



# **Top Secret**

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/26 : CIA-RDP88T00659R000100320001-1 **Top Secret** 25X1 25X1 **IRAN-IRAQ: Fighting Likely To Intensify** Anticipating a resumption of intense fighting on the battlefield east of Al Basrah, both sides have sent more men into the area 25X1 and continue to fortify their positions; Iraq will probably also increase its airstrikes against Iranian cities and economic 25X1 targets. 25X1 Iraqi warplanes attacked Qom and Tabriz in response to Tehran's Scud missile attack on Baghdad on Thursday. So far this year, Iraq has bombed more than 20 cities and towns in Iran, some almost daily. Tehran savs total Iranian civilian casualties this year already exceed 25X1 12,000. Comment: Amajor-Iragi-counterattack-to-remove-the Iranian salient east of Al Basrah remains unlikely in the next few weeks. Instead, Iragi units will probably try to nibble at the Iranian frontlines and slowly drive them back with small, localized attacks. Baghdad probably wants to conserve its resources because it expects Iran to launch new attaoks. 25X1 Iran probably will launch new attacks, either to expand its salient east of AI Basrah or to threaten Iraq's forces elsewhere on the southern front-and thus to draw Iraqi units away from the fighting near Al Basrah 25X1 <del>Tebran-wanto-to</del> isolate, not necessarily to capture, Al Basrah, but it is also trying to 25X1 Wear-down-Iraq's-Army, particularly-the-reserves. Iraq's-bombing of Iranian cities is unlikely, at least in the near term, to dissuade Tehran from further offensives. A more-effective use of air and artillery strikes against Iranian rear staging areas, however, might disrupt Tehran's-preparations 25X1 DIA Comment: While the Iranians could launch a major attack, with little warning, both sides now appear to be consolidating their positions. DIA believes that the Iraqis control Ujayrawiyah Island, and there is no positive evidence of Iranians there. The position of any remaining\_tranian forces would be tenuous at best because they would be well within Iraqi direct-fire weapons-range-25X1

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	SYRIA:	Assad's Economic Initiatives	
		·	,
		President Assad is taking new measures to halt Syria's economic decline—his most critical domestic concern—including pressing for more aid from moderate Arab states and cutting government	25X1
•		subsidies.	25X1
			25X1
		/The US Embassy in Damascus reports that economic concerns	
* /		Influenced Assad's decision to attend the recent Islamic summit in	· · ·
		Kuwait. As an enticement for Assad's attendance. Kuwait provided	25X1
		Svria with free oil late last vear	25X1 25X1
			20/(1
		Weakened domestic finances have forced Assad to approve additional measures to cut spending, although they will impose	
		further hardships on the Syrian population. Earlier this week, Damascus increased the price of gasoline by 71 percent and meat by	
		31 percent. Prime Minister	25X1
		Kasm-plans to reduce subsidies further in six-months, including	20/(1
		another-40-percent-rise-in-the-price-of-gasoline-	25 <b>X</b> 1
		Public dissatisfaction over economic conditions is increasingly	
		evident in Damascus, although there is little active dissension.	25X1
		3,000-automobiles-were-confiscated-from	25 <b>X</b> 1
		muclevel-government officials for resale, adding to the bitterness of such officials over the growing sacrifices they are being asked to	
		make. The US Embassy in Damascus says police recently used force	
		to control a crowd outside a government store.	25X1
		<b>Comment:</b> Assad's position is still secure, but he will face increasing	
		difficulty in deflecting the blame for economic problems. The plan to eliminate subsidies will probably be implemented slowly, and those for bread are likely to be left in place.	25X1
		Assad is ready to use Syria's extensive security apparatus to quash any domestic unrest. His opponents—chiefly Islamic	
		fundamentalists—have been unable to translate economic distress	
•		into organized antiregime activity.	25 <b>X</b> 1



**IRAQ: After Al Basrah** 

commitment it has been reluctant to make.



Baghdad remained relatively calm during the early phases of Iran's recent offensives, according to US-Embassy reports, but public morale began to decline as the magnitude of the casualties—estimated at 20,000—became known. There was great elation among the leaders when the Iranian attacks east of AI Basrah finally were blunted; President Saddam Husayn awarded Defense Minister Khayrallah the country's highest medal for directing the counterattack. The Embassy says Iraq's generals are pushing for more aggressive tactics, but civilian leaders fear the public would not stand for continued high casualties.

**Comment**: Barring a catastrophic military defeat or an assassination, the Iraqi regime will probably stay intact. A coup would be likely only if Saddam's continued rule is perceived to jeopardize Iraq's survival. The elevation of Khayrallah last week to the post of Army Chief of Staff may be an attempt to placate the generals by giving them greater influence in the leadership councils. The generals will use him as their conduit into Saddam's inner circle. Khayrallah's military competence is suspect, however, and this could become an issue if Iran launches another attack within the coming weeks, as expected.

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	UN-USSR: Soviet Bid To Control Disarmament Session	
	The USSR is already working to ensure that next year's scheduled UN Special Session on Disarmament—the first since 1978—is an effective forum for Soviet positions at the expense of the US. The session will be chaired by an East German, unless the West succeeds in postponing it to 1989, when a Latin American would normally assume the chair. The Soviets are supporting Cuban and Hungarian candidates for two other top positions and an Indian bid to chair a preparatory commission, which will meet this May- the Soviets plan to press the US hard on disarmament	25X 25X 25X
:	issues with an eye-on the US Presidential election campaign;	25X
and the second		20,
	<b>Comment</b> : Moscow is well aware the special session in New York will attract close international attention. The Soviets will bend every effort to control the agenda and resist Western moves to delay the session.	25X
	USSR: Resistance to Quality Control Soviet industrial managers are concerned about growing dissatisfaction among factory workers with new quality-control measures. According to senior officials, inspections have sparked increased grumbling among workers and have reportedly led to isolated work stoppages. The complaints focus on requirements to fix substandard goods, which take time away from work on the quantitative targets on which salaries and bonuses are based. General Secretary Gorbachev renewed his support for the quality- control program, despite opposition. at the recent plenum of the Soviet party's Central Committee.	25>
	Soviets' incentive structure and the strains inherent in Gorbachev's modernization drive. Civilian industries are being required to raise quality standards, but they have gotten no relief from ambitious plan targets and have experienced few improvements in the supply of raw materials. Gorbachev's commitment to the program is expected to remain strong, however, even if dissatisfaction among workers escalates. The Soviet leader has made clear that he will keep pressing in order to achieve long-term payoffs in the form of greater Soviet competitiveness in manufacturing and increased consumer satisfaction within the USSR.	25

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#### **SAUDI ARABIA: Drawing Down Oil Stockpiles**

Saudi Arabia apparently believes its 55 abroad is unnecessarily large and pote		25X1
and has begun trimming it.	the	25X1
drawdown has averaged about 200,000		
last month. At this rate, oil stockpiles c	could be virtually eliminated by	25X1
• • • • • • • • •		
<b>Comment:</b> Riyadh stockpiled oil as a s	trotonia hadra anainat	
· · ·	0 0 0	
disruptions of the world oil market by t	the Iran-Iraq war and to	
· · ·	the Iran-Iraq war and to bably will continue its	
disruptions of the world oil market by t increase its marketing flexibility. It pro- cautious rate of depletion to avoid dep Nevertheless, Riyadh is eager to trim s	the Iran-Iraq war and to bably will continue its ressing oil prices. torage costs, which—at about	
disruptions of the world oil market by t increase its marketing flexibility. It pro- cautious rate of depletion to avoid dep Nevertheless, Riyadh is eager to trim s \$6 million per month—now outweigh t	the Iran-Iraq war and to bably will continue its pressing oil prices. storage costs, which—at about he benefits of large stockpiles.	
disruptions of the world oil market by t increase its marketing flexibility. It pro- cautious rate of depletion to avoid dep Nevertheless, Riyadh is eager to trim s	the Iran-Iraq war and to bably will continue its pressing oil prices. storage costs, which—at about he benefits of large stockpiles. dissolve Norbec, their Swiss-	

#### **CANADA-SOUTH AFRICA: Hints of Further Sanctions**

Prime Minister Mulroney announced recently that Canada was considering total economic sanctions against South Africa and might go as far as breaking diplomatic relations. Mulroney also said he would try to persuade the US and the UK of the need for stronger action against Pretoria. The comments followed meetings with 25X1 leaders of the Frontline States, at which he opposed the use of violence to combat apartheid. 25X1

**Comment**: Canada has played a major role within the Commonwealth on the South African issue and is likely to call for more sanctions at a Commonwealth meeting in Vancouver next fall. It may also propose more economic aid for the Frontline States, but a break in diplomatic relations with Pretoria is unlikely. Greater economic pressure against South Africa would meet with widespread public support in Canada and would cost the troubled Mulroney government little because South Africa accounts for less than 1 percent of Canada's foreign trade. Given recent tensions with the US, Ottawa is unlikely to make a major attempt to influence US policy toward South Africa.



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	In Brief
Africa	<ul> <li>UNITA commandos attacked bridge near Cuito Cuanavale in</li> <li>Angola on Thursday, primary</li> <li>supply route to forward Angolan units severed will temporarily</li> <li>reduce threat to insurgent strongholds in area.</li> </ul>
	— Former President Nyerere may renege on promise to resign as head of <b>Tanzania</b> 's only party cronies reportedly engineering appeals demanding he stay Nyerere undermining President Mwinyi's economic reform, new IMF agreement.
Americas	<ul> <li>Colombian terrorist group M-19 reiterating threat to kidnap US Embassy personnel in retaliation for Lehder's arrest reports have linked terrorists to traffickers in plans to target Embassy personnel.</li> </ul>
East Asia	<ul> <li>South Korean police easily handled some 9,000 protesters, mostly students, who turned out for human rights rallies in Seoul, elsewhere Saturday meager public response may scuttle opposition plans for additional protests</li> </ul>
	— South Korea reportedly will respond on Friday to North Korea's call for political-military talks will reiterate these issues should be left to summit P'yongyang rejected this approach before, will probably persist in pushing new forum.
Western Europe	— Antonio Hernandez Mancha elected this weekend to head Spain's main conservative opposition party likely to give party more progressive, center-right image first major test will come in municipal, local elections this spring.
	<ul> <li>— Norwegian Defense Minister Holst, Chief of Staff Bull-Hansen continuing dispute over military strength, embarrassing minority Labor government opposition, conservative press support Bull-</li> </ul>
	Hansen if he resigned, government might be in jeopardy.

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	Special Analysis	25X
NDIA-PAKISTAN:	Force Levels, Tensions Remain High	
	The agreement this week to reduce forces in the border area is likely, if implemented by both sides, to reduce tensions and to provide the basis for continuing efforts to defuse the current situation. New Delhi appears determined to follow through with the Brass Tacks IV exercise, however, which is scheduled to continue until April, and each side is almost certain to retain a higher-than-normal military presence in sensitive border areas at least until the exercising forces return to garrison.	25X
	So far, both sides have deployed forces to provide defense against a sudden attack by the other. With the juxtaposition of heavily armed regular Army forces, a shooting incident could escalate quickly to more intense fighting, which could involve major forces on each side. Both countries appear prepared for a localized border conflict now.	25X
	Although India and Pakistan have taken steps to increase their overall military preparedness, particularly in the immediate border area, neither has taken the steps it would consider necessary for offensive action. Forces in the immediate border area are primarily infantry divisions, not the armored or mechanized units that both sides would	200
	rely on to press a major assault. India, if unconstrained by efforts to conceal the transition to a war footing, would be prepared to launch a major invasion of Pakistan and to bring the country to a war footing in 48 to 72 hours. Islamabad could achieve similar preparedness in 48 hours.	25X 25X
	Ground Forces	
		25X
	Pakistan and 850 tanks near the border, including its two armored divisions held in strategic reserve opposite Kashmir and Punjab. Islamabad	25X1
	considers these two divisions as necessary to counter any Indian	
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breakthrough; New Delhi sees t	nem as the primary Pakistani invasion	
forces.		25X1

#### Air and Naval Forces

Navies have not traditionally played a major part in Indo-Pakistani wars, and current naval dispositions probably are not considered threatening by either side. Both Navies are on alert, but most ships remain in port.

#### **Continued Risks**

During the initial implementation of the limited withdrawal agreement, Indian and Pakistani forces probably will continue to take additional steps to increase readiness elsewhere. The momentum of India's buildup should begin to slow next week, however. Because either side could gain a substantial advantage by cheating on the agreement given their poor intelligence capabilities both will continue to eye each other warily; a perception of cheating could triager new deployments and a new round of increased tensions.

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#### **Soviet Economic Indicators for 1986**

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	Special Analysis	
USSR:	Improved Economic Performance in 1986	
	The Soviet gross national product increased by about 4 percent last year, its fastest rate in a decade, because of a new high in farm output and reduced loss of work time. Progress in industrial modernization was slow, however, and some targets important to General Secretary Go <u>rbachev's program to acc</u> elerate economic	25)
	growth were missed.	25)
	Farm output increased by more than 7 percent, as an excellent forage crep and the fourth-largest grain-harvest on record-helped-Moscow- reduce grain-imports and contributed to increased production-of- meat,-milk, and eggs (Industry posted solid gains with annual growth of roughly 3.5 percent — up from about 2.5 percent in 1985. In the machinery sector output grew by nearly 4.5 percent—respectable but	25)
	well below the 6.6-percent growth planned to support industrial modernization. The sector was repeatedly criticized for failing to meet	
	goals for output mix, timely deliveries, and product quality.	25)
	Labor productivity in industry increased substantially to roughly 3 percent, as compared with about 2 percent per year between 1983 and 1985. Much of the improvement appears to have come from increased discipline, less drunkenness on the job, and more effective management, forced, in part, by labor shortages.	25)
	Some Mixed Signals	
	Some indicators of technical progress in industry show little improvement in 1986, despite gains in volume of output. The share of steel output produced with modern technology, for example, was virtually unchanged. In the machinery sector the rate of increase in production of high-technology products was not substantially higher than in recent years. On the other hand; Soviet reporting suggests that some slow progress was made last year in the conservation of energy and metal resources.	25) 25)
	The Soviets fell well short or meir plan to increase manufacturing capacity—an essential for Gorbachev's modernization campaign— despite the fastest annual growth in investment since the mid-1970s, about 7.5 percent. Although newly commissioned production facilities increased by 6 percent, this was less than half the rate planned to support the modernization program. Shortfalls were especially large in metallurgy, machine building, and energy. Progress remained slow in concentrating resources on high-priority projects, curtailing construction time, and reducing the volume of unfinished construction.	25)
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Per capita consumption grew by less than 1 percent in 1986, in part because legal sales of alcohol—a major component of consumer expenditures—fell by 37 percent as a result of the antialcohol campaign. Continued growth in wages, coupled with cutbacks in alcohol sales, resulted in a large increase in the amount of cash held by consumers. Despite greater availability of quality foods in both state-controlled and free markets, prices in the uncontrolled collective farm markets rose during 1986, reflecting the substantial increase in discretionary purchasing power.

Gains in key components of consumer welfare—food and housing may have earned Gorbachev some points with the populace. He can claim credit for improving Soviet economic performance despite the impact of the Chernobyl' nuclear accident and a deterioration of 15 to 20 percent in hard currency terms of trade because of the falling world price of oil.

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	Special Analysis
PERU:	The Threat From Sendero Luminoso
	Widespread attacks last month indicate that the extremist Sendero Luminoso insurgency has recovered from personnel losses it suffered during prison riots in mid-1986. The movement continues to recruit among the Indian peasantry, extend its rura operations into new regions, and increase its terrorist strikes in Lima. Neither President Garcia nor the military has developed a
	counterinsurgency strategy that will stem growing violence.
	Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, is Peru's largest and most dangerous insurgent group. It is a tightly knit organization of ethnocentric fanatics who espouse a hybrid ideology fashioned from Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and a rural, indigenous populism. The group seeks the total elimination of white and mestizo authority from Peru and the expulsion of all foreign influences. Although it shuns foreign sponsors and spurns alliances with other domestic radicals, i has grown from several hundred members in remote Ayacucho Department in 1980 to more than 4,000 guerrillas who operate
	throughout the country.
	Sendero Luminoso suffered a severe setback last year when some 250 members were killed during the government's suppression of riots in Lima's prisons. As a result,
	its leaders slowed operations during the last months of 1986 and restructured their forces nationwide.
	Resumption of Insurgent Attacks
	Lima has recently experienced a new wave of terrorist attacks, and,
	Sendero Luminoso plans to carry out a major attack in the capital every week. In mid-January, according to the US Embassy, the group blacked out Lima and six coastal departments—affecting more than one-half of Peru's population—by bombing power facilities in Lima and Junin. During the power failure, the guerrillas burned two textile factories and bombed several banks.
	Late last month, the group bombed several offices of Garcia's ruling party, wounding at least seven party members. The guerrillas also killed three guards in a daylight assault on the Indian Embassy and a few days later murdered a senior member of the ruling party.
	Meanwhile, the guerrillas continue small-scale attacks in rural areas to replenish supplies, damage economic infrastructure, and kill local authorities. Embassy reporting indicates the group is expanding
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rapidly into Puno and Cusco Departments in the south.	25X1
the insurgents are establishing a new military	2571
front in Puno-which borders Bolivia-and are making Cusco a	
logistic center and safehaven.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The Government Response	

Garcia has been unwilling to extend to new areas of heavy guerrilla activity emergency powers that would enable the military to take over the counterinsurgency effort from the police. He apparently believes such a move would call attention to the declining security situation. Peru's three police forces, however, lack the manpower, weapons, transport, communications equipment, and intelligence resources to combat the insurgency effectively

Even in areas where the armed forces are in control, according to<br/>the military generally reacts to25X1Insurgent actions and provides defense for larger towns, rather than<br/>patrolling aggressively. The rugged mountain regions where the<br/>insurgency thrives pose special tactical problems for the Army,<br/>particularly because the military is deficient in high-altitude<br/>helicopters.25X1

Garcia has often said that the underlying causes of the insurgency are poverty and inequity, but neither he nor the military is yet committed to a comprehensive counterinsurgency program that emphasizes civic action, psychological operations, or rural development. Sendero Luminoso leaders, however, apparently recognize the potential effectiveness of government civic action programs; they are increasingly targeting persons and facilities associated with rural development efforts.

### Outlook

Rural insurgent attacks and urban terrorism are likely to increase this year. The guerrillas probably will continue to avoid major clashes with the military, preferring small-unit attacks and high-profile sabotage operations that pose little risk of a substantial setback. Moreover, the extension of Sendero Luminoso activities into new rural areas will further stretch the government's already strapped counterinsurgency resources

Peru—particularly Lima—already is experiencing one of the highest rates of terrorism in the world, and the likelihood of foreign casualties, even if incurred incidentally, is rising. Attacks on foreign targets, and assassinations of high-level civilian and military leaders, would put increased pressure on Garcia to adopt tougher counterinsurgency measures.

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