



# Sam Nunn

UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
(202) 224-3821

MEMO TO: Editors  
FROM: Scott Maxwell  
DATE: March 28, 1986

RE: Senator Nunn's vote on contra aid

Senator Nunn asked me to send you the attached clipping from the Congressional Record. Included are his floor statement prior to the Senate's vote on contra aid, his letter to President Reagan, the President's response and a colloquy between Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen (R-ME), which collectively outline the reasoning behind Senator Nunn's vote in favor of military assistance.

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, last year. Senators LUGAR, BENTSEN, BOREN, CHILES, JOHNSTON, DOLE, DURENBERGER, DeCONCINI, ROCKEFELLER, NICKLES, DIXON, and I introduced an amendment to provide humanitarian assistance to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua.

That amendment was to provide humanitarian assistance to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua.

That amendment eventually became the law which provided some \$27 million in humanitarian assistance to the Contras and also provided the basis for the President to return to Congress and ask for military aid, as he has now done.

When we introduced our resolution, the United States had terminated all assistance, both military and nonmilitary to the Contras. Congress had refused to continue to fund a so-called covert program of military assistance to the Contras because of serious concerns about the administration's goals and the nature of the Contras.

The purpose of our amendment was to chart a course which would enjoy the broadest possible support in the Congress and the American people. We felt that if the United States was to have any success in confronting the crisis in Central America, it was necessary to develop a consensus behind a policy of supporting a genuinely democratic opposition with humanitarian aid, while keeping the military option alive but on the back burner.

At the time, I said, and I quote:

U.S. interests in the region can be reduced to two simple objectives: one, we must foster genuine democratic principles as well as economic and social growth, and two, we must prevent the Soviets or the Cubans or their surrogates from making Central America a base for the projection of their power. If we support dialogue, democracy, and national reconciliation in El Salvador as we do, we should also support those goals in Nicaragua.

I added, "Congress and the American people must be convinced that we are supporting the true democrats, men like Arturo Cruz."

*March 27, 1986*

FROM THE OFFICE OF SAM NUNN • U.S. SENATOR • GEORGIA

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Those remain our goals, that goals that I think we should pursue. We must now ask, what progress has been made since we enacted humanitarian assistance last year?

It is obvious that many people in this Chamber and in the country continue to believe that the administration's only true objective is a military overthrow of the government in Managua. Many also believe that the administration has been unwilling to negotiate either bilaterally or through the Contadora process. I believe the administration has to overcome this widespread skepticism if there is to be any hope for a sustainable American policy, whatever happens here today.

With respect to the Contras, lingering doubts remain about whether they are truly democratic and whether they respect human rights. It is unclear who is in control of the Contra organization. Is it the civilian leadership or is it the former national guard officers who make up most of the senior military leadership of the Contras?

The Sandinistas have refused to talk to the Contras and the internal opposition. They have not negotiated with the United States or the Contadora nations in good faith, and they have continued their military buildup and intensified their repressive domestic policies. Whatever one may think of the Contras and the Reagan administration policy, it is clear that the Sandinistas are repressing their people, damaging their economy and making efforts to destabilize their neighbors.

All of this confronts us with a terrible dilemma.

I am convinced that Americans will support genuine democratic resistance movements. Recent events in the Philippines show the enthusiasm that Americans have for those committed to democratic principles.

To criticize the Contras as they currently exist does not mean we should abandon them. The road to democracy where there is meager democratic tradition to follow is not smooth or simple. The recent steps toward democracy in the rest of Central America, principally in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are evidence of this. Yet we must support these fledgling efforts, as we are. We owe our support to those governments as well as to the genuine democrats who are in the Contra leadership.

A closely allied issue is whether the Contras adequately respect human rights.

President Carter set in motion a policy which emphasized respect for human rights as a key element in U.S. foreign policy. Although he was much criticized at the time, his policies have proven a rallying cry for those who champion freedom, liberty, and democracy around the world.

Mr. President, there are simply too many questions about the human rights record of the Contras. For example, Amnesty International and the Americas Watch have just released

lengthy studies which record many alleged violations of human rights by both the Sandinistas and the Contras. I do not know the truth of the allegations in these reports, but find that they raise many disturbing questions which must be answered. In a thoughtful floor statement on February 26, Senator LEAHY summarized these reports.

All of our offices have been receiving massive documents prepared by the Department of State which document human rights abuses by the Sandinistas. However, almost nothing has been said by the administration about alleged abuses by the Contras. This administration attitude must change if sustainable support for administration policy is to emerge in Congress and among the American people.

Mr. President, in deciding this issue, we are also sending a message to the people in Nicaragua and Central America that will have far-reaching implications. Nor would it be an exaggeration to say that we are also sending a message to the world. We must make this message unmistakably clear and strong.

Our message must be that the United States is firmly committed to the cause of democracy in the Americas and that we are determined that democratic movements in this hemisphere will not be crushed by armies and police power, whether of the left or the right.

What then is the solution to this dilemma and how do we convey the message of our support for democracy?

A strong message in support of democracy will not be conveyed if aid to the resistance squeaks by the Congress on a narrow vote.

In developing our policy we must demonstrate the United States neither wishes to restore the old regime in Nicaragua nor wishes to impose its own will upon Nicaragua. The resistance forces must be an authentic and democratic national liberation movement or they do not deserve our support. The message we send will be a clear one: The United States supports democracy in Nicaragua, not a return to the Somoza era.

I am encouraged by the appointment of Ambassador Habib as the President's Central America negotiator. But we need more than a man, we need a plan.

We face a difficult and demanding task. But there is reason to believe that this approach can succeed. Five years ago Nicaragua's neighbor, El Salvador, seemed destined toward greater bloodshed and repression.

But out of our debate here in Congress a two-track policy for El Salvador evolved: we gave military aid, but we also insisted upon democratization and reconciliation within Salvadoran society. The American public—and the Central American public—stood behind this sometimes slow-moving and imperfect policy. El Salvador today still has many difficulties. But the

levels of civil violence have diminished, a democratically elected government is in place, and the country has begun to rebuild.

Nicaragua, of course, is not El Salvador. It is today ruled by Marxists-Leninists: home-grown, but foreign sponsored. But this is another reason why our Nicaraguan policy is so important. The United States has shown—in El Salvador, in the Philippines and in Haiti—that we can help change repressive regimes. We must also find policies that enable us to respond to the challenge of Communist totalitarianism.

Accordingly, I have written the President a letter.

In that letter, I state that unless the Contras are perceived in the United States and Central America as a genuine democratic movement, it is unlikely that American aid can be sustained or that the Contras will attract much support in Nicaragua. Therefore, I asked the President to give assurances on several points which are spelled out in my letter. Let me summarize them:

First, aid should be given only to civilian political leaders who respect human rights, are genuinely democratic, and have not engaged in criminal activity; no aid should be given directly to military leaders.

Second, this political leadership must form a genuine democratic movement.

Third, the resistance forces must investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for human rights abuses.

Fourth, all intelligence and other nonmateriel assistance should also be funneled through the civilian leadership.

Fifth, strict accounting measures over our aid must be adopted.

And, sixth, humanitarian aid should include education in reading, writing, health care and agricultural and vocational skills that will foster economic and political growth.

The President has now responded to my letter. In his response, I am pleased that the President has pledged to meet these concerns and states that he fully agrees with the objectives of my letter.

I am also pleased that the resolution which has been—will be—introduced by Senators LUGAR, DOLE and BENTSEN contains provisions reflecting these concerns which are shared by many of us in this Chamber. I am grateful for the leadership of Senators COREN, RUDMAN and KASSEBAUM in this regard. Specifically, section 9(f) prohibits expenditure of the funds until the President determines and reports to Congress that the Contras "have agreed to and are beginning to implement":

Broadening their leadership base; coordination of efforts; elimination of human rights abuses; pursuit of a program to achieve democracy in Nicaragua, and subordination of military forces to civilian leadership.

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In addition, the Commission established by section 11 is required to report to Congress by June 30, 1986 on whether the Nicaraguan democratic resistance has agreed to, and are beginning to, implement these measures.

Finally, Mr. President and this is very important, Congress must exert vigorous oversight over all aspects of this program. We must investigate carefully the allegations of human rights abuses by the Contras. We must oversee this program to assure that the administration is making a good faith effort to negotiate and to build a democratic center. We must also carefully monitor progress of the negotiations. The Commission, which will be established by section 11, will provide us with the facts upon which we can conduct this oversight.

Mr. President, if we adopt the proposal we are debating, including the provisions I have discussed, and if the President adheres to the pledges made in his letter to me, I believe it will go a long way toward developing a consensus behind a sustainable policy of military pressure on the Sandinistas to negotiate while at the same time building a genuine democratic movement which will enjoy the support of the American people and of the other governments in the region.

I have spend a good deal of time talking to the administration's top officials about this, including the President and the Secretary of State. I would like to close by quoting from my exchange of letters with the President on this subject.

Mr. President, my letter stated a number of goals. The main goal I will state very briefly:

All aid should be given only to civilian political leaders that are genuinely democratic, respect human rights and have not or are not engaged in criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. No aid should go to the military leaders except through civilian leadership committed to these goals and principles.

Mr. President, I would like to read one part of the letter I received from President Reagan in response to my letter. This statement is on the second page of the President's letter. I think it is the most important commitment that we could have now in terms of the future of this Contra program. I quote from the President's letter:

Please be assured that I will implement this mandate from the Congress in a manner which gives primacy to civilian leadership and democratic development within the Nicaraguan opposition. To do so, we will work with the leadership of the Nicaraguan opposition to establish a council which, like our own National Security Council, ensures that military activities are conducted under the guidance of responsible civilian leaders. It is our intention that this body will be responsible for ensuring that U.S. assistance is fairly and properly administered.

I ask unanimous consent that the letters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE.  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, DC, March 26, 1986.

The PRESIDENT.  
The White House.  
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Last year when Senator Lugar and I, and a number of our colleagues, sponsored an amendment which provided humanitarian assistance for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua, we sought to develop a consensus behind a sustainable policy that would promote the growth of democracy in Nicaragua and support negotiations. One of the central purposes of our amendment was to foster the growth of democracy and respect for human rights within the democratic resistance.

I agree with your view that the establishment of a consolidated, Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua, allied with the Soviet Union and Cuba, represents a potential threat to the security of the United States. The Sandinistas have steadily tightened their grip on the people of Nicaragua. They have violated the human rights, and denied fundamental freedoms, of the Nicaraguan people. Moreover, the evidence is incontrovertible that the Sandinistas have continued to support guerilla movements and terrorism outside Nicaragua and that the Soviet and Cuban presence and influence has grown.

Although some progress has been made in forming a democratic political leadership for the contras, the American people and the Congress are reluctant to support the contras because they are not convinced that they are truly a democratic movement. The Congress, and I believe the American people, are prepared to support an authentic broad-based democratic resistance movement fighting for freedom and human rights in Nicaragua.

Our policy must indicate clearly not only what the United States opposes—a Marxist-Leninist repressive regime in Nicaragua—but also what we support, democracy and human rights. As we learned in El Salvador, the most effective force to prevent a communist success is a strong, principled, democratic movement which represents the real aspirations of the people. Similarly, in the Philippines we recently saw the enormous force generated when people want democracy and believe that there are leaders with integrity and courage who support democratic goals.

Unless the contra movement is perceived in the United States and Central America as an effort to bring democracy to Nicaragua, it is unlikely that American aid can be sustained or that the contras will attract the kind of political support required to bring about changes in Nicaragua.

Unfortunately, the contras have yet to become this force. Their political program and goals remain unclear. The various forces opposing the Sandinistas are divided. The power within the FDN, the largest contra force, still does not appear to be under civilian control. Although the United Nicaraguan Opposition has recently formed a Human Rights Commission, the contras' record and commitment on human rights remains unacceptable.

In El Salvador, we have used our military and economic aid effectively with bipartisan support, to strengthen democratic forces committed to human rights. We should follow a similar course in providing military assistance to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua.

I agree with the recent suggestion of Senators Cohen, Kassebaum and Rudman that the contras must agree to broaden their base, eliminate human rights abuses, and develop and pursue a program for achieving

democracy in Nicaragua. I suggest a number of measures to insure that U.S. aid is designed to bring about these goals which are essential for success.

First, all aid should be given only to civilian political leaders that are genuinely democratic, respect human rights and have not or are not engaged in criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. No aid should go to the military leaders except through civilian leadership committed to these goals and principles.

Second, the civilian political leadership of the opposition movements must form a genuine democratic movement. The United States must insist that they work together and that they broaden their base so as not to exclude Nicaraguans who are committed to democratic principles. This does not mean that they must all adhere to a common political approach, but only that they embrace democratic principles.

Third, vigorous action must be taken to enforce respect for human rights including investigation and prosecution of individuals within the resistance responsible for human rights abuses.

Fourth, all intelligence and other non-material assistance and cooperation should also be funneled through, or at least controlled by, the democratic civilian political leadership.

Fifth, strict accounting measures must be adopted to insure that all aid is being properly administered and accounted for.

Sixth, humanitarian aid should include basic education for the democratic resistance fighters and their families. We should, for example, teach reading, writing, health care, and other basic courses in agricultural and vocational skills which will foster political and economic growth.

It is my firm belief that these assurances would go a long way toward satisfying doubts that linger in the minds of the Congress and the American people as to whether the contras truly represent a democratic force worthy of our support. I hope you will be able to provide me with these assurances.

Mr. President, I have one final but important point. The foreign policy of the United States toward Nicaragua cannot succeed if the only way it can be sustained is by repeated, razor-thin votes of the Congress. We need to develop a bipartisan, sustainable policy toward Nicaragua that enjoys the long-term support of the Congress, the American people and of the governments and the people of Central and South America. I applaud the efforts of Senator Sasser, Senator Byrd, Senator Lugar and Senator Dole in seeking to develop such a policy. I hope you will support them in that effort and join in developing such a policy.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN.

THE WHITE HOUSE.

Washington, March 27, 1986.

HON. SAM NUNN,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR SAM: Thank you for your letter this morning regarding our need to move in a bipartisan manner on forging a policy which will lead to a democratic outcome in Nicaragua. I fully agree with your objective of ensuring that everything we do diplomatically, politically, economically, and, especially, with our aid should contribute to the goal of a truly democratic solution.

Your observations, regarding the Nicaraguan opposition and its need to broaden its appeal to the Nicaraguan people, are entirely accurate. I agree that we need to do more to ensure that the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is, indeed, a representative move-

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ment, responsive to civilian leadership which is, in turn, committed to the ideals of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and a better life for the Nicaraguan people.

It is because I believe so deeply in a truly democratic outcome in Nicaragua that I have endorsed a number of proposals made by thoughtful members of Congress, regional leaders, and the leadership of the Nicaraguan opposition itself, which are designed to further that end. The legislation that we have discussed with the Senate leadership and, which I find acceptable, reflects this advice and includes the following provisions intended to give effect to the objectives identified in your letter:

"The President shall use the authority provided by this Joint Resolution to . . . encourage the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to take additional steps, strengthen its unity, pursue a defined and coordinated program for representative democracy in Nicaragua, and otherwise increase its appeal to the Nicaraguan people."

Please be assured that I will implement this mandate from the Congress in a manner which gives primacy to civilian leadership and democratic development within the Nicaraguan opposition. To do so, we will work with the leadership of the Nicaraguan opposition to establish a council which, like our own National Security Council, ensures that military activities are conducted under the guidance of responsible civilian leaders. It is our intention that this body will be responsible for ensuring that U.S. assistance is fairly and properly administered. I have also endorsed language in the legislation which provides not less than \$3 million for "strengthening programs and activities of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance for the observance and advancement of human rights." Training and democratic principles will be an important part of our program. Finally, I am committed to ensuring that no aid be provided to those groups that remain in their ranks individuals who engage in human rights violations, drug smuggling, or misuse of resistance funds.

I believe that these commitments are responsive to your concerns and those of other members of Congress who are as dedicated as you and I to a sustainable bipartisan and truly democratic solution to the turmoil in Central America.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

MR. NUNN. Mr. President, there are a number of other statements that I think are important in President Reagan's letter. Time does not permit me to read them.

Let me close by saying that I am pleased that the resolution, the Dole-Lugar-Bentsen resolution, which I intend to vote for, contains provisions reflecting these concerns which are shared by many in this Chamber.

I am grateful to the leadership of Senators COHEN, RUDMAN, and KASSEBAUM in this regard.

I congratulate Senator COHEN for his leadership and I assure him that I agree completely with the goals that he has been effective in pursuing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if I have time, I yield whatever time I have remaining to Senator COHEN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes and 50 seconds.

Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. President, the present episode in the long-running debate over U.S. aid to the Contras has been marred and clouded by intemperate rhetoric. We seem at times to be focussing more on tactics—slogans and allusions aimed at inspiring the desired response—than substance.

It is imperative that we move beyond this. There are some critical issues which must be carefully considered if we are to arrive at a responsible policy.

I believe that a key to developing a sound, long-term approach lies in a careful consideration of the principal parties in Nicaragua.

Unfortunately for the Nicaraguan populace, the Sandinista government has removed lingering doubts about its nature and intent in the past year. Last October, the Nicaraguan Government suspended fundamental civil rights of its citizens, including the right to form unions and to strike; the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; freedom of movement; right of peaceful assembly; freedom of information; and the right to a trial. These and the continuation of other human rights abuses underscore more clearly than ever the antidemocratic nature and intent of a force which once promised to embody the hopes of the Nicaraguan people.

It is also clear that the Sandinistas have interfered in the internal affairs of their neighbors, and have encouraged the consolidation of Cuban and Soviet presence and influence. Last year, we were surprised at Daniel Ortega's indelicate visit to Moscow on the heels of the votes in the House of Representatives to deny aid to the Contras. This week lightning struck again in the form of a significant Sandinista incursion into Honduras as the Senate prepared to debate the merits of further aid to the Contras. It would appear that Mr. Ortega thought he could vanquish any claim the Contras might have as a fighting force; instead, he suffered a serious, self-inflicted head wound.

As a result of the Sandinista's internal policies and international designs, there appears to be little remaining doubt about the nature of their rule. As the distinguished Senator from Tennessee stated in the Democratic response to the President's televised address on aid to the Contras:

We agree that the Sandinista government has betrayed the promise of its own revolution, has suppressed the freedom of its own people, and has supported subversion against its neighbor in El Salvador.

The principal differences of view arise over the question of what to do about this. In my view, the United States does have an inescapable interest in problems and events in Latin America. Regional security is a valid concern and, tempting as it may seem, we cannot simply turn away from the situation in Nicaragua. Our objectives in this situation should be to help advance the democratic aspirations of the Nicaraguan people and to support

efforts by our Latin American neighbors to ensure regional security.

To meet the latter goal, I believe we must vigorously support the efforts of our Latin American neighbors to work out diplomatic solutions through the Contadora negotiating process.

This can also be advanced through measures to promote democratization in Nicaragua. Here, then, we must turn to consideration of the Contras.

While there has been increasing agreement among the public and Members of Congress concerning the nature of the Sandinista regime and the threat that it poses both to its neighbors and to the United States, there is still no consensus over the character of the Nicaraguan rebels. Indeed, the term "Contras" is misleading to the extent that it implies a single source of armed opposition to the Sandinistas. We know that there are in fact numerous groups battling the Sandinistas, groups which do not always share the same methods or objectives.

We need to address a number of unresolved questions concerning the Contras before we embark on a policy that will deepen our involvement with these groups. We need to ensure that their goals coincide with our own, that their methods are consistent with these goals, and that they have a program and organization which promises to garner significant popular support among their countrymen in Nicaragua.

The United States backed Contras stand accused of human rights abuses. Further, it is uncertain whether they can agree on a common agenda with other resistance groups or coordinate their activities.

If our goal is to bring pressure to bear on the Sandinistas to move toward democratization and regional security, then the Contras need to develop a common set of objectives along with a program and organizational structure for implementing them. They also need to develop recognition as legitimate and representative spokesmen for large segments of the population inside Nicaragua. Internal and international support for the Contras will grow only when it is clear that they are not CIA mercenaries or ex-Somoza national guardsmen intent on returning Nicaragua to the authoritarianism of the past.

In short, support for the Contras will not prove effective unless we make it clear to them that our support is contingent on reforms that will promote the formation of a confederated, broadly based, coordinated, democratic opposition.

It is for this reason that I joined with my colleagues, Senator KASSEBAUM and Senator RUDMAN, in pressing for legislation linking assistance to the Contras to concrete measures to develop and implement a reform program. Specifically, we have argued that additional aid beyond the initial outlay be prohibited unless and until the Con-

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tras have agreed and have begun implementing:

Confederation and reform measures to broaden their leadership base;

The coordination of their efforts;

The elimination of human rights abuses;

The pursuit of a defined and coordinated program for achieving representative democracy in Nicaragua; and

The subordination of military forces to civilian leadership.

Notification that these conditions have been satisfied would be provided through Presidential certification.

We have also insisted that an independent commission, established under the legislation, prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on whether the Contra groups have carried out these obligations.

Our purpose in this legislation is not to raise unworkable obstacles, but, rather, to establish a rational framework for ensuring that U.S. assistance promotes the objectives for which it is intended. Hence, we envision detailed reporting on the reform efforts of the Contras, including relevant information relating to the degree of success achieved in meeting the goals of the legislation.

I am pleased to note that these reform provisions have been included in the legislation we are considering today. I am hopeful that their enactment will give impetus to a healthy restructuring of the Nicaraguan opposition forces. In any case, the message, I trust, will be clear. The United States will not indefinitely funnel assistance to disparate, fractious forces with questionable human rights practices. What we demand is a broad-based, coordinated, democratic force with a popular program for promoting democracy in Nicaragua.

Mr. President, after years of debate and discussion, we are still groping for a policy toward Nicaragua. I believe it is essential that we define our objectives clearly and develop a carefully drawn plan to implement them. When a policy is ambiguous or opaque, efforts to rally support—especially through verbal bullying—will fail. Casting aspersions is not a substitute for the heavy responsibility and difficult task of persuading a free people to open their eyes and minds to near- or long-term dangers. We must instead define the problems, propose clear and specific policies to deal with them, and seek to convince the country and the Congress to support those policies.

The problems of Nicaragua and its relations with its neighbors do not lend themselves to quick or easy solutions. I believe that only through a multitrack approach which includes a Contra reform element can pressure be effectively brought to bear on the Sandinista government to move toward pluralism and democracy and to cease being a threat to regional security.

Mr. President, earlier this afternoon, I heard some of the debate character-

ized as a message to the Sandinistas or a message to the American people and our allies; that if we were not willing to support this assistance package, that America was not willing to stand up for her friends. A question came to my mind: Who are our friends? The enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, may we have order? I am trying to listen to the Senator from Maine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. COHEN. One of the major concerns Senator KASSEBAUM, Senator RUDMAN and I had was that we have no chance of success, any long-term chance of success, unless we are able to forge a bipartisan consensus in Congress and in the country.

We can only do that if we have a group that we can support that would be not only an effective military force but an effective moral force, as well; a force around which the people, the disenfranchised people of Nicaragua, could rally to say "these people now embody our aspirations"—the aspirations that have been, in fact, abandoned by the Sandinistas.

And it was for what reason that Senator KASSEBAUM, SENATOR RUDMAN, Senator NUNN, myself and others believed that it was important that we not support any package that did not call for a reform of the Contras to promote the formation of a confederated, broadly based, coordinated, democratic opposition. Right now, it consists of a number of disparate groups. They are not effectively organized. They do not adequately subordinate military forces to civilian rule. They stand accused of human rights abuses, and we simply could not continue to support a group on a long-term basis under such circumstances.

For that reason, we proposed an amendment—it was accepted—that would condition any additional aid, beyond the initial outlay, upon the Contras agreeing to implement a confederation and reform measures to broaden their leadership base, to coordinate their efforts, to eliminate human rights abuses, to pursue a program for achieving representative democracy in Nicaragua, and to subordinate military forces to civilian leadership.

Mr. NUNN. The Senator says, as I understand it—this is my view, and I am sure it is the view of the Senator from Maine—that this is not simply an altruistic principle of human rights and democratic principles, although that is part of it. It is really the key as to whether this policy we are pursuing has any chance of success, in terms of being sustainable in this country, which is in doubt now, and in terms, most importantly of being supported by the people of Nicaragua, which, in the final analysis, will determine the outcome.

Mr. COHEN. The Senator is correct.

If these groups do not organize, do not coordinate their activities, do not engage in promotion of the democratic reforms that are essential, they will lose the support of the Nicaraguan people, and we will face ultimate defeat. This is the key to a reform package.

Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator from Maine agree with the Senator from Georgia in the observation that now that we have the President's letter, and that we also have the language of the Senator from Maine in this resolution, we have something by which to judge the Contra movement? There will be no more debates in a vacuum 18 or 12 months from now. Either they move in this direction or, in my view, this will not be a program sustainable by the United States.

Mr. COHEN. The Senator is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut. [Mr. Dobb].

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I urge both my good friends from Georgia and Maine to see last week's interview on "Front Line," conducted by Judy Woodruff on Public Broadcasting. The person being interviewed thought the cameras and tape recorders were off. He made comments about who would be in control. I wish them well. I hope they are right in this, but I am suspicious that his statements may have been more reflective of the realities.

Mr. NUNN. I take that point well. I know about that interview, and that strengthened my conviction that there has to be civilian control by people who are committed to democratic principles.