

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

~~Secret~~

25X1

South Africa in the 1990s: Decade of Dramatic Change

25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

25X1

~~Secret~~

*ALA 86-10015L
April 1986*

Copy **85**

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

25X1

South Africa in the 1990s: Decade of Dramatic Change

25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

25X1

25X1

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
[redacted] the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa
Division. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

*ALA 86-10015L
April 1986*

Secret

25X1

South Africa in the 1990s: Decade of Dramatic Change

25X1

Overview

*Information available
as of 20 March 1986
was used in this report.*

From time to time the Directorate of Intelligence publishes reports that attempt to examine key international trends from a broad and longer term perspective. This speculative paper is designed to provide policymakers with a context for long-range planning by assessing the likelihood of political change in South Africa and its implications for the United States.

25X1

This report analyzes the patterns of black protest and white response in South Africa and, projecting beyond the trend analysis of previously published intelligence reports,¹ lays out the dynamic for fundamental political change in the 1990s.

25X1

In preparing this assessment, we employed a task force approach that included roundtable discussions with policymakers, interviews with academics and other experts, [REDACTED] The task force sought and obtained a wide range of perspectives on the issues discussed in this paper. In addition, this assessment draws upon the work already published by the Directorate of Intelligence on South Africa. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

ALA 86-10015L
April 1986

Secret

25X1

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Overview	iii
Key Judgments	vii
Introduction	1
Before the Choice—The Failure of Managed Reform	1
Economic Growth	3
Containing Black Unrest	4
Co-opting Blacks To Compromise	6
A Consistent Approach to Reform	6
Avoiding Sanctions	7
The 1990s—Moving Beyond the Stalemate	7
Implications for the West	9

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

**South Africa in the 1990s:
Decade of Dramatic Change**

25X1

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 20 March 1986
was used in this report.*

Dramatic political change is already taking place in South Africa and by the end of this century we believe the transition to black majority rule in Pretoria will be well under way, if not complete. Nevertheless, we believe there will not be a convulsive violent revolution because blacks will not have the capacity to overthrow the government by force given Pretoria's overwhelming security apparatus. The specific nature of a new black majority government—that is, whether it is a federal system or based solely on the principle of one man—one vote—and of the guarantees provided whites will depend in large part on the circumstances and events preceding that government's formation. We believe, however, that black willingness to compromise will diminish over time, and that the rights and privileges retained by whites will depend upon how quickly whites agree to negotiate with blacks on a solution to the country's racial crisis.

In our judgment, current political, social, and economic trends in South Africa work against the program of incremental reform pursued by the white regime:

- The South African economy is unlikely to grow vigorously during the coming years, undermining government efforts to assuage black frustrations through the provision of economic benefits. The inability of the South African economy to provide an improved standard of living for the country's rapidly growing black population is, in our view, the fundamental reason why the government's incremental reforms will fail to meet black expectations and reduce racial tensions. In the absence of economic solutions, blacks will seek political answers to their problems.
- Black unrest will continue and will impact more directly on whites.
- Blacks will become increasingly radical in their political views and less likely to settle for political reforms short of black majority rule.
- The government reform program will continue to appear inconsistent, undercutting Pretoria's efforts to attract moderate black support.
- International economic pressure on South Africa—including sanctions—is likely to increase.

Secret

25X1

As these trends become more acute during the 1990s, we believe that the strategy of managed reform will be discredited—not only in black eyes but for whites as well. Whites probably will then have to choose between two stark options: either impose a massive security crackdown involving the deaths of thousands of blacks and the complete suspension of many civil liberties, or agree to negotiations with black leaders to develop a new political system for the country.

Given the determination of South African whites, particularly Afrikaners, and their fears concerning black majority rule, we believe it more likely that Pretoria will first try to use force to quash black unrest. Such a development, in our view, could easily lead to bloody racial conflict. Racial strife claiming thousands of white and black lives could last for many years, given the resources of the white security establishment, but it is our judgment that whites could not endure indefinitely the political, economic, and human costs of a state of siege. Pretoria would eventually seek a negotiated end to the conflict, but with a black population willing to accept little less than white surrender. A less destructive transition to black-white power sharing is possible, in our view, only if a courageous and visionary Afrikaner leader emerges who is willing to drag whites into negotiations with blacks even in the absence of white consensus and before violence exhausts white determination to remain in power.

The United States and other Western nations will have scant ability to influence South Africa's Afrikaner leaders to pursue a negotiated solution. The impetus for a dramatic reversal in white policies toward blacks will most likely have to come from within the white community.

If South African whites attempt to force blacks into submission and essentially abandon reform efforts, opportunities for Soviet and Communist influence among nonwhites will grow. In addition, the United States and the West will:

- Be accused of supporting the white regime in international forums, despite the absence of effective Western leverage over Pretoria.
- Be hard pressed to keep other black states in the region from becoming involved in the conflict, particularly if the Soviet Union increases its influence with these governments.
- Be expected to insulate neighboring states from the effects of economic sanctions imposed on South Africa.

Secret

Secret


25X1

- Find it increasingly difficult to maintain useful contacts with black South Africans. Militant blacks may increasingly reject any cooperation with whites or the West.

If and when whites agree to negotiate with blacks on a transition to black majority rule, Pretoria may ask the United States and other Western countries to exert pressure on blacks in hopes of gaining their agreement to guaranteed protection of white minority rights. A new black government in South Africa will face significant economic problems as it attempts to improve conditions for millions of impoverished homeland blacks, and the West may be able to use promises of economic aid to persuade black leaders to moderate their demands.

The emergence of a black government in Pretoria certainly will not end the country's political and economic problems, and some of those problems will even worsen. Nevertheless, we do not expect trends in South Africa to mirror exactly those in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, in part because of a higher level of economic development, a vibrant private sector—black and white—and a sense of nationhood not often evident elsewhere in Africa.'

As the West develops relations with a new black-dominated government in South Africa, it probably will be called upon not only to provide financial support but also to ease black South Africa's entry into African politics and rebuff attempts by the Soviet Union to support leftist parties' efforts to gain control of the government. At the same time, the United States will probably find itself in an environment where it needs to counter black suspicion of US intentions and operate diplomatically in an unsettled arena where rival black tribal and political groups maneuver to gain dominance.




25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Figure 1
South Africa



706985 (543001) 3-88

25X1

Secret

25X1

South Africa in the 1990s: Decade of Dramatic Change

25X1

Introduction

During the 1990s, the future of South Africa will be the key African issue for the United States because of the strong influence that events there have on US domestic politics and because of southern Africa's strategic and economic importance. US policymakers will face many difficult, seemingly no-win decisions, both because the policies and attitudes of white and black political leaders will leave much to be desired and because, given the uniqueness of the South African situation, it will be difficult to ascertain just how quickly change will come.

We believe that developments in South Africa will be erratic and volatile in nature. Already, seemingly isolated and insignificant events—such as a rent boycott in several black townships and a decision by one Western bank to curtail operations—have had wide-ranging political and economic repercussions. As the crisis in South Africa continues into the 1990s, we expect that the chances will increase that one event or a series of seemingly unrelated events could start a process that culminates in fundamental political change.

While analysts disagree on many of the specifics of change—the where, what, when, why, and how—most believe that South Africa by the year 2000 either will have decided to negotiate the transition to black majority rule before suffering a full-scale race war, or will have already plunged into a conflict that can only end, in our view, with black rule. Some analysts believe, however, that the whites can muddle through and that South Africa by the year 2000 will look much as it does today. It is also possible that South African whites—much like the political elites in Iran during the late 1970s—will suddenly lose their will and capitulate rapidly and without much violence. These latter two scenarios—which the majority of analysts believe are unlikely—are described in the

inset “South Africa: Could Things Be Different in the 1990s?” The analysis that follows reflects the majority view that by the end of the century the transition to black majority rule in South Africa will be well under way, if not complete.

25X1

Before the Choice—the Failure of Managed Reform

At some point in the 1990s, if events proceed as we believe most South African whites would prefer, South Africa would have a complex and unique form of government and society that would allow for much greater intermingling of the races in economic, social, and even some government arenas. In this system, however, blacks would participate in national decisionmaking forums but whites would retain control over the most important national issues, such as security and economic policy. Under this government-imposed scenario, most Coloreds and Asians and a substantial number of blacks would be satisfied with this national accommodation, largely because of the benefits derived from cooperation. South Africa would still be a violent society, but unrest there would increasingly be viewed by all races as counterproductive and would be carried out by hooligan elements that have little political or moral support within their communities.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Despite white hopes and intentions, we believe the prospects are slim that South Africa will evolve into such a benevolent form of white domination. If South Africa is to proceed along a path of government-managed reform, certain minimum conditions must be met. In our judgment, however, current political and economic trends, both domestic and international, work against these conditions being fulfilled, and we expect that most of these trends will become more acute during the next few years.

25X1

Secret

Secret

South Africa: Could Things Be Different in the 1990s?

A convulsive, violent revolution in South Africa is extremely unlikely, in our view, during this century. Although revolutionary fervor could increase markedly among nonwhites over the next 15 years, they will not have the capacity to overthrow the government by force, given the government's overwhelming security apparatus. The following scenarios are plausible alternatives to what we believe are the dynamics that are likely to force fundamental change in South Africa by the year 2000. []

Whites Stay in Control by Sharing Power to a Limited Extent. *The government under the National Party proposes a national convention to write a new constitution. Participation in the convention is carefully circumscribed to eliminate the more militant nonwhite groups. Homeland leaders and other cooperative blacks are included. The result is an extremely complex confederal system that appears to offer power sharing to blacks but leaves whites in control of the economy and national security forces. Because of the poor state of the economy, gains by nonwhites are made at the expense of whites, leaving all groups dissatisfied and forcing the government to perform a perpetual economic balancing act. The West tentatively applauds the new system, although many observers warn that black aspirations will continue to be thwarted. Black areas—including urban communities—are given more autonomy, and there is some breakdown in apartheid as blacks are allowed to buy land in white areas and property ownership becomes the basis for citizenship in specific federal areas. Violence continues, but the reforms buy time and allow a white-dominated government to survive beyond the year 2000.* []

White Rule Collapses. *The government under the National Party proceeds with its program of incremental racial reform amid a high level of township unrest and guerrilla operations that cause many*

white casualties. By the end of this decade, black leaders—although still deeply divided—are able to organize repeated general strikes. Many workers are killed—especially in the mines—as the government tries unsuccessfully to break the strikes. At the same time, the government continues with its measured plans to liberalize apartheid laws. Economic conditions become chaotic with hyperinflation, shortages of essential goods, and interruptions in basic services. Emigration of highly skilled whites escalates. []

The whites who stay, convinced their survival is in immediate danger, become highly polarized and the National Party splits. One camp urges the government to negotiate quickly with credible black leaders before it is too late to obtain some guarantees for whites. Other whites pressure the government to stop its reform program, eliminate black leaders, and put down unrest with massive use of force. The government, paralyzed by a similar conflict within its own ranks, does neither. Instead, in a desperate attempt for a mandate, new elections are called. []

Results are inconclusive but a shaky parliamentary coalition is formed and demands the resignation of the State President. The divisive process of selecting a successor dissolves the parliamentary coalition. Significant black groups, meanwhile, sensing their white opponents are in disarray, agree to joint action and approach a new white coalition willing to negotiate majority rule. Senior military leaders, anxious to play a role in restoring order to the country and impatient with an equivocating white government, also support a plan for black majority government. []

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Figure 2. Millions of blacks live in squatter settlements in rapidly urbanizing South Africa. ☐



25X1

Prospects for managed reform satisfying to the majority of both whites and nonwhites are extremely bleak, in our view, unless South Africa:

- Has vigorous economic growth that allows for the emergence of a large black middle class.
- Contains unrest in black areas.
- Co-opts a majority of the new black middle class by convincing its members that economic gains outweigh majority political rights, while showing urban blacks in general that the government will not be forced to give up control over national decisionmaking regardless of the tactics blacks employ.
- Adopts a more consistent approach to racial reform.
- Avoids the imposition of stringent economic sanctions by the world community. ☐

Economic Growth

It is unlikely that South Africa's economy will grow fast enough or that economic resources will be redistributed sufficiently to permit a dramatic and broad-based increase in nonwhite living standards and the

development of a large black middle class. The specifics of South Africa's economic constraints are staggering. Urban blacks suffer from housing shortages, inadequate community facilities, dismal schooling systems, and widespread unemployment and underemployment. Just to bring the black education system to white standards by 1990, Pretoria, by its own estimation, would have to spend annually an additional \$2.7 billion or 18 percent of the total current budget (see figure 3). ☐

25X1

Between now and 1990, South Africa's economy is not expected to grow nearly fast enough to allow Pretoria to deal with any of these economic problems. CIA calculations indicate that, at the present level of production, the economy must grow at a sustained annual rate of about 5 percent simply to absorb new black entrants into the labor force, now estimated at about 1,000 per day. We expect—as at least one major international economic forecasting service predicts—that South Africa's annual rate of real economic growth for the remainder of this decade will be no greater than that realized in the first half of the

25X1


Secret

Figure 3
Expected Growth in South African Population

Million persons

January 1985 South African Government figures Total: 32.4

Projected for year 2000 by US Census Bureau Total: 44.9



308354 2-86

1980s—or about 2 to 3 percent at best. This rate could be lower if the price of gold falls, the world economic recovery slows sharply, or South Africa's economic isolation increases.

Given these economic constraints, we do not believe that a large, privileged, nonwhite middle class will emerge during the 1990s. In our judgment, black townships will continue to be divided communities, with some residents enjoying improved living standards but with the majority existing much as they do now—working in menial jobs, often unemployed, living in overcrowded conditions, and sending their children to inadequate schools. Many of these residents will stand to lose little if they engage in political protests or commit criminal acts out of boredom and frustration.

Containing Black Unrest

Given the lack of economic opportunity for most urban blacks—particularly those under 18, who make up over 50 percent of the population—we believe that

the next five years will be characterized by persistent violence in the black townships. Much of this violence will at first glance appear self-destructive, with many militant blacks killing those who “collaborate” with the white regime and destroying facilities within their own townships.

As the unrest persists, however, we believe that it will increasingly strike directly at whites and be more difficult to control. In our view, current trends in the violence—particularly in the already more radicalized Colored and black townships of Cape Province—provide early indicators of how nonwhite protest will evolve throughout the country during the next few years.

A review of unrest over the past 18 months suggests that among the most significant characteristics of nonwhite unrest are:

- The ability of black and Colored communities—particularly in the Eastern Cape—to sustain lengthy boycotts against white businesses. These boycotts have hurt white businessmen, forcing some into bankruptcy and leading others to seek accommodations with black activists. When local negotiations have failed to stem unrest, white communities have begun to put pressure on the national government to be more forthcoming in addressing black demands.
- The widespread disruption of the nonwhite education system caused by constant boycotts by black and Colored youths. Militant, idle youth have been the principal instigators of violence in the townships. The disruption of their education has long-term implications as well—many will be unable to find jobs in the future, adding to the pool of frustrated, unemployed blacks in the townships, and further diminishing prospects that a stable black middle class will emerge and be willing to cooperate with the plans of white politicians.
- The growing distrust of South African security services by even politically moderate or apathetic blacks. According to press and US Embassy reporting, many “middle class” parents condone, or at least excuse, the violence perpetrated by radical youth.

Secret

Figure 4. Government attempts to clamp down on unrest have failed to discourage young blacks from engaging in violent protest. ☐



25X1

- The greater willingness of the militant youth—including the Coloreds of the Western Cape—to engage in random violence against whites.
- The refusal of many black protestors to be intimidated by police actions and reprisals.
- The frequent attacks on black collaborators, which have, according to press and US Embassy reporting, disrupted the informer networks of the South African police.
- The tendency of black and Colored activists to organize more informally, thus making it difficult for the security services to contain unrest through detentions.
- The attempt to create “liberated” areas in some black communities, particularly in the Eastern Cape townships, which security services hesitate to enter. ☐

We believe that the declining control of South African security services over some black townships will make it easier for insurgent groups such as the exiled

African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress to operate in black communities. We expect that in coming years and during the 1990s the ANC and PAC will no longer have to depend almost exclusively upon operatives infiltrated from neighboring black countries for the execution of terrorist operations. These organizations, or new terrorist groups that may emerge, will be able to recruit and maintain agents in the black townships who are able to elude police detection. ☐

25X1

Over time, persistent unrest in South Africa will drag down the country's economy. There is yet no firm accounting available of how the current violence has affected the economy, but the instability in the Eastern Cape already has had a spillover economic effect on the region. We expect that widespread unrest will lead to longer and more politically inspired strikes by black workers and damage even further South Africa's poor economic prospects. ☐

25X1

Sustained unrest in the black townships, in our view, also will increasingly create a social climate that encourages violence and rewards the militants. This is

25X1

Secret

Secret

a difficult phenomenon to quantify, but experience in numerous diverse countries—Lebanon, Uganda, Northern Ireland—have led academics to theorize that once violence destroys the rhythm of everyday life, people become inured to its consequences and a new generation emerges whose lifestyle and morals are geared to coping with a violent existence. New leaders emerge in the communities who may not be particularly skillful at political compromise, but who do command the militants who control the streets. Already in South Africa, the press and US Embassy reports point to the fact that gangs of young blacks led by obscure radicals are disrupting their communities, closing down the schools, destroying facilities, committing random crimes, and intimidating the politically uninvolved. We believe black political leaders will find it increasingly difficult to control the militant youth in the townships and, as a consequence, the whites will be less able to cut political deals to dampen unrest. []

Co-opting Blacks To Compromise

In our view, the depressed economy and the persistent violence in black communities will increasingly undermine the white leadership's chances of satisfying black demands without relinquishing political control at the national level. Most urban blacks will not, during the 1990s, experience a significant improvement in their standard of living. Under such conditions, we consider it unlikely that most influential moderate black leaders will have either enough support or enough courage to step forward and openly support the political reforms that Pretoria is likely to offer. []

This will not stop Pretoria from pursuing its own incremental reform agenda, at least initially. But subsequent alterations in the apartheid system will not, in our judgment, quell township violence or black demands for political power at the national level. Reporting from press sources and from our Embassy and consulates in South Africa is consistent—blacks already demand an effective political role at the national level and want to be consulted before a new political dispensation is announced. Pretoria's continued offers of limited reforms and economic improvements will become increasingly irrelevant to black demands. []

The government's experience with Coloreds already presages, in our view, the impotency of the gradual reform strategy. []

[] the Coloreds were supposed to be easier to co-opt than blacks—they already were better off economically and the government even gave them their own chamber in Parliament. But the willingness of veteran Colored politicians to sign on to these reforms has not insulated the Colored communities from the same violence that has ravaged black areas. []

A Consistent Approach to Reform

One of the principal characteristics of South Africa's reform program to date has been its appearance of inconsistency. The record repeatedly shows that just when the stage is set for a significant announcement on reform by the state President, white political pressures or Cabinet indecisiveness lead the government to postpone initiatives. Or, just after the government has decided on a substantive reform, another government component announces moves that smack of old-fashioned apartheid. In our judgment, this pattern has cost whites the support of nonwhite moderates, who fear coming out in support of government moves lest another bureaucrat in Pretoria make a contradictory speech. []

We expect that this fitful approach to reform will continue during the next few years. Despite the not insignificant support that will exist for more far-reaching reforms—particularly among businessmen, academics, and journalists—we believe that the National Party, at least initially, will be unable to unite behind a more ambitious reform program. Because of its Afrikaner ethnic character, the National Party tends to amplify the voices of conservative white South Africans who favor only the most minor changes in the apartheid system. Although recent public statements indicate some Afrikaner leaders favor more dramatic and risky reform initiatives, public opinion polls suggest their base of support within the party is limited. []

The National Party, in our view, thus will continue to hew to a middle-of-the-road policy that is reformist but not daring enough to alienate conservative whites

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Figure 5. The white government will find its resources strained as it attempts to hold the line against mounting black pressure. ☐



25X1

or placate enough blacks. Conservative whites will continue to insist that only the abandonment of the reform effort and a return to the traditional principles of apartheid and even harsher security measures will restore order, while other reform-minded South Africans—most important, the businessmen—will remain frustrated by their inability to influence National Party policy. ☐

Avoiding Sanctions

The South African Government will have a difficult time avoiding the imposition of stiffer international economic sanctions over the next few years, thus making the implementation of costly reforms that much harder. To date, most Western nations have refrained from imposing extensive economic sanctions, but continued violence and repressive security measures on Pretoria's part will keep international attention focused on South Africa and complicate attempts by friendly governments to defer punitive sanctions. ☐

We believe that sanctions, independent of their effect on white resolve, would damage further the government's ability to meet black demands and defuse black unrest. Specifically, sanctions would:

- Eventually result in lower growth rates for the South African economy, further reducing the size of the pie that whites have to share—however unevenly—with blacks. South African economic officials

admitted openly, for example, that South Africa could only generate a 2- to 3-percent growth rate if it relied solely on domestic investment; the country needs foreign capital to grow at the brisk rates necessary to improve living conditions for a substantial number of urban blacks.

- Increase the blacks' confidence that their efforts are having an impact not only in South Africa but also abroad, and thus make them even less amenable to limited reforms. ☐

25X1

25X1

The 1990s—Moving Beyond the Stalemate

Rising black unrest and international criticism will at some point in the 1990s, in our view, bring the white regime to essentially two options: either institute a massive and indefinite security crackdown to quash black militancy or agree to negotiate with blacks on a new political system that provides nonwhites with the majority voice in the national government. Facing the necessity of making such a decision will not be easy for South African whites, and we expect that Pretoria will first seek halfway measures that do not foreclose either option. In fact, the white political leadership may never consciously make this decision, but eventually, in our view, its policies, either by design or by accident, will lead the country in one or the other direction. ☐

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

In our view, it is more likely that the white regime will attempt to use force to bring black unrest under control. We expect that by the 1990s quashing black militancy would require the imposition of harsh security measures that would involve the permanent detention and the killing of thousands of nonwhites.

Institution of a harsher security regime will only further politicize and polarize black attitudes. One of the new characteristics of the current unrest has been the failure of blacks—particularly militant youth—to buckle under in the face of constant and often brutal police reprisals. We expect this militancy to deepen and spread in the black communities. A massive security sweep against blacks could touch off a nationwide spasm of violence, strikes, and boycotts that would force Pretoria to commit much of the white male labor force to restoring order, cause severe economic dislocation, and end all chance that South African blacks would agree to a political solution that offered even minimal guarantees of white minority rights.

South African leaders will hesitate to launch a massive crackdown precisely because they are aware, in our view, that such actions could end all prospects for gradual reform. The longer Pretoria waits before bringing the full force of its security services to bear against blacks, however, the more likely it becomes, in our view, that such a crackdown would precipitate a widespread and even bloodier racial conflict.

If an aggressive and coordinated crackdown does occur, the implications would be wide-reaching:

- The South African economy would enter a severe depression as blacks withdrew their labor, as everyday commerce and trade were disrupted, and as a result of the international economic sanctions that would probably be imposed.
- South Africa's black neighbors—probably with Soviet encouragement—would be more likely to extend additional support to black insurgent groups, for example, by allowing them greater freedom to operate from their territories. The leaders of black neighboring states probably would still be concerned

about the threat of South African reprisals, but they would also want to support the black opposition in order to gain entree to those who would eventually form the new black South African government.

- The South African military would assume broad powers subverting civilian authority and bringing the country under de facto martial law.
- White casualties would rise significantly.
- Black homeland leaders would begin to lose control over their populations, and South Africa would have to spread its overextended security forces even further to maintain order in rural areas.

Racial strife claiming thousands of white and black lives could last for many years given the resources of the white security establishment, but it is our judgment that whites could not long endure the political, economic, and human costs of a state of siege. While a massive security crackdown might bring a respite, it would not provide whites with a long-lasting solution to their racial problems. As the consequences of the state of siege become more acute, South African white political leaders will be reluctantly drawn to the option they had earlier ignored—negotiations with black political leaders. Whites, however, will probably find themselves negotiating with more radicalized blacks who will be less willing to settle for something less than one man—one vote in a unitary state.

Despite the counterproductive nature of a massive security response, most observers believe South African whites are unlikely to negotiate seriously with blacks unless they have first failed to suppress a major insurrection and suffered a significant increase in white casualties.

According to polls and a review of Afrikaner press, whites consistently favor a strong law-and-order stance, and they sincerely fear that black majority rule would eventually lead to the destruction of their standard of living and bring South Africa to the sorry state of most black African nations.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X6

25X6

25X6

25X1

Secret

Secret

Nevertheless, we believe it is possible—although we disagree to what extent—that the futility of reform imposed from above and mounting black unrest will lead more South African politicians and other elites, even among the Afrikaners, to realize that considerable concessions will have to be made to prevent a major racial conflict, including an agreement to negotiate with blacks on a new political system for the country. Such views today are held by a minority, particularly among Afrikaners, but there are those even in the National Party who believe that whites must take bold and risky actions. []

This less destructive transition to black-white power sharing is possible, in our view, only if a courageous and visionary Afrikaner leader emerges who is willing to drag whites into negotiations with blacks even in the absence of a white consensus and before violence exhausts white determination to remain in power. Any South African leader who offered to negotiate with blacks on an equal basis would have a difficult time convincing blacks of his sincerity, not to mention getting black agreement to a political system that is sensitive to white concerns in such areas as the economy, education, and foreign policy. Whites would enter such negotiations still hoping to play upon black divisions and planning to draw out the talks as long as possible (see also inset, "South Africa: Could Things be Different in the 1990s?"). []

Implications for the West

We believe that the United States and other Western countries will have limited leverage to influence South Africa's Afrikaner leaders to pursue a negotiated solution. International attempts to facilitate negotiations are also likely to have little impact, given the whites' belief that institutions such as the United Nations are basically hostile to their interests. The impetus for a dramatic reversal in white policies toward blacks, in our view, will have to come from within the white community. US and Western experience in dealing with Pretoria has consistently demonstrated that South African politicians do not respond to outside pressure, particularly in regard to domestic policy. The West instead will probably have to spend most of its energies in ensuring that the South African

domestic crisis does not become a regional one and in preventing the Soviet Bloc from acquiring too much influence with the increasingly radicalized black groups. []

If South African whites during the 1990s attempt to force blacks into submission, we believe that opportunities for Soviet and Communist influence among nonwhites will be even greater. Soviet-supported black insurgent groups will become more active as South African security forces are preoccupied with quelling growing domestic unrest. The Soviet Bloc's willingness to provide at least prompt rhetorical support for even some of the more militant nonwhite demands will probably win it new friends. Moscow, however, will face its own problems in dealing with the South African crisis. Although Soviet ties to the ANC are well-established, many of its Communist supporters in the organization are white, Colored, or Asian. In addition, Moscow's access to other black militant groups within South Africa will be likely to remain limited, and some of these new black leaders probably will compete with the ANC for the support of the black majority. The Soviet Union probably will try to expand its contacts among blacks to accommodate the likely growth of exclusive, radical black consciousness among South African blacks and perhaps even within the ANC. We believe the Soviets will place a high priority on maintaining Marxist governments in countries such as Angola, and developing new Marxist allies in countries such as Zimbabwe to serve as models for future South African black leaders and to allow the Soviets to use these governments to maintain contact with black militants. Moscow's ability to increase its influence with South Africa's black neighbors will improve if Pretoria—as seems likely—continues to attempt to destabilize these governments to prevent them from supporting black insurgent groups. []

As racial unrest worsens in South Africa, we believe the United States and the West will:

- Be accused of supporting the white regime in international forums. Despite the absence of effective Western leverage over Pretoria, many governments, particularly in the Third World, will hold the West

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

responsible for black deaths and expect Western governments to impose a solution. At the same time, Pretoria will attempt to depict the struggle solely in East-West terms, and will ask the United States and other countries for military assistance.

- Be hard pressed to keep other black African states neutral, particularly if the Soviet Union increases its influence with these governments.
- Be expected to insulate neighboring African states from the effects of economic sanctions imposed on South Africa. Black governments will press the West for increased economic assistance to compensate for the spillover effects of sanctions.
- Be increasingly rebuffed by black South Africans. Western governments will find it difficult to maintain useful contacts with militant blacks who may increasingly reject any cooperation with whites.

[]

If and when South African whites do attempt to negotiate a transfer to black majority rule, the West may find itself intimately involved in the process. Whites, for example, may ask the United States and other Western countries to offer promises of economic assistance in return for concessions from blacks. Black leaders, in fact, are likely to realize the potential for instability in the impoverished black homelands even after South Africa comes under black majority rule, and may be willing to guarantee some white minority rights in return for a massive Western economic aid program for the homelands. []

In our opinion, the emergence of a black government in South Africa will not end the country's political or security problems, and will exacerbate economic difficulties. Black politics are likely to be unstable; blacks will be divided along tribal, class, and ideological lines. The Soviet Union will support leftist parties in their attempt to gain control over the government. In addition, a black South Africa will not easily fit into the politics of the African continent because South Africa, with its much larger economy and sophisticated and relatively advanced military, is likely to have interests different from those of the other Sub-Saharan countries. The United States and other Western nations probably will still be caught in tensions between the new South Africa and its African neighbors. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

Secret