

OR91 SALT

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REFLECTIONS THE SALT PROCESS

IN the summer of 1978, when it began to be clear that the SALT II treaty would be signed with the Soviet Union, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate began to prepare for its role in the procedures by which the Senate would take up a resolution of ratification. As a member of the committee, I journeyed to Geneva to talk to the negotiators of the draft agreement that was taking shape and began to go over the history of SALT I, more formally known as the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed in 1972.

It did not take long to establish that, whatever else SALT I might have done, it accomplished little by way of limiting strategic offensive arms. For that matter, it wasn't even an agreement about weapons as ordinarily understood. Rather, it was an agreement to limit the number of launchers each party would have for its long-range ballistic missiles. A launcher (or silo, in the usage of the military) for a land-based missile is a hole in the ground. You could get hurt by falling into one, but it is missiles, and, more specifically, the warheads of missiles, that kill people, and these were not at all limited by SALT I. Nor, it appeared, would they be much limited by SALT II. From the time of the first agreement, the number of American warheads increased steadily, and those of the Soviets more than doubled. It appeared they would double again under SALT II.

This was hardly reassuring. But more troubling still was the realization that this all came as news to me. I had never given great attention to the subject, but from the time of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, of 1963, I had had the impression that things were going well enough, or at least not badly. I did not have the excuse most persons might have for being vague about the details. I had served in four successive Administrations, from that of Kennedy on. I had known virtually all of the principal arms negotiators and, from university life, a good number of the strategic-arms theorists. I had sat at the Cabinet table of two Presidents listening to reports on progress. Always they *were* reports on progress. Or such was the impression I took away. I now began questioning my own judgment, then that of others—especially as the Carter Administration began to proclaim the virtues of SALT II in terms I could recognize as essentially the same as those in which the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations had presented their achievements in arms control. I began to wonder whether anyone from the most recent Administration, or more generally from the world of arms control, would ever describe the agreements in terms that comported with what now appeared to me as a different, even new reality.

I WAS to wait almost a year, until the morning of Wednesday, July 11, 1979, when Dr. William J. Perry, Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, testified on SALT-II before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Perry, a mathematician, speaks plainly and, as with many in his rarefied profession, is a man of unassuming appearance and manner. All the more was the contrast with the Caucus Room of the Old Senate Office Building, in which the hearings were held. The Caucus Room is a place of unshamed exhibition and splendor dating from 1906, when Theodore Roosevelt, having built the West Wing of the White House, commenced to challenge the Congress from his new office, and the Senate decided to get itself an office building of its own. Until that period, Presidents had worked in their living rooms, as it were, and senators at their desks in the Senate Chamber. Neither facility had been much expanded from the time of Jefferson, although during the eighteen-forties a kind of box was fitted onto the tops of Senate desks, adding a little storage space. (Daniel Webster declined the extravagance, so that to this day his desk is single-storied.) If the interior of the Capitol can be said to be Palladian and given to republican vir-

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tures in design, the Caucus Room, only slightly smaller than the Caucus Room, but itself, is Roman Imperial, and make no mistake. It struck me as a not inappropriate setting for Dr. Perry's subject, SALT II.

The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, had just finished his prepared statement in favor of the arms-limitation treaty. Curiously, the charts and displays he had brought along to illustrate his points, in the manner of military briefings, were exclusively concerned with recent and prospective improvements in and additions to the nuclear arms of both countries. The capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy so-called hard targets, such as missile silos, were represented as about equal, with the Soviets slightly ahead as of now and maintaining a slight lead through 1990—when both capabilities would have about trebled.

Perry's testimony began. He had no prepared statement, it being his role to provide answers to technical questions the Secretary's testimony might have raised. But he said a few words anyway, and in doing so made perhaps the best case yet presented for SALT II, while describing with a technician's candor its shortcomings. He said:

SALT I's success was in getting the process started. There was a substantial arms control success in the [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, but essentially there was no success in reducing the number of offensive weapons. The best evidence of that is, just look to see what happened to the number of warheads indicated on that chart since SALT I. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have added about 3,000 warheads since 1972.

The Vladivostok agreement [of 1974] was one more important advance in this process. It did specify upper bounds. It included bombers, not just missiles in the forces, but it still permitted substantial increases in warheads as of that time.

President Carter tried to break that upper spiral with his March, 1977, proposal for SALT, and as you well know, that was rejected by the Soviet Union. In fact, it is my belief that any SALT proposal in this time frame that does not preserve the Soviets' right to modernize their ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] force would be rejected. My judgment is, they have made a very substantial commitment to that. The ICBM is really the only strong component of their strategic forces, and they seem to be resolutely opposed to making any substantial reduction in it.

Therefore, the SALT II treaty which we have arrived at, while it is a major improvement over the Vladivostok agreement... still allows significant upward spiral of the number of nuclear weapons. I anticipate that the Soviet Union will

continue to pursue the modernization of the forces which Dr. Brown showed you, and that we will respond to that, so that both sides then will continue to have significant increases in nuclear warheads.

That is the bad news. The good news that comes with that is that SALT II also establishes a process and goals. The most significant goal is the one to achieve a real reduction in nuclear weapons—not in delivery vehicles but in actual weapons. My question then, as a defense planner, is how do we structure our strategic programs in the years ahead to be compatible with that goal—not only to be compatible with it but actually to facilitate the achievement of that goal of getting a reduction, a real reduction, in nuclear weapons in the future.

The master term here is "process." Clearly, neither the first nor the second agreement did much to limit arms. Weapons and weapons systems on both sides continue to accumulate. But the agreements did establish a forum in which the two nations discussed these matters, and entered into a degree of cooperation concerning them. This was the case, I had understood for some time, in the matter of monitoring—the various means by which each nation keeps track of the activities of the other in order to verify that the SALT agreements are being kept. Whether our abilities here are sufficient was the question the Intelligence Committee faced when it began formal hearings on the issue of verification soon after SALT II was signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, on June 18th.

ALONE of the standing or select committees, the Select Committee on Intelligence normally does its work in closed sessions, which meet in the Capitol dome in a small hearing room that is suspended, you might say, from the cupola. It was built up there for the use of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the first committee of the Congress that routinely did its work in camera. Of the materials the Intelligence Committee deals with, none are more sensitive, because they really are secrets, than those concerning information about Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and, more especially, concerning the means by which that information is obtained. A minuscule fraction of the information comes from agents of one or another sort—HUMINT, in the contraction favored by the intelligence community. Early in the postwar period, it was judged that the Soviet Union was much too

day, by far the greatest portion of our intelligence comes from what are known as "technical collection systems." Basically, there are three such systems. First, a number of satellites continuously circle the earth taking photographs of the Soviet Union, as can now be done with extraordinarily high resolution. (The technicians speak of picking out "the golf ball on the green.") Second, the United States can monitor the radio signals, known as "telemetry," which the Soviet missiles send back in flight. Third, American ships watch incoming missiles in the Pacific firing zones, establishing distances travelled, the pattern in which multiple warheads land (known as the "footprint"), and other such information. The Russians have comparable systems. Either side can effectively count the number of land-based missiles set in silos and ready to be launched on the other side. The numbers of submarines and launchers are readily enough established, as are the numbers of intercontinental bombers.

Each side, naturally, hopes that the other side will not know when some new advance has been made in detection systems, and on this score there was some difficulty to be resolved as the Senate prepared to consider verification under the SALT II agreement. In recent years, Soviet intelligence in the United States had scored a number of successes that alerted the Russians to the development of new American intelligence technology. In 1975, Soviet agents had obtained information about a major satellite system known as Rhyolite. In 1978, it was learned that agents had also obtained the operating manual for the most advanced of our satellites now in operation, the KH-11. In both instances, the espionage had seemingly been simple and inexpensive; in one case, the materials were acquired, for quite modest amounts of money, from a youthful employee of the TRW corporation, and in the other from an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency itself. This suggested that the Soviets have no great difficulty learning what we are capable of spotting, and can take appropriate evasive action. In addition, the loss to the United States of listening posts in Iran which monitored activity at a missile range near the Aral Sea, in south-central Soviet Asia, involved a considerable loss of information not easily obtained otherwise. Then, on June 19th, the House leaked to the *New York Times* that the United States had a similar station in Nor-

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way. The leak was intentional, to reassure those favorable to the treaty, but at the same time it jeopardized the Norwegian "asset," to use another term of the intelligence community. Thus, the question arose as to whether the United States would be able to be certain that the Russians were abiding by the terms of an arms-limitation treaty that would extend through 1985. The record of SALT I was both reassuring and cautionary. There was no conclusive proof that the Soviets had committed any major violations of SALT I strictly construed. By and large, what they agreed not to do they did not do. But where we said we *hoped* they would not do something they paid not the least attention.

This, as it turned out, was no small matter. One of the principal negotiating objectives on the American side in SALT I was to insure that neither side built any more "heavy" missiles. This is a term for missiles big enough to carry a huge "payload," which can deliver a large number of nuclear warheads, capable of reaching and destroying missiles on the other side. They are potential "counterforce" weapons, because they can be used effectively against other forces. (Missiles aimed against cities are called "countervalue" weapons.) As of 1972, the Russians had three hundred and eight heavy SS-9 missiles, while the United States had no modern heavy missiles. In SALT I, it was agreed to freeze both sides, meaning that the Soviets would and we would not have modern heavy missiles. Although this appeared to be an imbalance, American strategic doctrine at that time did not call for counterforce weapons, and we were well enough content. It was understood that the Soviets would replace their SS-9 missiles with a new model, or "generation"—the SS-18. However, the Soviets were then also planning to replace a medium-sized missile, the SS-11, with another new model, the SS-19, which was so much bigger and more accurate as to become, for practical purposes, a new heavy. As the Intelligence Committee stated on October 5, 1979, in the public portion of its report to the Senate on the capabilities of the United States to monitor SALT II:

The Soviets' unanticipated ability to replace the much larger SS-19 in a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo circumvented the safeguards the United States thought it had obtained in SALT I against the substitution of heavy for light ICBMs.

Similarly, in SALT I the United States conceded to the Soviets the right to build a larger number of missile-

carrying submarines than we were permitted, in order to compensate for the Soviets' "geographical disadvantage." (To reach the open Atlantic Ocean, for instance, Soviet submarines must pass through the relatively narrow gaps between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom; our submarines reach the open ocean at once.) But the range of the SS-N-8, the new Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, turned out to be considerably greater than expected, enabling it to be fired at American targets while the submarine remained in the Barents Sea. There is little reason to think the Soviets cheated by misrepresenting the range of their weapon at that time. They simply remained silent about its full potential. But in any case they got an edge on us.

Our monitoring system soon established that the SS-11 had been replaced by the SS-19, although the newer missiles used the same silos, slightly enlarged. The State Department was provided the facts and presented them to the Soviets. It was then that the problem arose. The Soviets agreed, or did not disagree, that they were putting an entirely new strategic-weapons system in place but asserted that nothing in the SALT I agreement prevented their doing this. Nothing did.

SALT I—the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty permanently limiting each side's ABM systems, and the "interim" executive agreement that essentially prohibited each side from building additional ballistic-missile launchers for five years—was signed by President Nixon in Moscow on May 26, 1972. In an address to a joint session of Congress on the day he returned to the United States, the President hailed the event, saying, "This does not mean that we bring back from Moscow the promise of instant peace, but we do bring the beginning of a process that can lead to lasting peace." However, two weeks later, in a message transmitting the agreements to the Senate, he stated that while together these were an "important first step in checking the arms race . . . it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms-limitation agreements can be reached."

At this time, the Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, was maintaining that the Congress must go ahead with programs for offensive-weapons systems permitted by SALT I, such as the Tri-

and the B-1 bomber. In a press conference on June 22, 1972, Nixon stated that Laird was correct in this judgment:

Mr. Brezhnev made it absolutely clear to me that in those areas that were not controlled by our offensive agreement that they were going ahead with their programs. For us not to would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and jeopardize the cause of world peace.

SALT I, he added, "while very important, is only the first step, and not the biggest step."

SALT II has so far followed precisely this pattern. Just as Nixon had done, President Carter, immediately upon returning to the United States from his summit meeting, delivered an address to a joint session of Congress last June in which he hailed the agreement, and in the same address (not waiting two weeks) he announced there would be more weapons. Indeed, he asserted that one of the principal advantages of the treaty is that it would enable us to go forward with a new missile system—the MX. This "missile experimental" (one day it will no doubt be named for a Greek god) is to be a mobile land-based missile, our first. It will be more powerful even than the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan giants of the nineteen-fifties, the only heavy missiles the United States has ever, so far, deployed. On September 7th, President Carter announced the "basing mode" and other specifics of the MX. Each would be placed on a vehicle and moved to a couple of dozen different launching emplacements around a "race track," in random and presumably unpredictable ways, so as not to be "targeted" by Soviet missiles. Each would carry ten warheads, each of these with a yield equivalent to hundreds of kilotons of explosives. (The Hiroshima bomb was twenty kilotons.) The "race tracks" will require thousands of miles of road and an area the size of Massachusetts. The President said the new MX "is not a bargaining chip," to be bartered away in any future arms negotiations, but will represent a permanent "unsurpassed" feature of the nation's strategic nuclear deterrent. Two hundred MX missiles would be deployed in Nevada and Utah. This mode, the President said, met requirements he had set for a mobile missile system: survivability, verifiability, affordability, environmental soundness, and consistency with arms-control goals. On this occasion, Secretary Brown, while predicting

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that the Soviets would respond "negatively" to this United States announcement, said that if they engaged in a fruitless race" to try to overwhelm our new system they would strain their economic resources, and that if they created a new land-based missile system of their own they would be vulnerable to United States attack, presumably from the new American system.

The Federation of American Scientists promptly declared the MX to be "not just an inflationary multi-billion-dollar strategic mistake, but an arms-control disaster." The F.A.S., begun in 1946 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists, has since that time been a leading advocate of nuclear-arms control. Its judgment was stern:

The MX missile announced today contains the seeds of its own destruction since, as a counter-force weapon, it will necessarily stimulate the Soviet Union to procure still more warheads which will, in turn, quickly threaten MX quite as much as the Minuteman missiles are presently threatened. In the process, the SALT limits will become untenable. Worse, the Air Force will ask for the right to abrogate the ABM treaty to get anti-ballistic missiles to defend the MX. Thus the ABM treaty will also be threatened and the arms race will really be back with a vengeance.

The F.A.S. warned that there was "no strategic need to imitate the Russian preference for large land-based missiles," and added, "The precipitous quality of the decision to move to match the Soviets in land-based missile throw-weight has been induced by SALT." Induced by SALT? If this seems a contradiction in terms—or, at the very least, "counterintuitive," to use a term of systems analysis—then all the more reason to pay heed. There are systems that exhibit such properties, producing the opposite of their intended outcome, with the consequence that intensifying the effort to achieve the desired one achieves even more of the undesired.

As the summer passed into autumn, attacks on SALT II from arms-control advocates increased. Just two days after the F.A.S. issued its statement, Richard J. Barnet, who served in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Kennedy Administration, described the treaty in an article in the *Washington Post* as "something to stir the hearts of generals, defense contractors, and senators from states brimming with military reservations and arms plants." His tone verged on the contemptuous:

The 100-page treaty, which reads like the prospectus for a bond issue, is neither

disarmament nor arms control but an exercise in joint arms management. The military in both countries because it ratifies the huge weapons-acquisition programs both are pushing.

In the fall issue of *Foreign Policy*, Leslie H. Gelb began an essay on the future of arms control with the blunt assertion "Arms control has essentially failed." He had a friendly word for SALT II, which is perhaps not surprising, for, as a director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from 1977 to 1979, he had had the principal responsibility in the Department of State for conduct of the negotiations once the Carter Administration came to office. But he concluded that in the main the process had not worked.

Only a few weeks ago, the *Times*, with what measure of irony one cannot say, called for ratification by declaring, "SALT II is a sound agreement that will confine the nuclear arms race to specified channels." It is perhaps not fair-minded to press the images of editorialists too far, but it may be noted that when a diffused flow is forced into a confined channel the result is acceleration. Whatever became of arms control?

At each stage of the SALT negotiations, and with each new agreement, the nuclear forces on both sides have increased. Those of the Soviets have increased faster than those of the United States, but this trend was present prior to SALT. When the talks were first proposed, in 1967, the Soviets had nine hundred nuclear warheads. They have some five thousand today. At the expiration of the SALT II treaty in 1985, it is now estimated, they will have roughly twelve thousand. During that period, the number of United States warheads will grow, from the present nine thousand two hundred, to about twelve thousand also. By 1985, the Soviets will have four warheads for every county in the United States, and the United States will have four warheads for every rayon, a comparable unit of government in the Soviet Union. But the Soviet warheads in total will have more than three times the megatonnage of the American warheads. Although it is possible that these rates of growth would be greater without the treaties, it is also possible that they would be lower.

At the hearings concerning our ability to verify the Russians' compliance with the treaty, men of formidable intellect, some detached, came before the Intelligence Committee to argue

the probabilities and the difficulties of verification, but always in the context of the Russian-Soviet numbers. It came to me that, with numbers so great, verification couldn't much matter. Suppose that by foul duplicity, compounded by American incompetence, the number of Russian warheads increased in the years immediately ahead from five thousand to thirteen thousand, rather than to only twelve. If an additional thousand mattered, surely an additional seven thousand mattered more. Well, not necessarily—only if the increase provided the Soviets some special edge. But they would have an edge on megatonnage in either event. Indeed, they already have that edge. There was something unreal about our inquiry. The possibility that the Soviets might increase their nuclear forces at a pace greater than agreed to was an object of much concern, but almost no heed was being paid to the fact that both they and (now) we are roaring ahead in an arms race, and using the treaty as an argument for doing so.

Was this "the bureaucratic mind at work"? Preoccupied with predictability, but scarcely at all distressed when what seems predictable is disaster? In part, yes. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been in place for almost two decades now, and may be assumed to be as committed to the SALT process as the Bureau of Reclamation is to irrigation, and process can become sufficient unto itself. Jay Forrester, at M.I.T., has contributed the playful maxim that with respect to complex social problems intuitive solutions are almost invariably wrong. Among the intuitive and the severely logical alike, what is happening is known as a vicious circle.

There was, in any event, a more portentous paradox to be resolved, and as the Intelligence Committee hearings droned on my attention drifted away from verification toward the subject of doctrine. The SALT process has its premise in the doctrine of deterrence. The MX missile is incompatible with the doctrine of deterrence. It is, as its advocates in the Administration like to say, a "hard-target-kill" counterforce weapon." But the strategic doctrine of deterrence specifically precludes either side from obtaining counterforce weapons. How, then, could we be building the missile that undermines the doctrine in order to sustain the doctrine?

A paradox? Yes, and the makings beyond human dimension. I had best be out with it directly. Deterrence was a stunning intellectual

achievement. It "solved" the seemingly insoluble problem of how to control the use of nuclear weapons. But it was flawed and has been undone by the intuitive but wrong assumption that the Soviets would see the logic of our solution and do as we did. Especially that they would see the meaninglessness of strategic "superiority."

As no other subject, strategic-arms doctrine has been the realm of the intellectual and the academic. This is military doctrine, to be sure, but it has never, in this nation, been formulated by military men. It began with the physicists who created the weapons—men such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe, and Leo Szilard—who were then joined by other physicists and scientists, and also by social scientists. These latter—men such as Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Fred C. Iklé, Alain C. Enthoven, Henry Rowen, and Henry Kissinger—came to be known collectively as "defense intellectuals." They moved in and out of Washington, but in the main they kept to their campuses and think tanks, or almost always returned to them, where their task, in Kahn's phrase, was "thinking about the unthinkable." Indeed, they have been something of a caste apart, even in academia. Oppenheimer at Alamogordo as the first atomic bomb exploded—"I am become death, the shatterer of worlds"—gives something of the aura of it. They ate at their own tables in the faculty clubs, and held seminars to which few were invited. They met with Russians when few others did.

And they developed the doctrine of deterrence—a doctrine of weapon use of which the first premise was that the weapon must never be used first, and of which the principal object was that it never be used at all. The nuclear power was to deploy its forces so that if attacked it could attack back, inflicting assured destruction on the party that had attacked in the first place. This capacity could be achieved by a fairly limited number of missiles aimed at the cities of the potential adversary. Only two developments could undermine the doctrine. If the adversary developed and deployed a defensive weapon—an ABM—that could protect his cities, then his destruction would not be assured and he could become aggressive and threatening. Or if the adversary possessed an offensive weapon that could destroy the missile force aimed at his cities—which is to say a counterforce weapon—then, also, his destruction could not be assured and he could become aggressive and threatening. SALT I blocked the first devel-

opment. SALT II seems destined to insure the second.
This has come about, in the main, because the Russians did not keep to our rules. There has been nothing academic about their strategic doctrine, or at least not that we know of. They appear to have just gone plodding on, building bigger and better weapons, until, by an incremental process, they are on the point of being able to wipe out American land-based missiles—a counterforce ability. At one level, this achievement has been spectacular; at another, less so. For all the sophistication involved, nuclear weapons today are still nothing more than improved versions of the V-2 rocket with an atom bomb on top. But the improvements have reached the point where the doctrine that was to prevent their use has evidently been utterly undone. It had been the hope of the early arms-control negotiators that we would teach the Soviets our doctrine and they would abide by it. If there was something patronizing in the notion of "raising the Russians' learning curve," as the phrase went, there was also much respect in the belief that once we had come to the correct solution of a complex problem they could be brought to see that we were indeed correct. These were serious American academics, who held their Russian counterparts in full regard. But the enterprise failed. And why? Because the Russian situation is not our situation, the Russian experience not our experience. If intellect must fail, let it fail nobly; and it is in nobly rejecting the notion of failure that intellect fails most often.

Perhaps that is too strong. To state that an enterprise has failed is to suggest that it might have succeeded. Yet from the outset this has somehow seemed improbable. Let it be said for the postwar strategic nuclear theorists that they were not intimidated by their subject, nor immobilized by it. They did not shrink from action in the face of an incredible new dimension of war.

The influence of the theorists was to be seen early on, when the United States government, in 1946, proposed to turn its atomic bombs over to the United Nations—a proposal that the Soviet Union blocked. Then, for a period, the theorists receded from influence as the United States, with the only strategic nuclear force around, adopted, or said it had adopted, a policy of "massive retaliation," which contemplated the use of nuclear weapons in response to aggression by conventional ones. By the late nineteen-fifties, however, the Soviets commenced to have a strategic

nuclear force of their own, whereupon the true issue was joined: How to face an adversary with the same powers of destruction?

In one respect, this was an issue as old as the airborne bomb—a development recognized as revolutionary long before it became so. George Quester, in his fascinating book "Deterrence Before Hiroshima," has traced the "prehistory" of nuclear deterrence. In 1899, the First Hague Conference banned bombing from balloons, but the Germans went ahead even so to develop the first strategic bombing force, using dirigibles, while the British may be said to have prepared for them with a theory. In a study, "Aircraft in Warfare," published in 1916, a British mathematician, F. W. Lanchester, offered a quite contemporary notion of what we think of as the nuclear deterrent:

A reprisal to be effective must be delivered with promptitude like the riposte of a skilled fencer. A reprisal which is too long delayed possesses no moral weight and has every appearance of an independent act of aggression; it may even plausibly be given as an excuse for a subsequent repetition of the original offence. . . . The power of reprisal and the knowledge that the means of reprisal exists will ever be a far greater deterrent than any pseudo-legal document.

There was much discussion in the pre-nuclear era of the utility of attacking cities, of the ability to defend cities, of preempting the enemy's offensive air forces, and the like. In a letter written in 1914, Winston Churchill revealed himself a firm advocate of what would be known as "counterforce." "The great defence against aerial menace," he wrote then, "is to attack the enemy's aircraft as near as possible to their point of departure." However, perhaps because the opportunity was so new, most thinking concentrated on attacking cities.

In this respect, the outlines of an enduring argument were apparent well before the technology itself was at hand. It was in the Second World War that technology created opportunities to implement speculation. What to do with a strategic bombing force? What to do with emerging missile forces? We now know from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, conducted at the war's end, that the bombing of German cities was less effective in weakening Germany than was thought at the time. We also know that Hitler's V-2 rockets might have had significant impact if, instead of being used as terror weapons against the Channel ports—the staging areas for the Allied offensive into

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the Continent—which is where some of the German generals wanted to send them.

Consideration of these issues in the nuclear era was surely colored by the use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in what current theorists would call a "countervalue" mode. So awesome was the scale of destruction from what, by today's standards, was a small bomb that the destruction of whole countries could now be envisioned. Had the distinction between military and civilian targets disappeared? It was this possibility, immobilizing to many, that brought forth the doctrine of deterrence. The problem for the United States, as earlier it had been for Great Britain, was to deter aggression. We were the great power, with no need or desire to attack others but wishing to avoid being attacked. We had not succeeded with Germany and Japan. But the nuclear weapon suggested that the power of retaliation had become awesome indeed—enough to inhibit any would-be aggressor who had any sense of the realities involved. Not only awesome but capable, in Lanchester's words, of being "delivered with promptitude," in contrast to the long buildup that had been required for American forces before they could be effectively used in the Second World War.

Albert Wohlstetter conceived the "second strike" as the key concept of deterrence. This is to say, the nuclear riposte. If an enemy strikes, you will strike back with devastating consequences. In addition, Wohlstetter offered two crucial insights. There is an essential requirement for the invulnerability of one's ability to strike back. The design of strategic forces and their emplacement has to insure this. But it is also the case that this can never be insured once and for all. Any force becomes vulnerable over time, especially if an adversary is working hard at making it so. Hence, there can be no final deterrent.

It was Wohlstetter's insights that made defense planners aware, in the late nineteen-fifties, that the bombers of the Strategic Air Command were becoming vulnerable to Soviet attack. When the Russians had few warheads and no missiles, two dozen dispersed SAC bases were secure enough. But as Soviet capabilities grew in the nineteen-fifties the airplanes became vulnerable. In response, however, from 1962 to 1967 the United States deployed a thousand Minuteman missiles in the Midwest in "hardened silos—that is, to say, in launchers dug deep and

heavily protected. This was then an invulnerable second-strike force. But soon doubt. Not only did the Soviets acquire more missiles and more warheads, which was predictable, but an unpredictably rapid rise in accuracy also took place. Missiles once meant to hit within miles of a target now possessed accuracies prescribed in hundreds of yards. Hardened silos could be destroyed.

Another technology was also being developed—that of destroying missiles in flight with an anti-ballistic missile. Whereupon the issue of defense arose. Essential to the doctrine of deterrence was that neither side have any defense. In effect, each side exchanged hostages, whose lives thereafter depended on their side's good behavior. The Russians were given American cities, to be destroyed instantly if the United States launched a nuclear attack on Russia. This was our guarantee to the Russians that we would not launch such an attack. The Russians were deemed to have given us their cities. But now there was talk of hedging. It seemed the Russians might be developing a means to defend themselves against incoming missiles, much as anti-aircraft defenses were developed in an earlier period. ABM systems are highly technical in design but simple enough in concept. One bullet shoots down another bullet. But if the systems worked, if our second strike did not assure the destruction of Soviet cities, then the Soviets could contemplate a first strike, and deterrence would fail. In this scenario, the nation that defends its cities can strike first, knowing that its cities are no longer hostage. In another scenario, the nation watching this defense being built strikes first, before it has lost its hostage. This is how SALT began.

THEY are not impersonal intellectuals who made these calculations. Some are intense and committed as few men of the age. But to share their passion it is necessary to enter their logic. What do you mean, one could ask, when you say that we must not defend ourselves because if we do our enemy will attack? The problem of public perception was not great in the nineteen-sixties. A deference system—a willingness to leave difficult decisions to experts—which had been in place since the bomb was built, continued undisturbed. But then heresy appeared in the midst of the close-knit and almost closed community of exchange or "damage limitation," as it was

termed. If damage limitation was possible, how could it be foregone? Wohl's logic was impeccable. The Air Force, understandably, was worried about the vulnerability of our Minutemen, and with a straightforward military logic proposed to double their number: with more targets, a Soviet first strike would have less chance of wiping out our second strike. But with twice as many Minutemen the United States could target the Soviets' missiles as well as cities, and so reduce their capacity for a retaliatory strike. Doctrine has it that, given available technology, two warheads must be aimed at a silo to have a satisfactory probability of a "kill." Given the number of Soviet missiles at the time, one thousand single-warhead Minutemen could not be counted on to "take out" the Soviet strike force, but two thousand could. (There is the ever-present problem of "fratricide," whereby the first warhead to land destroys its mate—but enough.) It was our doctrine to deny ourselves any such capacity, lest the Soviets understandably become alarmed. Better to keep to the one thousand, but to defend them. Not so, said others, most especially Robert S. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense. If we defend anything, the demand will spread to defend everything.

John Newhouse begins "Cold Dawn," his account of SALT I, which originally appeared in this magazine, by likening the debate to the disputations of the Church Fathers:

So much of the substance and vocabulary of SALT are at least as remote from reality, as most of us perceive it, as early Christian exegesis.... As in the case of the early Church, contending schools form around antagonistic strategic concepts. The most relevant of these are known as assured destruction and damage limitation, and each can claim broad support and intellectual respectability. Debates between the two schools recall those between the Thomists and the essentially Franciscan followers of Duns Scotus. The Thomists prevailed, as have the proponents of assured destruction, who assert, for example, that ballistic-missile defense of population is immoral because it may degrade your adversary's ability to destroy your own cities in a second strike. His confidence undermined, he might then be tempted in a crisis to strike pre-emptively; in short, knowing you are effectively protected from his second-strike assault and fearing your intentions, he may choose to strike first. Thus, stability, a truly divine goal in the nuclear age, becomes the product of secure second-strike nuclear offenses on both sides.

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and the first agreements, constituted a victory for a specific assured destruction." It was even then a contested doctrine and gave signs of how vulnerable it might be to ideological attack in the form of caricature. In 1969, Donald Brennan, of the Hudson Institute, labelled it "mutual assured destruction," so that the acronym "MAD" came into play, like some new weapons system all its own. But even earlier, in the 1964 film "Dr. Strangelove," Stanley Kubrick had caricatured a proposal of Herman Kahn, "the doomsday machine," which would automatically produce a second strike, so that the victim of a first strike could never hesitate to retaliate and decide instead to surrender. Making a second strike inevitable in order to prevent a first strike was eminently logical, but its proponents could also be made to seem crazy, like the mad scientist in Kubrick's film—a caricature which suggested that because so many of the defense intellectuals were German, their thinking must also be Teutonically rigid.

Looking back, it seems clear that the urgency with which the Americans approached the Russians in the hope of obtaining an arms agreement that would protect the assured-destruction doctrine arose as much out of concern to secure the doctrine in American strategic policy as to introduce it to the strategic policy of the Soviet Union. If it could be codified in an agreement with the Soviets which committed both sides, then the argument at home would be more secure. For good or ill, attacks on MAD had about them a quality of the political left. If the Russians could be shown to have the same dispassionate view of nuclear realities, this might mollify such opposition in the United States. Of course, if Americans of both left and right persuasions would argue later on that assured destruction is a strategy that places exceptional reliance on the good faith and good judgment of quite unreliable adversaries, the adversaries could well remark that this was our idea, not theirs.

But there was also a technological imperative. In the middle nineteen-sixties, the Soviets began to deploy their own missiles in hardened silos, which over time might give them a second-strike capability, and even a first-strike capability, to destroy U.S. land-based missiles in a surprise attack. No great technological feats were involved—just a steady creep of numbers, size and accuracy. Planners in the Pentagon and defense intellectuals began to talk of

defenses that would preserve our second-strike capability. The doctrine decreed that this, too, would be destabilizing. Once an anti-ballistic-missile defense was perfected, the temptation to use it to defend cities as well as missile silos would grow. And the other side could never be sure that we weren't planning to do exactly that, as quickly as possible, at a time of our own choosing.

The decision point came on December 6, 1966—"the precise beginning of SALT," as Newhouse has it—at a meeting between McNamara and Lyndon Johnson, in Austin, Texas. Instead of going forward with an ABM system, as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, McNamara urged that a decision be put off until the State Department could explore with Moscow the idea of talks on limiting strategic arms.

In these events, as in others, McNamara emerges as a man of deep feeling and utter integrity, but almost too much of the latter. A Captain Vere without serenity. It was his judgment that assured destruction required an ability to destroy twenty to twenty-five per cent of the Soviet population and fifty per cent of its industrial capacity in a retaliatory strike. He also judged that the Soviets must be convinced that they could do as much damage to the United States if it fell to them to retaliate. Hence, there must be no American missile defense. In a speech at Ann Arbor, in 1962, he had questioned the prudence, even the morality, of such a targeting doctrine, but thereafter he put qualms behind him and did his duty. He held unflinchingly to the proposition that deterrence "means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor." Through the nineteen-sixties, pressure grew for the United States to develop modern heavy missiles, as the Soviets had done, or to double the Minuteman force. He successfully blocked each effort, asserting, in 1967, when the United States had five thousand warheads, that this number was "both greater than we had originally planned and in fact more than we require." He repeatedly warned against the "mad momentum intrinsic to . . . all new nuclear weaponry," adding, "If a weapon system works—and works well—there is strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required."

In June, 1967, seven months after the meeting in Austin, Soviet Foreign

Minister Alexei Kosygin arrived in Moscow for a summit meeting with President Johnson. Dean Rusk, who was Secretary of State at that time, later recalled for Newhouse that the Americans tackled Kosygin in a "go for broke fashion." The Russians, naturally, wondered what we were up to. When told of the dangers of the ABM, Kosygin replied, in effect, "How can you expect me to tell the Russian people they can't defend themselves against your rockets?" This surely is a recognizable political instinct. At about this time, Senator Richard Russell was saying that if there was a nuclear war and only two persons survived he wanted them both to be Americans.

A year later, on June 24, 1968, the Senate voted funds for the deployment of an ABM system known as Sentinel, which had been developed but not put in service. Three days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced that his government was ready to begin negotiations. Roger P. Labrie, of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, writes that "SALT, like all previous attempts at negotiating limitations on nuclear weapons, stemmed from the interaction of new weapon programs with prevailing strategic concepts."

Then the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia. The first SALT talk, scheduled for September 30, 1968, was put off, and before the atmosphere had cleared Richard Nixon had succeeded Lyndon Johnson. But the two Presidents differed little in strategic doctrine. Nixon, if anything, was the more concerned with the nuclear race. Finally, the talks began. Kissinger took over. SALT I was signed.

WHAT was SALT I? First, agreement was reached that neither side would deploy a general ABM defense. This was a success, surely—at least for doctrine. There would be little defense against strategic missiles. (Each party was to be allowed two truncated ABM sites, but no more.) Second, the Soviets obtained agreement to nuclear parity with the United States. This was a large achievement for them, in both symbolic and real terms, but one that doctrine allowed the United States to concede. At the time the SALT process began, McNamara calculated that the United States had a three- or four-to-one advantage in number of warheads, which was not the true measure of nuclear power. But the doctrine of assured destruction minimizes the ques-

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tion of advantage. As long as the second strike is devastating, Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350019-3
Superiority, in this perspective, loses its meaning. In July, 1974, after the SALT II negotiations had begun, Kissinger responded to a question in a press conference thus: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it . . . at these levels of numbers?" After a point, numbers meant nothing—to us.

The doctrine of assured destruction holds that the curve relating numbers of weapons to strategic power flattens out at a fairly early stage. It may or may not be chance that this stage was seen to have been reached at about the number and extent of the weapons systems the United States already had in the mid-sixties. In 1971, two of the most gifted and experienced defense intellectuals, Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith (the former an official of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the latter an official of the Nixon Administration), wrote in their book "How Much is Enough?":

The main reason for stopping at 1,000 Minuteman missiles, 41 Polaris submarines and some 500 strategic bombers is that having more would not be worth the additional cost. These force levels are sufficiently high to put the United States on the "flat of the curve."

It may be said that this judgment was reached at a time when the atmosphere of the Vietnam War made it pointless to consider any increases. Even so, there should be no question that the view was sincerely held.

Again, looking back, it seems clear that this doctrinal consideration took the edge off the American disappointment that SALT I did not provide for any real arms reduction. The United States had hoped to put a freeze on the development of any further heavy missiles, with their greater capacity to knock out an enemy's ability to retaliate after a first strike. But the Russians were going ahead with both their SS-18 and SS-19, and there was no stopping them. In ballistic-missile-firing submarines, the Russians were accorded a numerical advantage of sixty-two to our forty-four to "compensate" for the greater distances their underwater craft would have to travel to be on station. As noted above, they soon equipped these submarines with a longer-range missile, wiping out their disadvantage, and thus coming out ahead of where they had been. If we were disposed to think that such margins didn't matter, clearly the Russians were not. The United States very much hoped to ob-

tain agreement that neither side would deploy a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile—e.g., the MX—but nothing came of this.

The great and debilitating failure of SALT I, however, is that it did not produce any agreement between the two nations on strategic doctrine. It might have seemed that it did, and certainly Americans hoped that it did, but it did not. This failure was made clear in July, 1972—two months after the treaty was signed—by William R. Van Cleave, a political scientist who has served as an adviser to the SALT delegation. In testimony before a Senate subcommittee headed by Henry M. Jackson, Van Cleave made a point that it was time some political scientist made:

The U.S. arms-control community has always had an academic character and a hyper-rationalistic approach to arms control that assumes arms control to be an intellectual problem rather than a political one.

Van Cleave was critical of the "eagerness" of the American negotiators for an agreement that, he felt, led them repeatedly to change positions. He was scornful of the belief, as he saw it, that we and the Soviets shared an overriding common goal of strategic stability as defined by American strategic and arms-control concepts. The over-all evidence, he said, "is persuasive that the Soviet leaders do not share our assured-destruction doctrine. That they do is an unsupportable notion."

What doctrine *did* the Soviets espouse? This seemed evident enough to Van Cleave: "The Soviets—in contrast to the United States—have seen the strategic-force balance as an expression of political power." It had been McNamara's view, and it persisted, "that the strategic-force balance had no important political meaning." Whatever the case, it was clear to Van Cleave that the Soviets thought otherwise. To have the power to blow up the world three times was to have more power than did he who could blow it up only twice. The Soviet military seemed to have a simple notion that more was better than less. There were, at the very least, those among them who were prepared to think of nuclear wars as winnable, in the sense that one side would emerge better off than the other. This sort of thinking, of course, is incompatible with the doctrine of assured destruction.

The Soviet Union's military were, in any event, very much in control. Strategic doctrine in the Soviet Union is not made by professors. In his book

"My Country and the World," Andrei D. Sakharov, the Russian physicist, recounts an event in 1955 in Siberia, where he had successfully tested a Soviet hydrogen bomb:

The evening after the test, at a private banquet attended only by the officials in charge of the tests, I proposed a toast that "our handiwork would never explode over cities." The director of the tests, a high-ranking general, felt obliged to respond with a parable. Its gist was that the scientists' job is to improve a weapon; how it is used is none of their business.

The American negotiators of SALT I were to learn early on just how firmly the Soviet military were in charge when they found that they knew more about Soviet strategic forces than did their Soviet civilian counterparts. Military secrets are not widely shared in the Soviet Union, and at one point in the negotiations a Russian general suggested to an American that it wasn't necessary to talk about such matters in the presence of—what?—unauthorized listeners! Soviet military plans were not, in any significant measure, subject to negotiation with Americans or anyone else. In consequence, the Americans returned home to face a second negotiation with their own military. What seems to happen in SALT talks is that when negotiators have, in effect, agreed with the military forces of another nation that those forces should be increased they are almost required to return and agree with their own military forces that their forces should be increased also. It is a matter of relationships. If the Russians were building a Caribbean fleet, and the United States was either ignoring this or else snarling and snapping and threatening, American admirals, while they would certainly be urging a Baltic fleet or some such countermeasure, could nonetheless be told to stay out of the argument and leave foreign affairs to the President. But once the President had agreed with the Soviets that it was quite acceptable for them to have a flotilla in the Caribbean he simply would not be in a position to tell his own admirals that they would be allowed no compensatory increases. He could, of course, but he would be discredited as a man who preferred the interests of other people's military to his own. In a situation where the Soviet military always insists on more, the process will always end with the American military insisting on more as well.

One display Secretary Brown brought to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last July compared the Poseidon

missile, now deployed in the Poseidon nuclear submarines, with the Trident missile that has been designed for the new Trident submarines, the first of which will go to sea sometime next year. Secretary Brown's display ticked off the relevant information:

TRIDENT IMPROVEMENTS OVER POSEIDON

- * Weight—15% greater
- * Fuel—advanced technology, more efficient
- * Accuracy— $\frac{1}{3}$ more accurate at same range
- * Range—twice as great
- * Explosive power—twice as great

Those who follow weaponry would have noted that the new missile, with far more destructive power, is nonetheless about the same size as its predecessor. In fact, Trident I missiles can be fitted in the launchers of the Poseidon submarine. (This is now being done, with the result that our submarine fleet will have much greater megatonnage in its warheads even before the new Tridents begin to be commissioned.)

As one thought connects to another, I found my attention drifting away from Secretary Brown's exhibit and back to a sunny June day in 1977, my first year in the Senate, with many things still unfamiliar. The Navy was launching a new submarine, the U.S.S. New York City—the first warship ever named for our town—and I had been asked to speak at the ceremonies in the shipyard of the Electric Boat company, in Groton, Connecticut, where it was to be launched. I had done a spell in the Navy at the end of the Second World War, and shipyards were familiar. But as the official party walked along to the ways where the modest New York City awaited us, a never equalled leviathan hove in sight. There, broadside to the river—for it would fair stretch to the opposite bank if launched in the conventional manner—was the hull of the first Trident submarine. There has never been such a thing, and anyone who has been to sea would know it. My U.S.S. Quirinus, 40-mm. gun mounts and all, could have been taken on board as a ship's launch. James R. Schlesinger, then Secretary of Energy, was walking beside me. He had been Secretary of Defense during the period when the Trident program was getting under way, and he recalled expressing misgivings about it, saying that the boats were too big, too vulnerable—that smaller ones would have done better. What had possessed us? I asked. It was the price of SALT I, Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350019-3

And so an American buildup of sorts commenced, ending the long freeze of

the late nineteen-sixties. But we hadn't our heart in it; we just did it. We never admitted to ourselves that the Russians did not accept deterrence as doctrine; that, unless stopped by the most forceful intervention, they would build until they achieved superiority. They might, for example, have been told in 1969 that this would be a wholly unattainable goal. That we would outspend them two to one. That we would still be spending when they were bankrupt. But this was a threat we could not make, even though, ironically, it is one we could have carried out. I fear that those may turn out to have been the days when the peace of the world was irretrievably lost.

THEY did not seem so. Nixon deeply desired that a SALT II agreement—a permanent treaty this time—would put an end to increases in nuclear weapons and possibly bring about actual decreases. But he fell, and negotiations made no progress in that direction under President Ford, although he, too, was altogether committed to the process. Then came the new Carter team, including many old faces from the Johnson years. They were hopeful, even exhilarated by the opportunity they now had, and they moved quickly with a bold proposal.

In March, 1977, the Carter Administration, in the person of Cyrus Vance, who had been Deputy Secretary of Defense under Johnson and was now Secretary of State, proposed to Moscow a significant reduction in nuclear weapons. This Comprehensive Proposal would have reduced the number of launchers for MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) from 1,320, which had emerged as the lowest level the Soviets would accept, to between 1,100 and 1,200, with a separate sublimit of 550 on the number of MIRVED ICBMs, the most accurate and worrisome kind. (A MIRVED missile has more than one warhead, each of which can be independently aimed at a different target. As the "bus" travels through space, it ejects first one warhead, then another, in different trajectories and at different velocities.) Five hundred and fifty is the number of MIRVED ICBMs the United States has deployed.

Paul Nitze, who has been officially involved in arms negotiations under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon (there are not many qualified persons in this field, and careers show field of policy), has testified that Vance's 1977 proposal offered the So-

viets "complete assurance against any significant counterforce threat from the United States." But the Russians abruptly turned it down. Gromyko was scarcely polite. He all but suggested that to propose to the Soviets that they reduce strategic arms was an insult. (To be sure, his actual remarks were addressed to the suddenness with which the proposal was made.) In any event, with significant reductions dismissed, the SALT II negotiations proceeded to a wan conclusion, the basic numbers almost unchanged after two and a half years of negotiations by the new team. At Vladivostok, in 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev had agreed that each party should have 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers), with a sublimit of 1,320 MIRVED missiles plus bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles. (A cruise missile is essentially a pilotless plane. Unlike a ballistic missile—which simply goes where it has been aimed, like a bullet—a cruise missile can be directed in flight.) SALT II reduces this over-all limit to 2,250 by 1981, but without any consequence. The Soviets will scrap some antiquated missiles they have probably kept around only for bargaining purposes. We will hold on to our B-52s—planes that are now as old as the pilots who fly them. SALT II limits the number of warheads per MIRVED ICBM, but each side is to be permitted an entirely new ICBM and to improve its existing ones within limits that may or may not permit fundamental advances. There are no limitations of significance.

Once again, a second negotiation took place back in Washington. The result was the MX. Recall that a principal American objective in SALT I was to prevent the Soviets from building any more heavy missiles, which they proceeded to do regardless. Again, no reduction in modern heavy missiles could be agreed to; thus SALT II provided that the Soviets should continue to have 308 and we should continue to have none. Opponents of SALT II make much of this "imbalance." But, as Ambassador Ralph Earle II, chairman of the American delegation to SALT, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July, the MX, while not a heavy missile, does have as much "equivalent effectiveness as Soviet heavy ICBMs." In a word, the MX is a counterforce missile. And that is what the issue has been from the first. The United States would now do what we vowed we would never do. And so SALT II produced precisely the advance in counter-

force weaponry which SALT I had hoped to prevent. Spokesmen for the Carter Administration began to stress that the content of the treaty really didn't matter much, that it was the process that had to be preserved.

But if the process meant anything, it had to be one that protected assured destruction as a strategic doctrine. The proposal to go ahead with the MX implied that we ourselves were abandoning that doctrine. Of course, by 1979 assured destruction was already in ideological danger in its own sanctuaries. Newhouse, likening much of the debate in the nineteen-sixties to earlier debates about heresy, also notes that heresies somehow never die out. However much orthodoxy always asserted itself in the end, McNamara continued to have doubts. In 1964, less than two years after his Ann Arbor speech, he declared in a Defense Department "posture statement" that "a damage-limiting strategy appears to be the most practical and effective course for us to follow." Such a strategy would involve trying to destroy some of an adversary's missiles in order that his retaliatory strike would not be so devastating. (Of course, implicit in this concept is the possibility that the United States might, after all, strike first—in response, for example, to a Soviet invasion of Europe.) At this time, United States missiles were presumably aimed at Russian cities. McNamara acknowledged that a damage-limiting strategy would require greater forces than the "cities only" strategy, but he thought it would be worth it, especially with a Chinese nuclear force coming on line. In 1966, he appeared to favor an anti-Chinese ABM system. This would be a "thin" system, designed to defend against only a few missiles. The Russians would know that such a system was not directed against their large and growing force, simply because it would offer no effective defense. The proposal is worthy of note as an example of logic producing illogic. The reasoning that led to the decision was flawless, save that the Chinese had no missiles. McNamara soon enough recanted. In the middle of the Vietnam War, he could scarcely ask for more nuclear weapons, but his doubts were on record. He was not alone.

In the spring of 1968, just as the SALT talks were about to begin, Harold Brown, then Secretary of the Air Force, told the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee:

In addition to the capability, our measurement of deterrence should include two other criteria, less

central but still important: (1) ratios of surviving population and industry must be high, and (2) the surviving military balance should remain in our favor... if deterrence should fail, a favorable surviving military balance could make it easier for us to negotiate an end to the war and limit further damage to the United States.

At this time, Schlesinger, still at Rand, commenced to argue that the United States could not allow the Soviets to develop an "asymmetric capacity against us." That is to say, they should not have a counterforce capability greater than our own. For either side to have such a capacity would be fatal to the doctrine of assured destruction, properly construed; for both to have it would be doubly fatal. Schlesinger persisted, and in 1973, as Secretary of Defense, he proposed that the United States develop a "heavy throw-weight" missile to offset Soviet developments. This missile became the MX.

More to the point, in the course of the nineteen-seventies Pentagon officials began to talk openly of targeting Soviet military facilities in terms of "limited strategic options." The Trident II missile, to be deployed aboard the giant submarine, would verge upon a counterforce capability. (Submarine-launched missiles are still not as accurate as land-based missiles. Thus, while they are fully effective in an assured-destruction mode—they can be sure of hitting Leningrad, for example—they are less so in a counterforce mode, where the target is a hole in the ground ten or fifteen feet in diameter, requiring that a warhead land within several hundred feet or so in order to "kill.") Nothing dramatic by way of a great debate ending in a break with previous policy occurred. Rather, as the Soviets crept toward a first-strike capability, American strategic doctrine slowly changed also. This was never really acknowledged, except in the edginess and growing anxiety of those who could sense the drift of events but could not arrest them.

An episode in the fall of 1976 revealed the depths of this anxiety. Once each year, the intelligence community produces the National Intelligence Estimate, known locally as the N.I.E. A measure of grumbling began about the relative optimism concerning Soviet intentions and kept being repeated. Leo Cherne, of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, had the inspired notion to set up competing estimate and one to challenge it. George Bush, as Director of the Central Intel-

ligence Agency, had the self-confidence and good grace to agree. The exercise went forward and was concluded. The B Team made a powerful case—more so than had been anticipated. In October, word of the exercise leaked; in December, the *Times* reported the results. The B Team, headed by Richard Pipes, of Harvard, had come to the conclusion that the Russians were seeking strategic superiority.

The indignation in Washington was palpable. The very suggestion was greeted with horror, as will happen when a doctrine grows rigid. The B Team members were near to anathematized. They had been invited to challenge the conventional wisdom, but they had made too good a case. Senator Malcolm Wallop subsequently observed:

While consciously refusing to entertain the Soviets' own conception of what they are about militarily, the authors of the NIE's over the years have evaluated Soviet strategic forces using indexes which tend to stress our own doctrine of MAD.

The 1976 N.I.E., Wallop noted, did mention that the Soviets seem to think in terms of ability to win nuclear wars. Nevertheless, the estimates continued to interpret both United States and Soviet forces according to the criterion of assured destruction. But how could this interpretation be reconciled with Soviet conduct? By 1976, they were (as they still are) spending twelve to fourteen per cent of their gross national product on defense—the sign, if the nineteen-thirties offer any evidence, of a country planning to go to war. "Bureaucratic inertia" was an explanation put forth, and it could well be the right one, although "momentum" might be the better term. But after a point larger possibilities had to be confronted. In his 1978 annual report as Secretary of Defense, Brown said that because of "a substantial and continuing Soviet strategic effort," the strategic balance "is highly dynamic." Although puzzled as to "why the Soviets are pushing so hard to improve their strategic nuclear capabilities," he noted that "we cannot ignore their efforts or assume that they are motivated by consideration either of altruism or of pure deterrence." Then, in May, 1979, in the commencement address at Annapolis, Brown asserted that Moscow had long sought to threaten American land-based missiles and would probably be able to achieve this capability in the early nineteen-eighties. In an analysis of the speech, Richard Burt, of the *Times*, a formidably well informed

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and well connected journalist, offered the judgment that **Approved For Release 2005/04/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350019-3** he accepted the B Team's analysis.

As perspectives on Soviet conduct began to change, American conduct began to be seen in different light also. Was it the case that the Soviets were "catching up"? Were we "falling behind"? It must be understood that these were new questions. In the McNamara era, it had been assumed that American strategic superiority was as certain as was the validity of American strategic doctrine. But now it began to be noted that while the United States budget for strategic arms had been level for a decade and a half, that of the Soviets had continued to rise. In rough terms—they can only be that—the Soviets since 1968 have been outspending the United States in strategic forces by a margin of two to one. Dr. Perry reported to the Foreign Relations Committee that current United States spending on strategic forces is about \$12 billion a year, while the Soviets spend on the order of \$25 billion. (More recently, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported that the Soviet Union spent a total of \$140 billion on all its armed forces in 1977—almost one-third of all military spending in the world. The United States spent \$101 billion. Wohlstetter calculates that American strategic spending, in constant dollars, actually peaked back in fiscal 1952.) The Soviet buildup has been steady over a generation now, leading an arms-control expert from the Kennedy era to remark recently that if the familiar man from Mars were to be presented with a chart showing the rise of Soviet weaponry over the past three decades and told that somewhere during that period an arms-limitation agreement was signed with the United States, the visitor would be quite unable to pick the year.

The result is to be seen in numbers of warheads. If plotted, it would be seen that the Soviet curve has been steeper for some time now—up from a more than five-to-one disadvantage in 1967 to less than two-to-one today, on to parity in 1985 and to superiority thereafter, if the trends persist.

Number of warheads, however, is not the only measure of nuclear power. Size matters, and accuracy matters even more. It is not a question of projecting a time when the Soviets will have attained superiority; they have already done so. In this area, Nitze's estimates are indispensable, both because they are his and because they are

public. In throwweight—the pounds of "payload" that can be sent aloft—Nitze estimates that the Soviets by 1977 had an advantage of 10.3 million pounds to the United States' 7.6 million, this being the effect of the Soviet heavy missiles. By 1985, he projects a widened gap: 14.5 million for the Soviets, eight million for the United States. The gap is even more dramatic in the critical category of explosive power—in what is called "equivalent megatonnage." Nitze gives the Soviets a nearly three-to-one advantage for 1977: 9,319 equivalent megatons for the Soviets, 3,256 for the United States. For 1985, he projects a slightly widened gap but not greatly increased amounts of megatonnage on either side.

HOW did this come about? As near an answer as we are likely to get is that a synergistic relationship developed between the doctrine of assured destruction and the combined restraints on the United States imposed by the experience of Vietnam and the hopes aroused by détente. If this seems complicated, let it be said that nothing simple is likely to explain how the world's most powerful military nation lost its advantage over an economically and technologically inferior competitor in the course of a decade—and with almost no one noticing.

The doctrine of assured destruction, as I have noted, holds that the curve relating numbers of weapons to strategic power flattens out at a fairly early stage. One of the virtues of the assured-destruction doctrine was that it permitted the civilians in the Pentagon and in the Bureau of the Budget to form an estimate of what the military really needs. How many warheads, for example, were required to insure that fifty per cent of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union would be destroyed in a second strike? The doctrine fitted in surprisingly well with the management ethos that McNamara and others brought to defense issues. It suited even better the needs of the government leaders of the later nineteen-sixties who, while seeking strategic-arms limitations, were also waging war in Vietnam. Holding back expenditure in the strategic area eluded the fury that would have arisen had they proposed otherwise, and may have moderated opposition to the war. (An interesting aftermath: those most bitter about the Vietnam policies of the Johnson era are today likely to be most supportive of the strategic policies put

in place by that Administration, while those who supported Johnson in Vietnam are likely now to be suspicious of SALT.)

These considerations were, if anything, even more intensive in Nixon's first term. Certain defense intellectuals of the Johnson era began to assert that Soviet strategic behavior was basically imitative of ours—two apes on a treadmill, as the image went—overlooking, presumably, that the fondest hope of the community in the early sixties was that Soviet behavior *would* become imitative. In any event, this was presented as an argument against increasing American forces. Then Nixon embarked on the policy of détente with the Soviets, which added further grounds for allowing United States force levels to remain frozen. And that is what happened.

The irony of all this was nicely illustrated in an article in *The New Republic*, in August, 1979, by the journalist Morton Kondracke. At the end of July, Henry Kissinger had testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, declaring himself not so much opposed to SALT II—he allowed he would have initialled the treaty—as in favor of great new military expenditures to prevent a further weakening of the United States of a sort that, he said, had brought about a "crisis situation threatening the peace of the world." Kondracke interpreted this as the familiar (although puzzling) charge that Democrats are somehow soft in these matters. He seems to have taken the charge personally. In any event, he retorted with some vehemence:

According to Kissinger, when the US left Vietnam, the Republican administration of which he was a part planned to build major new strategic weapons systems: the B-1 bomber by 1981, the MX missile by 1983, the Trident submarine and missile by 1979, and various kinds of cruise missiles in the 1980s. These weapons would have reversed the trend toward Soviet superiority, "but every one of these programs has been canceled, delayed, or stretched out by the current administration."

Kissinger's version of history scarcely squares with the facts or with Pentagon figures. Far from trying to reverse the strategic doctrines of the Johnson administration, Kissinger and President Nixon accepted them completely. The US land-based missile force was not increased by a single launcher during eight years of Republican administration. In fact, the Nixon and Ford administrations cut back on strategic spending from the levels reached in the closing Johnson years. Johnson's last budget called for \$22 billion in strategic outlays, but the Ford and Nixon administrations averaged \$10 billion a year in comparable

dollars. Some cuts were imposed by Congress, but most were called for in the Ford budgets. It's true, few liberals were impressed when Republican officials boasted that they were continuously cutting defense spending, but they really were.

All true enough. The Nixon-Ford years were a time of unprecedented increase in social spending, and of decline in military spending. Rather like the Hitchcock film in which the diamond is hidden in the chandelier, this information was effectively concealed from the American people by publishing it in the budget. It may well prove that the historic mission (as Governor Jerry Brown might say) of the Carter Administration is to increase defense spending and cut social spending. There is a mild law of opposites in American politics. Republicans frequently do what Democrats promise, and the other way around. President Carter was the most dovish of candidates in 1976, promising to cut the defense budget by five to seven billion dollars a year. Nothing of the sort happened, however. Social spending was effectively frozen, but defense spending began immediately to rise. In an address in Washington on September 27th of this year, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, made a good deal of this:

While our critics say they would have been strong for defense if they had remained in office, in fact, defense spending in constant dollars declined in seven of the eight years of the Nixon-Ford Administration. For the past decade, there has been a steady decline in the level of the defense budget in real dollar terms. We began to reverse that trend in the first three budgets of the Carter Administration, and President Carter is the first President since World War II to succeed in raising defense spending for three straight years in peacetime.

Brzezinski was not just taking credit for increasing defense spending. He was asserting that his Administration, unlike its predecessors, was awake to the Soviet challenge. It has been a quiet development, this emergent challenge. Those who spy some special cunning at work have a difficult case to make. The plain fact is, as Van Cleave testified in 1972, that the Soviets never gave any indication that they accepted assured destruction as a strategic doctrine and would not seek nuclear superiority. How does the proverb go? The fox knows many things, the hedgehog knows one thing. The one thing their hedgehog heads seemed to know is that more is better. So they kept getting more. In this

manner, the Soviets have acquired, or capability against our land-based ICBMs. We hope to do the same to theirs. Everything the SALT process was designed to prevent has come about.

The Soviets did not do this by cheating or by startling technological breakthroughs. They did it by the steady accumulation of more missiles (an additional thousand in the course of the nineteen-seventies) with greater accuracy, and more warheads with greater explosive power. They aimed them, as evidently they have always done, at our silos—in violation, that is, of our doctrine that they should be aimed at our cities, so that they could retaliate with vast destruction in case we attacked first. They either now can or soon will be able to take out our silos, leaving the United States with a much reduced second-strike capability. Not enough, it is generally thought. Besides, Nitze writes, the Soviets now have a third and fourth strike—an ability to deter our retaliatory strike by threatening our surviving cities and population. If it is all unthinkable, the Soviets seem nonetheless to have been thinking about it.

As have we. Heresy and recantation abound, and one of the more striking events of the SALT II debate so far is that both Secretary Brown and Kissinger appear to have joined Schlesinger. In his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on July 11th, Brown said that the Administration's primary goal was maintaining essential equivalence with Moscow in nuclear forces, but that to do it "we need to show the Soviets that they do not have an advantage in attacking military targets—that we, too, can do so." And he elaborated a bit, in response to a question from Senator George McGovern: "It is not a matter of us pushing the Soviets into being able to destroy our silo-based missiles. They have gone that route." Brown stressed that the mobile MX missiles, in addition to being able to survive attack, had another attribute: "Because of their accuracy and their warhead capability they will be able to hit Soviet silos, and that will, indeed, give the Soviets a motive for going away from silo-based missiles."

A month after testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Kissinger spoke in Brussels at a meeting of military experts. As reported, he said he now believed that successive United States Administrations, including the Nixon and Ford Administrations, were wrong in thinking they could adequately protect the United

States and Western Europe against strategic nuclear force primarily designed to wipe out Russian cities and factories rather than to strike at missile silos and other military targets. The policy of mutual assured destruction had created a "paradoxical world [in which] it is the liberal, humane, progressive community that is advocating the most blood-thirsty strategies." It was absurd, he continued, "to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide." It was necessary for the United States to develop a new nuclear "counterforce capability" consisting of missiles designed to be used against military targets rather than civilian ones.

Herein resides the final irony of the SALT process. Not only has it failed to prevent the Soviets from developing a first-strike capability; it now leads the United States to do so. The process has produced the one outcome it was designed to forestall. And so we see a policy in ruins.

WHAT are we to do? First, we must try to get some agreement on what our situation is. Is it wrong to think that something of the sort is emerging? The Washington Post noted on August 1st, "Here it is barely midsummer, and a growing chorus of important voices (whose opposition had been most feared) is saying that the treaty itself is no villain, that its ratification is almost a matter of indifference, that the fundamental strategic problems that most concern them are in fact beyond the power of the treaty, *as such*, either to remedy or even make much worse."

Jimmy Carter is the exception. On July 31st, the same day Kissinger testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, the President declared, in Bardstown, Kentucky, that SALT II will "stop the Soviets' buildup." It will not do anything of the sort. Nor does anyone in the Carter Administration who is in a position to know argue any longer that it does. Last spring and summer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, were unanimous in their conclusion that Soviet strategic power, under the agreement, would expand beyond what it is now. At the July 11th meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General David C. Jones, said, "Some may conclude that the agreement, by itself, will arrest the very dangerous adverse trends in Soviet strategic forces, including current

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and projected qualitative improvements. This is simply **Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350019-3** And later: "Similarly, the focus on constraining what the Soviets could do without a SALT agreement had obscured the more fundamental recognition of what they have done, are doing, and can do within the SALT framework." The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, George M. Seignious II, has stated that the Soviets will continue to engage in a "relentless" strategic-arms buildup with or without the SALT II treaty.

We can hope that the President now knows he has been wrong. If this is so, we can hope he will say so. The SALT II treaty is in trouble, because many senators feel it has been misrepresented. A profound change could take place if the President were simply to say that it is a chilling agreement but the best he could get, and that it is in our interests only if SALT III brings true reductions. Secretary Vance, in his letter of June 21, 1979, submitting the treaty to the President for transmission to the Senate, said, candidly enough, "For the first time, we will be slowing the race to build new and more destructive weapons." If the President were to say only as much—that we are at most slowing the race—things could be different. If he does not, there is no alternative save to oppose him on the facts, and try to develop a national policy without him. This is not easily done *with* a President engaged. But, in my view, it must be done. For those in charge of American strategic policy—including the President, whether or not he has thought it through—are now advocating a course of action which, if successful, will bring about the very nuclear face-off that not ten years ago was unhesitatingly defined as the worst-case condition. This is to say that the United States and the Soviet Union will be confronting each other knowing that both have the capacity to attack and destroy the other's land-based missile forces, and can do so in forty-five minutes.

If still further irony is desired, it may be noted that, in the most explicit way, American behavior has turned out to be imitative of the Soviets. This was implicit in the aftermath of SALT I, when the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber were agreed to. But these weapons were at least compatible with an assured-destruction doctrine. The price of SALT II, negotiated within the Administration before the treaty was even signed, was the MX missile. From

the time Schlesinger first proposed it, the United States had a counterforce missile. In other words, after only two rounds of negotiations, acquiring a counterforce capacity has become the condition of salvaging the very negotiations that were begun with the object of preventing either side from obtaining a counterforce capacity.

In any event, the world is sure to be different for the United States, and considerably less secure. Within months, the Soviet Union will have the capacity to destroy the Minutemen, our land-based deterrent. These are the missiles that were meant to deter the Soviets from initiating any nuclear exchange. Following such a first strike by the Soviets, an American President could send in bombers and launch our submarine missiles. No one can estimate the horror that would follow in the Soviet Union and then, of course, in the United States. It may be that this prospect will be sufficient to deter the Soviets from launching a first strike, whatever the degree of provocation or panic. But is there reason to suppose that nuclear superiority will have no effect on their international behavior? Certainly men such as Nitze think otherwise. He writes:

To some of us who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in 1962, or the Middle East crisis in 1973, the last and key judgment in this chain of reasoning—that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences—comes as a shock. In the Berlin crisis of 1961 our theater position was clearly unfavorable; we relied entirely on our strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Khrushchev's ultimatum. In Cuba, the Soviet Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying. In the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced; both sides compromised.

It is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect international politics and diplomacy from the underlying real power balances. The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence—military, economic, or political—rest.

In any international crisis seriously raising the prospect that the military arms of the United States and of the USSR might become engaged in active and direct confrontation, those directing U.S. and Soviet policy would have to give the most serious attention to the relative strategic nuclear capabilities of the two sides.

Unequal accommodation to the Soviet Union would then have resulted not in cooperation and peace but in forced withdrawal.

It has been said that the Soviets have learned to live with American nuclear

superiority and that we can learn to live with their nuclear superiority. No doubt we can. But will anyone assert that in such circumstances we will not be living differently? And if one is drawn to the unhappy conclusion that the SALT process has not limited the number of weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union, what are we to think about the nature of world politics when many nations possess the nuclear weapon? What will be *their* views—the views of India, Pakistan, South Korea, Israel, South Africa, Libya, Argentina, Brazil, perhaps others—on deterrence, assured destruction, and the rest? Kissinger suggests that once the present state of affairs is understood, "panic" will spread through the world.

THE decisive technological event that led to the shift in the balance of power, it seems to me, was the deployment of MIRVs—a term first used in public in 1967. Packing a number of warheads on each missile no doubt seemed an elegant and economical solution to the problems that the Johnson Administration faced. (In the United States, development of MIRV began in 1965. The first flight tests took place on August 16, 1968. The first Soviet test took place five years later, in August, 1973.) But it profoundly transformed the significance of the Soviets' huge rockets, with their tremendous throwweight. Once the Soviets could install MIRVs, they were bound to be "ahead." As viewed in hindsight, it might have been perceived that the MIRV technology would work ultimately to the Soviet advantage. If it were the case that the American interest in MIRV was related to a desire to overcome a putative ABM system in Russia, the elimination of ABM should have argued simultaneously for the elimination of MIRV as well. But this assuredly did not happen. So long as no one had a defense, deterrence doctrine tended to ignore the proliferation of offensive weapons.

In what sense, it is asked, do the Soviet heavy missiles mean that the Soviets are "ahead"? This is the question with which adherents to assured destruction automatically respond when the Soviet superiority is mentioned. President Carter, in his 1979 State of the Union Message, reported that "just one of our relatively invulnerable Poseidon submarines... carries enough warheads to destroy every large and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union." His proposal that the Soviet missiles be deployed on a race-track system was

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openly a response to those who question whether submarines alone provide assured destruction. The *Times*, on September 11th, stated that "President Carter's choice of a new basing system to make American missiles mobile and invulnerable to surprise attack removes the only real obstacle to ratification of the SALT treaty." This is, of course, the Administration's view also; as long as a second strike is assured, received strategic doctrine remains valid, and technicalities such as the size of an adversary's forces are not relevant. This is to say that if the Soviets are "ahead" merely in the sense that they have more, it just doesn't matter that much.

And what happens if we don't, in fact, build the MX? The deference structure that previously surrounded nuclear strategy is no more. (Who, reading this article, can remember noting that the Johnson Administration had decided to develop a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle?) In a nation where nuclear power plants can no longer be built, does anyone seriously suppose that the government can dig up Utah and Nevada to put in place our largest missiles without arousing passionate opposition, of which the statement of the Federation of American Scientists is merely a foretaste? The opposition to the Alaska pipeline will be recalled; a key amendment protecting the pipeline from court challenges by environmentalists passed the Senate by one vote. The Air Force has identified thirty-eight federal laws that could have bearing on the MX and on the vast network of shelters that will have to be dug in Utah and Nevada in order to hide it. (This list still overlooks the Wild, Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act of 1971.) In Washington, it is all too plain that a considerable body of opinion is remaining muffled on the MX so as not to jeopardize SALT II. Once SALT II is adopted, this opposition will become open, and will find leadership in the political world from prominent, even dominant figures such as Governor Brown, who has opposed the MX with special intensity.

If environmental obstacles fail, opposition will surely arise to the spending involved. Indeed, it already has arisen. Early in the debate on SALT II, it was reasonably safe to assume that there was a high correlation between support for the treaty and opposition to defense spending. The correlation was not perfect, but it was significant. Thus, on January 26th, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a dependable critic,

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statement fiercely attacking the Carter Administration's 1980 budget, "Only defense receives a real increase in funding." He said these increases should be given the closest scrutiny:

First, in the strategic field, we should not reorient our defense posture more to fight a nuclear war than to prevent it. We should not develop weapons systems that increase the threat of nuclear war. We should not buy weapons to appease the opponents of SALT.

Here our number one concern ought to be the MX missile and its basing system. The Administration plans to spend nearly \$1 billion in the FY 1979 Supplemental and the FY 1980 budget. This billion is but a foot in the door for many additional billions. Even without cost overruns, the system will cost us at least \$30 billion to build and deploy.

The MX missile is highly accurate and devastating. It is so threatening to Soviet nuclear forces that it could tempt Soviet leaders to strike us first in a crisis. The result will be unparalleled destruction to both societies.

But President Carter went ahead in any event. And then went beyond that. Carter had accepted increases in defense spending; he now began to advocate them. Public-opinion polls showed that the strongest argument for SALT II was that it would improve our strategic position. The public felt strongly that we should not cut defense spending if there was a new SALT treaty, and many seemed to think the right course was to have both—SALT II and a bigger defense budget. Whatever the case, SALT II was no more than signed when the President—"to the consternation of liberals," as the political scientist William Schneider observes—began to argue that the new treaty allows for higher United States military spending in order to reach parity with the Soviet Union. More immediately, a number of senators, such as Sam Nunn, began to state that they could not support any treaty unless there was such an increase in military spending. The Administra-

tion agreed, and before long the SALT debate had produced what Richard Falk, of Princeton, who does not at all approve, has called "a mood of bipartisan militarism." Senator Ernest F. Hollings said:

The SALT hearings did have a shocking effect on this Congress and on the people of the United States... Rather than a disarmament arms limitation, we had, in contrast, rearmament hearings and a rearmament conference and a rearmament treaty between the American people and our leadership.

In the course of all this, the Senate doves of a sudden found themselves in a hawk trap. In 1972, the SALT I ABM treaty passed easily, by a vote of 88 to 2, but by the autumn of 1979 it was hard to count thirty-five votes for SALT II. If a resolution of ratification were to pass, a great many undecided votes would have to be obtained, and many of these set as their price an increase in defense spending. Senator Nunn called for a true increase of five per cent per year for the coming five-year period. On September 18th, the Senate, by an overwhelming 78-19 vote, agreed to a true increase of three per cent for the coming fiscal year. (Kennedy voted for the increase, and has come out in favor of development, but not deployment, of the MX.) Next, by a surprising 55-42 vote, a five-per-cent true increase was agreed to for fiscal years 1981 and 1982. The 1982 defense appropriation would be in the neighborhood of \$170 billion. The total outlay for fiscal 1976 was \$87.9 billion.

A case can be made for this fall's increases. (I supported both.) But not for the blindness with which the Administration and its supporters are going about it. The dominant mood in the last Congress was to bring a halt to increases in federal spending. This culminated in an amendment to a tax-cut bill in 1978 which was sponsored by Senator Nunn and Senator Lawton Chiles, both Democrats. The amendment, which was passed by the Senate but failed of adoption in the House, would have required that total federal outlays as a proportion of the gross national product decline by stated intervals from 21.5 per cent in 1979 to 19.5 per cent in 1983. Very simply, if the country wants the over-all budget ceiling to come down and the military budget floor to rise, social spending will be crushed. A pretty price for an arms-limitation treaty that increases arms.

Of course, increases of social spending are at least as influential as those who want to see military outlays in-

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creased. The record over the decade, as Dr. Brzezinski's speech of September 27th suggests, is that they are more powerful. There is every reason to think that once SALT II is ratified they will withdraw their support for the military increases, having realized what such costs—the defense budget would about double, to \$250 billion by fiscal 1985—will mean to domestic outlays. There is room for much misunderstanding and not a little bitterness in all this.

And if these pressures are not sufficient, the Soviets will surely launch a determined propaganda campaign. The MX, they will say—have said!—is contrary to the "spirit of SALT." Those who supported SALT will be rallied to oppose this abandonment of SALT principles. In 1978, the Soviets demonstrated that they could reverse with relative ease the United States' decision to deploy the neutron bomb—the "capitalist" bomb that "destroyed people but not property." The MX missile will certainly arouse yet fiercer passions.

For two decades now, the doctrine of deterrence has led us to believe that strategic superiority doesn't matter. "What in the name of God is strategic superiority?" Kissinger asked. There is a simple answer. Strategic superiority is the power to make other people do what you want them to do. Already, the Soviets, approaching a palpable strategic superiority, give signs that it is their intention to control our defense policy. They set out to block the deployment of the neutron bomb in Europe, and they did. They evidently intend also to try to prevent our deployment of intermediate-range Pershing II missiles in Europe. They have given plain notice that they will not permit the United States to deploy an MX missile that would in fact be an "invulnerable" counterforce weapon. In the best of circumstances, the missiles could not be in place until late in the nineteen-eighties. SALT II, if ratified, expires in 1985. By then, the Soviets will know all there is to know about the capabilities of the new American weapon. They know enough already to be certain that it is a counterforce missile, and we do not pretend otherwise. It will have a combination of yield and accuracy that gives to each warhead a kill probability against a Soviet silo without precedent in our missile force. In response, the Soviets need only say that if we go ahead they will have to abandon the "fractionation" limits of a maximum of 10 warheads per land-based missile which are imposed by SALT II. President Carter has

said that it is these limits which make the MX viable. If the Soviets went the size of their heavy missiles permits, they would effectively have a first-strike capability against the MX. Tom Wicker, writing in the *Times*, states:

Without the limit of 10 warheads per missile... the treaty would impose, the Soviets could put so many warheads on their giant SS-18 missiles that not even the mobile MX missile system could be made safe.

This, alas, is not the likely "scenario." When the Soviets announce that they are increasing the number of warheads per missile, as they will be permitted to do once SALT II expires at the end of 1985, the President of the United States, whoever he is, will announce that in view of this Soviet action our reaction must be to double the size of the MX. Whereupon the Soviets will announce that they are putting mobile missiles on highways. (A trench system will be too expensive for them.) SALT II will have effectively brought an end not only to the hope of arms limitation but to the SALT process itself.

IS there no hope? There is some, if not much. We should be clear that we are in for a very bad time, and that the longer we put off recognizing our condition the worse it will become. It may just be possible to join hawk and dove, liberal and conservative (hopeless, deceitful terms!) in recognizing that we have held to a strategic doctrine that cannot be sustained. It would work only if the Russians shared it, but evidently they do not, and neither do a growing number of Americans. The physicist Freeman Dyson has argued most vigorously that only defense weapons are moral in a nuclear world, making the nice point that we don't have such defenses in part because there is no elegance in their development. In his memoir, "Disturbing the Universe," some of which originally appeared in this magazine, Dyson writes, "The intellectual arrogance of my profession must take a large share of the blame. Defensive weapons do not spring, like the hydrogen bomb, from the brains of brilliant professors of physics. Defensive weapons are developed laboriously by teams of engineers in industrial laboratories." Engineers!

Dyson continues:

Mutual assured destruction is the strategy that has led the United States to build up a massive force of nuclear bombers and missiles, sufficient to destroy the cities

and industries of both countries many times over, while deliberately denying the possibility of a defense.... The basic idea of mutual assured destruction is that the certainty of retaliation will stop anybody from starting a nuclear war.

Dyson is a believer in damage limitation:

The ground on which I will take my stand is a sharp moral distinction between offense and defense, between offensive and defensive uses of all kinds of weapons. The distinction is often difficult to make and is always subject to argument. But it is nonetheless real and essential. And at least its main implications are clear. Bombers are bad. Fighter airplanes and anti-aircraft missiles are good. Tanks are bad. Anti-tank missiles are good. Submarines are bad. Anti-submarine technology is good. Nuclear weapons are bad. Radar and sonar are good. Inter-continental missiles are bad. Anti-ballistic-missile systems are good.

Just as Dyson's views were being published in *The New Yorker*, the political scientist Karl O'Lessker was making almost precisely the same point in *The American Spectator*, an organ of pronounced conservative views:

Older readers will recall that most notorious of all presidential campaign television commercials, the one in 1964 that showed a little girl plucking the petals from a daisy while the voice-over recited the countdown to an all-obliterating nuclear explosion. Paid for by the Democratic National Committee, it was designed to impute to Senator Barry Goldwater a degree of recklessness, bordering on insanity, that would, were he to be elected President, in all likelihood lead to a nuclear holocaust killing tens of millions of little children around the world. The ghastly irony of that commercial is that at the very time it was receiving the personal approval of President Johnson, his own Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was fixing in concrete an American military strategy that had no options other than this nation's surrender or the indiscriminate slaughter of countless millions of civilians here and in the Soviet Union in a militarily pointless nuclear exchange. What makes it all the more appalling is that the Russians, by contrast, were then elaborating a strategy designed to gain victory by destroying Western armed forces while minimizing civilian casualties: an application of classic Clausewitzian doctrine....

It is this reality that underlies the anti-MAD, anti-SALT partisans' call for the development of city-protection systems, from fallout shelters to anti-ballistic missiles. And it is one of the sovereign ironies of our age that the proponents of MAD have succeeded in portraying the anti-SALT camp as being indifferent to the horrors of nuclear war, while in point of fact it is MAD, and MAD alone, that postulates the nuclear annihilation of great cities as the logical culmination to international conflict.

Andrei Sakharov, a fervent supporter of SALT II, in a review of Dyson's

book in the *Washington Post*, made a similar point. Sakharov repeats Dyer's words "Somewhere between the gospel of nonviolence and the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction there must be a middle ground on which reasonable people can stand—a ground that allows killing in self-defense but forbids the purposeless massacre of innocents." Sakharov then comments, "With all my heart and soul, I support this thesis," adding his agreement with George Kennan that first-strike nuclear weapons are both amoral and, in the West, can lead to, in Sakharov's words, "dangerous complacency with regard to conventional weapons." (He refers to the decline of Western conventional arms.)

Moving and humane as such a comment may be, it ignores the fact that, in principle, assured destruction was not an offensive strategy. Cities would be levelled only as a response to aggression: the very terribleness of the response to aggression was supposed to prevent it. It were well that, before abandoning the doctrine, we remember why we adopted it in the first place. But that, in a way, is the most telling point. It is *hard* to remember just why we did it. As a set of ideas, deterrence theory was perhaps not very complex; but it was too complex.

Political ideas must be simple. Which is not to say they must be facile. To the contrary, the most profound propositions are often the simplest as well. Whitehead's rule to "seek simplicity and distrust it" is appropriately cautionary, but he did first of all say: seek simplicity. Imagine explaining assured destruction to a rally. There was a time when no one had to do that, when the essential information was held in a few hands and a deference system made it possible for decisions to be made without much being questioned. That was the political situation in which assured destruction was adopted as national strategy. That situation no longer exists. We will never knowingly agree to start building the MX merely as a bargaining chip, as some have suggested, intent on stopping as soon as a bargain is reached. A shift in American strategy to defensive modes that the Soviets could not think aggressive or destabilizing would now require an open debate on strategic doctrine of the kind we have not had. For what it may suggest, let me note that after a year's immersion in the subject I have no view of my own, save **Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400250018-3** to think that political ideas, in order to be viable, must be simple. Assured

destruction is the kind of idea that **Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400250018-3** is easy to grasp. Damage limitation, by contrast, is insinuctive—the idea of defending oneself is easy to grasp.

BUT, above all, is it not possible to return to the simplicity of the idea that nuclear arms should be controlled? Wohlstetter has remarked of SALT that it is a problem posing as a solution. Part of the problem has been the attachment of the process of negotiation to the specific assumptions of a strategic doctrine that only one side entertained. Yet a further problem has arisen from the unreal notion that there is somehow a distinction between "strategic" nuclear weapons and other kinds. The Pershing II missile, which the United States would like NATO to deploy in Western Europe, is as much a strategic weapon as far as Britain and Holland are concerned as is the Trident in the United States. Almost the best case for SALT II is that SALT III could engage the whole panoply of nation-busting nuclear arms. The United States and the Soviet Union today have far too many nuclear weapons. They ought not to have any. Yet while the other does, both will. But need we have more and more? Need we sign treaties to legitimate an arms race that neither side might be willing shamelessly to go forward with unilaterally?

An agreement on principles accompanying SALT II asserts that it is the intention of the parties to achieve in SALT III what are called "significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms." But already the Carter Administration—this strangely ambivalent Administration whose pronouncements Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., has described as "an antiphonal chorus of hawk and dove"—has been warning us not to expect anything of the sort. Gelb, in his *Foreign Policy* article, noting that "many people insist that only through reductions can one achieve 'real arms control,'" warned against "a fascination with reductions." Not many weeks after the article appeared, this became a distinct Administration line. When the Foreign Relations Committee began in mid-October to "mark up" the SALT II treaty, "highly placed" sources were all over Capitol Hill warning against the very thought that SALT III might produce arms reductions. Vernon A. Guidry, Jr., reported in the *Washington Star*: **Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400250018-3** One key SALT analyst still in government, who did not want to be named,

says any new treaty will have to include reductions because they have come "to represent strategic seriousness."

But as for making "deep cuts" the test of any new agreement, he says, "we've got to get our arms control constituency thinking in a more sophisticated and mature way about these things."

Gelb and other analysts point to the need to look more closely at elements within the over-all total of strategic weapons, such as agreements that would help keep missile submarines safe.

Within government, thorough examination of these questions has only recently begun. There is no expectation of breakthrough negotiations next time. "The next SALT agreement will indeed be modest," said one knowledgeable Pentagon official.

Is it truly not possible to propose to the Soviets that some reductions be negotiated forthwith? So that the world, ourselves included, will know that the time is coming when the strength of our respective forces will at last begin to decline? And if the Russians refuse then at least we will know what we are in for.

A senator can take refuge in what the body calls the "pending business." And that is the SALT II treaty. The debate over its ratification ought to be an opportunity for the illumination of our situation, an opportunity to examine the quality of the ideas that have brought us to our present pass. On August 1st, I proposed an amendment to the treaty in the hope that it might prove clarifying. I have taken the language about "significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms" from the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations which accompanies the treaty and inserted it as the last paragraph of the treaty and specified that unless such reductions are agreed to by December 31, 1981, the treaty terminates.

This date corresponds to the period of a protocol accompanying the treaty which prohibits either side from deploying mobile ICBM launchers—an MX, for instance—or deploying sea-launched or ground-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of six hundred kilometres, of the sort we now contemplate placing in Western Europe. The Joint Statement of Principles provides that these issues will be discussed in SALT III. But on October 26th President Carter assured Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd that he was utterly and irrevocably committed to going forward with both the MX and the cruise missiles and would never bargain them away in return for some reductions. And so it has come to this. Determined above all else

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to win Senate approval for a treaty with arms limitation in the title, a President pledges himself never to limit arms but rather to raise them to unprecedented levels. This, of course, will mean the collapse of SALT III—unless we agree now that by a time certain in the near future actual reductions will be agreed to. This is to say, before the MX momentum is so great that the Russians shift into a yet higher gear in order to outrace us, while we become ever more panicky as the realization spreads that two decades of deterrence have left us desperately exposed to Soviet threat.

I expect all manner of criticism of my particular initiative. It will be argued, by defenders of the SALT process, that two years is too short a time to complete the task. I will be told that wisdom dictates that the pace of arms-reduction negotiations not be forced. Yet one wonders whether such objections by defenders of the process do not indict that very process—by pointing out the futility of trying to make it do what it is supposed to. I will be reminded that the Soviets resisted the proposals for armed reductions offered by Secretary Vance in March of 1977. If they would not agree even to discuss them in 1977, why should they do so now? I believe this question needs to be answered, and as soon as reasonably possible. I think it best that the SALT II treaty itself oblige the Soviets to give us their answer—one way or the other—so that we are no longer able to delude ourselves about our prospects.

We *did* delude ourselves after SALT I. An amendment by Senator Al-an Cranston to the Joint Resolution of Congress that endorsed the Interim Agreement called on the President at the earliest practicable moment to begin "Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (SART)" with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other countries. In a prescient speech on the Senate floor on September 14, 1972, Cranston said:

As I look ahead, I see what looks like endless series of escalators broken only by occasional landings which lead in turn to other escalators. A partial limitation will be followed by a new build-up, which may in turn be limited by a new freeze and superseded by new and sophisticated forms of escalation. And so it will go.

An amendment by Senator Edward S. Brooke declared:

Congress considers that the success of the interim agreement and the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the preservation of longstanding United States policy that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should seek unilateral advantage by developing a first-strike potential.

Clearly, neither expression of congressional intent and desire had the least effect on the outcome of SALT II.

But have we ever probed deeply into Soviet feelings on this matter? We have never asked them to face, directly, the intellectual dilemma of an arms-limitation negotiation that produces arms expansion. Or is this what the Soviets have wanted all along? Surely, they have prospered militarily and geopolitically during the life of the SALT negotiations. Has that been their purpose? We have nothing whatever to lose if we try to find out. At the least, I have been convinced that the SALT process is not self-corrective, and that, accordingly, the energy necessary to change its present direction must be generated from outside the SALT process. It is a process grown unreal, producing results opposite to those intended but thereupon defended as valuable in their own right. Gibbon has been described as detecting a "leakage of reality" in the late Roman Empire. There was a Pope then, and it didn't help, and it may not help that there is one still. But John Paul II certainly had a point when he said, at the United Nations, that the nuclear build-up shows there is "a desire to be ready for war, and being ready means being able to start it."

—DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN