

Handwritten notes:
11/17/60
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Executive
83-1078/3

28 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: "The U.S. - U.S.S.R. Arms Control Negotiations"
- Analysis and Recommendations

This memorandum was done by a very interesting fellow who I would think knows little about arms control but is a student and practitioner of negotiating strategy. I came across him in the early fall of 1980 when he was in a state of great disgust with the way the negotiations for the Iranian hostages was being handled. He attended five meetings of the Iranian negotiating group in the White House as a consultant. This relationship developed out of some work he had been doing for the FBI in advising them on hostage negotiations. He showed me his post-meeting critique of these meetings which I thought were very much on the mark. He also predicted with uncanny accuracy just what the Iranians would do and when they would do it. His rationale was based on perception that the Iranians would treat the hostages like carpets, recognizing they would attain their highest value two weeks before the election and that their value would then fade quickly and become virtually worthless if Reagan won the election. With this general perception he called a lot of specific shots on the nose.

I would like you to read this and see if you can obtain any insights that would be of value to the Estimate.


William J. Casey

JCI
EXEC
REG

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