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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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17	NIO/SP		X		
18	C/ACIS/DI		X		
19	ES		X		
20	ER				
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22					
		SUSPENSE	29 Aug 1986 <small>Date</small>		

Remarks NIO/SP to prepare coordinated draft for ADCI review/DCI signature as suggested if appropriate.

Executive Secretary
21 Aug 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

On 29 Aug NIO/SP advised a letter would not be a good idea and that he is scheduling meeting with DCI (incl C/ACIS) week of 2 Sept to discuss.

(Taken from ES C-Gram file)



SECRET

Executive Registry

86- 3471/2

21 August 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: CJCS Response to Aspin and Kennedy Letter on SALT II

REFERENCE: Memo from NIO/SP, dtd 15 Aug 86, Same Subject
(NIC 03825/86)

Thanks for your memo about the CJCS response to the Aspin and Kennedy Letter on SALT II. I share your reaction. I wonder if this would be an appropriate opportunity to again raise the question of strategic significance in the context of verification and safeguards. If you think so, try a draft letter, probably to Poindexter.



William J. Casey

DCI
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21	D/SOVA		X 15		
22	NIO/USSR		X 16		

SUSPENSE

ER

Date

X 2

Remarks

Executive Secretary

22 Aug 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510

Executive Registry

86-3471x/3

August 13, 1986

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C., 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We support your courageous and wise decision to stop complying unilaterally with the fatally flawed SALT II Treaty that the Soviets are systematically violating. We agree with the statements in your May 27, 1986 SALT II decision:

"It makes no sense for the US to continue to hold up the SALT structure while the Soviet Union undermines the foundation of SALT by its continued, uncorrected noncompliance... In the future, the US will base decisions regarding its strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, rather than on standards contained in expired SALT agreements unilaterally observed by the US...I intend at that time [i.e. near the end of 1986] to continue deployment of US B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional US systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty." (Emphasis added.).

Now that we can rationally plan our strategic force modernization programs to deter the relentlessly expanding Soviet strategic threat, instead of merely planning to unilaterally stay within the SALT II limits, we are concerned about the ability of the United States to maintain a credible strategic offensive nuclear deterrent force under current Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budgetary constraints. We believe that we must urgently seek the most cost effective strategic force options possible as we try to modernize our forces and bolster deterrence. We are at the unfortunate stage in our Department of Energy nuclear weapons development and production complex where we must try to make the best of our existing assets and accept budget limited modernization. We are at the same unfortunate stage in our strategic nuclear force options, in our view.

Accordingly, we request that the Air Force, the Navy, the Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and your National Security Council staff each make independent, unclassified estimates of the cost effectiveness of all of the following strategic force options:

1. a. Equipping the remaining 17 Poseidon C-3 MIRVed SLBM submarines with the Trident I C-4 MIRVed SLBM, increasing survivability.

b. Upgrading the guidance of all the Trident I C-4 MIRVed SLBMs on all 29 remaining Poseidon SSBNs to give them some hard target accuracy.

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C-119-15

2. Deployment of 100 stockpiled Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs, and re-deployment of the 50 to 100 Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs replaced by MX MIRVed ICBMs, in existing single warhead Minuteman II silos. This option was authorized by Congress in FY 1981, and appropriated by Congress in FY 1982. Deployment of 100 would have cost only \$50 million then, increasing US ICBM warheads by 11% at the ridiculously low cost of only \$205,000 per deployed warhead. Deployment of 200 existing Minutemen IIIs would increase US ICBM warheads by 22%, at the low cost of about \$100 million. (The Administration rejected this option in 1983 because it would have put the US over the SALT II MIRVed ICBM/SLBM ceiling in 1985.)

3. Re-deployment of 150 to 200 existing Minuteman II single warhead ICBMs in a reserve, garrison-based, road-mobile mode.

4. Possible deployment of an additional 50 B-1B bombers until the ATB Stealth bomber reaches its planned Initial Operational Capability in 1991.

5. Deployment of more nuclear-armed SLCMs on all SSN-688 Los Angeles Class SSNs.

6. Deployment of an additional increment of 100 MX MIRVed ICBMs in a superhard silo mode, with an ABM point defense or an ERIS/HOE ABM defense of all the 100 new silos, or in a mobile "Carry Hard" mode.

7. Evaluation of the relative cost effectiveness of the Midgetman small ICBM program, currently estimated to cost about \$44 billion, in comparison with the above options.

Mr. President, we respectfully request that the separate service, JCS, OSD, and NSC unclassified estimates on the cost effectiveness of each of these options be made available to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee by November, 1986, so that we can make use of them in considering your FY-1988/1989 Defense Request next January.

Jim Hollings
Walter D. Dill
Mr. [unclear]

Sincerely,

James A. M. [unclear]
John [unclear]
John [unclear]
D. [unclear]
[unclear]

Copies To:

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary of the Air Force
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Army
National Security Advisor to the President
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

William B. [unclear]

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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22					

SUSPENSE _____ Date _____

Remarks

Executive Secretary

4 Aug 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

jay —

I got this on
Fri downtown.

pls dnt as you see
fit.

J

JACK KEMP
31ST DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

July 28, 1986



PLEASE RESPOND
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WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-5265
DISTRICT OFFICES
1101 FEDERAL BUILDING
111 WEST HURON STREET
BUFFALO, NY 14202
(716) 846-4123
484 S. MAIN STREET
GENEVA, NY 14456
(315) 788-3360

Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are deeply disturbed by reports that you may have directed that certain limits on U.S. strategic defenses may be incorporated within our negotiating position at Geneva. Because we believe this represents a grave threat to the integrity of your SDI, and a departure from your previously well-defined arms control objectives, we urgently seek a meeting with you to discuss these concerns in full. Pending that meeting, we would like to raise a number of points for your consideration.

First, as you know, we number among your strongest supporters in the House and the Senate. And we must warn you, if the U.S. pursues this new negotiating course, we fear for the survival of SDI funding in Congress.

If we succumb to Soviet entreaties to extend the ABM treaty or otherwise bargain away our right to near-term SDI deployment, we will risk losing strategic defenses altogether. As we know from our experience with the ABM treaty, when the United States pledges not to do something -- such as deploy strategic defenses -- the Congress will not appropriate funds to preserve that option.

Secondly, we respectfully suggest that were you to commit this country to abide by the American arms control lobby's private interpretation of the ABM treaty, your Strategic Defense Initiative would thereafter exist in name only -- and everyone would know it. The advice you are receiving that such a commitment would be gratis because we could not, in any event, build respectable strategic defenses over the next five to ten years, is technically wrong and politically too clever by half.

Contrary to what some in your Administration have asserted, there are things we can and must do by way of near-term SDI deployment that we are not doing precisely because the ABM treaty stands in the way of sensible planning.



C-119-15

Honorable Ronald Reagan
July 29, 1986
page 2

For example, right now we could build an American equivalent of the dual capable SA-12 surface-to-air missile system that is now coming off Soviet assembly lines. Such a system would provide insurance to great numbers of innocent people, and complicate any attack on military targets.

In addition, because we have neglected near term options available to us, the Soviet Union will soon have the first high-energy laser in space while we have none. They won't call it an anti-missile device, but it will be able to destroy U.S. missiles. How many, we won't know. (You may wish to request an update on how an object in space can be hidden, camouflaged, and decoyed.) But there is no reason why the United States should brook further delay in acquiring these powerful tools for upsetting enemy attacks and protecting millions from their consequences.

Another example, the ERIS rocket, the successor of the HOE interceptor that destroyed a warhead above Kwajalein two years ago, could be put into production. The Army's airborne optical adjunct, a kind of infra-red airborne warning and control system for warheads, could be produced and mounted on a Boeing 767. Together, these two systems could reduce any attack just above the atmosphere and provide broad area coverage.

Additionally there are near term surveillance capabilities that would not only greatly enhance our warning capability but would also multiply the effectiveness of new intercept technologies. And there are other examples of present technology we could exploit, if only the SDI program were designed to include near-term deployment options.

Mr. President, if the Administration keeps on defining SDI as a faraway dream for the next millenium, no one will support it, including us. But if we begin now, as we must, to build the anti-missile devices we can build, the American people would soon enjoy real and growing protection.

We must caution you, however, that we will lose this singular opportunity to strengthen stability and peace if the course of arms control negotiations imposes limits on SDI deployments.

Honorable Ronald Reagan
July 29, 1986
page 3

Finally, there is a real question about the seriousness and sincerity of our arms control compliance policy. You have reported to Congress three times now that the Soviet Union is in violation of the ABM treaty. Moreover, it is the judgment of our intelligence community that the Soviet Union may be laying the infrastructure for a nation-wide ABM defense -- precisely what the ABM treaty was intended to prevent.

Given this irrefutable evidence, we cannot conceive how the United States could possibly agree to extend the ABM Treaty and maintain any credibility in our efforts to put an end to Soviet arms control violations. Nor in good conscience could we, as elected representatives, ask the American people to reaffirm an old treaty that the Soviets are blatantly violating even as they put their signature to paper.

The fact of the matter is that the ABM treaty has only served to constrain U.S. strategic defenses. The Soviet program has proceeded apace. The ABM treaty was predicated on offensive reductions that never materialized. Instead, the Soviet Union has engaged in the greatest offensive military buildup in history. The cumulative result has been a steady erosion of our deterrent.

It would be a tragedy and a mistake of historical magnitude to reaffirm this failed arms control path, just as we are on the verge of achieving a breakthrough in your magnificent vision of a defense based on destroying weapons and preserving human lives.

We anxiously await the opportunity to meet with you to discuss this new negotiating overture, and its impact on SDI and the future security of our nation.

Respectfully,

MALCOLM WALLOP
U.S. Senator

JACK KEMP
Member of Congress

DAN QUAYLE
U.S. Senator

HENRY HIDE
Member of Congress

PETE WILSON
U.S. Senator

JIM COURTER
Member of Congress

JAMES MCCLURE
U.S. Senator

DUNCAN HUNTER
Member of Congress

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Date

Remarks The attached, a 2 July letter to CJCS from Sen. Kennedy and Cong. Aspin re the President's 27 May decision on SALT and the JCS response of 30 July, is provided. FYI. (It may be of use in the breakfast with Aspin, previously scheduled for rescheduled).

Executive Secretary

5 Aug 1986

Date

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

July 2, 1986

Executive Registry

86- 3471x/1

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Room 2E873
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dear Admiral Crowe:

As you know, the Administration's recent announcement that it no longer intends to abide by the SALT II agreement is a topic of considerable concern here in Congress and around the country. We have heard the arguments of the civilian policy-makers in support of this decision, but we have not yet heard from our nation's military leaders. The decision to abandon the SALT II limitations could significantly affect our national security, and we think it is important for the Congress and for the country to hear your personal and professional judgments.

To that end, we would be grateful if you would respond to the following questions:

1. Administration spokesmen say that the Soviets have no military rationale to build their strategic forces above SALT II's quantitative constraints (e.g., on MIRVed missile launchers and reentry vehicles per MIRVed missile launcher). Do you share this assessment? Are there future developments in U.S. strategic forces -- such as the deployment of mobile ICBMs or of a strategic defense -- that would change this judgment?

2. Do you believe that Soviet adherence to the quantitative constraints of SALT II helps your ability to plan future U.S. forces by simplifying the task of predicting the future size and characteristics of Soviet strategic forces? Do you believe that the absence of the SALT II provisions facilitating verification will adversely affect your ability to gather information about Soviet forces?

3. How do the three Soviet arms control violations mentioned in the President's decision -- development of a second "new" type of ICBM, telemetry encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar -- affect U.S. security? Do these violations adversely affect our ability to deter a Soviet nuclear strike? Do they adversely affect strategic or crisis stability? How do these violations affect our ability to execute strategic war plans, should this be needed?

4. Will the conversion of several more B-52s to carry ALCMs -- a move that will carry us over the SALT II limits -- increase significantly our security? What, if any, military requirement is served by this added ALCM carriage capability? Do we have enough ALCMs available today to take full advantage of this increased ALCM carriage capability?

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5. Ambassador Nitze suggested that the Navy may dismantle more Poseidon submarines for reasons of cost-effectiveness, and that this would technically keep us within SALT II limits past the end of this year. What are the Navy's current plans for the overhaul and/or dismantling of Poseidon submarines, and how will those plans affect the time when the United States, under current policy, will exceed the SALT II limits?


6. In 1979, when SALT II was signed, the Chiefs said that this treaty made a modest contribution to U.S. security. Has that judgment changed? If so, why?


Because your answers will contribute to the debate about SALT that will occur in Congress later in the summer, we would be grateful if you could supply us with written responses to these questions by July 14, 1986, the day before Congress returns. For that same reason, we would like your responses to be unclassified. Any classified details that support your judgments could be provided as an appendix.

We are writing letters with identical questions to each of the other members of the JCS.

Thank you for your cooperation on this important matter. Your advice and counsel -- and that of the individual service chiefs -- is highly valued, not only as an independent military adviser to the President but also to the Congress and the American people.

Sincerely,


Les Aspin
Chairman, House Armed
Services Committee


Edward M. Kennedy
U. S. Senator



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 July 1986

The Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the opportunity to provide our views on the President's 27 May decision on SALT.


We support the President's decision. It contains positions, Mr. Chairman, with which we believe you too can agree, that is, strong commitments to the modernization of strategic forces, arms control, and to restraint in deployment of strategic weapons.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff base their support, in part, on their assessment of likely Soviet actions inside or outside of a SALT regime. Under SALT the Soviets have been able to field the strategic systems they believe are necessary vis-a-vis the United States' strategic capability. The Soviets have increased the number of their weapons about fourfold since SALT I. They have doubled their weapons since they signed SALT II. They have steadily modernized their strategic systems under SALT. While they have dismantled some systems, in general these were older systems reaching the end of their economic and militarily effective lives. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Soviet forces resulting from no SALT restraints will not differ appreciably in terms of overall strategic capability from those forces they are currently developing.


The JCS support for the President's decision also draws on our knowledge of US programs and resources. Our forces are deployed on the basis of our perception of what is required to counter the Soviet threat. We, too, have dismantled older systems while focusing on modernization.

The answers to your specific questions are attached. We have attempted to answer your questions in as straightforward a manner as possible. Thus, these answers include our best military judgment after considering all relevant input. As further context to the specific answers, we would ask you to consider the


JCS belief that deterrence is not only based on our strategic forces and their necessary modernization but also on well-equipped conventional forces, the strength of our alliances and our research for strategic defense.




WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff




JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
General, US Army
Chief of Staff



P. X. KELLEY
General, US Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps



C. A. H. TROST
Admiral, US Navy
Chief of Naval Operations



LARRY D. WELCH
General, US Air Force
Chief of Staff

Attachment

Question 1:

Administration spokesmen say that the Soviets have no military rationale to build their strategic forces above SALT II's quantitative constraints (e.g., on MIRVed missile launchers and reentry vehicles per MIRVed missile launcher). Do you share this assessment? Are there future developments in U.S. strategic forces -- such as the deployment of mobile ICBMs or of a strategic defense -- that would change this judgment?

- Under the limits of SALT II the Soviets are proceeding with a vigorous strategic expansion program to upgrade their ICBM, SLBM, and bomber forces.

- We see little military rationale for the Soviets to expand their strategic forces significantly beyond the large increases permitted under SALT II. Based upon any reasonable military accounting of Soviet force structure, they have more warheads than they require today to attack US targets. We would also note that economic considerations may come into play.

- From this, we conclude that the Soviets will concentrate primarily on qualitative improvements, rather than emphasizing continued quantitative increases to their number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). We believe they would do this with or without SALT.

- While the Soviets do assess US force developments in determining their own force requirements, we believe the Soviets are likely to concentrate on qualitative improvements, rather than substantial quantitative growth, even with projected future developments in US strategic forces, which we believe already have been considered by the Soviets in their force development plans. Although the Soviets have the potential to expand quantitatively if they choose to do so (e.g., they are much more prone to keep older systems in their inventory) we do believe that from a US deterrence perspective these steps would have only marginal influence on the overall strategic picture. At the same time such increased investments in nuclear weapons would be expensive.

Question 2:

Do you believe that Soviet adherence to the quantitative constraints of SALT II helps your ability to plan future U.S. forces by simplifying the task of predicting the future size and characteristics of Soviet strategic forces? Do you believe that the absence of the SALT II provisions facilitating verification will adversely affect your ability to gather information about Soviet forces?

- There is little to indicate the Soviets will continue to increase significantly the quantity of their SNDVs. It is true

that one potential impact of Soviet noncompliance with SALT could be retention of older SNDVs as they deploy modernized delivery vehicles. However, Soviet retention of older systems does not significantly increase the projected strategic threat to the US because the Soviets already possess more than adequate strategic forces.

- We are confident in our ability to count numbers of fixed, deployed Soviet SNDVs, with or without SALT, but Soviet encryption of ballistic missile test data denies us the information we require to assess the quality of their system improvements. Consequently, from a military perspective, encryption is a significant violation.

Question 3:

How do the three Soviet arms control violations mentioned in the President's decision -- development of a second "new" type of ICBM, telemetry encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar -- affect U.S. security? Do those violations adversely affect our ability to deter a Soviet nuclear strike? Do they adversely affect strategic or crisis stability? How do these violations affect our ability to execute strategic war plans, should this be needed?

- The Soviet deployment of their second new type ICBM, the mobile SS-25, is a clear violation of SALT II -- a violation of the first order. The major significance of this deployment is that it provides the Soviets yet another new generation ICBM, more capable than its predecessors, with which we must contend. It is important to note that this violation stems from deployment of the missile itself as a second new type, rather than its mobile basing mode. However, SS-25 mobility does significantly increase US targeting difficulties and removes a growing portion of the Soviet ICBM force from our prompt retaliatory capability.

- Soviet encryption is a major violation whose significance is that it reduces the US ability to monitor Soviet qualitative improvements to their strategic ballistic missile forces. Again, we state this in the context that modernized weapons are the fundamental problem, not the total numbers.

- The Krasnoyarsk radar has military significance with respect to potential contributions to a nationwide ballistic missile defense. It is the key long-lead element of a national territorial defense which closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detecting and tracking coverage.

- Taken as a whole, these violations give the Soviets definite advantages and testify to the importance of the Strategic Modernization Program.

Question 4:

Will the conversion of several more B-52s to carry ALCMs -- a move that will carry us over the SALT II limits -- increase significantly our security? What, if any, military requirement is served by this added ALCM carriage capability? Do we have enough ALCMs available today to take full advantage of this increased ALCM carriage capability?

- Our strategic requirements are based on the overall magnitude and nature of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces. Equipping the B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage is a quick, cost effective way to reduce the current shortfall in the number of "modernized" weapons the US requires to hold the Soviet target base at risk and contributes to our plans for assuring continued penetration of Soviet airspace by a diversity of delivery systems. We will continue deployment predicated on the future actions of the Soviets.

- We have sufficient ALCMs in production to take full advantage of this increased ALCM carriage capability.

Question 5:

Ambassador Nitze suggested that the Navy may dismantle more Poseidon submarines for reasons of cost-effectiveness, and that this would technically keep us within SALT II limits past the end of this year. What are the Navy's current plans for the overhaul and/or dismantling of Poseidon submarines, and how will those plans affect the time when the United States, under current policy, will exceed the SALT II limits?

- Three Poseidon SSBNs are scheduled for overhaul in FY 87, and their funding is included in the President's FY 87 Budget. As the President indicated in his 27 May 1986 statement, all future SSBN overhaul decisions will be based on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and on funding. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. If the FY 87 Poseidon SSBN overhauls are conducted as presently scheduled, the continued conversion of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles will cause the United States technically to exceed the terms of the SALT II Treaty.

Question 6:

In 1979, when SALT II was signed, the Chiefs said that this treaty made a modest contribution to U.S. security. Has that judgment changed? If so, why?

- Yes, the JCS assessment has changed because the strategic realities have changed since 1979.
- Originally, the JCS viewed SALT II as a modest but useful contribution to US national security interests. The Chiefs hoped to bound the upper limits of Soviet growth and moderate the Soviet strategic modernization program. Those expectations, coupled with implied domestic support for comparable US strategic modernization, led to the judgment that SALT II was an acceptable risk to US national security interests.
- Unfortunately, the Soviets have failed to comply with certain key features of SALT II and other strategic arms control agreements and have eroded our confidence in their commitment to meaningful arms control. The SS-25 deployment constitutes a significant development beyond that codified in SALT II, and the pattern of encryption clearly impedes our ability to verify measures on which SALT II depends.