

**Directorate of Intelligence
Office of Central Reference**

24 July 1985

NOTE FOR:

DCI
DDI

FROM:

[Redacted]

DD/OCR

SUBJECT: Wallop's Statement on Nicaraguan Bios

Bob:

This excerpt from the Congressional Record of 3 October 1984 evidently is the one mentioned by Senator Wallop. It contains biographic material on the Nicaraguan contra leaders, as well as some background material on the opposition to the Sandinistas, and was introduced into the Record by Senator Wallop. The biographies were produced by State Department (Office of the Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean) and were based on reports OCR prepared in December 1983 (for Assistant Secretary Motley) and on data obtained by Public Diplomacy from contra organizations.

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down that street in the wrong direction.

Either this country stands for, and seeks for, and will support, legitimate aspirations to freedom, or it is not the country that I think it is, and this is not the Senate that I hope it is.

Mr. GOLDWATER. One additional question, and I shall sit down:

The decision in these matters in my opinion and according to the Constitution rests with the President, the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief has seen an ultimate threat to our freedom on borders 800 miles away. I might suggest that is the closest we have ever come since the attack on Pearl Harbor to having our freedom threatened.

I might add that because I live on the Mexican border, I might feel a little more closely associated with this threat than others who live a greater distance away.

But does the Senator from Wyoming not feel that regardless of what wordage we might adopt on this floor in the form of an amendment, ultimately it is the Commander in Chief who is going to have to make up our minds or we are going to have to amend the Constitution, and I frankly think that this might be a good test for the President to try his case, because before this Constitution of ours can survive and we can go along as a free people, in my opinion, we have to defeat the War Powers Act. I do not like to bring this in at this time, but I just wanted to raise that one point before I sit down; that is, it is our Commander in Chief, not us, who has to make these final decisions, and much as I dislike arguing with my friend from Hawaii, because I have the utmost respect for him—he is one of the great heroes of our World War II; he is a man who is dedicated to our principles—but in this case, I have to agree with my friend from Wyoming that the language of this amendment should not be adopted by this body.

Mr. WALLOP. I thank the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. President, I made my case on the floor, and I will not make it again, for the strategic significance of this area. I have asked whether this country wants another Cuba in this hemisphere, and whether it is willing to live with the resulting effects on the Panama Canal and on our southern border. Today, I wish to concentrate on something a little different, an essential issue that we have neglected. Whatever we do with regard to Nicaragua, our action or inaction will redound to someone's benefit. If we do not support the contras, then we support the Communists. In war, there is no equivocation. What is going on down there is a war waged by people seeking their freedom, and by Communist tyrants trying to crush it.

I have in my hand Senate Concurrent Resolution 74 signed by 70 Senators of this body to encourage and support the people of Afghanistan, on the

other side of the world, on the Soviet border, in their struggle to be free from Soviet domination.

We all know who we are, the cosponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 74, and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the list of cosponsors.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. TSONGAS (for himself, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CHILES, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. DIXON, Mr. DOLE, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. EXON, Mr. FORD, Mr. GARN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. HART, Mr. HATCH, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. HUDDESTON, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MATTINGLY, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. PELL, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SASSER, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. WARNER, Mr. WILSON, Mr. ZORINSKY, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. PERCY, Mr. JEPSEN, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. DENTON, Mr. SYMMS, Mr. EAST, Mr. INOUE, Mr. DODD, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. HECHT, Mr. McCLURE, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. WALLOP, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. LAUTENBERG) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I wonder what they see as the difference, those who feel one way about Afghanistan and another about Central America. Sure, they will be saying that there are Soviet occupation troops in Afghanistan.

But is not Cuba and the Soviet Union in effect an occupation force with the Sandinistas? Who in here thinks that the Sandinistas can operate on their own independently and could trigger a free election if they wanted to without the permission of their Soviet and Cuban masters?

Why would we vote to help freedom on the other side of the globe and to further the cause of the Soviet Union near our own border?

Does anyone in here doubt that a victory over the Nicaraguan resistance would be a victory for the Soviet Union? Of course it would be.

Why is it that there are some in this body so eager to give that victory to the Soviets and the Cubans?

Do the Nicaraguan people have less right to be free than the Afghans?

The resolution says:
... It would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom.

Where are all my consistent fellow cosponsors? What is the difference between people seeking freedom in the mountains of Central Asia or the mountains of Central America?

Where are you? Why is it that it is more important to be free there than in our own hemisphere?

Perhaps here is the answer. The resolution says:

That it should be the policy of the United States to support effectively the people of Afghanistan in their fight for freedom; . . .

Perhaps these cosponsors are willing to say such things when there is little chance of achieving them, but when a real choice is before them, instead of backing freedom, in effect they are backing a Soviet victory in our own hemisphere.

How good is it to have votes on clear issues? How clear can you get? The choice is absolutely there. Voters can cast their votes and decide between sincerity and hypocrisy.

Both of those causes are worthy of the support of a free people proud of freedom, and this I hope to God in America is still one.

Mr. President, lest there be any doubt as to the nature of the leaders of the contras, I ask unanimous consent that the biographies of the contra leaders, showing them to be freedom-loving people, many of whom formerly were Sandinistas, be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

INTRODUCTION

The Sandinistas are waging an intensive propaganda campaign to discredit their opponents as counter-revolutionaries. They denounce the leaders of the armed anti-Sandinista organizations as henchmen of former President Somoza. But the facts show that nearly all the so-called "contra" leaders were actually staunch opponents of Somoza. Many fought against Somoza and contributed to his defeat. Subsequently, they became disillusioned when they saw that the democratic revolution for which they had sacrificed so much was being transformed by the Sandinistas into a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. This paper provides an overview of the reasons many Nicaraguans turned against the Sandinistas and examines the composition of the groups that form the armed opposition.

WHY THE OPPOSITION DEVELOPED

The Sandinistas' victory in 1979 depended largely on the spirit of rebellion against Somoza which had developed during the 1970's. Political parties—including the Conservatives, who were the traditional opposition force, dissident Liberals, Social Christians, and Socialists—all clamored for an end to Somoza's total domination of the nation's political system. Businessmen, farmers, ranchers, and professionals—united in the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP)—struggled against Somoza's control of Nicaragua's economy. Independent labor confederations fought for workers' rights and an end to repression of the organized labor movement. The Catholic Church, under the leadership of Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, became an outspoken critic of the Somoza regime and advocated freedom and social justice. The Permanent Commission on Human Rights exposed the abuses of the Somoza government to the world. The independent daily La Prensa spearheaded the crusade against Somoza; in early 1978, the assassination of the paper's editor, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, sparked the revolution.

The Sandinistas concluded that by de-emphasizing their Marxist-Leninist ideology and forming a tactical alliance with the broad spectrum of organizations opposed to

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Somoza, they could seize power. Accordingly, they appealed to all Nicaraguans to join their revolutionary movement and pledged that the pillars of the new government would be pluralism, a mixed economy, and nonalignment. The Nicaraguan people came to view the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the major armed anti-Somoza organization, as the only viable alternative to Somoza's continued rule. Placing faith in the FSLN's promises, Nicaraguans from all walks of life and all political persuasions rallied round the Sandinistas banner and joined in the popular revolution that triumphed in July 1979.

The Sandinistas determined to maintain the appearance of a broadly based popular regime. The original junta of the new Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) contained moderates as well as Sandinista militants, and the cabinet included non-Sandinistas. Even the key post of Defense Minister was given to a defector from Somoza's National Guard, Colonel Bernardino Larios. However, the Sandinistas viewed this merely as an interim arrangement that would facilitate the consolidation of their power. In September, the FSLN National Directorate held a secret strategy session which produced the "72-hour document," a blueprint for the creation of an FSLN-controlled Marxist-leninist State in Nicaragua.

As the Sandinistas labored to consolidate their power, groups that had struggled so long against Somoza became increasingly opposed to Sandinista policies and actions. These groups found themselves confronting a regime far more formidable and doctrinaire than its predecessor. Activists in opposition parties were harassed and their opportunities to proselytize were limited by law. Members of the private sector saw the government take over the lion's share of the economy and impose rules greatly restricting their ability to manage their own firms. Independent labor leaders were frequently persecuted, and strikes were outlawed while the real wages of workers declined. The leadership of the Catholic Church was attacked by the FSLN for continuing to speak out on issues such as human rights, church unity, individual freedom, and the fight to a religious education. The Permanent Commission on Human Rights was persecuted for revealing Sandinista human rights violations, and its president was driven into exile. La Prensa was muzzled by a harsh censorship law, and on numerous occasions the paper did not publish because virtually all the day's hard news had been prohibited by government censors. Defense Minister Larios was replaced by a member of the FSLN's National Directorate, and he subsequently spent more than two years in prison accused of being a counter-revolutionary; he still is not permitted to leave the country.

The Sandinistas have reneged on their promise to bring democracy to Nicaragua, and an ever-growing number of Nicaraguans see their revolution betrayed by the FSLN. Many have remained in Nicaragua thus far, trying to wage a civic battle with the Sandinistas. Others have concluded that the civic course was futile, and that the only way the Sandinistas would leave power was the same way they acquired it, through military force. In the past few years, a number of armed anti-FSLN organizations have emerged and initiated combat operations against the Sandinistas. These groups represent widely differing constituencies within Nicaragua, reflecting the diversity of the groups that formerly had opposed Somoza. A lack of unity has hampered the effectiveness of the anti-FSLN efforts. In the summer of 1984, however, the three major exile organizations—FDN, MISURA, and

ARDE—formed an alliance named the Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR).

THE ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS

I. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE—FDN

The FDN is the largest of the armed anti-FSLN organizations. It was founded in 1981 under the leadership of former National Guard officers. As the focal point for armed resistance to the Sandinistas, it quickly attracted many of those who had become disaffected with the FSLN. Its ranks were swollen by influential political and business figures, by peasants from northern Nicaragua who were fleeing Sandinista repression, and even by disillusioned Sandinistas themselves. The influx of new members led to a fundamental transformation of the FDN, and in December 1982 a new National Directorate was formed which was dominated by anti-Somoza civilians. The new civilian leadership purged any former National Guard members whose background was questionable. It retained other former National Guard members with clean records in positions where their military expertise was needed. A further reorganization of the FDN occurred in October 1983, and Adolfo Calero, a prominent Conservative and business leader, assumed the position of President of the National Directorate and Commander in Chief. The FDN's rapid growth has permitted it to field 42 task forces for combat operations. All but four of these units are currently led by civilians or ex-Sandinistas. Overall, less than 1% of the FDN's total strength were previously members of the National Guard, while about 15% were actually ex-Sandinista fighters. The FDN claims to have between 10,000 and 12,000 members.

II. MISURA AND BLACK CREOLES

MISURA evolved out of the Alliance for the Progress of Miskitos and Sumos (ALPROMISU), an Indian organization founded in 1973 with the help of Protestant churches working in the Atlantic Coast region. The initial objective of the organization was to compel the Somoza regime to respect the rights of the indigenous Indian populations. Following the fall of Somoza, the Sandinistas renamed the organization Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity (MISURASTA). Gradually, Sandinista mistreatment of the indigenous population led MISURASTA leaders to criticize the FSLN and, finally, to flee into exile. By the end of 1981, Sandinista persecution and forced relocation of Indian communities prompted the beginning of a large-scale exodus of Miskito Indians from Nicaragua. The government officially disbanded MISURASTA, but the organization lived on as former members developed a center of armed resistance to the FSLN. This group was headed by Miskito leaders such as Wycliffe Diego and Steadman Fagoth. In 1983, it adopted the name MISURA. This organization claims to have between 1,000 and 2,000 members.

III. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE—ARDE

ARDE is a coalition of organizations led by individuals who took an active role in the revolution, including many who were initially officials of the Sandinista government. ARDE was formed in exile in 1982. For a year, its leaders sought to restore the original course of the revolution through political means. In mid-1983, after peaceful political efforts proved futile, ARDE began military operations in southern Nicaragua. Since it was founded, ARDE has attracted thousands of former Sandinista fighters and civilians who have lost faith in the leadership of the FSLN. In 1984, a split occurred within the organization. The MDN, UDN/

FARN, FSDC, and STDN—four of the component organizations which held the major political leaders of the alliance and a few hundred of its guerrillas—entered a pact with the FDN and MISURA. The FRS and MISURASATA—which included most of the guerrillas and some of the civilian leaders—refused to align themselves with the FDN and have continued to operate independently. While these differences remain unresolved, the two factions agreed in September 1984 to coordinate their activities whenever possible. The following are the member organizations of ARDE:

A. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT—MDN

The MDN is a social-democratic party founded in 1978. It drew its support from middle class Nicaraguans, including many professionals, and it played an active role during the revolution. Its head, Alfonso Robelo, was one of the original members of the ruling GRN junta, but he resigned his position in 1980 in protest to Sandinista actions. The leaders of the MDN, particularly Robelo, subsequently were subjected to heavy FSLN harassment and fled into exile in 1982. Robelo has emerged as a key civilian leader of ARDE.

B. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES—UDN/FARN

The UDN/FARN is a political/military organization founded in 1981 by veteran anti-Somoza fighter Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro. The UDN/FARN was one of the original groups of ARDE, but Chamorro pulled his group out in the spring of 1983 and worked with the FDN for several months. In the spring in 1984, his differences with ARDE were overcome and the UDN/FARN rejoined the alliance.

C. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY FRONT—FSDC

The FSDC was formed in 1983 by Christian Democratic leaders who had fled into exile. It is led by figures such as Roberto Ferrey who were long-time opponents of Somoza.

D. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' SOLIDARITY—STDN

The STDN was founded in 1983 by labor leaders such as Zacarias Hernandez who were forced into exile by Sandinista persecution of the independent labor movement. They had been steadfast opponents of the Somoza regime.

E. SANDINO REVOLUTIONARY FRONT—FRS

The FRS, headed by Sandinista hero Eden Pastora, was created in 1982 by disillusioned Sandinista militants, many of whom had fought alongside Pastora on the Southern Front during 1979. The FRS was a founding member of ARDE, but it severed its ties when the leaders of other ARDE groups decided to form an alliance with the FDN and MISURA. Many of ARDE's combat troops chose to follow Pastora. The FRS claims to have more than 5,000 members.

F. MISKITO, SUMO, RAMA, AND SANDINISTA UNITY—MISURASATA

MISURASATA is the other Indian organization that evolved out of ALPROMISU. As noted above, the Sandinistas renamed the Indian organization MISURASATA, and later officially dissolved it when its leadership became highly critical of FSLN actions. In 1982, Miskito leader Brooklyn Rivera joined with other MISURASATA members in the south and commenced operations against the Sandinistas. This group retained the name MISURASATA and acted independently of MISURA forces in the north. MISURASATA leaders have collaborated

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closely with Pastora's forces, and MISURASATA joined with the FRS in refusing to form an alliance with the FDN and MISURA.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF OPPOSITION LEADERS

Sandinista propaganda seeks to portray the leaders of the armed opposition groups as associates of Somoza. The following biographical sketches show the contrary: that most were ardent opponents of the Somoza regime.

I. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE—FEN

Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, President of the National Directorate and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the FDN

Adolfo Calero was a prominent businessman and a lifelong political opponent of Somoza. He received part of his education in the United States, graduating in 1953 from the University of Notre Dame and later doing graduate work in industrial management at the University of Syracuse. He holds a law degree from the University of Central America in Nicaragua. In the late 1950s he became a major stockholder in and manager of the Coca-Cola Company of Nicaragua. His views on social and economic issues translated into tangible benefits for his workers, such as profit sharing, pay exceeding the minimum wage by 60%, and scholarship programs. He served as a director of the Chamber of Commerce and was a member of the Nicaraguan Developmental Institution (INDE) and the Nicaraguan Developmental Foundation (FUNDE), and a co-founder of the Human Development Institute (INPRHU). In the early 1970s, he was the dean of the faculty of Economics and Business Administration at the University of Central America.

Calero began his political career in 1953, when he joined other anti-Somoza activists including Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal (the editors of *La Prensa* assassinated in 1979), Rafael Cordova Rivas (currently a member of the GRN Junta), and Reynaldo Antonio Tefel (currently a member of the GRN cabinet) in forming an opposition youth movement. Later in the 1950s, he became an activist in the Conservative party, the traditional opposition group to Somoza. In 1959, he helped organize managerial strikes in support of the "Olama and Los Mollejones" insurrection headed by Chamorro.

Calero's stature within the Conservative party grew during the 1960s, and in 1970 he was offered a seat as an alternate in Congress as part of a pact between Fernando Aguero (Conservative party head) and Somoza. Calero refused the offer, insisting that Aguero's actions amounted to a sellout to Somoza. Instead, Calero joined other party members, such as current conservative leader Mario Rappacoli, and founded the Authentic Conservative Party. He became the party's coordinator in 1977.

Following the assassination of Chamorro in 1978, Calero was a principal leader of the strikes and civic activity that shook the Somoza regime. He subsequently served as his party's representative in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), an umbrella organization of opposition groups. He and other FAO leaders were jailed for a month for initiating a general strike.

Following the fall of Somoza, Calero initially attempted to cooperate with the FSLN in rebuilding Nicaragua. He was a leader of the Democratic Conservative Party which was forged during the revolution by uniting the previous divided conservative movement, and he was selected to the key position of political coordinator for the party. By the end of 1982, having become

totally disillusioned with the FSLN and the minor role it allowed other political parties, Calero went into exile to join the FDN. He was appointed to the FDN's National Directorate and in October 1983 elevated to the post of President of the National Directorate and Commander in Chief of the FDN's Armed Forces. He serves as the FDN's representative on the Directorate of UNIR.

Enrique Bermudez Varela, Member of the FDN National Directorate and Chief of the Strategic Military Command

Enrique Bermudez is a career military officer who graduated from the Nicaraguan Military Academy and attained the rank of colonel in the National Guard. He was not politically active and regarded himself as a professional soldier. Bermudez spent much of his career abroad. He attended military training courses in Brazil and the United States. He served with the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and was head of the Nicaraguan delegation to the Inter-American Defense Council. During the years preceding the revolution, Bermudez was Nicaraguan Defense Attache in Washington. After the revolution, he helped organize other exiled National Guard officers and was a founder of the FDN.

Alfonso Callejas Deshon, Member of the FDN National Directorate

Alfonso Callejas was trained as a civil engineer at the University of Santa Clara in California. After working for several years with the Standard Fruit Company, he founded his own business and eventually had interests in cattle, bananas, and cotton. He held various local and national offices in his capacity as an engineer, and headed the National Office of Water Resources in the early 1960s. He served as Minister of Public Works and later was named Vice President of the Republic under Somoza. He became disenchanted with the Somoza regime, however, and in 1972 resigned as a public protest to Somoza's efforts to maintain himself in power. He was a member of Somoza's National Liberal Party (PLN), but he was a leader of a group of dissidents who sought to restore true liberal values to the party. In 1978, he organized a PLN grassroots movement designed to force Somoza to resign. He spent the last months of the Somoza regime in exile in Honduras. Callejas returned to Nicaragua after the revolution, and although he was reportedly investigated and cleared of any wrongdoing, his properties were confiscated. He subsequently went back into exile.

Indalecio Rodriguez Alaniz, Member of the FDN National Directorate

Indalecio Rodriguez is a veterinary doctor who served as a professor and President of the University of Central America in Managua. As the son of a prominent anti-Somoza figure, he became politically active at an early age. He participated in an opposition youth movement, and became active in the Independent Liberal Party (PLI). He was jailed twice in the 1950s for his anti-Somoza political activity, and went into exile in 1960 where he became involved for a time with the newly formed FSLN. After several years abroad, he returned to Nicaragua to accept a position at the University of Central America, and he remained there during the revolution. By 1981, he had become disillusioned with the FSLN and abandoned his post to go into exile.

Lucia Cardenal de Salazar, Member of the FDN National Directorate

Lucia Cardenal de Salazar is the widow of prominent Nicaraguan businessman Jorge Salazar Arguello, murdered by Sandinista security forces in November 1980. She was

educated in Catholic schools in Nicaragua and the United States. During the revolution, the Salazars collaborated with the FSLN and harbored Sandinista militants who were being sought by Somoza's forces. Her husband, a top official of COSEP, played a key role in the civic opposition to Sandinista policies in late 1979 and 1980. He was a progressive leader whose popularity was rising when Sandinista security agents set him up and shot him allegedly for participating in a conspiracy. Following her husband's death, Mrs. Salazar fled Nicaragua and subsequently joined the FDN.

Marco A. Zeledon, Member of the FDN National Directorate

Marco A. Zeledon was a prominent businessman who played a leading role in private sector organizations. He has held key positions, such as president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Industry, and served as member of the Board of Governors of the Central American Institute of Food Marketing and of the Financial Committee of the developmental organization FUNDE. He was a progressive businessman who was one of the first to promote constructive forms of interaction in decision-making among the private sector, the government, labor unions, and community organizations. He became increasingly active in anti-Somoza politics during the 1970s, and participated in a private sector initiative to persuade Somoza to implement policies that would result in a more equitable distribution of wealth. Zeledon went into exile after the Sandinistas confiscated his cereal business.

II. MISURA AND BLACK CREOLES

Wycliffe Diego, Coordinator of the Political Commission of MISURA

Wycliffe Diego is a Miskito Indian leader from the Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Cabezas. He was a Moravian pastor and an active member of ALPROMISU, eventually attaining the office of Coordinator. In 1974, he was jailed by Somoza for allegedly being a Communist. Like many other Miskitos, Diego initially supported the revolution but became increasingly critical of the FSLN's treatment of his people. In 1981 he fled into exile after the Sandinistas arrested numerous Miskito leaders. Although the FSLN officially disbanded MISURASATA, Diego collaborated with other members of the movement in transforming MISURASATA into an armed anti-Sandinista group. He was gravely wounded in an assassination attempt in 1982. He represents MISURA on the directorate of UNIR.

Steadman Fagoth Muller, Member of MISURA

Steadman Fagoth, a Miskito Indian leader, was an active opponent of Somoza. While studying biology at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua in the early 1970s, he was arrested twice for his political activities. He became a member of the ALPROMISU organization which defended Indian interests. Following the revolution, he became a leader of the Sandinista-sponsored successor to this group, MISURASATA. He was that organization's first representative on the quasi-legislative Council of State. Fagoth began to criticize Sandinista mistreatment of his people, and in February 1981 he was among a group of Indian leaders arrested for "counter-revolutionary activity." He was also accused of having been an informant for Somoza during his university days, but MISURASATA insisted that his collaboration had been at the behest of the FSLN. In May, Fagoth was released on the condition that he accept a lengthy scholarship in a Soviet-bloc country. He managed to flee to Hondu-

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ras where he joined other MISURASATA members who were fighting against the Sandinistas. In 1982, he was wounded in an assassination attempt.

Roger Hermann, Member of the Political Commission of MISURA

Roger Hermann, a young Indian leader from Puerto Cabezas, became active in MISURASATA in 1979 in the labor field. Two years later, when the FSLN attempted to coerce him into working for the secret police (DGSE), he chose to go into exile instead. He was elected to MISURA's Political Commission in 1983.

III. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE—ARDE

A. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT—MDN

Alfonso Robelo Callejas, Political Coordinator of ARDE, Head of the MDN

Alfonso Robelo was trained as a chemical engineer and served as director of the University of Central America in Nicaragua during 1970-72. He subsequently became a leader in the private sector and was president of the Nicaragua Chamber of Industries until 1975. For the following three years he headed the developmental institute INDE.

Robelo's work with progressive, non-Somoza private sector organizations led him to a growing political role in the anti-Somoza movement. Following the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal in early 1978, Robelo founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), a political party of businessmen, industrialists, and profession created to provide leadership for the opposition to the Somoza regime. As head of the MDN, he became an active member of the Broad Opposition Front (FAO).

One of the original five members of the GRN junta, Robelo resigned in April 1980, publicly stating his opposition to the Marxist-Leninist tendencies within the FSLN-dominated government and to the strong Cuban influence. His efforts at civic opposition provoked severe harassment by the FSLN, including Sandinista mobs vandalizing his home. Robelo fled into exile in 1982 and subsequently became a founder of ARDE. He serves as ARDE's representative on the Directorate of UNIR.

B. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES—UDN/FARN

Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro Rappacoli, Leader of UDN/FARN, Commander of ARDE's Military Forces

Fernando Chamorro was a prominent anti-Somoza figure since the 1940s. He participated in numerous military operations against the regime, and he was repeatedly exiled or imprisoned by Somoza. During the revolution, he executed a spectacular rocket attack on Somoza's bunker from a room in the nearby Intercontinental Hotel. In 1979, he fought on the Southern Front. After the Sandinistas took power, Chamorro retired to private life. In 1981, he went into exile and organized the UDN/FARN. In September 1982, he joined in founding ARDE, but he pulled out in 1983. He rejoined ARDE in 1984, and became the commander of its military forces when Pastora withdrew that summer.

C. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY FRONT—FSDC

Roberto Ferrey, Secretary General to the FSDC

Roberto Ferrey studied law at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua and went on to do postgraduate work at Southern Methodist University in Texas. During his university years, he became a founder of

the opposition student group, the Christian Democratic Front. In his law practice, he specialized in labor cases and frequently acted on behalf of unions affiliated with the Christian Democratic-oriented Latin American Workers Central (CLAT). Because of this involvement with strike actions, he was jailed several times by the Somoza regime. He became a key figure in the Social Christian Party, and went into exile in 1978 to participate in the struggle against Somoza. After the revolution, he returned to Nicaragua and became a legal adviser in the new Ministry of Justice. In July 1983, he resigned his post and moved to Costa Rica where he joined the FSDC.

D. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' SOLIDARITY—STDN

Zacarias Hernandez, Secretary General of the STDN

Zacarias Hernandez was a veteran labor leader of the dockworkers union at the Pacific of Corinto. He had contracts with organizations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the AFL-CIO, and the Somoza regime repeatedly arrested him for his efforts to promote free trade unionism. After the revolution, the Corinto union joined the Sandinista Workers Central (CST). The dockworkers grew dissatisfied with the CST, but when they attempted to switch their affiliation to a Social-Democratic confederation, Hernandez and other union officials were subjected to a campaign of harassment and intimidation. Hernandez fled into exile where he became a co-founder of the STDN.

E. SANDINO REVOLUTIONARY FRONT—FRS

Eden Pastora Gomez, Leader of the FRS

Eden Pastora was the FSLN's most renowned revolutionary hero and a senior official of the GRN until he broke with the Sandinista leadership in 1981 and eventually took up arms against his former colleagues. Pastora was reared in a conservative Catholic family, and his father was killed in 1942 by the National Guard for alleged subversive activities. In the 1950s, he studied medicine in Mexico, but later returned to Central America to join the guerrilla struggle against Somoza. By the 1970s he was in charge of logistics for the FSLN insurgents operating from Costa Rica and was the leader of the Sandinistas' Southern Front.

Pastora had gained wide fame in August 1978 when, as "Comandante Cero," he led the Sandinista unit that seized the National Palace in Managua. That operation gained the release of 59 political prisoners, but its real significance was that it captured the imagination of the Nicaraguan people and allowed the Sandinistas to become the symbol of resistance to the Somoza regime. During 1979, Pastora led Sandinista troops fighting on the Southern Front.

Following the Sandinista victory in July 1979, Pastora became Vice Minister of Interior. In January 1980, he was reassigned as Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of the National Militia. He became increasingly disgruntled over the radical policies implemented by the FSLN and the heavy foreign influence in the revolution, especially the thousands of Cubans that permeated the government. In July 1981, he resigned his posts and went abroad. In April 1982, he publicly denounced the FSLN leadership for betraying the revolution and organized the FRS. That September, he helped to found ARDE. The following spring, he became the military leader of ARDE's forces when it initiated military actions in southern Nicaragua. He has opposed any alliance with the FDN.

Jose Davila Membreno

Jose Davila studied economics at the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua and went on to do advanced work in economics and development in West Germany. He was active in student politics and later became a senior officer of the Social Christian Party (PSC), one of the main opposition groups to Somoza. Following the revolution, he served as the PSC's delegate to the quasi-legislative Council of State. In 1981, he became secretary of the civic opposition umbrella organization, the Democratic Coordinating Board. The following year, he went into exile and helped form the Nicaraguan Association of Democratic Unity (ANUDE). In 1983, this group split and Davila went with the faction that founded the FSDC. That September, the FSDC formally joined ARDE. When the FSDC elected to join other ARDE groups in entering a coalition with the FDN, Davila left the FSDC to work with Pastora's FRS.

Donald Castillo

Donald Castillo was a principal labor leader and held key positions in Social Christian-oriented labor confederation, the Nicaraguan Workers' Central (CTN). He was a staunch opponent of Somoza and actively supported the FSLN during the 1970s. In 1976, he was expelled from Guatemala for arms smuggling. After the revolution, he became the CTN's delegate to the quasi-legislative Council of State. He became increasingly disillusioned by the Sandinistas' unfair labor practices, and in mid-1981 served as the coordinator of a civic opposition group which held a dialogue with the FSLN in an unsuccessful effort to resolve national problems. He subsequently went into exile where he became a co-founder of the STDN and joined ARDE. When the STDN supported the decision to form an alliance with the FDN, Castillo left the organization and collaborated with Pastora's FRS.

F. MISKITO, SUMO, RAMA, AND SANDINISTA UNITY—MISURASATA

Brooklyn Rivera Bryan, Leader of MISURASATA

Brooklyn Rivera, a mathematician, is a Miskito Indian leader from the Sandy Bay area of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. He initially supported the revolution against Somoza and was a founding member of MISURASATA when it was established by the Sandinistas in 1979. He grew increasingly disenchanted with the FSLN and began to protest Sandinista repression of Indians. In February 1981, he was among the Indian leaders arrested, accused of "counter-revolutionary activity." He was released after two weeks, but he continued to criticize FSLN efforts to nationalize Indian lands and culturally assimilate the Indian population, and he was forced to go into exile later that year. In 1982, he became the leader of Indians who organized a separate MISURASATA faction in the south.

GLOSSARY

ALPROMISU—Alliance for the Progress of Miskitos and Sumos.

ANUDE—Nicaraguan Association of Democratic Unity.

ARDE—Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.

CLAT—Latin American Workers Central.

COSEP—Supreme Council of Private Enterprise.

CST—Sandinista Workers' Central.

CTN—Nicaraguan Workers' Central.

DGSE—General Directorate of State Security.

FAO—Broad Opposition Front.

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FARN—Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces.

FDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Force.

FRS—Sandino Revolutionary Front.

FSDC—Christian Democratic Solidarity Front.

FSLN—Sandinista National Liberation Front.

FUNDE—Nicaraguan Developmental Foundation.

GRN—Government of National Reconstruction.

INDE—Nicaraguan Developmental Institute.

INPRHU—Human Development Institute.

MDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Movement.

MISURA and Black Creoles.

MISURASATA—Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity.

PLI—Independent Liberal Party.

PLN—National Liberal Party.

PSC—Social Christian Party.

STDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Workers' Solidarity.

UDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Union.

UNIR—Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the distinguished manager of this portion of the legislation is on the floor, as is the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence. I would like to direct a question, preceded by a statement.

May I say to the Senator from Alaska that we are discussing on the floor of the Senate classified matters of the greatest sensitivity. That is to say, statements about classified matters are being made which this Senator believes to be incorrect. But to debate such matters fully in the open would be to reveal what we are bound not to reveal. And that puts at a disadvantage those who disagree with some of the statements being made.

Mr. President, if the Senator from Alaska could just turn my way for a moment, a quarter turn.

Mr. STEVENS. I am listening.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have here the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence accompanying the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1985. It is labeled "Top Secret, Codeword."

Now, this report has been filed for sometime now. We have hoped we would have an authorization bill, as we have had each year since 1979. For the first year since then, there is no bill. The distinguished chairman and I both wrote the leaders this morning asking, "Are we not to have an authorization bill?"

But, I say to the Senator from Alaska, I do not know how I am to debate the contents of this measure at the moment. And that is what we seem to have chosen to do.

Mr. WALLOP. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to.

Mr. WALLOP. I know of nothing that has been classified that the Senator from Louisiana said nor that the Senator from Hawaii has said. Since only one other person has spoken, I assume the Senator from New York is referring to the Senator from Wyoming. I wonder if you can enlighten me as to what you mean.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. This is the problem I raise. I have some disagreement with some of the statements made by the Senator from Louisiana.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will refrain for 1 moment. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would the Senate have the kindness to pay attention?

I would disagree with some of the statements made by the Senator from Louisiana. I would have more specific disagreements with the Senator from Wyoming. But to make my case contrary to their statements, I would have to discuss matters in a top secret report to this body, which I cannot do because we are here in open session.

Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to yield. I hope I am yielding for some resolution.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I might suggest this is not the place to debate the report of the Intelligence Committee.

Is the Senator saying that the comments that are in the Record so far are classified beyond that report?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am saying that representations have been made as to the nature of our involvement in the area we are discussing which do not comport with the specific content of this report. Yes, I am saying that.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senator addressed the question to me, and I would just say this: It appears to me that, in order to discuss an item which places a limitation on a classified program, it is necessary to skirt quite closely to classification. I have in my hand a completely sanitized question and answer response so that this Senator would not go beyond classification in responding to any question you want to ask about Nicaragua. I think the Senator from Wyoming has a similar concept in terms of what he has done.

The mere fact that the subject matter that is discussed in that report that the Intelligence Committee has classified is discussed in these comments which are totally not classified by those that have the authority to classify documents, is, in my opinion, no reason to say that there has been classified material discussed on the floor.

As a matter of fact, the Senate of the United States does not have the authority to classify documents. We do maintain classification that is given to us by the executive branch. But right now we are talking about limitations raised by the Senator from Hawaii, and legitimately so, saying that there should be a phasing out of moneys that are contained in a classified portion of this bill that is before us. He has raised it in an honorable way without disclosing any classified material.

This Senator has not heard anything yet on the floor of this Senate that has invaded the sphere of classifi-

cation. And I have tried to listen. Though I may not look at everyone, I do try to listen to what is going on because this is touchy. And I think we have done our best.

I would urge the Senate to realize that we are dealing with classified areas. They could affect the lives and certainly the future of a great many people. Therefore, I would urge the Senator to address the issue of the Senator from Hawaii's amendment and not the issue of classification because I disagree with the Senator as far as the extent to which we have gone today.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Alaska is not suggesting that I misrepresented my views on this matter or spoke in a way that would not be warranted by the facts as I understand them.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska is saying to the Senator from New York that his understanding of what is classified is I feel colored by the classification of the report of the Senate Intelligence Committee. And I am responding by saying that everything I have heard on the floor so far is contained in information we have asked for and received from those people who are involved in the classification process concerning the questions that are before us. They have been sanitized and they contain no classified material. I would be happy to show the Senator if he would like to see them.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Hawaii has arisen. I will yield the floor, but I will accept the offer of the Senator from Alaska. But I would like the Senator from Alaska to understand that we have taken the affairs of this committee with great care and solemnity. We have prepared on time our materials. We have asked to come to the floor. We have been prepared for a closed session. I do not say this has been denied us, I simply say this has not happened. That leaves those who will represent things as being other than I think they are the opportunity to say that and denies this Senator the opportunity to reply.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WALLOP). The Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, in order to clarify and clear the air, may I suggest that we go into a quorum call very briefly, protecting the right of the Senator from New York, as far as his right to the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I do not think the Senator from New York has the floor.

Mr. INOUE. I have the floor now.

Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator withhold that so I would be able to address the amendment so we may at least be able to proceed with the debate and discussion? I have some

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comments that are not directed toward the issue which has been raised now between the Senator from New York and the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. INOUE. This clarification will just take a few minutes. We have the classified document.

Mr. KENNEDY. I just wanted to make some general comments, if I could.

Mr. INOUE. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I hope the Members of this body will support the amendment of the Senator from Hawaii. I intend to do so, because I believe this amendment will mean an end to the covert war, the President's war in Nicaragua, I had intended to offer the Senate with my colleague, Senator BINGAMAN, from New Mexico, a similar amendment that would also terminate funding for the secret war.

I do not intend, to delay the Senate a great deal to debate this issue. So I would like to make some comments on that in support of the Inouye amendment, and I think that would support the amendment the Senator from New Mexico and I would have offered. Make no mistake, the Senator from Hawaii's amendment will put an end to this illegal war.

Mr. President, in listening to this debate this afternoon, if one were not entirely familiar with the Inouye amendment, one might think that we were passing a sense-of-the-Senate resolution commending the Sandinista government. We have heard the Senator from Louisiana discuss the recent history of the repressive activities of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the denial of freedom of assembly, the denial of freedom of religion. We have heard the attack on the Sandinista government for failing to respect the freedom of the press. Then we heard another Senator comparing what is happening in Nicaragua, with what is happening in Afghanistan.

Mr. President, the issue is American involvement in overturning an indigenous government in Nicaragua. That is basically and fundamentally wrong. It is wrong under international law. It concerns activities which this body has not yet approved, it is a policy which is ineffective because it strengthens the repressive forces in Nicaragua, and it has not been successful in achieving what those who have supported this measure have felt that its purpose was; namely, interdicting the arms flow into El Salvador.

I daresay those who want to continue support for the contras ought to be making the positive case for continued support rather than just reciting and repeating the repressions which exist in Nicaragua today, which all 100 Members would unanimously condemn.

Mr. President, if we were to follow the logic of those that have opposed the Inouye amendment, we would be funding a secret war in Libya. Why

not do that? We have read news reports suggesting that there were assault teams being supported by the Libyans that were going to attack the President of the United States. That seems to me to be more outrageous than even the violations of human rights or the violation of church rights in Nicaragua.

What about undermining the Syrian Government? They are sheltering the terrorists, who may be responsible for blowing up the marine barracks in Lebanon according to the administration. Why are we not undermining that government with its record of heinous activities and the righteousness of our particular cause against those who were involved in the brutality, the terrorism, the violence, and the assassination of brave young Americans? Why are we not doing that this afternoon? Why are we not having a street war in Iran after their humiliation of the United States in holding the 53 brave Americans, all of whom returned safely to the United States I might add? Why are we not supporting a war there? Why are we not conducting a secret war in Cuba for all the reasons that have been outlined by those that have spoken against the amendment of the Senator from Hawaii this afternoon? Why is there not ample justification for all of those? Why are we not sending Americans and American taxpayers' money all over the world trying to police the world?

I thought we had learned, Mr. President, that lesson in recent times.

Mr. President, it has not been an effective policy and the logic of their argument cannot stand any fair evaluation of the facts.

This war ought to be ended, and it ought to be ended now. I applaud the amendment of the Senator from Hawaii in ensuring that we will see an end to the support for the Contras, many of whom are not as interested in fighting for freedom as they are in plundering their countryside. We hear talk about how we had to fund freedom fighters in Nicaragua. Who was funding freedom fighters in the United States at the time of of the American Revolution? Who was funding them? But we have to pour out American taxpayers' money on a war which is illegal, on a war which has been ineffective, and a war which has actually strengthened those that we find are perpetuating the greatest kinds of violations of the kinds of values which we hold dear.

Mr. President, I say that enough is enough on this issue and this war. We have had an opportunity in April of last year where 30 Senators voted for peace. In June we had 43 Senators who voted for peace. Now is the last chance for the Senate in this session to vote again for peace.

I hope that the Senate will support the Inouye amendment.

Mr. EAST addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. EAST. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak briefly in opposition to the Inouye amendment with all due respect for the very distinguished Senator from Hawaii.

First, as regards the remarks of the Senator from Massachusetts, I would remind him that France did help us in the American Revolution, and he queries why we do not —

Mr. KENNEDY. The French helped the patriots in Massachusetts? Mr. Senator, that is a new note in history.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has the floor.

Mr. EAST. I have the floor, and I would like to comment. The Senator was suggesting that no one helped us in our efforts, and I was simply reminding the Senator as a matter of historical fact that France did help the United States during the French Revolution as well as some other European powers.

Second, the Senator raises the interesting point, why are we not doing something perhaps to undermine the Government of Qadhafi or undermine the Government in Syria, or to undermine the Government in Cuba. I would agree with the Senator. It is probably a good idea. Let us put this in a little broader perspective. Under Marxist-Leninist thinking, the rationale goes like this. This is the dimension that Lenin added. He said the revolution will not take place in the major industrial powers as Marx envisioned it in the United States and Western Europe, but in the Third World. This is where the protracted conflict will take place and that the motherland of the revolution, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia under Lenin in 1917, will find proxies in the underdeveloped or soft underbelly of the world, as they put it, to take this protracted conflict through wars of subversion. Then what you are to do is take the soft underbelly, and then the ripe fruit of North America and Europe—the major industrial powers—would fall. That is precisely the strategy they have used. The Soviet Union uses the PLO and Syria as surrogates in the Middle East. They use their surrogates in Africa. They are using in Cuba in Africa and Central America, and they are using Vietnam in Southeast Asia.

To get back to the contra aid, I think Senator JOHNSTON has stated the case extremely well.

Here we have a very legitimate effort of a broad-based group trying to reverse that trend, and for us to ignore it in every circumstance I think is to revert to the isolationism of the 1930's. As Jeane Kirkpatrick said a little while ago, it is not a matter of being hawk or dove, but a matter of being an ostrich as to what is occurring in the world.