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### **Special Analyses**

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AUSTRALIA:	Possible Opposition Split	K	
	Queensland State Premier Bjelke-Petersen's apparent bid to become Australia's next prime minister threatens to divide conservative opposition to Prime Minister Hawke's Labor government and improve Hawke's chances of reelection.	25X1	
<b>5</b>	Bjelke-Petersen, who has dominated politics in Queensland for 19 years, has announced he will leave his state post to seek a seat in the federal parliament in the next election, which must be held by April 1988. Bjelke-Petersen's political base is the Queensland branch of the National Party, the junior partner—with the Liberal Party—in the conservative coalition opposing the Hawke government.		25X1 25X1
	In a move to gain control of the National Party, Bjelke-Petersen last week engineered the withdrawal from the state coalition of the Queensland Nationals. According to the US Embassy, the Queensland Nationals have urged the federal National Party to break from the coalition, citing their disagreement with the coalition leadership's tax policies.		25X1
	Bjelke-Petersen's strength against conservative rivals will be tested this weekend in the election for the Northern Territory Parliament where he is backing candidates to challenge the ruling conservative coalition government. According to the Embassy, a strong showing by his allies in the Northern Territory might persuade Bjelke-Petersen to accelerate his campaign to replace Ian Sinclair as leader of the federal National Party.	X	25X1
	<b>Comment</b> : In recent public opinion surveys, an opposition coalition led by Bjelke-Petersen outpolled Hawke's Labor government. Bjelke-Petersen's sudden popularity, however, probably stems largely from growing public discontent with Hawke's handling of the economy, which is in its second year of slow growth, and with the lackluster performance of Liberal Party leader Howard as head of the opposition coalition.		25X1
•	Bjelke-Petersen's strongly conservative policies—especially his opposition to trade unions—are unlikely to stand up well under closer scrutiny by the Australian public. It is also unlikely that the National Party could win enough seats in the next election for him to become prime minister. Nonetheless, Bjelke-Petersen stands a good chance of gaining control of the federal National Party and is almost certainly positioning himself to become a power broker for the conservatives at the national level.		25X1
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KUWAIT-USSR-US: Negotiations To Protect Tankers	
Kuwait may sign a tanker protection agreement with the USSR unless the US allows 11 Kuwaiti tankers to be put under the US flag. The US Embassy in Kuwait says that Kuwaiti officials would rather not turn to the Soviets but are disappointed with the delay in the US offer and feel compelled to protect their petroleum exports. Moscow's offer to place as many as 11 Kuwaiti tankers under the Soviet flag with Soviet crews and to supply limited military escort for them has been swift by comparison, according to the US Embassy. Putting all 11 Kuwaiti tankers under the US flag would be difficult because only six of them meet US specifications.	25X1 25X1
<b>Comment</b> : Kuwaiti officials would probably abandon the negotiations with the USSR if the US were to agree to protect all 11 tankers. Protection for liquefied petroleum gas and product tankers is particularly important because of the highly explosive nature of such products, which make up the bulk of Kuwait's petroleum exports. Initially Iran would probably be cautious about attacking reflagged or escorted Kuwaiti ships and, at least at first, seek other ways to limit Kuwaiti petroleum exports, including terrorist operations against Kuwaiti oil facilities. An agreement between Kuwait and the USSR would increase the Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf and would aid Moscow's efforts to expand its ties to other Arab Gulf states.	25X1 25X1

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#### TURKEY-IRAQ: Turks Strike Kurdish Camps in Iraq



Turkey has announced that 30 of its aircraft bombed Kurdish rebel strongholds in northern Iraq yesterday. The raid was in retaliation for a Kurdish attack that killed 14 people in a Turkish village last month. The Turkish air operation was carried out under terms of a 1983 understanding with Iraq that permits hot pursuit of rebels by Turkish forces. Unconfirmed press reports indicate that Turkish commando units also are operating against the Kurds inside northern Iraq.

**Comment**: This is the fourth major cross-border operation by Turkey since the 1983 understanding was reached with Iraq. This year 35 Turks have been killed in Kurdish attacks, and Ankara has been under increasing pressure after the attack last month to retaliate. The airstrike probably will curtail Kurdish activities for awhile, but the advent of better weather will probably bring another round of Kurdish . attacks and Turkish retaliation. Baghdad will relish the almost certain negative reaction in Tehran to the raid against Iranian-supported Kurds and will welcome any reduction in Kurdish pressure on Iraqi troops in the north.

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		IICCD_IIDVA: Lukowarm Cunnart for Andhr	_#:	
		USSR-LIBYA: Lukewarm Support for Qadha		
		In a speech in Tripoli on Monday, Soviet Polit		
		member Solovyev expressed strong condemi interference in Chad, solidarity with the Libya	an people, and criticism	25 <b>X</b> 1
		of Arab disunity. Solovyev, in Tripoli for the 1	10th anniversary	
		celebration of "people's rule" in Libya, also r leader Qadhafi from the Supreme Soviet, whic	read a cable to Libyan ch. although it offered no	
		explicit support, wished him success in his fig	ght for peace, progress,	0514
	]	and independence.		25X1
		<b>Comment</b> : Solovyev's speech was typical of a	Soviet official	
•		pronouncements on Libya—long on sympath but short on tangible support for the regime.	ly for the Libyan people	
		have received similar high-level treatment in t	the past. Politburo	
•		candidate member Demichev was in Tripoli la 16th anniversary of the revolution. Although S	ast September for the Solovvey, the Leningrad	
		party boss, has traveled abroad and has met	t foreign visitors to the	
		USSR, this was his first speech addressing a may have been sent to Libya to gain exposure	foreign policy topic. He	25¥1
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SOUTH YEMEN-NORTH YEMEN: Oil Find	
Yemenis hope to develop the find quickly and are preparing for construction of a gathering system and a pipeline. Aden is seeking	25X1
non-Communist participation in further exploration and development and has expressed interest in working with US and other Western firms.         Comment: The find appears to be substantial, perhaps as large as that in North Yemen. South Yemen hopes that the development of the find will ease its chronic economic troubles and domestic political tensions. The South Yemenis almost certainly prefer Western oil technology to that of the Soviets, but Western participation would add further strains to Soviet-South Yemeni relations, which have been tense since the coup in January 1986. South Yemeni exploration in the undefined border area between the North and the South is also likely to add to the pressures, primarily over the South Yemeni exile issue, that are already building between the two Yemens. Overlapping Saudi border claims in this area will further complicate the problem.	25X1 25X1
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### In Brief

Europe	— British Labor Party's defeat in recent byelection aggravating     M     infighting over how to control radical local party organizations
	voter perception that Labor too fragmented to govern effectively will increase.
Americas	Key Salvadoran cleric tacitly endorsed government demands for end to rebel violence before new peace negotiations refused role in guerrilla-orchestrated national debate indicates2widening gulf between Church leaders, extreme left.25%
East Asia	China's Railway Ministry evidently budgeted no more than \$1 billion for locomotive imports for 1986-90, according to press dims prospects for US exports, worth \$450 million in 1984-86 bartering for Soviet locomotives more attractive now.
Oceania	South Pacific Forum urging <b>France</b> to postpone midyear referendum on self-determination in <b>New Caledonia</b> effort by <b>Fijian</b> Prime Minister, moderate head of Forum, to win time for elements favoring independence to build political support. 25X
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#### **Special Analysis**

#### NICARAGUA:

#### Counterinsurgency Strategy

Managua has adopted a two-prong strategy aimed at keeping the insurgents on the move while denying them support from the rural population. Its forces are reacting aggressively to the latest cycle of rebel infiltration. On the political front, the government is concentrating scarce economic resources on the rural sector and is increasing the distribution of land titles to give peasants a greater stake in the revolution. Although all is not going well for the Sandinistas, their recent performance suggests that the better trained and newly equipped rebels will face a more proficient and formidable foe than in the past.

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#### **Controlling the Rural Population**

Since 1985,	high-ranking	25X <sup>-</sup>
Sandinista officials have been conc	cerned about the government's loss	
of popular support in rural Nicarag	gua. Anticipating a renewed rebel	
offensive once US military aid was	resumed, the regime last year	
began to redirect scarce social ser	rvices, economic development	
funds, and internal security operat reporting indicates that the regime	lions to rural areas. US Embassy	
1987 emphasize rural development	t programs at the expense of	
projects in urban areas.	t programs at the expense of	25 <b>X</b> 1
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Accelerating the distribution of land titles to peasants in the northwest and central regions has been a key element in the government's strategy of denying rural support to the insurgents. Nearly 1 million acres were to be confiscated and more than 15,000 peasant families were to receive land last year, according to the US Embassy. Nearly all this land was to be confiscated from regime opponents or suspected rebel sympathizers.

At the same time, the government's security forces have increased efforts to intimidate supporters of the insurgents. The Interior Ministry, which is responsible for internal security, has assumed control of neighborhood defense committees in rural villages and recruited networks of informants to discourage peasants from selling food to the rebels, according to recent defectors. When the lack of supplies forced the insurgents to abandon some operating areas last fall, security forces arrested hundreds of their supporters and forcibly relocated thousands of them, according to Embassy sources.

#### Outlook

Although the Sandinistas' aggressive military strategy has failed to stem the flow of insurgents into Nicaragua, it will probably slow the guerrillas and keep them on the move. The greater number of insurgents inside the country and the increasing tempo of the war will test the flexibility of the government's forces, however, more severely than in the past.

Other measures by Managua will hinder efforts by the rebels to develop support networks and to live off the land. President Ortega told farmworkers and cattlemen last month that the regime planned to press ahead with its land reform program, confiscating more farms and turning them over to peasant cooperatives,

By forming strings of cooperatives garrisoned by the militia, the regime hopes to limit further the insurgents' ability to obtain food.

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