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**Directorate of
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Sudan's
Political Parties

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A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

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Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
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NESA [ ]

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Sudan's Political Parties

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Summary

Information available as of 6 July 1987 was used in this report.

Sudan's return to parliamentary government in 1986 after nearly two decades of military-dominated rule marks the country's third attempt at pluralistic democracy since independence in 1956. Multiparty governments in the 1950s and 1960s failed to effectively address Sudan's national problems. They worsened the country's sectarian, tribal, ethnic, and regional divisions, and in periods of crisis the Sudanese willingly accepted takeovers by strong military leaders.

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Long out of power, Sudan's party leaders have again created a domestic political scene marked less by accomplishment than by party rivalries and haggling over political spoils. The political system remains fragmented. Returns from the election in April 1986 gave no party a decisive victory and showed that no party can claim a national constituency. A Cabinet shuffle in June 1987 removed several troublesome or ineffective ministers from the government but did not end party rivalries or improve the government's ability to address Sudan's massive problems.

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The centrist coalition under Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi is an uneasy patchwork of contending parties and political rivals:

- Sadiq's Umma Party, dominant in rural central and western Sudan, has roots in the country's largest Muslim sect, the Ansar. The Prime Minister is both the head of the party and the leading figure in the sect. Sadiq and a small group of personal advisers maintain tight control over the party. The Umma favors compromise legislation on the status of non-Muslims under Islamic law but opposes a secular state. The party supports populist economic measures such as subsidies and opposes dismantling the statist measures enacted by former President Nimeiri. In foreign policy the Umma advocates a nonaligned position that includes trying to get along with Libyan leader Qadhafi.

- The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sadiq's principal coalition partner, has roots in the Khatmiyyah Muslim sect, which is almost as large as its historic Ansar rival. The Khatmiyyah sect draws support from urban businessmen, intellectuals, and wealthy farmers in northern and eastern Sudan and has a significant number of adherents in Sudan's officer corps. Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani is both the sect leader and party patron. The DUP does not radically differ from the Umma on domestic issues, although its friendlier attitude toward its Egyptian patron and the

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United States creates tension. The DUP's determination to check Prime Minister Sadiq's efforts to centralize power and its internal divisions and antagonistic factions tend to make the party a disruptive, unreliable coalition partner.

- The third element in the ruling coalition is a bloc of Assembly members from five southern parties and the Sudan National Party (SNP), which represents the Nuban tribesmen of southern Kurdufan. Initially numbering 38 legislators, the bloc's size has diminished as several of the southern parties have split internally over the Prime Minister's policies for administering the south. With the exception of the SNP, none of these parties have a significant popular base. Participation in the coalition by some members of the southern parties allows Sadiq to project the image of a truly national government and provides him with the guise of imposing decisions such as the recent reorganization of the south's political administration. The parties also could help him retain a majority in the Assembly if the DUP bolts from the coalition, but they are unreliable partners—suspicious of the northern Muslims and distrustful of Sadiq. They want a secular state, a federal system that would enhance regional autonomy, and a stronger African identity for Sudan.

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The parliamentary opposition includes the National Islamic Front—a significant political force representing the extreme religious right—and the Communists—whose fortunes have declined steadily since the 1960s when the Sudan Communist Party was the largest and best organized Communist party in Africa:

- The National Islamic Front's (NIF) strong third-place showing in the 1986 election reflects its superior leadership, organization, and funding. The party is the political arm of the largest Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood faction. Both the faction and the party are under the leadership of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. The NIF, which has long opposed the domination of Sudanese politics by the leaders of the traditional Muslim sects, has shown it can stir up trouble in the streets. The party platform calls for an Islamic state that respects the rights of non-Muslims; favors a private sector within an Islamic economy; and backs strong ties to the West, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

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- The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) won only three seats in the Assembly in 1986. It has no significant popular base and draws support mainly from trade unionists and intellectuals in the major northern cities. Divided between pragmatic party leader Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud and the more militant party newspaper editor Ali al-Tijani al-Tayyib, the SCP generally cooperates with the Sadiq government. The party poses no threat in the Assembly and only a moderate covert threat in the near term. The SCP espouses a secular state, supports subsidies, opposes privatization, condemns austerity measures mandated by the International Monetary Fund, is critical of the United States, and is wary of both Egypt and Libya.

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Several other important groups on the Sudanese political scene exist outside the parliamentary system:

- The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)—the political arm of the major southern insurgent group, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army—prevented voting in more than half of the constituencies in the south in 1986. The SPLM does not recognize the legitimacy of the Sadiq government and has continued its insurgent attacks in the hope of maintaining pressure on the government by straining both financial resources and military loyalty. Led by former Sudanese military officer Dr. John Garang and supported by Ethiopia, the SPLM claims to seek a secular, unified, federal, democratic, and socialist Sudan. Historical distrust between north and south along with issues such as the status of Islam and revenue and power sharing make prospects for negotiations and resolution of the southern insurgency dim.

- Sudan's Ba'thists, the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, won no seats in the Assembly in 1986 and have virtually no popular following, although their pan-Arab ideology is attractive to some young military officers. They are split between Iraqi-supported and Syrian-backed factions and depend on their respective country patrons for funding. The Ba'thists, like the Communists, view the Sadiq government and the current political system as conducive to their growth. Their domestic policies are similar to those of the Communists, but their foreign policy positions are colored by the policies favored by their patrons.

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- The Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, which are viewed by most Sudanese as Libyan surrogates, did not take part in the 1986 election and have refused to participate in the democratic process. They have little popular following and are factionalized, but they represent a pool of potential terrorists and subversives susceptible to Libyan direction. 25X1

The outlook for stable, multiparty democratic government in Sudan is bleak. Despite Prime Minister Sadiq's evident good intentions, Sudanese increasingly question the government's legitimacy because its decisionmaking capability is consistently undermined by interparty and intraparty infighting. Opposition activity by northern groups, tempered in the recent past by the fear of triggering a military takeover, is likely to increase in the next year as the government's paralysis becomes more obvious. If the coalition government fails to develop effective leadership, civil unrest in Khartoum—including the prospect of clashes involving party militias—or a further major deterioration in the security situation in the south would set the stage for an Army takeover and the return of military-dominated rule.

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Figure 1
Selected Sudanese Tribal Groups[a]

a Authoritative sources acknowledge 56 groups comprising 597 tribes in Sudan.

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The centrist government formed in May 1986 under Umma Party and Ansar sect leader Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi marks the third Sudanese effort to build a parliamentary democracy since independence in 1956. The overthrow of the 16-year authoritarian regime of President Nimeiri in 1985 paved the way for the return of political parties and the pluralistic democracy that has remained the ideal for Sudan's elite since the end of British rule.

Party and personal rivalries have undermined the decisionmaking capability and political stability of Sudan's democratic regimes, which have ruled the country for only eight of the past 31 years. The multiparty governments have failed to foster national unity in the face of Sudan's sectarian, tribal, ethnic, and regional divisions. During periods of crisis under these earlier parliamentary governments, most Sudanese have willingly accepted takeovers by strong military leaders. In 1958 civilian leaders invited the Army to take control, and in 1969 Gaafar Nimeiri, then an Army colonel, met little popular resistance when he took power following five years of government paralysis caused by successive weak coalition governments.

President Nimeiri used the ineffectiveness of the multiparty regimes to justify outlawing parties and establishing a one-party state on the Arab socialist model. He first moved against the Muslim sectarian parties and the Muslim Brotherhood and later turned against the left after an abortive Communist-backed coup in 1971. A few party leaders joined Nimeiri's Sudan Socialist Union, but many others joined opposition fronts abroad or were imprisoned at home.

By the late 1970s, Nimeiri's domestic support had eroded as he became more autocratic and erratic. In April 1985 senior military officers ousted him in the midst of massive demonstrations triggered by price increases. The interim military regime inherited a grim legacy. Sudan's economy was in a shambles, and an insurgency continued to grow in the south. Nimeiri's controversial decisions in 1983 to divide the south into three separate regions and to impose Islamic civil, criminal, and economic laws throughout Sudan not only fueled the insurgency in the animist and Christian south but further weakened the economy.[1]

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Overwhelmed by the domestic situation, the military acquiesced to popular demands for a freer political atmosphere following the coup. The Transitional Military Council agreed to allow the return of political parties and a free press, to abolish Nimeiri's State Security Organization, to hold free elections, and to turn over power to a democratically elected civilian government within a year.

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Election Results and Coalition Building

Returns from the election in April 1986 indicate that no Sudanese party won a landslide and that no party can claim to have a national constituency. The Sudanese media reported that 73 percent of the eligible population registered to vote and that 11 of the 31 parties that ran in the election won seats in the Constituent Assembly.

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[1] Nimeiri's division of the south into three regions in 1983 violated provisions for a semiautonomous and united south in the Addis Ababa accords of 1972, which ended the first southern rebellion after 17 years. Southerners, moreover, believed that his imposition of Islamic law throughout the country violated the spirit of the 1973 Constitution. Northern Muslims, meanwhile, were upset by Islamic law provisions that meted out harsh punishments such as mutilations for theft and forbade drinking of alcoholic beverages. They also believed that poorly crafted laws that eliminated interest and replaced income taxes with the Muslim *zakat* (tithe) heightened dislocations in the economy.

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Sudanese Politicians on Democracy

"The democracy we are calling for . . . is guided democracy. That is guidance that we are not imposing out of dominance or arbitrariness but rather through channels of mutual understanding among the various political forces. The only alternative to failure in the democratic system is descent into the abyss of dictatorship and national fragmentation."

Sadiq al-Mahdi
Prime Minister and president of Umma Party

"Democracy will always and forever be in danger, and it will always be threatened as long as [Sudan is] at this level of economic, social, and political backwardness."

Bakri Ahmad Adil
Minister of Education, Umma Party

"The weak performance of parliamentary life threatens democracy."

Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud
Secretary General, Sudan Communist Party

"There will not be anything threatening democracy if all the people stand up for the good of the nation,

proceed with strong legislation, and call for Islamic law, because, if it were not for the Islamic religion, there would be no morals."

Ahmad Muhammad Ata al-Manan
Assembly member, DUP

"It should be pointed out that military coups represent a constant threat to democratic life, but the experience of the past 16 years and the destruction and ruin they brought have made it difficult for military rule to continue."

Sid Ahmad al-Husayn
Minister of Interior, DUP

"It is not enough to pursue democracy by means of weak patterns, but it requires us to work to deepen these patterns and democratic institutions and link them to the Sudanese citizen's emotions so as to become part of his being, compelling him to consider these institutions as working to safeguard his interests."

Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha
National Islamic Front

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Sudan's two northern Muslim sectarian parties gained the largest number of votes. The Umma Party of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi won a plurality with 100 of 264 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Its historic rival, the Democratic Unionist Party, placed a distant second with 63 seats. The radical Muslim Brotherhood, which ran as the National Islamic Front, finished a strong third with 51 seats. (See appendix A for a more detailed analysis of the election returns.) (

Southern rebel activity prevented voting in over half of the southern constituencies, and the more moderate southern parties filled only 31 of the 68 seats allocated to their region in the Assembly. The Sudan National Party of the Nuban tribe was the only ethnic party to place well, coming in fifth with eight seats. The Beja People's Congress—an ethnic party from the Red Sea Hills in the northeast—took one seat.

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Figure 2. Former Military Council leader Suwar al-Dahab voting in April 1986.

The left made a poor showing, with the Communists winning only three seats and the Ba'th Party failing to win any.

Party infighting delayed the formation of a coalition government for almost a month. US Embassy reporting suggests interparty and intraparty haggling over the distribution of key positions proved more disruptive to coalition building than any major political difference. Following an intense period of negotiations into mid-May, the southern and Nuban bloc joined the Umma and Democratic Unionist parties in forming a centrist coalition that represented about three-quarters of the 264 seats in the Assembly. Excluded from the coalition, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists entered the parliamentary opposition. Southern rebel leaders refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new government.

The Cabinet that emerged in mid-May 1986 reflected the uneasy compromises struck among the coalition partners. Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi assumed the defense portfolio, and Democratic Unionist leader Al-Sharif Zayn al-Hindi became both Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The major parties shared the most sensitive posts. In addition to defense, the Umma took the post of attorney general and the portfolios of finance and planning, energy and mining, agriculture, animal wealth, industry, education, and Cabinet affairs. In addition to foreign affairs, the Democratic Unionists took the portfolios of interior, health, public works and housing, trade, and information. Representatives of four separate southern parties each took one of the less prestigious domestic ministries, and a representative of the National Alliance—a group of unions and parties formed after the coup in 1985—was appointed Minister of Peace and National Constitutional Conference.

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Prime Minister Sadiq had to make additional compromises in the disposition of key government posts. Earlier in May 1986 the Assembly elected Democratic Unionist leader Ahmad al-Mirghani as Chairman of the State Council and de facto head of state. Four other Council posts were split among the major parties and one southern representative. The Umma Party won the coveted post of parliamentary speaker, while one of two positions as deputy speaker was reserved for but not accepted by leaders of the Sudan National Party, according to the US Embassy.

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In May 1987, just two days short of the Cabinet's first anniversary, Sadiq dissolved his government. This move followed criticism by the top military leadership over the government's failure to act decisively in addressing severe economic problems and the southern insurgency, and public accusations by Trade Minister Muhammad Abu Hurayrah (a Democratic Unionist) that some fellow ministers were corrupt. Sadiq's action was supported by the Mirghanis, who wanted Abu Hurayrah removed from office for attempting to undermine the Mirghanis' leadership of the Democratic Unionist Party.

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Constitutional Framework for the New Government

The interim constitution adopted by the caretaker military government in late 1985 provides the guidelines for civilian government until Khartoum adopts a permanent constitution. [a] In the interim constitution, as under the Nimeiri regime, Islam retains its privileged position as the source of law.

The Constituent Assembly elected in April 1986 is unicameral and has 301 seats, of which 28 are set aside for university graduates and the remainder are allotted to geographic districts. The Assembly exercised its power to elect key government officials on 6 May 1986 when it voted for a five-man State Council, the Prime Minister, and the Assembly Speaker. In the event of impeachment, retirement, or the death of these officials, the Assembly has the authority to elect their successors.

In addition, the Assembly passes legislation or can amend the constitution with a two-thirds vote of its membership. Its major responsibility, however, is drafting a permanent constitution, after which it will

transform itself into a parliament within four years. Rebel activity prevented voting in 37 of 68 constituencies in the south during the April 1986 election, and, until elections can be held in these areas, work on a permanent constitution cannot be completed.

The State Council serves as a collective head of state. It is the chief constitutional authority and supreme commander of the armed forces. In the absence of a permanent constitution, the Council shares responsibility with the Assembly for defining legislative procedures. The judiciary is directly responsible to the Council, which appoints judges to staff the country's courts. The Council also has the authority to pardon or commute the sentence of any individual convicted of any offense.

The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are responsible to the Constituent Assembly for conducting the executive and administrative duties of the government. The Prime Minister has the responsibility to make individual appointments to the Council of Ministers who must receive the approval of the State Council. In the event the Prime Minister is traveling abroad or is temporarily incapacitated, he has the authority to designate a minister of his choice as acting Prime Minister.

[a] Prime Minister Sadiq this year tabled more than 100 amendments to the interim constitution to enhance his legislative and judicial powers. His coalition partners and the NIF opposition—both fearing the return of Nimeiri-style authoritarianism—have opposed several of these amendments, claiming that they undercut the checks and balances of the interim constitution. A number of the amendments, however, were passed by the Constituent Assembly in early April. Nevertheless, the NIF pressed Sadiq to make extensive compromises that weakened the powers given to the Prime Minister in the original amendments.

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Following three weeks of negotiations among the political parties—both coalition members and oppositionists—a new Cabinet was formed in early June. The new Cabinet differs little from its predecessor—11 of the original 20 ministers retained their positions, two other ministers assumed new portfolios, and the allocation of portfolios among the parties remained

basically unchanged. Notable differences between the two governments were the removal of Abu Hurayrah as Trade Minister, the withdrawal—for personal reasons—of Democratic Unionist Party Secretary General Hindi from the post of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and the expansion of the Cabinet

Division of Political Posts Among Parties

	Assembly Seats [a]	State Council Seats	Cabinet Members [b]
Total	260	5	20
Umma	100	2	10
Democratic Unionist Party	63	2	7
National Islamic Front	51	0	0
People's Progressive Party	10	0	1
Sudan National Party	8	0	0
Southern Sudan Political Association	7	0	1
Sudan African People's Congress	7	1	0
Independent	6	0	0
Sudan Communist Party	3	0	0
Sudan African Congress	2	0	0
Beja People's Congress	1	0	0
Sudan People's Federal Party	1	0	1
Unaffiliated	1	0	0

[a] Official results of Constituent Assembly elections as reported by the Sudan News Agency on 25 May 1986. Four additional deputies have been seated and several independent deputies have joined political parties since the 25 May tally was released, but these changes have not altered the overall balance within the Assembly.
[b] As of 19 June 1987 four Cabinet seats were unfilled.

from 20 to 24 seats. Sadiq left four Cabinet positions unfilled in an attempt to entice opposition parties, most notably the National Islamic Front, to join the coalition.

Parties in the Coalition

The National Umma Party

The Umma Party's plurality in last year's election reflects its status as the largest Muslim party to reemerge after Nimeiri's overthrow. In contrast to the


Figure 3. Sadiq al-Mahdi on the campaign trail, spring 1986.

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Democratic Unionists, the Umma Party effectively used the grassroots organization of its affiliated religious sect, the Ansars, to encourage voting and ensure that its strength was not diluted by multiple candidates running for the same position. Prime Minister Sadiq stifled opposition from significant factions within the party.

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Base of Support. The Umma has historical roots in the Ansars—Sudan's largest Muslim sect—who are followers of the charismatic religious leader, the Mahdi. In the late 19th century the Mahdi led a successful religious-political movement that united Sudan and temporarily won independence from Egyptian and British rule. Election returns indicate that the Umma's electoral strength came from its traditional areas of support in central and western Sudan.[2]

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[2] The Umma Party had no significant electoral strength outside traditional areas of support in western Sudan, except in Khartoum, according to an academic paper presented at a US Government–sponsored seminar on Sudan in October 1986. When comparing the pattern of Umma support with the most comparable election results in 1953, the paper indicates the party has shifted its base of support westward toward Sudan's border with Chad.

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Sadiq al-Mahdi

Sadiq al-Mahdi combines political and religious leadership as Prime Minister, head of the Umma Party, and the most prominent leader of the Ansar sect. Western observers have noted that he exhibits three distinct political characteristics:

- *A northern Sudanese politician representing the interests of Sudan's Muslim governing elite, he is opportunistic, adept at building short-term coalitions, and contemptuous of Christian/animist southern Sudanese.*

- *The leading candidate for the position of Imam of the Ansars and scion of Sudan's most notable family, he acts as guardian of Sudan's Islamic identity and takes an authoritarian approach to decisionmaking.*

- *Western educated, Sadiq emphasizes to Westerners the secular, democratic, and moderate aspects of his political views. Presenting his positions on issues in well-constructed, rationally based arguments, he has demonstrated an ability to deal comfortably with and impress Westerners.*

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These three characteristics served Sadiq well during his 20 years in Sudan's political wilderness by enabling him to tailor his message to different audiences. In our judgment, however, they have not contributed to his developing a core of principles or policy objectives needed to address Sudan's massive problems, especially the issues of Islamic law and the southern rebellion. Moreover, he has shown a tendency to overestimate his political skills and underestimate the strength of his opposition and the complexity of problems he faces. As a result, he often makes promises he cannot fulfill.

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Sadiq, who is 52, received a degree in economics with honors from Oxford University in the late 1950s. He served as Prime Minister from July 1966 until the following May. During most of 1970-78 he was in exile or imprisoned. With Libyan support, he orchestrated a nearly successful coup against President Nimeiri in 1976. Sadiq reconciled with Nimeiri in 1978 but was jailed during September 1983–December 1984 for criticizing the President's Islamic laws.

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The Ansars still have a strong rural identity in these areas, although over the past 20 years increasing numbers have moved into northern urban areas, according to academic sources. Ansars also have traditionally looked to the Army as a means of upward mobility and represent an estimated 40 percent of the enlisted men in the Sudanese armed forces,

Party Leadership. Sadiq al-Mahdi has strong personal control over the Umma party in his capacity as both head of the party and leading contender for the position of Imam of the Ansar. Embassy sources say that Sadiq has an inner circle of

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25X1

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about 10 loyal advisers, composed mainly of associates and relatives who serve in the Cabinet or perform sensitive party and quasi-governmental duties. Prominent members of this circle include party secretary and Agricultural Minister Umar Nur al-Da'im and Sadiq's cousin Mubarak al-Mahdi, head of the party's foreign affairs committee and Minister of Industry.

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The US Embassy reports that Umma leaders outside of Sadiq's inner circle have criticized his dependence on a narrow set of advisers. Traditionalists in the party have expressed resentment over the influential role played by his wife, Sarah, who was elected to the Umma's General Secretariat in early 1986.

Mahdi family squabbles have threatened party unity in the past and could prove to be a factor in weakening the current regime. Sadiq's uncle, Ahmad, and his first cousin, Wali al-Din, each head an Umma faction. Neither man, in our judgment, poses an imminent threat to party unity, but each has the potential to make trouble. Ahmad—more politically conservative than the Prime Minister—according to US Embassy reporting, claims 20 Umma delegates in the Assembly would be prepared to join him in a new coalition in the event of a major disagreement with Sadiq.

Wali al-Din—considered militant and pro-Libyan by US Embassy sources—has no popular following but could instigate internal clashes between his and Sadiq's followers in the 5,000-man Ansar militia.

Party Platform. Sadiq and his inner circle take primary responsibility for Umma Party policy but remain sensitive to the views of Umma constituents on key issues like Islamic law. Academic specialists stress there is wide support for the abolition of Nimeiri's version of Islamic law among the Umma and other northern Muslim parties but that no Muslim party supports a return to a secular state. The Western-educated Sadiq probably is more liberal than his followers regarding Islamic law, but we believe his status as great-grandson of the Mahdi and the most prominent contender for the long-vacant post of Imam of the Ansars, the support for a new set of Islamic laws by a majority of northern Muslims, and the threat of assassination by religious fanatics will prevent him from advocating a secular constitution.

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US Embassy reporting indicates that Sadiq and other Umma leaders probably are willing to implement more liberal Islamic laws to mollify southern Sudanese and other non-Muslims. Nevertheless, Sadiq's efforts to alter the interim constitution's commitment to Islamic law with a compromise amendment proved so controversial that discussion of the issue was postponed.

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Sadiq's government has sent conflicting signals on the southern insurgency. Umma leaders have sought dialogue with the southern rebels and have openly stated their commitment to hold a constitutional conference that would air national problems and southern grievances. Meanwhile, Sadiq has actively pursued a policy of acquiring arms and training for the armed forces in the hope of maintaining Army morale, decreasing

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Domestic and Foreign Policy of the New Government

Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in late July 1986 made a major policy address to the Constituent Assembly that, given the lack of an official Umma Party platform, remains the broadest expression of both the Umma Party's and the new government's domestic and foreign policy positions. In the domestic area Sadiq called for:

- *Removal of all vestiges of the former Nimeiri regime; support for democracy and building more democratic regional and local government, but maintaining a state of emergency for security reasons.*

- *A peaceful resolution to the southern insurgency, offering to revise foreign treaties in response to rebel demands but emphasizing plans to rearm the armed forces to prevent military defeat; southern demands for a secular state were sidestepped, however, with a statement that Nimeiri's Islamic laws would be replaced by new ones.*

- *Guidelines to cut government spending and increase revenues while proposing price controls on basic commodities and a temporary freeze on all debt repayment; foreign aid would be sought for a new policy of rural development.*

- *Improvements in social welfare—health, education, and labor—and greater controls on refugees and on the activities of foreign voluntary agencies.*

In the foreign policy area, Sadiq underscored Khartoum's commitment to nonalignment and regional cooperation, stressing Sudan's Islamic, Arab, and African heritage and reaffirming and elaborating on the direction taken by the interim regime. These include:

- *Adopting Arab unity as a strategic goal in pursuit of Arab economic and military strength but refraining from forming alliances; support for Palestinian self-determination.*

- *Reformulating the special relationship with Egypt to serve the interests of both countries and establishing a Brotherhood Charter with Saudi Arabia; continuing to develop relations with Libya in the direction of overall Arab unity.*

- *Using the context of the Nile Valley Charter to develop and maintain good ties to Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire; developing West African ties with regard to Chad and Nigeria.*

- *Strengthening relations with both superpowers in the service of national and common interests, while preserving the principle of nonalignment; deepening relations with Western Europe, China, Japan, and the Third World.*

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coup plotting, and gaining military superiority to press the rebels to enter into a dialogue.

In economic policy, US Embassy reporting indicates the Umma leadership has adopted populist positions, including favoring consumer subsidies and opposing major economic austerity measures mandated by the International Monetary Fund that would cause widespread hardship. Sadiq has also called for a freeze on domestic and foreign debt repayment. Umma leaders are moderately supportive of private enterprise, especially of adopting policies that favor their large farmer constituency, but they do not support actions that would significantly alter statist policies adopted under Nimeiri, fearing the consequences could destabilize the government in the short term.

The Umma Party supports a return to the pre-Nimeiri policy of nonalignment and good relations with neighboring states. The US Embassy reports that Umma leaders and almost all other party leaders view this policy as the most pragmatic way for Khartoum to maintain its sovereignty, undercut external support to the southern rebels, and cultivate sources of economic aid.

Umma leaders continue to value the benefits of good ties to the United States and the West, but they oppose a return to the close strategic cooperation with Washington that existed under the Nimeiri regime. Sadiq's request in January 1987 that the United States remove its pre-positioned equipment from Port Sudan highlights concern for maintaining Khartoum's nonalignment. Symbolic of this commitment, Sadiq visited Moscow in August 1986. US Embassy reporting indicates Umma leaders believe Moscow has leverage over Ethiopia—a key supporter of the southern rebels—and view the Soviets as a potential source of aid.

Party leaders favor maintaining the rapprochement with Libya started in April 1985 to prevent Tripoli from renewing its support to the southern rebels and to maintain it as a source of economic and military aid. Libyan leader Qadhafi supported Sadiq when he was in opposition to Nimeiri in the 1970s, and US Embassy reporting indicates Qadhafi contributed substantial funds to Sadiq's 1986 election campaign.

Nevertheless, we believe Sadiq's relationship with Qadhafi is opportunistic and lacks a shared ideology or foreign policy goals.

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Umma leaders view a rapprochement with Ethiopia as crucial to solving the southern insurgency. During Sadiq's meeting with Ethiopian Chairman Haile-Miriam Mengistu in July 1986, however, he failed to reach an agreement to end support to each other's insurgents. The US Embassy indicates Umma leaders are prepared to increase aid to Ethiopian dissidents as a method to press Addis Ababa to come to an agreement. Party leaders favor improving relations with Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire to discourage an escalation in their political and humanitarian support to the southern rebels.

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Sadiq and other party leaders favor redefining the special relationship with Egypt developed under the Nimeiri regime, including the integration charter of 1982. Umma leaders recognize Egypt's strategic importance as a counter to Libyan and other external threats. We believe that Sadiq's visit to Cairo last February and the signing of a Brotherhood Charter reflected pressure from the Army to improve ties to Egypt. Nonetheless, Umma leaders remain suspicious of Cairo's support for their Democratic Unionist coalition partners and continued provision of asylum for Nimeiri. The Umma Party leadership wants to enhance its ties to Saudi Arabia, Sudan's key regional donor. Sadiq visited Riyadh October 1986 and again this July, each time seeking extensive economic and military aid.

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Party leaders want to bring Sudan into the Arab mainstream, including putting distance between Khartoum and the Camp David accords. Sadiq favors maintaining good ties to both moderate and radical Arab and Muslim states so that Sudan can benefit from their aid and, in return, offer its good offices to mediate regional disputes such as the Iran-Iraq war and the Libya-Chad conflict. The Prime Minister used this rationale to justify his visit to Tehran last December to formalize improved ties to Iran while trying to maintain good relations with Iraq.

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Democratic Unionist Party

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) placed a distant second in the April 1986 election because, in our judgment, it lacked the unity, organization, and leadership to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from making inroads into the party's traditional areas of support in northern and eastern Sudan.

Base of Support. The DUP has roots in the Khatmiyyah Muslim sect, which is almost as large as its Ansar rivals. The party's Unionist designation originated in the 1950s when the Ansars supported independence and the Khatmiyyah supported union with Egypt. The DUP draws most of its support from urban intellectuals, wealthy businessmen, and farmers. Academic sources note that a significant number of senior officers in the Sudanese armed forces have a Khatmiyyah background.

Party Leadership. Khatmiyyah sect leader Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani is the party patron, and Al-Sharif Zayn al-Hindi technically heads the DUP. In contrast to previous sect leaders, Mirghani involves himself directly in party affairs, maintaining a tight hold over the party's policies and financial resources. The US Embassy reports the younger and more liberal members of the party oppose Mirghani's direct role, arguing for a real separation of the sect and party leadership.

the June Cabinet shuffle and the resignation in July of one of two DUP members of the State Council were partly the result of increasing challenges to the Mirghanis' hold over the party.

Since the late 1950s when the party first called itself the National Unionist Party (NUP), it has splintered, changed names, reorganized, and reunited several times. Personal squabbles and frictions over sectarian versus nonsectarian leadership have generally caused divisions. The US Embassy reports that the current DUP is a reincarnation of the pre-1969 party. Two major factions united just before the election as a result of pressure from their Egyptian backers. These include Khatmiyyah sect leaders and NUP secular leaders who formed the opposition abroad in the 1970s. Two other small Unionist factions that reject the domination of sect leaders over the party have formed a new NUP under the leadership of Ali Muhammad Hasanayn.

Party Platform. The DUP is an unreliable partner in the coalition government not only because historic rivalries make its commitment to cooperation with the Umma questionable but also because of its weak leadership and tendency to splinter. A US Embassy source has described the DUP as a base without a leadership and the new NUP as a leadership without a base. US Embassy reporting indicates the DUP works to check many of Prime Minister Sadiq's efforts to centralize power. State Council Chairman Ahmad al-Mirghani attempts to use his constitutional powers to limit Sadiq's control over the Army and the bureaucracy. Embassy reporting indicates that the DUP, like the Umma, is building an armed militia and intelligence network to protect its interests.

The DUP leadership's domestic policies as expressed in speeches and in its newspaper *Al-Itihadi* generally do not differ radically from those of the Umma Party. DUP sectarian leaders, however, seem closer to the Muslim Brotherhood about the status of Islamic law than the Umma Party leaders and are more supportive of a free enterprise economy, according to US Embassy reporting.

On foreign policy questions, disagreements with the Umma Party are pronounced. The DUP, especially the Khatmiyyah faction, has historically favored close ties to Cairo and, according to the US Embassy, has received substantial funding from the Egyptians, who are trying to rebuild the DUP. Nevertheless, DUP leaders are often irritated with what they perceive as indifference from President Mubarak and other Egyptian leaders. According to the US Embassy, the DUP opposes close ties to Libya, works to limit the Libyan presence in Sudan, is wary of increased ties to radical Arab and Muslim states, and wants to establish closer ties to the United States than does the Umma Party.

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Ethnic and Southern Parties

Only seven of some 14 ethnic and regional parties that ran in the 1986 election won seats in the Assembly. The ethnic parties include the Sudan National Party (SNP), led by Father Philip Abbas Ghabboush, whose support comes from the Nuban tribesmen of southern Kurdufan. Another ethnic party—the Beja People's Congress—won a seat in a constituency populated by its tribesmen in the Red Sea Hills of northeastern Sudan. Together with five southern parties, these parties' 38 delegates in the Constituent Assembly are united in the African bloc under the leadership of Father Ghabboush. The US Embassy reports that these parties—except for the Beja party, which is not in the government coalition—are important to Sadiq, who needs their support to project the image of a national government and to help retain a simple majority in the Assembly if the DUP should bolt from the coalition.

Base of Support. The SNP—which includes Christians and Muslims—has, in our judgment, the resources to create significant problems for the government if it went into open opposition. US Embassy reporting indicates Father Ghabboush—who is under arrest on corruption charges—is an inveterate coup plotter and troublemaker. He has refused to accept the position of Second Deputy Speaker in the Assembly and may decide to join the opposition. Nubans have in the past instigated civil unrest in Khartoum, according to the US Embassy.

The Nubans also maintain contact with the southern rebels. They identify with their southern neighbors, and, together, Nubans and southerners form the majority of the enlisted men in the Sudanese armed forces. The Beja nomads in the Red Sea Hills have traditionally resisted central government authority, but we believe they are not numerous in Khartoum and are less able than the Nubans to cause direct problems for the Sadiq government.

Academic sources indicate that the moderate southern parties in the coalition government have little real support in the south, and southerners view most of the party leaders in the government as corrupt and opportunistic.[3] The Sudan African People's Congress (SAPCO) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP)—both from Al Istiwa'i (Equatoria)—are the only parties based in the south. The other parties are headquartered in Khartoum, including the Nuer-backed Sudan People's Federal Party (SPFP), the Sudan African Congress (SAC)—Dinka-backed, with direct links to the rebels—and the Southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA). The US Embassy reports the SSPA is the only party that won in all three regions in the south and claims to represent only the south in contrast to the other southern parties, which espouse national goals.

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Platforms. The African bloc parties are disruptive and unreliable junior members of the coalition. In July 1986 they walked out of the Assembly for three months to show their opposition to Sadiq's stand on Islamic law. Members of the African parties are suspicious of their northern Muslim coalition partners and especially distrust Prime Minister Sadiq's efforts to centralize power. The moderate southern parties are not large enough or sufficiently active to have an armed militia that could pose security problems for Sadiq, but US Embassy reporting suggests the Nubans probably have arms and a small militia.

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The common policy link among these parties is that they want Sudan to have a stronger African identity. The Sudanese press reports they vehemently oppose Islamic law and want a secular state but eschew violence in solving the country's problems. They favor a federal system of government that would enhance regional autonomy, want more political power and revenue sharing, and favor a national conference—to include the southern insurgents—that would discuss solutions to the country's problems, especially those relating to the south.

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[3] The southern insurgency prevented voting in large areas of A'ali an Nil (Upper Nile) and Bahr al Ghazal as well as some parts of Equatoria. Only 31 of the 68 southern constituencies had elections for seats in the Assembly. US Embassy reporting indicates that the number of registered voters in the south was very small, and the only violence during the election took place in the south, where insurgents shot a candidate. Until elections can be held in the 37 uncontested southern constituencies, the Assembly will be unable to adopt a permanent constitution.

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The two southern parties based in Equatoria oppose the concept of one southern region revived when the Transitional Military Council in April 1985 restored the Addis Ababa accords of 1972.[4] The Equatorians view the return to one southern region as favoring the large Dinka tribes of A'ali an Nil (Upper Nile) and Bahr al Ghazal. Last February, after nine months of haggling among southerners had brought no agreement, Prime Minister Sadiq unilaterally imposed a southern governmental structure and appointed a six-man high executive council and three civilian governors and deputy governors. The southern parties refused to accept Sadiq's decision. The SAC Minister of Labor resigned in protest, and the SSPA and SAPCO have split between those members who hold government positions and wish to remain in office and those who hold no post and wish their party representatives to withdraw from the coalition.

The African parties tend to favor closer ties to the West and other African countries than does the Umma Party, according to the US Embassy. Embassy reporting indicates these parties especially distrust the Umma Party's apparent close ties to Libya.

Opposition Parties in the Assembly

The National Islamic Front
The US Embassy reports the National Islamic Front's (NIF) strong third place in the 1986 election reflects the growth of the Islamic movement since the 1960s and its superior leadership, organization, and funding. In addition to 28 geographic constituencies, the NIF won 23 of the 28 Assembly seats set aside for university graduates. A special analysis of election returns presented by an academic specialist at a US

Government–sponsored conference last October indicated that the NIF gained geographic constituencies at the expense of the disorganized DUP.

The US Embassy reports that many NIF members of the Assembly are well educated and hold advanced degrees from universities in the West, including the United States. The NIF was the only northern party to win seats in the south—running well-educated graduates in constituencies where few southerners could qualify—and the only party to have women candidates win seats—two—in the Assembly. Western observers note that the NIF attracted large numbers of women and youth in the campaign, reflecting the appeal of the Muslim "progressive" platform of the party. US Embassy sources stress that the NIF continues to gain adherents through its social welfare programs, including provision of favorable loans by Islamic banks to young military officers and free housing to young couples for their first year of marriage.

Base of Support. The NIF is the political arm of the largest Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood faction, which has been under the leadership of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi since 1969. The Brotherhood draws its following largely from urban professionals, intellectuals, students, and small merchants. Academic sources indicate that it has successfully recruited from younger members of the Umma and Democratic Unionist Parties since it emerged from its underground status in the 1960s.

During the post-1977 reconciliation with the Nimeiri regime, the Brotherhood used its position in the government to penetrate universities, labor groups, the government bureaucracy, and the Army. Nimeiri arrested Turabi and key members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the spring of 1985 in the hope of deflecting criticism of the more negative aspects of his Islamization program that many Sudanese believed were instigated by the Brotherhood. After Nimeiri's overthrow, the interim regime released the Brotherhood members from prison, and they soon organized themselves as the National Islamic Front.

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[4] The Military Council never actually returned to the provisions of the Addis Ababa accords that gave southerners their own regional assembly, which in turn selected a president, a higher executive council, and governors. The accords also gave southerners the right to impose their own taxes and created a southern military command of 12,000 troops, half of whom were to be southerners.

The Military Council, moreover, never reunited the south administratively and was not in compliance with the accords when it appointed three separate military governors and a higher executive council. Prime Minister Sadiq's appointment of civilian governors and a new executive council in February 1987 also technically violates the accords.

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Party Leadership. Turabi failed to win a seat in the Assembly in April 1986 because the other major parties joined forces to support the Democratic Unionist candidate, according to US Embassy reporting. But, as head of the NIF, Turabi still has strong personal influence over the direction of party policy. Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha leads the NIF delegation in the Assembly. The US Embassy reports that the NIF has a 25-man politburo that makes important decisions on a collegial basis, consciously avoiding the autocratic style of the dynastic leadership of the Umma and Democratic Unionist Parties.

Divisions within the NIF leadership are not well defined, but there is a small faction of the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Sadiq Abdallah Abd al-Majid. This faction broke away in protest against Turabi's reconciliation with Nimeiri after 1977. It continues to call itself the Muslim Brotherhood, but we believe its inability to win any seats in the Assembly indicates that it poses no major threat to Turabi and the NIF.

The NIF claims to be a "loyal opposition," but we believe it poses a serious threat to the stability of the coalition government. It has the strength to split the coalition vote in the Assembly or to entice conservative factions of the DUP or the Umma from the coalition if the Sadiq government makes compromises on such controversial issues as Islamic law. In addition, the NIF has the capabilities within professional and student groups to organize mass demonstrations and instigate civil unrest. The two weeks of sporadic antiregime demonstrations led by NIF students in Khartoum in the fall of 1986 resulted in violence and, in our opinion, are a harbinger of unrest. The students protested against the government's economic policy, constitutional amendments, delay in convening the constitutional conference, and the "freeze" on Islamic laws. Even more important, we believe the NIF's influence in the military could be used to inspire a coup in the event of serious domestic deterioration. Embassy sources report that, like the Umma and the DUP, the NIF is building an armed militia.

The US Embassy reports that initially the NIF wanted to enter the coalition, but the Umma and the DUP believed its presence would endanger foreign aid and resolution of the southern problem. Embassy reporting indicates that since the beginning of 1987 the NIF has rejected several offers from Sadiq to enter the coalition and has used the party's newspaper, *Al-Riyah*, to stress the indecisiveness of the Sadiq government. Rivalry and antagonism between Turabi and his brother-in-law Prime Minister Sadiq add a personal dimension to the NIF's role in the opposition.

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Party Platform. The NIF represents the extreme religious right in Sudan, and its adherents strongly oppose the domination of civilian politics by the leaders of the traditional sects—the Ansar (Umma) and Khatmiyyah (DUP). In *Al-Riyah* the party calls for an Islamic state that respects the rights of non-Muslims as protected minorities within the traditional context of Islamic law. Academic sources note that the NIF views Islam as the key to rehabilitating Sudan politically, economically, and socially. The party officially rejects violence as a means to implement an Islamic state, although it probably would be willing to come to power through a military coup. The NIF is antagonistic toward the Communist Party, and outbreaks of violence between the NIF and leftist students have been fairly common on university campuses.

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The NIF's stance on resolution of the southern problem differs little from that of the Umma Party, but it takes a hard line to win support in the Army. For example, press reports indicate that Turabi has been in contact with rebel leaders in London, and he says that he accepts the idea of regional autonomy in which each region would define its own legal code. Last January the NIF published a charter stressing the party's commitment to Islamic law but reiterating its traditional stand on the rights of non-Muslims and stressing the need for regional autonomy and power sharing. The charter demands a cease-fire as a precondition for the attendance of the southern rebels at a future constitutional conference. Southern politicians are suspicious of the NIF charter, and the southern rebels have not responded.

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The NIF is highly supportive of the private sector. The party favors an Islamic economy, of which interest-free banking represents a major facet. Scholars note the NIF views itself as progressive and supports women in the workplace, stating that wearing traditional garb, including the veil, allows women to compete more effectively in the labor force by protecting them from unwanted male sexual advances.

In foreign policy, US Embassy reporting indicates that Turabi and NIF leaders maintain positions that closely resemble those of the DUP. Despite their support for nonalignment, party leaders want good ties to the West as a means to limit leftist influence in Sudan. Turabi favors strong ties to both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Turabi backs the Libyan rapprochement but wants to limit Libyan influence in Sudan. NIF members have denied rumors of Turabi's close ties to the Iranian leadership, but the US Embassy notes the NIF admires the Iranian model of a nonaligned Islamic state,

The Communist Party

The poor showing of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) in the 1986 election reflects its continuing decline since the 1960s, when it was the largest and best organized Communist party in Africa. Academic sources note that the party has never recovered from a 1970 split, when the more moderate wing allied itself with Nimeiri, or from purges after the abortive Communist-led coup in 1971.

Base of Support. US Embassy and academic sources report that the Communists have no significant popular base and draw support mainly from trade unionists and intellectuals in the major northern cities. The same sources suggest that the Communists were surprised by Nimeiri's overthrow and unprepared to function in a free environment after years of operating underground.

Party Leadership. The organization of the SCP is similar to that of other Communist parties, consisting of a politburo, a secretariat, and a central committee, according to academic sources. Since 1977 Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud has headed the Communist Party, and the more militant Ali Tijani al-Tayyib— spokesman and chief editor of the party newspaper— is regarded as a potential rival. US Embassy sources report that the SCP is divided between the pragmatists led by Nuqud and the ideologues who identify with Tijani. the SCP leadership has postponed its national conference for fear that differences over policy and Nuqud's opportunistic and nonideological style of leadership would heighten already serious splits.

Party Platform. We believe that the SCP poses no immediate threat to the Sadiq government in the Constituent Assembly and only a moderate covert threat over the next two years. Nuqud's open criticism of Prime Minister Sadiq has been mild

Reporting by the US Embassy indicate the Communists probably have a parallel covert strategy to enhance their underground network in the trade unions and the military.

Despite the Marxist rhetoric, the SCP leadership occasionally takes an independent line in its newspaper, *Al-Maydan*, and is strongly nationalistic.

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One scholar notes that many Sudanese consider the SCP to be almost a traditional party, despite its espousal of a secular state, because it does not oppose working with the sectarian parties. US Embassy sources report the SCP recognizes the cultural and historical importance of Islam in Sudan and is willing to coexist with it. The SCP's public stand on the southern rebels is similar to the Umma Party's official line, but the party opposes a military solution. In economic policy, the US Embassy reports the party agrees with the Umma's definition of the problems but is much more supportive of subsidies, opposes privatization, and condemns austerity programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund.

Al-Maydan frequently criticizes the US presence in Sudan, maintaining that steps should be taken to prevent US interference in Sudan's internal affairs. The party's stand toward Egypt is similar to the Umma Party's wariness, and it favors rapprochement with Marxist Ethiopia as part of the solution to the southern insurgency. Even though the SCP nominally supports the Libyan rapprochement, the US Embassy reports it has openly criticized the Libyan presence as posing security problems and opposes Qadhafi's efforts to establish a union between the two countries.

Other Opposition Groups

The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
The SPLM is the political arm of the major southern insurgent group, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLM opposed the April 1986 election, and its insurgent activities prevented voting in more than half the constituencies in the south. It

does not recognize the legitimacy of the Sadiq government, calling it the "government of the day" in its radiobroadcasts.

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Since Nimeiri's overthrow, dialogue has taken place between the rebels and Sudanese politicians and officials, but no progress toward negotiations has resulted. In July 1986, Prime Minister Sadiq's talks in Addis Ababa with the movement's political and military leader John Garang proved inconclusive. The US Embassy reported that Garang agreed to talks with Sadiq only in the latter's capacity as head of the Umma Party, not as Prime Minister.

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Backed by Ethiopia and, until Nimeiri's overthrow, Libya, Garang formed the SPLA in 1983 in opposition to Nimeiri's policies toward the south. The southern rebellion—a resumption of the north-south civil war that raged from 1955 to 1972—has its roots in the fundamental divisions between the northern Arab Muslim majority who dominate the central government and the mostly animist and Christian south. Garang and most other rebel leaders are mainly from the Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal regions, although in the recent past Equatorian tribesmen have also joined. One scholar describes the rebel leaders as mainly Dinka tribesmen who are young, idealistic, Christian, and well educated by Sudanese standards.

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The rebel movement suffers from the personal rivalries and tribal and ideological differences that have reduced the cohesion of earlier southern dissident movements. A well-placed source of the US Embassy says that the movement has several factions and is divided between those who seek a peaceful solution and an uncompromising military wing that seeks victory on the battlefield.

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The insurgency poses a major challenge to the survival of the coalition government. Garang's refusal to negotiate, in our opinion, reflects his deep personal distrust of Sadiq, a belief that the SPLA can instigate a military takeover, and probable preference for

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John Garang

SPLA leader Col. John Garang is a charismatic and effective leader. Since his defection from the Sudanese Army in mid-1983, he has molded mutinous southern military troops and additional recruits into an effective insurgent force. In his speeches and writings he has consistently stressed national goals and advocated the creation of a federal system with extensive regional autonomy as the solution to rule by a "minority Arab clique" that he claims is largely responsible for Sudan's massive economic and political problems.

Garang is extremely suspicious of Khartoum's Arab Muslim political establishment in general and of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in particular. His envoys have repeatedly told US officials that the worst fighting in the 1955-72 civil war and the assassination of a southern rebel negotiator in Khartoum occurred during Sadiq's first term as Prime Minister (1966-67). Garang's suspicions may be so great that he would reject genuine efforts by Khartoum to address his demands.

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Garang, 41, has received both military and academic training in the United States. He attended the Infantry Officers' Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia (1974) and earned a Ph.D. in economics from Iowa State University (1981). These studies provided him with important knowledge for leading his insurgent movement. In the military course he learned about guerrilla warfare tactics, and he gained extensive knowledge about the south while conducting field research for his dissertation on southern Sudanese development strategies.

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negotiating with Army officers who now are less identified with former President Nimeiri. Since 1983 the rebels, in our judgment, have become an effective fighting force, controlling most of the southern countryside and cutting off transportation links to key Army garrisons in the area. We believe that fighting the insurgents strains the Army's unity and loyalty to the Sadiq government, increasing the prospect of a coup. The rebels set back economic recovery by preventing Khartoum from resuming work on vital oil and water projects in the south and forcing it to assume,   an added financial burden of about $500,000 a day to support military operations.

The SPLM claims to seek a secular, unified, federal, democratic, and socialist Sudan. We believe that

Garang and other leaders hope to make the SPLM the basis for a national party. SPLM leaders want greater political and economic power sharing between Khartoum and the south as well as other regions. They have consistently demanded that Khartoum meet several conditions before they attend a constitutional conference that might facilitate negotiations. The Kokka Dam agreement signed by the SPLA and representatives of the National Alliance in March 1986 set forth preconditions for talks, including the repeal of Nimeiri's Islamic laws and all other laws restricting freedom, abrogation of military pacts with other countries that impinge on Sudanese sovereignty, and public commitment by the Sadiq government that

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the constitutional conference will choose a new interim government that will hold new elections.

The Ba'th Party

The Ba'th—the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party—is a Pan-Arab revolutionary movement that has little or no popular following in Sudan and won no seats to the Assembly during the April 1986 election. Nevertheless, scholars note that the Ba'th's Pan-Arab socialism appeals to some young Sudanese military officers. The Ba'thists are split between a larger Iraqi-backed wing headed by Badr al-Din Mudathir and a Syrian-backed wing. Each wing depends on its respective country patron for funding, and each has its own newspaper.

Like the SCP, the Ba'th Party views the Sadiq government and the current democracy as conducive to the party's growth. The Iraqi-backed Ba'thists worked with the traditional Muslim parties in exile in the 1970s, especially with the more secular, radical factions of the DUP. US Embassy reporting indicates that Ba'thist officers planned more than one coup attempt during the transitional government that followed Nimeiri's overthrow and present a disruptive element should they decide to oppose the Sadiq government. US Embassy reporting suggests that the Ba'thists may have a small armed militia.

Ba'thists hold many of the same domestic policy positions as the SCP. They favor a secular state and oppose privatization and austerity measures mandated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Their foreign policy stance is strongly influenced by their affiliation to their country patrons. The Syrian wing tends to be more critical of US and Western influence in Sudan, and the Iraqi wing has opposed Libyan influence in Sudan.

The Sudanese Revolutionary Committees

The Sudanese Revolutionary Committees (SRC), which most Sudanese view as Libyan surrogates, did not run in the April 1986 election and have publicly stated they will not participate in the political process, according to the US Embassy. The SRCs have little popular following in Sudan despite extensive Libyan economic and organizational support. For example, the committees were only marginally successful in

1986 when they attempted to rally anti-US sentiment over US actions against Libya, according to the Embassy. Tripoli trained the SRCs as a subversive force against the Nimeiri regime, and they returned to Sudan only after Nimeiri's ouster.

US Embassy reporting indicates the SRCs pose no immediate threat to the Sadiq government, but they could undermine political stability by providing an armed pool of terrorists and subversives for Libya. Abdallah Zakariyyah, who spent some 10 years in exile in Tripoli, heads one of several SRC factions. The four or so factions disagree on leadership and whether they should be a revolutionary movement. Zakariyyah tries to project a positive image by claiming he rejects violence and that the committees are not an extension of the Libyan system of government. Nevertheless, the SRCs want to adapt Libyan leader Qadhafi's system of government to the Sudanese situation and strongly favor unity with Libya.

Outlook for the New Multiparty Government

Out of power for 17 years, Sudan's party leaders have created a domestic political scene reminiscent of the mid-1960s when interparty and intraparty rivalries and haggling over political spoils took precedence over national concerns. The performance of the Constituent Assembly has further discredited civilian leaders. The Assembly has passed no key legislation, it had four major adjournments in the first year, and it has failed to convene at least five times for lack of a quorum because of walkouts by different parties or absenteeism of Assembly members.

Prime Minister Sadiq's legitimacy as the key figure in the government is generally accepted, but, in our opinion, he cannot take decisive action on major issues for fear of alienating one group or another. He told the Arab press in an interview two years ago that Sudan needed a "guided democracy" for the country to be governable. His ability to make bold decisions is hampered by the fact that the Umma Party did not—and probably could never—win a majority in elections

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and clearly does not have a national constituency. Sadiq's dependence on the Democratic Unionists and southern coalition partners—both suffering from internal divisions—has prevented quick action on issues such as the creation of a new state security service or the new governmental structure for the south.

Formal opposition activities by most northern parties and other groups against the Sadiq government have been tempered by the fear of triggering a military takeover. For example, both the Communist and Ba'th Parties continue to cooperate with the civilian government, hoping to gain time to build strength among labor groups, students, and the Army. Prime Minister Sadiq's apparent willingness to tolerate their political activities probably makes his government the best option available to the left. The leftist parties, in our view, seem unwilling to precipitate unrest, believing that they are not sufficiently strong in the military to prevent a coup led by conservative or Islamic fundamentalist officers who would be hostile to the left.

In contrast, the National Islamic Front on the religious right has been an unrelenting critic of Prime Minister Sadiq and his government. NIF leader Turabi has refused Sadiq's offers to enter the government, instead using his opposition status to attack the government's indecision. US Embassy reporting suggests that Turabi is increasingly successful in offering his party as an alternative to the sectarian-based Umma and Democratic Unionists. The Sadiq government contained the NIF-inspired demonstration over economic grievances last fall, but this protest served to intimidate Sadiq by underscoring the NIF's ability to mobilize students and other groups. US Embassy reporting indicates that Turabi openly admits that he has good support in the Army.

The weak performance of the Umma-DUP coalition suggests that the prospects for stable multiparty democratic government in Sudan are poor. Academic sources note that Prime Minister Sadiq and other party leaders genuinely view democratic government

as the country's salvation but seem not to have learned from the failure of earlier civilian coalition governments. Problems with the economy and the insurgency are awesome in scope. The government's lack of cohesion and discipline, often the result of party factionalism and petty personal squabbles, compound efforts to find solutions. Even the passage of constitutional amendments that would increase Prime Minister Sadiq's powers is unlikely to alter significantly the governmental paralysis in Khartoum.

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If, as we expect, the coalition government fails to develop effective leadership, civil unrest in Khartoum or a further deterioration in the security situation in the south would set the stage for the coalition government's fall over the next year or so. Prolonged civil unrest over food and energy shortages or price increases—as well as clashes between the large number of southern refugees and northern Muslim party militias—are real possibilities in the capital. A major rebel offensive that took a key southern city or that killed a considerable number of military personnel probably would erode even the institutional support the Army now has for the coalition government.

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We believe more senior military officers—mainly Khatmiyyah, conservative, pro-Egyptian, and pro-Western—will not long tolerate a discredited coalition government or a successor if it falters in the next two years, fearing that their inaction would erode central authority to a dangerous point, further divide the Army, and risk a coup by younger, more radical officers. In response to a military takeover, the political parties could mount a strong, possibly bloody resistance with their armed militias, and Army leaders probably would be forced to suppress at least some of the parties and detain some civilian political leaders. Military leaders, hoping to defuse hostilities, may also decide to form a coalition government with one or more of the parties, most likely the NIF or the sectarian faction of the DUP, both of which have adherents and sympathizers in the officer corps.

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Appendix A

Comparative Analysis of the 1953 and 1986 Election Returns in Northern Sudan [5]

The relative strengths of the political groupings in northern Sudan have changed significantly in recent years. A comparison between the results of the 1953 and 1986 elections helps to illustrate this point. These two elections offer the most valid comparison because of significant similarities in the structure of the available results and in the organization of the competing parties.

In both the 1953 and 1986 elections, factions of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) were joined in a single party (in contrast to the elections of 1958 and 1965). The provincial-regional units for the available statistics are also similar. In each case there are six regional units with roughly the same boundaries (Khartoum, Ash Shamali [Northern], Kurdufan, and Darfur regions are roughly the same in both), while in 1953 Kassala is similar to the Ash Sharqi (Eastern) region of 1986 and Blue Nile in 1953 is comparable to the Al Awsat (Central) region of 1986. Specific details may vary, but general comparisons can be made.

The first and most obvious observation is that the position of the mainline parties has changed significantly. In 1953 the National Unionist Party (NUP)—predecessor of the DUP—and the Umma Party clearly dominated the field. All other parties were minor in their impact, with the largest "third party" reflecting the strength of a few particular tribal leaders and not a major national sentiment. Ideological parties, either Islamic or leftist, attracted some support among educated Sudanese but made no impact in the territorial constituencies. The strongest of the ideological parties was the Communist Party, which looked like it might, in the long run, be the only effective challenge to the political dominance of the sectarian, mainline parties.

[5] This analysis was prepared as part of a contract study presented at a US Government–sponsored seminar on Sudan held in October 1986.

Figure 4
### Vote by Party as a Proportion of Total Votes in North, 1953 and 1986 [a]

Percent

1953

Other [b] 12.4
National Unionist Party (NUP) 43.8
Umma Party 43.8

1986

Other [b] 11.2
National Islamic Front (NIF) 18.9
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 30.7
Umma Party 39.2

[a] The figures in the charts for 1953 are based on election statistics provided in *Sudan News and Features*, 1 September 1954. The figures in the charts for 1986 are based on official election results provided by the *Sudan News Agency*, 25 May 1986.

[b] For 1953, the others are primarily independents, tribal leaders, and the Socialist Republican Party which gained about 8 percent of the total vote in the northern provinces, especially in Eastern (Kassala), Central (Blue Nile), and Darfur. For 1986, the other parties are primarily independents and small regionally important parties. The major ones are the Sudan Communist Party in Khartoum and the Sudan National Party in Khartoum and Kurdufan.

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Figure 5
Vote by Party for Regions in North, 1953 and 1986 [a]

Legend:
- National Unionist Party/Democratic Unionist Party (NUP/DUP)
- Umma Party
- National Islamic Front (NIF)
- Other [b]

Percent

[a] The figures in the charts for 1953 are based on election statistics provided in *Sudan News and Features*, 1 September 1954. The figures in the charts for 1986 are based on official election results provided by the *Sudan News Agency*, 25 May 1986.

[b] For 1953, the others are primarily independents, tribal leaders, and the Socialist Republican Party which gained about 8 percent of the total vote in the northern provinces, especially in Eastern (Kassala), Central (Blue Nile), and Darfur. For 1986, the other parties are primarily independents and small regionally important parties. The major ones are the Sudan Communist Party in Khartoum and the Sudan National Party in Khartoum and Kurdufan.

313837 8-87

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The picture painted by the results of the 1986 election is dramatically different. Although the mainline sectarian parties together received almost 90 percent of the vote in 1953, they received only 70 percent of the vote in 1986. In 1986 there was a clear third-party option, the Muslim Brotherhood–led National Islamic Front (NIF), which gained almost 20 percent of the vote, with support throughout the north. Although the mainline parties were still clearly dominant, they seem to be facing a significant challenge. In contrast

to 1953, the challenge was not coming from the left, which received little support outside Khartoum, but from the NIF on the extreme Islamic right.

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The general position of the two parties in terms of the proportion of the votes shows a dramatic decline. The two parties divided the northern provinces in 1953,

Figure 6
Vote as a Percentage of Total Votes for Parties by Region, 1953 and 1986[a]

■ National Unionist Party/Democratic Unionist Party (NUP/DUP)
■ Umma Party
☐ National Islamic Front (NIF)

[a] The figures in the charts for 1953 are based on election statistics provided in *Sudan News and Features*, 1 September 1954. The figures in the charts for 1986 are based on official election results provided by the *Sudan News Agency*, 25 May 1986.

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with one party clearly dominant in each province. The NUP received 68 percent of the votes in Khartoum, 65 percent in Northern Province, and 53 percent in Kassala Province, while the Umma dominated in Kurdufan (53 percent) and Darfur (55 percent). Blue Nile was more evenly divided because of a strong showing by the Socialist Republican Party and by independent candidates. In 1986 there was only one region that was clearly dominated by a single party. The Umma Party received 62 percent of the votes in Darfur. Meanwhile, the NIF received more votes than the Umma Party in the Khartoum and Northern regions. |

A comparison of party performance in the two elections shows remarkably little change in the Unionists' position. Khartoum, for example, provided 14 percent

of the total national vote for the NUP in 1953 and 17 percent of the total vote for the DUP in 1986. In both years about 60 percent of the votes for the party came from the Northern, Eastern/Kassala, and Central/ Blue Nile regions. Thus, one might say that the general profile of the Unionist alliance remains basically the same, although the party received a smaller share of the overall vote in 1986 than in 1953. Nevertheless, the Unionist profile shows a gradually declining party. |

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The picture for the Umma Party is similar. The three major regions for the Umma Party—Central/Blue Nile, Kurdufan, and Darfur—provided roughly 80

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percent of the total party vote in both elections. There was a significant shift in 1986, however, in that the regions of Kurdufan and Darfur account for a larger part of the vote, and Darfur emerges as the location of a quarter of the total Umma Party vote. This might suggest a growing ruralization and "westernization" of the party. One long-run implication of this shift for the Umma Party leadership may be increasing difficulties in appearing secularist or in modernizing the party.

A comparison of the two elections also provides some indications about the nature of the support for the NIF. In 1953 only small electoral support for the Brotherhood-supported group came from the graduate constituencies. This became overwhelming support for the NIF in 1986, with the Brotherhood sweeping the graduate constituencies. In the territorial constituencies the NIF gained slightly more than half of its total

vote in Khartoum and the Northern and Eastern regions, the old areas of Unionist dominance. It appears to have advanced directly at the expense of the Unionists in those areas. In Kurdufan and Darfur, areas of Umma dominance, the NIF received a significant portion of the votes, but it was the Unionists and not the Umma position that was affected. The NIF, therefore, appears to be the rising successor to the old NUP alliance as the second major political party in Sudan.

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If this is the case, it has significant implications for the Unionist leadership. Clearly, the old mainline parties cannot appear to be slack in their support for Islam. Umma and Unionist competition with the NIF for popular support is likely to become more evident and probably will lead these mainline parties to become more strident in the advocacy of Islamic fundamentalist positions.

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Appendix B

Key Party Leaders

Umar Nur al-Da'im

One of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's closest associates for 20 years, Umar Nur al-Da'im has been secretary general of the Umma Party since 1985 and Minister of Agriculture since May 1986. For many years Nur al-Da'im has served as Sadiq's trusted emissary, spokesman, and troubleshooter.

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An Embassy source has described Nur al-Da'im as an implementor rather than a formulator of Sadiq's ideas and policies.

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Nur al-Da'im holds a Ph.D. in agricultural engineering from Goettingen University in West Germany. After several years as chief agricultural engineer at a government-run agricultural project, he was elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1965. During Sadiq's first term as Prime Minister, Nur al-Da'im served as Agriculture Minister in late 1966. When the Umma split into two factions in 1967, Nur al-Da'im remained loyal to Sadiq and became deputy leader of Sadiq's backers in the Assembly. After the military seized power in 1969, he was in exile for many years organizing Sadiq's opposition to the regime. He is about 57.

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Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani

Muhammad al-Mirghani has been the leader of the Khatmiyyah sect (Sudan's second-largest Muslim sect) and "patron" (head) of the Democratic Unionist Party for nearly 20 years. He is the older brother of Ahmad al-Mirghani, chairman of the State Council, through whom he has direct imput into the government. Many Sudanese, both in and out of the party, have criticized Mirghani's leadership and blame him for the DUP's poor showing in the April 1986 election. He maintains firm control over the party's financial resources and policymaking, but he failed to develop effective ties to the party's rank and file. Secular elements within the party have expressed a desire to see the traditionalist Mirghani withdraw from active involvement in the party and to serve only as spiritual leader of the Khatmiyyah.

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Mirghani holds a degree in economics from the University of Khartoum. Unlike many other political leaders from the 1964-69 parliamentary period, he neither participated in nor openly opposed the regime of Gaafar Nimeiri. Mirghani is about 51.

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Ahmad al-Mirghani

A prominent figure in the Democratic Unionist Party and the younger brother of DUP "patron" Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, Ahmad al-Mirghani has been chairman of the five-member State Council, Sudan's collective head of state, since May 1986. He is widely regarded as a weak political figure and exerts little influence within the government. On several occasions Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi has failed to inform Mirghani of important policy decisions. Sudanese political observers regard him as a frontman in the government for his elder brother, who does not wish to hold a government position.

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Mirghani studied economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science. During the late 1960s he held several high-level positions in the DUP. In the late 1970s he accepted then President Gaafar Nimeiri's reconciliation offer to political opponents and served on the politburo of Nimeiri's political party for two years. Before assuming his current position, Mirghani was engaged in private business and served as chairman of the Sudanese Islamic Bank. He is 46.

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Al-Sharif Zayn al-Abidin al-Hindi

Secretary general of the Democratic Unionist Party since 1985, Al-Sharif al-Hindi served as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in Sadiq's first Cabinet. Widely criticized for his performance,   and wishing to devote more time to personal affairs, Hindi rejected offers to retain his government positions in Sadiq's second Cabinet. Although he has expressed support for some Unionist politicians opposed to the Mirghanis' leadership of the DUP, the Mirghanis have worked to have Hindi continue as DUP secretary general to reduce the prospect that he will join the NUP. Hindi's continued influence over government matters was evidenced when he prevented Sadiq from appointing an official he favored to succeed Hindi as Foreign Minister.

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A member of the Constituent Assembly during 1967-69, Hindi was jailed for opposition activity after the military seized power in 1969. Freed in the early 1970s, he went into exile and joined the foreign-based opposition. In 1982 he succeeded his deceased elder brother, Husayn Sharif al-Hindi, as leader of the opposition National Unionist Party. (One of the two parties that joined in the mid-1960s to form the DUP, the NUP resumed its activities in the 1970s as an opposition party.) After the April 1985 coup that ousted President Gaafar Nimeiri, Hindi returned to Sudan and became secretary general of the DUP. He is about 55.

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Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi

Hassan al-Turabi has served as head of the main faction of Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood—renamed the National Islamic Front in 1985—since 1969. He promotes Islam as the key to uniting Sudan's diverse groups. Regarding the issue of the non-Islamic south, Turabi says he supports political federalism that would protect the interests of southerners. Turabi's personality and political views elicit extremely passionate feelings from both supporters and opponents. A charismatic figure and effective advocate of his views, he commands enthusiastic responses from supporters while instilling fear and hostility in his opponents. In the April 1986 election he was defeated in his bid for a seat after six parties withdrew their candidates for the seat and backed a single candidate. Nevertheless, he has a voice in the Assembly through his tight control over the NIF's 51 parliamentarians.

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Turabi, 54, holds a master of laws degree from the University of London and a doctorate of laws from the University of Paris. He has served in government as Attorney General (1979-83) and adviser to the President for foreign affairs (1983-85). Although Turabi is a brother-in-law of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, personal and political differences have severely strained relations between the two men.

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Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha

Ali Taha is a member of National Islamic Front politburo and a longtime associate of NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi. With Turabi's failure to win a seat in the Constituent Assembly, Taha was selected to head the NIF's parliamentary delegation. In this position he serves as leader of the largest opposition bloc in the government.

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Taha began his political career as president of the Muslim Brotherhood–dominated Khartoum Students' Union during 1969-70. He later served as a judge and rose to the Brotherhood's leadership. In 1977, when the Brotherhood reconciled with then President Gaafar Nimeiri, he became a member of the People's Assembly. With the Brotherhood's increased prominence in Nimeiri's government, Taha served as head of the Assembly during 1984-85.

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Philip Abbas Ghabboush

Father Philip Ghabboush, a perennial figure in Sudanese politics with a history of involvement in coup plotting, is the leader and founder (1985) of the Sudan National Party (SNP). An ordained Anglican priest who draws most of his support from his fellow Nuba tribesmen, Ghabboush is a spokesman for Sudan's "have nots." A charismatic leader and articulate advocate of his views, Ghabboush favors a socialist economic system, a secular constitution, and a decentralized political system. In addition to his base of eight SNP deputies in the Constituent Assembly, he has won the support of 30 southern deputies from various parties to form the fourth-largest bloc (African Group) of delegates in the Assembly. Ghabboush has twice led a walkout of this bloc, including a July-October 1986 boycott of Assembly sessions, to protest the division of political spoils and demand the repeal of Islamic laws. In April 1987 he was jailed on corruption charges. In July he was released without a trial.

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A hereditary leader of his tribe, Ghabboush devoted his early life to service in the Anglican Church. In 1965 he was elected to the Constituent Assembly on a platform advocating regional autonomy for non-Arabs. Ghabboush has been implicated in at least three coup plots since 1969. He is 63.

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Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud

Muhammad Nuqud has served as secretary general of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) since 1971. He was one of three SCP members to win Constituent Assembly seats in the April 1986 election.

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Nuqud has said that the SCP is a minor party that must seek alliances with stronger political parties to survive and influence Sudanese society. Since the current government was formed, Nuqud has supported many of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's policies as a way of opposing the SCP's archenemy, the NIF. He, however, has been unable to unite the party behind him. The party's newspaper has contradicted Nuqud's views on several occasions.

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Nuqud, a lawyer by training, has worked full-time in the SCP since its founding in 1956. He served in the Constituent Assembly during 1965-68. One of the few leaders of the SCP to escape the roundup and execution of Communists following their failed coup in 1971, Nuqud became secretary general by default. He was in exile in Eastern Europe during most of 1971-85. He is about 57.

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Appendix C

Selected Data on Members of the Cabinet and State Council

	Party	Position(s)	Comments	Date and Place of Birth
Cabinet				
Sadiq Siddiq al-Mahdi	Umma	Prime Minister; Minister of Defense; President, Umma Party		1935 Omdurman
Umar Nur al-Da'im	Umma	Minister of Agriculture; Secretary General, Umma Party	See Appendix B.	1930 Kurdufan
Bakri Ahmad Adil	Umma	Minister of Education	Longtime associate of Sadiq and high-ranking party official . . . tasked with reducing NIF influence in educational system . . . formerly a business executive, governor of Kurdufan (1980-81), and head of drought relief committee (1985).	1934 Kurdufan
Adam Musa Madibu	Umma	Minister of Energy and Mining	Closely associated with Sadiq since 1960s . . . works well with US oil company officials . . . Ph.D. in civil engineering from Northwestern University . . . son of prominent tribal leader . . . former Defense Minister (1967-68).	1937 Darfur
Mubarak Abdallah al-Mahdi	Umma	Minister of Industry; Head, Umma Party Foreign Affairs Committee	Cousin and protege of Sadiq . . . involved in Sadiq's 1976 coup attempt, but new to national politics . . . former businessman who appears committed to revitalizing private sector . . . holds a degree in business administration.	1950 Khartoum
Salah al-Din Abd al-Salam al-Khalifa	Umma	Minister of Cabinet Affairs	A trusted, longtime lieutenant of Sadiq . . . serves as the Prime Minister's "gatekeeper" . . . moderate and pro-Western . . . grandson of Khalifa Abdallahi, top general and later political successor of the Mahdi (Sadiq's great-grandfather).	1930 Central
Bashir Umar Muhammad	Umma	Minister of Finance and Planning	Former academic with little political experience . . . intelligent and well versed in economic theory, but not fully familiar with the details of the economy and bureaucracy . . . active in formulating and implementing Umma's southern policy . . . Ph.D. in economics from Manchester University.	1951 Kurdufan

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Selected Data on Members of the Cabinet and State Council (continued)

	Party	Position(s)	Comments	Date and Place of Birth
Abd al-Mahmud al-Haj Salih	Umma	Attorney General	Umma Party chairman Kusti . . . ex-Communist . . . worked in government judiciary (1967-74) and private practice (1974-86).	1942 Central
Muhammad Bashir Gamma	Umma	Minister of Irrigation	Has an engineering background . . . deputy governor, then acting governor of Darfur during early 1980s.	NA
Rashida Ibrahim Abd al-Karim	Umma	Minister of Social Welfare	Only woman in Cabinet . . . niece of Prime Minster Sadiq's influential wife, Sarah . . . once Sadiq's personal secretary . . . headed Cabinet's training office during Nimeiri regime . . . graduated from Khartoum University's Faculty of Arts.	NA
Hussein Abu Salih	DUP	Minister of Health	Neurosurgeon . . . served as Health Minister in transitional Cabinet (1985-86) . . . as head of Khartoum doctors' trade union, instigated strike that led to 1985 coup . . . studied in Cairo and at Royal College of Surgeons in London.	1930 NA
Muhammad Tawfiq Ahmad	DUP	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Experienced and respected politician . . . Minister of Culture and Information during 1986-87 . . . secretary of NUP in mid-1960s . . . highly regarded for experience and honesty . . . long-time contact of US Embassy . . . diploma in administration from Oxford University.	1918 Northern
Muhammad Tahir al-Jaylani	DUP	Minister of Public Works, Housing, and Public Utilities	Member of Beja tribe . . . former civil servant in Ministry of Local Government and district commissioner in Eastern Province (1979-85).	1940 Eastern
Sid Ahmad al-Husayn	DUP	Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Interior; Deputy Secretary General, DUP	A lawyer and politician . . . poor manager and ineffective as Interior Minister . . . anti-Libyan, but has told Western diplomat that he fears personal harm from Libyans if he curbs their activities in Sudan . . . received higher education in Egypt.	1934 Northern
Mamun Sanada	DUP	Minister of Culture and Information	Lawyer and DUP politburo member . . . Attorney General in 1967 and later legal adviser to Kuwaiti aid fund . . . Ph.D. in comparative politics from Oxford University.	1932 Northern
Hassan Muhammad Mustafa	DUP	Minister of Youth and Sports	Trade union leader and antiregime activist during 1970s . . . imprisoned four years in mid-1970s for political activities . . . unsuccessful candidate for Assembly seat in 1986.	1940 Northern

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Selected Data on Members of the Cabinet and State Council (continued)

	Party	Position(s)	Comments	Date and Place of Birth
Ibrahim Hassan Abd al-Galil	DUP	Minister of Trade and Supply	Sound understanding of economics and favorably inclined toward private sector . . . not assertive . . . former dean of the Faculty of Economics at Khartoum University . . . Ph.D. in economics from UCLA.	NA
Aldo Ago Deng	SSPA	Minister of Transportation and Communications	Experienced southern politician . . . former deputy governor of Bahr al Ghazal (1983-85) . . . [_____] initially opposed to division of south, changed opinion when offered post in new regional government . . . Dinka tribesman.	1942 Bahr al Ghazal
Lawrence Modi Tombe	PPP	Minister of Labor	Bari tribesman.	NA Equatoria
Red Chol Jok	SPFP	Minister of Local Government	Nuer tribesman.	NA Upper Nile
State Council				
Ahmad al-Mirghani	DUP	Chairman, State Council	See Appendix B.	1941 Khartoum
Ali Hasan Taj al-Din	Umma	Member, State Council	Son of former Umma leader in Darfur . . . given Darfur seat on Council to signify party's gratitude for Darfurian support . . . former civil servant and for last decade employed by Islamic Development Bank . . . Ph.D. in administrative science from University of Paris.	NA Darfur
Idris Abdallah al-Banna	Umma	Member, State Council	A close adviser to Sadiq . . . served as Umma's spokesman and chief representative on the NASC during transition period . . . involved in Umma negotiations with SPLA . . . director of radio and televison during 1967-68 . . . during 1970s worked in broadcasting in Saudi Arabia . . . studied journalism at Boston University.	1924 Omdurman
Pacifico Lado Loleik	SAPCO	Member, State Council; Secretary General, SAPCO	Medical doctor . . . served in southern Regional Assembly (1978-83) . . . supported southern division, rewarded with presidency of Equatoria People's Council (1983-85) . . . advocates a federal system with local governments to determine legal system . . . poorly informed on key issues.	1938 Equatoria

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Appendix D

**Selected Data on Parties Represented in the
Constituent Assembly, Cabinet, and State Council**

Party	Leaders	Constituency	Publications
Umma	Sadiq al-Mahdi, President; Umar Nur al-Da'im, Secretary General	5-6-million-member Ansar sect.	*Sawt al-Umma* (Biweekly)
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)	Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, party patron; Al-Sharif Zayn al-Abidin al-Hindi, Secretary General	5-million-member Khatmiyyah sect.	*Al-Itihadi* (Weekly)
National Islamic Front (NIF)	Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, Secretary General; Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha, head of NIF parliamentary delegation	Urban professionals, intellectuals, students, and small merchants.	*Al-Riyah* (Daily) *Alwan* (Biweekly)
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	Eliaba James Surur, Chairman	Equatoria Region.	None
Sudan National Party (SNP)	Philip Abbas Ghabboush, President	Nuban tribe based in southern Kurdufan Region.	None
Southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA)	Samuel Aru Bol, President; Peter Gatkouth, Vice President; Lawrence Lual Lual, Secretary General.	Only southern party to field candidates for the Assembly in all three southern regions.	None
Sudan African People's Congress (SAPCO)	Morris Lawya Ezekiel, Chairman; George Longokwa, Deputy Chairman; Pacifico Lado Loleik, Secretary General	Equatoria Region.	None
Sudan Communist Party (SCP)	Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud, Secretary General; Ali Tijani al-Tayyib, politburo member	Trade unionists and intellectuals in Khartoum and other northern urban areas.	*Al-Maydan* (Daily)
Sudan African Congress (SAC)	Walter Kunijok, President; Mabior Leek Deng, Secretary General	Upper Nile Region (Dinka tribe).	None
Beja People's Congress	Taha Ahmad Taha, sole Beja deputy in Assembly	Beja tribe located in Eastern Region.	None
Sudan People's Federal Party (SPFP)	Joshua Dewal, head	Nuer tribe based in Upper Nile Region.	None

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