



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

~~**Top Secret**~~




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National Intelligence Daily

**Friday
17 April 1987**



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Defiance of Authority by Argentine Military



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
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ARGENTINA:



Army Mutineers Challenge Alfonsin

An Army regiment in Cordoba is harboring an active-duty officer who refuses to testify on human rights violations; President Alfonsin has ordered military police to arrest the officers involved.

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~~Officers of the Army's III Corps in Cordoba Wednesday declared local control of an airborne regiment to protect a colleague who refused to testify in civilian court hearings on human rights violations;~~

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About 17 officers are involved, including some assigned to other III Corps units, and they are supported by other officers posted throughout the Army. According to the press, the III Corps commander and other senior military leaders have tried unsuccessfully to persuade the mutineers to surrender, forcing Alfonsin to direct federal police to cordon off the regiment and to send in Army police to stand by to arrest them on his order. ~~at least three and possibly four additional Army regimental commanders probably have promised to grant asylum to officers who refuse to report to civilian courts.~~

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Thousands rallied outside the National Congress building yesterday to denounce the military's actions. Alfonsin and other political leaders may travel to Cordoba to deal directly with the mutineers.

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Comment: This first instance of overt defiance of judicial authority by an active-duty officer challenges both the civilian leadership and the military high command. The rebellious officers probably hope to force Alfonsin to end the human rights trials by declaring an amnesty for military personnel. The President, however, will be reluctant to make such a politically unpopular move before the Congressional elections in September unless he has legislative backing from both his own party and the Peronist opposition.

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Declaration of a state of siege endorsed by Congress, however, would send a strong signal to the military that the Alfonsin administration enjoys broad support and that the mutineers would be politically isolated if they move against the government. Alfonsin probably would prefer a peaceful settlement rather than resorting to force, but he may have to act quickly to prevent other Army units from taking similar actions and to preserve the government's authority.

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Sino-Indian Border Dispute



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CHINA-INDIA:

Possible Chinese Action

China may be preparing to provoke isolated incidents along the Indian border to portray New Delhi as the aggressor; New Delhi is likely to react strongly to even a minor provocation.




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
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A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman on Wednesday rejected Indian accusations of border intrusions and reiterated claims that New Delhi is occupying large tracts of Chinese territory.



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
~~In discussions with a senior US diplomat in Beijing on Wednesday,~~ a Chinese Foreign Ministry official expressed pessimism that negotiations would result in Indian troop withdrawals and stated that China would have few options but to resume patrolling the disputed area, although Chinese troops would not fire first. He predicted that China would not be ready to return to the negotiating table until the second half of the year.



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
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The Chinese Ambassador to India will leave for Beijing shortly, ~~according to the US Embassy in New Delhi.~~ His scheduled replacement, the current Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, is not expected to report to New Delhi soon, ~~according to the US Embassy in Kathmandu. The Embassy in Nepal noted that~~ the replacement is an expert on border issues, especially the Chinese-Indian border.



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Comment: The Chinese Foreign Ministry official's reference to new patrolling—and lack of interest in immediate negotiations—suggests that Beijing may move to increase tensions. The departure of the Chinese Ambassador from New Delhi at this time sends another signal of rising tensions, but the intention to send a border expert later indicates Beijing eventually hopes for a negotiated settlement.



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Beijing may choose to begin aggressively patrolling Indian-controlled areas near the Chinese outpost on Wangdung Ridge. This probably would be intended to draw Indian troops into a provocation that China could use to portray India as the aggressor and to demonstrate to New Delhi Beijing's resolve in seeking an Indian withdrawal from forward positions.



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DIA Comment: There is no evidence to indicate Beijing desires hostilities on the Sino-Indian border. Beijing has emphasized its wish to settle the border dispute through negotiations, a position reiterated in the 16 April meeting with US diplomats, although it does warn that hostilities are possible if a peaceful solution is not found. There is no evidence of any troop movements to reinforce its exposed position in the disputed sector, where Chinese forces are badly outnumbered, and Beijing is unlikely to provoke hostilities without being ready to cope with Indian retaliation. Forces garrisoned in the area are not sufficient to counter a large Indian response, and it would take approximately three weeks to move additional forces into the region, not including acclimatization of the troops to the high altitude. Any hostilities before the summer monsoons are therefore unlikely. If Beijing chooses to increase patrolling, it would send a signal that New Delhi might regard as provocative but would not necessarily represent a deliberate effort to precipitate an incident.



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KUWAIT: Progress Toward Protecting Shipping

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The Kuwait Oil Tanker Company is moving rapidly to implement its plan to protect shipping in the Persian Gulf. According to the US Embassy, an initial inspection of the three ships that will be put under the US flag identified few problems. [Redacted]
China will probably provide one to three tankers as a token gesture. France has no tankers available to lease and does not want Kuwaiti ships under the French flag. [Redacted]

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Comment: Kuwait is eager to finish the reflagging inspections. It probably expects the US to overlook minor deficiencies in the Kuwaiti ships. Although local officials were hopeful that all five permanent UN Security Council members would participate directly in protecting Gulf shipping, the absence of France will not impede Kuwait's strategy. Kuwait has agreed to lease three ships from the USSR; a similar agreement with the UK is being negotiated. US offers of assistance continue to win praise from Gulf leaders. [Redacted]

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Shevardnadze on Costs

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told Soviet party members in East Berlin last month, [redacted] Moscow's international prestige would suffer unless the Soviet presence in Afghanistan were reduced in the near future. He said that Soviet military involvement was costly and that troops should be withdrawn, but only after Soviet civilian advisers had been recalled to allow the Kabul government to become more independent. He claimed Moscow would agree to the establishment of a neutral Afghanistan.

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Comment: Shevardnadze's remarks accord with many recent statements by Soviet officials that Moscow is increasingly concerned about the various costs of involvement in Afghanistan and intends to end or reduce it. He and other Soviets, however, have told Pakistan and the US that any political compromise will have to be built around the current regime and that, without such a settlement, the Soviets will stay the course. The Kabul regime would be unable to survive a Soviet withdrawal in the near term. [redacted]

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


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
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
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MAURITANIA-MOROCCO: Friction Growing

The dispute over Western Sahara may lead to a realignment of Mauritania's foreign policy and the fall of President Taya.

[Redacted]

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The US Embassy in Nouakchott says senior Mauritanian officials are concerned that Morocco will try to occupy the Western Saharan town of Guera, currently held by Mauritanian troops. Nouakchott says it will use force to resist Moroccan encroachments.

[Redacted]

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Comment: Taya's two-year-old regime had favored Morocco rather than the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas challenging Rabat for control of Western Sahara. An attempt by Morocco to seize Guera, which is near Mauritania's principal economic center of Nouadibou, might force Taya to seek military support from Algeria and the Polisario. Mauritania has no capability to confront Morocco militarily.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

POLAND: Shakeup in Leadership

Warsaw announced yesterday several leadership changes intended to revitalize its stalled economic reform program. Zdzislaw Sadowski, chairman of an important economic advisory commission, replaced Zbigniew Gertych as Deputy Premier. Janusz Pawlowski was named to succeed labor minister Stanislaw Gebala, and Aleksander Legatowicz, who is not a Communist Party member, was appointed to the State Council. Both Sadowski and Legatowicz are members of the Social Consultative Council, an advisory body created by General Jaruzelski last year to air alternative views.

[Redacted]

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Comment: Sadowski, the new Deputy Premier, is a longtime proponent of reform who earlier this month announced broad new reform proposals being considered by the regime. He was brought in to overcome resistance to reforms within the Council of Ministers. In appointing Legatowicz—a leading lay Catholic activist—Jaruzelski is the first Bloc leader to heed Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's injunction to appoint competent people irrespective of party membership. The appointment of Sadowski and Legatowicz to top policymaking positions increases the legitimacy and influence of the Consultative Council. Legatowicz's elevation may also be a further signal of the regime's willingness to entertain the Catholic Church's calls to broaden the political dialogue; it could serve to isolate opposition figures not willing to work within the system.

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CHINA-UK-HONG KONG: Harsh Words From Deng

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Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping yesterday cautioned the joint Chinese-Hong Kong committee, which is drafting Hong Kong's future constitution, that any move toward greater democracy in Hong Kong should be implemented gradually to ensure stability. Qualifying Beijing's earlier pledge not to interfere in Hong Kong's internal affairs, Deng asserted that China would reserve the right to intervene in certain unspecified matters. The current meeting of the constitution committee in Beijing is focusing on which Chinese laws will apply to Hong Kong after 1997, a subject of controversy in the territory.

[Redacted]

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Comment: Deng probably wants to warn the British to move cautiously with their plans to introduce greater democracy. Beijing views such plans, which are expected to be announced next month, as interference in the drafting of the constitution. Although Deng affirmed that Hong Kong would retain its current political and economic system, perhaps even beyond the 50 years guaranteed in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, his statement implying possible Chinese interference may create new unease in Hong Kong's business community. Deng also may have been playing to Chinese Communist Party traditionalists who have never been entirely happy with the Hong Kong agreement.

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In Brief

USSR

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East Asia

South Korean police anticipating student demonstrations this weekend marking student revolt that overthrew Syngman Rhee . . . Seoul appears confident it can prevent large rallies . . . cancellation of constitutional revision may spark violence.

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Deng Xiaoping hinting Zhao Ziyang will be confirmed as **China's** party chief next fall . . . says Zhao cannot continue as both premier, acting party chief and that party position more important . . . no word on choice for premier

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Near East

Pakistani F-16 yesterday downed **Afghan** SU-22 that had penetrated Pakistani territory, according to US Embassy in Islamabad . . . pilot may have bailed out over Pakistan . . . second Afghan plane downed in less than three weeks

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Europe

Technical problems with **UK's** new air-launched antiradiation missile delaying entry into service until late 1988 . . . follows delays, cost overruns on Tornado radar and loss of Nimrod AWACS . . . reportedly shaking confidence in technical capabilities.

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Norwegian Parliament reaffirms policy on naval ship visits . . . leftist motion for no-nuclear-weapons declaration rejected . . . government will continue to assume ships do not carry nuclear weapons . . . no effect on US policy.

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Africa

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Contending Militias in Southern Lebanon

Militia	Leader	Objective
Amal	Nabih Barri	Maintain position as strongest militia in the south, remove Army of South Lebanon, avoid major increase in Israeli presence, keep ties to Syria, prevent Palestinian buildup in refugee camps.
Hizballah	Shaykh Fadlallah	Develop stronger infrastructure in south, attack Israeli targets inside security zone and Israel itself, help Palestinians.
Fatah	Yasir Arafat	Rebuild presence in south, especially around Sidon and Tyre, attack Israel.
Popular Nasirite Organization	Mustafa Saad	Defend Sunni Muslim interests in Sidon, maintain close ties to Palestinians.
Army of South Lebanon	Antoine Lahad	Defend Christian interests in southern Lebanon, weaken Shias and Palestinians, maintain close ties to Israel.

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LEBANON:

Shias Move South

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[Redacted] fighters, while still defending their stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs, have also sought to escape the Syrian intervention by moving south. Their competition with Amal for the support of the local Shia population will raise the general level of violence. [Redacted]

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A leadership struggle in the south has plagued Amal's attempts to restore its position and wrest support from Hizballah, eroding Barri's power. The US Embassy in Beirut reports Amal's former military commander in the south, Daud Daud, maintains a large and loyal following and continues to challenge Barri's supremacy. The shifting of Barri supporters south will help nullify Hizballah gains. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Hizballah is successfully improving its military and civilian organization and infrastructure. Hizballah leaders claim Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel are now serving in the area; they may be helping Hizballah develop its organization. [Redacted]

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Shias last week killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded two more. The attack is the latest in a surge of Shia violence against Israeli or Israeli-backed forces. Israel has responded to the recent incidents with air and artillery strikes; the Army of South Lebanon is encouraging its men to adopt more ruthless tactics. [Redacted] which will further alienate local Shias. [Redacted]

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

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The greater numbers of Amal-Hizballah fighters in the south will almost certainly provoke more intense Israeli military action to help the Army of South Lebanon. Tel Aviv has refrained from striking at Hizballah support centers in the Bekaa Valley because of concern about US hostages, but Israel will continue to disrupt Hizballah activities in the south.



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As Syrian security forces curtail militia activity in Beirut, both Amal and Hizballah will continue to redirect their efforts to the south. Larger Israeli retaliatory operations there would drive the local populace to support still more anti-Israeli attacks.



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
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Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Dispute in the Aegean



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
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Special Analysis

GREECE-TURKEY: Tension Over the Aegean

Greece and Turkey, shaken by their brush with war last month over mutual misperceptions about exploration for oil in disputed Aegean waters, are taking steps to tone down their rhetoric and to improve communication. Prospects for a solution to the emotional and complex dispute, however, remain slim. The recent flareup underscores the vulnerability of US and NATO bases in the region to Greek-Turkish rivalries.

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Greek and Turkish intransigence regarding their Aegean and Cyprus disputes is such that the possibility of a miscalculation leading to conflict is always present. The risks may even be increasing; although the relationship has been marked for years by alternating periods of crisis and relative calm, tensions have remained high since last summer. The main issues over the past year have been the delineation of the continental shelf, continued militarization of the Greek island of Limnos, designation of air corridors, normalization of Turkish-EC relations, and modernization of Turkish tanks on Cyprus.

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Neither War nor Peace

Greek Prime Minister Papandreou rejects the Turkish demand that Aegean issues be settled in bilateral talks; Ankara is equally set against the Greek proposal to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. An ostensible agreement in the 1970s that tried to combine these approaches foundered because the Greeks wanted to discuss only terms of reference for submitting the issue to the Court while the Turks wanted a bilateral accord that the Court would essentially ratify

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The recent crisis has led to mildly encouraging exchanges between Turkish Prime Minister Ozal and Papandreou about international adjudication, but without substantial outside pressure the talks probably will quickly grind to a halt. Already, hardliners in Ankara appear to be backing down from Ozal's offer to go to the Court, while Papandreou is again hinting strongly that any dialogue must be limited to drawing up terms of reference for international adjudication.

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The Aegean Dispute

Greece argues that history, precedent, and its possession of about 2,800 Aegean islands entitle it to the lion's share of sea, air, and continental shelf rights in the Aegean. Athens finds support for its claims in the 1958 and 1983 Law of the Sea Conventions, which enshrine the principles that nations have a right to a 12-mile territorial sea and that islands have a continental shelf. The Greeks' main fear, in addition to being deprived of the shelf's presumed resources, is that Turkey would eventually parlay any rights to the shelf beneath Greek islands into limits on Greek sovereignty. The Turks contend that the eastern half of the Aegean shelf is a natural prolongation of the Turkish mainland and that a 12-mile territorial sea around Greek islands would effectively cut off the Turkish Aegean coast from the high seas.

Both sides can find ample legal basis to defend their positions credibly, but the Greeks believe that the general thrust of existing law favors them, and they have therefore continued to insist on international adjudication. The Turks have favored trying to resolve the case bilaterally, presumably because they fear they would be shortchanged by the International Court.



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
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
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Turkey's application to the EC may provide the next flashpoint in Aegean relations. Papandreou will doubtless use the threat of blocking Turkey's entry into the EC—which is fraught with difficulties even without Greece's opposition—to press Ankara for agreement to international adjudication or other major concessions. Ozal may have broached the idea of going to the Court as a maneuver in preparation for Ankara's EC bid. The combination of domestic political pressures and the two sides' inherent inflexibility, however, may lead them to another major confrontation, particularly if the Turks see Athens as the sole obstacle to EC membership.




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Implications for the US and NATO




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Athens apparently still wants to negotiate a new base agreement to replace the one expiring next year, but Papandreou's distrust of the US executive branch and the latest Greek-Turkish flareup will incline Athens to take a particularly tough line on control of the bases and of US activities on them. Moreover, the Greeks will probably insist on explicit assurances by the US to maintain the military balance in the region and on a substantial increase in aid to guard against US circumvention of the traditional, Congressionally mandated 7-to-10 ratio of US military assistance to Greece and Turkey, respectively.



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Ankara, meanwhile, has responded to growing domestic outrage over US Congressional efforts to cut back and to condition aid to Turkey by suspending implementation of the recently renewed defense cooperation agreement—pending an "improvement" in relations. This decision will not affect the current level of US military operations in Turkey, but, if Ankara believes the US has not sufficiently addressed its concerns, it might lead to the blocking of further military cooperation as provided in the new accord or ultimately to its renegotiation.



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
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
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Special Analysis

CHAD-FRANCE: Continued Military Dependence

N'Djamena remains dependent on massive US and French assistance in its effort to drive the Libyans out of Chad, despite the bonanza of Libyan equipment recently captured. Supply lines are lengthening as the action moves farther north, and foreign material and logistic support—crucial to Chadian victories at Fada and Oaudi Doum—will become critical as Chad begins its offensive to recapture the Tibesti region and the Aozou Strip.



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Nearly all of Chad's military budget comes from external sources, and combat, severe environmental conditions, and long supply routes take a heavy toll on N'Djamena's equipment, sustaining the demand for more. The US Embassy reports that Chad needs additional heavy trucks, spare parts, technical services, ammunition, and fuel to conduct operations in Tibesti and to preserve gains in the north.



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France delivered to Chad almost \$82 million worth of equipment and supplies, including antitank weapons and transport vehicles, before the attack on Oaudi Doum. France continues to maintain bases at Bir Kalait and Abeche that provide mechanical and medical services to Chadians at the front. French technicians at Bir Kalait repair captured equipment,



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N'Djamena will be able to use some of the vehicles, ammunition, and light arms left by the retreating Libyans, that the government lacks the support facilities, trained personnel, ammunition, and spare parts to take advantage of captured armor. Chad hopes to move the Libyan tanks and armored cars to N'Djamena for display and to defend strategic points in the capital, according to the defense attache, and may seek training from Egypt and Iraq.



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Chad will become increasingly dependent on French logistic support during the planned offensive in Tibesti. The French were heavily involved in rapidly airlifting equipment, fuel, and supplies to Chadian bases along the 16th parallel before the attacks on Fada and Oaudi Doum. Chad's new US-supplied C-130 transport aircraft will give it only limited airborne resupply capabilities, and the French may increase resupply sorties to Siltou—a Chadian convoy staging area 144 miles (90 kilometers) above the 16th parallel. Despite his heavy dependence on the French, Habre appears determined to proceed with his planned offensive to take Aozou, even though French opposition to such a move may slow resupply and push back his timetable for a full-scale offensive.



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Special Analysis

SOUTH KOREA:

New Focus on Succession

South Korea's President Chun appears to be linking his abrupt abandonment of constitutional revision to public efforts to suggest that ruling party chairman Roh Tae Woo will succeed him, but informed opinion in Seoul is skeptical that Chun has settled on a successor. Opposition politicians are obviously off balance because of Chun's postponement of constitutional reform, but security officials and other Korean observers believe his action has increased the chance of organized protests this spring. Progovernment media efforts to portray US support for Chun's action make it likely that any protests will have an anti-US cast.




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The press is giving wide play to Chun's commitment to make other "reforms," including changes in the election law and the basic press law, and to hold a convention of the ruling party in June to select a presidential candidate, but many in Chun's camp and in the opposition remain deeply skeptical of his intentions. Some members of the ruling party have told the US Embassy that Chun's haste in taking action may scuttle Roh's chances, despite stories in the progovernment press promoting Roh as a "shoo-in" to succeed Chun.




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The manner in which Chun scrapped constitutional revision has reinforced these doubts. contacts of the Embassy report Chun's decision to act now was closely held. Only a few around Chun—not including Roh—evidently were privy to his thinking.



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If Chun wants to maintain political influence after 1988, electing a new president under the current Constitution would make it more difficult for him to do so. Without a declaration by the new president that he would serve a shortened term, the new leader would serve seven years and wield virtually unfettered authority. Under those circumstances, Roh's personal following in the military and his reputation as a leader would make him less attractive to Chun than other choices such as Prime Minister Lho Shin Yong, who is susceptible to manipulation by Chun.



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Zeroing in on the Opposition's Disarray

The breakup of the main South Korean opposition party last week appears to have accelerated the timing of Chun's move. According to the Embassy, many South Koreans view Chun's action as a step to prevent opposition leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung from using constitutional revision to rally their forces. [redacted]

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[redacted] the government is trying to hinder the new party's efforts to organize by harassing the party's members and by attempting to undercut Kim Young Sam through public smears. [redacted]

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Chun's decision was accompanied by an intensified crackdown on his opponents, including the "indefinite" house arrest of Kim Dae Jung, which has isolated him from virtually all outsiders. Press reports say the government is again arresting dissidents and has ordered riot police to prevent demonstrations. [redacted]

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Internal squabbling in the new opposition party is aiding the government's efforts. [redacted]

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backers of Kim Dae Jung are clashing with Kim Young Sam's more moderate faction over whether to admit dissidents groups into the new party. [redacted]

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Turbulence Ahead

Public reaction to Chun's move—including a thinly veiled rebuke by Catholic prelate Cardinal Kim—suggests there will be more antigovernment activities. The US Consul in Pusan reports the move will probably increase the turnout at coming student protests. The security services are worried about the potential for domestic turmoil. [redacted]

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The government's attempt to suggest that the US supported Chun's decision seems likely to aggravate anti-US sentiments. The Consulate in Pusan reports dissident activists and radical students have voiced suspicion of Washington's role. The new opposition party is likely to shy away from a strategy that centers on street rallies, fearing its vulnerability to charges by the government that it was responsible for clashes between protesters and riot police. [redacted]

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