to Angola. The Guatemala bombing reportedly was in retaliation for Mexico's failure to release two CORU members who tried to kidnap the Cuban consul in Merida, Mexico.

The latest incident of possible anti-Castro bombing occurred earlier this week when a Cubana jetliner was ripped by an explosion shortly after taking off from Barbados on a flight from Georgetown, Guyana, to Cuba. All 78 passengers were killed. A man who called the Miami Herald claimed a group called "El Condor" placed a bomb on the Cuban plane.

Orlando Bosch, a pediatrician, is now believed by intelligence sources to be in Caracas, Venezuela. According to these sources, Bosch says that two anti-Castro activists affiliated with the New York cell of CORU were responsible for the death of Letelier and that these men are the only anti-Castroites still collaborating with DINA. Bosch is said to be claiming that Letelier's death was neither planned nor approved by CORU.

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

19 APRIL 1977

6
CIA Academic
Selzer, Michael

There's More Intelligence In Classrooms Than You Think

Org 1 National Student Assoc.
Am. Assoc. of University Professors

Despite last year's Senate Select Committee's report on Intelligence saying there was massive CIA influence in U.S. universities, the Central Intelligence Agency is still in the education business. The CIA is still funding research conducted on many of the nation's campuses, is still recruiting students and professors for extracurricular activities and is still helping foreign spy agencies keep tabs on dissident foreign students.

The full scope of CIA involvement on campuses may never be known. According to the final report of the Committee, scores of professors, administrators and graduate students are actively engaged in "open" and "clandestine" CIA work. They recruit American and foreign students, write propagandistic literature, conduct research and travel abroad using their cloak of academic status for cover.

Specifics of these operations were deleted by the CIA before the Committee released its final report, including the names of whatever individuals and institutions that had been cooperating with the CIA. And due to a Presidential order given last year, the CIA will continue to enter into "contracts and arrangements" for "classified or unclassified research... with academic institutions." It is not yet known whether or not President Carter will continue this policy.

However, an increasing number of students and faculty members throughout the country have become very vocal in their disapproval with the too-cozy relationship between the CIA and colleges. The unsavory flavor associated with a multitude of CIA activities has led several national academic associations to condemn clandestine CIA presence on campus.

Although they have received little national attention, the National Student Association, the American Association of University Professors and the Council of American Political Science Association have passed resolutions opposing any initiation by government agencies to involve academia in covert intelligence operations under the guise of academic research and have asked their members not to participate in such activities.

But for some, that is not enough. Nathan Gardel, a student attending the University of California in Los Angeles, wants to know the full extent of involvement between the CIA and the University system. He has filed for this information through the Freedom of Information Act and is currently trying to have the \$3,000 copying fee waived to get it. Gardel, however, has not stopped there.

He wants to see all correspondence between the CIA and the nine-school university system relating to the CIA recruitment drive of last year and all information about UC contracts. Gardel believes that the UC president, David Saxon, has not been entirely free with the information. Gardel explained "this is not to say he (Saxon) knows everything" but we'd like to see what he does know. At present, the CIA is openly funding weather climate research at UC San Diego. Climate warfare was used by the CIA in Vietnam and Cuba.

More recently, an alleged CIA connection with a college professor of Brooklyn College in New York has stirred controversy to the point where the faculty members of the political science department have asked for their colleague's removal from the staff.

The professor, Michael I. Selzer, has been charged by several faculty members, one of them his brother-in-law, with being associated with the CIA. In a statement to the president of the college, the department members said that because of Selzer's "admitted agreement in covert intelligence activities for the CIA, he has violated... understood, accepted statements (by national associations) and casts grave doubts of his credibility as a teacher, scholar and professional colleague... and that his actions as described warrant removal from the college."

Selzer, according to one professor, first became involved with the CIA last spring. Selzer is quoted as saying "his work for the CIA was only confined to Europe." No other details are known.

Selzer supposedly admitted his CIA connection at a recent departmental meeting. He is now

in Israel on a leave of absence but when contacted there by several New York newspapers Selzer denied that he had any contact with the CIA. He also said that he'll take legal action if dismissed and is contemplating libel charges.

A spokesperson for the college said the president, Dr. John Kneller, has already set up a committee to investigate all facts and allegations pertinent to the case and assured all that Selzer's rights would be protected.

In a prepared statement, however, Kneller said, "It is up to an individual faculty member whether he wants to establish an 'open' relation with an intelligence agency. I stress the word 'open' because I think there is no place in the academic community for a clandestine relationship of any kind."

One organization, based in Washington, D.C., is attempting to college and distribute any and all information regarding CIA-campus related activities. The Center for National Security Studies offers information, education material, pamphlets and speakers for those who wish to join in ending covert operations on campus. Write or phone Christy Macy at the Center, 122 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, (202) 544-5380.

Org 1 Council of American Political Science Assoc

Gardel, Nathan
CIA 2.95.1 FOIA

Org 1 Center for National Security Studies

Earl
CIA 1-01 TURNER, Adm
CIA 1-04 Hunt, E. Howard
Kennedy, John F.
CIA 1-04 Angleton, James
CIA 1-01 Helms, Richard

DALLAS MORNING NEWS
22 August 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4D

E. Howard Hunt allegedly in Dallas

Memo's existence denied

By EARL GOLZ

Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said here Monday his agency has found no memo stating that E. Howard Hunt was in Dallas when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963.

The memo allegedly was written in 1966 and initialed by CIA Director Richard Helms and CIA counterintelligence chief James J. Angleton, according to a story in the Wilmington, Del., Sunday News Journal.

THE MEMO ALLEGEDLY said the presence of CIA agent Hunt in Dallas on the day of the assassination "had to be kept secret" and a cover story giving Hunt an alibi for being elsewhere "ought to be considered," the News Journal said. Hunt later was convicted for his part in the 1972 Watergate burglary.

The newspaper said Hunt was acting chief of the CIA station in Mexico City "in the weeks prior" to the assassination.

Accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald visited Mexico City in late September and October 1963 and talked to officials at the Cuban and Russian embassies in an effort to arrange passage to Cuba, the Warren Commission said.

Turner said neither Helms, Angleton

nor Hunt has been quizzed by the CIA about the alleged memo because "it's not our job to question them."

He said any probe into the existence of the memo should be done by the House Assassinations Committee.

Turner, in Dallas to speak at a luncheon sponsored by the Dallas Council on World Affairs at the Sheraton-Dallas Hotel, said he has no knowledge the committee ever asked for or obtained such a memo. He said his agents have "turned ourselves upside down" to get any information requested by the committee.

"We have a working arrangement with the committee as to what can be turned over and what cannot," Turner said. All CIA documents about the assassination — uncensored except when the identity of an agent might endanger his life — have been released to the committee, he said.

THE NEWS JOURNAL article also said: "Some CIA sources speculate that Hunt thought he was assigned by higher-ups to arrange the murder" of Oswald.

A letter purportedly written by Oswald on Nov. 8, 1963, asking a "Mr. Hunt" for "information concerning my position" was first printed by The Dal-

las Morning News in the spring of 1977.

The letter, authenticated as Oswald's handwriting by three handwriting experts commissioned by The News, concluded, "I am asking only for information. I am suggesting that we discuss the matter fully before any steps are taken by me or anyone else."

An unidentified source mailed a copy of the letter from Mexico City to independent assassination researcher Penn Jones Jr. of Midlothian. The source claimed he delivered a copy to FBI Director Clarence Kelley in late 1974.

The unsigned cover letter from the Mexico City source, written in Spanish, said the letter from Oswald to Mr. Hunt "could have brought out the circumstances to the assassination of President Kennedy." By mid-1975, Kelley had not responded to the 1974 delivery of the letter, the source said, so a copy was sent to Jones.

HUNT REPEATEDLY has denied he was in Dallas on the day of the assassination. He also has said he was not in Mexico City after 1961.

Hunt's explanation that he took off at noon on Nov. 22, 1963, and went shopping and ate a Chinese dinner in downtown Washington with his wife allegedly was described by CIA sources as "a cover story concocted as a result of the memo," the News Journal article said.

"They (CIA sources) say all of Hunt's witnesses are CIA-arranged and that his wife cannot be questioned because she was killed in a plane crash," the newspaper said.

Org 1 ~~Dallas~~
Council on World
Affairs - DALLAS

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

DENVER, COLORADO
POST

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

CIA 405 - Denver, Co
01A1.04 Sommerville
JAMES M.

E - 256,439
S - 344,155

~~ORGI CRA (Continental
Revolutionary
Army)~~

MAY 1 1975

Bombings Claimed By Group

A letter purporting to be from a group called the Continental Revolutionary Army (CRA) claimed responsibility for the bombings Monday at the American National Bank and the east Denver home of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official, Capt. Robert Shaughnessy reported.

Shaughnessy, head of the police bomb squad, said the letter was received Wednesday afternoon by the Straight Creek Journal, a weekly newspaper.

3 TYPED NOTES

The letter made reference to "the oppression of the Puerto Rican people," according to the editor, Ron Wolf. He said the letter consisted of three typed notes.

Shaughnessy discounted the authenticity of the letter. "We have a number of letters on file we know are authentically CRA, and a comparison causes us to doubt the authenticity of this letter," Shaughnessy said.

The CRA, believed to be a small, local group of antiestablishment persons, also claimed responsibility for the bombing of a Public Service Co. of Colorado facility in Adams County and a warehouse owned by International Telephone & Telegraph Co. in lower downtown Denver last year.

EARLIER LETTER

A letter purporting to be from the CRA also claimed responsibility after a bombing Feb. 3 at the Park Central complex a few blocks from the American National Bank.

Four women were injured slightly in the explosion Monday at American National, 17th and Stout Sts. No one was injured in the explosion at the home of James M. Sommerville, chief of the CIA's Denver field office.

DENVER, COLORADO
ROCKY MT. NEWS

M - 214,490
S - 236,903
MAY 1 1975

Paper: Revolutionary army claims bomb credit

A Denver weekly newspaper has received a letter from a group calling itself the Continental Revolutionary Army in which the group claimed responsibility for the Monday bombings at the American National Bank and the home of Central Intelligence Agency regional director James M. Sommerville.

After obtaining a copy of the letter from the Straight Creek Journal, police Capt. Robert Shaughnessy said, "Certain elements in this letter lead us to believe it is not authentic. We have authentic CRA letters on file and the difference between them and this one causes us to question the authenticity of this letter."

Monday, four employees of the American National Bank, 17th and Stout Streets, were injured when a bomb exploded outside their office.

Approximately 12 hours later a pipe bomb exploded outside Sommerville's southeast Denver home. No one was injured.

Shaughnessy said he can find no connection between the two blasts.

The CRA is believed responsible for the bombings of a Public Service Co. substation in Adams County a year ago and one at a pipe-fitting firm owned by International Telephone & Telegraph Co. last October.

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON POST
21 MARCH 1983*P. Mathews, Jan
CIA 1.04, Richeson, Gene
orig Creative Initiative
(orig under Mathews)*

The 'New Volunteers' of Silicon Valley

By Jay Mathews
Washington Post Staff Writer

PALO ALTO, Calif.—In a converted auto body shop a few blocks from Stanford University, the maelstrom of money and competitive tension known as the Silicon Valley has produced its oddest byproduct, a group of affluent dropouts bent on saving the world.

Gene Richeson had cofounded one of the world's most successful high-technology electronic firms by the time he was 30. Ed Kyser had helped perfect a profitable ink jet-printer before he was 40. Jim Burch was a writer and vice president with the West Coast branch of a leading advertising firm. Mike Helft was vice president of an electronics firm.

Today each works full time, without salary, at the Creative Initiative Foundation, a startling demonstration of

what can occur when boredom and midlife self-examination catch up with those favored few Americans who have made it big in their 30s and 40s.

The foundation, which has tackled a range of contemporary problems, from energy conservation to chemical contamination to the nuclear arms race, is drawing a new kind of volunteer: bright and wealthy people willing to abandon lucrative careers in the Silicon Valley, the dense collection of electronics firms south of San Francisco that offers chances for rapid advancement and instant riches.

Now headed by Richard Rathbun, an architect whose father helped build one of this area's first high-tech firms, Creative Initiative has 28 couples with one or both partners engaged in trying to stop the nuclear arms race. Most of the men are on unpaid leave from high-salaried

positions. Mark Blitz, assistant director of the federal Action agency and an expert on volunteer programs in the United States, said he knows of no other program outside Silicon Valley that has so many successful executives abandoning their careers for full-time volunteer work.

Blitz said some large firms are now offering paid leaves to executives to do nonprofit volunteer work. Among such volunteers is Pete Paffrath of the Creative Initiative staff, an IBM executive on a year's paid leave to work on the foundation's "Beyond War" film project.

Before he decided to spend his time telling other businessmen of the need to create an alternative to a nuclear holocaust, Richeson, 41, had climbed from a small-town boyhood in Talco, Tex., to success as a CIA surveillance satellite systems engineer to the top of the ROLM Corp., which he helped form in 1969.

"When we were first married, we had defined a number of goals," said Donna Richeson, 38, a former CIA staff employe who works for Creative Initiative. "We would have a family, Gene would advance himself in his career. But we thought it would take much longer than it took. We had our children, we had a nice home, and we thought, 'What else is it that life is all about?'"

Richeson's father died at age 60, when Richeson was 30. "I began to think that I did not have an unlimited amount of time," he said. With the stock he had accumulated in his company he knew he could afford to do something else. One partner applauded his plan, another "thought I was crazy," but he

dropped it all in 1977 and went to work for Creative Initiative.

Bob Harwell was a divisional controller with Hewlett-Packard, a certified public accountant with a cautious approach to life. But he happened to take one of the courses in philosophy and human relationships sponsored by Creative Initiative a decade ago, and found it to be "a revelation."

When the group began its "Beyond War" project, Harwell "made a very quick decision" and took a year off last May. The reaction at Hewlett-Packard, which he calls "a very conservative company," was surprisingly favorable. With his company stock holdings and a trust fund left to his wife by an uncle, they could still support themselves and their three sons.

The philosophical core of the Creative Initiative Foundation started with an electrical engineer, lawyer and Stanford Business School professor named Harry Rathbun, now 87, and his wife Amelia, now 77. The couple turned an interest in philosophy into a series of seminars on personal relationships and alternative approaches to contemporary problems, attracting people from the San Francisco area.

Richard Roney, 38, on leave from ROLM Corp. to work for Creative Initiative, said he and his wife Regina, 37, attended a foundation course called "Challenge for Change" 10 years ago.

He was struck by a book in the course written by Victor Frankel, a psychiatrist who had survived the Nazi concentration camps of World War II.

"His point was, if you had a larger purpose in life, you could survive anything," Roney

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	ATF		
2	JR STEVENS, CREEPERS!		
3	DB		
4	cm - file		
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
<p>Andrew: [] called to say on or about 1 March a court case, Oliver v. CREEP, will take place with Barker and Martinez (of Watergate fame) suing CREEP. They will claim that they were told by CREEP that Watergate was a CIA caper. [] will be our man in the witness chair. (DDO tells me that Knoche was subpoenaed last night, and that [] will testify 24 Feb.). jdc</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
[]			2/18/77
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

STAT
 STAT
 STAT

STAT

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

13 JAN 1975

Ex-Agent Says C.I.A. Screened Oil Staff

Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, Jan. 12—A former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency said here today that the Creole Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of the Exxon Corporation, used the C.I.A. in 1960 to screen employees in Venezuela.

The former agent, Philip Agee, who has begun a campaign to expose C.I.A. activities, made his statement before the Russell Tribunal II, a seven-day assembly of mainly left-wing intellectuals investigating charges of repression in Latin America.

Mr. Agee, who worked for the C.I.A. from 1957 to 1969, mostly in Latin America, said he had been involved in the screening operations for Creole while working for the C.I.A. in Washington.

It was his job, he said, to check if prospective employees of the company had left-wing connections, in which case they would not be hired.

Mr. Agee said he "guessed" that the C.I.A. was still doing similar work for Creole. He said such screening was a general service the agency performed for large American-owned firms in Latin America.

Vice President Rockefeller, whose family owns a large number of shares in Exxon and who is a former director of Creole, was named earlier this

month by President Ford to head a panel to investigate charges of illegal C.I.A. spying on American citizens inside the United States.

Ten days ago a book by Mr. Agee, "Inside the Company: C.I.A. Diary," was published in Britain. The book recounts in detail his daily activities while he was a member of the intelligence organization.

The Russell tribunal—named after the late British philosopher and pacifist, Bertrand Russell—also heard an appeal today from Isabella Allende, daughter of the late President of Chile, Salvador Allende-Gossens. Miss Allende asked for international aid in obtaining the release from a Chilean prison of Laura Allende, a sister of the President and a Socialist politician who was arrested last November by the Chilean police.

An earlier tribunal met in Stockholm in 1967 and heard allegations of American war crimes in Vietnam.

yesterday that he had reached officials of Creole in Caracas by telephone and that they had denied categorically having ever used the C.I.A. to investigate prospective employees or current employees.

Hugh Morrow, a spokesman for Vice President Rockefeller said after checking with Mr. Rockefeller yesterday that the Vice President had "never heard of any use of C.I.A. to check Creole employees."

Mr. Morrow said that Mr. Rockefeller had served as a director of Creole until 1958 when he resigned. That resignation took place when he became Governor.

Mr. Morrow added that the Vice President relinquished his stock in the company and had no connection with Creole now.

ORG 1 CREOLE PETROEUM CORP.
ROCKEFELLER, Nelson

3
THE TIMES (LONDON)
20 FEB 1975

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Outside job

Our security forces find themselves in an embarrassing situation over the Crime Writers' Association. The association have asked Scotland Yard to provide someone to give a talk on D15, D16 and the Special Branch at the International Crime Writers' Conference, to be held in London this autumn.

They want somebody to give a broad and authoritative outline of security in this country. But the Yard has turned down the request for security reasons. Even mundane facts about counter-espionage (the work of D15), espionage (the work of D16) and the work of the Special Branch are considered too delicate for public airing.

Ted Allbeury, one of the organizers of the conference, says that if the Yard does not provide a speaker he will go to the Central Intelligence Agency. Their angle on British security could be quite juicy.

Allbeury has in mind as guest speaker the ubiquitous American, Miles Copeland, the self-appointed expert on the CIA who says he was once an agent. He is sure to be able to cobble together something rather—if less authoritative—than our own people could provide.

p-Allbeury, Ted

01291 Crime Writer's Assoc.

CIA 6.04 Copeland, Mile

CIA 3.03 Gr. BRITAIN

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200350001-7

0291 Crown Books

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-1

21 September 1978

Washington readers set their own trends when it comes to buying books

By Leslie Bennetts

Special to The Washington Star

No one has yet claimed you are what you read — not even the most greed-besotted author crazed by the relentless banality of his book tour — but what someone reads surely gives an indication of what kind of person he is. And Washingtonians, it seems, have their own specific preferences, different from those of people elsewhere.

On any given week, the Washington best-seller list is likely to reveal a substantially different set of titles than the national list. Not surprisingly, local book-sellers say what sells in Washington reflects the city's major industry.

EXCERPT:

Another local favorite is spy novels, which sell as well as bugging devices in this town. Different neighborhoods service a different clientele, of course; at Crown Books out in McLean, a couple of miles from CIA headquarters, the recent spate of CIA books fly off the shelves faster than you can say, "Make that man's beard fall out!" Recently "The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben" has joined works by John Stockwell, Frank Snepp and Vernon Walters as current biggies. (In the magazine department, the best-sellers out there are Penthouse and Playboy.)

Org 1 Common Interest Network

National Intelligence Stu

Org 1 American Bar Assoc.

SUITE 1102, 1800 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

American Security Council

CIN - An Update

AFCEA

by

AFAUSSS

Captain Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret.)
and
Constance Bates

AFIO

CIRA

CAG

CSI

The founding and the first year's activities of the Commor were reported in FILS, Volume 2, number 5, October 1983, an update on Thomas Troy's report.

Wale Foundation

NISC

Professional intelligence officers have traditionally beer their work - shouting their good works from the housetop professional association which would bring public attent simply not the thing to do. But Congress changed all that.

NMIA

NSIC

NIP

Security + Intell Found

As Tom Troy wrote, "retired intelligence officers, old pros, ceaseless round of accusations, investigations, revelations, and condemnations of the intelligence agencies. They had organized in defense of themselves, their careers, their craft, their agencies. At the same time, they had found natural allies - retired military, defense specialists, some academicians, public-spirited citizens - whose concern for national defense made them also supportive of a strong, effective national intelligence system."

CIA 7-02 FBI

"Out of the collaboration there came on the Washington scene, in the last decade, more than a baker's dozen of either new intelligence organizations or old organizations with a new interest in intelligence. From them came in the aggregate much talking, meeting, fund raising, and promoting of causes and projects. So much, in fact, that retired Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow of the Security and Intelligence Fund (now the Security and Intelligence Foundation) was laughingly moved to complain, 'There are too damned many people barking up the same tree. There's need for some coordination.'"

There had been some suggestion of a super-organization, to which all others could belong, which would act as a coordinating body for their efforts. Some organizations talked of combining, but as is normally the case, the question of which organization would be subsumed brought all these efforts to naught.

At the October 1981 convention of the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA) at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., leaders of four professional intelligence groups discussed the profession, and particularly the role of their organizations. In addition to NMIA, the National