

ruary or March, with a Christmas break. They said February or March of 1981, you understand. It did not last four or five months, it lasted for three years, and we didn't end this meeting until September 1983.

Let me also say in this connection that, in addition to the three years of formal meetings, I had during that period the opportunity to spend more than 400 hours in private discussions and negotiations with the Soviet delegates. So whatever conclusions and generalizations I want to share with you about this process are based on that kind of experience.

Now I was not a novice to Soviet matters. At one point I taught political science as well as law, and I taught a course on problems of democracy and another course on Marxism-Leninism. I wrote a book on the effort of the Communist party to capture the American labor movement. So I didn't come to the issue as a total novice.

The Narrowness of the Soviet Negotiators

I'd followed with care the Soviet Union's relationship with other nations and its role on the world scene. But I encountered two things I had not anticipated and that frankly surprised me in my experience in Madrid. Almost everything else that I experienced was consistent with my conclusions and observations, based on my prior study and examination and my limited experience. The two things that I had not expected to find were as follows: First, I had not expected to find the degree of commitment to Leninism that I actually did find in the heads of the Soviet delegation. I am not prepared to generalize and to say that that degree of commitment went through the whole delegation. I didn't meet every member, or at least didn't have intensive conversations with every member of the Soviet delegation. Nor am I prepared to say this necessarily means that Leninism has deep roots within the Soviet society. I do not know. What I can say, however, is that I was surprised by the degree of commitment to Leninism that existed in the leadership of that delegation. When you are spending 400 hours in conversations, and particularly if you feel you are a little bit familiar with the concepts of Marxism-Leninism, it isn't difficult to find yourself involved in conversations about Marxism-Leninism. I expected to find a more pragmatic view, maybe a more cynical view.

The pragmatism was there but let me tell you about the meetings I had with two different heads of delegations of the Soviet Union. Both were deputy foreign ministers—I think there are a total of five deputy foreign ministers under Gromyko. One of them, when the meeting started, was a 75-year-old man, a very capable man who had been a "survivor." He had his ups and downs, but was at the time a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a very powerful man. He had spent 11 years as head of the negotiating team with the Chinese. As the Chinese negotiations were

moved to the front burner, he was moved back into those negotiations, and was succeeded at Madrid by another man who was also a deputy foreign minister. He was a man who our government told me was of considerable importance within the system. In both of them I did find this kind of commitment to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism.

The second thing that surprised me was the degree of lack of information about the United States and the American people. Now, I am aware of the fact that we don't know enough about them. But we are after all an open society and I expected that they would know more about how we function, how decisions are made, and about our cultural milieu in general. I was frankly very disappointed to learn that they did not know as much as I thought they knew. Included in the delegation were obviously high officials of the KGB with whom I talked and whom I certainly thought knew more about us than it turned out that they did. Indeed, I expressed my disappointment to them, particularly to the head of the KGB group there, that they did not know more about us. This of course tends to complicate our relationships with them.

A Deadly Serious Adversary

Now, let me see if I can bring both of these things together and share with you certain consequences that it seems to me flow from them. We are dealing with an extremely serious adversary. Its leadership cadre is serious and relatively single minded. They have to be. These are people who have come up the hard way in their system. They have all been schooled in this hard way—and you don't survive this schooling unless you are able to survive the toughness of the system. Whether people smile, and whether they like jazz or don't like jazz really is irrelevant. I don't think our press does us a great service by this emphasis on irrelevancies. These are serious people. They're well trained. The training is vigorous. At the outset, it is very much a theoretical training with an emphasis on basic principles. Those who undergo this training understand that it is not safe to deviate from these principles.

I am also convinced that this is probably the most deadly and the most serious adversary that we have faced in our long history—and this for many reasons.

First is the question of their intent. The record of their intentions does not inspire confidence in anyone who believes in world order. The extent to which they are permeated with Leninist ideology, the extent to which they do not know us, strengthens, I believe, an attitude within the system and those who populate that system in positions of influence. It strengthens an attitude which believes in (a) an inevitable victory on their part because they are riding the wave of history, and (b) a feeling on their part that there is a kind of corruption in the West which undermines will and intent and which has within it the seeds of its own destruction. They be-

lieve this; the leadership, I am convinced, believes this. The system depends on this belief—indeed I think it is this kind of conviction which permits the system to survive its difficulties.

Objectively we can look at the Soviet Union and see the many difficulties that confront the Soviet regime. But we cannot ignore the faith in their own ultimate victory. Even though many scholars here might argue that this conclusion is questionable, I would say that no prudent society, and no leadership that wants to be responsible can afford to rest its own security on an assumption that runs contrary to the conclusion I have asserted. To have your security depend on the good will, the good intentions of the Soviet regime is to put our own society at risk. This no prudent society and no responsible leader should permit.

We know that the Soviet Union is a massive military power and we know that it is a highly repressive police state. These factors, of course, add to the element of danger—which leads me to the conclusion I have stated about the seriousness with which we must regard this adversary.

Our Soviet adversary has another facility of which we must take note. They have the ability to use language in a way which is designed to confuse people like ourselves and undermine our will. This they do professionally and effectively. They take a noble word like democracy and adopt it as their own—as you know, they frequently call their systems “people’s democracies.” This is a total corruption of the term. It makes me think of the Tower of Babel and the confusion that reigned among the people involved in this Biblical story.

Words have different meaning. The Communists are able to use these differences to promote their own appeal, which they then use as an instrument of expansionism or aggression. Their ability to use people and to use democracy is an example of this talent. The Communist appeal is essentially a humanitarian appeal. They talk about justice being the end result. They attempt to take advantage of injustice where it exists, and in their propaganda they identify themselves and ally themselves with efforts to achieve humanitarian goals such as freedom or justice. In this respect, they are unlike the Nazis who had a negative appeal to civilized people. This, of course, adds to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Fortunately, of course, the gas has largely gone out of their ideological balloon. Their own excesses have led to the point where, as of today, their ideology has very little appeal. They are identified as a result of their excesses as a repressive regime. What they do have going for them, deliberately, is of course massive military power. And that leads me, therefore, to another conclusion which I have arrived at as a result of my own experiences, highlighted by Madrid, which is that what they respect is power.

The Key Importance of Power

The extent to which their adversary has power of its own adds an element of dignity to the argument of the adversary. We are respected because of our power, and I therefore am a strong believer in American military power, American military strength. I am convinced there is no substitute for it.

Within the last few days I’ve had occasion to think about the time when President Lyndon Johnson proposed to the Soviet leadership that we get rid of antiballistic missiles. He had been persuaded by the secretary of defense that this was a desirable objective. And he proposed this to the Soviet leadership and the Soviet leadership rejected the idea completely and decisively. They simply said there is a threat to us, etc., etc. Now, President Nixon made a proposal to the Congress for the deployment of an antiballistic missile defense. The Congress accepted this proposal, and it passed. And lo and behold the Soviets were suddenly prepared to talk about restraining antiballistic missile defense. We had to engage in this display of strength before they had the incentive to negotiate. I’m convinced that President Reagan’s March 1983 proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative was an impelling move which has led to what appears to be the new Soviet willingness to sit down again and talk about arms control—this in spite of the fact that they walked out of the Geneva arms control talks last year. Again it was a manifestation of our seriousness of purpose which provided the incentive to them to move. I believe these lessons are important for us to understand.

Unilateral concessions by us are not interpreted in my opinion as acts of good will. I believe that unilateral concessions by us are interpreted as a lack of will.

Western Unity in the Madrid Negotiations

Let me state some conclusions about my experience in Madrid. We were there for three years, and the preparatory meeting lasted for nine and one-half weeks rather than 10 days. We had in Madrid the unique factor of total allied unity. Not only were we together, but on basic issues the correctness of our position and the strength of our position led the neutral countries to join us when matters came to a crunch. And, indeed, toward the end, the strength of our position, as well as its reasonableness, coupled with the unity of the West, led some of the Eastern European countries to join us quietly and support our objectives.

Allied unity is essential to successful negotiations with the Soviets. At Madrid we had NATO caucuses, for example, a minimum of three times a week, and there were times when we met four and five times a day. The United States delegation decided there would be no secrets from our allies—we would do everything together. That gave us the strength which proved important in the negotiations.

I recall very early on in the meeting saying to my Soviet colleague: "Look, I'm just telling you our position. It is not just the American position—it's the Western position." Incidentally, one must be consistent in the position one takes. This, I think, we were. The Russians called it stubbornness—but be that as it may. We must do these things. To continue my story of my conversation with the Soviet delegate, I remember saying to him: "Look, you're skeptical about what I'm saying to you. Fine. Don't take my word. Call in the French, call in the Germans, the Dutch, the Norwegians—talk to them. Don't just talk to me." Obviously he was surprised by this. They would never say to me, "Call in the Hungarians." Or, "Call in the Czechs." When the Soviets did speak to the other Western delegates, they learned that the West was completely united. As a result of this I am able to say that the West got everything that it asked for in Madrid—it took three years to achieve it, but on paper the West got everything it asked for.

The Outcome of the Madrid Conference

In an unpublicized way we also got the gestures we asked for in addition to the words. The Madrid concluding document, for those of you who are international scholars, has tightened up some loopholes in the Helsinki Final Act—which was in itself a document heavily based on humanitarian considerations—and took it a step further. We included the essential ingredient of free trade unionism, for example, based on the Polish experience—the Solidarity experience.

Now one could argue that words by themselves don't make much sense. As a matter of fact I used to argue with myself about this. What's the sense of the words if the acts are not consistent with the words? Let me tell you why I am prepared to defend the words.

I think it is somewhat like the Ten Commandments. One might argue that at one time or another most of us will violate one or more of those Ten Commandments. And yet they are important standards that serve two purposes. First, they are important standards towards which to strive—and such standards are also needed for a responsible international community. The Soviets in this case have accepted the agreed upon standards which we must all strive to attain. Second, the standards we have agreed upon can be used to judge those states that do not live up to them. I think one of the great values of the Madrid meeting was that we took the Helsinki standards seriously. We did not let the Soviets get off the hook.

Toughness and Persistence Do Pay Off

There hasn't been an international forum at which the nature of the Soviet Union has been as thoroughly and as fully described as it was in Madrid. I had one Western foreign minister say to me and to the secretary of state, after the meeting, that he was convinced that in his own

country the support for the emplacement of the intermediate range missiles—the cruise missiles and the Pershings—was very much the result of a public opinion which had been bombarded by descriptions of the nature of the Soviet Union and the violations of the Helsinki agreement which served as a constant reference. I was on European television practically daily in one country or another. I was on BBC once a week, regularly on World News Service. The nature of the Soviet Union was constantly under discussion. We asked the Soviet Union: "How do you expect us to believe any agreement you sign if you don't live up to the agreement you signed in 1975 at Helsinki?" So the Helsinki standards became very important in the on-going battle for the hearts and minds of the people.

This is one reason why I say that the Madrid meeting was so important, and why I must say to you now in concluding my remarks that, as far as the West is concerned, successful negotiations with the Soviets must be based on candor and honesty about the nature of the opposition. For us to pussyfoot around because we don't want to offend them is to me perceived as a sign of weakness—and in reality it is a sign of weakness. People have said to me, "How can you negotiate while you're engaged in a policy of confrontation?" The Soviets use that word all the time—"confrontation." Let me answer this question by telling you that I was confronting them. It was confrontation. I do not deny that. Some lawyers will tell me that if you negotiate you have to try to get along with the other fellow, you don't confront. I say to you that in the business of our relationship with the Soviet Union, since the issues are serious, since the divisions are profound, our differences are profound. For us not to engage in confrontation, for us not to be candid about our concerns, I think does not make for an honest negotiation and cannot lead to any kind of constructive results. It is nothing but a charade. So I believe in the most fundamental way that one must be candid.

The press this week indicated that as far as the president is concerned it is essential in our negotiations in Geneva that we highlight the issue of Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. It is indispensable that we do so. Even though they may yell like stuck pigs—that's unimportant, they should yell. They choose when they are offended. They choose when they feel good. They choose when they are insulted. They choose when they are angry. These are all part of a serious negotiating effort. The Soviet act must not dissuade us from being honest and candid and consistent about our position.

If we raise an issue 11 times and there is no response or rejection of the issue and if it is important to us and if we don't raise it the twelfth time—that becomes significant to the Soviets. Because we have dropped the issue, the Soviets conclude that it's not important for us anymore. We must understand that, so we do not drop

the issue the twelfth time. If it's an issue that is of real concern to us, we must continue to raise it—patiently, persistently, consistently. I am convinced of that.

If we can maintain the same kind of Western unity, and if we can make the Soviets pay a price for transgressing agreements—whether it's a price in public opinion, or whether it's a price in benefits, or whether it's a price in relationships—and if we can maintain our military strength, I think we have a shot at entering into some kind of constructive relationship with them. And since the stakes are so high, I think it's essential for us to do everything we can to exploit that shot and to make that shot available to us.

Question Period

Arnaud de Borchgrave: Max, the one thing I don't quite understand is why it took so long to reach these conclusions. If you go back and read the Soviet theoretical journals in the early 1970s, they define peaceful coexistence as a shift in the global correlation of forces favorable to them, made irreversible by their growing military power. Then when you were signing the Final Act in Helsinki, they were already laying the logistics for the introduction of Cuban proxy troops into Africa and they were also going into production of the SS-20, which was deployed two years later. Why did it take until the invasion of Afghanistan for people to reach the conclusions that you have just set forth?

Kampelman: I can add another piece of evidence. It has to be that at the time they signed the ABM treaty they were planning the radar installation in Siberia which is in violation of the ABM treaty we have been talking about. Our experts tell us it would take about a dozen years to plan and engineer and construct to the present point of construction. This is, of course, part of the nature of the problem. Why is the problem not understood? It gets discouraging.

First of all, newer generations like to learn things for themselves. They also think they can do things better than their parents did. Parents know this. This is similar to the problem of how do you keep children's fingers away from the fire, the candle, so that the child doesn't get burned. Sometimes you can't succeed in persuading them; they've got to burn themselves sometimes in order to learn. This is one of our problems. But there is something else that I think is of great importance. Perhaps it is also a tribute to Soviet effectiveness in trying to influence public opinion. That is, the Soviets have been able to capture for themselves the rhetoric of peace. I've never understood why we have permitted that to happen—but we have permitted it to happen. Maybe some of it has to do with the nature of our system.

Our Defense Department has to make an appeal to the Congress because it can't do anything without making its appeal to the Congress—that has to be public—asking for so much for armaments. This then gets played up around the world. This helps the Soviets to

capture the rhetoric of peace. Knowing then that we can't afford to let them capture that rhetoric, we sometimes feel that we have to be doing things in order to identify ourselves with peace. And some of the things we mistakenly do are contrary to our interests, as I see it, and that's an important consideration. But there is also something else that I think is present. Our presidents—it doesn't matter which party it is—are generally people who strive for peace and understanding and, of course, a brave new world. This is part of the American dream. They would like to go down in history as peace-lovers, whether or not they win the Nobel Peace Prize. The temptation to them therefore to use their energies in that direction is there. The desirability of the end result is not in question. What is at issue is the means of achieving that end result. Our own culture tells us that to get along with our neighbors we must be prepared to turn the other cheek. So we extend ourselves. We take initiatives. We are nice. Culturally this is our way of doing things. And that's frequently a mistake.

I want us always to be nice, let me say—in fact, even when I was candid I always maintained good personal relationships with the other side. But I really think our presidents must always keep in mind—and that our secretaries of state and our advisers on foreign policy must always keep in mind—this is a system which forces Sakharovs to go on hunger strikes, this is a system which puts the Scharanskys in jail, this is a system which kills Catholic priests who attempt to show any kind of independence of thought and religious views, this is a repressive society which has millions of people in labor camps and in prison camps. We must never forget that. This is why the human rights ingredient is so important. This is a system which takes political opponents and puts them in psychiatric hospitals as a form of political reprisal. If we can keep that always in mind, and not the Western dress and the smile, which may be there on a personal level, then I think we will be able to keep our eye on the ball.

John Wohlstetter: Jean-Francois Revel has just written a book *How Democracies Perish* which suggests that democracies have certain self-destructive tendencies. As one example of this he cites the imposition of martial law in Poland and the lack of what he called any effective Western response, which in part was predicated on the fact that, instead of sending tanks, they simply hired General Jaruzelski to do their work for them. Do you think that we did have an effective response to the Polish crisis in 1981, and if not, do you think Revel is right that we are not capable of having one?

Kampelman: First, let me say that I think democracy has certain weaknesses. But, so what? I mean, we know that. I also think we have many strengths and I think our strengths are a great deal more effective than our weaknesses, if we pay attention to these weaknesses and attempt to deal with them. Let me say this about the Polish experience. The Solidarity movement came into