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Cuban Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa



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A Research Paper

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*ALA 86-10034
August 1986*

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Cuban Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [Redacted] the
Middle America–Caribbean Division with
contributions from the Africa Division of the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, the
[Redacted] and the Office of
Leadership Analysis. [Redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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**Cuban Presence in
Sub-Saharan Africa**

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Scope Note

This paper

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[Redacted] It discusses Havana's tools and tactics for achieving its objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa. The benefits of and constraints on Cuba's activities in the region are also addressed, including an assessment of Fidel Castro's perspective on the current situation in southern Africa. Detailed information on Cuba's involvement and numbers of Cuban personnel in various Sub-Saharan African states are given in an appendix arranged alphabetically by country. [Redacted]

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Cuban Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa 


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Summary


Information available as of 15 June 1986 was used in this report.

President Fidel Castro's campaign to promote Third World militancy against the West has been most successful in Sub-Saharan Africa. Havana's dramatic interventions in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid-1970s marked Cuba's emergence as a major force in the Third World and greatly increased Havana's value to Moscow. Prior to 1975, Cuba had diplomatic relations with 20 Sub-Saharan African states and fewer than 2,000 civilian and military personnel stationed there. Today the Cuban presence in Sub-Saharan Africa totals some 49,000 military and civilian personnel, and Havana has formal ties to 38 countries. 


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Havana has gained influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by focusing its efforts on cooperation agreements and economic aid programs for smaller countries, providing security assistance to beleaguered regimes, and giving limited political and material support to incipient revolutionary movements. 

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Cuban military and security assistance is the largest and most influential component of Havana's foreign aid program to Africa. Havana's assistance in this area includes providing asylum and training in Cuba for guerrilla groups; training in third countries; financial assistance and arms deliveries; security training and personal bodyguards for selected leaders; advisory cadres, which on occasion have participated in combat operations; and combat forces for both defensive and offensive operations. To conserve scarce economic resources, most of the military assistance Havana provides to African countries consists of advisory personnel or troops. More than 80 percent of the Cuban presence in the region consists of combat troops or military advisers. Cuban military personnel currently are serving in a dozen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

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The presence of Cuban combat troops in Sub-Saharan Africa gives Havana the ability to deploy military personnel rapidly to another country in the region should an ally need assistance and presents Cuba with opportunities to exert significant influence on the internal politics of the host country. Cuban intelligence and security advisers stationed in numerous African countries provide prime sources of information and influence for Havana, and in at least two cases—Angola and the Congo—they have helped stabilize pro-Cuban regimes. 

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Cuban military commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa have not been without cost, however. [redacted] increasing discontent in both the Cuban military and the domestic population over Cuba's 11-year involvement in Angola. Moreover, worsening economic conditions will probably contribute to Havana's reluctance to increase its commitments to Ethiopia and Mozambique. [redacted]

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As with its military aid, Cuba's civilian assistance programs emphasize sending Cuban personnel trained in such areas as medicine, agriculture, construction, education, government, and mass organizations. Currently there are about 8,500 Cuban civilians in 19 African nations. In addition to these civilian assistance programs, Havana provides over 16,000 scholarships for African students to study at the secondary and postgraduate level in Cuba. Although such civilian assistance programs have generally been successful in expanding Cuban influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, reporting indicates that Havana's economic problems have led it to cut the costs of its current programs, which may restrict its ability to finance new aid projects.



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Havana probably will try to compensate for its economic constraints and the stalemate in Angola by focusing greater attention on South Africa. Castro, perceiving the United States as on the defensive from mounting international criticism of South Africa, is working to rally black African states against Washington and Pretoria, and to highlight Cuba's role as leader of the struggle against apartheid. Havana is likely to score significant successes in isolating Pretoria during the August summit of the Nonaligned Movement, where Havana wields significant influence. Cuba is using its influence gained from training and equipping ANC guerrillas in Angola to urge the ANC to take more aggressive and violent action inside South Africa. We believe, however, that Havana's efforts to aid SWAPO will continue to be hindered by the disunity of this insurgent organization.



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The Castro regime will continue to seek new opportunities for influence in the region. Havana probably will emphasize sending personnel and offering programs such as security training and scholarships for secondary students. Excluding an unanticipated situation in South Africa, however, we do not expect a significant expansion in Cuba's presence in the area. Havana already has diplomatic relations with most Sub-Saharan nations, and few seem inclined to permit a large Cuban presence. [redacted]

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Africa has given Castro the opportunity to become an important political actor on a global scale. This, in our estimation, assures the continuation of his meddling on that continent for as long as he remains in power. Moreover, he apparently believes that the trend of events in southern Africa is irreversible, and he sees a major Cuban role there as a means of guaranteeing himself a prominent place in history. His commitment to the struggle for "liberation" is fundamental and unyielding, and we believe he cannot bear to be excluded from what he sees as a historic process that will inevitably result in the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. His struggle allows him to don the cloak of moral righteousness and gives him leverage in international relations, especially in multilateral forums. He seems willing to disregard the growing domestic disenchantment with his Africa policy, probably in the belief that the eventual collapse of the regime in Pretoria would give him a much-needed foreign policy victory at US expense, and would justify his insistence on maintaining a massive military presence in the region.

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Cuban Diplomatic Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa



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Cuban Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa



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Introduction

Since the early 1960s, most of Cuba's successes in its campaign to lead the Third World struggle against the West have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Havana's dramatic intervention in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid-1970s signaled Cuba's emergence as a major force in the Third World. Although Havana has since reduced its forces in Ethiopia, the Cuban presence in Sub-Saharan Africa has expanded from less than 2,000 prior to 1975 to some 49,000 military and civilian personnel in 18 countries.

two regimes and demonstrating "international proletarianism," Castro enhanced his reputation in the region. During the second half of the 1970s, 18 more African nations established relations with Cuba.



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Cuban Objectives in Africa

Castro's goals in Africa have evolved over time, but one tenet has remained constant—to lead the Third World's struggle against perceived Western exploitation. During the 1960s, the Cuban leader supported liberation movements throughout Africa and Latin America. By 1970, however, the guerrilla strategy was discredited, Cuba was isolated internationally, its economy was in a shambles, and the Castro regime was under heavy pressure from Moscow to adopt more pragmatic policies. As a result, in Africa, Havana sought to end its isolation and—simultaneously—better its ties to Moscow.

Despite Castro's attempt to strengthen his influence with Moscow, his goal of leading an anti-US struggle by Third World nations remained paramount, in part because of Castro's desire for a major role in international affairs and as an affirmation of the Cuban revolution. Given this outlook, but restricted by scarce resources, the Cubans have developed assistance programs that emphasize sending trained Cuban personnel to help ideologically sympathetic governments and revolutionary movements. These programs include: political support in international organizations; medical and technical assistance in such fields as agriculture, construction, and education; and help in organizing political parties, bureaucracies, and mass organizations.

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The new approach met with considerable success. Before 1970, Cuba had diplomatic relations with only four Sub-Saharan African countries. By the end of 1974 this number had grown to 20 (see table 1). Cuba's increasing respectability dovetailed effectively with the Soviet policy of detente, and the tension that had existed between Moscow and Havana was reduced. Havana's value as a Soviet ally soared, however, when the Cuban military interventions in Angola and Ethiopia preserved pro-Soviet Marxist regimes in both countries. By providing military support to the

Cuba's military assistance has been the most effective in developing influence, however. Havana's programs in this area include providing sanctuary and training in Cuba for guerrilla groups; training in third countries; financial assistance and arms deliveries; security training and personal bodyguards for selected leaders; advisory cadre, who at times have directly participated in combat operations, and combat forces for both defensive and offensive operations. There is no particular pattern in the way these programs have been applied. Assistance has generally been tailored to meet the needs and requests of the recipients.



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Cuban Presence and Ties to Sub-Saharan African States

	Date Relations Established	Type of Diplomatic Relations ^a	Intergovernment Commission for Economic Cooperation	Trade Agreement	Civil Aviation	Military Advisers	Combat Troops	Civil Advisers	Students Studying in Cuba
Angola	11 Nov 75	1	1976	X	X	8,000	28,000	6,000	2,600
Benin	1 Feb 74	1				6-10		30	200
Botswana	9 Dec 77	2							
Burkina	15 Dec 77		1983			4			600
Burundi	2 Feb 74	1						6	
Cameroon	31 Aug 74	3							
Cape Verde	8 Sep 75	2	1979		X	19		15-20	10
Chad	18 Oct 76	2							
Comoros	23 Dec 76	2							
Congo	10 May 64	1	1979	X	X	10-15	300-400	55	1,000
Equatorial Guinea	27 Dec 72	1			X			10	25
Ethiopia	18 Jul 75	1	1977	X	X	1,500-2,000	1,500-2,000	1,100	2,386
Gabon	1 Apr 74	4							
The Gambia	19 May 79	2							
Ghana	Reestablished May 74	1	1982	X	X			23	610
Guinea	1960	1	1979		X	10		25	135
Guinea-Bissau	1 Oct 73	1	1978			140		100	300
Ivory Coast	11 Feb 86	1							
Lesotho	14 Jun 79	2							
Liberia	19 Apr 74	2							
Madagascar	11 Apr 74	1	1979		X			5	
Mali	Reestablished 13 Nov 72	1	1982	X					

Tools and Tactics of Cuban Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa**Diplomatic and Political Techniques**

Havana has made significant inroads in improving diplomatic ties, usually the first step toward establishing a Cuban presence in a host country. The Cuban approach typically begins with Havana pushing for better diplomatic relations, often appealing to the target country's interest in enhancing its nonaligned

credentials. Usually some type of foreign relations cooperation agreement follows, occasionally accompanied by trade and civil aviation accords.

Relations with the target country are further cemented by the visits of high-level Cuban officials, who offer a variety of technical assistance programs. The extensive travels of Castro's special African envoy,

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Cuban Presence and Ties to Sub-Saharan African States (continued)

	Date Relations Established	Type of Diplomatic Relations ^a	Intergovernment Commission for Economic Cooperation	Trade Agreement	Civil Aviation	Military Advisers	Combat Troops	Civil Advisers	Students studying in Cuba
Mauritania	15 Aug 72	2							
Mauritius	15 Oct 76	2							
Mozambique	25 Jun 75	1	1977	X	X	600-800		1,025	2,303
Niger	25 Apr 76	1							
Nigeria	25 Jun 74	1	1981						
Rwanda	6 Sep 79	2							
Sao Tome and Principe	11 Apr 76	1				50-70		50-70	300
Senegal	10 Aug 74	6							
Seychelles	Apr 78	1	1980			4		15-29	50
Sierra Leone	24 Apr 72	1			X				60
Tanzania	Jun 64	1			X	5		15	?
Togo	22 Jun 79	2							
Uganda	10 May 74	5	1980						
Zaire	Reestablished Aug 79	1							
Zambia	19 Jun 72	1						12-18	96
Zimbabwe	19 Apr 80	1						6	400

- ^a 1—Ambassadorial level
 2—Nonresident Ambassador
 3—Status unknown
 4—Embassy closed
 5—Charge level
 6—Embassy only

Jorge Risquet, underscore the high priority Havana attaches to maintaining solidarity with its allies in Africa. Press reports indicate that Risquet visited Angola, Ethiopia, Benin, Ghana, and Burkina in the latter part of 1985. This year Risquet headed a Cuban delegation to Angola to discuss cooperation between Havana and Luanda. At the conclusion of the meetings, Risquet announced that Havana had agreed to strengthen its cooperation with Luanda in the area of

defense, and reasserted Cuba's commitment not only to the security of Luanda but also to the destruction of apartheid in southern Africa. In the cases of those countries that are wary of Cuban motives, Havana frequently offers bilateral exchanges in politically neutral areas. For example, Cuban sports and cultural delegations have visited Nigeria several times since the establishment of relations in 1974.

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Jorge Risquet Valdes: Havana's Africa Czar



Bohemia ©

As Cuban President Fidel Castro's special envoy in charge of Cuban-Angolan affairs and Havana's overseer of Cuban activities in all of Sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1970s, Jorge Risquet occupies one of the most sensitive—and perhaps one of the most powerful—positions in the Cuban Government. A member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee since its inception in 1965, Risquet also has held a seat on the party's Secretariat since 1973 and on the Politburo since 1980. He fought against the Batista regime under both Fidel and Raul Castro, the latter—because of their close relationship—reportedly using his influence to maneuver Risquet into positions of importance. [redacted]

Because he has extensive experience in African affairs as head of Havana's technical mission to Angola (1969-79), and later as Chief of Mission (1978-79) there, Risquet enjoys the confidence of Fidel and, as such, is given a great deal of autonomy—especially on matters related to Angola. Risquet, for example, is reported to exercise authority over Cuban military commanders in Angola—where he also outranks the Cuban Ambassador—during his frequent visits to that country. [redacted]



Ghanaian leader Jerry Rawlings was accorded lavish attention during his July 1984 visit to Cuba, and was decorated with Cuba's most prestigious medal. [redacted]

Verde Olivo ©

Havana also enhances its relations with African countries by inviting official delegations to visit Cuba and witness showcases of the revolution. Such trips often result in the two countries signing a limited cooperation agreement and issuing a joint communique voicing support for Cuban political objectives. For example, the US Interests Section reports that the red-carpet treatment Burkinan President Sankara and Ghanaian President Rawlings received during their visits to Havana in 1984 was a forerunner to expanded cooperation between these countries and Cuba. [redacted]

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Havana gains allies and cements relationships by providing political and propaganda support in international organizations for various African countries and liberation movements. Cuba has provided substantial rhetorical support for the African National Congress (ANC) and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) as part of its commitment to "international proletarianism" and the cause of Namibian independence. Havana's experience with the politics of international organizations is frequently used on behalf of its friends in the UN and other bodies. In exchange, Cuba is able to draw upon the assistance of Third World nations on issues of importance to Havana. For example, Cuba last year sponsored a resolution condemning coercive economic measures applied by developed countries against developing nations.

[Redacted]

Havana expends great effort in advancing shared African and Cuban political goals in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). For example, Cuba's intensive backstage maneuvers at the Luanda NAM ministerial conference in September 1985 resulted in Zimbabwe gaining chairmanship of the NAM, giving Havana opportunities for manipulating the agenda and influencing the August 1986 summit, according to US Embassy reporting. Apparently concerned that the favored contender, Yugoslavia, would propose moderate declarations, Havana initiated a lobbying blitz, dispatching senior official delegations to 13 Third World countries to canvass support.

Zimbabwe, inexperienced in hosting an international event, has been receptive to Cuba's offer of assistance in managing the summit.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Castro is probably [Redacted] [Redacted] hoping that it will render Mugabe indebted to Cuba and thus more receptive to Cuban overtures. Moreover, Cuban logistic support will present opportunities for influencing the NAM proceedings. According to US Embassy reporting, Havana's provision of translators to the 1985 Luanda NAM ministerial meeting enabled Cuba to greatly influence the wording of the final declaration. We believe Cuba will utilize this August's summit to focus international attention on South Africa and bolster the positions of the Frontline States and the insurgents battling Pretoria.

Although we believe Castro views the conference as key to his campaign of increasing Third World pressure on Pretoria, Havana's severe economic difficulties have apparently forced Cuba to severely cut its budget for the summit.

[Redacted]

Aid Agreements

The Cuban economic aid program is a major component of Cuban policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, often touted by Castro as exemplifying Cuba's commitment to "international proletarianism." The aid programs—most in the form of civilian advisory assistance as opposed to material or financial aid—involve approximately 8,500 Cuban civilians serving in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries

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Cuban operation of the Marromeu Sugar Mill, Sofala Province, Mozambique [redacted]



Cuban medical personnel working in Cotonou Hospital and University Center, Benin [redacted]

[redacted] Havana traditionally gains a foothold in these countries by providing rudimentary medical and educational aid, as well as assistance in construction, agriculture, and other technical areas. [redacted]

[redacted] we estimate that less than 25 percent of Cuban aid consists of grants of capital goods and other materials. [redacted]

The establishment of a joint commission for economic and scientific-technical cooperation provides the framework for the aid relationship between Cuba and an African country and serves as the primary mechanism for subsequent decisions on the provision of Cuban personnel and other aid. Havana currently maintains joint commissions with 15 Sub-Saharan African countries. The commission is a permanent body that meets annually to work out a formal protocol detailing Cuban civilian assistance for the year in such areas as science, health, education, and

agriculture. Cuba provides such technical assistance on the basis of the recipient's ability to pay; generally, Havana pays the salaries of its civilian advisers, while the host country provides the necessary materials and equipment, food and housing, a personal spending allowance, and transportation for the Cuban personnel. Although most Cuban advisers possess rudimentary skills by Western standards, the assistance they provide is superior to that of most Sub-Saharan African countries, and is relatively inexpensive. [redacted]

Health Programs

[redacted] Havana's medical assistance program is one of the most successful elements of its civilian assistance programs; medical personnel often make up the majority of the Cuban contingent in the host country. [redacted]

[redacted] Most of the more than 2,000 Cuban medical personnel abroad are general practitioners, [redacted]

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many providing routine care to the rural populace that has infrequent access to medical services. Cuban press reporting indicates, for example, that some 385 Cuban medical personnel serve in 13 provinces of Angola. [redacted]

gram. Cuban press reporting indicates Harare will send some 400 students this year to the Isle of Youth for five years of instruction. US Embassy reporting indicates Cuba is providing Harare 25 instructors this year. [redacted]

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By training more medical personnel than needed at home, Cuba has developed a reasonably cost-effective way to gain entry to Third World countries in desperate need of medical assistance. Cuban medical contingents abroad not only serve to promote Cuba as a leader in the field of medicine, but also play a political role in advancing relations between Cuba and the host country. [redacted]

Cuba also offers a limited number of scholarships for advanced study at its universities and technical schools, particularly attractive to African countries with no postsecondary educational institutions. For example, Sierra Leone recently agreed to send students to Cuba for academic and vocational training. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] we estimate that about 500 postsecondary foreign students are enrolled in Cuban universities and technical schools.

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Military Assistance

Cuban military and security assistance to established regimes is the largest and most influential component of Havana's foreign aid program in Africa. It consists of combat troops—the largest component—military and security advisers, and limited materiel support. According to Castro's public statements, since 1975 over 200,000 Cuban personnel have served in Angola alone, the majority in military or military support roles. [redacted]

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Educational Assistance ²

In addition to civilian assistance programs, Cuba offers numerous secondary school scholarships for African students to study in Cuba. On Cuba's Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth), the Castro regime has established a group of 21 secondary schools for some 16,000 foreign teenagers—the vast majority from Africa. Zimbabwean President Mugabe, apparently impressed by Cuba's educational programs, recently agreed to an ambitious educational exchange pro-

The large Cuban combat presence in Africa also gives Havana the ability to deploy military personnel rapidly to another country in the region should an ally need military assistance. For example, Cuban units in Ethiopia have probably been involved in [redacted] out-of-country deployments. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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**Cuba: Schools for Foreign Students
on the Isle of Youth**

One of the Castro regime's most successful showcase programs is the education of some 16,000 foreign teenagers at two dozen secondary schools on the Isle of Youth. Havana portrays the schools as its unselfish contribution to resolving the education problem in the Third World. Some 2,400 Ethiopian youths orphaned by the war in the Ogaden in 1978, for example, were given scholarships through junior and senior high school, which in some cases amounts to a stay of up to eight years. The schools have received generous coverage in Cuban publications intended for foreign audiences and are a mainstay on the itinerary of showcases that Havana displays for visitors from abroad. The influx of foreign students began after the Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975, and today the student body—Cuban and foreign—comprises well over a third of the total population on the Isle of Youth. [redacted]



Some of the estimated 2,600 Angolan students studying in Cuba. This group stands at attention in front of its school on the Isle of Youth. [redacted]

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Each school is a self-contained unit comprising about 600 students, 50 teachers, and 20 support personnel. The schools are surrounded by some 600 hectares of citrus groves where students grow fruit as part of the daily work-study program in effect at all Cuban secondary schools in the countryside. The length of stay on the Isle of Youth depends on each student's previous level of education. Students who perform well are selected for advanced education or training at higher institutions. [redacted]

[redacted] Training at these facilities [redacted] lasts anywhere from a few months to a year. Moreover, each secondary school, in addition to its conventional academic departments, has a military department that provides classes in basic military subjects [redacted]

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Although unpublicized, several special facilities on the island are used to provide foreign students with small arms training and anti-aircraft and field artillery familiarization, as well as field experience in camping, map reading, survival, and traversing rough terrain. [redacted]

Virtually all foreign student groups, at one time or another, have been involved in incidents of unacceptable behavior, and many youths have been sent home short of graduation as punishment. Culture shock and the rigid Cuban discipline appear to be the primary causes of student discontent. A senior Ethiopian official admitted to a US diplomat that Cuban

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**Foreign Student Enrollment
on the Isle of Youth in 1984**

	Number of Schools	Number of Students
Total ^a	21	11,925
Ethiopia	4	2,386
Mozambique	4	2,303
Angola	4	2,193
Nicaragua	2	1,196
Namibia	2	1,180
Ghana	1	610
Congo	1	588
Sahara Democratic Arab Republic (Polisario)	1	580
South Yemen	1	547
Guinea-Bissau		313
Sao Tome and Principe		29 ^b

^a [] foreign students on the Isle of Youth presently number over 16,000, as a result of new contingents from Burkina, Sudan, and Zimbabwe as well as increased enrollment of Angolans.

^b Uses the same schools as students from Guinea-Bissau.

Source: *Cuba Internacional*, Havana, August 1984, p.27.

[]

training is accomplishing the opposite of what was intended—returning students were embittered at the Ethiopian Government and at Communism in general. []

Despite the problems, the schools are an effective vehicle for creating an image of revolutionary Cuba

as an altruistic society superior to that of Western countries and worthy of emulation elsewhere in the Third World. The list of Third World leaders who have been taken to see them includes such luminaries as dos Santos, Sankara, Nyerere, Mugabe, Kaunda, Mengistu, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, and ANC chief Oliver Tambo. The trip to the Isle of Youth has become a ritual for virtually every visiting African leader or any education official from a country with little educational infrastructure faced with the problem of training its young people. Moreover, many of the foreign students are the children of high government or party officials, who thus have a personal stake to consider when weighing their country's relationship with Cuba. []

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In bearing the expense of these schools, Havana believes it is forging lasting links to the future leaders of the Third World, and most likely views the schools as an investment that—in addition to immediate propaganda benefits—is bound to pay handsome dividends within one generation. Despite disclaimers from some governments that send students, the schools' curriculums contain strong doses of political indoctrination, according to students who have defected, and visitors who have observed the library holdings of the schools report that little is available other than standard Marxist political and economic textbooks and research materials. The Cubans clearly hope to gain political advantage through training students who may become influential elements of the next generation, shaping the political and economic future of their respective homelands. []

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In those countries where Cuba has a substantial military presence, Havana is in a position to exert significant influence on the internal politics of the host country. For example, [redacted] the Cuban military played a role in countering a coup attempt against the Neto regime in Angola in May 1977. In addition, [redacted] a Cuban-manned Presidential bodyguard was credited with preventing the overthrow of Congolese President Massamba-Debat during an Army revolt in mid-1966. The presence of Cuban personnel in key sectors of the host country also provides prime avenues of information and influence for Havana. For example, [redacted] Cuba's advisory role to the Cape Verdean security service gives it near-total knowledge of important developments in that country. [redacted]

The Cuban Government has also placed Cuban military personnel in Africa and ingratiated itself with various African leaders through the provision of security and intelligence assistance, particularly to leftist leaders threatened by coups. US Embassy reporting indicates Cuban security assistance helped stabilize pro-Cuban regimes in Burkina and Ghana. [redacted]



Following his seizure of power in a 1981 coup, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings sought Cuban security assistance to counter perceived threats to Ghana from exiles in neighboring countries. [redacted]



[redacted] A number of African leaders have had Cuban military personnel in their bodyguard forces for years—among them Congo's President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Guinea Bissau's




Presidents Castro and dos Santos sign a joint communique following the Angolan leader's March 1984 visit to Cuba. [redacted] Cuba Internacional ©

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President Vieira. [redacted]



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Continuing Support for Angola and Ethiopia

In some cases, such as Angola, the presence of Cuban combat units is vital to the survival of the regime. Although the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) emerged victorious in March 1976 from among the three rival Angolan movements, the regime has been increasingly challenged by South African incursions and the growing threat from Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgents. To meet these threats, Havana has increased its troop strength in Angola over the years, including substantial augmentations in late 1981 and late 1983. Drawing on [redacted]

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[redacted] we estimate there are a total of 36,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, of which 28,000 are combat troops assigned to air, air defense, and ground combat units. The remaining 8,000 Cuban military personnel are specialists, technicians, and advisers assisting the Angolan Army. [redacted]

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Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu receives the Order of Playa Giron during his 1978 visit to Cuba. [redacted]

The Cubans say [redacted] that their military role in Angola is to defend vital strategic installations while the Angolan Army fights the war.

[redacted] Cuban forces are deployed primarily in the provincial capitals and along the key supply lines. They guard the main garrisons and provide essential support services, freeing Angolan troops for field operations. Cuban involvement in combat operations has been limited to piloting aircraft and helicopters, manning much of the air defense system, driving armored vehicles, and filling support roles. [redacted]

The Cuban Government's other major military presence in Africa is in Ethiopia. The Cuban combat brigades were originally deployed to Ethiopia in late 1977 and early 1978 to help Ethiopia repulse the Somali invasion of the Ogaden region. Since the end of that fighting, the Cuban military contingent has been confined to garrison duty, serving primarily as a deterrent to another Somali invasion. [redacted]

[redacted] we estimate Havana withdrew 5,500 troops and several hundred support personnel from Ethiopia in late 1983 and early 1984, primarily because of the reduced Somali threat and Ethiopia's unwillingness to continue bearing the cost for the Cuban presence. The Intelligence Community estimates there are currently between 1,500 and 2,000 Cuban combat personnel in Ethiopia, and approximately the same number of military advisers and

technicians. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

Focusing on Southern Africa

Cuban President Castro apparently views the turmoil in South Africa as presenting an opportunity to expand Havana's influence in the region. [redacted] 25X1

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Havana is also attempting to intensify pressure on South Africa by garnering the support of Frontline States for Cuba's role in the region and through increased aid to the insurgents. Castro was particularly successful in generating propaganda against Pretoria through the visits of four Frontline States leaders to Havana last year. [redacted] 25X1


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[redacted] Following Angolan President dos Santos' visit last October, Castro publicly reiterated that the "new strength" of Angolan and Cuban forces coincided with the "irreversible crisis of apartheid" in South Africa. In addition, Tanzanian President Nyerere during his visit publicly thanked Castro for his contribution to the survival of the MPLA regime. Nyerere continued on to Angola after his Havana visit to

confer with Namibian insurgent leaders, [redacted] 25X1
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
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In addition to his propaganda efforts, Castro apparently is expanding Havana's support to insurgent groups operating against the Pretoria regime. [redacted]



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[redacted] Havana apparently hopes that the increased guerrilla activity inside South Africa will force Pretoria to divert forces from Namibia, allowing SWAPO forces to operate more freely. [redacted]

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[redacted] Castro is planning to use the NAM summit in Harare this August to unite Third World nations against South Africa. [redacted]

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[redacted] Despite some frictions, however, relations between the two are generally good, as recently demonstrated by ANC President Oliver Tambo's March visit to Cuba. [redacted]

[redacted] Havana, having skillfully maneuvered behind the

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scenes to assure Harare the NAM chairmanship and providing substantial technical assistance for Zimbabwe to host the event, is in an excellent position to push southern African issues to the forefront of the NAM agenda. [redacted]

to increase its commitments to Ethiopia and Mozambique. [redacted]

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Outlook and Implications

Havana generally has had success in furthering its political and military ties to smaller African countries through cooperation agreements and assistance programs. Economic assistance serves as a tangible demonstration of support to African leaders that lends credibility to Cuban professions of commitment, and, through the physical presence of Cuban technicians, Havana transmits its views of domestic and international issues to host-country nationals. Cuba's ability to expand this program will be limited by its economic problems. [redacted] Havana already is trying to cut the costs of its technical assistance to some African countries. [redacted]

Havana probably will attempt to compensate for its economic restrictions and the stalemated military situation in Angola by increasing pressures on South Africa. Castro, seeing the United States on the defensive as a result of mounting international criticism of South Africa, is working to rally black African states against Washington and Pretoria and highlight Cuba's role as an enemy of apartheid. Cuba's attempts to isolate Pretoria probably will be successful at the NAM summit where Havana wields significant influence. We believe, however, that Havana's efforts to aid SWAPO will continue to be hindered by the disunity of this insurgent organization. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Cuban Government has refused to continue paying all travel expenses for Cuban technicians traveling to Burundi, and Havana requested additional allowances for its technicians in Madagascar recently. [redacted]

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[redacted] Over the next two to five years, we believe economic problems will continue to restrict Havana's ability to finance aid projects abroad and will limit the number of highly qualified personnel Cuba can send overseas. We expect, therefore, that, as the number of Cuban civilian personnel or "internationalists" increases, their level of competence is likely to decline. Over the longer term, such a trend could undercut the positive image Cuba has been able to create. [redacted]

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In the meantime, we believe Cuba will continue to be frustrated by the military situation in Angola. The improved performance of UNITA forces indicates that there is no near end in sight to Havana's 11-year involvement in the war. The deteriorating situation in Angola has worsened morale problems among Cuban troops, and, if Cuban casualties continue to rise, Castro could face increasing discontent at home. Moreover, worsening economic conditions in Cuba will probably contribute to the reluctance of Havana

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Appendix

Cuban Involvement in Sub-Saharan African States: A Country Survey ³

Angola

Cuba's involvement in Angola began in the early 1960s when Havana began providing limited guerrilla warfare training to the MPLA—one of the liberation movements that fought Portuguese colonial rule. Cuba also sent small amounts of arms, supplies, and advisers to the MPLA bases outside Angola, trained MPLA insurgents in Cuba, and provided propaganda support. Revolution in Portugal in 1974 and Lisbon's decision to cut free from its African colonies left the three rival Angolan movements contesting for power. The conflict flared into open war in March 1975 and Cuba gradually increased its involvement by sending advisers and military support personnel to assist the MPLA. By early 1976, Cuba responded to increased South African military pressure on the MPLA by sending some 18,000 combat troops to Angola, which led the way to an MPLA victory by March 1976.

[redacted]

[redacted] currently there are an

estimated 36,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, of which 28,000 are combat troops assigned to air, air defense, and ground combat units. The remaining 8,000 Cuban military personnel are specialists, technicians, and advisers assisting the Angolan Army.


[redacted]

In addition to their military presence, the Cubans have an estimated 6,000 civilian advisers in Angola providing humanitarian and economic assistance. According to diplomatic sources, Cuban civilians work in all parts of the Angolan Government, performing both advisory and functional tasks. Cuban civilians also serve as teachers, doctors, construction workers, agricultural experts, and economic advisers. [redacted]

³ This appendix details the current state of relations between Cuba and most of the Sub-Saharan African states with whom Havana has diplomatic relations. It excludes nations where there are no Cuban military or civilian assistance programs. For each nation listed, we have estimated military and civilian personnel serving in these countries. [redacted]

[redacted]

Cuban Military Presence in Angola, 1975-85



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Benin

Cuba does not have a military or strategic interest in Benin, but finds Cotonou's socialist bent and membership in the Nonaligned Movement attractive. Diplomatic relations were established in 1974, and Havana maintains an embassy in Cotonou. In 1984, it was staffed by 11 diplomatic personnel. At that time, Havana provided Benin with some 30 medical and technical personnel [redacted]

[redacted]

The most extensive area of cooperation is in education; some 200 Beninese scholarship recipients are studying in Cuba, according to press reports. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

Burundi

Cuba's presence in Burundi, never strong, and minimal since 1983, apparently is expanding. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1974 and signed a technical assistance protocol in 1976, but cooperation in the areas of health and agriculture did not begin until 1980.

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[Redacted] the Cuban presence decreased and relations cooled following the 1983 departure of the Cuban Ambassador.

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[Redacted] Since that time, the Cuban presence in Burundi has been limited to a small diplomatic corps headed by a Charge and some half dozen Cuban civilian advisers.

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The visit of Benin's Foreign Minister to Havana in October 1985 and the establishment of a joint cooperation commission in December further cemented relations between the two countries. Havana probably will press Benin for contracts on construction projects in an effort to earn hard currency, and possibly for trade in agricultural products.

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[Redacted] A commercial agreement by the two countries—which essentially grants most-favored-nation status—was ratified in 1984, but so far there are no indications of a developing trade relationship.

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[Redacted]

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Burkina

Although Cuba has not forged particularly close ties to Burkina, Havana's access to Ouagadougou's intelligence apparatus may allow it to influence the country's politics. President Sankara visited Havana in September 1984, where he received the red carpet treatment and was awarded the prestigious Jose Marti medal. The two countries signed a technical cooperation agreement in early 1985, but, according to US Embassy reporting, no Cuban technical advisers had yet arrived in Burkina as of January 1986.

The US Embassy also reports that there are four Cuban military advisers attached to Burkina's internal security and intelligence service, which could give Havana the opportunity to recruit anti-Sankara officers and possibly provide LIPAD—a Marxist group that seeks to depose Sankara—with information on the regime's strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the Burkinan security and intelligence service is headed by Vincent Sigue, who received terrorist training in Cuba, according to US Embassy reporting.

Cape Verde

Cuba's interest in Cape Verde and its influence in the government of this small group of islands off the northwestern coast of Africa has been strong since relations were established in September 1975.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] this influence is largely a result of the fact that most of the government ministers of Cape Verde and many of its citizens reportedly have received free educational, political, and technical training in Cuba. The two countries established a joint commission for economic cooperation in 1979, and Cuban advisers

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[Redacted] are active in nearly every department of the Cape Verde Government. Cuban influence is further evidenced by the fact that Cape

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Verdean laws appear to be copied from the Cuban model. [redacted] the size of the Cuban contingent in Cape Verde in August 1985 at 35 to 40 personnel—including as many as 19 military and security advisers [redacted]

Pointe Noire and Brazzaville have served as key logistic facilities for resupplying and reinforcing Cuban forces in Angola's Cabinda Province. The US Embassy reports that the Cuban military camp in Pointe Noire is used as a holding area for troops waiting to be transferred to Angola. This camp is also used as a rest and recreation area for Cuban troops serving in Angola. [redacted] the number of Cuban troops in Pointe Noire has remained fairly constant at an estimated 300 to 400 personnel. [redacted]

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Cuban influence in Cape Verde appears to be heaviest in the military. US officials, [redacted] report that Cape Verde's 300-man security service has eight Cuban advisers, and that three Cuban military advisers assist the 1,500-man Army. [redacted] all Cape Verdean military and police officers go to Cuba for training, and that the security services are closely tailored after the Cuban model. [redacted]

Press reporting over the past year indicates that Cuba and Congo have a warm political relationship. During 1985, a large number of top Congolese officials visited Cuba, including the National Assembly President, Minister of Education, Forestry Minister, Justice Minister, and Foreign Minister. In December, Jorge Risquet met with Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Luanda to discuss the struggle of the South African people against the apartheid regime. [redacted]

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Havana's interest in maintaining warm relations with Praia most likely stems from the need to protect the Cuban airlink to Angola. All flights carrying Cuban personnel to and from Angola make their necessary refueling stops in Cape Verde. Although most of the arms, ammunition, and other supplies destined for Angola are now routinely flown or shipped in by the Soviets, limited quantities of supplies—including arms—evidently are still carried aboard Cuban military flights transiting Cape Verde. [redacted]

The relationship between the two countries, however, has been characterized by occasional frictions. The US Embassy notes that the poor behavior of Cuban troops stationed in Pointe Noire has alienated the local population. In addition, according to press reports, Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso occasionally displays annoyance at Castro's messianic view regarding socialism, charging that the Cuban leader's attitude does not foster genuine solidarity and harmony among socialist nations. [redacted]

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[redacted] in January and February 1984, two Cuban military flights passing through Cape Verde's Amilcar Cabral Airport carried arms to an undisclosed location. (S NF NC OC)

Congo

Congo was the first self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state in Africa, and since 1963 has patterned its development on the East European and Cuban models. The Congolese sympathize with Castro's revolutionary philosophy, and support many of Havana's views on international issues. Cuba has provided technical assistance to the Congo Government in key economic sectors such as agriculture, animal husbandry, public works and construction, industry, mining and energy, transportation, and trade. Many of these projects are presently stalemated, however, as a result of Brazzaville's financial problems. [redacted]

Exclusive of the Cuban presence at Pointe Noire, the US Embassy in Brazzaville places the Cuban presence at about 55 civilian technical personnel, with an additional 10 to 15 Cubans advising Congolese security forces. The US Embassy also reports there are six Cuban diplomatic and consular personnel presently listed in Congo. [redacted]

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For Havana, Congo's importance lies in its role as a support base for Cuba's Angolan involvement. Since 1975, the Congolese port facilities and airfields at

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Equatorial Guinea

Cuba's influence in Equatorial Guinea has declined dramatically since President Obiang took power in August 1979 and expelled the large Cuban military and civilian contingent. Since then, the Obiang regime has allowed military and economic agreements with Havana to lapse. According to the US Embassy, Havana currently provides no military aid to Malabo, and there are only some 10 Cuban personnel, including six doctors, serving there.

[redacted]

Ethiopia

Cuba and Ethiopia established diplomatic relations in July 1975, almost a year after the Ethiopian military overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. Ties between the two countries are strong, cemented by the close relationship between Castro and Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu and Havana's provision of troops to help Ethiopia repulse the 1977 Somali invasion. Although the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia has been reduced considerably in recent years, civilian advisers and technicians continue to be active, according to the US Embassy.

The relationship between the two countries started to develop shortly after February 1977, when then Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam became Chairman of the Military Council after a bloody power struggle. Castro visited Addis Ababa in March 1977, and later that month attempted to mediate the Ethiopian-Somali dispute over control of Ethiopia's Ogaden region by chairing a meeting between Mengistu and Somali President Siad. Although the talks failed, [redacted] Castro came away impressed with Mengistu's "revolutionary credentials."

[redacted] that was intended to supplement the regular Army. The number of Cuban advisers more than doubled after the outbreak of the Ethiopian-Somali war in July 1977. Later the same year, according to US Embassy reporting and academic studies, Havana, Moscow, and Addis Ababa agreed on the

commitment of Cuban combat troops to Ethiopia. The initial deployment began in late November, and by April 1978 some 16,000 to 17,000 Cuban military personnel, including pilots, had been deployed to Ethiopia, where they were organized into combat brigades and played a key role in defeating the Somalis.

We believe, on the basis of [redacted] Embassy reporting, that the Cuban combat brigades stationed in Ethiopia were reduced substantially during a drawdown that began in late 1983 and was completed by the beginning of 1984. The Cuban presence was reduced from about 7,000 combat troops to an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 combat troops by April 1986. We believe, on the basis of US Embassy reporting [redacted] that Ethiopian units took over the equipment and garrisons of most of the Cuban combat brigades beginning in 1983.

[redacted] most analysts in the Intelligence Community believe that a Cuban mechanized brigade of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 troops remains at Dire Dawa. Some analysts, however, believe that [redacted] can substantiate only the presence of a motorized battalion—approximately 400 troops—and a small caretaker force. This unit may have the protection of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti rail line—an economic link between the Ethiopian interior and a major port—as its mission. We believe the Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia are intended to be tangible evidence to Mengistu of the Cuban commitment to the security of his regime.

We believe there are approximately 1,100 Cuban economic technicians and other civilian personnel in Ethiopia. According to US Embassy reporting, Cuban civilian personnel are involved in the fields of education, health, agriculture, industry, construction, and water resources. Cuban-Ethiopian trade is negligible, according to the US Embassy. In 1982, the last year for which statistics are available, Havana imported less than \$350,000 worth of linseed from Ethiopia while exporting \$26,000 worth of spare parts, screws, and trailer parts to Addis Ababa.

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
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
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Ghana

Cuba resumed diplomatic relations with Ghana in May 1974 after an eight-year hiatus following the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah. However, significant interaction between the two countries did not take place until Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings seized power in a 1981 coup. At that time, Rawlings sought Cuban security assistance to counter perceived threats from exiles in neighboring countries. [redacted]




Havana's economic woes and Ghanaian nationalism probably limit a greater Cuban influence and presence for the near term. Cuban economic influence in Ghana is minimal, and we do not expect it to increase significantly. The US Embassy reports that Havana has been providing only limited technical aid and training to the Rawlings regime for some time, mainly in the areas of agriculture and health. [redacted]



[redacted] Although some 600 Ghanaian students currently are studying in Cuba, press reports indicate the Ghanaian Government has had to contend with student complaints of mistreatment by their hosts. The US Embassy in Accra reports that extensive rumors of death, ill health, and student unrest at the Isle of Youth circulate in Accra, and that the educated public remains skeptical of the value of a Cuban education. [redacted]

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We believe Rawlings is wary of Cuban intentions, but there is potential for Havana to make inroads through its close ties to Ghana's radicals, particularly Kojo Tsikata, the government official responsible for security and foreign affairs. Numerous reports have described Tsikata's efforts over the years to strengthen Havana's influence in Ghana. [redacted]



A Cuban medic serving in Kankan Hospital, Guinea [redacted]

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[redacted] We believe Rawlings is vulnerable to the manipulative Tsikata, who apparently is working hard to convince Rawlings that Cuban military assistance is needed to provide the necessary security against perceived internal and external threats. [redacted]


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Guinea

Relations between Cuba and Guinea are not as close as they were under the regime of Ahmed Sekou Toure, largely because under President Lansana Conte Conakry has turned to the West for economic development assistance. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

During the late 1970s there were some 400 to 600 Cuban advisers in Guinea. Now the number is only about 35. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Press reports indicate a Cuban team is constructing the Kissidougou-Kankan road in the eastern part of Guinea [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Guinea-Bissau

Cuba provided extensive military assistance to Guinea-Bissau in its fight to gain independence from Portugal and has maintained close ties since 1974. Guinea-Bissau has provided support over the years for Cuban political objectives, and President Vieira demonstrated solidarity with Havana by attending Cuba's Third Party Congress last February. President Vieira, who has been in power since 1980, has a personal affinity for Cuba; he received training there in the early 1970s, and Havana provides him an all-expense paid vacation on the island every year, according to US Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

Havana's primary interest and area of influence is in Guinea-Bissau's military. Since its creation in the early 1960s, the Army has been principally trained, equipped, and advised by the Soviet Union and Cuba, according to US Embassy reporting. There are an estimated 140 military advisers in Guinea-Bissau. The presence of Cuban and Soviet advisers in the military establishment presumably provides Havana and Moscow early warning of any coup plotting. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau arrives in Havana at the invitation of Fidel Castro, March 1982 [Redacted]

Granma ©

[Redacted]

The Cuban civilian presence in Bissau is estimated to include some five diplomatic personnel and 100 technical advisers, according to US Embassy reporting. The Cubans are involved in aid projects in such fields as education, construction, telecommunications, agriculture, and public health. In addition, according to Cuban press reports, some 300 Guinea-Bissauan students are studying at secondary schools on Cuba's Isle of Youth. Although Cuba's assistance has been generally well received, US Embassy reporting indicates that Cuban medical personnel completing their last year of medical training in Bissau have been a source

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of friction. The Bissauans reportedly feel the Cuban medical students are practicing on them, [redacted]

[redacted]

Mozambique

Cuba moved quickly to establish diplomatic relations with the Machel regime shortly after Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, and the first cultural agreement between the two countries was signed the following year. Cuba initiated economic relations with Maputo in 1977 and sent civilian advisers to help rebuild Mozambique's deteriorating sugar refineries. Today, Mozambique has the third-largest number of Cuban personnel in Africa after Angola and Ethiopia. [redacted]

[redacted] there are [redacted] about 1,000 Cuban economic advisers and civilian technicians providing assistance in the areas of fishing, construction, and medical services. Cuban press reports indicate that, as of 1984, some 2,300 Mozambican students were studying on Cuba's Isle of Youth. [redacted]

Since at least 1977, Cuba and the Soviet Bloc countries have supplied Mozambique with military advisers to help organize its Army and direct the fighting against an increasingly effective insurgency. We estimate that there are currently about 600 to 800 Cuban military advisers and technicians serving in Mozambique. Cuban advisers are present in some Army units, principally motorized infantry and artillery units, at battalion level and above. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Sao Tome and Principe

Havana and Sao Tome have maintained close ties since establishing diplomatic relations in 1976, and Cuban military advisers continue to play a key role in the development of the Sao Tomean Army. Although press reports indicate that several hundred Cuban military personnel are stationed on the islands, [redacted]

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[redacted] the number is much smaller—perhaps only 50 to 70. Cuba's most significant security role is the training of President Manuel da Costa's Presidential Guard. According to the US Embassy, in 1984 da Costa wanted to ask Havana to provide 300 Cubans for his Presidential Guard, an idea apparently successfully quashed by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Security. US Embassy reporting indicates that Sao Tome's new Defense Minister, Raul Braganca Neto, received at least some of his military training in Cuba. [redacted]

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Cuba also has a significant civilian aid program in Sao Tome, particularly in education. Given the country's relative poverty—Sao Tome has no university-level facility of its own—the Cuban option is particularly attractive. According to Cuban press reports, some 300 Sao Tomeans are currently studying in Cuba, and an unknown number of Cuban teachers instruct in Sao Tome. Even though Embassy reporting from time to time suggests Sao Tomean disillusionment with Cuba's education aid, we see no indications that da Costa will request the teachers' departure. [redacted]

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[redacted]
The US Embassy also reports that Cuban officials serve in the Ministry of Planning as well as in other government posts, and that Cuban advisers are active

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in developing Sao Tome's ruling party organization. Moreover, [redacted] da Costa requested Cuban assistance in increasing the party's ideological penetration of the masses. Havana also provides an estimated 50 to 70 civilian advisers and technical personnel in the agricultural, fishing, and health sectors—it is estimated that every third doctor on the islands is Cuban. [redacted]


Southwest Indian Ocean Islands

Havana has met with some success in developing its ties to the island states, but the Cuban presence in this region remains limited. Cuba provides technical assistance to Seychelles and Madagascar but has no advisers stationed in Comoros or Mauritius. [redacted]

In Seychelles the Cubans have some 15 to 29 civilian technicians advising the government's ministries and providing medical aid, as well as four Cuban military advisers [redacted]

[redacted] The two governments' party organizations signed a two-year cooperation agreement this year. Press reports indicate that 50 Seychelles students are presently studying in Cuba; however, the US Embassy indicates that those sent in the past have been appalled by the living standards in Cuba. If this is true, Havana may have difficulty in expanding the program. [redacted]

In Madagascar, the Cuban presence is limited to a few agricultural and medical technicians and a small diplomatic contingent. [redacted]



[redacted] Madagascar's Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Cuba in late 1985 and signed several agreements on scientific and technical cooperation. According to press reporting, one area of aid will be the sugar industry. [redacted]

Cuba's efforts to expand its influence among the island states will continue to be constrained by the small scale and low technical level of its aid. In




Then Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere visits Cuba in September 1985 [redacted] *Cuba Internacional* ©

addition, these governments have found Cuban assistance to be expensive, and, in some cases, language barriers have hampered Cuban activities. Moreover, [redacted] there is a perception among some southwest Indian Ocean leaders that the Cubans are merely doing Moscow's bidding. [redacted]

Tanzania

Havana established diplomatic relations with Dar es Salaam in 1964 and has provided technical assistance in the health, education, and agriculture sectors since the early 1970s. [redacted]



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
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President Fidel Castro and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda during the latter's October 1985 visit to Cuba [redacted]

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
support to the Zimbabwean guerrillas based in Zambia. The Cubans also trained SWAPO forces in Zambia during this period. Kaunda, however, refused Havana's offer to station Cuban troops in Zambia, and sharply limited Cuba's civilian presence in his country. [redacted]

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More recently, Kaunda's chairmanship of the Frontline States has lent public support for the Cuban presence in Angola. The Zambian leader visited Havana last October, [redacted]

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[redacted] Zambia also formalized the two countries' technical cooperation relationship by establishing a joint commission, according to US Embassy reporting. The Cuban presence in Zambia is currently limited to some two dozen diplomatic and medical

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Zambia

Cuban-Zambian relations have been largely influenced by developments in southern Africa and tempered by President Kaunda's reluctance to have a Cuban presence in his country. [redacted]

[redacted] during the 1970s the Zambian leader's desire to help topple the white minority Rhodesian government led him to permit some 60 Cuban military personnel to provide material and advisorial

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
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personnel, and is likely to remain at these levels, because of Kaunda's concern over alienating Western sources of economic support. [redacted]

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Zimbabwe

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, angered by Havana's past support for the rival ZAPU party, has over the years refused numerous offers by Cuba of technical assistance. However, Havana has made some headway in recent months toward improving relations—formally established in 1980—with this important Frontline State. An exchange of high-level visits beginning in late 1985 resulted in agreements to expand bilateral cooperation. [redacted]




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[redacted] US Embassy reporting indicates that Havana will send some 40 doctors to Zimbabwe and is developing an ambitious educational exchange program with Harare. [redacted]

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Havana may also make inroads in its relations with Harare through Zimbabwe's hosting of the NAM summit. Cuba's intensive backstage maneuvers at the Luanda ministerial meeting of the NAM resulted in the appointment of Zimbabwe to the chairmanship of the NAM. As a result, Havana will have ample opportunities for manipulating the agenda and influencing the outcome of the summit. Zimbabwe, because of its inexperience with hosting an international summit and the cost, apparently is receptive to Cuban assistance. [redacted]

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