



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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Nicaragua: Support for Regional Insurgency and Subversion

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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SNIE 83.3-2-85/L

March 1985

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SNIE 83.3-2-85/L

NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR
REGIONAL INSURGENCY
AND SUBVERSION

Information available as of 14 March 1985 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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SCOPE NOTE

This NIE is a follow-on to SNIE 83.3-85, *Nicaragua: Prospects for Sandinista Consolidation*, February 1985 [redacted] and NIE 83.1-85, *El Salvador: The Outlook for the Duarte Government*, March 1985 [redacted]

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Those Estimates examined the future outlook for those countries in detail, as well as the implications of continuing Sandinista support for the Salvadoran insurgency. This Estimate provides additional information on the extent of Nicaraguan support for regional insurgents and subversive groups. [redacted]

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Nicaragua's support for insurgents in El Salvador and the rest of Central America remains an integral part of Sandinista foreign policy. Nicaragua also has established ties with other revolutionary groups throughout the hemisphere, developing a more sophisticated network and coordinating its activities more closely with Cuba [REDACTED]

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Nicaraguan support remains a critical factor in sustaining the Salvadoran insurgency. Nonetheless, there appears to have been some reduction of materiel support over the past year, probably as the result of several factors:¹

- Managua's growing problems with its own insurgency and continued direct and indirect US pressure.
- The assessment by Castro and the Sandinistas that, in view of President Duarte's election and the increasing capabilities of the Salvadoran military, insurgent prospects for a near-term victory have declined.
- The need for greater discretion created by the Manzanillo and Contadora negotiations, which focused greater attention on Managua's support for insurgents.
- Internal guerrilla logistic problems in El Salvador [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, convincing evidence of continued shipments from Nicaragua by sea, land, and air indicates that, while Managua may shift its activities and deliveries to minimize its own vulnerability or husband occasionally scarce resources, it has an abiding commitment to the maintenance of the insurgency in El Salvador. Indeed, Managua's role as a communications center and training hub for the Salvadorans has remained constant during the last 12 months. We believe that, over the long run, once the Sandinistas feel more secure, support for the Salvadoran insurgents can be increased. [REDACTED]

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Nicaraguan activities elsewhere in the Central American region provide other examples of training and arms support for radical groups, generally typified by close cooperation with the Cubans. The establishment of communications and broadcast sites in Nicaragua in 1983 and

¹ For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Sandinista support for regional insurgencies and their negotiating posture, see NIE 83.3-85, *Nicaragua: Prospects for Sandinista Consolidation*, February 1985 [REDACTED]

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1984 for Guatemalan guerrilla factions parallels early communications support for the Salvadorans. In Honduras, the Sandinistas have used infiltration teams in an attempt to establish an insurgency and pressure the Honduran Government. Nicaragua also has provided arms and training to the orthodox Costa Rican Communist party. [redacted]

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Nicaraguan training support of other radicals in Latin America has expanded in the last year and, on the basis of reporting from a wide variety of sources, appears to be closely coordinated with Cuban efforts. Training courses in Cuba and Nicaragua are frequently complementary, and leftists from Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and the Dominican Republic have received instruction in the two countries. Many of these contingents receive combat experience in Nicaragua before returning to their home countries. The cooperation extends to training by Cuban instructors of regional insurgents at Nicaraguan facilities. Nicaragua also reportedly acts as an arms conduit to several of the countries cited above [redacted]

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In Costa Rica and Honduras, where support has been more concerted, the Sandinistas probably hope to gain leverage against the governments. In more distant countries, where opportunities for successful revolution are less promising or where Nicaragua has little if any real influence, the Sandinistas have nonetheless maintained contact and, in certain cases, have actively supported radical leftists. In these areas, Sandinista involvement has demonstrated revolutionary solidarity; Managua also probably welcomes foreign radicals as a small but enthusiastic source of troops for their counterinsurgency effort. [redacted]

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Intelligence gaps on Nicaraguan export activities are of concern to the Intelligence Community. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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DISCUSSION

1. Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgents over the last five years has been an invaluable lifeline for weapons, munitions, and other supplies. In the early years of the Sandinista revolution, Managua's efforts focused largely on the Salvadoran cause. Gradually, however, the Sandinistas began to take a more active role aiding other insurgents. Over time, Sandinista practices have also become more sophisticated, providing Managua better concealment and also allowing it to deny publicly its involvement in giving support to the Salvadoran insurgency.

2. Since 1979, the Sandinistas have worked hand in glove with the Cubans in sponsoring subversion, both in El Salvador and elsewhere.

an ongoing series of consultative meetings among Cuban and Nicaraguan officials and Salvadoran rebel leaders both in Managua and Havana. In addition, a variety of reporting indicates that Cuban instructors provide training to regional insurgents at Nicaraguan facilities. Further testifying to the integral Nicaraguan-Cuban effort are such examples as in November 1984 indicating that a mixed Cuban-Nicaraguan team was to go from Managua to El Salvador.

3. The Cuban-Nicaraguan complementary efforts extend well beyond El Salvador. Managua and Havana worked jointly in establishing the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union—the consolidation of the principal Guatemalan rebel factions in 1982. The initial meetings brokering the agreement took place in Managua, with Nicaraguan and Cuban officials. As a prod to unification, the Cubans and Nicaraguans threatened, in the absence of unity, to cut off the Havana-Managua arms supply.

4. A variety of other examples in Central America illustrate the close working relationship between the two countries. In Costa Rica, Havana designated both a Cuban and a Nicaraguan pegpoint to handle leftist unity talks. In Panama, the relationship is so close that the Sandinistas recently recruited an asset and are sharing him with Cuban operatives.

5. In general, Havana and Managua appear to have worked out complementary training patterns for radicals from throughout the Latin American area. Basic guerrilla instruction appears to take place in Nicaragua, with more advanced training provided in Cuba. Sources throughout Central America have reported on this pattern.

Frequently, it also includes a stint in Nicaragua fighting the anti-Sandinista insurgents before the trainees return to their home countries. In the Dominican Republic, where the Cubans have not been very successful in preventing squabbling between competing leftist groups, Nicaragua and Cuba apparently now are separately training members of two rival groups.

The El Salvador Pipeline

6. The Sandinista commitment to maintaining the Salvadoran insurgency remains strong, and Managua continues to play a key role as a training base, guerrilla headquarters, and support center.

There is enough specific evidence of materiel resupply from Nicaragua to El Salvador, however, for the Intelligence Community to be confident that it continues and that it remains a critical factor in determining the Salvadoran guerrillas' military capabilities.

1984, Year of Shifting Patterns

7. A number of new variables affected the Salvadoran situation and the Cuban-Nicaraguan role last year, prompting Havana and Managua, at a minimum, to review their strategy and levels of support. These included:

- Managua's growing problems with its own insurgency and continued direct and indirect US pressure.
- The assessment by Castro and the Sandinistas that, in view of President Duarte's election and the increasing capabilities of the Salvadoran military, the insurgents' prospects for a near-term victory had declined.

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— The need for greater discretion created by the Manzanillo and Contadora negotiations, which focused greater attention on Managua's support for insurgents.

— Internal guerrilla logistic problems in El Salvador. [Redacted]

8. In mid-May [Redacted]

[Redacted] Nicaraguan officials met with Salvadoran guerrilla and political leaders. [Redacted] the Sandinistas indicated that, predominantly because of US pressures and Nicaragua's internal problems, Managua would no longer be able to provide significant aid. The Sandinistas urged the Salvadorans to emphasize negotiations to gain power, rather than to pursue military victory.

[Redacted]

9. Sandinista concern appeared to continue throughout the summer.

[Redacted]

10. Nevertheless, [Redacted]

[Redacted] there has been a reduction in Sandinista materiel support to the insurgency since mid-1984.

[Redacted]

11. Restrictions have not, however, reached critical proportions. Throughout 1984 and up to the present,

[Redacted]

continued arms and materiel shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador, despite the elevated concerns in Managua. The information suggests that, while Managua may shift its activities and deliveries to minimize its own vulnerability or to husband occasionally scarce resources, it has an abiding commitment to the maintenance of the insurgency in El Salvador. Evidence of ongoing deliveries includes:

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] two weapons deliveries from Nicaragua during the first quarter of last year, including 150 M-16 rifles, 40,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, and an assortment of grenades, grenade launchers, and explosives.

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— [Redacted] the guerrillas received a shipment of mines from Nicaragua via Honduras in May, while insurgents in central El Salvador reported the delivery of 166 rifles [Redacted]

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— [Redacted] mid-May when Sandinista officials told guerrilla leaders that it is "vital that munitions reach you."

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[Redacted]

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— [Redacted] a guerrilla representative in Nicaragua said in late February 1985 that Nicaragua was providing better portable radios for the guerrillas to use in conducting ambushes.

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— Several reports over the past six months from guerrilla defectors and prisoners in which they recount firsthand details of deliveries of arms and the arrival of men from Nicaragua. [Redacted]

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12. For the last several years, [Redacted] reporting has been consistent in relating that the Cosiguina Peninsula is a major hub in the resupply network, with

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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several transshipment points in the area for the dispatch of both men and materiel to El Salvador. Two of the points identified [Redacted] reporting were Potosi and La Pelota—60 and 50 kilometers, respectively, across the Gulf of Fonseca from El Salvador. Imagery analysis tended to confirm [Redacted] verifying pierwork, warehouse facilities, and large canoes on La Pelota, and a mainland beach area cleared as a transshipment point to the island. The La Pelota facility was attacked and badly damaged by anti-Sandinista insurgents in late 1983. Area residents freely admitted to US journalists that it had been used for arms shipments. [Redacted]

13. Meanwhile, the Potosi facility had been upgraded in 1982 and included a large, lighted, wooden pier, POL tanks, a warehouse, and other supply buildings. Imagery in 1983 showed a Dabur-class patrol boat anchored near the facility with a tarp-covered cargo and an ocean-going canoe moored alongside—highly suggestive of an arms transfer in progress. In the last year, however, portions of the Potosi facility have been dismantled, and the site currently appears largely inactive. Some of the salvaged material may have been used to upgrade the nearby Santa Julia camp, which appears to be primarily a training base for Salvadorans but which [Redacted] sources have reported is also now used as a transshipment point. The rough terrain on the peninsula offers numerous other areas where concealed transshipment facilities could be located. [Redacted]

14. [Redacted] has reflected ongoing resupply activities in the Gulf of Fonseca area. During the period August-November 1984, [Redacted] indicators reflected at least eight infiltration operations. However, the concealment practices have made precise identification of the routes or cargos almost impossible. [Redacted]

15. At other times, various intelligence indicators have demonstrated the origins and methods of delivery of materiel. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

16. This activity followed on the heels of the unloading of the Bulgarian arms carrier, the Christo Botev, in Nicaragua in late October. [Redacted] had reported earlier that Libyan military equipment destined for El Salvador had been loaded in Tripoli on a Bulgarian ship which, on the basis of satellite photography, we believe was the Zakharii Stoyanov. The Stoyanov proceeded to offload its cargo in Burgas, Bulgaria, where the Christo Botev picked up cargo and then made its journey to Nicaragua. This sequence of events fits with information from [Redacted] source indicating Libya's intention to use Nicaragua as the focal point for Libyan assistance to guerrilla groups such as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of El Salvador. [Redacted]

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17. Intelligence Community plotting of the main logistics corridors in El Salvador—[Redacted] also points clearly to maritime receipt of arms shipments across the Gulf of Fonseca from Nicaragua. (See figure 2). [Redacted] was partly corroborated by a captured guerrilla map in 1984 showing arms transport routes moving from the coast through the Salvadoran logistic corridors. Together, they reflect the guerrillas' high dependence on maritime receipt of arms from their suppliers— [Redacted]

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18. In addition to such repeated indicators of resupply activity, both Cuban and Sandinista officials privately acknowledge the Salvadoran resupply operations. During his farewell calls in April 1984 on [Redacted] two key Sandinista [Redacted] US Ambassador

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Quanton reported that both men implicitly acknowledged their government's involvement with the Salvadoran rebels. [Redacted] the reported arms supply coordinator—contended that Managua did not admit to supply of the guerrillas just as the United States did not admit to the mining of Nicaraguan ports, but he added that both knew the truth. Similarly, [Redacted] admitted the existence of the insurgents' command and control network but suggested a quid pro quo by saying it could not be shut down unilaterally. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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Figure 2
Central America Arms Routes



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[redacted]—and also a report from a [redacted]
[redacted]-Jiloa is known for billeting both Salvadoran and Honduran guerrillas, although Hondurans have not been noted there since the beginning of 1984. Local residents told the defense attache in March 1984 that a contingent of 20 Salvadorans in civilian attire were undergoing physical training and classes at the camp. A new group of 12 replaced the 20 in May, [redacted]. The same source reported another new group of 12 arrived in August 1984.

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22. [redacted] stated that Salvadoran guerrilla units often undergo basic military training at Sandinista army facilities under the supervision of Sandinista officers. Trained insurgents are sometimes integrated into regular army units or internationalist brigades to fight the anti-Sandinista forces. Last November and again early this year, a Nicaraguan Democratic Force unit exchanged rounds with a group of combatants identifying themselves as Farabundo Marti guerrillas, [redacted].

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[redacted] reported that Salvadorans integrated into the Sandinista army are sent to the Honduran-Nicaraguan border for "their baptism of fire" before being infiltrated back into El Salvador. [redacted]

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Training

19. In addition to military materiel, the Sandinistas continue to provide political and military training to the Salvadoran insurgents. We believe that a few hundred rebels may be undergoing training in Nicaragua at any one time [redacted].

20. We believe, on the basis of a variety of evidence, that a new training camp for the Salvadoran guerrillas in Nicaragua was established in 1984. [redacted]

[redacted] reported last July that a military barracks was under construction near Santa Julia on the Cosiguina Peninsula. Furthermore, [redacted] reported in late August that a training/processing center for Salvadoran insurgents exists at the head of the Cosiguina Peninsula. Satellite imagery of Santa Julia shows new buildings, a small-arms firing range, and an obstacle course. (See figures 3 and 4.) The buildings and a vehicle dispersal area are hidden in wooded terrain, apparently to limit observation, an indicator that the camp probably is for unconventional warfare training. Moreover, the isolated location and proximity to El Salvador make it ideal for insurgent training and infiltration. [redacted]

21. A variety of sources have reported the training of Salvadoran insurgents in the vicinity of Managua as well. A camp located at Jiloa, which since 1981 has housed—for training and safehaven—Salvadorans awaiting infiltration into El Salvador, is apparently still functioning. (See figure 5.) [redacted]

Communications

23. Nicaragua has also been a communications base for the insurgents since 1980. All five Salvadoran guerrilla factions maintain their communications headquarters there. [redacted]

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Other Assistance

25. We believe the Sandinistas are fairly circumspect about their physical presence in El Salvador to avoid being unequivocally implicated in the insurgency. Nevertheless, we have detected several recent instances where Nicaraguans provided assistance in El Salvador,

[Redacted]

26. In addition, [Redacted] reporting indicate that Cuba and Nicaragua continue to maintain close contact with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders and to monitor the status of the insurgency:

[Redacted]

Future Salvadoran Resupply

27. We believe that external resupply and support assistance from Cuba and Nicaragua will remain critical for the Salvadoran insurgents for the foreseeable future. This will be particularly true of munitions and other provisions, which remain the major priority for the insurgents. We judge that the insurgents' mentors will try to maintain the military viability of

the guerrilla alliance, but will increasingly focus on a political strategy to promote the regional revolutionary cause. Thus, we expect Managua and Havana to continue to provide sufficient materiel for the guerrillas to sustain at least their current level of activity. We doubt that resupply from Nicaragua is likely to return to pre-1984 levels unless there are major changes in the Salvadoran or Nicaraguan political or military situations [Redacted]

28. We expect several of the factors that contributed to some decline in the volume and frequency of materiel shipments to the Salvadoran insurgents from Nicaragua in 1984 to hold true in 1985. These include:

- The likelihood that the Salvadoran Army will maintain the tactical initiative, which has forced a reduction of large-scale guerrilla operations and disrupted internal supply networks.
- The improved surveillance by Salvadoran, Honduran, and US authorities, which is complicating resupply from Nicaragua.
- The possibility that guerrilla strength, which we believe peaked in 1984, will decline, thus decreasing requirements for external resupply.²

29. These trends are likely to be reinforced by the negotiation strategy reportedly favored by Nicaragua and Cuba. For example, [Redacted] Managua and Havana have reevaluated the situation and no longer believe the guerrillas can achieve a military victory in El Salvador, and may in fact face an eventual defeat by the US-backed Army. Consequently, Castro and the Sandinistas reportedly are prepared to maintain the integrity of the guerrilla effort in El Salvador, but their strategic focus increasingly is shifting toward international political initiatives designed to: (1) obtain security guarantees for the Sandinistas through the Contadora peace process and (2) promote negotiations between the Salvadoran Government and the guerrillas. Several reports indicate that Castro believes that, once the Sandinista revolution is consolidated, support for the Salvadoran insurgents can be increased. [Redacted]

Regional Subversion

30. Nicaraguan activities elsewhere in Central America and the hemisphere provide other examples of training and arms support for radical groups,

² For a more detailed discussion of the subject, see NIE 83.1-85, *El Salvador: The Outlook for the Duarte Government*, March 1985.

[Redacted]

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generally typified by close cooperation with the Cubans. In Costa Rica and Honduras, where support has been more concerted, the Sandinistas probably hope to gain leverage against the governments. In areas where opportunities for successful revolution are less promising, or where Nicaragua has little, if any, real influence, the Sandinistas have nonetheless maintained contact and, in certain cases, actively supported radical leftists. In these more distant countries, Sandinista involvement has demonstrated revolutionary solidarity; Managua also probably welcomes these individuals as a small but enthusiastic source of troops for their counterinsurgency effort. (See inset on page 15.)

Honduras

31. The Sandinistas—in active cooperation with the Cubans—have shifted their policy toward Honduras from one of peaceful coexistence to more active subversion, even though their efforts so far have been largely ineffective.

Havana and Managua before 1982 cautioned against the premature launching of an armed struggle in Honduras because Honduras was serving as a conduit for arms shipments to El Salvador and a safehaven for Salvadoran guerrillas. Nevertheless, as the Honduran Government began to intercept arms shipments, disrupt leftist networks, and cooperate with the Salvadoran military and anti-Sandinista groups, Cuban and Nicaraguan tactics shifted. A variety of sources report that they actively recruited and trained Honduran radicals abroad starting in late 1981 and began active operations in late 1982.

32. From Terrorism to Guerrilla Infiltration.

The Sandinistas first attempted to intimidate the newly elected administration of Honduran President Suazo with a wave of terrorist actions in the second half of 1982.

the Nicaraguan Embassy in Tegucigalpa was implicated in the 4 July bombing that year of two electrical substations by members of the Salvadoran People's Revolutionary Army and the Honduran Revolutionary Popular Forces. Honduran security forces raided a Salvadoran safehouse and captured two insurgents who had participated in the attack and linked the Nicaraguans to their operation. Reportedly during the same raid, a Nicaraguan national, later identified as Sandinista *Comandante* Modesto, was killed. Honduran terrorists seized over 100 prominent Honduran and foreign businessmen in San Pedro Sula in September 1982, demanding the release of some 60 Honduran and Salvadoran leftists. The operation, reportedly planned

in Cuba, probably had Nicaraguan support. Other terrorist activities—bombings on 4 August and 4 November 1982—reportedly were perpetrated by the same Honduran and Salvadoran organizations, possibly with Sandinista direction. Another example of the close link between Honduran leftists and Managua was the September 1983 dynamite attack on an airlines office in San Pedro Sula. The operation by the Cinchoneros—a radical Honduran group—was in announced retaliation for the bombing of Nicaragua's international airport by anti-Sandinista forces.

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33. The shift of strategies by Managua and Havana was apparent during the summer of 1983, when information

revealed that the Sandinistas infiltrated 96 Cuban- and Nicaraguan-trained Honduran insurgents into Olancho Department. The group's objective was the establishment of a base of operations and an insurgent organization in the Honduran interior. Most of the infiltrated Hondurans reportedly had undergone military training for up to two years in Nicaragua and at a guerrilla training facility in Pinar del Rio, Cuba. Several participants turned themselves in to the authorities within days and others starved to death in the jungle. A Honduran military operation lasting nearly three months captured or killed the remaining insurgents—including the group's leader, Jose Reyes Mata.

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34. Exactly a year after the Olancho operation, Managua infiltrated another group of Cuban- and Nicaraguan-trained Hondurans near El Paraiso, although on a smaller scale—reportedly some 20 insurgents. By October 1984 the Honduran military had netted 28 of some 60 would-be insurgents and their local recruits,

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Nature of Nicaraguan Support to Latin Radicals

Country	Remarks	Year Assistance Initiated
El Salvador	Support of Salvadoran insurgency to include provision of arms, ammunition, other materiel, and training on a sustained basis; serves as a secure rebel headquarters and communications base.	1979
Honduras	Support of terrorist activity; provided training and arms; helped infiltrate insurgents into Honduras; promoted unity efforts.	1981
Guatemala	Provided limited amount of arms and training; instrumental in unifying main insurgent groups; new communications support.	1981
Costa Rica	Maintenance of armed Costa Rican Communist group operating inside Nicaragua since revolution; provided some training and arms; gives guidance and material assistance to domestic left through Embassy in San Jose.	1979
Panama	Recruitment of Panamanian operative with Cuban cooperation.	1985
Colombia	Armed Colombian guerrillas operating in Nicaragua against counterrevolutionaries since revolution; provides military training to two Colombian radical groups.	1979
Ecuador	Provided military training to Ecuadorean guerrilla group; currently giving training and support to domestic terrorist organization; Nicaraguan Embassy in Quito active in support of local left.	1980
Bolivia	Nicaraguan Ambassador in La Paz active in contacts with domestic left.	1983
Chile	Support base for numerous Chilean leftists; provided military and political training; Chilean guerrillas operating against anti-Sandinista insurgents; served as conduit for arms.	1983
Argentina	Provided false travel documentation for several radicals; has served as a safehaven for Argentine left since revolution.	1979
Uruguay	Group of Uruguayan Communists in Nicaragua as coffee pickers, perhaps received military training; plans to open Nicaraguan Embassy in Montevideo will facilitate contacts with left.	1984
Brazil	Possibly provided military training; group of Brazilian Communists scheduled to enter into armed operations against anti-Sandinistas.	1984
Venezuela	Group of Cuban-trained Venezuelan radicals in Nicaragua, probably to fight against anti-Sandinistas.	1983
Dominican Republic	Military and political training provided to Dominican left since revolution; Nicaraguan Embassy in Santo Domingo active in supporting domestic radicals.	1979

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35. As with El Salvador, Sandinista officials have admitted their involvement. [redacted] in March 1983 Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D'Escoto told the UN Secretary General that Nicaragua would one day send guerrillas into Honduras—the Olancho infiltration occurred four months later. [redacted]

38. As with the Salvadoran insurgents, the Sandinistas provide the Hondurans with battlefield experience. [redacted] in March 1984 that a company-sized unit of Honduran Communists and other revolutionaries, commanded by Sandinistas, was targeted against anti-Sandinista forces. [redacted]

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36. **Training.** In addition to the training reportedly provided by Cuba and Nicaragua to the infiltrated insurgents, a variety of sources have detailed other types of instruction. [redacted]

39. **Other Support.** The Sandinistas provide headquarters and sanctuary to virtually every known Honduran leftist group, according to a variety of sources. The Honduran radical left in 1983 and 1984 issued several unity announcements from Managua, attesting to its close association with the Sandinistas, and the Nicaraguan capital serves as a base for the dissemination of leftist literature. [redacted]

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40. Despite Nicaragua's severe economic problems, it has provided funding to various Honduran groups. [redacted] radical university elements received technical equipment and funds from Nicaragua to produce anti-US propaganda in January 1984. [redacted]

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37. Training activities have continued, as illustrated by several examples:

- Honduran authorities in September 1983 arrested a guerrilla "paymaster" who reportedly was responsible for distributing payments to the families of young men who had gone to Nicaragua and Cuba for training.
- In August 1984 [redacted] the University of Honduras labor union was actively recruiting its membership and students for guerrilla training in Nicaragua and Cuba.
- As of early November 1984, three recruiters were combing three Honduran departments for candidates to take guerrilla training in Nicaragua and Cuba. [redacted]

[redacted] Some 70 reportedly were already in different stages of the training process. [redacted]

Guatemala


41. Cuba and Nicaragua continue to provide assistance to Guatemalan leftists, who have been fighting a guerrilla war for over 20 years, although it has been more sporadic and not as far-reaching as in the Salvadoran case. Over the last six to 12 months, however, Managua has extended new communications support to the Guatemalan insurgents, which is reminiscent of early Sandinista support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. [redacted]

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Costa Rica

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46. The Sandinistas apparently view Costa Rica as a special category in their efforts to export the revolution—one step removed from the confrontational policy of supporting insurgencies elsewhere in Central America and subject to a more subtle mix of clandestine and other means. Several factors probably account for Nicaragua's posture, including the absence of a standing army and San Jose's inclination to remain neutral in regional conflicts. Both Cuba and Nicaragua probably recognize that an insurgency in Costa Rica would have little chance of success. In addition,

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43. *Training.*

[redacted] we judge that the bulk of the training given to the Guatemalan left occurs in Cuba, but a limited amount is provided by the Sandinistas. Managua probably plays a greater role in facilitating the travel of training candidates to Havana.

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[redacted] they believe that armed insurrection in Costa Rica would prompt San Jose to call on Washington for security assistance that eventually could result in a military intervention aimed at Nicaragua.


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47. Shortly after their revolution, the Sandinistas began to use their residual local support in Costa Rica—which had actively supported the anti-Somoza campaign—to promote their own regional interests.

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[redacted] the Sandinistas set up a support apparatus for the Salvadoran guerrillas in Guanacaste Province during the early 1980s. In 1982, Managua made initial efforts to establish a terrorist support network in San Jose

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[redacted] but the network was discovered. Nicaragua continued to deal with the left, but shifted to less aggressive tactics.


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48. *Training and Arms.* Managua's most extensive clandestine support goes to the so-called Mora-Canas brigade—a group of Costa Rican radicals that has been operating in Nicaragua against the anti-Sandinista insurgents.

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44. *Arms Deliveries and Other Activities.* Solid evidence of Nicaraguan arms support in recent years is lacking. Nevertheless, we believe that land routes through Honduras for weapons destined for the Salvadorans are probably also used to transport materiel to the Guatemalans.



[redacted] members of the Costa Rican Communist party who fought with the Sandinistas during their revolution form the basis for this military arm, which formally organized in late 1981. Their initial preparations included spending some six to 12 months on unspecified military duty in Nicaragua.

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[redacted] Since then, the Sandinistas have provided officer training to selected members.

[redacted] since last fall that several hundred actual combatants have been in Nicaragua helping to counter the insurgents in the south.

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Some of the Costa Rican Communists' internal party

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differences revolve around the role of the brigade, which the hardline faction wants to use as the backbone of a domestic insurgency. Reflecting the special status of Costa Rica, Sandinista officials have said privately that they would support an armed confrontation in Costa Rica if events sparked it, although they have advised against starting one.

49. In addition to providing battlefield experience to the Communists, the Sandinistas have provided arms support. [redacted] in December 1983 that 1,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition were to be smuggled into Costa Rica for the Communist Party. Earlier reporting indicated that the brigade had cached weapons from Nicaragua on both sides of the border.

[redacted] the Sandinistas have also provided training such as that accorded to union leaders on the organization and indoctrination of union members.

[redacted] the leftist Broad Democratic Front sent five militants for training at a Sandinista army base in 1984. This group reportedly followed a previous contingent that returned in 1984.

50. *Diplomatic and Other Contacts.* In addition to using direct supplier contacts, Nicaraguan diplomats also actively cultivate the left inside Costa Rica.

[Large redacted block]

South America and the Caribbean

52. In our view, Managua has increased its involvement in South America and the Caribbean. Although these activities are on a relatively small scale, they now range from efforts to cultivate solidarity to supporting and training insurgent groups. (See table.)

Colombia

53. Although Colombia is a member of the Contadora group and maintains correct relations with Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have continued to aid Colombian guerrillas.

[Large redacted block]

54. In the course of their training, the M-19 members have received combat experience against the anti-Sandinista insurgents. An M-19 guerrilla spokesman publicly admitted in early December 1984 that members of his group were fighting in Nicaragua and had been there since the Sandinista revolution.

[Redacted block]

Ecuador

55. Nicaraguan political and financial support to the Ecuadorean left is well documented and, according to limited information, extends to military training.

[Redacted block]

56. In 1983, then President Hurtado officially admonished Nicaraguan Ambassador Cortes for cultivating the domestic left. His successor, President Febres-Cordero, reportedly sent the dean of the diplomatic corps to deliver the same message in November 1984. Cortes persisted in efforts to build links with the left, [redacted] and Ecuadorean authorities finally expelled the Consul last December as a warning to the Nicaraguans.

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Summary of Nicaraguan Support to Latin Radicals

Country	Arms	Ammunition	Military Training ^a	Political Training	Communications	Funds	Safehaven	Other Support ^b	Year Begun
El Salvador	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		1979
Honduras	•	•	•	•		•	•		1981
Guatemala	•	•	•		•				1981
Costa Rica	•	•	•	•		•		•	1979
Panama								•	1985
Colombia	•	•	•				•	•	1979
Ecuador	•	•	•			•		•	1980
Bolivia								•	1983
Chile	•		•	•			•	•	1983
Argentina							•	•	1979
Uruguay			•						1984
Brazil			•						1984
Venezuela			•						1983
Dominican Republic			•	•				•	1979

^a To include experience fighting against anti-Sandinista insurgents.
^b To include support through Nicaraguan diplomatic missions, false documentation, recruitments, and so forth.

57. In addition, the Sandinistas have offered funding to the Ecuadorean left.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Chile

59. The Pinochet regime in Chile has been an obvious target for clandestine support to the left, and Managua has played a role in aiding its subversion, at least since early 1983. Supporting Sandinista efforts, but also providing training, Chilean leftists were fighting against the anti-Sandinistas in northern Nicaragua in July 1983 after receiving guerrilla warfare instruction in Cuba and the Soviet Union, [Redacted]

[Redacted] Nicaragua was scheduled to serve as the transshipment point for arms and ammunition from Libya to Chilean radicals as of early 1983—and in mid-1984—although we are not able to confirm the transfers. Chilean expatriates were involved in mid-1983 in recruiting internationalist brigades to receive military training in Nicaragua, [Redacted]
 [Redacted] The brigades reportedly were to fight

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against the anti-Sandinistas with the option of going to another—unspecified—Latin American country to fight at the expiration of their tour of duty in Nicaragua. [redacted]

workers, and politicians and reportedly urged them to convert Bolivia into a “free country” like Nicaragua.

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60. The Sandinistas also provide the Chilean left with other means of support. For example, [redacted] 120 members of the Chilean Unitary Popular Action Movement recently participated in a political action training course in Nicaragua. [redacted]

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Managua provides safehaven to representatives of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left and the Chilean Communist Party. [redacted]

Other Countries

61. Intelligence from several other countries points to a fairly wide range of Nicaraguan contacts with subversives, although the reporting from other Latin American nations is sporadic and often affords only a glimpse into the Sandinistas’ local activities. For example:

62. Elsewhere in the region, the Sandinistas probably will pursue a dual strategy of trying to draw other nations into bilateral agreements while continuing to support the left. In South America and the Caribbean, the Sandinistas probably will continue to try to be discreet in their activities and take care not to damage relations with friendly governments in the region. Nonetheless, we believe they will also hedge their bets—especially since some friendly governments are beginning to become disillusioned—by continuing to provide assistance and guerrilla training to leftists in the area [redacted]

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- The Sandinistas have provided medical, educational, ideological, and military training to some several hundred Dominicans since 1979 [redacted]. Other reporting has corroborated the training, although we believe the number is somewhat less. Also, Managua’s mission in the Dominican Republic in October 1983 sponsored a strategy session with local leftists to plan demonstrations, peace marches, and protest letters condemning US policy toward Nicaragua.
- Some members of the Venezuelan Revolutionary Tendency group, who received guerrilla training in Cuba, were in Nicaragua as of July 1983, [redacted] probably to receive combat experience by fighting the anti-Sandinistas.
- Nicaragua reportedly facilitated travel to Syria for several Argentine Montoneros by providing them with Nicaraguan passports. Sandinistas reportedly engaged Montoneros to assassinate Anastacio Somoza Debayle in Paraguay in 1981, and a Montonero-owned radio station in Costa Rica was closed in 1980 and shipped to Nicaragua.
- In September 1983, the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Bolivia became the subject of a Bolivian Senate investigation after he met with students,

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