



Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
(703) 351-7676

George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs

14 March 1986

DCI:

FYI. Herewith a tidied up copy of the Op-Ed piece or speech you cabled in. I have also attached copies of my notes to Buchanan, Dolan and Poindexter.

Bob Gates contributed to and approved the final version.

STAT



George V. Lauder



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
13 March 1986

Dear Admiral Poindexter:

Director Casey asked me to send you this copy of a possible Op-Ed piece or part of speech he may give. He would be pleased if you find it useful to quote from or whatever in support of the President's program.

Also at the DCI's request I have sent copies to Pat Buchanan and Tony Dolan for possible use in the President's speech.

Sincerely, .



George V. Lauder

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

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George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs

13 March 1986

Pat,

Herewith a copy of Director Casey's possible
Op-Ed piece or speech. Please use it in any way
that would be helpful. Tony Dolan and
Adm. Poindexter also have copies.

Sincerely,

George V. Lauder

Patrick J. Buchanan
Special Assistant to the President and
Director of Communications
The White House

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Washington, D.C.
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George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs

13 March 1986

Tony:

Herewith a copy of Director Casey's remarks.
Feel free to use them any way you wish.

Sincerely,



George V. Lauder

Anthony Dolan
Special Assistant to the President and
Chief Speechwriter
The White House

STAT

THE ERODING BALANCE

William J. Casey

Director of Central Intelligence

Over the last decade, the strategic balance between the Soviet Bloc and the Western Alliance has been taking on new dimensions.

From the beginning, the Soviets had dominance in land warfare. This was countered by U.S. superiority in strategic forces. From 1965-1980, the Soviet strategic offensive forces caught up and, in many key areas, surpassed ours. Even as the United States in recent years has acted to modernize its strategic forces, the Soviets have been doing more. For example, the Soviets are now protecting their land missile force by making much of it mobile, whereas the U.S. mobile ICBM will not be deployed until the 1990s.

This current situation, representing a net decline in relative U.S. strategic power, is being potentially compounded as the Soviets complete a missile defense around Moscow and develop the components and the production line capable of building a much larger, widespread missile defense system.

If President Reagan's military modernization program and Strategic Defense Initiative are sustained, we may be able to catch up and stay abreast of rapidly expanding Soviet military power.

But there are two other dimensions of the strategic balance where we are still falling behind. Soviet strategic military power may never be used. It may be merely the backdrop for an aggressive challenge being played out worldwide, but most particularly on the ground in the Third World and in the vicinity of critical sea lanes.

Over the past twenty years, the Soviets have acquired bridgeheads in Cuba and Vietnam, and client states in South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Since coming to power in early 1985, Soviet party leader Gorbachev has made strong efforts to strengthen the Soviet hold on these bridgeheads. Many are being linked, moreover, in a growing logistic and mutual support network that depends on expanding Soviet naval and air power.

Take, for example, the Soviet position in the Caribbean. The Soviets have created in Cuba the strongest military force in the Western Hemisphere, with the exception of our own. Over the last few years they have given Cuba massive infusions of MiG-23 aircraft, T-62 tanks, artillery pieces and multiple rocket launch systems, infantry combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, helicopter gunships, SA-2 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, fast torpedo and missile attack boats and Foxtrot-class submarines. The Soviets themselves have at their own military bases in Cuba 4,500 Soviet troops and

advisors and the largest intelligence collection and electronic monitoring capability outside the Soviet Union.

Cuba, however, is merely a Soviet stepping-stone in the Caribbean.

Even now, Cuban construction crews are completing, outside Managua, the largest military airbase in Central America. When finished, it will be capable of accommodating Soviet jet fighters, heavy transport aircraft, and Tu-95 bombers. Soviet reconnaissance aircraft now routinely fly from the Kola Peninsula in the Soviet arctic to Cuban airfields and on to Angola. When the new field is operational, the Soviets will be able to fly from the Soviet homeland to Nicaragua, refuel there, and continue by way of the Pacific to air bases in the Soviet Far East.

In addition, the already short, direct sea connection between Cuba and Nicaragua will be made even shorter when the Bulgarians complete a major port facility on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua. Now if this were used only for Nicaraguan exports, that would be fine. Unfortunately, the existing port is used for wholesale importation of Soviet weapons. The new port will simply make their transshipment from Cuba all the more efficient.

Similar links and components of this network have been established around the globe. From Angola, Soviet naval and air forces now routinely operate astride western shipping lanes in the Atlantic. These forces depend on a growing West African Marxist base manned and protected by nearly 2,000

Soviet Bloc advisors, 35,000 Cuban troops, and a local Angolan Government army of 100,000.

The Mediterranean segment of this Soviet global network is anchored at Libya and Syria. Some 6,000 Soviet Bloc advisors aid these countries. Their presence makes achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East less likely, and they also provide the "ground crews" for rapid expansion of Soviet military power in the region should that be directed by the Politburo.

Similarly, this network threatens western sea lanes in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean from bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Base rights in these and some other countries play no small part in the Soviet ability to operate its naval forces over extended periods in the Indian Ocean.

Finally, Soviet naval and air forces operating out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam command the vital sea lanes linking Japan, Taiwan and South Korea with Middle East oil supplies and Southeast Asian customers.

Moreover, the bases permit the Soviets to operate routinely from naval and air bases in the Soviet Far East down the China coast. It is clear that these bases, acquired from the Vietnamese since about 1980, pose a threat to Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines, which are critical to the defense of our friends and allies throughout the Pacific.

Now, the West could cope if the Soviets were merely interested in acquiring overseas military bases and colonies. But the Soviets have no intention of stopping there.

A more valuable role for their bridgeheads on the various continents is for the spread of subversion, terror, and destabilization. From Nicaragua, terrorism and subversion have been exported throughout Central America and into Chile, Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America. Nicaragua has also served as a transfer point for drug traffic enroute to the U.S. From Libya, there is invasion of Chad, attempts at destabilizing governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan, and subversion throughout West Africa. From Angola, there are intrusions into Zaire. From Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, there have been armed intrusions into Pakistan and occasionally even Iran.

The Soviets are spending many billions of dollars to consolidate their holdings and make additional gains in the Third World. This will further tilt the balance against the West. To accomplish this, they are now spending \$4 billion a year in Cuba, \$1 billion a year in Angola, several hundred million in Nicaragua, \$3 or 4 billion a year in Afghanistan, and another billion in Vietnam. This aid to its many clients does not, by the way, include funding of Soviet forces or bases such as those installed and operated at Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet effort is further supported by a flood of weapons that pours out of the great arms depot at Nikolayev on the Black Sea to pro-Soviet regimes and insurgent groups all over the world.

To give an additional push to its efforts at destabilizing pro-Western governments around the world, the Soviets have also aided terrorist groups in Western Europe and the Middle East. It is true that the Eastern European hand is more obvious than the Soviet hand in supporting terrorists. Nonetheless, hard evidence exists of their combined support. And that

support takes many forms. The Soviets and their satraps provide training, weapons, communications, documentation, safehaven and other assistance to terrorist groups.

What does it take to prevent this Soviet ten billion dollar annual investment from producing even more hostile bases and eroding the strategic balance even more rapidly?

There is a priceless asset available to the West for this purpose.

During the 1960s and 1970s, people in many parts of the world were flocking to join Communist insurgencies. In the 1980s, this trend has reversed. Today, some half million people around the world are fighting in resistance movements against Communist regimes or Communist occupation. Afghanistan is virtually a nation-in-arms fighting against 120,000 Soviet occupation troops. In Angola, Savimbi has some 60,000 fighters in all parts of the country battling the Cubans, Marxist Angolans, and Soviet advisors. In Ethiopia, Eritrean and Tigrean rebels fight the Marxist Mengistu government and the largest army in Africa with its Cuban and Soviet advisors. In Kampuchea, 50,000 insurgents struggle bitterly with 170,000 occupying Vietnamese soldiers. In Marxist Nicaragua, 20,000 resistance fighters--most of whom are campesinos driven from their homes by the regime--are holding their own against 120,000 Sandinista troops and militia armed with the latest Soviet assault helicopters and tanks.

Despite these valiant efforts to shake off the Soviet yoke, the outcome of many liberation struggles is far from certain. The Soviets can be expected to react violently to insurgency, popular rebellion, or even attempts by lesser Marxist governments to liberalize their regimes.

During the Brezhnev Era, the Soviets announced the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which says, in effect, "once Communist, always Communist." There is every indication that--despite his smiles and smooth manner--Gorbachev will apply that doctrine with renewed vigor. Now this is not new. During the 1950s and 60s the Soviets installed whomever they pleased as leaders in Eastern Europe. You may recall their violent removal of Alexander Dubcek and installment of the puppet Husak regime in 1968. The Soviets also removed--and murdered--two puppets in Afghanistan in 1979.

Most recently, hardline pro-Soviet elements in the South Yemen government initiated a coup against President Ali Nasser. The coup soon escalated into a bloody civil war between military and tribal elements loyal to Ali Nasser and those of the hardline pro-Soviet camp. After watching the blood flow for a few days, the Soviets threw their unreserved support to the pro-Soviet Yemeni Vice President, then in Moscow, who was speedily confirmed by the Yemeni Politburo as the new president. The message in all these cases is clear: leaders of governments installed by Moscow who seek improved relations with the West do so at their peril. The message is also clear that the Soviets will brook no challenges in any part of their empire.

The brutality of the Communist regimes against which many peoples have risen has already driven millions of their fellow countrymen into exile. Our failure to support their struggles will send millions more our way. We seem to have already forgotten the tragic experience of the "boat people" from Vietnam and Kampuchea.

Communist-initiated violence around the world has resulted in thousands of deaths attributable directly to attacks or to plain murder by occupation forces. Thousands more have died of starvation, disease, or exposure. And millions have been made refugees. In Afghanistan, for example, fully one quarter of the prewar population--nearly four million people--has fled from the terrors of Soviet occupation. In Central America, the story is the same. Thousands have been killed or executed by the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran Communists, and fully a quarter of a million people made refugees. In Ethiopia, the Marxist government has squandered its meager financial resources on buying Soviet weapons while virtually ignoring the agonizing famine that has killed thousands of its people. Ethiopia's only response has been to force-march other thousands from their homes in the drought-stricken north to ill-prepared camps in the south. The plight of Kampuchea is nearly unbelievable. In five years, it is estimated that yet another million Kampuchians have been killed, died of malnutrition, or fled from the rapacious Vietnamese occupation.

The sums needed by these brave men and women to fight for their freedom and, incidentally, to protect our own security and freedom, are paltry. If we deny them our help now, what does that say of us as a people? Indeed, what verdict can history bring against a great people that refuses to help others and thus cannot help itself?