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February 18, 1984

CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET ISSUES:
STATUS AND PROSPECTSI. ARMS CONTROL

START: Status. Soviet deferral of resumption reaffirmed by Gromyko in Stockholm, but with Vice President, Chernenko called nuclear arms control major area for positive US-Soviet discussion. Soviets know we have new things to say on START in restricted channels (Dobrynin pressed Hartman to volunteer Thursday). Prospects. If Framework presented to Soviets soon, some possibility of getting detailed confidential discussion underway over next few months (though they may continue to insist on something on INF/FBS as precondition to serious talks).

INF: Status. Soviets continue fixated on U.S. INF, and refuse resumption without some expression of U.S. "willingness to return to the situation that existed before deployments;" in Stockholm Gromyko shied away even from quiet discussions in restricted channels. Prospects. Near-term chances of renewed separate INF talks minimal. Gromyko pointed toward inclusion of U.S. INF systems in any resumed START talks, was informed that any negotiation dealing with GLCMs and P-IIIs must also deal with SS-20s.

MBFR: Status. Talks to resume March 16. President's letter to Chernenko said we are prepared to introduce some new ideas and to be flexible on data if Soviets flexible on verification. Prospects. Difficult to be too optimistic on these long-running talks, but some forward movement seems possible by summer assuming early Allied agreement on new proposal enabling us to respond to Soviets soon.

US-SOVIET CBMs: Status. January session moved us forward on upgrade of Hotline, but Soviets most reluctant on some of our more ambitious proposals. Soviets appear interested in principle in nuclear terrorism discussions. We are now coordinating USG proposal with Allies before going to Soviets. Prospects. Follow-on session on communications CBMs tentatively set for April; basic Hotline upgrade agreement possible by early summer. Could talk with Soviets on nuclear terrorism within a month assuming Allied support firms up; would not move multilaterally until some agreement with Soviets.

CDE: Status. Early sparring in Stockholm with basic NATO and Soviet approaches still far apart, and Soviets pushing declaratory measures such as Non-Use-of-Force Treaty; NATO seeks substantive notification measures. Prospects. We should pursue private dialogue underway in Stockholm. Realistic compromise proposals may be months or even years off without high-level political decisions, i.e. a package with points satisfying both sides.

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State Dept. review completed

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NON-PROLIFERATION: Status. Third round of highly technical and essentially non-political bilaterals just concluded in Vienna; both sides see them as valuable mechanism for policy coordination in this area. Prospects. Soviets have proposed and we are ready to agree to another session for December.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Status: Secretary Shultz announced to the CDE that we will be presenting a draft CW treaty in coming months; once State and ACDA competing versions are reconciled, a text will be submitted for interagency clearance. OSD opposes concept of such a treaty, but has proposed US-Soviet bilateral verification discussion. Prospects: Final treaty will not be ready for CD submission before April at the earliest; we may wish to pick up bilateral discussion proposal in interim.

NUCLEAR TESTING: Status: Soviets have turned down our proposals to discuss verification before ratification of 1976 TTBT treaty every time, and believe they have the propaganda high ground in calling for discussion only after it is ratified. Prospects: An interagency group is studying further approaches to the Soviets. One option involves ratification of TTBT in exchange for Soviet consent to on-site verification of a few nuclear calibration tests. Some agencies oppose any change in our position on basis of our non-compliance report to Congress.

ASAT ARMS CONTROL: Status. Soviets probably intend to make this major issue and Tsongas Amendment may prevent our testing the U.S. ASAT system absent talks with Soviets. Basically very little possible on this now until fundamental verification problems resolved. Some confidence-building measures are now being discussed within the USG and could be proposed for discussion with Soviets. Prospects: Proposals for CBMs or prohibiting certain acts could be discussed once USG study completed, but would be of less interest to Soviets than ASAT ban.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS: Status. Little dialogue between military establishments except in Incidents-at-Sea context, and we have held back from proposing regular exchanges between Weinberger and Ustinov or Chiefs of Staff. Prospects. A proposal of a Weinberger-Ustinov or Vessey-Ogarkov meeting could be made whenever we deem appropriate. Ex-CJCS David Jones plans to visit Moscow as member of Dartmouth Group delegation in March. Soviets, however, are likely to be extremely cautious until some progress made on other issues.

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II. REGIONAL ISSUES

MIDDLE EAST: Status. Talking with Soviets here and Moscow, and Soviets negotiating with French on UN role in Lebanon.

Prospects. Soviets unlikely to do much to help us in Lebanon, but nervous about Syrian-impelled confrontation with us. Could acquiesce in UN role and possibly eventual Syrian withdrawal in return for commitments on U.S. and Israeli forces. Further discussion in Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko channels could be useful to avoid miscalculation.

AFGHANISTAN: Status. Soviets dug in for long term, but feeling pressure. Talks under UN auspices may resume in April. Pakistan welcomes US-Soviet bilateral contacts as supporting its efforts, but last US-Soviet "experts'" talks in Moscow in July 1982.

Prospects. As pressure on the ground rises, Soviets may look to further cross-border incursions on Pakistan, to UN process and/or to direct talks with us as safety valve. We could make some points about role of guarantors in overall settlement that included withdrawal timetable if we wished to probe their longer-term intentions and prove we support UN process.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: Status. Steady progress now on South African disengagement from Angola, and discussions on shape of final settlement continue with some prospect for success, but Soviets could still block either through SWAPO or in Luanda. Chet Crocker talked with Soviets three times in 1982, but not since.

Prospects. Sending Hartman in with an update could give Soviets a better feel for the dilemmas they face.

KAMPUCHEA: Status. Soviets combine support for Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with more active policy vis-à-vis ASEAN states, and item has not ranked high in bilateral dialogue.

Prospects. No immediate prospects of inducing the Soviets to decrease aid to Hanoi.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

EMIGRATION/ANTI-SEMITISM: Status. Decline in levels of Jewish and other emigration continues, with last year's Jewish total about 3% of 1979 figure. Perennial topic in high-level meetings since 1981; latest "representation lists" on divided families and spouses and U.S. nationals handed over to Gromyko's deputy in Stockholm; Secretary raised anti-Semitism with Dobrynin after Stockholm; Bronfman visit to Moscow now uncertain.

Prospects. Return to large numbers unlikely, but Soviets could make some gestures -- through quiet diplomacy or to public figures -- in election year, and numbers could rise slightly as function of overall atmosphere in relationship.

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SOVIET DISSIDENTS: Status. Andropov era saw rounding up and sentencing of all but a handful of Soviet dissidents. We raise these issues at regular intervals, including at Stockholm, but Sakharov still in Gorkiy, Orlov is going to internal exile after finishing seven-year sentence, and Shcharanskiy is still in jail. Prospects. Again not good, although, again, gestures are probably more possible under Chernenko, and we should encourage through quiet diplomacy.

IV. BILATERAL ISSUES

MARITIME BOUNDARY: Status. We offered a 50-50 split in the disputed territory in the Bering Sea. January negotiations in Washington complicated by unacceptable new Soviet position claiming additional areas for their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf rights. Prospects. New round is expected but not yet scheduled for near future. If Soviets move off their new position, an agreement would be possible within a few months at most. If they dig in, there will be extended negotiations.

KAL SAFETY MEASURES: Status. Discussions have begun in Montreal with Soviets and Japanese on installation of beacons, improved communications, and designation of emergency landing fields in the Soviet Far East along KAL 007 route. Prospects. Soviets have proposed US-Soviet-Japanese experts' group and signalled willingness to take concrete air safety steps under the ICAO umbrella. Action should be possible, but Soviets will remain wary of accepting even implicit responsibility for shutdown, and results could take months.

KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: Status. Advance teams preparing for the formal opening of consulates under 1974 agreement were withdrawn as an Afghanistan sanction; now we have no official presence in Ukraine, while Soviets continue activities in New York out of their UN Mission. Last summer both sides agreed to move forward again, but progress ended with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm, noting timing must be right. Prospects. A negotiating strategy is awaiting NSC approval; Soviets say they are ready to open consulates at any time; talks could resume immediately; agreement could be reached and TDY advance teams could perhaps be in place by summer. Detailed arrangements could delay formal opening for some years.

EXCHANGES AGREEMENT: Status. We allowed US-Soviet cultural exchanges agreement to lapse after Afghanistan. Programs dropped off in both directions, but Soviets can arrange tours through private U.S. organizations, so we cannot exact reciprocity in the absence of agreement. We cannot mount USIA travelling exhibits in the Soviet Union, and Soviets now blocking Hartman's efforts

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to run cultural programs out of his residence. Two sides agreed in principle in July to begin negotiations, but movement stopped with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm. Prospects. Draft proposal is far advanced, but would require high-level approval. It would probably take some months to negotiate agreement, but might be completed this year.

CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS: Status. First round of talks aimed at alleviating some of our ongoing visa and other consular problems with Soviets recessed in May after FBI refused to agree to additional entry point by sea at Baltimore (in addition to San Francisco) in return for two new points offered by Soviets (Brest and Nakhodka). Prospects. If FBI lifts veto on Baltimore, talks could resume at any time and produce balanced package of useful small housekeeping steps.

SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE: Status. Proposed to Soviets in late January. They have yet to respond. Prospects. Soviets have not appeared enthusiastic to date. We need response soon if there is to be any hope of making simulated rescue flight this summer.

COAST GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE TALKS: Status. Soviets agreed just before KAL to discuss S&R procedures with senior Coast Guard officials, looking perhaps toward an agreement on coordination of search operations in Bering Sea. They deflected our December efforts to set up a meeting. Prospects. Soviets would probably agree now. Discussions and a possible agreement could be impressive following our well-publicized frictions during the KAL search and rescue operation.

PRIVATE/CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. Status. Already an upsurge of interest in expanding people-to-people contacts; some in Congress want to invite a Supreme Soviet delegation this year. Prospects. To limit exploitation by Soviets, we might encourage tougher-minded experienced groups like American Council of Young Political Leaders to visit. Supreme Soviet visit could attract major Soviet figure to U.S.

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. 10-year agreement, which has some utility in facilitating U.S. business efforts in Moscow, expires in June. Prospects. U.S. could propose renewal in the next few weeks. The Soviets would probably accept.

JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION: Status. A scheduled meeting was cancelled as an Afghanistan sanction, and this official, cabinet-level body has thus not met since 1978. Prospects. We could propose meeting later this year, assuming we have had a positive response on other economic steps.

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FISHERIES AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. Extended twice under this Administration and up for renewal in July, this agreement has allowed a joint fishing venture that benefits U.S. fishermen. Soviets have not been allowed to fish directly in U.S. waters since Afghanistan. Prospects. Approval of an 18-month extension would permit improved planning by U.S. fisherman. USG could consider giving the Soviets a direct fish allocation at any time.

CURRENT AGREEMENTS: Status. There are US-Soviet cooperative agreements in force on the environment, health (including artificial heart research), housing, and agriculture that have functioned at low levels, partly because of the political atmosphere and partly because of restrictions on high-level US-Soviet contacts. Soviets interested in reviving these exchanges and giving them appropriate leadership. Prospects. Agreements could be given additional content by USG side with the participation of higher-ranking U.S. officials.

NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: Status. A number of agreements were allowed to lapse after Afghanistan, some of which would be in our favor to renegotiate. They include the areas of space, transportation, and basic sciences and engineering. Prospects. Soviets are on record as favoring renewal and expansion of agreements, and these cases, affected agencies also new agreements. Transportation could be renewed by exchange of notes we had partially carried out before KAL. Others would take some time to develop proposals and negotiate agreements.

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