




**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**



# National Intelligence Daily

**Monday  
2 March 1987**



**Top Secret**

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2 March 1987

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**USSR-  
WESTERN EUROPE:**

**INF Accord Expectations Raised**



**General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal for an INF accord separate from agreement on offensive and space arms suggests that Moscow believes an accord can be concluded during the final two years of the Reagan administration and that Gorbachev's arms control agenda is strongly supported by his Politburo colleagues. The West Europeans are likely to find Gorbachev's proposal attractive, and Washington can expect pressure from basing country governments to conclude an accord.** 



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Gorbachev's statement released by TASS on Saturday was previewed to Ambassador Kampelman by Ambassador Vorontsov in Geneva several hours earlier. Vorontsov stated Moscow is willing to conclude an INF accord independent of agreement on strategic offensive and space arms. He proposed that the INF negotiators remain in Geneva past the scheduled closing date on Wednesday for the purpose of working out an accord. Vorontsov added the Soviets will formally present their proposal at a specially requested plenary session in Geneva today. 

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**Comment:** Moscow's decision to drop linkage and revert to its pre-Reykjavik proposal for a separate INF agreement appears to reflect a Soviet assessment an arms control agreement that could lead to another summit is still possible.  some Soviets have voiced the opinion that the US may be receptive to an arms accord as a means of demonstrating that, despite domestic political problems, major policy initiatives can be successfully pursued. The Soviets are also aware the US has plans for presenting a draft INF treaty in the near future, and they may intend to upstage such a move in the hope of focusing the negotiations on Moscow's agenda. 

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The Soviet INF initiative appears to underscore Gorbachev's authority among his colleagues on arms control questions. His statement bore the clear imprimatur of collective Politburo support, and, for the first time in print, Gorbachev cites his position as Chairman of the Defense Council, a striking allusion to his authority on political-military decisions. 

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In framing their latest proposal, the Soviets appear to be seeking to address West European concerns—voiced in the wake of the Reykjavik summit—that a zero-zero INF outcome in Europe would accentuate Soviet advantages in theater nuclear and conventional weapons. Most significantly, Gorbachev stated that Moscow was

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
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prepared to begin talks on theater missiles "immediately." This appears to represent a shift from Moscow's previous position that talks on shorter range missiles should begin only after the implementation of an INF agreement. 


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West European governments will publicly welcome Gorbachev's latest move. Leaders of the five basing countries all are publicly on record as favoring the zero-zero outcome for Europe and have indicated privately to US officials that they are prepared to live with this outcome. Many officials, however, believe the complete withdrawal of US INF systems from Western Europe would harm their security interests. 

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The West European public probably will anticipate that an INF accord is imminent because their governments have portrayed Moscow's linkage of an INF accord to agreement on SDI as the key obstacle. As a result, West European governments probably will come under greater public pressure to push Washington for progress on an agreement. 

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Such pressures on the US are likely to be particularly strong if the only obstacles to an accord are perceived to be verification issues and the US insistence on the right to convert withdrawn Pershing IIs to shorter range Pershing IBs. The onset of negotiations to reduce Soviet shorter range nuclear missiles will permit West European leaders to claim the US did not ignore their concerns about Soviet shorter range systems in an INF agreement. At the same time, West European leaders realize that NATO has very little leverage to force Soviet reductions because it has few comparable systems and the key country—West Germany—appears unwilling to consider counterdeployments to build such leverage. 

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**FRANCE-LEBANON: Impact of Abdallah Sentence**

***France is bracing for violence in the wake of the outcome of Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction leader Georges Abdallah's trial on Saturday.*** [redacted]


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According to the US Embassy, the judges chose to ignore the political environment and ~~French Government machinations to weaken the~~ case and ruled on the basis of the evidence. [redacted]

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Abdallah will be eligible for parole in as few as 15 years, but only the President can pardon him. In relaying Abdallah's decision not to appeal, his lawyer warned that militant Arabs everywhere would see the sentence as a declaration of war. While French officials have hailed the tough sentence, they are warning the public of the high risk of terrorist attacks. [redacted]

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**Comment:** President Mitterrand is unlikely to pardon Abdallah and risk accusations of being soft on terrorism. Abdallah still has until next week to reconsider an appeal, and a reduction in the sentence cannot be ruled out. The government of Prime Minister Chirac will probably decide to accept the outcome, however, and try to salvage some credit for toughness despite its maladroit attempts at leniency for Abdallah. [redacted]

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Abdallah's brother, the current head of LARF in Lebanon, has vowed swift retaliation for any conviction and will try to move quickly to make France—and possibly the US—pay for the sentence. The group's ability to stage spectacular bombings like those of last September cannot be assessed; however, it has been under considerable Syrian pressure not to attack French interests. If LARF or its allies—notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—Special Command and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia—are unable to take revenge in France, they may target French or US interests in Lebanon or elsewhere in the Middle East. Although public opinion initially would probably support the government in the face of renewed terrorism, any prolonged campaign could provoke an outbreak of anti-Americanism because of the high US profile during the trial. [redacted]

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**SOUTH KOREA:**

**Bracing for Antigovernment March**

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***The return of Seoul's large student population to campuses this week increases the chances for violent conflict at a human rights march tomorrow.*** [Redacted]

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Students, opposition politicians, and religious groups will march tomorrow to mark the 49th day—religiously significant for Buddhists—since the death of a student in police custody. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] student organizers intend to demonstrate peacefully in hopes of winning support from students who oppose Chun but want to avoid confronting the government. [Redacted]

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leftist students are particularly anxious to attract new recruits—a government crackdown depleted radical ranks last fall—to swell the turnout at rallies later this spring, [Redacted]

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Despite the radical's strategy, some extreme elements are threatening to use gasoline bombs if security services deal harshly with marchers. For its part, Seoul [Redacted] will prevent the march by deploying thousands of riot police to cordon off the proposed route. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Seoul's plan to keep demonstrators from reaching the march's starting point probably lessens the chances for widespread violence, but increased student participation in the event will make it harder to prevent scuffles. [Redacted]

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In addition, the government's tough tactics may cause a backlash that would fuel the human rights issue. Such a reaction would complicate efforts by ruling party hardliners to push the constitutional revision proposal through the National Assembly this spring. It would also place party moderates, who have lobbied for a more tolerant approach to human rights rallies, in a stronger position to delay the revision until Chun's term ends next year. [Redacted]

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For their part, Chun's political opponents will point to harsh measures as more evidence that Seoul is not interested in political reform. Tough tactics may also provide the recruits the radicals hope to attract. [Redacted]

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**SUDAN-EGYPT:**

**Results of Sadiq's Visit**

***Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq's recent visit to Cairo has partially repaired Egyptian-Sudanese relations, but mutual suspicions and differences remain.*** [Redacted]

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Both Sadiq and Egypt's President Mubarak appeared determined to reassure the other of good intentions and to ease strains that have characterized relations since Sadiq came to power last year.

According to US Embassy reporting, Sadiq did not raise the sensitive issue of Egyptian asylum for deposed President Nimeiri, and Mubarak accorded Sadiq red-carpet treatment during his five-day stay. [Redacted]

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The visit produced a "Brotherhood Chapter" providing a more flexible framework for bilateral relations. The Sudanese accepted Egypt's bid of its good offices to bring Khartoum and Addis Ababa together. They also expressed willingness to pursue diplomatic solutions to the southern insurgency. Sadiq requested—but got no promise of—Egyptian weapons to thwart Ethiopian aerial supply of southern Sudanese rebels and to counter Ethiopian air attacks into Sudan. [Redacted]

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Sadiq and Mubarak failed to agree on other regional issues, however. Egyptian officials criticized Sadiq's rapprochement with Libya, disagreed with his neutral stance on Chad, and disparaged his overtures toward Iran. Sadiq questioned Egypt's support for the Camp David accords, but Egyptian officials stood firm on the benefits of disengagement with Israel. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Sadiq's warm reception in Cairo should stifle complaints from key Sudanese military officers and opposition leaders that he was allowing bilateral relations to deteriorate. The Prime Minister's willingness to endorse an Egyptian role in resolving Sudan's conflicts with Ethiopia allows Mubarak to satisfy a similar request from Addis Ababa and may enhance Egypt's credentials as a regional peacemaker. Personal relations between the two leaders improved considerably. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**PAKISTAN-  
AFGHANISTAN:**

**Military's View of the War**

***Lower level Pakistani military authorities—departing from Islamabad's official view—believe that the Soviets and the Afghan regime pursued the war against the Afghan insurgents more aggressively last year than in the past, but they claim that the Communists' tactics are flawed and that neither side is winning the war.*** 



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These Pakistanis 


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 say a major flaw in Soviet tactics is an unwillingness to use airmobile troops to envelop the enemy from behind. The Pakistanis criticize the insurgents for tactical inflexibility and for relying too much on standoff weapons—such as 107-mm rockets—a practice that they believe has led to a decrease in aggressiveness and effectiveness. 

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**Comment:** Neither the Soviets and Afghans nor the insurgents significantly improved their military position last year, although both sides added new weaponry. The Afghan army may have marginally improved its performance, but it remains plagued by manpower shortages, factionalism, and poor morale. Soviet forces were more effective last year in their use of air and artillery support, but Soviet ground and airmobile forces have not operated more aggressively, apart from raids and ambushes by special-purpose forces. 

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The resistance has begun to use sophisticated weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles and multiple rocket launchers, more effectively. These weapons have enhanced the rebels' ability to mount ground operations. 

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The official Pakistani assessment is less pessimistic than the opinion of field-grade officers, and Islamabad's view is reflected in current Pakistani negotiating positions. 

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[Redacted]

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**EC:**

**Budget Dispute**

***A plan proposed by EC Commission President Delors to solve the Community's long-term funding problem by linking budget contributions to member states' gross domestic product is likely to cause a long, debilitating dispute between the rich northern members and the poorer Mediterranean members.*** [Redacted]

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Delors has proposed changing the formula for member-state contributions from the current 1.4 percent of value-added tax collections to 1.4 percent of GDP, which may result in a potential 50-percent increase in EC funding over the next five years. He also has proposed doubling economic development expenditures for depressed regions, and greater discipline over agricultural spending. The proposal is intended to address the \$22 billion in unfunded commitments the EC has accumulated in recent years, partly because of increasing agricultural spending. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** The proposed increase in regional spending would largely benefit the poorer southern members of the Community, which favor the plan. The three net contributors to the EC—the UK, West Germany, and France—probably will not agree to the proposal in its present form. [Redacted]

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Bonn and Paris generally support tightening controls on expenditures but will continue to back agricultural spending to placate their farmers. Prime Minister Thatcher has threatened to withhold the British share of any spending increase until the EC has made substantial savings in agricultural spending—this year amounting to 63 percent of the EC budget. [Redacted]

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EC farm ministers have had little success in stemming agricultural overproduction. Member-state political pressures will probably rule out significant cuts in farm spending this year. [Redacted]

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A protracted deadlock between northern and southern members is probable. Neither side will be willing to make any concessions until later this year, when the Community begins planning for next year's budget and will be forced to deal with an estimated \$4 billion shortfall in the current budget. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**LEBANON: Army Reacts to Syrians in West Beirut**

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Tensions between Christian Lebanese Army officers and the Christian Lebanese Forces militia are rising in the wake of the Syrian troop deployment in West Beirut. [Redacted] Lebanese Forces Commander Samir Jaja is increasingly concerned about Lebanese Army efforts to take control of the Christian enclave.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**Comment:** Christian tensions will intensify further when Lebanese-Syrian negotiations on a plan for political reform resume this week. The Army leadership probably will use force only as a last resort to control the militia, however, especially because Jaja's supporters have succeeded in infiltrating key Lebanese Army posts—a disturbing development for Awn. Christian apprehension about the Syrian threat is exaggerated; the new Syrian forces are still consolidating their grip on the western sector against the opposition of Hizballah and the Palestinians. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**ZIMBABWE-USSR: Renewed Arms Talks**

Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe's decision to send a high-level military delegation to Moscow this month suggests Harare may be close to a major arms-supply relationship with the Soviets. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] The Zimbabweans reportedly are seeking MIG-29s and a modern air defense system to use against possible South African attacks. ~~They also are likely to discuss conventional arms needed for operations against RENAMO guerrillas in Mozambique and long-range civilian aircraft.~~ [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Moscow, despite traditionally cool relations with Harare, has courted Mugabe by proposing arms sales ever since he visited the USSR in late 1985. Nonetheless, the Soviets almost certainly will not sell Zimbabwe MIG-29s, which have been exported only to India and Iraq and whose sale could provoke a strong South African response. Harare would have difficulty paying for such weapons and operating them without a substantial Soviet military presence—something Mugabe would prefer to avoid. As a result, Harare ultimately may buy less advanced Soviet aircraft and air defense equipment, particularly if Moscow is willing to provide them on concessionary terms. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**ALBANIA: No Letup in Criticisms of US, USSR**

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
Tirane has not softened its hostility toward the US and USSR while seeking other international contacts. In a recent speech, party leader Alia ruled out reconciliation or relations of any kind with Washington or Moscow. Premier Carcani added that Tirane will continue to expand ties to its Balkan neighbors and other countries. The local press, meanwhile, has attacked Soviet leader Gorbachev's openness campaign as further abandoning Communism and dismissed US-Soviet arms control talks as cynical and meaningless. [Redacted]



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**Comment:** Albanian leaders are probably trying to demonstrate to the US and USSR that there has been no policy change since Enver Hoxha's death two years ago. The attacks on Moscow add weight to Tirane's recent rejections of high-level Soviet overtures. Tirane realizes that increased contact with Western states is crucial to expanding imports needed for economic modernization. Alia next may increase efforts to establish ties to West Germany and to increase contacts with the UK—two countries with which Albania lacks formal relations. [Redacted]



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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**HONDURAS: Tensions Over Military Restructuring**

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Proposals by Armed Forces Chief Regalado to restructure the high command are heightening tensions in the military. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] midlevel officers [Redacted]

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oppose Regalado's plan to create five new general officer positions because they believe this would benefit a rival faction of more senior officers. [Redacted]

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leaders of the disgruntled officers also believe some members of the senior group are plotting to remove them from their commands. They reportedly think Regalado will help them fend off reassignments if they continue to support him. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** Regalado's efforts to rely on a more traditional chain of command in the military probably are intended to undercut ambitious midlevel officers who are eager to expand their power now in order to ensure that they will assume top military positions in 1990. Regalado is unlikely to restructure his commands without the support of a majority of military leaders. He probably fears that any precipitous action on his part could spark a backlash similar to the one that led to the ouster of Armed Forces Chief Alvarez in 1983. [Redacted]

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**AFGHANISTAN: Precipitation Adequate for Crops**

Afghan crop conditions appear normal for this time of year, but tight food supplies are expected to persist in the cities—as compared with the farm areas—because they are dependent on shipments from rural areas and outside the country. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] major rivers—feeding irrigated croplands—are flowing at levels equal to those of 1985 and 1986. [Redacted]

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light snow cover across dryland farming areas, where about 20 percent of the annual wheat crop—the staple of the Afghan diet—is grown. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The food balance in Afghanistan remains precarious because of the tendency to draw down food stocks during the winter months. Despite normal conditions in many areas, this year's harvest will depend on precipitation between now and May. Food supplies are likely to be tighter in the cities than in the countryside, except possibly in the north. Shortages have been reported in major cities—Kabul and Qandahar in particular. The major cities are heavily dependent on supplies shipped from farm areas and abroad, which are susceptible to interruption because of the fighting and damage to the road networks. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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In Brief

Middle East

— **Iran and Iraq** separately claim to have inflicted substantial casualties in renewed fighting near Al Basrah Saturday . . . Tehran says it captured major fortifications following Iraqi attack . . . Baghdad says Iranian attack repulsed . . . no confirmation.

[Redacted]

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Americas

— Leftist-controlled **Ecuadorean** congress has censured President Febres-Cordero over scandal concerning sales of official cars . . . opposition will continue to attack Febres-Cordero, but legal action against him unlikely.

[Redacted]

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— **Bolivian** President Paz has named chief of staff, Juan Carlo Duran, Interior Minister . . . ruling party politician . . . US Embassy says he is free of narcotics taint, unlike predecessor . . . appointment should facilitate drug crackdown efforts.

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[Redacted] 25X1

Asia

— **Vietnam** claiming oil production this year will reach only 5,600 b/d . . . [Redacted] . . . Vietnam clearly dependent on **Soviet** oil.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] 25X1

Europe

— **Netherlands** seeking foreign donors to supplement humanitarian aid to **Surinamese** refugees . . . amount authorized last fall almost gone . . . development assistance still withheld until Paramaribo shows progress on democratization.

[Redacted]

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**France** has sent Army brigadier general to command all service units in **French Guiana** . . . reflects French concerns about security at Kourou space launch center and along border with **Suriname**.

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**Special Analysis**

**USSR-  
SOUTHEAST ASIA:**

**Shevardnadze's Tour**

[Redacted]

**Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze travels to Southeast Asia and Australia beginning today. He probably hopes to persuade his non-Communist hosts to expand relations with the USSR despite Moscow's support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Shevardnadze will reassure the USSR's Indochinese allies that their interests will not be harmed by Soviet approaches to ASEAN and China.** [Redacted]

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The Cambodian issue remains the primary obstacle to better Soviet relations with ASEAN states and Australia. Shevardnadze presumably will try to portray the Vietnamese as flexible on the terms of a settlement, play down Moscow's ability to influence Hanoi, and reiterate that increased dialogue between ASEAN and the Indochinese states and direct Sino-Vietnamese talks are keys to resolving the issue. [Redacted]

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Shevardnadze's public comments in Phnom Penh and Hanoi are likely to highlight alleged Vietnamese flexibility. [Redacted]

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[Redacted], but there is no reliable indicator to suggest that Moscow is pressing Hanoi to withdraw from Cambodia. [Redacted]

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Shevardnadze probably will urge Bangkok and Jakarta to endorse Moscow's recent call for official contacts between ASEAN and CEMA and will seek expanded bilateral economic ties to all three of the non-Communist states he visits. He is also likely to solicit their support for Soviet efforts to participate in regional economic groupings such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and the Asian Development Bank. In Bangkok, Foreign Minister Siddhi's planned visit to Moscow in May will be a primary topic of discussion. [Redacted]

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The Soviet Foreign Minister is certain—particularly in Australia—to contrast the USSR's recent adherence to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty with the US refusal to do so. He may put in a good word for ASEAN's efforts to formulate a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone, especially in Indonesia, which is spearheading the idea. The Soviets claim that such regional treaties pave the way for General Secretary Gorbachev's proposed conference on Asian security, but Shevardnadze is not likely to be able to persuade Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia to endorse such a conference as long as Vietnamese military operations continue in Cambodia. [Redacted]

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Shevardnadze's trip will signify to China that the Soviets intend to play a greater role in Southeast Asia and Oceania. His stops in Indochina will remind Beijing that, although Moscow wants to improve Sino-Soviet relations, it will not pursue that goal at the expense of Soviet allies. 

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The visit to Hanoi will give the Soviets the opportunity to assess recent leadership changes there and to prod the Vietnamese gently to get their economic and political houses in order. Shevardnadze's trips to Laos and Cambodia will remind Hanoi of the Soviets' intention to deal directly with Vietnam's Indochinese clients. 

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
**Special Analysis**

**COLOMBIA:**

**Insurgents' Strategy**

***The leftist Patriotic Union, the political front of Colombia's largest insurgent group, has declared its independence from the guerrillas in order to strengthen its political position. Meanwhile, the insurgents may forge an alliance of all major rebel groups to attack the country's key oil facilities.*** [Redacted]

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Leaders of the Patriotic Union have denied responsibility for recent insurgent actions, including increased attacks on government troops, by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The dissociation is aimed at protecting the Patriotic Union's political gains—particularly its role in Congress—even if the insurgents' three-year-old truce with the government breaks down. It is not likely, however, to placate Colombians angered by the recent attacks, because the rebels' political leaders are closely identified with the guerrillas and used armed intimidation to muster votes in the national election last year. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] even while the Patriotic Union maneuvers for greater legitimacy, the FARC may be mobilizing for a joint offensive with the Cuban-backed National Guerrilla Coordinator, an alliance of Colombia's three other major insurgent groups. A

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[Redacted] guerrilla forces near the country's largest oil refinery. [Redacted]

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~~The refinery is located near FARC territory and in an area where the alliance's National Liberation Army—which is trying to reach a political and military accord with FARC—bombed gas and oil lines earlier this month. The National Liberation Army has attacked the nation's major oil pipeline repeatedly since last March~~ [Redacted]

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The FARC will continue to build its military power and demonstrate solidarity with other rebel groups, but it is unlikely to declare a formal end to the truce with the government as long as the Patriotic Union—already preparing for nationwide mayoral elections in March 1988—retains political credibility. [Redacted]

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Growing tension and distrust will continue to strain FARC's relations with the government during the next several months, and President Barco has accelerated efforts to improve his government's limited counterinsurgency capabilities. Systematic, coordinated attacks on major oil facilities—and particularly on the refinery—would strongly test the security forces but could prompt Barco to widen military action against the insurgents. [Redacted]

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Special Analysis

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SWEDEN:



New Foreign Policy Tack

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***In the year since Olof Palme's assassination, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has attempted to reinvigorate Sweden's traditional policy of "armed neutrality" by playing down differences with the US and the USSR and by avoiding controversial international socialist causes in favor of national and regional issues. His renewed emphasis on neutrality enjoys broad public support and is likely to be the cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy even if the Social Democrats relinquish power following a national election next year.***

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Carlsson appears to be convinced that Palme's aggressive involvement in international socialist causes and his disputes with the US over Vietnam, Third World issues, and East-West relations had caused strains in Sweden's peacetime policy of neutrality. Tensions with the USSR in the early 1980s over alleged submarine incursions and espionage had also shaken the Swedes' image of nonalignment.




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Palme's frequent public criticism of the US has been dropped by Carlsson in favor of what US diplomats characterize as a constructive private dialogue. He has also played down differences with Moscow in an effort to keep Soviet-Swedish relations on an even keel.



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Carlsson is not as active internationally as was Palme. He declined to participate in the "Palme Commission" on disarmament and has played only a minor role in the Socialist International. Although Sweden has provided steadily increasing amounts of aid to Nicaragua and has been involved in promoting human rights in Central America, it has done so in a relatively nonconfrontational manner.



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The Prime Minister has concentrated on national and regional issues such as the Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone. Balanced neutrality and Nordic issues will probably continue to be Sweden's top foreign policy priorities after the election next year. Opposition leaders generally support Carlsson's new look but differ on the extent of aid to countries like Nicaragua and on how hard Stockholm should push for a nuclear-free zone.



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