

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

*Memo
Churo*

TO:

	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1 DCI		X w/o att		
2 DDCI		X w/o att		
3 EXDIR		X w/o att		
4 D/ICS				
5 DDI				
6 DDA				
7 DDO				
8 DDS&T				
9 Chm/NIC		X/ w/o att		
10 GC				
11 IG				
12 Compt				
13 D/Pers				
14 D/OLL				
15 D/PAO				
16 SA/IA				
17 AO/DCI				
18 C/IPD/OIS				
19 VC/NIC		X w/o att		
20 NIO/USSR	X w/att			
21 ES		X w/o att		
22				
SUSPENSE		25 Sept Date		

Remarks

[Redacted]

D/ Executive Secretary
17 Sept 84
Date



3637 (10-81)

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17 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: UNESCO

1. Leonard Marks, formerly Director of USIA, is chairing a commission designated by Secretary Shultz to advise on whether we should pull out of UNESCO. He asked us for an assessment on how the Soviets would react-- either withdraw or let their interest lapse, or take it over and use it. He also asked what difference it would make if we stay in to maintain influence over that instrument, take the chance that the Soviets will move to use it as an instrument in the Third World, discontinue support and have the Germans and British maintain the free world interests or what?

2. The attached doesn't quite get at the real question to my satisfaction. I'd like your input on this question and then we will talk about how to send it back through the system or whatever needs to be done.


William J. Casey

Attachment:



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DDI- 05077/84

SEP 13 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence *f*

FROM :
Director of Global Issues


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SUBJECT : Soviet Response to US Withdrawal from UNESCO

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The attached memorandum provides our analysis of likely Soviet initiatives in response to the announced intention of the United States to withdraw from UNESCO by the end of 1984. The response was prepared by OGI and SOVA.

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


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Attachment:
As stated

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US WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO: SOVIET GAINS AND LOSSES

Current Soviet Exploitation of UNESCO

1. The breadth of Soviet efforts to use UNESCO to achieve their objectives, the extent of Soviet presence on the UNESCO staff (Tab A), and the size of the Soviet delegation indicate that the Soviets consider UNESCO to be one of the most important international organizations. We believe that UNESCO programs are tailor-made for Soviet initiatives designed to influence media content, particularly in the Third World, establish contact with influential persons in the media, educational, scientific and cultural fields and to gain specific technical information. [redacted]

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2. In recent years we have observed Soviet:

- o Efforts to use UNESCO publication services for propaganda purposes.
- o Use of UNESCO media services to expand distribution of Soviet radio and TV programs.
- o Initiatives to establish a UNESCO database of valuable copyright information.
- o Active support of Third World proposals to establish the New World Information and Communication Order.
- o Use of the UNESCO as a cover for espionage as evidenced by French expulsion of Soviet intelligence officers in the UNESCO secretariat. [redacted]

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Soviet Tactics and Opportunities

3. As UNESCO reform negotiations proceed through the fall, we believe that the Soviet Union will follow its well established pattern of behavior in international organizations similar to UNESCO by:

- o Supporting Third World positions and demands wherever possible.
- o Avoiding commitments to provide substantial additional resources in future years.

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- o Agreeing to proposals to improve the management of the organization provided the changes are not strenuously resisted by Third World blocs and do not cost the Soviets more money.

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4. During the coming weeks, we believe the Soviets will:

- o Argue that the budget cuts resulting from US withdrawal will adversely affect developing countries and particular groups within those countries--journalists, scholars, etc. Given the size of the US contribution but uncertainty about how the cuts would be allocated, the Soviets could raise concerns among a substantial number of states and beneficiary groups. We believe Soviet arguments would have to be tempered by their reluctance to increase their own contribution as was the case when the US withdrew from the ILO.
- o Accuse the US of "bullying" tactics which affect the essential operating principles of international organizations by threatening to withdraw if its demands are not met. The Soviets are likely to point to US withdrawal from the ILO (1977 to 1980), suspension of US participation in the UN's ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, reduction in US participation in the UN's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and intimations of US withdrawal from the UN Conference on Trade and Development as a pattern of US opposition to international organizations in which Third World countries have a great stake. For example, a 15 June TASS item charged, "The United States decision to withdraw from UNESCO has finalized a malicious campaign which has been conducted against it by US reactionary circles for a long time."

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5. After a US withdrawal, the Soviets would have renewed opportunities to exploit the vacuum. Generally, the US would have a greatly reduced ability to monitor and restrain Soviet initiatives and abuses of UNESCO programs and staff while the Soviets gain influence. We believe the key Soviet initiatives are likely to include:

- o Intensified efforts to support Third World calls for a New World Information and Communication Order and to take steps to implement such practices as licensing of journalists.

- o Use of UNESCO as a platform to press its case for developing countries use of Soviet foreign news services as alternatives to the Western press.
- o Moves toward increased Soviet influence in the UNESCO secretariat. The Soviet Ambassador to UNESCO, at a May press conference, suggested that US personnel in UNESCO should leave when the US withdraws. In theory, US citizens are international civil servants who could not be removed, but in practice, continued employment could be difficult for non tenured American employees and new hiring of Americans would be curtailed, eroding the presence of US citizens over time.
- o Enhancement of its efforts to secure technological developments without paying royalties based on copyright protection.
- o Countering any human rights issues raised in UNESCO by shifting the discussion to disarmament, a subject Moscow has prepared for by placing a Soviet official in the office responsible for disarmament issues.

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Soviet Losses from US Withdrawl

6. Despite gaining some significant advantage from a US withdrawal, we believe Soviet initiatives would be tempered by resistance from Western countries remaining in the organization. Furthermore, the Soviets would come under pressure from Third World members to increase their contributions to UNESCO and, we believe, the Soviets would lose ground when they refuse the request. To the extent that US scientists and researchers contribute useful technological information and other products which find their way to the USSR through UNESCO, the Soviets would lose a source of significant information. Ironically, the Soviets would benefit from successful negotiations concerning management reforms because they have an interest in improving the management of UNESCO. A poorly run organization adversely affects the programs which they are using to achieve their own goals. A smaller UNESCO, without access to US funds, would not have the resources to undertake some of the activities of interest to Moscow.

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7. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—Paris

UNESCO was founded in 1945 to promote international collaboration in the fields of education, science, and culture. It has 160 members. The Soviet Union joined in 1954.

UNESCO's secretariat is headed by a director general, who is appointed by the General Conference upon the nomination of the Executive Board. As the chief

administrative officer of the organization, the secretariat is charged with formulating draft work programs and proposals for action by the Conference and the Board. Staff appointments are by personal choice but must be geographically representative.

Total staff: 2,800

Number of Soviets/East Europeans: 73

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

Grade	Name	Title	Location	Country
ADG	Tanguian, S.	Assistant Director General	Paris	USSR
D-1	Avakov, R.	Senior Program Officer	Paris	USSR
	Dumitrescu, S.	Director of Division	Paris	Romania
	Paszkowski, M.	Deputy Director	Paris	Poland
	Pobukovsky, M.	Director of Division	Paris	USSR
	Sibrava, V.	Director of Division	Paris	Czechoslovakia
P-5	Zachariev, Z.	Director of Division	Paris	Bulgaria
	Alferov, Y.	Program Specialist	Geneva	USSR
	Dolbnin, G.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Fedorcsak, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	Hungary
	Herold, P.	Chief of Section	Paris	Germany
	Kabatchenko, M.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Kolessov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Koptilov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Korner, H.	Program Specialist	Paris	Czechoslovakia
	Kotchetkov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Krivtsov, Y.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Oliounine, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Snezhko, I.	Senior Program Officer	Paris	USSR
	Tchogovadze, G.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR

**United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (continued)**

Grade	Name	Title	Location	Country
P-4	Arsov, M.	Liaison Officer	New York	Bulgaria
	Belikov, V.	Senior Purchasing Officer	Paris	USSR
	Bertels, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Boutzev, C.	Program Specialist	Paris	Bulgaria
	Chlebowska, K.	Field Program Officer	Paris	Poland
	Gorbenko, B.	Interpreter	Paris	USSR
	Guelekva, Z.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Khvilon, E.	Chief of Section	Paris	USSR
	Kouznetsov, N.	Senior Editor	Paris	USSR
	Kovacs, M.	Program Specialist	Paris	Hungary
	Matsui, S.	Program Specialist	Paris	Ukraine
	Matveev, Y.	Recruitment Officer	Paris	Ukraine
	Michulsky, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Mirochnikov, L.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Naidenov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Oudatchine, V.	Producer	Paris	USSR
	Petrouchine, S.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Reshov, M.	Executive Assistant to the ADG	Paris	USSR
	Rojnov, V.	Administrative Officer	Paris	USSR
	Rousko, I.	Program Specialist	Paris	Ukraine
	Roussinov, M.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
Sabirov, F.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR	
Shchebrov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	Belorussia	
Smirnov, I.	Reviser	Paris	USSR	
Soloviev, E.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR	
Zykine, Y.	Reviser	Paris	USSR	
P-3	Akimov, I.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Barsukov, S.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Garmonov, I.	Reviser	Paris	USSR
	Gladneva, V.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Guerassimov, E.	Legal Officer	Paris	USSR
	Jouravlev, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Khudin, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
	Koridze, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Kostikov, V.	Editor	Paris	USSR
	Legomska-Dworniak, M. M. A	Program Specialist	Paris	Poland
	Serebrennikov, V.	Program Specialist	Paris	Belorussia
	Souzioumov, A.	Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
	Sova, A.	Translator	Paris	USSR
P-2	Iakoubenko, S.	Assistant Finance Officer	Paris	USSR
	Lebedev, I.	Assistant Program Specialist	Paris	USSR
G-4	Petrenko, T.	Clerk	Paris	USSR
	Shtarbanov, G.	Senior Clerk	New York	Bulgaria
G-3	Brintchouk, R.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Calabuig, P.	Receptionist	Paris	USSR
	Jankowskaia, M.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Kolychalov, E.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Lebedeva, N.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR
	Semenova, G.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Stepanian, M.	Audio Typist	Paris	USSR
	Vastchenko, A.	Micrographic Reproduction Operator	Paris	USSR
Vermard Traykova, V.	Clerk	Paris	Bulgaria	
G-2	Billant, L.	Composition Typist	Paris	USSR