



**Director of
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WESTERN EUROPE- Assessing Soviet INF Offer
JAPAN-CHINA:

Reactions to General Secretary Gorbachev's acceptance of the global elimination of all LRINF and SRINF systems have been favorable, but the key NATO Allies are likely to reject Moscow's condition that US warheads for West Germany's 72 Pershing 1As be destroyed. 


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British Prime Minister Thatcher has welcomed Gorbachev's offer provided there are no strings attached and that any agreement is verifiable. West German Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher have noted that the global elimination of all INF systems would help to overcome some differences on verification. Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone was receptive to the proposal but said the government would have to study it carefully. 


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Media reaction in Western Europe credits Gorbachev with removing a key obstacle to an INF accord. Press accounts generally have neglected to mention the Pershing 1A issue as a remaining obstacle. Chinese news media carried without comment a straightforward summary of Gorbachev's interview on the Soviet offer 

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Comment: West European leaders probably will withhold a definitive reaction until Moscow's position on the Pershing 1As becomes clear. Bonn—for the time being, at least—almost certainly will reject inclusion of the Pershing 1A warheads as part of an agreement, and British and French officials are certain to support Bonn. 

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The Kohl government will come under strong pressure from the public and from political opposition to compromise on the Pershings, but the government's position on their exclusion is unlikely to change as long as Bonn is certain of support from its allies. At some point, however, Bonn probably would be receptive if the Soviets were to offer to bypass the Pershing issue by signing a separate agreement on LRINF systems. London and Paris, on the other hand, strongly favor including SRINF constraints in an overall INF agreement. 

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Beijing almost certainly will welcome Gorbachev's announcement. The removal of all medium-range missiles in the Soviet Far East is Japan's primary arms control concern, and Tokyo probably is pleased that Gorbachev specifically delinked cuts in Asian INF from earlier demands for reciprocal cuts in US nuclear systems in the Far East.

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SRI LANKA-INDIA: Moves Toward Peace

Meetings between Colombo, New Delhi, and Tamil groups this week have resulted in significant progress toward a settlement on Tamil autonomy, but Colombo's continuing military operations and opposition from Sinhalese groups suggest President Jayewardene will crack down hard on the insurgents if talks fail.

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The latest proposal expands on agreements negotiated last year between Colombo and Tamil moderates and provides for two separate provinces in the north and east to be governed by a single provincial council—a key insurgent demand. It also calls for a referendum within a year to decide if the two provinces should be merged. New Delhi will negotiate on the Tamils' behalf, according to US Embassy reporting, and, for the first time since he assumed office, Prime Minister Gandhi will go to Sri Lanka next week.

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The US Embassy in Colombo says Jayewardene hopes for a settlement, and some Sri Lankans speculate a deal may be cut this week. Jayewardene met individually with many cabinet ministers this week to urge their support for the proposals. Tamil insurgent representatives and moderate Tamil politicians reacted favorably to the plan in discussions with Indian Foreign Secretary Menon Tuesday, according to US Embassy reports. Influential segments of the Buddhist clergy and the main Sri Lankan opposition party are against the proposals, however, and have warned that its acceptance might precipitate a revolt among the island's majority Sinhalese community.

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Comment: The new proposals go further than previous offers in addressing Tamil demands for autonomy, and they break new ground in appointing India as a negotiator in the peace process. Success will depend, however, on whether New Delhi can deliver the main insurgent group and whether Jayewardene can overcome—or successfully ignore—domestic opposition to the plan.

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~~Jayewardene is preparing for a military option if talks fail.~~ New Delhi's new position as negotiator for the Tamils will put to the test its leverage on both Colombo and the insurgents. Gandhi risks another foreign policy embarrassment if Jayewardene backs away from his promises in the face of domestic opposition.

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USSR: Grain Prospects Improve

Izvestiya reported today that the 1987 Soviet grain crop so far is quite good "above or on a level with last year's." The harvest in 1986 was officially set at 210.1 million metric tons—the fourth largest ever.

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Comment: It would take optimal growing conditions for the rest of the crop season for the Soviets to produce 210 million tons this year. If the weather is only average, the crop probably will be closer to 200 million tons. A dry fall and a harsh winter that hurt winter grains was followed by a prolonged cool, wet spring that delayed sowing, jeopardizing this year's crop. During the last two and a half months, however, more favorable weather conditions over almost all Soviet grain-growing areas have left most of the grain crop very healthy.

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KUWAIT-OPEC: Oil Production Increasing

Kuwait's decision to exceed substantially its OPEC oil production quota threatens to undercut hard-won OPEC unity and further strain relations with Iran. [redacted] Kuwait's oil production increased sharply in June and may have reached 2 million barrels per day by midmonth, almost double its quota. Iran and Iraq have also been raising production—almost in tandem—over the past few months, and the United Arab Emirates continues to lift more than its quota. Total OPEC production currently exceeds its ceiling of 16.6 million b/d by more than 1.5 million b/d. [redacted]

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Comment: Kuwait may be stockpiling crude as a hedge against Iranian hostilities or trying to maintain its market share in the face of Tehran's overproduction. Not all the oil is being sold, but sustained Kuwaiti overproduction and exports would put pressure on oil prices. It would also raise the risk of Iranian retaliation against Kuwaiti tankers and oil facilities. Saudi Arabia may, in the extreme case, threaten to stop supporting Kuwait's oil export operations in order to prevent the OPEC accord from unraveling. Kuwait has not bowed to pressure from Saudi Arabia or Iran in the past, however, and probably will continue its independent oil policy [redacted]

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IRAQ: More Conciliatory Kurdish Policy

Iraq is easing its repressive campaign against rebellious Kurds and making attempts at conciliation. It has stopped razing Kurdish villages and is allowing lowland Kurds to return to areas near their destroyed towns. ~~According to the US Embassy~~ It has also reopened negotiations with Jalal Talabani, who heads the dissident Popular Union of Kurdistan. Izzat Ibrahim, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and a longtime Kurdish expert, has again been put in charge of the regime's Kurdish policy. He replaces security chief Ali Hasan Al-Majid, who had been directing the harsh campaign. [redacted]

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Comment: Iraqi President Saddam Husayn appears to be heeding advice from the military that the government risks losing more territory to the rebels next winter if the Kurdish situation is not defused. A more conciliatory policy may ease Kurdish animosity and stem the recent increase in defections to Iran. A reduction in guerrilla fighting in the North would make it less necessary to move Iraqi forces from the front with Iran. Talabani probably is negotiating with Baghdad both to relieve pressure on his forces and to hedge against a reduction in Syrian support if Syrian-Iraqi relations warm. Baghdad probably will not offer significant concessions. [redacted]

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Aquino's Land Reform Program

Component

Comment

Complete the distribution of rice and corn lands following program begun by former President Marcos . . . includes about 13 percent of cultivated land.

Relatively little controversy . . . but administrative problems could slow distribution.

Redistribute land seized from Marcos cronies as well as foreclosed and idle lands . . . almost 10 percent of cultivated land.

Legal complications likely to slow disposition of seized lands.

Redistribute or provide for equity shares in all other farms . . . includes sugar and coconut plantations . . . 18 percent of cultivated land.

Most contentious component . . . sugar and coconut farmers resistant . . . some threatening to take up arms.

Allocate public lands . . . 14 percent of cultivated lands.

Program still in early planning stages.



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PHILIPPINES: Sharp Reaction to Land Reform Decree

A decree President Aquino issued Wednesday outlining a \$2.5 billion program to redistribute some 55 percent of the agricultural land has met immediate and widespread opposition. Although Aquino left important details of the program for the decision by the new Congress—which convenes Monday—some legislators have already announced they will craft their own program. According to press reports, at least 15 associations of landowners have said their members will not give their land up and will destroy their crops if Aquino's program is enacted. The largest farmworkers union, a Communist-dominated group that claims Aquino's program has too many loopholes and is doomed to fail, planned a protest rally in Manila today.

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Comment: The legislation is likely to bog down in the Congress because most congressmen are large landowners or depend heavily on landowners for political support. Politically powerful sugar and coconut farmers—who stand to lose their source of income in return for a vague package stretching compensation over 10 years—may be the most vocal opponents. Should the Congress hesitate too long, Communist-led radical farmers and landless peasants will increase their protests, raising the risk of violence. A farmers' rally in Manila earlier this year left 12 demonstrators dead.

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NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA-US: Military Talks Proposed

North Korea ^{on 23 July} ~~yesterday~~ proposed that the two Koreas and the US begin talks on arms reduction next March in Geneva, with observers from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The proposal includes reducing the armed forces of each Korea to fewer than 100,000 troops by 1991, removing US forces and nuclear weapons from the peninsula, closing US military bases, and converting the Demilitarized Zone into a "peace zone." P'yongyang proposed that the Commission verify the actions. It announced that it will reduce its own army by 100,000 troops by yearend.

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Comment: The offer repackages several longstanding North Korean themes; P'yongyang almost certainly floated it for propaganda gain and to take advantage of political uncertainty in the South. The initiative's timing—three weeks after South Korean President Chun's handpicked successor called for democratic reform—and the proposal that talks begin immediately after a new President takes office suggest the North hopes to give the opposition, students, and dissidents in the South a campaign issue.

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25X1**Fiji: Chiefs Propose Constitutional Compromise**

Fiji's traditional Council of Chiefs proposed Wednesday that the 52-member lower house of parliament be expanded by adding 10 seats of ethnic Fijians, in addition to the 22 seats reserved for them under the existing constitution. The proposal will be considered by the Governor General's constitutional review committee, which includes a minority faction led by deposed Prime Minister Bavadra. Meanwhile, Colonel Rabuka, who led the mid-May coup, reversed his position on declaring a republic and announced he now favors remaining in the Commonwealth.

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Comment: The decision of the Council of Chiefs is designed to ensure the dominance of the native Fijians over the slightly more numerous ethnic Indians. Both the decision and Rabuka's reversal reflect the success of moderate elements—led by former Prime Minister Mara. Nevertheless, the political climate is increasingly polarized. Militant Fijian youths rampaged against Indian businesses this week in Suva, and leaders of the deposed coalition government, which was predominantly Indian, have threatened a national strike in the important sugar industry if the regime declares a republic.

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25X1**SURINAME: Tenuous Opposition Coalition**

Suriname's three major ethnically based political parties recently formed a coalition to contest the National Assembly election in November, but inherent tensions already threaten its prospects.

~~coalition leaders disagree on Head of Government Bouterse's role after the election, and the leader of the smallest party reportedly is distrusted by other party leaders because he has cooperated more readily with Bouterse. According to the US Embassy,~~ party leaders expect the turnout at a rally scheduled in early August to dwarf one Bouterse recently held for his party and they anticipate easily winning the election.

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reportedly
Comment: Common hatred of Bouterse will help hold the coalition together initially, but ethnic and political differences probably will surface as the election approaches. Surinamers may be reluctant to embrace the coalition because they believe elections will not affect Bouterse's hold on power. If the coalition gains sizable popular support, Bouterse probably will try to destroy it through a combination of co-optation and intimidation. Defection of even a minor party to Bouterse might give him enough votes in the legislature to determine the president.

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
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State of Mexico: Fradulent Voting Results



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MEXICO: Ruling-Party Vote Fraud

Vote tampering in elections this month robbed the Mexican Socialist Party of the governorship of the State of Mexico, [redacted] the party—a recently formed leftist coalition—won almost 43 percent of the vote against 34 percent for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party. Official tallies, however, gave the PRI 63 percent of the vote and the Socialists 9 percent. [redacted] only 25 percent of registered voters cast ballots, but the State Electoral Commission doubled that amount. In addition ballots were altered at voting booths and at government offices in Mexico City. [redacted]

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Comment: Ruling-party officials probably hoped a sweeping victory in the country's most populous state would set the tone for the presidential election next year. The unexpectedly strong showing by the left may indicate it will be a greater challenge to the PRI than the conservative National Action Party, the traditional runner-up. The 75-percent abstention rate probably hurt the ruling party, and party officials probably will try to select candidates with more appeal and resort to more liberal use of economic stimuli to woo voters in future elections. [redacted]

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BRAZIL: Party Demands Hamstring Bresser

Brazil's ruling party, the Democratic Movement Party, has put Finance Minister Bresser on notice that domestic growth must not be jeopardized by an agreement with creditors. The party has announced an economic platform calling for growth and higher salaries; the party is strongly opposed to policies that would lead to recession. Its platform stresses that Brazil must not allow formal or informal monitoring by the IMF and must reduce transfers abroad in order to increase domestic investment. [redacted]

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Comment: Although Bresser's long-range plan is broadly consistent with the goals of the ruling-party platform, the party remains antagonistic toward creditors. Domestic political pressures are already causing Bresser to backpedal on an IMF agreement, the resumption of interest payments, and the option of converting some debt into foreign investment. The ruling party, by restraining the Finance Minister's ability to offer compromises, is increasing the risk that current talks with bankers will prove fruitless. Lack of foreign financial support would make it hard for Brazil to increase investment needed for rapid growth. Obtaining sufficient investment funds is essential to Bresser's long-range plan. Public deficit targets will have to be adjusted upward, if necessary, to prevent recession, making it difficult to keep inflation in check. Rising prices and increased domestic demand would endanger export targets, which are already ambitious when viewed against the recent growth of international trade. [redacted]

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In Brief**Americas**

- **Haitian** Communists reportedly planning attacks on US Embassy, diplomats this week ... may have assistance from Middle Eastern terrorists ... Communists willing to target US officials.

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South Asia

- Police killed five in **Bangladesh** during first half of 54-hour antigovernment general strike, according to press, ~~US Embassy~~ ... ~~100 injured when protesters burned Army recruitment center~~ ... police and opposition increasingly aggressive.

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Middle East

- 30,000 **Iranian** Hajj pilgrims staged peaceful demonstrations in **Saudi Arabia** on Friday, Tuesday ... much anti-US rhetoric, but security forces avoided confrontation ... additional Iranian-led protests likely.

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- **Gulf Cooperation Council** ministerial meeting to be held Saturday in **Saudi Arabia**, according to US Embassy ... will discuss cooperation with US reflagging operation, contingency plans for **Iranian** military threat ... no major policy changes likely.

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Africa

- US Embassy unable to confirm alleged RENAMO massacre last weekend of almost 400 civilians in southern **Mozambique** ... no firsthand accounts available ... Maputo exploiting incident for propaganda advantage.

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- **OAU** summit opening ~~Monday~~ *on 27 July* probably will avoid harsh criticism of ~~US, Reports US Embassy~~ ... calls for international conference on African debt, more **South African** sanctions likely ... **Zambian** President Kaunda probably next OAU chairman.

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USSR

- **USSR** on 7 July *reportedly* withdrew ships surveilling area near Bermuda where Yankee-class submarine sank last fall ... probably for operations elsewhere ... coverage expected to resume ... primarily watches for Western salvage attempts, debris.

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- **USSR** *reportedly* lifting most controls on World War II documents ... follows opening of other archives and approval of monument to Marshal Zhukov, war hero persecuted by Stalin ... shows willingness to confront previously taboo issues.

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Special Analysis**EAST GERMANY-
WEST GERMANY:****Summit Prospects**

East German leader Honecker's visit to Bonn in early September, his first, will advance the long effort he has made to legitimize his regime and normalize relations with West Germany on his terms. Moscow's approval of a German summit is a major tactical shift, probably intended to induce Bonn to accept the Soviet demand for destruction of the US nuclear warheads for its Pershing 1A force or to have Bonn urge the US to exclude all short-range INF systems from an INF accord. The Soviets this week publicly highlighted the Pershing issue as a principal obstacle remaining to an INF agreement.

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The visit will have great symbolic importance for all Germans, in part because it has been so long and difficult in the arranging. It is at least the third attempt Honecker has made to reciprocate the official visit Chancellor Schmidt made to East Germany in 1981. The continuing Soviet veto of a German summit has been a major bone of contention between Honecker and Moscow.

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Honecker has long sought an official trip to West Germany for his own prestige and to validate his claim to head a separate and sovereign German state. Whatever the protocol limitations imposed by Bonn, the Western public will view the event as a full-blown visit by a foreign head of state. Honecker will also visit his hometown in the Saarland, where his sister lives, and call on President von Weizsaecker and important regional leaders, including Bavaria's Franz-Josef Strauss.

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Honecker's reception by Chancellor Kohl in Bonn makes it likely the East Germans will press Kohl to reciprocate with a visit to East Berlin. Such a visit would buttress East Germany's claim, contrary to the Four-Power Agreement, that the Soviet Sector of Berlin is its capital.

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In Bonn, the two sides will sign an environmental agreement and may conclude accords on nuclear energy and scientific and technical cooperation. They may agree to joint projects for sharing electric power and improving highways and rail service from West Germany to West Berlin.

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The West Germans may ask Honecker to rescind a recent decision to limit the amount of hard currency available to East German travelers to the West. While admitting no linkage, Honecker might consider a deal in return for Bonn underwriting this travel or an expensive project in East Germany like environmental cleanup. He is likely to press his proposal for a nuclear-weapons-free corridor in Central Europe as well as Moscow's position on Pershing missiles. Bonn will stress its support for major reductions in conventional, chemical, and short-range nuclear forces. [REDACTED]

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A successful summit may help the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats in two West German state elections shortly after Honecker's departure but could also lead to public pressure for major concessions to East Germany, such as recognizing a separate citizenship. Honecker is likely to hope that after Bonn he will be able to visit Paris and London. [REDACTED]

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Special Analysis**INDIA-CHINA:****Preparing for Prolonged Border Tension**

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Since mid-June, New Delhi and Beijing have stopped exchanging strongly worded warnings against the use of military force and have put forward proposals for talking about their differences.

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the Chinese regarded Indian Foreign Minister Tiwari's visit to Beijing last month as a conciliatory gesture and have invited him to return. The Indians have agreed, according to the US Embassy in Beijing, and Tiwari reportedly plans to go in October.

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The Chinese expect Tiwari to offer concessions, and Prime Minister Gandhi probably will give him leeway to discuss China's claims to the Aksai Chin territory in the west to demonstrate flexibility. India's position that its claims to Arunachal Pradesh are not negotiable, however, is likely to fall short of China's expectations.

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Although, the political atmosphere has improved somewhat, neither side seems ready to make the concessions necessary for serious negotiations.

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both sides anticipate a prolonged period of tension.

Neither side is likely to risk a major military clash until after Tiwari presents his proposals in Beijing. If political talks are held but fail to satisfy Beijing, the Chinese are likely to postpone a date for the next round of border talks—now rumored for November—and may try to seize some Indian territory before winter weather restricts troop movements. New Delhi may be hoping to forestall a Chinese military move by delaying its "Checkerboard" exercises until fall.

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Special Analysis**FRANCE-
SOUTHERN AFRICA:****Paris Reassessing Ties**

French Prime Minister Chirac and President Mitterrand are expanding contacts with southern Africa's Frontline States and taking a more critical line toward Pretoria; they are responding to domestic pressures and positioning themselves for the presidential election next year. Underlying differences on South Africa will probably preclude major shifts in French policy on sanctions and divestment.

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The impetus for France's efforts to improve relations with Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe has come from French arms manufacturers and other businessmen, including the management of the oil consortium Elf-Aquitaine, who see opportunities for French trade and investment. The US Embassy in Paris reports that Elf officials have been pressing Chirac in particular to withdraw support from UNITA, which has threatened Elf's operations and technicians in Angola.

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French Foreign Ministry officials have helped persuade Chirac that his narrow concentration on francophone Africa—in contrast to the Socialists' broader perspective—was ill-advised, according to the Embassy. This spring Chirac sent his diplomatic counselor to the Frontline States to solicit their views on South Africa and other regional issues. French and Mozambican officials recently discussed military aid, and the French agreed to open a \$170 million line of credit to Maputo.

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Chirac Still Straddling Issue

Chirac may hope that improved relations with the Frontline States will add credibility to his conservative government's ill-defined policy toward the region. Since he came to power last year, he has attempted to steer between those in his government who view the ANC as a vehicle for Soviet interests in South Africa and human rights activists who favor a hardline attitude toward Pretoria. He has distanced himself from the divestment and sanctions movements, for example, by taking refuge behind British and West German opposition to sanctions within the EC, but he has been increasingly critical of South Africa recently.

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Chirac's efforts to improve his South African credentials have been hurt by a group of conservative legislators from his governing coalition and the extreme right who claimed on returning from a factfinding trip to Pretoria that apartheid no longer exists in South Africa. Chirac is being pressed by some government ministers to refute those statements and risks losing centrist voters in his campaign for the presidency next year if he fails to clarify his stand.

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Mitterrand Pressing Ahead

President Mitterrand, who remains noncommittal about a second term, is trying to profit politically from the conservatives' ambivalence toward South Africa. For example, he has refused to accept the credentials of Pretoria's Ambassador-designate until South Africa makes concessions on a French citizen imprisoned in South Africa for refusing to testify against ANC activists. Recently Mitterrand's wife participated in a highly publicized meeting in Senegal between the ANC and a group of moderate Afrikaners.

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Mitterrand supports expanded contacts with Angola and Mozambique with enthusiasm, probably seeing an opportunity for France to encourage these states' flirtation with the West and for him to take the lead from Chirac on policy there. Mitterrand has invited Angolan President dos Santos to Paris in September, apparently hoping to counter UNITA leader Savimbi's controversial visit there last year. The Embassy suggests the energetic new French Ambassador to Angola may have ties to Mitterrand's Socialist Party.

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Outlook

South Africa is not likely to be a key issue in the French presidential election expected next spring, but Mitterrand and Chirac will try to use it in a way that will curry favor with concerned voters and francophone African leaders—who frequently provide campaign financing to French candidates. Chirac is not likely to shift substantially his policy toward Pretoria before the election because a tougher stance might lose him some conservative votes, while a softer approach would further alienate centrists.

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Mitterrand, for his part, will probably pursue a strategy of moral posturing on South Africa, as he did before the legislative election last year. Both leaders will continue to promote contacts with Angola and Mozambique and urge them to turn westward, but Chirac is unlikely to abandon discreet contacts with UNITA.

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