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Attachment A

ISSUES FOR NATIONAL-LEVEL CONSIDERATION AND ACTION
TO IMPROVE U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS

1. Achievement of greater representational equivalence in the totals of U.S. and Soviet official presence in the USSR and U.S., respectively; at present there is a great disparity in favor of the USSR. Greater consistency is also needed between the assessed intelligence collection threat and national policy regarding the activities of both Soviet and East European personnel. There should be a more realistic and enforceable reciprocal limitation of Communist country personnel. Travel restrictions, now only applicable to Soviet personnel, should be applied across-the-board to all Warsaw Pact country personnel, many of whom are acting as surrogates for the Soviets.
2. Reassessment of "criteria country" status for the PRC. This status mandates an extensive, sustained FBI FCI effort ~~which may not be justified in the light of U.S. policy toward China which~~ ^{even though} strongly fosters a large official presence, a large numbers of visitors, transfer of technology, etc. Greater consistency is needed between the assessed intelligence collection threat and national policy regarding the activities of PRC personnel.
3. Assignment of broader authority or a stronger voice to the FBI in the area of visa denial, particularly in those instances involving applicants who are known or suspected intelligence officers of criteria countries.
4. Development and issuance of a national policy mandating consolidation of criteria country establishments in the U.S. that perform similar functions. For example, such business entities as Belarus, U.S.-USSR Marine Resources, Inc., and the Soviet Trade and Economic Council could be consolidated into Amtorg, forcing a reduction in the number of establishments and personnel requiring FCI coverage.
5. Development and issuance of a policy requirement for all criteria country foreign missions to obtain State Department approval to purchase and lease property for mission-related activities. There is already a requirement that the Soviet and PRC obtain State Department approval prior to the purchase or lease of property. The inclusion of all criteria countries would enable control over property acquisition and would enhance CI coverage of the facilities involved.

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7. Review and expedite DOJ/INS progress toward improving automated procedures for obtaining information control over non-immigrant visitors to the U.S. Some visitor control functions which are important to counterintelligence cannot be achieved under current INS operating procedures.
8. Enhancement of the security awareness programs within the U.S. Government applicable to U.S. Government agencies, U.S. Government contractors, private industry and academia--to achieve thereby increased telecommunication security awareness, and better understanding and more reporting of hostile intelligence service contacts and recruitment attempts.
9. Development and implementation of a common intelligence community policy and practice for use of the polygraph as a personnel security aid. Although an emotional and controversial issue, polygraphy--skillfully used--is an effective tool for screening out security risks and thereby enhancing personnel security. *why limit to IC?*
10. Strengthening of common concern R&D programs to enhance physical security, especially for U.S. embassies under construction in denied areas, e.g., Moscow and Beijing, and development of a central mechanism, appropriately funded, to carry out other countermeasure research and development in areas of common concern. Such a mechanism is of particular concern in areas where the cost/return ratio makes funding a problem for any single agency but where the costs can be well-justified if the aggregate benefit to all agencies is considered.
11. Revision of FOIA to exempt CIA, FBI/FCI and/or foreign intelligence/foreign counterintelligence activities to better protect sources and methods and also to smooth relations with and restore confidence of foreign liaison services.
12. Assignment of responsibilities to different agencies for maintaining central data bases, as a service of common concern and computerized as appropriate, on communist country (a) civil air overflights of the U.S.; (b) container "land bridges" in the U.S.; and (c) merchant shipping, fishing vessels and research ships in U.S. waters.
13. Establishment of security-related responsibilities in regard to communist country civil air overflights of the U.S. and merchant shipping/fishing vessels/research ships in U.S. waters. Currently there are inadequate national policies and procedures for evaluating or protecting against communist country intelligence collection from civil aircraft or from noncombatant ships. The Departments of Defense, Commerce, Transportation and State, the FAA and the Intelligence Community all need to be tasked to perform appropriate roles in making others aware of communist country activities, evaluating the threat and taking countermeasures.

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15. Development of a strengthened counterintelligence policy and capability for NATO Headquarters. Although the Director, NATO Office of Security has improved his personnel security screening capabilities and has had discussions aiming at developing an offensive CI capability, further strengthening of this effort to counter the many successful hostile intelligence service penetrations of NATO will require national-level policy support.
16. Development and/or strengthening of cradle-to-grave operational security (OPSEC) programs in appropriate U.S. Government agencies and activities/projects, especially the policy structure, implementation organization and training of personnel to achieve an optimal integrated countermeasure effort.

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