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Contents

Italy: Andreotti Abandoning Bid To Form Government	5
Mozambique: Status of Insurgency	6
Notes	
West Germany-USSR: Visit to Moscow	8
Nordic States: Stalling on Nuclear-Free Zone	8
Sri Lanka: Insurgents Strike Back	9
China-US: Trying To Sidestep FMS Program	10
China-Portugal: Agreement on Macau	10
India: Failure of New Space Launch Vehicle	11
In Brief	12
Special Analyses	

Central America: Reactions to the Arias Peace Plan13Spain: Gonzalez Government Under Fire15

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25 March 1987

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closer to a national election.

the referendums be held.

from outside the party leaderships.

Andreotti Abandoning Bid To Form Government

ITALY:

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Prime Minister-designate Andreotti's apparent abandonment of his efforts to form a new government will move Italy one step 25X1 25X1 According to press accounts, Andreotti, a Christian Democrat, will return his mandate to President Cossiga today unless the Socialists agree to his proposals for averting the referendums on civilian nuclear energy and judicial reform currently scheduled for 14 June. The Socialists yesterday, however, strongly reiterated their position that 25X1 **Comment:** Cossign prefers to avoid early elections and, over the next few days, may ask another Christian Democrat or a leader of one of the smaller coalition partners to seek to form a government to lead the country until the election scheduled for next year. He could also toy with the idea of forming a government of "technicians" drawn 25X1

Any effort undertaken by Cossiga to preserve the current parliament however, is likely to founder. The Christian Democrats will be reluctant to offer another candidate and will oppose any governing formula that does not involve cancellation of the referendums—their party expects it would suffer embarrassing defeats on both issues. The Socialists, for their part, will continue to insist on holding the referendums and on other demands just as unacceptable to the Christian Democrats.

Should Cossiga conclude he has no choice but to dissolve parliament, as seems likely, the Socialists and Christian Democrats will clash on the leadership of an interim government and over the timing of an election. The Socialists will demand that Prime Minister Craxi remain in office through the election and that the vote be held in late June, allowing him to reap publicity benefits from hosting the Western economic summit in Venice earlier that month. The Christian Democrats will insist that Craxi be replaced by a Christian Democrat, or a national leader such as a Senate President Fanfani, and that the vote be held no later than the end of May to ensure cancellation of the referendums

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25 March 1987

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Status of Insurgency

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Tanzanian troop				
0	ezi River, and si		vean-units.ard	a occu
the major towns	s they captured	last month		
				a lar
number-of-troo	os may be en ro	ute to the tov	wns now occu	
Zimbabweans,	according to US	Embassy rep	oorting	
	een active in no	rthoostorn T	ate and Zamh	ozia
	the past month;			Jezia
	y. The insurgent			
	nd seriously dan			
	ked Zimbabwea			
	inflicting light ca			
Zimbabwean ur	nit into Malawi,		*	
				tingen -
for emergency statements, how negotiations. Comment : Figh Mozambique du November. In a have remained commitment ar hold territory. T supply problem them. A Zimbal likelihood of RE	idering talks with food deliveries to wever, Chissano nting will remain uring the dry sea departure from in liberated town and a lack of conf The Zimbabwean is, however, and owean withdrawa ENAMO reoccup	o the interior has strongly heavy throug ason, which re past practice ns, suggestin idence in the units are vu Harare may al would sign ying those to	. In several re rejected ento and from Apr e, Zimbabwea g an increase Mozambicar Inerable to at soon decide ificantly incre	ecent p ering entral il to an troc ed milit s' abil ttacks to with ease th
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WEST GERMANY-USSR: Visit to Moscow

West German President von Weizsaecker and Foreign Minister Genscher have accepted a Soviet invitation to visit Moscow in early May, according to press reports. Soviet officials earlier claimed they had told West German interlocutors that a presidential visit and a formal apology by Chancellor Kohl for his comparison of General Secretary Gorbachev and Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels last October were necessary before Kohl could visit Moscow or Gorbachev would travel to Bonn,

Comment: Bonn probably believes the invitation is confirmation that Moscow is moving to improve relations after Kohl's speech to the Bundestag last week, even though that address included no apology. The Soviets may continue to show their displeasure, however, by offering no commitment on any visit by Kohl or Gorbachev and giving preferential treatment to other West German leaders such as Genscher, who has strongly praised current Soviet domestic reforms. Both sides will use the visit to express support for an INF agreement and for expanding East-West trade. They also may conclude bilateral agreements on nuclear energy and environmental cooperation

NORDIC STATES: Stalling on Nuclear-Free Zone



Comment: Sweden and Finland will push hard for the working group, which they see as a necessary step toward reaching a consensus on creating a nuclear-free zone. Iceland—the strongest opponent of a zone—will seek to block movement on this issue at least until the Foreign Ministers' meeting in August. The Danes, sensitive to perceptions that the smaller Nordic states are being bullied by their larger partners, will probably support Iceland. If an intergovernmental working group were created, some believe it would only serve to "study the issue to death" while keeping it from the purview of more radical parliamentary committees

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	SRI LANKA: Insurgents Strike Back	
	The largest Tamil insurgent group in Sri Lanka has launched at least five attacks against government installations since Sunday. According te-pressumports, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, have attacked	
,	Army positions on the Jaffna Peninsula, killing at least five soldiers and capturing eight, and 25 Sinhalese villagers are said to have been killed by Tamil militants in the North Central Province. Government spokesmen claim the insurgents are seeking to provoke attacks by	25X1
	security forces.	25X1 25X1
S. Douil -	Comment : The Tamil attacks, probably aided by recent arms deliveries from India, are the first in nearly two months and mark a shift from the insurgents' strategy of "fading away" instead of engaging government forces. Their initial success suggests that the Tigers' capabilities were not seriously hurt by recent government military operations. New Delhi probably hopes to get negotiations	
-[moving again by next-month and will raise objections if Colombo's retaliation causes significant Tamil civilian casualties.	25X1 25X1

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new aircraft will be impossible unless the company gaining the F-8-2 contract installs the package; no other firm will have access to the package's software documentation. FMS rules prevent Beijing from choosing the company to provide the F-8-2 avionics, but the Chinese may hope to encourage a low bid from that firm by suggesting future deals with it.

CHINA-PORTUGAL: Agreement on Macau

Beijing has acceded to Lisbon's request that Macanese and local Chinese entitled to Portuguese citizenship be allowed to hold Portuguese as well as Chinese passports, according to press reports. That issue was the focus of the fourth and final round of negotiations between China and Portugal, which this week produced the agreement to return Macau to Chinese administration on 20 December 1999. Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva reportedly will travel to Beijing next month to sign the joint declaration

Comment: The terms of Macau's transfer are likely to be modeled after the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, but Macau lags far behind Hong Kong in preparations to train local Chinese to administer the territory. The Macau Government will probably implement a program in the interim to facilitate the transfer of administration to local Chinese and Macanese, in part to prevent a flight of Portuguese passport holders to Portugal. China's apparent concession on passports conflicts with its nationality law—citizens of China cannot hold dual nationality—and Beijing probably will recognize the Portuguese passports only as travel documents.



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Top Secret 25 March 1987

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INDIA: Failure of New Space Launch Vehicle

The highly publicized first launch of India's new space booster—the Augmented Space Launch Vehicle—ended in failure yesterday,

Comment: The failure marks another political problem for Prime Minister Gandhi, who attended the launch. It is also a setback for India's space program; the last launch was in April 1983, and the future of the program depends in part on the success of this space vehicle. The new vehicle can carry a payload three times the weight of that carried by India's older booster and is intended to test hardware for India's next-generation, larger launch vehicle. The next launch, carrying a West German multispectral optical sensor, was scheduled for early next year; it now may be delayed.

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25 March 1987

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In Brief	25X1 25X1

	antigovernment protest today, US Embassy reports first such	
	effort by labor since 1983 major demonstrations unlikely, but	
	slum area violence, numerous arrests possible.	25
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	Some violence likely during tóday's strike by Ecuadorean workers	25
	protesting government's austerity measures leftists seeking	
	impeachment of President Febres-Cordero US Embassy-eno-	
	possible target extensive security measures taken.	25
	Large arms cache discovered recently in northern Chile, according	25
	to press includes M-16 ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades	
	same items similarly found last year terrorists may still have	
	significant amounts of hidden arms.	25
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Europe	British Labor leader Kinnock confirms party would keep US	
	missiles pending INF agreement but would remove them within five	
	years statement aimed to reassure leftwingers yet make	
	Kinnock look reasonable during US visit opening tomorrow.	25
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Africa	South African railworkers' strike spreading now involves	25
	11,000 blacks bombing at Soweto train station Monday	20
	apparently strike-related Pretoria's authorization of summary	
	dismissals may provoke clashes with security forces.	25
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	Uganda last week agreed to broad World Bank, IMF reform	
	package, according to US Embassy Kampala unlikely to meet 🔨	~
	terms of accord as political, security situations deteriorate.	25
		25
	on 28 March	
Terrorism	Bomb blast Monday in Lahore, Pakistan, killed six, injured 52,	25
	according to US. Consulate there target was meeting of anti-	
	Shia Sunni fundamentalists no evidence of Afghan involvement	
	incident will increase local Shia-Sunni tensions.	25
	Tunisian arrested for bombing Djibouti restaurant frequented by	
	French soldiers may have been recruited by radical Palestinian	
	group it has ties to Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction,	
	whose terrorist leader remains jailed in Paris.	25

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25 March 1987

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Key Provisions of the Current Contadora Draft Treaty and the Arias Peace Plan

Contadora	Arias
Entrance into force	
Officially would take effect when ratified by all five Central American countries but would prohibit actions that would "frustrate" the purpose of the treaty in the interim.	Upon signature by the five Central American countries.

Verification

Would create a Verification and Control Commission on security matters (VCC) made up of four members proposed by the Contadora mediators and approved by each Central American country.

National reconciliation

Calls for democratic, representative, pluralistic political systems in accordance with national laws. Would guarantee equal conditions for all political parties to participate in election, with guaranteed access to mass media. Would create commission consisting of the Secretaries General of the UN and the OAS and Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group and the Support Group. Each country facing an armed insurgency is to form a National Commission for Reconciliation and Dialogue consisting of representatives from the government, the internal political opposition, the Catholic Church, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Within six months, the Central American Presidents are to meet to evaluate progress in executing the treaty.

Upon signature, parties in conflict in each country are to begin a cease-fire. Each government is to begin a dialogue with all unarmed internal opposition groups and increase the democratic, representative, and pluralistic nature of its political system. Within 60 days, governments are to declare a general amnesty for insurgents and political prisoners; to restore freedoms of association, assembly, and speech; and to guarantee free access to mass media. During the first six months of next year, each government is to hold free, open, and democratic elections to choose representatives to a new regional parliament and, after that, equally free elections for positions at all levels of government in accordance with existing election schedules.

Ceilings on arms and troops

Treaty unclear on exact timing but apparently upon signature would require the five Central American countries to begin negotiations to determine "reasonable" levels of arms and troops. After ratification, parties apparently must suspend all military purchases except ammunition and spare parts. Within 60 days, the VCC would suggest limits and a schedule for reductions. If agreement is not reached, the VCC's proposals are to be implemented and, over a long term, restrictions on foreign military advisers, bases, and exercises are to be lifted. Within 60 days of signing, the five Central American governments are to begin negotiations on the control and reduction of their current weapons inventories and on the number of their military forces.

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Top Secret 25 March 1987

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Key Provisions of the Current Contade Draft Treaty and the Arias Peace Plan	ora (Continued)
Contadora	Arias
External support for insurgents	
Would prohibit all political, military, financial, and logistic assistance to groups seeking the removal or destabilization of other governments. Would direct each government to devote all available means to deny such groups use of its territory. (No time period stipulated.)	Upon signature, all external aid to insurgents in the region is to end. Each government is to reaffirm its commitment not to provide safehaven or military assistance of any kind to groups trying to destabilize other countries.
Military exercises	
Would suspend all international military exercises for 90 days after final ratification. Would allow one exercise per year until the parties agree on limitations on arms and military forces, after which exercises with forces from outside Central America would be prohibited. Only minor restrictions on national exercises. Controls would be lifted if an arms limitation agreement were not reached.	Not covered.
Foreign military and security advisers	
Would eliminate all foreign military advisers within 180 days of signing. The VCC is to propose limits on the number of technical advisers to be permitted in the future. Controls are to be lifted if an arms limitation agreement is not reached.	Not covered.
Foreign Bases	
Would eliminate all foreign military bases and foreign military schools within 180 days of signing and prohibit the establishment of new ones. Controls would be lifted	Not covered.
if an arms limitation agreement were not reached.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Top Secret 25 March 1987

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Contadora-and-Nicaraguan-Maneuvering	
The Contadora Group has already issued a communique praising some elements of the Arias plan as beneficial to the broader peace process.	25X1 25X1 25X1
The Sandinistas initially were wary of the plan, probably because they were excluded from the early negotiations. In recent weeks, however, Managua has announced it will attend the meeting in Guatemala and would accept several key provisions of the proposal—including dialogue with the unarmed domestic opposition and freedom of the press—if it were integrated into the Contadora process.	25X1

Outlook

The Core Four will probably try to negotiate a united position in the coming weeks in an effort to counter Contadora and Nicaraguan maneuverings. To hold the initiative at least until the five Central American presidents meet in Guatemala, Arias is likely to pay greater attention to Honduran and Salvadoran security concerns, but he probably will not allow changes that would obviously give the Sandinistas an excuse to reject the plan. Moreover, the Gore Four presidents' longstanding fear of appearing to be too closely allied with the US and of appearing to be obstructing the peace process will kinder their ability to take a tough stand against Nicaragua.

President Ortega's public offer last week to drop Nicaragua's objections to US military bases and exercises in Central America long a sticking point in the Contadora negotiations—is a sign that the Sandinistas are again trying to portray the Core Four's demands as the sole obstacles to a settlement. In addition to scoring propaganda points, Managua-probably-hopes that a reinvigorated Contadora process would complicate US efforts to continue providing-military aid-te-the Contras and that it would also stave off what it sees as the possibility of direct US military-intervention. 25X1

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25 March 1987

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25 March 1987

	Special Analysis	
SPAIN:	Gonzalez Government Under Fire	X
	For the first time in his five-year tenure, Spain's Socialist Prime Minister Gonzalez faces widespread popular discontent over social and economic policies. He remains strong politically, but local elections scheduled for this spring may prompt him to use the negotiations with the US on use of bases in Spain to score points with the public and to retain the support of his increasingly restless left wing.	25X1 25X1
	The prudent economic policies of Gonzalez have served Spain well since the Socialists came to power in 1982. Inflation fell from 14.4 percent in 1982 to 8.3 percent in 1986; the current account has improved from a deficit of more than \$4 billion to a surplus of \$5 billion; and Spain's 3-percent economic growth rate is its best since 1978, exceeding the EC average. Gonzalez has also increased foreign confidence—more than doubling foreign investment in the country last year.	25X1
	These gains have not come without cost. Spain has an unemployment rate of more than 21 percent, the highest in Western Europe. Moreover, improvements in education and health care under Gonzalez have been slower than some would like.	25X1
	Mounting Discontent	
	Until recently, the public has accepted the government's policies as necessary to solve Spain's economic problems, but the relative domestic calm is ending. High school students staged a series of strikes over the past three months that ended with the government giving in to demands for lower tuitions and more scholarships. Farmers and workers have subsequently attacked the government's plans for restructuring the agricultural and industrial sectors and maintaining tight control over wages. Doctors, teachers, transportation workers, and miners are also expressing their discontent with the government's performance.	25X1
	More worrisome for Gonzalez are the indications of dissension within Socialist ranks. some party members are criticizing him for failing to push social reforms more vigorously and for remaining aloof from the rank and file. Although the Socialists' labor affiliate refused to join the recent Communist- backed worker demonstrations, it has begun to distance itself from the government's anti-inflation policies, chiding the Finance Minister for his efforts to restrict wages	25X1 25X1
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The growing restiveness is also reflected in recent opinion polls. Some 79 percent of Spaniards believe that unemployment has worsened this year, although the rate of joblessness actually has fallen slightly. The public is pessimistic about other social issues as well, including terrorism, drugs, and health care. Such discontent could deepen if the police overreact in their effort to control demonstrations.

Gonzalez, Strong but Vulnerable

Despite the growing dissatisfaction with his policies, Gonzalez remains personally popular, and the opposition divided and weak. Polls suggest that if a national election were held tomorrow, the Socialists would almost certainly win. For a party not used to being on the receiving end of protests, the recent demonstrations nonetheless must have had a sobering effect, particularly with regional and municipal elections to be held in June.

	Gonzalez probably		
also fears that former Prime Minister Suarez—whose nationalist and			
populist rhetoric is increasingly appealing to center-left voters-will			
be the net beneficiary of any gene	eral unrest and fissures among the		
Socialists.			

Implications

Despite a generally favorable economic outlook for this year, Gonzalez is unlikely to alter his policies significantly because he is strongly committed to preparing Spanish business to face EC competitors. Instead, he may use foreign policy issues to deflect criticism of his domestic policies and to solidify his base of support among left and center voters in the runup to the June elections. Gonzalez may, for example, play up his government's promise of large reductions in US forces by publicly highlighting differences with Washington—a tactic that could further limit Madrid's maneuvering room in the bases negotiations.

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16

25 March 1987

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