




**Director of
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National Intelligence Daily

**Wednesday
22 July 1987**



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
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

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PERSIAN GULF: Iran Urging Cease-Fire on Shipping

Tehran hopes to balance its opposition to the UN resolution on the Iran-Iraq war by proposing a cease-fire on shipping attacks in the Persian Gulf. 

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Tehran denounced the UN resolution to end the war as a US effort to support Iraq, but Iran's Ambassador to the UN has not yet accepted or rejected it. Iran is urging the UN to try to obtain a cease-fire in the Gulf and says it will attack ships only in retaliation for Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping. Iran contends that the intervention of US forces in the Gulf would violate the UN resolution and render it "null and void."




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France announced yesterday that it would provide a military escort for two of its oil tankers sailing in the Gulf but, henceforth, French ships plying the Gulf do so at their own risk. Tension between France and Iran remains high since they broke diplomatic relations last Friday.




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Comment: Tehran hopes its proposal for a cease-fire in the Gulf will cast it as the party willing to pursue peace and Iraq as the source of tension. The Iranians also would like to separate the war in the Gulf, where Iran is most vulnerable, from the land war, where Tehran has the initiative. Iran will be trying to reduce the impact of the resolution by portraying it as part of the US effort to justify an increased presence in the region. 

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Paris evidently feels obligated to escort the two tankers that were scheduled to go to the Gulf before its announcement, but the action probably does not reflect a permanent change in France's basic policy of not escorting ships. Paris probably also hopes the move will demonstrate resolve toward Iran. French naval units near the Gulf are ill equipped to defend themselves against air attacks, and their ability to defend merchant shipping is similarly limited. The French frigates currently in the Gulf would probably also have trouble defending against small, fast craft attacking at night. 

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JAPAN-US:

Toshiba Affair Enters New Phase


Political sniping from the opposition, divisions in the bureaucracy, and media questioning on the Toshiba case have greeted Trade Minister Tamura on his return to Tokyo, where he is trying to portray as successful his discussions with US officials on the technology diversion case. 

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
Tamura's public remarks since returning to Japan imply he made no promises in Washington to take specific actions. Despite Tamura's hints in the US that Tokyo could play a leading role in pursuing COCOM initiatives that would help stem future diversions, statements of other officials fall short of such an offer. 


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According to the US Embassy, the opposition parties and media are demanding proof of a direct link between the Toshiba Machine Company's illegal export of milling machines to the USSR and reduction in Soviet submarine noise. Early statements by Japanese officials, and testimony in the Diet by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and others on the subject conflicted, fueling the debate. Recent remarks reflect a common government stand that there is a "strong suspicion" of linkage. 

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
Tokyo is likely to press the US for more information in order to answer growing demands from the press and the opposition for proof and to help build its case that the Toshiba diversion poses a serious threat to Japanese national security 

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ALGERIA-TUNISIA-LIBYA:

Bendjedid Presses Cooperation

Algeria appears determined to bring Libya into its Treaty of Fraternity and Concord with Tunisia and Mauritania.



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
According to the press, Tunisia reopened air travel and other communications links to Libya last week, and Algiers announced Monday that the three capitals plan to build a gas pipeline linking their countries.

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Comment: President Bendjedid, who is trying to assert Algerian leadership of North Africa, is pressing ahead with his greater Maghreb scheme, despite differences in his government over how to deal with Libyan leader Qadhafi. He appears to be trying to take a middle course between those pushing for full political unity with Libya and those wary of Qadhafi.

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Qadhafi almost certainly wants to join the treaty, although he is reluctant to recognize the "colonial" border with Algeria while he is denying the legitimacy of the "colonial" frontier with Chad. As a gesture, he would be willing to meet Tunisia's financial demands and promise to refrain from meddling in Tunisian and Algerian affairs in return for similar pledges from Bendjedid and Bourguiba.

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SUDAN:

Civil Unrest Mounting

A rash of disturbances in Khartoum is stretching police capabilities, and the military is likely to stage a show of force against the demonstrators.

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~~According to the US Embassy,~~ students are protesting shortages of books and equipment, while others are demonstrating because of shortages of fuel, public transportation, power, and water. Intermittent strikes by postal and telecommunications workers and electricians have cut off some essential services. ~~The Embassy believes~~ the demonstrations will continue to increase in number and size.

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~~the Army will soon begin a show of force, moving troops and armored vehicles in Khartoum. In addition, police have orders to arrest suspected agitators, more checkpoints are being set up on the outskirts of the city, and searches are being organized in areas where arms are believed to be hidden.~~

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~~Army participation in the new security measures is to be held to a minimum. Many officers are unhappy with the current unrest, but most want the civilian government to resolve the problem.~~

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Comment: Periodic waves of strikes and demonstrations have occurred in Khartoum over the past year, but the current round indicates that civilian impatience with Prime Minister Sadiq's ineffective administration is increasing. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the Army will impose stronger measures to deal with demonstrators and senior officers are likely to consider forcing the civilian government to step aside.

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
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
CANADA: Socialist Party Sweeps Byelections

The socialist New Democratic Party won another three seats in Parliament on Monday, two in longtime Conservative strongholds. The results lend credence to nationwide polls in recent months that have shown the party leading the Tories and Liberals. Gallup gives the New Democrats 41 percent of the support this month of the decided voters, the Liberals 35 percent, and the Tories 23 percent, a near-record low. Press analysis suggests that the results of the byelection will increase Tory infighting as Prime Minister Mulroney comes to be seen as the party's biggest liability and will intensify debate among the Liberals over John Turner's leadership.



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Comment: The NDP victories underscore the public's distaste for the scandal-plagued Tory government and for Mulroney in particular. Tory popularity has fallen steadily despite a strong economic recovery and the conclusion of a new constitutional accord. Some Tory leaders probably believe the party has no choice but to persevere, hoping the Socialists' surge will ebb and Liberal infighting will increase by the next election in 1989. Others, however, may conclude that the Tories should risk an early election to capitalize on Liberal disarray and the specter of a socialist victory, despite the Conservatives' current poor standings in the polls—particularly in view of the large number of undecided voters.



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


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EC-USSR: Prospects for Diplomatic Relations


Member states disagree on how quickly the EC should expand ties to Moscow, Most are said to believe that recent domestic economic and political changes in the USSR are significant; some EC members interpret the recent Soviet Central Committee plenum as clear evidence that the balance of power has shifted in favor of General Secretary Gorbachev and his reform program. France remains skeptical, however, arguing that Soviet foreign policy objectives remain unchanged and that progress on human rights has been slow. EC disagreement with Moscow over the status of West Berlin, moreover, is still a barrier to establishing full relations, according to various US Embassy reports.



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Comment: Resistance among powerful EC members is probably sufficient to slow but not halt progress toward expanded foreign policy consultations and eventual diplomatic relations with Moscow. The issue will almost certainly be considered by EC foreign ministers at their meeting in September.




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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Najib Concludes Visit

TASS reports that General Secretary Gorbachev discussed "additional steps and measures in the interests of a speedier normalization" with visiting Afghan party chief Najib, who returned to Kabul yesterday. Najib told a Moscow press conference that these would include political steps already announced as well as economic and military measures. TASS emphasized continued Soviet support for Kabul's "national reconciliation" policy and said Najib had been invited to attend the October Revolution celebrations.



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


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Comment: Najib's visit to Moscow last December was the prelude to his cease-fire and "national reconciliation" initiatives. The Soviets may have used the latest visit to push a new proposal—such as a rumored roundtable conference involving all parties to the Afghan conflict—although Najib's statement to the press suggests that measures other than political may be in the offing. The official statements do not indicate optimism about the near-term prospects of the current policy. Although references to Najib are not warm, the invitation to return in the fall shows that Moscow is underlining its commitment to him and his regime.



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In Brief

Africa



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— [redacted] **Malian** President Traore reducing **Soviet** influence, wants closer ties to West . . . dismissed Soviet advisers with suspected KGB links, easing out pro-Soviet party officials . . . Bamako may seek more Western aid. [redacted]

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— [redacted] **Mozambique** recently asked **Portugal** to train 100 military officers annually . . . part of effort to reduce dependence on **USSR**, improve prospects against RENAMO . . . [redacted]

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Americas

— **Brazil's** President told US Ambassador IMF accord politically impossible . . . wants US banks to settle without it . . . stalemate likely as banks still demanding token interest payment, IMF program [redacted]

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— **Salvadoran** rebels' attacked **Honduran** border patrols three times this month [redacted] . Honduran army cooperating with Salvadoran military . . . using forces to block rebels from returning to refugee camps used as sanctuaries. [redacted]

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
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— **Guatemala** considering trade ties to **Cuba**, [redacted] . allowing Cuban press to open office in capital . . . strong Guatemalan military opposition makes full diplomatic relations unlikely. [redacted]

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Special Analysis

IRAQ:

Strategy After UN Resolution

Baghdad has given preliminary indication that it will accept the UN Security Council resolution on the Iran-Iraq war and will try to ensure that the onus for any further fighting falls on Iran. The Iraqis probably will halt air attacks in the Persian Gulf at least temporarily. Iraq will try to keep the superpowers involved in the Gulf so that they will continue to press Iran to end the war.



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Baghdad will try to contrast its eagerness to end the war with Tehran's intransigence.


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Baghdad has announced that its General Assembly will debate the resolution in a few days, but the outcome undoubtedly will be favorable. The US Embassy in Amman reports that Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz said Iraq would honor a cease-fire unless attacked. If, however, Iran has not accepted the resolution and withdrawn to the international border within a few weeks, Iraq probably will resume its shipping attacks because of its longstanding belief that a cease-fire limited to the Gulf favors Iran.

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Meanwhile, Iraq probably will begin diplomatic efforts to get Security Council members, particularly the superpowers, to adopt a follow-on resolution calling for stiff mandatory sanctions against Iran for violating the cease-fire resolution. China, the USSR, the UK, France, Ghana, and Congo, however, are likely to drag their heels on such a measure

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While moving closer to the US, Iraq is eager for continued Soviet support as well and will maintain close ties to Moscow. Iraq is concerned that the Soviets will cut a deal with Iran at Baghdad's expense. In a recent address to ruling Ba'th Party officials, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn lauded General Secretary Gorbachev for economic reforms similar to those Saddam is pushing in Iraq. The Iraqis early this month signed a five-year technical, trade, and economic agreement negotiated with Moscow last year. The USSR, Iraq's principal arms supplier, continues to assist in the development of Iraq's energy and agricultural sectors.

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Gorbachev Speaks Out on *Glasnost*

Under the press of debate about the legitimate boundaries of *glasnost*, Gorbachev has made the clearest statement to date of official guidelines:

On the value of openness . . .

- “The most controversial questions need to be debated while having respect for one another. In even the most extreme points of view there is something valuable. . . .”
- “I think that we never will be able to forgive or justify what happened in (Stalin’s purges of) 1937-38, and we never should. . . .”
- “I do not see any drama in polemics, in the confrontation of points of view. It is normal.”

And its limits . . .

- “This is not permissiveness, *glasnost* is called on to strengthen socialism.”
- “If they start seeking out . . . values and discoveries outside the limits of the interests of the people and beyond the limits of socialism, then the Central Committee will publicly subject this to criticism.”

Specifically, Gorbachev cited as beyond the bounds of permissible debate:

- “Things that go beyond the bounds of our system, in particular that we should renounce the instrument of the planned economy.”
- “The idea that it is possible to get by without the party . . . there must be no disrespectful attitude toward cadres in general.”
- “A rejection of everything that has gone before . . . would be a mistake. . . . We are proud of everything that enriches our long and great history.”
- “We would be concerned if (our artistic intelligentsia) tried in conditions of openness, publicity, and democratism to gain revenge for every criticism.”

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Special Analysis

USSR:

Gorbachev, Ligachev Increasingly at Odds

Since the Central Committee plenum last month, policy disputes between General Secretary Gorbachev and senior party secretary Ligachev appear to be heating up. In a sharply worded speech, Ligachev has protested abuses of glasnost and excesses of the media. Gorbachev has refuted Ligachev's suggestions that the situation is getting out of control, but he has acknowledged that openness must have limits—and he may have approved curbing groups that are going too far. If their political fortunes continue to wane, Ligachev and opponents of reform may become more aggressive in attempting to use the glasnost issue against the General Secretary. [redacted]

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Even before the plenum, Ligachev had been distancing himself from some controversial political and economic reforms proposed by Gorbachev, while continuing to support him on many other issues. Although the promotion of three additional senior secretaries at the plenum significantly weakened Ligachev's influence within the secretariat, he has not been silenced. In a speech early this month at the newspaper *Sovetskaya Kultura*, he voiced the strongest public reservations to date on the part of a senior Soviet official about *glasnost*. He charged that the media, while moving in the right direction, had dredged up "scum and debris" and brought forth some "dubious ideas." Ligachev called instead for "constructive" *glasnost*, blending artistic merit and "profound ideological commitment." [redacted]

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This speech and other recent appearances suggest that Ligachev is determined to retain a voice in the regime's ideological and cultural policies. Gorbachev ally Aleksandr Yakovlev has become increasingly prominent in those areas, however, and his recent promotion to full Politburo membership gives added weight to his pronouncements. Yakovlev has been substantially more tolerant of wide-ranging debate than Ligachev and last week appeared to take issue with him by criticizing unnamed persons who call for limits on openness. Even Soviet insiders seem confused about the respective roles the two men are playing: ~~a senior economist told US Embassy officials that~~ [redacted] Yakovlev is now in charge of ideology, but a [redacted] party official said that Ligachev and Yakovlev are sharing ideological responsibilities. [redacted]

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Ligachev's concerns that the reforms may be going too far are no doubt shared by many party officials who are not only hesitant about reforms themselves but also fear that encouragement of media criticism weakens the prestige of the party. To address these concerns, Gorbachev has appointed Yakovlev to head a new commission charged with maintaining the momentum of the reform process while ensuring that it does not get out of hand. ~~(according to Embassy reporting)~~  

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Media criticism of recent manifestations of unbridled Russian nationalism indicates that concerns about *glasnost* giving rise to extremism are shared by reformers as well as more orthodox party members. ~~US Embassy reporting suggests that~~ Moscow party boss Boris Yel'tsin was criticized by unnamed senior officials for meeting with demonstrators from an extreme Russian nationalist group, Pamyat', in May. ~~According to an Embassy source,~~ Yakovlev told ~~media officials that the group must be destroyed and authorized a press campaign against it~~ 




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In a 14 July speech to media officials, Gorbachev appeared to respond to the concerns raised by Ligachev. He promised that *glasnost* and criticism would not be allowed to undermine "socialist" values or create a climate of disrespect for party officials. His remarks suggested, however, that he did not share the same degree of concern as Ligachev about excesses in *glasnost*. Gorbachev denied that grounds exist for "great political reproaches" and asserted that there is something valuable even in the extreme viewpoints that have been aired. 

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The General Secretary may see himself as vulnerable on the issue of openness. He told the media chiefs that some people are just waiting for "you or me to make a mistake . . . to turn it against the entire process of democratization and *glasnost*." 

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The unusual public airing of differences between Gorbachev and Ligachev suggests they may be moving toward a showdown over reform. Tension between the two may contribute to rumors circulating in Moscow that Gorbachev wants to dilute further Ligachev's power by moving him to the largely ceremonial presidency now held by the 78-year-old Gromyko. 

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The Chilean Political Spectrum

The Moderate Opposition Parties

All political parties have been technically illegal in Chile since the military government came to power in 1973, but several dozen moderate parties and factions continued to operate more or less openly. The moderate parties have formed several coalitions in the past few years.

- **The Democratic Alliance.** A broad grouping of seven parties from the moderate right to the center left founded in 1983 and dominated by the centrist Christian Democratic Party. Chairmanship rotates every six months among the parties.
- **The National Accord.** Eleven mainstream parties that signed a comprehensive series of moderate proposals for a transition to democratic government in August 1985 at the instigation of the Catholic Church's primate. Includes two conservative and two leftist parties along with the original members of the Alliance. Quiescent in recent months.
- **The National Civic Assembly.** A loose grouping—led by the Christian Democrats—of 18 leading professional, labor, academic, and social groups formed in April 1986. Largely inactive in recent months.
- **The Party of National Renovation.** Established in January 1987, through the fusion of two moderate right and one far right parties. Key members were formerly closely identified with the Pinochet government and at one time apparently favored the President's reelection in 1989. Several now endorse the free election campaign headed by Sergio Molina.

In March 1987, the government passed legislation—one of the laws that under the constitution of 1980 must be in place before the presidential plebiscite is held—to legalize non-Marxist political parties. As of late last month, eight parties, mostly from the right of center, had begun the initial steps to acquire legal status.

Far Left Groups

The Communist Party of Chile is the largest and best organized far left group in the country; its total card-carrying membership has grown to 37,000, and its youth wing probably numbers about 20,000. In December 1983, the party supported the creation of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, which has become Chile's main terrorist group, with a membership of 1,500 to 2,000. It has carried out more than 2,500 bombings since late 1983 and mounted the assassination attempt against Pinochet in September 1986.

Several other far left groups advocate violence to overthrow Pinochet, but none approaches the Front in size or frequency of terrorist actions, including the pro-Cuban Movement of the Revolutionary Left. Most far left parties belong to the Communist-led Popular Democratic Movement coalition, which was folded into the new United Left alliance in mid-June. The Communists used the Movement—and will try with the alliance—to channel many of their overt political activities, such as calls for street protests and for liaison with student, labor, church, and professional groups.

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Special Analysis

CHILE:

Moderate Opposition Gathers Strength

Chile's moderate opposition, benefiting from growing popular exasperation with both President Pinochet and leftist violence, is showing considerable cohesion and a new pragmatism. A voter registration drive is beginning to catch on with the public, and the moderates have made overtures to the armed forces that could result in a consensus civilian or military successor to Pinochet. The far left remains politically isolated; it will probably not be able to disrupt violently the moderates' efforts to reach an accommodation with the military.

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Recent polls show overwhelming popular backing for a return to democracy and a direct election to select the next president in 1989. There is almost no support for the plebiscite backed by Pinochet. Nevertheless, most Chileans expect Pinochet to retain power, even though they would prefer one of several opposition leaders.

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Moderates Shift Tactics

Moderate opposition leaders gained little with confrontational tactics over the past year and now recognize that most Chileans repudiate violence. They acknowledge they must avoid street protests, promote the free election and voter registration drives, and convince the military they are a viable alternative to Pinochet.

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The US Embassy notes the Christian Democrats typify this greater realism. They are the main opposition and later this month probably will replace longtime Chairman Gabriel Valdes—hated by the military—with Patricio Aylwin, a respected conservative determined to gain the trust of the armed forces.

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Pinochet is disturbed by this prospect because he believes Aylwin will improve the party's image and make it a greater threat to his government.

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Aylwin's main goal is to persuade the armed forces to prevent Pinochet from running for reelection. He and several other moderates have signaled the Military Junta—which must approve the plebiscite candidate—that they would back a consensus conservative candidate, civilian or military, who pledged to carry out a genuine political transition after 1989. They believe the military will not risk selecting Pinochet as the candidate if the moderates can register about three-fourths of the 8.3 million eligible voters by mid-1988.

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The registration drive is headed by a nonpartisan council, which is raising funds and establishing a national organization. Its coordinator, Sergio Molina, is a moderate Christian Democrat who is widely

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respected, even by senior military officers. He and other opposition leaders say, according to the US Embassy, that if Pinochet is nominated the opposition can still mobilize to denounce vote fraud and generate a massive vote against him. [redacted]

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The Role of Other Sectors

A prominent Chilean business leader has told US officials that the business community fears that Pinochet's free market economic policies will become discredited if he stays in power much longer. As a result, the business community is distancing itself from the President and now prefers a civilian as transitional chief of state. Businessmen plan to launch a program next month to build support for the private sector and, by inference, for a consensus presidential candidate in 1989. [redacted]

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Leaders of the two main labor confederations are touring the provinces to support the voter registration drive. Last month the church's Episcopal Conference called on Chileans to register, and the head of the government's election service announced the recent rise in voter registration is partly due to strong church support. [redacted]

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Far Left Isolated

[redacted] the Communists—the main subversive force in the country—remain on the defensive following the government seizure of major arms caches last summer and their failed attempt to kill Pinochet last September. Communist leaders now emphasize political tactics and play down their past advocacy of violence as the only way to remove Pinochet. So far, however, their efforts to rebuild their ties to the moderate opposition have been fruitless. [redacted]

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Terrorism by the Communist-affiliated Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front declined markedly over the past year, but bombings and assaults on the security services surged following the killing last month of 12 terrorists in alleged shootouts. Communist-sponsored violence probably will increase in the coming months, particularly since moderate opposition leaders almost certainly will continue to distance themselves from the Communists. [redacted]

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
Pinochet remains determined to ram through his nomination as the sole plebiscite candidate. He can no longer convincingly argue that he is the only alternative to chaos, however, because the moderates have indicated a willingness to accept a slow transition to civilian rule that would safeguard key military and conservative interests. Pinochet will also find it hard to capitalize on any resurgence of Communist terrorism as long as the moderates continue to reject cooperation with the far left and condemn violence. [redacted]

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
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Special Analysis

BRAZIL:

Opposition to Sarney Grows

The Sarney administration's program to halt runaway inflation—the Bresser Plan—is becoming a lightning rod for growing public criticism of the President. Organized labor is uniting behind plans for a general strike next month, and leftists are demonstrating in favor of an early presidential election. Conservative forces who have withheld criticism of Sarney may return to the attack if he abandons the Bresser Plan. The protests are creating the political conditions necessary for leaders in the Constituent Assembly to ease Sarney from office.



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A recent opinion poll indicates dissatisfaction with Sarney and his policies is widespread. A majority of voters doubt the Bresser Plan will bring an end to inflation, unemployment, or the wage freeze. Public discontent runs so deep that only 3 percent of those polled would vote for Sarney in a field of seven candidates if a direct election were held now, according to press reports.



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
Labor and Left Take to Streets

~~Discontent with the economy is fueling spontaneous, sometimes violent, street demonstrations, which are being exploited by the left. The US Embassy says that militant unions have joined with leftist parties in large antigovernment demonstrations in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia. Growing layoffs and the wage freeze are creating strong support from the rank and file for a general strike next month.~~



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Sarney's most vocal opponents on the left—Marxist Lula da Silva of the Workers Party and his charismatic populist rival, Leonel Brizola—have agreed to join forces to press for an early election, ~~according to the Embassy.~~



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
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
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
Stirrings on the Right

Conservative political and business groups have muted their criticism since Sarney introduced the Bresser Plan but are wary that Sarney will reinstate the populist social and economic policies he turned away from last year. Landowners demonstrated in Brasilia last week to protest legislative efforts to expand agrarian reform, but refrained from directly criticizing Sarney.



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Recent statements by retired and active-duty military officers who disapprove of Sarney indicate that hardliners in the military, although a minority, are restless. Their dissatisfaction with the President's weak leadership might spur the high command to move more forcefully to prop up Sarney's government if the situation deteriorates further.




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Prospects for This Year




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Protests will probably intensify as the economy declines. ~~The US Consulate in Sao Paulo reports that~~ there is a sense of crisis among the poor and that they have taken to random looting of supermarkets. Leaders of the Democratic Movement are pressing Sarney to increase federal spending to head off a recession, and he probably will be forced to discard economic austerity, unleashing inflation again. Political commentators say the conservatives may renew their attacks if Sarney surrenders to growing leftist pressure to scrap the Bresser Plan.



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Under these conditions, the Constituent Assembly probably would curtail Sarney's term and call a direct election in 1988 or 1989. The Assembly might strip Sarney of many of his powers by establishing a new parliamentary system before the election. Such a move, however, would raise concerns in the military over the prospect of a Brizola presidency, and the high command would try to exert influence behind the scenes to support Sarney through the transition period.



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There is also the risk that the collapse of fiscal discipline could lead to spiraling economic protests, with violence becoming more common. Popular and political pressures for an immediate presidential election could cause military leaders to move in concert with civilian leaders in the Constituent Assembly in an effort to ease Sarney from office.



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