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YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1987

## K.G.B. Runs Commerce Unit, U.S. Says

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 — A State Department report, based on classified Central Intelligence Agency data, asserts that the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry is headed by a K.G.B. lieutenant general and is systematically engaged in commercial espionage in the West.

It is the first time the chamber, which is housed in the former Moscow stock exchange at Ulitsa Kuibysheva 6 and represents itself as the Russian equivalent of Western chambers of commerce, has been officially branded by the United States as a center of industrial spying.

The document says that of 140 officials identified with the chamber, about one-third are known or suspected intelligence officers, of whom a few are from the G.R.U., or military intelligence, and the rest from the K.G.B., the main Soviet intelligence organization, known by its Russian initials for the Committee on State Security.

The report did not get much attention when it was put out for what State Department officials said was "limited" distribution last August. But it reached the Soviet Union and, according to sources here, was believed to have angered Soviet officials, including the Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

### Was It on Gorbachev's Desk?

Officials here said the document might have been on Mr. Gorbachev's desk during his meeting with Secretary of State George P. Shultz last week that failed to set a date for a summit meeting.

Albert V. Melnikov, Commercial Counselor at the Soviet Embassy, said, "I have no comment on" the commercial espionage allegations.

The report identified the chamber's chairman as Lieut. Gen. Yevgeny P. Pitovranov of the K.G.B., who is on the

## A Government document says one-third of the officials are spies.

executive committee or governing board of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, a forum for improving commercial exchanges between the two countries.

The chamber "exploits and misleads" Western business and government leaders by systematically using international trade exhibitions and seminars for collection of economic data, the report contends.

### State Department Document

"Hosting over 200 trade exhibitions and about 100 Western business delegations annually and inspecting thousands of goods each year give its employees extraordinary access to imported equipment and uncounted contacts with foreign companies," according to the State Department document.

Cited as principal collection priorities are robot technology, marine technology, including that dealing with submarines doing deep sea research, and industrial chemicals.

The chamber was also accused of "falsifying" end-user documentation during inspection of Western equipment coming into the Soviet Union, according to the report.

For example, when a Western company producing goods for a civilian industry in the Soviet Union requests a quality control inspection, the chamber usually prepares a declaration of inspection for the equipment.

When Soviet officials wish to hide the true identity of the Soviet user, the re-

port said, "officials may doctor the document so that the foreign supplier may never suspect that he has sold his product to a closed facility probably involved in military production."

When the Soviet buyers purchase merchandise from a foreign source, it must be inspected to insure that it meets agreed specifications. This is done by quality control inspectors of the Goods Inspection Administration of the chamber.

These inspectors go abroad frequently, and can be assigned to a Western factory for several weeks or for months.

The inspectors are not normally subject to the travel restrictions and surveillance imposed on diplomatic personnel.

### Some Companies Persuaded

The report said they "sometimes wander into off-limits areas on the pretext of inspecting equipment" and they may "also target Western engineers and scientists for recruitment as agents to pass along technical information or trade secrets."

The chamber has been successful, the report said, in persuading Western companies to exhibit "sensitive" electronic, instrument-making, engineering, and other equipment.

Once the target companies bring their equipment to the Soviet Union for exhibition, the report said, Soviet officials put pressure on them to sell it. "A former Soviet military attaché has reported that Western businessmen have often been drawn into negotiations on the sale of sensitive equipment," it added.

Quotation of the Day,  
page 2, every day,  
in the News Summary.  
The New York Times.



Reuters

Dobrynin said Mikhail would spell out his summit meeting in a bid to please President Reagan.

Mr. Shultz's visit to

Mr. Dobrynin provided into Mr. Gorbachev's week, a number of questions about why the Soviet summit plans in his meeting with Mr. Shultz and whether it had been a bargainably a miscalculation.

Mr. Gorbachev reported that Mr. Gorbachev was disappointed that the summit was unprepared last week. Mr. Gorbachev's answers to the Soviet questions made during the summit were strategic and space respond to offers made last month by Foreign Minister Gorbachev.

Mr. Gorbachev presented Mr. Shultz with proposals on reducing long-range weapons, including specific proposals on three subcategories of warheads on land-based missiles, the number of sea-based ballistic missiles, and the number of air-launched

Mr. Gorbachev had proposed in the two sides negotiating the capabilities of ob-

A *masculinum*

# Party tricks' file upsets Soviets

## Gorbachev angered by U.S. report on disinformation

By Terry Atlas

Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—At the low point in his talks last week with Secretary of State George Shultz, a suddenly angry Mikhail Gorbachev pulled from his stack of papers a month-old State Department report on Soviet disinformation and other "dirty tricks" to influence foreign public opinion.

The report was "all marked up," Shultz said afterward, and the Soviet leader "seemed to resent the fact that there were critical comments in it."

Kathleen Bailey, author of the report, said Monday that she was not altogether surprised by Gorbachev's reaction.

"You would anticipate they would be upset about it, yes, because we've exposed what they've done," she said.

Ironically, Shultz at the time had not seen the 90-page report, which documents a variety of Soviet "active measures," such as a disinformation campaign that contends the AIDS virus is the result of American germ warfare experiments. By Monday, Shultz had a copy of the unclassified report.

Bailey, former research director at the U.S. Information Agency, is deputy assistant secretary of state for research, specializing in Soviet efforts to influence world public opinion through deception and lies.

The report was the work of an

interagency government group that draws on officials from intelligence agencies, from the State and Defense departments and the U.S. Information Agency.

Partly in response to pressure from the political right, the State Department a year ago established, under Bailey, an Office of Active Measures Analysis and Response to monitor such Soviet activities and to plan U.S. steps to counteract them.

The study, requested by Congress, looked at the way the Soviets use disinformation (deliberately false or misleading information), forgeries, front organizations and other covert measures to advance Soviet foreign policy and to damage the U.S. in the eyes of the world.

"The Soviets have been picking up their activities in this area significantly," Bailey said, despite Gorbachev's calls for more openness and better relations with the West.

Jeffrey Richelson, an intelligence specialist at the Brookings Institution, said there is no question that the Kremlin directs such undercover activities.

If the Soviets are planting false stories, then "it's certainly legitimate to try to find out about them and to try to show they're not true," he said.

The report documents Soviet efforts to spread false stories that, for instance, the U.S. supplies chemical weapons to the anticommunist Af-

ghan resistance fighters and that the U.S. has developed an "ethnic bomb" that selectively kills nonwhites.

The report traces the AIDS story, a disinformation campaign that has particularly angered American officials. Last month, Shultz complained about it to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who reportedly said Moscow would try to stop spreading the story.

In addition, the report cites the World Peace Council and its American branch, the U.S. Peace Council, as Soviet front organizations that promote the Kremlin's defense and disarmament proposals.

The group is said to be directed by the international department of the Soviet Communist Party, which is headed by Moscow's former ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin.

The report covers what it says are Kremlin efforts to use Soviet religious leaders to influence their counterparts around the world and damaging forged documents that seem to be the work of Moscow or its allies.

The official Soviet news agency Tass, in a story Sept. 30 about the report, said critically: "The authors of the publication seemed to be guided by two simple rules: Any public organization opposed to Washington's official directives was a 'front' for the Russians, while any

The Washington Post \_\_\_\_\_  
 The New York Times \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Washington Times \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Wall Street Journal \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Christian Science Monitor \_\_\_\_\_  
 New York Daily News \_\_\_\_\_  
 USA Today \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Chicago Tribune SEC 1 - Pg. 6

Date 28 OCT 1987

press report damaging to U.S. prestige was Soviet disinformation."

Shultz, recounting his conversation with Gorbachev, said he gave no ground to the Soviet leader.

"There was sort of an attitude [by Gorbachev] of how could anybody be critical of the Soviet Union," Shultz recalled. "And I said really it's very easy."

"After all, you invaded Afghanistan, you shot down that Korean airliner and then Mr. Gromyko [then Soviet foreign minister] went to Madrid and said that they'd do it again," Shultz said he told Gorbachev. "And then you've been spreading all this bum dope about AIDS, so you can see that it's possible to be upset."

United States Department of State



# **Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry**



# **Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry**

This paper was prepared for the Department of State for public distribution. It is based on a classified study initially done by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency for US Government officials.

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## **Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry**

### **Key Judgments**

*Information available as of 2 January 1987 was used in this report.*

The USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry plays an important role in the Soviet effort to collect Western economic information of value to Soviet industry. It carries out that role while acting as a trade promoter and facilitator with excellent access to Western firms. Among other things, the chamber:

- Introduces Western firms to Soviet foreign trade and industrial organizations.
- Provides foreign trade data to Soviet agencies.
- Carries out official trade functions, including hosting exhibitions and facilitating patent work.
- Maintains representations in at least 14 countries.

Of the chamber's known staff of 140, about a third are KGB officers. The chamber also maintains ties to the GRU.

Some of the chamber's trade promotion activities involve exploiting or misleading Western business and government leaders by:

- Systematically using international trade exhibitions and seminars for economic collection.
- Falsifying end-user documentation during inspection of Western equipment coming into the USSR.

The chamber's collection priorities—if it has any—are unknown. However, since at least the 1960s, it has tried—often successfully—to collect information on a wide range of Western technology, including:

- Robot technology.
- Marine technology, including that dealing with submarines doing deep-sea research.
- Industrial chemicals.


The chamber's contribution to the overall Soviet effort to collect information on Western technology is difficult to gauge. However, its trade promotion activities—hosting over 200 trade exhibitions and about 100 Western business delegations annually and inspecting thousands of goods each year—give its employees extraordinary access to imported equipment and uncounted contacts with foreign companies, particularly US or US-affiliated firms.



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**Figure 1**  
**Structure of USSR Chamber of**  
**Commerce and Industry**



## Intelligence Collection in the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry

### Setting the Scene

The Soviet program to acquire militarily significant Western technology is well documented. The effort consists of two programs that use both legal and illegal means. The first, managed by the Military-Industrial Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, seeks one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hardware and blueprints to improve the technical levels of Soviet weapons and military equipment. The second, run by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet intelligence services, diverts dual-use manufacturing and test equipment into the production lines of weapons industries.

Along with the organizations that spearhead these technology-transfer programs, other agencies aid the process. This publication focuses on how one of the most important of these agencies—the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry—creates and uses opportunities for legally acquiring information of value to Soviet industry and, in doing so, misleads Westerners about certain chamber activities.

The chamber collects economic information—in itself, a legal activity. It does this while assisting major Soviet foreign trade actors in exhibiting goods, hosting seminars, and translating commercial documents. It easily gains access to such information because it is a frequent contact for Western companies doing business with the Soviets. For example, US businessmen who need information or procedural assistance on trade matters can contact the chamber's representative at the New York office of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. When Westerners arrive in Moscow to sell their products, the chamber introduces them to the appropriate Soviet foreign trade organization or industrial customer. At various stages in the commercial process, the chamber steps in to encourage negotiations and help solve problems between Soviet industrial clients and their potential Western suppliers.

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### Affiliations

*According to its charter, the chamber is a public agency. However, it works closely with—and is probably secretly subordinate to—the Ministry of Foreign Trade:*

- *The chamber's predecessor organizations operated openly under the People's Commissariat for (now the Ministry of) Foreign Trade.*
- *Many chamber employees originally worked in the Ministry and graduated from its Academy of Foreign Trade.*
- *Some chamber officials use the services of the Ministry's personnel administration when traveling abroad, and their visas state that they are Ministry—not chamber—employees.*

*The chamber probably disavows its official government connection in order to conform to the organizational structures of Western chambers of commerce, which operate independently of their governments. Like many Western corporations, the chamber has a headquarters office and subsidiary associations, which are divided into firms and departments. The chamber even has its own version of shareholders: in return for a membership fee, about 4,500 Soviet industrial enterprises, scientific research institutes, public health and cultural organizations, construction and transport agencies, and foreign and domestic trade organizations can draw upon chamber services.*

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However, some of the chamber's functions involve deception. In the USSR, it helps inspect Western equipment, some sold legally to civilian industries but destined from the first for defense-related organizations.

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## The Chairman



*Pitovranov*

*KGB Lt. Gen. (Res.) Yevgeniy Petrovich Pitovranov has been an officer in the chamber since 1966. He is on the Executive Committee (governing board) of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council.*

*Pitovranov has studied at the Moscow Electromechanical Institute for Railway Transport Engineers. He joined the Communist Party (CPSU) in 1938. From the late 1930s until 1951 he served in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and successive intelligence organizations. In 1951 Pitovranov began an 18-month imprisonment during then General Secretary Iosif Stalin's purge of intelligence officers who had associated with secret police chief Lavrentiy Beriya. After the post-Stalin regime released him, Pitovranov served as Deputy High Commissioner in Berlin (1953-54), KGB resident in the Embassies in Berlin (1955-58) and Beijing (1959-61), and head of the KGB Training School (1962-64). He then attended the CPSU Higher Party School; upon graduation, he joined the chamber as a deputy chairman. He was promoted to first deputy chairman in 1972. His responsibilities in his first two chamber posts included supervising international exhibitions and registering patents and trademarks. Pitovranov, 71, speaks German. He is not believed to speak English. He and his wife, Yelizaveta Vasil'yevna, have three grown children.*

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## Collection Targets

The chamber's collection priorities—if it has indeed set any—are unknown. However, during the past two decades it has often succeeded in collecting information on a wide range of Western equipment. The following examples are typical:

- A Soviet in the Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce tried in 1983 to collect technical data on Western marine technology, including computer software packages and information on deep-sea research submarines.
- A chamber official in West Germany attempted during the late 1960s to obtain data on secret chemical-processing procedures.
- The chamber sponsors trade fairs to which it routinely invites Western manufacturers whose products fit Soviet industrial needs. Invitations have been extended to, among others, a Japanese industrial robot association and a Western producer of calibration equipment for precision electronics.
- At Expo-70 in Tokyo, chamber personnel solicited from a Japanese trading firm reports containing data extracted from a technical paper, information on Western applications for patents, and information on Mitsubishi's technical research funds.
- The chamber routinely requests several copies of technical publications provided for seminars given by Western businessmen. In one case, the chamber seminar coordinator asked a Western electronics manufacturer to send him all construction, manufacturing, and design standards relating to the product and its specific industrial applications.

## Links to Soviet Intelligence

The exact number of chamber employees is unknown. Of the approximately 140 officials who have been identified, about a third are known or suspected intelligence officers, of whom a few are GRU (military intelligence) and the rest KGB. Analysis of the



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**Gennadiy Fedorovich Solntsev**

**Chief, Fenno-Soviet Chamber of Commerce,  
Helsinki (since 1984)**

*Age 65 . . . affiliated with the KGB . . . 1949 graduate of Institute of Foreign Trade . . . first secretary in Embassy economic section in Austria 1956-60 . . . commercial attache, Soviet trade mission, Canada, 1967-71 . . . joined chamber in about 1976 as deputy chief of Foreign Exhibitions Department . . . deputy general director of V/O Ekspotsentr during 1977 and 1981-84 . . . worked in United States as deputy chairman of Kama River Purchasing Commission 1978-81 . . . low-key, polite, knowledgeable . . . described as effective with US businessmen . . . in late 1970s tried to coax US diplomat in Moscow into sending him technical literature from a seminar . . . speaks good English.*

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career patterns and activities of the remaining officials suggests that the actual number of KGB and GRU officers is higher.

KGB use of chamber cover appears to be quite broad:

- KGB staff officers fill about half of the senior management slots in the chamber's Moscow apparatus and thus are in a position to have considerable policymaking authority. In most other Soviet administrative units, intelligence officers hold lower level positions and concentrate mainly on intelligence operations.
- Some of these senior managers have had extensive experience in clandestine operations.
- KGB officers are found in almost every chamber component; in most government agencies, they tend to congregate in only one or two components that deal with foreigners (like foreign trade organizations and foreign relations or protocol departments).

The chamber conducts intelligence operations both at home and overseas. Overseas, it maintains representations in several countries. A representation may be



Central Arbitration Laboratory,  
Moscow Goods Inspection Administration

Foreign Trade ©

part of a Soviet trade delegation to a country or a separate, bilateral chamber, such as the Italian-Soviet Chamber of Commerce in Milan, the Franco-Soviet Chamber in Paris, or the British-Soviet Chamber in London. In the United States, the chamber is represented on the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York.

Judging by their activities, it appears that the KGB fills the top slots in these overseas organizations. They conduct regular chamber work to gain credibility, establish business contacts, and lay the foundation for future collection. Firms whose products are of technological interest to the USSR are contacted for information on manufacturing processes and technical specifications. Soviet foreign trade representatives may then follow up on these leads with offers to develop a market for the company's goods in the Soviet Union or simply with offers of cash.

#### **Inspection Methods**

**The Inspectors.** When the USSR purchases something from a foreign source, the product must be inspected to ensure that it meets specifications agreed upon at the time of sale. This is done by quality control inspectors (also called acceptance engineers),<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Acceptance engineers can be found in other Soviet organizations, such as the State Committee for Science and Technology and industrial enterprises that have economic dealings with the West. All quality control inspectors operate in the same way.

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**Inspection Officials**

**Yuriy Maksimovich Levin**  
**Chamber Inspector, Nissho-Iwai, Japan**

*Age 47 . . . serving for fifth time in same post with this firm (previous tours have been less than a year) . . . known KGB affiliation . . . uses State Committee for Science and Technology credentials . . . has often contacted Japanese manufacturers to request technical details on equipment Soviets purportedly interested in buying . . . has played on manufacturers' eagerness to make sales to obtain technical specifications and procedures.*

**Vladimir Ivanovich Gornostayev**  
**Chief, Goods Inspection Administration**  
*(since about 1968)*

*Age 73 . . . possibly involved in GRU illegals operations . . . director of Soviet industrial and trade exhibitions in Australia 1961 and in Turkey 1963-65 . . . described as reserved, rather unsocial, difficult to influence, and ambitious but not conniving.*

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some of whom serve in the Goods Inspection Administration of the chamber. Among their legitimate responsibilities are preparing invoices and other documents that accompany goods, witnessing certificates of origin, and conducting laboratory tests.

The position of quality control inspector provides an excellent cover for Soviet intelligence officers trained in S&T collection methods. These inspectors go abroad frequently; they can be assigned to a Western factory for several weeks or for months. Most will be able to return for several tours if the host country has no objection. Acceptance engineers are not normally subject to travel restrictions and surveillance imposed on diplomatic personnel and thus are able to gather technical information more easily than can embassy or consulate officials. Observers of Soviet commercial personnel abroad note that acceptance engineers sometimes wander into off-limits areas on the pretext of inspecting equipment or looking at equipment test

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**Doctoring the Documents**

*When a Western firm producing goods for a civilian industry in the USSR requests a quality control inspection, the chamber usually prepares a declaration of inspection for the equipment. That document includes the name of the inspector, the name of the Soviet organization that is the customer, and the names of two customer representatives. In cases in which the Soviets wish to hide the true identity of the Soviet user, officials may doctor the document so that the foreign supplier may never suspect that he has sold his product to a closed facility probably involved in military production.*

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results. Acceptance engineers routinely initiate contact with firms other than the one to which they are assigned in order to obtain technical details on equipment that the USSR is supposedly interested in purchasing. They may also target Western engineers and scientists for recruitment as agents to pass along technical information or trade secrets.

**Destination—Defense Industry.** The Goods Inspection Administration helps funnel foreign goods acquired by the USSR into defense or other classified facilities. It does this in a variety of ways. For example:

- Its personnel can conceal the identities of Soviet military or defense end-users from Westerners who have legally sold equipment to what they thought were nonstrategic facilities. They can accomplish this by preparing false certification documents during quality control inspections.
- It inspects and forwards imported items that have arrived in the USSR. There is reason to believe that half or more of the imported equipment inspected by the Moscow branch of the chamber ended up in defense-related facilities. According to the Soviet press, as of 1982 the chamber had conducted over

1.6 million inspections of imported goods, and the volume of services had risen by 250 percent since 1969. These figures suggest that much equipment that is not export controlled is nevertheless of value to defense-related organizations.

#### **Trade Exhibition Tactics**

One of the chamber's two foreign trade organizations, V/O Ekspotsentr, organizes international trade fairs and exhibitions. Ekspotsentr annually handles more than 200 exhibitions in the USSR and about 25 Soviet expositions abroad. It establishes special booths—called commercial centers—for Soviet foreign trade and scientific specialists to use as a home base while they assess advanced technology exhibited at the fairs. In 1983 a senior expert with the Main Engineering and Technical Administration (GITU), a component of the Foreign Trade Ministry, was named director of an international exhibition center in the chamber. The presence in the chamber of this official, as well as of other GITU officials, indicates close coordination between the two organizations in facilitating the assimilation of foreign equipment.

**Targeting Displayed Equipment.** The chamber clearly views exhibitions as opportunities to gather industrial intelligence. It has been successful in gaining the participation of Western countries, even those that belong to the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), and in persuading them to exhibit sensitive electronic, instrument-making, engineering, and other equipment. Once the targeted companies bring their equipment to the USSR for exhibition, Soviet officials—probably including chamber exhibition representatives—pressure them to sell it. A former Soviet military attache has reported that Western businessmen have often been drawn into negotiations on the sale of sensitive equipment.

**Collecting Technical Information.** At exhibitions chamber officials collect any industrial information they can. Several sources have noted the enthusiasm with which they gather up unclassified handouts on equipment manufactured in the West. Western visitors to exhibitions in the USSR believe KGB officers have entered locked display rooms at night to copy design information from equipment, but this charge cannot be independently confirmed.



*International Trade Center, Moscow*




*AVTODORMASH-80 exhibition*

#### **Reaping Seminar Benefits**

The other chamber foreign trade organization involved in industrial collection efforts is V/O Sovintsentr, which runs the International Trade Center in Moscow as well as various hotels and office buildings in the city. Each year Sovintsentr's hotels accommodate thousands of guests—including US Government officials—from Western industrialized countries. Sovintsentr also sponsors seminars in Moscow for foreign businessmen who wish to brief Soviet officials on their products. In 1983 alone, it organized about

**Figure 2**  
**Exhibition Sections**



# INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITIONS IN THE USSR


1987

3rd International Exhibition "Equipment for Drugs Production and Control" Moscow	January 14-22	2nd International Exhibition "Building Materials and Construction Manufacturing Technology" Moscow	May 27-June 9
2nd International Exhibition "Equipment for Vibroacoustic Characteristics and Machine Parts Strained State Studying" Minsk	February 11-19	4th International Exhibition "Industrial Robots" Leningrad	July 1-9
4th International Exhibition "Optics at Man's Service" Moscow	March 4-12	4th International Exhibition "Electrotechnical Equipment and Power Transmission Lines" Moscow	July 19-24
3rd International Exhibition "Equipment for Antitrust Coatings Application" Leningrad	March 11-19	6th International Exhibition "Chemistry" Moscow	September 10-19
International Exhibition "Municipal and Domestic Equipment" Minsk	April 1-9	3rd International Exhibition "Animal-Breeding and Fodder Production Mechanization Equipment" Riga	September 10-24
4th International Exhibition "Equipment for Automobiles Service and Maintenance" Moscow	April 1-9	4th International Exhibition "Traffic Security Engineering" Moscow	October 14-22
2nd International Exhibition "Ultrasonic Engineering" Vilnius	April 7-15	3rd International Exhibition "Equipment for the Oil and Gas Industry" Moscow	October 20-28
3rd International Exhibition "Equipment for the Bearing Industry" Moscow	April 8-16	International Exhibition "Scientific Research in Technological Mineralogy" Leningrad	October 21-28
3rd International Exhibition "Equipment and Machinery for Mechanization and Automation of Major and Auxiliary Operations in Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and Geological Prospecting" Alma-Ata	May 13-21	3rd International Exhibition "Equipment and Processes in Microbiological Production" Moscow	November 23-December 8
International Exhibition "Use of Natural Energy and Secondary Energy Resources in Agriculture" Voronezh	May 13-21		
International Exhibition "Automation Means for the Garment-Manufacturing Industry" Kiev	May 24-27		

All inquiries concerning participation in the exhibitions, please, address to:

V/O "Exposentr" USSR CO.,  
1a, Sokolnichesk ul.,  
Moscow, 107/13, USSR  
Telephone 26665 74  
Telex 411435 EXPO SU

At the request of companies, industrial associations and branch unions V/O Exposentr also organizes individual specialized exhibitions, symposia and seminars, Days of Economy and Technology both in Moscow and in other cities of the USSR.



## EXPOCENTR

can also arrange any specialized exhibition, symposium or seminar, or Economy and Technology Days in Moscow or other Soviet cities at the firms' request.

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**Exhibitions Officials**

**Marlen Khorenovich Akopov**  
**Director of Soviet Exhibitions**  
 (since about 1976)

*Age 46 . . . suspected KGB affiliation . . . served in Embassy in Nepal as interpreter during 1961-62 . . . joined chamber as translator in about 1971 . . . worked in Exhibitions Abroad and Foreign Relations Administrations . . . representative to Board of International Expositions in Paris since 1966 . . . has often traveled to United States for negotiations on exhibitions and 1982 World's Fair . . . friendly, gregarious, and able to draw people out . . . cultivates relationships with US officials who have high-level political contacts . . . described as shrewd and tough . . . speaks excellent English.*

**Konstantin Fedorovich Afanas'yev**  
**Deputy General Director, V/O Ekspotsentr**  
 (since at least 1981);  
**Director, Firm Inovystavka, Ekspotsentr**  
 (since at least 1983)

*Age 66 . . . KGB colonel . . . probably responsible for S&T matters . . . served in trade mission in Cologne as staff employee during 1957-60 . . . was refused visa for second tour in 1962 because of prior activities and contacts . . . during 1964-68 was first secretary at trade mission in Vienna . . . joined chamber in about 1969 as deputy director of specialized foreign exhibits . . . speaks fluent German; good French and English.*


**Khachik Gevorkovich Oganessian**  
**Former Deputy General Director, V/O Ekspotsentr**  
 (1978-84)

*Age 72 . . . retired in 1984 . . . supervised all Soviet agents in Tehran during 1946-50 as second secretary and consul . . . assigned to Vienna as chief of an illegals section of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 1950-53 . . . deputy chief, MVD Counterintelligence Section, East Berlin, 1954-59; there he ran illegals and handled sabotage operations and for most of the time was attached as adviser to East German Ministry of State Security . . . first identified in chamber in 1969 as deputy chief of Foreign and International Exhibitions Department . . . advised US companies on types of equipment chamber wanted them to display . . . described as cordial and helpful on exhibition administrative details.*

**Ivan Luk'yanovich Rozhkov**  
**Director, Firm Informreklama,**  
**V/O Ekspotsentr (since about 1983)**

*Age 67 . . . suspected GRU officer . . . was field army radio operator and then captain in engineer corps during World War II . . . foreign trade representative in Italy 1964-67 . . . first secretary in Bolivia from 1970 until he was declared persona non grata in 1972.*

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Collection Service Data Processing Center Businessman's Moscow ©  
V/O Sovintsentr

150 seminars at the Trade Center. Seminar sponsorship constitutes Sovintsentr's largest and one of its most successful information collection efforts.

At these professional gatherings, Sovintsentr officials attempt to collect technical intelligence and to monitor the activities of foreign business representatives. They display literature that suggests that businessmen who are losing trade because of government restrictions on selling high-technology items to the Soviet Union should lobby against such sanctions. The chamber informs businessmen before the seminar that they are not permitted to keep Soviet calling cards, and it attempts to confiscate all cards they may already have collected.

#### Access to Commercial Data Bases

The chamber has a computer center, which contains a new automated storage and retrieval system operated by Sovintsentr. The center provides information to the chamber's members on world market prices, international trade and finance, patent and invention specifications, and stock exchanges. It includes a library, a microfilm storage area, and an S&T data bank. The center uses IBM 370/148 and PDP 11/70 computers, which the United States exported legally to the USSR in 1978.

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#### V/O Sovintsentr Officials

**Aleksandr Fedorovich Khlystov**  
**Deputy General Director,**  
**V/O Sovintsentr (since at least 1980)**

*Age 53 . . . administrator of International Trade Center . . . probably KGB colonel . . . translator at New York World's Fair in 1959 . . . foreign trade employee in London 1961-65 . . . adviser and counselor at Soviet pavillion at Expo-70 in Tokyo . . . deputy division chief in chamber in 1974 . . . drinks heavily.*


**Gennadiy Nikolayevich Tapeszko**  
**Director, Firm Interkongress,**  
**V/O Sovintsentr (since April 1985)**

*Age 46 . . . suspected KGB officer . . . employee (non-diplomatic), Office of Commercial Counselor, Embassy, Colombo, 1963-64 . . . became Inturist representative in Trade Mission, New Delhi, 1968 . . . while driving an automobile in 1972, killed Indian bicyclist; lacked diplomatic immunity and left India abruptly . . . joined chamber in about 1976, probably as chief of protocol in V/O Ekspotsentr . . . served in Soviet-Belgian Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, from about 1977 until 1981 . . . became deputy director, Firm Interkongress, in about 1982.*

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The computer center is part of Akademset, a data-transmitting network for Soviet scientific institutes. The institute appears to control other network members' access to the data bases. It is reasonable to assume that Sovintsentr's computer center supplements its economic collection activities by tapping into Western online information services through VNIIPAS. VNIIPAS currently has access to unclassified military-related data.

**Figure 3**  
**Hotel and Seminar Operations**





### **Acquiring Western Patent Information**

***Soyuzpatent Association.*** In July 1985 the chamber reorganized and upgraded its Patenting of Inventions Administration and renamed it Soyuzpatent. Like its predecessor, Soyuzpatent is the sole patent attorney in the USSR; it acts by proxy for foreign citizens wishing to patent their inventions and trademarks in the USSR, and it registers Soviet patents abroad.<sup>2</sup>

The association maintains a patent translation service, provides patent file searches, briefs foreigners on Soviet patent laws, and produces reference publications in foreign languages.

***Foreign Patent Applications.*** When foreigners apply for patents in the USSR, a process begins by which the chamber is alerted to the existence of foreign technical information that may be of interest to defense or science sectors. It asks inventors to send as much proprietary information as possible to the Soviet organization that conducts the patent examination. Such information can include technical drawings, design details, or formulas. Research shows that the chamber also conducts patent searches for Soviet industry and provides lists of Western companies involved in specific applied technology. If an invention is deemed useful, the Soviets may then decide to license it or buy the patent—an entirely legal procedure.

Such patent and licensing decisions are made by V/O Litsenzintorg, a unit of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The chamber—along with industrial ministries and other economic organizations—is represented on


<sup>2</sup> The Scientific Research Institute of Patent Expertise of the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries conducts the actual patent examination on the basis of applications submitted by the chamber. As of 1981, the chamber had filed about 2,600 patent applications from companies representing 41 countries and had issued over 18,000 patents and certificates of invention to those countries.

the Litsenzintorg governing board. Board member M. L. Gorodisskiy, the current chief of Soyuzpatent, is a KGB officer and former member of the Foreign Trade Ministry's GITU. He undoubtedly has considerable experience in identifying Western patents of particular benefit to Soviet defense and civilian industry.

### **Technical Literature**

Several Soviet agencies, including the chamber, collect and exploit open-source material on Western state-of-the-art technology. A growing number of information clearinghouses translate foreign publications and disseminate them to Soviet research enterprises for review. Soviet press articles report that the chamber maintains a large translation service. About 6,500 translators skilled in scientific and patent terminology produce about 180,000 pages annually for chamber members. The chamber also has a component that publishes summaries of foreign-language documents on economic, scientific, and technical affairs as well as a periodic bulletin. The component also disseminates books and reference aids to chamber members.

**Figure 4**  
**Soyuzpatent Association**



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**Patenting and Publications Officials**

**Mikhail Lvovich Gorodisskiy**  
**Chief, Patenting of Inventions**  
**Administration—now Soyuzpatent**  
**(since at least 1969)**

*Age 60 . . . has had extensive contact with Americans through international organizations dealing in trade and patents . . . has degree in international law from Institute of Foreign Trade . . . senior legal adviser in foreign trade organization V/O Mashinoimport 1957-63 . . . official in Main Engineering and Technical Administration of Foreign Trade Ministry from 1963 until about 1965, when he joined chamber . . . described as shrewd, amiable, and talkative . . . speaks English.*

**Svyatoslav Viktorovich Filippov**  
**Deputy Chief, Patenting of Inventions**  
**Administration—now Soyuzpatent**  
**(since at least 1981)**

*Age 58 . . . KGB staff officer . . . doctor of juridical sciences and specialist on US legal system . . . served in Office of Legal Affairs of UN Secretariat in New York 1965-69 . . . analyst in Institute of the USA and*

*Canada and consultant to USSR Supreme Soviet in late 1970s . . . described as good observer and judge of personalities . . . has good feel for arguments that will counter US positions . . . gives impression he is wheeler-dealer . . . visits high-level US Government and business officials during frequent trips to United States to study and to attend conferences . . . speaks English.*

**Sergey Pavlovich Lyubimov**  
**Chief, Information and Publications**  
**Administration (since at least 1978)**

*Age 68 . . . KGB agent or staff officer dealing with S&T . . . graduated from Tula Mechanical Institute in 1941 and Academy of Foreign Trade in 1952 . . . worked in Ministry of Foreign Trade in early 1950s . . . probably joined chamber in about 1957 . . . served in United States during 1963-66 as correspondent for TASS, where he concentrated on obtaining technical information on behalf of KGB residency in New York . . . identified as chief of chamber's Foreign Relations Department in 1966 . . . commercial counselor in Ethiopia from 1972 until about 1976 . . . speaks English and German.*

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United States Department of State



## Soviet Influence Activities:

# A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986 - 87

August 1987



**On the cover (from Pravda, daily paper of the CPSU Central Committee, October 31, 1986):**

Caption above cartoon states: "The AIDS virus, a terrible disease for which up to now no known cure has been found, was, in the opinion of some Western researchers, created in the laboratories of the Pentagon." The words on the flag emanating from the beaker state: Virus "AIDS."  
Caption below the cartoon reads:  
"Pentagon (AIDS) specialists."

Department of State Publication 9627

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*Released October 1987*

# **Soviet Influence Activities:**

## **A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986 - 87**

*August 1987*



## Preface

In response to legislation passed in 1985, the Department of State on July 30, 1986, submitted to Congress a document titled *Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns*. This report updates that document, focusing on events and changes which occurred between June 1986 and June 1987. Both reports were prepared by the Active Measures Working Group.

The Active Measures Working Group is an interagency committee chaired by the Department of State. In addition to State, membership includes representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Departments of Defense and Justice. The Working Group is devoted to analyses of and responses to worldwide active measures against the United States.

Propaganda is distinct from active measures, yet the two are closely integrated in fulfillment of Soviet foreign policy objectives. The definition of propaganda used in this report is: information that reflects the perceptions or perspectives of a government—in this case, the Soviet Union. Active measures—such as the use of front groups or the spread of disinformation (lies)—are deceptive operations that attempt to manipulate the opinions and/or actions of individuals, publics, or governments. They often are covert.

Active measures, the focus of this report, cannot be discussed without also addressing propaganda. The themes of propaganda are often reinforced by and are the *raison d'être* of active measures. Thus, while the main purpose of this report is to reveal and describe Soviet influence activities that are deceptive and illegitimate, they will be discussed in the overall context of Soviet propaganda.





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## Definition

The term "active measures" is a literal translation from Russian, *aktivnyye meropriyatiya*, which denotes covert or deceptive operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy. Active measures are distinct both from espionage and counterintelligence, and from traditional diplomatic and informational activities. The goal of active measures is to influence opinions and/or actions of individuals, governments, and/or publics.

Deception is the essence of active measures. Often these measures involve covert activity, but not necessarily so.

Covertly implemented Soviet active measures are the responsibility of Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate, which works in close coordination with the International Department (ID) of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. All Soviet agencies and representatives abroad are potentially available to support or participate in Soviet active measures campaigns. Techniques include the following:

- **Disinformation and Forgeries**

Disinformation, a deliberate attempt to deceive public or governmental opinion, can be oral and/or written. Forged documents are frequently used in attempts to discredit individuals, institutions, or policies in such a way as to damage U.S. foreign policy interests.

- **Front Groups and Friendship Societies**

The ID coordinates activities of front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, as well as local fronts and friendship societies. Fronts normally present themselves as non-governmental, non-political organizations engaged in promoting desirable goals such as world peace.

- **Non-ruling Communist and Leftist Parties**

The ID is also responsible for liaison with non-ruling communist and leftist parties. Contacts

with these parties are usually overt, and often are used to persuade the parties to carry out specific political action or propaganda campaigns on behalf of the U.S.S.R.

- **Political Influence Operations**

Agents of influence disguise their KGB connection while taking an active role in their nation's governmental, political, press, business, labor, or academic affairs. Their objective is to convert their influence in those realms into real policy gains for the Soviet Union. At times, the Soviets use unwitting contacts to achieve similar results.

Although the term active measures is taken from Russian and we generally think of active measures as being Soviet in origin, active measures may occasionally be generated against the United States by other foreign powers. Yet, no state uses active measures techniques as extensively or as effectively as the U.S.S.R.

In studying active measures it is important to understand that propaganda and other efforts employed by the Soviets to influence public perceptions—such as cultural programs, radio broadcasting, and publications—may not be active measures in themselves, but may be the vehicles used to promote and sustain active measures. For example, a forgery—definitely an active measure—might surface accusing the United States of plotting to assassinate a foreign leader. Even after being exposed by the United States as a forgery, the content of the forged document may be repeated, for instance, by *Novosti*. Thus, *Novosti*, an official propaganda and information organ, is used to promote an active measure. For this reason, Soviet propaganda and public diplomacy efforts and means must be taken into consideration when examining active measures.



## Executive Summary

The first three chapters of this document deal with some of the bureaucratic structures used by the Soviet Union in conducting active measures and propaganda campaigns. Chapters IV and V address two primary influence techniques—forgeries and disinformation. Chapter VI explores the use of deception and influence activities by using a case study: the campaign on Afghanistan. The final three chapters summarize Soviet influence activities in Latin America, Africa, and the United States. A brief outline of these chapters is below.

In 1986, at least three bureaucratic changes in the Soviet active measures apparatus took place which are likely to have significant effect:

- organizational and personnel changes within the World Peace Council (WPC), the pre-eminent Soviet front group which is devoted to promoting the U.S.S.R.'s defense and disarmament proposals and to denigrating those of the United States;
- changes in the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the bureaucratic organization responsible overall for active measures; and
- addition of a Nonaligned Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The changes in the WPC probably will result in greater participation by Westerners in the WPC decisionmaking process, facilitating the front's ability to interface with and influence Western peace and religious groups. The changes in the ID streamline it, and bring in a leader—former Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin—who is highly conversant with Western society and media. The addition of a Nonaligned Department institutionalizes the priority Moscow places on the Nonaligned Movement's activities and political decisions, and probably cements bureaucratic links to the KGB—an institution intimately involved in many active measures.

One of the most important tools used in furthering Soviet foreign policy objectives, particularly in the areas of defense and arms control, is religion. Moscow tightly controls organized religion in the U.S.S.R., and members of the various religious groups directly represent the Kremlin's policies. If they did not, they would

neither be allowed to serve in positions of authority in those groups, nor to travel abroad to make contact with foreigners. The upcoming Millennium of Christianity in Russia will provide an opportunity for Moscow to portray the U.S.S.R. as tolerant of religion and to mobilize visiting church representatives on behalf of Soviet defense and disarmament proposals.

The Soviet Peace Committee, formally the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, is a group within the U.S.S.R. which promotes a nuclear freeze, cessation of nuclear testing, scrapping of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, and nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Peace Committee is funded and directed by the Soviet Government. It is used to influence Western peace movements. Not only do its members regularly interact with peace groups in the United States and Europe, but the Committee also seeks to orchestrate Western peace group activities through such initiatives as the "Peoples Peace Appeal"—a petition campaign to enlist people on behalf of Soviet disarmament proposals.

Forgeries increasingly are being used as a means to spread disinformation about U.S. policies. The chapter on forgeries presents samples of forgeries which have surfaced since the summer of 1986. They demonstrate how the use of authentic letterheads, accurate signatures, and fake text can be combined to create forgeries that can have a profoundly negative impact on U.S. foreign policy. A false theme common to several of the forgeries—which is evident in Soviet propaganda as well—is that the United States is engaged in establishing a military presence abroad for the purpose of destabilizing other nations.

The active measures apparatus of the U.S.S.R. generates a substantial amount of disinformation, much of which is spread through media placements rather than forgeries. One such campaign, an attempt to spread false allegations that the United States created the AIDS virus (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome virus) during biological warfare research, is not even credible to the top Soviet scientist working on the AIDS virus, Dr. Viktor Zhdanov. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. has printed the story in Soviet media—controlled by the government—and encouraged its repetition in foreign media.

The AIDS disinformation campaign is but one of a series in which the U.S.S.R. attempts to identify



the United States as a violator of the biological warfare convention, which prohibits research on biological and toxin weapons. For example, the United States has been accused of creating an ethnic bomb that selectively kills people of one race or group. Although most of these charges seem absurd to many, they have repeatedly appeared in Soviet and Third World media. One of the purposes of such tales is to drive a wedge between the Third World and the United States.

The United States is also falsely accused of supplying chemical weapons to the resistance in Afghanistan. This is but one of the themes in a major active measures and propaganda campaign which seeks to shift blame for the continuing war onto the United States, while trying to justify the Soviet occupation. There has even been an attempt to deceive the world public about the level of the Soviet presence. In October 1986, the U.S.S.R. pledged to withdraw some troops; in reality, new troops were introduced solely for the purpose of demonstrating a withdrawal.

Soviet active measures and propaganda take place against a backdrop of legitimate foreign relations activities—economic, diplomatic, and cultural interactions. Occasionally, legitimate activities provide avenues for active measures and propaganda. For example, student exchange programs may be used to develop contacts who will spy for or otherwise assist the U.S.S.R. in a deceptive manner. A Soviet diplomatic mission may pressure or pay the local press to place propaganda or disinformation in publications.

To illustrate legitimate foreign relations which may be used to promote Soviet influence, a case study of Soviet interactions in Latin America is presented in Chapter VIII. Section two of that chapter focuses on Soviet cultural and information activities as an example of how the U.S.S.R. has influenced perceptions and opinions of Latin Americans, particularly in Nicaragua.

Africa provides a case study of how Soviet active measures—particularly disinformation—are conducted on a multi-country basis. Campaigns such as those on AIDS and chemical and biological warfare are carefully tailored for African audiences. To demonstrate how the Soviet Union targets Africa with anti-U.S. disinformation, a synopsis is presented of false accusations leveled by Moscow and repeated by world press. The basic charge, initiated at the time of the Nonaligned Movement's summit in Zimbabwe in 1986, was that the United States had devoted significant funds and effort to a program to disrupt the summit and damage the Nonaligned Movement.

Chapter X details Soviet active measures in the United States. Although such disinformation as the AIDS story may make its way into the U.S. media, the primary tool of active measures in the United States is front groups. The National Council for American-Soviet Friendship and the U.S. Peace Council are two prominent fronts which are actively engaged in influence activities. Both, for example, are tasked to build relationships with U.S. peace and religious groups. The purpose is to enlist U.S. citizens in telephone, letter-writing, and petition campaigns against U.S. defense and disarmament policies and in support of Soviet goals. Much of this activity is conducted through "fronts of fronts" to obscure Soviet direction and funding.

In conclusion, the Soviet Union is engaged in a highly coordinated campaign to influence world opinion through propaganda and, more insidiously, through such active measures as disinformation and front groups. This effort involves multiple bureaucracies in the U.S.S.R.—and primarily the International and Propaganda Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as well as the KGB—and is approved by the highest levels of the Kremlin. Perhaps the best summary of the intent and effect of this effort is provided by a short interchange with two former KGB agents, contained in the concluding chapter.

## Chapter I

# Changes in the Soviet Active Measures Apparatus During 1986

Organizational and personnel changes occurred during 1986 in at least one major Soviet front organization, as well as in key CPSU departments and ministries responsible for planning and implementation of active measures. Three of the most important changes are discussed below: reorganization of the leading bodies of the Helsinki-based World Peace Council, leadership changes in the CPSU International Department, and the establishment of a Nonaligned Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### Reorganization of the World Peace Council

The World Peace Council (WPC) is the largest and most important Soviet front organization set up after World War II. It has members from at least 142 countries and, through various affiliated groups and subsidiary fronts, can call upon a broad range of supporters on a host of controversial international issues.

One of the primary WPC means of mobilizing support and coordinating activities with other groups is overlapping membership. Thus, WPC officials often serve on the boards and committees of other fronts or activist groups. Many Soviet officials who serve in the WPC and other fronts also occupy prominent positions in the U.S.S.R.'s domestic academic, literary, scientific, and religious bureaucracies.

The WPC works to unite communists with such other social or political groupings such as socialists, national liberation movements, and revolutionary leaders from the Third World. In order to gain acceptance and/or support of Soviet foreign policy objectives outside the U.S.S.R.'s traditional network of allies, the WPC is increasingly developing contacts with groups that are not so highly politicized (e.g., environmentalists, professional and social organizations).

One of Moscow's goals during the past year has been to alleviate the stresses which had developed since 1980 between hardline Soviet WPC officials and noncommunist West European peace activists. The hardliners had taken the position that only the

United States deserved criticism for arms control and defense-related policies. Many prominent noncommunist activists disagreed with this and sought to place blame equally on the superpowers. Moscow for years has waged an intense propaganda campaign to discredit this "equal responsibility" thesis and its supporters.

To help heal the rift with these peace activists, the WPC, at Moscow's behest, undertook a series of reforms at an organizational meeting staged April 24-27, 1986, in Sofia. The key changes were: reinstatement of the Office of Secretary General; formal strengthening of the Bureau; and enlargement of the Secretariat, Presidential Committee, and presumably the Council as a whole.

### The Secretary Generalship

Johannes Pakaslahti, a member of the strongly pro-Soviet minority group of the Finnish Communist Party, was elected WPC secretary general at Sofia, thus reinstating a position that had been eliminated in 1977. Romesh Chandra, a Politburo-level member of the Communist Party of India, had last occupied that position. When the secretary generalship was eliminated in 1977, Chandra was made WPC president. He still occupies the presidency, but his power and influence over the substance and direction of WPC activity is now diluted with the elevation of Pakaslahti. The latter can be expected to push Moscow's favored peace and disarmament program to the forefront of the WPC's agenda.

On the opening day of the WPC meeting in Sofia, then-Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (Soviet Peace Committee) chairman Yuri Zhukov noted that "a number of national peace committees have recently put forth a proposal to reinstate the post of WPC General Secretary who by cooperating in a close tandem with the President would be responsible for all day-to-day activities of the Secretariat."<sup>1</sup> He went on to state that the Soviet Peace Committee supported this proposal and that, in view of the special importance of cooperating with Western anti-war movements, a European would be appropriate for the job. He then stated that a member of the peace movement from

the WPC's host country (Finland) would be most appropriate of all.

In an article written after the Sofia meeting, Zhukov described Pakaslahti as "a leader of the widely representative public organization, the Peace Committee of Finland, [who has been] unanimously elected WPC Secretary General." Taken together, these events suggest that Moscow played a role in Pakaslahti's selection: at the very least, the Soviets had Pakaslahti picked out for the job once the movement to reinstate the post of Secretary General had gotten under way.

## Bureau of the Presidential Committee

Prior to the Sofia meeting in April, the Presidential Committee included the WPC's president, its 39 vice-presidents, and members from 12 additional countries. It now has the president, 50 vice-presidents, and presumably, the secretary general.

The new vice-presidents (12) are from Afghanistan, Belgium, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, North Korea, Libya, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Uruguay, and Zambia. South Yemen was dropped, so there was a net gain of 11. Of the 12, only Belgium, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, and Zambia had been additional members of the former Bureau; the others previously occupying that status—Chile, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Peru, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Switzerland, and Grenada—were dropped, presumably because of the low level of WPC-sponsored activities conducted in those countries.

Zhukov, in the speech noted above, called for strengthening the Bureau and organizing *ad hoc* working groups under its control. After the meeting, he said that the Bureau had been restructured to make it "the movement's main executive body." He added that it would meet whenever the need arose, and that working groups of the WPC vice-presidents would do the same.

The fact that the Bureau can now call meetings on an as-needed basis appears to diminish the authority of Chandra, who previously had the authority to call such gatherings to handle "emergencies" (such as the U.S. intervention in Grenada) between regularly scheduled Bureau and Presidential Committee meetings. Under the new structure, there will necessarily be more consultation.

## The Secretariat

In his speech to the WPC, Zhukov had complained of underrepresentation of West Europeans and, by implication, North Americans on the Secretariat. This situation was somewhat

remedied by the addition of Marilyn Olsson, a Swede, and Robert Prince, a U.S. citizen, to the WPC secretariat, the organization's permanent, full-time body. This move underscored Moscow's desire to increase the WPC's participation in mainstream Western peace activities from which it—and the Soviet Peace Committee—had theretofore been excluded.

In retrospect, before the Sofia meeting there may have been changes indicating the Soviet intention to shake up the WPC leadership. For example, the replacement of Tair Tairov by Oleg Kharkhardin as chief Soviet member of the Secretariat was probably an effort to limit Chandra's power. Kharkhardin wields more bureaucratic clout than Tairov; prior to his Helsinki assignment he was one of two Soviet Peace Committee first deputy chairmen and, while first deputy, was probably a member of the International Department. As such, he would have had significant control over daily WPC activities.

## The Presidential Committee

The Presidential Committee, an organization which includes the Bureau described above, was expanded by 20 percent (from 225 to 270) at Sofia. The Netherlands was given three positions including a vice-presidency; Brazil, the Congo, Ireland, and Mexico also gained three each. North Korea, Libya, New Zealand, and Senegal gained two each including a vice-presidency.

The Netherlands and Belgium are particularly crucial to the Soviet efforts to weaken NATO and to use the peace movement to promote the U.S.S.R.'s defense and disarmament policies. New Zealand is equally important for similar reasons. The U.S.S.R. has welcomed the separation of New Zealand from its alliance with Australia and the United States (the ANZUS defense relationship) and has supported the New Zealand denial of visits by U.S. warships to its ports.

Brazil and Mexico, the two major Latin American debtors to Western financial institutions, are pivotal in the anti-repayment campaign by international front organizations—backed particularly strongly by Cuba. Libya, in view of the bombing of Tripoli last year by U.S. airplanes, is the chief object of sympathy in Soviet-orchestrated propaganda to identify the United States as primary sponsor of "state terrorism." Korean unification, an issue of increasing prominence in Soviet propaganda, is frequently the subject of front organization activities. For example, it was the focal point of a conference in Havana in December 1986.

## Changes in the International Department

The International Department (ID), one of the departments of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, plays a key role in formulating and implementing Soviet foreign policy. It serves the CPSU's top decisionmaking body, the Politburo, by coordinating and reviewing inputs on Soviet foreign policy matters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, the various branches of the Soviet military establishment, and various think-tanks under the Soviet Academy of Sciences (particularly the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations).

The ID also maintains traditional responsibility for liaison with nonruling communist, socialist, and other leftist parties; international front groups; liberation movements; and friendship societies. The ID uses this network to distribute aid as well as propaganda and ideological guidance on international affairs. Other ID responsibilities include assisting the CPSU Propaganda Department and Soviet media organs with propaganda campaigns, overseeing clandestine radio operations, and exercising oversight of the editorial board of the monthly theoretical journal of the international communist movement, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, also known as the *World Marxist Review*. The ID uses the *World Marxist Review* to communicate policy lines to foreign communist parties. Additionally, the ID plays a particularly important role in planning, coordinating, and guiding active measures—programs of disinformation and deception designed to discredit the U.S. image abroad and undercut U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Ideas for active measures and propaganda campaigns can originate in the ID, the Politburo, the Propaganda Department, or the KGB. The Politburo provides overall direction, with Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate, the Propaganda Department, and the ID being tasked with implementation. An active measures campaign may involve both covert and overt activity. Service A has the primary responsibility for covert active measures, but it works in close coordination with the ID and, probably, the Propaganda Department. The ID uses its wide network of international contacts and front groups to coordinate, fund, and carry out campaigns.

Although the largest and most widely known front group operating under the general direction of the ID is the World Peace Council (WPC), Moscow funds a host of special-interest fronts targeted at specific professions and groups. As can be seen in

the list of ID officials contained in the appendix to this chapter, the ID has personnel at the sector chief level who are assigned to deal with the fronts, friendship societies, and international organizations.

The ID has a staff of about 300 people working in various geographic and functional bureaus. Its day-to-day functioning is thought to be overseen by one of the two first deputy chiefs. Under the first deputies are a number of deputy chiefs and sector chiefs heading subdepartments or sectors staffed by officials known as instructors. The ID also employs research assistants and has consultants on whose expertise they can call, but who are normally employed elsewhere (at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, for example).

Between the two World Wars, CPSU relations with other communist parties and early active measures-type operations were handled by the Third International, or Comintern, which was disbanded by Stalin as a gesture of good will to the allies in 1943. The ID was set up sometime afterward as successor to the Comintern. (The ID shared the "successor" label with the Cominform during the latter organization's short life.) Until 1957, the ID handled relations with both ruling and nonruling communist parties, but the 1956 crises in Hungary and Poland led the Soviets to overhaul their relations with ruling communist parties. This responsibility was taken from the ID and given to a new Department for Liaison with the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries.<sup>2</sup>

It is not known who headed the ID in its early years, but Boris Ponomarev acceded to the post in the early-to-mid 1950's. Ponomarev, until March 1986 an alternate member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee, was a leading foreign policy specialist and party theologian.

Under General Secretary Gorbachev, a number of important changes have been made in the ID. Ponomarev was replaced in 1986 by Anatoliy Dobrynin, the long-time ambassador to the United States. Georgiy Korniyenko, the former first deputy minister of foreign affairs, was named a first deputy chief, and Lt. Gen. Viktor Starodubov, formerly Soviet Commissioner at the Standing Consultative Commission (on arms control), was brought in, presumably as chief of a sector dealing with arms control matters.<sup>3</sup>

Korniyenko's appointment leaves the ID with two first deputies. The other is Vadim Zagladin, who has been in his position for over 10 years. He, like Korniyenko, is a full central committee member. Both have experience in U.S. affairs and arms control matters.

Overall, the amount of personnel shuffling in the ID in the past couple of years has been significant, with much care apparently taken to fill key slots with professional diplomats and other

foreign policy experts. Under these higher caliber professionals, the ID has retained its traditional responsibilities and has expanded its role. The appointments of Dobrynin, Korniyenko, and Starodubov have resulted in the ID taking more of a policy focus and an even higher profile in the Soviet foreign policy apparatus. Moreover, the presence of Starodubov and Korniyenko seem to signal that the ID will play a larger role in arms control and disarmament concerns, one of the most prominent objectives of Soviet active measures efforts.

In the active measures arena, certain trends are emerging that might be attributable to a reinvigorated ID. ID officials, who frequently travel abroad, are showing increased sophistication. Now, in addition to meeting with leftist parties and front groups, ID officials are seeking to cultivate contacts with serious academics and other distinguished personalities, even very conservative ones. The officials are also displaying an improved ability to deal with the Western press.

Soviet links with the major front groups, such as the World Peace Council, are now widely recognized. Increasingly, the U.S.S.R. is building bridges to non-front groups, such as the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), which Moscow attempts to manipulate but does not directly control.

Finally, the ID reportedly is making a serious attempt to resolve differences and repair relations between the CPSU and other communist parties, such as those of some West European countries, Japan, and Yugoslavia. This effort appears part of Gorbachev's hope of staging an international conference of communist parties; the Italian Communist Party in May rejected such a proposal, days after it was made by Romanian President Ceausescu.

## The Nonaligned Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

With the formation of a new Nonaligned Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in May 1986, Moscow attempted to institutionalize its activities to influence the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).<sup>4</sup> Moscow's interest in the NAM has grown steadily since the NAM's radicalization in the early 1970s.<sup>5</sup>

The department is probably intended to improve coordination between the various bureaucracies concerned with the NAM—the MFA, the ID, the KGB, and the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Although it is not yet certain, the Nonaligned Department will probably have a significant role to play in the active measures arena.

Sergey Yakovlevich Sinitsyn, an African specialist in the MFA and a former KGB officer, was appointed chief of the Nonaligned Department. His having served in the KGB is expected to facilitate the department's implementation of active measures. In fact, the formation of this new department already may have resulted in an increase of disinformation and media manipulation with regard to the Nonaligned Movement. (Chapter IX details some of the Soviet-orchestrated disinformation spread about the United States with regard to the 1986 NAM summit in Harare, Zimbabwe.)

Moscow was also behind an effort to distribute to NAM countries anti-U.S. books—such as *The Devil and His Dart* (authored by the European correspondent of *Blitz*) and *Conspiracy Against the Nonaligned Movement*—before and during the summit in Harare, August 26–September 7, 1986. Both books falsely portray the United States as determined to overthrow legitimate Third World governments, while it ruthlessly exploits their peoples and resources.

Disinformation is often accompanied by simple propaganda. Before, during, and after the Harare summit, the Soviet press gave considerable favorable attention to the NAM. For example, a 34-page supplement to the 1986 issue of *New Times*—a journal identified by KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko as a propaganda tool for the ID and the First Chief Directorate of the KGB—was devoted to the history of the Nonaligned Movement and stressed the Movement's "anti-imperialist principles." Additionally, Gorbachev praised the NAM in his speech before the CPSU Central Committee in September, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze cited the NAM favorably in his address to the United Nations' General Assembly in September. During a press conference in October, NAM Chairman Mugabe favorably compared Soviet support for the NAM with alleged U.S. insensitivity to NAM concerns.

Before the Harare summit, Moscow made numerous demarches to key NAM member countries. Press reports indicate that the focus was twofold: obtaining support for Soviet disarmament proposals, and ensuring that NAM communique language on Afghanistan did not mention the Soviets by name. In support of its diplomatic efforts, the U.S.S.R. followed events in Harare very closely; observers reported that at least 50 Soviet nationals were in Zimbabwe to cover the meeting.

The U.S.S.R. had reason to be pleased with the summit. The United States was specifically criticized in the summit communique 68 times, 19 in the section on Latin America and the Caribbean alone. Moscow reacted favorably, citing the summit's endorsement of Soviet disarmament proposals. Soviet media have emphasized the

summit's criticism of U.S. policies—especially toward South Africa and Nicaragua—and U.S. “economic imperialism” (the phrase Moscow used to publicly describe announced cuts in future U.S. aid to Zimbabwe). A September TASS article claimed: “Most of the participants...in their speeches and practically every paragraph of its document criticize either directly or indirectly the United States and denounced the Reagan Administration's great power policy.” Another TASS article reported that “the Soviet Union highly appreciates the activities of the [Nonaligned Movement]” and that “the U.S.S.R. will continue to side with the Nonaligned in their struggle against the forces of aggression and hegemonism.”

Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R. was not pleased with all of the summit's results. For example, India took a moderate approach toward the United States during the NAM summit. Although Prime Minister Gandhi cited Soviet disarmament proposals favorably, he also, on behalf of the NAM, called on the Soviet Union to stop intervening in Afghanistan. Nor did Gandhi criticize the United States by name during his three speeches at the NAM summit.

Soviet displeasure with this stance was reflected in an article criticizing Gandhi's “studious avoidance of any reference to the negative role of the U.S.A in world affairs...at Harare” that appeared in the *Patriot*, a pro-Soviet Indian newspaper set up by the KGB in 1962 as a vehicle for spreading disinformation.

The Soviet Union's influence on the NAM may increase at a greater rate now that the Nonaligned Department has been established. A measure of its continuing success might be gauged in the results of the special ministerial session of the NAM's Coordinating Bureau held in Georgetown, Guyana, in March 1987. A communique was issued containing 26 specific anti-U.S. citations—a new record for a NAM document on a geographic region.

### Peru: A Future Target of Opportunity

Peru is a contender for the 1989 NAM chairmanship, and the Soviets probably view its candidacy positively in the belief that Peru, as

chairman, might feel compelled to support positions that would cause bilateral problems with the United States. Should Peru be selected as the next NAM chairman, Moscow almost certainly will try to duplicate its Harare effort. Soviet personnel in Peru constitute the largest Soviet presence in any South American country. Moscow has a strong track record in placing material in the Peruvian media, with a press attache office as well as separate offices for *Novosti*, TASS, *Pravda*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Trud*, and Soviet radio and television.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> Yuriy Zhukov, “Bring the Activities of the World Peace Council in Accord with the New International Situation,” speech at World Peace Council meeting, April 24, 1986, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Elizabeth Teague, “The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, October 27, 1980.

<sup>3</sup> Col. Wallace Spaulding (ret.), “Shifts in CPSU ID,” *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1986, pp. 80-86.

<sup>4</sup> The Nonaligned Movement was founded in 1961. It has a membership of 99 states (plus the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's Organization) which claim to be independent of either superpower. Some of these nations, however, are very much under the influence of Moscow. Among them are Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, and Vietnam. The close alignment of these nations to the U.S.S.R.—coupled with their ability to act quickly as a small, disciplined cadre within the NAM—has offset their relatively small number.

<sup>5</sup> Richard L. Jackson, *The Nonaligned and the Superpowers* (1983), pp. 189-208. By 1973, the NAM had become, in Moscow's view, a positive mechanism to be used both to isolate the United States and to gain acceptance for Soviet global aims. From that time, Soviet praise of nonalignment became progressively more generous. By 1976, when the Colombo summit met, Brezhnev was emphasizing identical CPSU and NAM orientations: “As has been repeatedly emphasized in important documents of the CPSU, the Soviet Union highly values the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-racist orientations of the NAM. . . .”

## Appendix

# The International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

### Chief

*Dobrynin, Anatoliy*: Full Member Central Committee, CPSU; Secretary, Secretariat, Central Committee, CPSU; Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission, Council of Nationalities, U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

### First Deputy Chiefs

*Korniyenko, Georgiy*: Full Member Central Committee, CPSU.

*Zagladin, Vadim*: Full Member Central Committee, CPSU; Secretary, Foreign Affairs Commission, Council of the Union, U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

### Deputy Chiefs

*Brutents, Karen*: Candidate Member Central Committee, CPSU. Member, Presidium, Orientalist Association.

*Kovalenko, Ivan*: Member, Presidium, Orientalist Association.

*Shaposhnikov, Vitaliy*: Council Member, World Peace Council.

*Urnov, Andrey*

*Zuyev, Yuriy*

### Sector Chiefs

*Gryadunov, Yuriy*: (Iraq) Member, Presidium, Orientalist Association.

*Kharlamov, Yuliy*: (WPC)

*Korendyasov, Yevgeniy*: (Black Africa)

*Kudachkin, Mikhail*: (Spanish-speaking America)

*Kutsobin, Petr*: (India) Member, Presidium, Orientalist Association.

*Legasov, Aleksey*: (Friendship Societies)

*Lisovolik, Dmitriy*: (U.S.)

*Mochalin, Dmitriy*: (FRG-Austria) Council Member, World Peace Council

*Pertsov, Vladimir*: (Spain)

*Polyakov, Genrikh*

*Pyshkov, Boris*: (France, Portugal)

*Rozdorozhnyy, Ivan*: (Scandinavia)

*Rykin, Viktor*

*Senatorov, Aleksey*: (Japan, Far East)

*Sharif, Dzhavad*: (United Kingdom)

*Shumeyko, Grigoriy*: (International Organizations)

*Smirnov, Genrikh*

*Starodubov, Viktor*

*Tolstikov, Vladimir*

### Deputy Sector Chiefs

*Denisov, Yevgeniy*: (Mali, Ethiopia)

*Fedorov, Vladimir*: (Scandinavia)

*Kuzmin, Sergey*: (Syria)

### Instructors

*Vorozheykin, Yevgeniy*: (Sweden)

*Yegorov, V.*

### Responsible Workers

*Bazhanov, Yevgeniy*

*Bokelev, A.*

*Churilov, Yevgeniy*: (Venezuela, Paraguay)

*Drozdov, Eduard*

*Fomenko, Vladimir*

*Guskov, Aleksandr*: (Yemen, National Liberation Movements in Arab Countries)

*Ignatyev, Aleksandr*

*Kapskiy, Eduard*: (Angola, Mozambique)

*Khlebnikov, L.*

*Klyuyev, Boris*: (India)

*Kobelev, Yevgeniy*

*Koshelev, Yuriy*

*Kostyagin, A.*

*Kozlov, Yuriy*: (Honduras, Venezuela) Chief, Latin America Institute.

*Krylov, A.*

*Kudinov, Valeriy*

*Lagutin, Yevgeniy*

*Matuzov, Vyacheslav*: (Lebanon, Syria)

*Moisenko-Yelikiy, Dmitriy*

*Muravyev, Dmitriy*

*Pastukhov, Dmitriy*

*Petruk, Boris*: Senior Researcher (Angola, Zambia); Africa Institute.

*Romanov*: (Germany)

*Rymko, Yevgeniy*: Deputy Chief, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*Semenkov, Karl*

*Semivolos, Sergey*

*Shemenkov, Karl*: (Greece)

*Slepov, Nikolay*: (Greece)

*Smirnov, Stepan*: (Finland)

*Tikhmenev, Vladimir*: (Chile, Peru, Uruguay)

*Travkin, Vladimir*: (Mexico, Guatemala)

*Tyutyunov, V.*

*Ulasevich, Vladimir*: (Jamaica, Canada)

*Vavilov, Aleksey*

*Veber, Aleksandr*: (Italy)

*Veselitskiy, Afansiy*: (Italy)

*Yegorov, B.*

### Consultants Group

#### Leader

*Zhilin, Yuriy*

#### Members

*Ivanitskiy, Oleg*: (Italy)

*Kovalskiy, Nikolay*: Senior Researcher, World Economics and International Relations Institute.

*Kozlov, Aleksey*

*Lobov, Aleksey*: (Iraq)

*Menshikov, Stanislav*

*Midtsev, Veniamin*: (Africa)

*Mineyev, Aleksey*: (Colombia, Panama)

*Sharayev, Vladimir*: (Ethiopia)

*Sidenko, Viktor*: (Africa)

*Sobakin, Vadim*: Deputy Chairman, Association of Soviet Jurists.

*Sokolov, Igor*

*Yezhov, Vsevolod*

## Chapter II

# Soviet Religious Organizations as a Tool of Influence

The Soviets have long sought to influence international religious organizations and have attempted to couch Soviet foreign policy goals—particularly those concerning defense and disarmament—in religious terms to gain support. The projection of Soviet policy positions, propaganda, and disinformation into Western and Third World religious debates is likely to intensify.

Although such longstanding Soviet religious fronts such as the Christian Peace Conference are losing credibility and influence in the West, new methods and venues of access are taking their place. Particularly, the U.S.S.R. is stressing interactions between its “unofficial” religious organizations and Western peace and religious groups. A primary means of influencing these groups is through contacts at international meetings, many of which are Soviet-sponsored. Those held within the U.S.S.R. are carefully orchestrated by the government.

Increasingly, the U.S.S.R. has allowed Soviet religious delegations to attend meetings abroad to interact with religious elites of Western and Third World nations. Only those religious leaders who are acceptable to the Soviet Government however, are allowed to travel abroad and they are expected to use these ecumenical gatherings to explain and promote Soviet foreign policies. For example, Sergei Gordeyev, a member of the permanent staff of the Moscow Patriarchate's Department of International Relations, often accompanies high-level Soviet religious delegations abroad. He uses these opportunities to discuss official Soviet positions on foreign policy, arms control and national security.

A primary obstacle to the influence activities of Soviet churchmen is the widespread knowledge that the state controls religion in the U.S.S.R. Using high-profile ecumenical gatherings and personal interactions with Western and Third World religious leaders, Soviet church leaders have sought to convince their counterparts that: opinions expressed by Soviet churchmen are independently derived and freely held, and Soviet and bloc religious figures enjoy a degree of societal prominence and influence comparable to that of their Western colleagues.

## The Soviet Religious Propaganda Apparatus

The International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee is a major participant in the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policy. One section of the ID is responsible for general oversight of “mass organizations” and their international activities. Policy guidance regarding religious propaganda and the use of religion for active measures appears to flow from this organization to the Council for Religious Affairs, a subordinate body of the Council of Ministers which is responsible for maintaining overall control of church-state relations in the U.S.S.R.

Within the U.S.S.R., the regional heads of the local Committees on Religious Affairs control the actions and statements of churchmen. Abroad, however, their actions and statements are expected to adhere to official Kremlin positions. This oversight process involves other components of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus and the KGB. For example, Prof. Pavel T. Podlesnyi of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada accompanied a Soviet church delegation to a 1983 international conference of religious leaders in Canada. Later that year, he was a “principal expert speaker” at a meeting of the Christian Peace Conference Working Committee in Moscow. Podlesnyi functions as a “watchdog” and adviser on foreign policy issues for the Christian Peace Conference and the Russian Orthodox Church.

In November 1984, a career Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) diplomat, rather than a party propagandist, was appointed head of the Council for Religious Affairs. This undoubtedly has facilitated the marketing of Soviet foreign policies by Soviet religious officials.

## The Soviet Church as Foreign Policy Representative

In return for Kremlin permission to function in the U.S.S.R., the church assists in representing Soviet foreign policies to foreigners. For example,



church leaders act as unofficial good will representatives in hosting Western and Third World counterparts when they visit the U.S.S.R. Church officials seek to impress foreign religious envoys with Moscow's message that there is official Soviet tolerance and respect for "believers' rights."

Many Western religious leaders view church conferences in the Soviet Union—usually hosted by the Russian Orthodox Church—as government-manipulated media events. Nonetheless, foreign delegations continue to attend for a variety of reasons: Many recognize that they are being manipulated, but feel that maintaining ties with coreligionists in the Soviet bloc is an overriding consideration; some are attracted by the opportunity for a free or subsidized trip to the Soviet Union, with prospects for international media exposure.

The Kremlin's use of the church in marketing its foreign policy is not new. It took official form in 1958 with the creation of the Christian Peace Conference, now a prominent Soviet front group, and the granting of permission for the Russian Orthodox Church to join the World Council of Churches in 1961.

Regime control of the church's activities and pronouncements is entrenched. Because the entire administrative structure of the Russian Orthodox Church is monitored closely by state security organs, only clerics who can be relied upon by the Kremlin reach positions of authority and high public profile. Voices of dissent are treated first as insubordination within the church hierarchy; only when the church is unable to control a maverick member of the clergy is he turned over to state authorities for prosecution. Church leaders and administrators thus have developed a keen sense of what is permissible.

The loyalty and reliability of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy are often rewarded with special treatment and favorable publicity. In *Kommunist* (April 1980), Vladimir Kuroyedov, then-chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, wrote:

It must be said that the vast majority of the representatives of the priesthood in our country correctly understand the laws on religious cults and observe them; they display political loyalty to the policies of the Soviet state....

The overall relationship between the Soviet leadership and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy has developed over time from one which was almost all stick and no carrot into one which—at least for senior clergy—has come to include more carrot and only tacit reference to the stick. Kuroyedov concludes his article in *Kommunist* with an implicit tribute to the propaganda value of the Russian Orthodox Church:

The churches functioning in the U.S.S.R. take an active part in the struggle to strengthen universal peace, to avert the threat of another world war, to halt the arms race, to

establish just relations between peoples. This noble activity meets with the approval of citizens and all the public, and is much appreciated by the Soviet Government. (TASS, March 28, 1980)

The Russian Orthodox Church is integrated financially as well as structurally into the Soviet foreign propaganda apparatus. Regular, sizable contributions of funds from the church's coffers to the official Soviet Peace Fund have been a long standing aspect of the tacit agreement between church and state in the U.S.S.R. This fund is controlled by the Soviet Peace Committee, which coordinates many of the activities of Soviet front organizations.

The close relationship between the church and state in the U.S.S.R. has benefits for the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1946, for example, the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church, in communion with Rome, was forcibly merged with the Russian Orthodox Church. On occasion of the 40th anniversary of the L'vov Assembly—at which the merger was effected—TASS, May 19, 1986, issued a lengthy, laudatory statement.

Conversely, the Soviet Government can paper over a controversial policy decision by resorting to the legalism of separation of church and state. For example, when the Vatican requests Soviet authorization for appointments or visits, government officials can respond by referring the Vatican to the Moscow Patriarchate, thus indirectly tabling the request. When the Vatican then approaches the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, the church can obliquely incorporate longstanding Soviet foreign policy interests in its response.

Currently, the Russian Orthodox Church is being actively used to support Soviet policy positions on defense and disarmament issues. Patriarch Pimen, long known to be receptive to government and party guidance, has been accorded a place of exceptional prominence in the recent campaigns against the Strategic Defense Initiative and for the nuclear-weapons-test-moratorium. A lengthy open letter to President Reagan in June 1986, attributed to the Patriarch, was given front-page coverage by *Izvestiya* and disseminated worldwide via TASS. Both the open letter and the Patriarchal Easter sermon for 1986 echoed official Soviet propaganda formulations regarding arms control issues.

It is important to make the distinction that Soviet clergy do not simply endorse peace and disarmament as general concepts or worthy objectives. Rather, their support is geared to specific Soviet policy lines. It is difficult for Westerners, who are used to the independent stances taken by their own churches, to comprehend the extent to which Soviet churches function as arms of the official Soviet Government.

## The Millennium of Christianity in Russia (1988-1988)

The Soviets are gearing up to make the Millennium of Christianity in Russia in 1988 a major international media event, and to use the year-long celebration to influence religious circles beyond the Soviet bloc and enlist religious leaders in promoting Soviet peace policies. A major goal of this campaign is to create the impression that Christian bodies in both the East and West are united in their opposition to SDI and in support of Soviet disarmament initiatives.

Domestically, the U.S.S.R. is carefully orchestrating the celebration of the Millennium. Various ecclesiastical "showcases" in major Soviet cities have been designated as accepted locations for activities. These showcases are being remodeled to host clerics visiting in 1988. The ancient Danilov (St. Daniel) Monastery in south-central Moscow is being restored for use as the Russian Orthodox Church's downtown administrative headquarters. Until now, the Patriarchal offices have been located in the less accessible outlying village of Zagorsk.

In addition to providing the church with an urban setting for its administrative offices, the Soviet Government is constructing a hotel for visiting clerics on the Danilov Monastery grounds. This is likely to give a "Potemkin Village" aspect to the Millennium celebration.

In preparation for the Millennium, the Russian Orthodox Church held two conferences. The first—on historical aspects of Ancient Russia's conversion to Christianity in 988 AD—took place in Kiev in June 1986. The second—on religious dogma—took place in Moscow in June 1987. Foreign clergy and other dignitaries attended both events. As usual, policy pronouncements on peace themes were endorsed by the assembled religious leaders.

The Millennium is not the only avenue to sprucing up Moscow's image with regard to religious tolerance. Recently, for example, church officials have been accorded greater prominence and publicity. In 1986, two articles featuring the Russian Orthodox Church appeared in *Soviet Life*, the Soviet government's glossy equivalent of *Life* magazine for foreign distribution. Both articles give the impression that Russian Orthodox clergy—and, by implication, all religious leaders—are widely accepted as respected members of Soviet society.

Another aspect of the campaign is the recent liberalization of restrictions on clerical activity. Published in the January 1986 issue of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, these liberalizations significantly extend the scope of sanctioned

religious activity to include, for example, allowing the clergy to visit believers in hospitals and prisons. (Religious education of youth and proselytizing is still banned, however.) Moreover, religious associations are given the status of juridical persons in the eyes of the Soviet state. Theoretically, the Moscow Patriarchate and other religious organizations can now bring claims against organs of the government or the Communist Party before the Soviet judicial system.

## All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists

The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB) is the officially approved umbrella organization that coordinates and controls the activities of the registered Protestant churches within the Soviet Union. Although much smaller than the Russian Orthodox Church, AUCECB is called upon to perform similar functions. The organization is regularly represented at Soviet-approved ecumenical gatherings by its General Secretary A. M. Bychkov or Council Chairman V. E. Logvinenko.

Like the Russian Orthodox Church, AUCECB automatically adapts its policy stances to those of the Soviet Government. For example, in April 1986, AUCECB held a plenary session in Moscow at which a resolution was adopted urging "Christians of the whole world" to treat with "particular censure" the development of SDI.

Because many Western ecumenical organizations—such as the World Council of Churches and its national affiliates—are predominantly Protestant, AUCECB's participation in "East-West exchanges" and "dialogs" is particularly useful for Moscow. In early 1986, a delegation of the AUCECB paid a fraternal visit to the Baptist Church in Nicaragua on the occasion of the latter's 50th Convention Assembly. The visit provided a forum in which Soviet-Nicaraguan policy stances could be reformulated in a "church context."

## Catholics in the Soviet Union

The Catholic presence in the U.S.S.R., in addition to being relatively small, is divided ethnically into two groups: traditional ("Latin rite") Roman Catholics of the Baltic republics (primarily Lithuania) and the Byelorussian SSR, and Ukrainian ("Byzantine rite" or "Uniate") Catholics. Although neither religious community provides significant opportunities for propaganda exploitation, overall Soviet policy distinctions in its

relations with these indigenous Catholic groupings has important propaganda implications.

As a result of the 1946 absorption of the Ukrainian Catholic Church into Russian Orthodoxy, neither the Soviet state nor the Russian Orthodox Church recognizes the existence of Ukrainian Catholicism. Officially there are no Ukrainian Catholics in the U.S.S.R., and protestations of Ukrainian emigre groups to the contrary are portrayed as manifestations of anti-Soviet slander campaigns. Beyond denying that the problem exists, Soviet Government and religious spokesmen simply refuse to address the topic.

The traditional Roman Catholic populations of the Baltic republics and Byelorussia, however, are officially recognized. According to Igor Troyanovsky in *The Catholic Church in the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1984), "...the rights of Roman Catholics are effectively guaranteed by Soviet law, and complete freedom of conscience and religion is ensured." Since these officially recognized Catholic communities are comprised primarily of more nationalistic Lithuanian and Polish ethnic groups, they present relatively fewer opportunities for exploitation by the Kremlin.

The Soviets, sensitive to foreign criticism of their treatment of Catholics, publish books—primarily in Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian—on the purportedly happy state of Catholicism in the U.S.S.R. A Leningrad film studio has made a film on the subject, but it deals only with "Latin rite" Roman Catholics and highlights state-funded restorations of churches in the Baltic republics and Byelorussia.

## The Anti-Zionist Committee

The Soviet Government officially considers Jews to be an ethnic group, such as the Ukrainian and Baltic minorities, rather than a religious community. A small number of Soviet Jews, however, have been used for regime propaganda purposes as have the Christian organizations. An organization with a heavy Jewish component was created in April 1983 to serve the Kremlin's policy and propaganda interests—the Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Society.

The Anti-Zionist Committee is headed by retired Soviet Army Col. Gen. David Dragunskiy, an ethnic Jew. The Committee is used to promote, among other issues, Soviet defense policies. In its opening "appeal," the committee accused the United States of "using international Zionism as a key weapon in its attempts to change the existing military balance through an intensified arms race and to conduct psychological warfare."

## Central Asian Muslims

Sensitive to charges of being intolerant of Islam—particularly since the invasion of Afghanistan—the Soviets in pronouncements and propaganda seek to portray a liberalism toward Islam in Central Asia, where the majority of the U.S.S.R.'s 50 million Muslims live. As one Soviet author wrote, in English, "these people believe in Allah and have performed their religious rites for five or six decades within the Soviet system.

... Under Soviet law Muslim communities have the right to build mosques or rent prayer houses, and they have every opportunity to make use of this right." (Leon Emin, *Muslims in the U.S.S.R.* [Moscow: Novosti Agency Press Publishing House, 1984].)

An article appearing in a less accessible local language, however, is far less indulgent:

Our ideological opponents, by fighting against communism under the banner of Islam, are trying to describe the cultural and historical heritage of the peoples of the Soviet East as a religious heritage. ... The conditions of socialism make it impossible for religion to have an influence on national forms. But ethnic-religious relations still remain in the cultural sector, in the customs of part of the population, in their way of life and habits as a legacy from the past. ... *The progress of socialist nations is constantly eliminating the religious influence from peoples' traditions and customs.* (Zh. Mammadova, "Superficial 'Defenders' of 'Muslim Culture,'" in *Kommunist*, February 5, 1986.) (Emphasis added.)

Religious customs and traditions are thus distinguished from genuine religious conviction.

Rhetoric aside, Moscow is keenly aware of the need to make concessions to domestic Islam, especially to satisfy the politically important Arab world. In the 1980s, for instance, the Soviets agreed to permit the World Muslim League—a conservative, Saudi-supported Islamic organization headquartered in Mecca—to establish an Islamic University in Soviet Central Asia.

Like their Christian counterparts, Muslim religious leaders understand and adhere to state-mandated controls and do not openly criticize the lack of religious freedom. In an interview with the Arabic publication *al-'Awdah* in September 1986, Soviet Mufti Tal'gat Tadzhuiddin emphasized the vitality of Islam in Soviet Central Asia, the excellent condition of mosques, and the printing of the Koran in the various languages of Soviet Central Asia. Fulfilling his other role of unofficial good will ambassador for the Soviet Government, Tadzhuiddin recited the standard litany of Soviet "peace" proposals, Soviet observances to make 1986 as the International Year of Peace, and the "struggle" of the Soviet state to establish and maintain "world peace." (Jerusalem *al'Awdah*, in

Arabic, Sept. 15, 1986, pp. 46-68, JPRS-NEA-86-149, December 10, 1986)

Soviet Muslim leaders, in conjunction with the Council for Religious Affairs, have hosted conferences in the Soviet Union on various Islamic themes. Speeches and concluding resolutions invariably adhere to the official policy line. The Kremlin has been using the officially sanctioned Muslim hierarchy to promote its policies since the 1962 formation of a Department of Foreign Relations with Muslims Abroad, under the central Council for Religious Affairs. Additionally, the government set up parallel foreign relations departments under each of the four Muslim administrative districts. The four spiritual directorates are increasingly being used to foster favorable impressions among visiting foreign delegations of Islam's treatment in the Soviet Union. The first "all-Muslim Conference" was held in 1970, in Tashkent.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 tarnished Moscow's image as a friend of Islam. The World Muslim League called upon all Islamic nations to boycott a 1980 Soviet-hosted Muslim conference in Tashkent. Muslim delegates who did attend publicly chastised their hosts for the invasion, as well as for restrictions on the practice of Islam in the Soviet Union. The few, terse references to the conference in the Soviet press suggest it must have been an acrimonious meeting. Similar meetings were not held during the next 6 years.

Contacts with foreign Muslims, however, did not cease. The four Soviet religious boards continued extending invitations to foreign delegations from individual countries to visit the U.S.S.R. Many visits involved repeat tours by long-term foreign friends of the official Soviet Muslim establishment.

By October 1986, the Soviets felt sufficiently confident to stage another Muslim conference. Some 60 Islamic nations sent religious delegations to the meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan (*The Observer*, October 12, 1986). Some of the attendees—such as World Muslim League Secretary General Abdullah Omar Naseef—claimed that attendance was only to protest the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Soviet goals were achieved: Despite some verbal protests, Soviet-prepared resolutions reportedly were passed.

The 1986 Baku conference may have paved the way for the November 1986 visit to Moscow by Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General Pirzada. He was received by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other high MFA officials. Significantly, Pirzada made a follow-on visit in February 1987, ostensibly to participate in a February peace conference. The two visits fell on either side of a January 1987 OIC summit in Kuwait.

One of the official actions of the Baku conference was to set up a preparatory committee to organize further international conferences to which the representatives of Arab and other Islamic nations would be invited. This committee is to be chaired by Allashukur Pashazade (Pashayev), chairman of the Spiritual Directorate of Soviet Muslims of the Transcaucasus, whose administrative office is in Baku. This move not only institutionalizes these conferences, but also ensures that they will be under Soviet control.

Pashazade is an unusual figure. He acceded to his present position at the age of 29, causing a sensation in the Soviet Islamic community which traditionally defers to seniority. He is a skilled representative of "official" Soviet Islam who speaks Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Russian, and English. He is a member of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee presidium and a corresponding member of the Jordanian Royal Academy. He studied under Ayatollah Khomeini at Qom and is a representative of the U.S.S.R.'s Shi'ite community (approximately 10 percent of Soviet Muslims). His appointment to the post of chairman of one of the four Muslim spiritual directorates is illustrative of Moscow's recent efforts to rejuvenate and revitalize its apparatus for conducting relations with foreign Muslims.

Equally significant are Pashazade's status as chief representative of the Soviet Shi'a community and, in this connection, the choice of the predominantly Shi'ite city of Baku as the site for the 1986 all-Muslim conference. Moscow may have decided to shift its focus in foreign Muslim relations toward the heretofore neglected Shi'ite branch of Islam.

Shi'as generally constitute a disgruntled minority in many Islamic nations, one which Moscow may see as ripe for exploitation, especially to counterbalance the largely conservative Sunni establishment. Also, Moscow may be calculating that Iran will remain a theocracy after the death of Khomeini and that access to Tehran will depend on the U.S.S.R.'s Shi'a credentials.

## The Christian Peace Conference

The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) is a Soviet front organization subservient to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its main purpose is to promote Soviet foreign policy positions and propaganda in Western religious circles. It is, however, more effective in the Third World, where its close affiliation with the U.S.S.R. is not widely known. Founded in 1958, the CPC holds "All-Christian Peace Assemblies" every five-to-seven years in Prague, where it is headquartered.

The CPC in 1986 organized its activities around the general theme of the UN International Year of Peace. The various regional CPC affiliates (African Christian Peace Conference, Latin American Christian Peace Conference, and Asian Christian Peace Conference) held assemblies, presumably with CPC financial support. The Moscow Patriarchate often supplies prepaid tickets for travel to and from many of these events via Aeroflot, the Soviet civil airline.

Moscow continues to fund the CPC, indicating it remains satisfied with the front, notwithstanding apparent CPC decline in effectiveness vis-a-vis Western audiences. The fact that there have been no significant changes in the CPC's top leadership in almost 10 years is further evidence of Moscow's continuing approval of the organization's activities.

## The World Council of Churches

The World Council of Churches (WCC) is an ecumenical organization of more than 300 churches, the denominational constituencies of which encompass more than 400 million Christians worldwide. Headquartered in Geneva, the WCC has an executive committee that takes stands on political and other international issues.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the WCC's focus shifted away from traditional ecumenical dialogue toward policy stands on contemporary social and political issues, some of which paralleled Soviet stands. Soviet church officials have been increasingly active in encouraging WCC support for policy lines that the U.S.S.R. also supports, and for using its fora for presenting official Soviet views. In part, the WCC's receptivity is due to its leadership. WCC General Secretary Emilio Castro is an advocate of liberation theology who was exiled from Uruguay for his links to leftist organizations.

The WCC sometimes sponsors organizations or activities that have some form of affiliation with Soviet front organizations. On occasion, the WCC works with the CPC and/or its affiliates to encourage foreign governments to remove U.S. military bases.

The Christian Peace Conference works assiduously to influence WCC rhetoric and actions. In preparation for the 1983 WCC General Assembly in Vancouver, Canada, a conference of Christian women met in Kiev in April 1983. The women were instructed on how to coordinate their activities in Vancouver with the CPC and the Russian Orthodox Church delegation. The result was the defeat of a pending resolution demanding an immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Russian Orthodox and CPC representatives argued successfully that if the General Assembly voted to condemn the invasion, the East European women

and Soviet clergy would not be permitted to attend future WCC meetings. For similar reasons the WCC declined to take note of or act on messages from persecuted East European Christians at the same gathering. (Democracies Under Strain, Institute for the Public Interest, No. 3, June 1986)

WCC representatives have cooperated with the preeminent Soviet front, the World Peace Council, in hosting a non-governmental organization symposium on "World Peace and the Liberation of South Africa and Namibia" at the WCC headquarters in Geneva, June 11-13, 1986.

WCC headquarter's support for radical leftist and/or violent movements in the Third World has already caused considerable controversy within member churches, particularly over the open funding of South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the African National Congress.

## The Asian Buddhist Council for Peace

The Asian Buddhist Council for Peace (ABCP) is the Soviet front responsible for maintaining and improving ties with Buddhists worldwide. It claims 15 affiliates in 12 countries. There are ABCP "National Centers" in Bangladesh, Kampuchea, North Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Thailand, the U.S.S.R., and Vietnam. Burma is the only country with a significant Buddhist population which maintains no relations with ABCP.

Ostensibly, the organization is dominated by Mongolia. Its headquarters is in Ulan Bator, and its leadership—president, secretary general, and deputy secretary general—is entirely Mongolian. Following the usual pattern for Soviet fronts, however, the Soviet membership—coreligionists from the central Siberian Buryat Autonomous SSR—ultimately sets the organization's policy.

Like all other Soviet fronts, ABCP holds international conferences controlled and funded by Soviet authorities. One held in Vientiane, Laos, in February 1986 featured demonstrations and resolutions condemning SDI. Other official proclamations: commended "the political courage of the U.S.S.R. in extending a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing"; recalled and condemned "the sufferings of our brothers in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea caused by chemical genocide"; and endorsed the Soviet-backed Asian-Pacific zone of peace initiative. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, the World Council of Churches, and the World Peace Council were among the non-Buddhist attendees at the Vientiane conference.

ABCP appears to have more members on the World Peace Council than any other organization. In addition, both the ABCP's president and its

secretary general sit on the World Peace Council's Presidential Committee; no international organization holds more than two slots on this body, and only four other Soviet fronts have this maximum representation. The steady increase of ABCP representation therein would seem to reflect an increased Soviet emphasis on the ABCP and Buddhism.

One of the ways in which the U.S.S.R. uses the Buddhists is to gain support for a major Soviet foreign policy goal in the Indian Ocean—the establishment of the Indian Ocean zone of peace, a euphemism for advocating the removal of U.S. military bases on Diego Garcia. In Sri Lanka, several prominent Buddhist monks have sponsored events designed to develop popular support for the Indian Ocean zone of peace proposal. The monks hold important positions in such Soviet fronts as the Ceylon Peace Council (the national affiliate of the World Peace Council), the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), and the Sri Lankan-Soviet Friendship League. These organizations all work to fan anti-U.S. and anti-Western sentiment in Sri Lanka.

The Soviet Government underwrites exchange visits between Soviet and Sri Lankan Buddhist monks and sponsors university scholarships for monks to study in the U.S.S.R. The Sri Lankan chairman of the Sri Lankan-Soviet Bhikkus (Buddhist Monks) Association traveled to the U.S.S.R. in 1983, and his Soviet counterpart visited Sri Lanka in December 1986.

Sri Lanka is not the only locus of Buddhist activity in support of Soviet policy goals. At the 15 Conference of the World Buddhist Federation, held in Kathmandu in November-December 1986, the

standard Soviet-backed resolution calling for the creation of an Indian Ocean zone of peace was approved. The Soviets did not get all they might have liked from this meeting, however. A Soviet-sponsored resolution calling for world nuclear disarmament was passed only after language attacking the U.S. SDI program was removed, and a resolution expressing concern over the persecution of Buddhists in Vietnam was passed over the objections of the Soviet and East European delegations.

The Tibetan exile Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal leader of Lamaism, maintains cordial relations with both the Soviet Government and the ABCP. The Dalai Lama has visited the Soviet Union three times, most recently in September 1986 to attend a two-week ABCP event in Ulan Ude, the capital city of the Buryat SSR. During this visit he was received by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Pimen at the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery in Moscow, where the two religious leaders held a press conference highlighting joint Christian-Buddhist efforts to secure world peace.

The Dalai Lama generally seems to have taken pains to avoid the appearance of embracing wholeheartedly Soviet religious peace propaganda; rather, he uses Soviet-sponsored religious events as convenient fora for decrying the continuing plight of Tibetan exiles. During his first visit to the Soviet Union in June 1979, he reportedly expressed merely a satisfaction that Soviet Buddhists were not prevented from practicing their religion (UPI, 3 August 1979). On his second visit, in September 1982, which was billed as a "private stop on the way to Mongolia," Western correspondents noted the Dalai Lama carefully maintained a low profile.



## Chapter III

# The Soviet Peace Committee \*

Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Kremlin has undertaken more vigorous efforts aimed at drawing nonaligned states, foreign communists, socialists, and noncommunist pacifist groups into a Soviet-led campaign to isolate the United States on the peace issue. The new Soviet party program, the Gorbachev regime's most comprehensive and authoritative statement of overall goals and strategy, endorses Moscow's expanded efforts to use public opinion and political movements in the West to influence Western governments. (For background on Moscow's view of the peace movement, see Appendix A.)

In this context, the Kremlin appears to be relying increasingly on highly structured, party-controlled domestic organizations to generate support abroad for U.S.S.R. foreign and defense policies among groups (scientists, physicians, athletes, and business people, for example) outside the U.S.S.R.'s traditional network of supporters. This shift in tactics parallels Gorbachev's skillful public relations efforts to build bridges to organizations with which Moscow has had past differences. It also comes at a time when the Soviets are lowering the profile of some of the well-known, Soviet-backed international fronts, such as the World Peace Council (WPC), which previously have attempted to fulfill this role.

This chapter will discuss the role, structure, and work of one such domestic organization—the Soviet Peace Committee (formally known as the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace). The Soviet Peace Committee downplays its CPSU connections to promote “people-to-people” contacts, to break down “harmful stereotypes” of the U.S.S.R., and to manipulate foreign perceptions of controversial international issues. After several years of alienation from mainstream European pacifist movements (during which time some foreign countries denied Soviet Peace Committee officials visas because of suspected intelligence connections, see Appendix B), the Soviet Peace Committee now aims to cultivate a more accommodating image and increase its appeal among Westerners. The CPSU doctrine that guides its activities has not changed, however.

The recent appointment of Genrikh Borovik, CPSU member, well-traveled correspondent, veteran propagandist, and former KGB agent, to head the Soviet Peace Committee is the most visible indication of Soviet efforts to rehabilitate the organization. Moscow believes that his ability to demonstrate flexibility with foreigners will help generate interest in the Soviet Peace Committee as a legitimate “peace” organization (see Appendix C for background on Borovik).

Since Borovik's appointment, the Soviet Peace Committee has been in the forefront of a skillful Soviet public relations effort to promote Moscow's “new thinking” and push arms control initiatives, primarily through a series of well-publicized meetings with prominent Westerners. The Soviet Peace Committee also managed an effort to gather millions of signatures for a petition supporting Soviet arms control positions.

## The Organization and Its Function

The Soviet Peace Committee is a Moscow-based “public” organization that receives overall guidance and directives from the CPSU. It was formed in August 1949, just 5 months after the creation of the Helsinki-based World Peace Council.<sup>1</sup> Because it constitutes the U.S.S.R.'s official “peace movement,” the Soviet Peace Committee invariably supports all Soviet-sponsored peace and disarmament initiatives and refrains from criticizing any aspect of Soviet foreign or domestic policy. For example, it failed to denounce the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the December 1981 declaration of martial law in Poland, and the September 1983 Soviet shootdown of a Korean airliner. Moreover, the Soviet Peace Committee has never condemned Soviet human rights violations, and frequently has defended the harassment and imprisonment of “unofficial” Soviet peace activists; it has vigorously fought the efforts

\* A version of this paper was published May, 1987 as a U.S. Department of State *Foreign Affairs Note*.



of some Western peace activists to contact and maintain relations with these individuals. <sup>2</sup>

Soviet officials maintain that the Soviet Peace Committee is a public organization, representing solely the opinions of the Soviet people and in no way controlled or influenced by the CPSU. <sup>3</sup> Soviet spokesmen on numerous occasions have declared that it is natural for the Soviet public to praise the "peaceloving" actions of the U.S.S.R., and criticize the policies of Western nations.

The Statutes of the Soviet Peace Committee (*20th Century and Peace*, No. 3, March 1985) mandate the organization to "promote relations and contacts with foreign organizations and movements," "carry out work to explain the burning issues of the Soviet and the worldwide movements for peace," and "represent the Soviet peace supporters in the World Peace Council."

In this context, the Soviet Peace Committee is tasked by the CPSU to play a central role in generating Western interest in and support for the "struggle for peace," a political/ideological tenet central to the U.S.S.R.'s efforts to unite diverse Western pacifist groups and nonruling communist parties and direct their protests exclusively against the West. As deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, Dmitri Volkoganov, recently defined the struggle for peace:

...the real struggle for peace is not a kind of abstract form of pacifist condemnation of war 'in general.' It is above all the exposure of the true culprits of the terrible danger threatening mankind. It is a struggle against those who are blocking the peace initiatives of the socialist countries and who are unwilling to abandon the criminal idea of solving the main contradiction of the age by nuclear force. (*Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986)

The unidirectional "struggle" described by Volkoganov similarly found expression in the new party program adopted at last year's 27th CPSU congress:

Mass democratic movements [are] objectively aimed against the policy of reactionary imperialist circles and merge into the common stream of the struggle for peace and social progress.... The communists...are now on the frontline of the struggle for the conservation of peace on earth.... They clearly understand the reasons for the threat of war, expose those really to blame for the aggravation of international tension and the arms race, and seek to cooperate with all those who can contribute to the antiwar struggle. (CPSU Program, *Pravda*, March 7, 1986)

The "struggle for peace" concept starkly contrasts with the "equal responsibility" doctrine espoused by many Western pacifist groups. That doctrine maintains that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as the two superpowers, bear equal blame for the nuclear arms buildup and international tensions. Since the early 1980s, the Soviet Peace Committee unsuccessfully has sought to discredit this idea of superpower equivalence (see Appendix D). In the process, Peace Committee officials have

demonstrated a striking lack of tolerance for the opinions and positions of Western pacifist groups and individual activists who have disagreed with the "struggle for peace" concept, criticized equally U.S. and Soviet policies, or failed to recognize and support Moscow's self-proclaimed "peace initiatives." <sup>4</sup> Soviet press accounts of international peace gatherings have indicated that the hard line adopted by the Peace Committee publicly also has found its way into private exchanges with Westerners. This apparently happened at a "peace forum" staged in Moscow last February.

The Committee is organized nationally, with more than 120 regional affiliates scattered throughout the U.S.S.R.; all are responsible for organizing "peace activities" at the local level in Soviet enterprises, state farms, universities, and scientific institutes.

The Peace Committee controls several "commissions" on disarmament, religion, the Third World, art and culture, and the mass media. One of its newest commissions, the "Retired Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament," recently met in Vienna with its Western counterpart organization, the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament" (TASS, April 29, May 4, 1987). Through these special-interest subsidiary bodies, the Soviet Peace Committee seeks to mobilize noncommunist pacifists, journalists, clergy, scientists, and representatives of other interest groups in support of Soviet foreign policy. <sup>5</sup> The commissions meet regularly at Peace Committee headquarters to formulate plans for counterpart organizations run by the WPC and such other "special interest" international communist fronts as the International Organization of Journalists, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. <sup>6</sup>

All commissions are headed by well-known Soviet media, academic, literary, and scientific personalities in order to facilitate Soviet Peace Committee contacts with foreigners in those professions. One of the Peace Committee's most active subsidiary bodies is the "Scientific Council on Research on the Problems of Peace and Disarmament" (SCRPPD), targeted specifically at Western scientists (see Appendix E). In the future, the Peace Committee will rely more heavily on the SCRPPD, as well as its various commissions, to promote contacts with Westerners.

The Soviet Peace Committee is staffed by prominent academics, journalists, and scientists, among others (see Appendix F). The organization currently is headed Genrikh Borovik, who replaced Yuriy Zhukov <sup>7</sup> in early March. Borovik was identified recently as a former agent in the Tenth Department of the Second Chief Directorate of the

Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), responsible for recruiting foreign journalists (see Appendix C).

The Peace Committee publishes a monthly magazine titled *20th Century and Peace*, first issued in 1958 and now translated from Russian into English, French, Spanish, and German. The journal publicizes the work of the WPC, reports on major Peace Committee gatherings, and carries articles critical of the United States and NATO; it also features articles that attack Western peace activists who disagree with Soviet policies. The journal is edited by Al'bert Belyayev, a member of the CPSU's Central Committee Central Auditing Commission and editor in chief of the Central Committee daily *Sovetskaya Kultura*.

## The Soviet Peace Fund

The Soviet Peace Fund is a party-controlled organization that finances the work of the Soviet-backed international fronts via the Soviet Peace Committee. The fund, a type of financial clearing house administered by the Peace Committee, is headed by Soviet chess master and Peace Committee member Anatoliy Karpov. The chairman of the board of the U.S.S.R. State Bank, Viktor V. Dementsev, is a Peace Committee vice-president; Dementsev's position allows funds collected by Karpov to be funneled expeditiously to the WPC and other fronts.

Like the Soviet Peace Committee, the Peace Fund is nationally organized with local affiliates throughout the U.S.S.R.. Soviet citizens make "donations" to the fund, which are mailed to Peace Committee headquarters or paid through the U.S.S.R. State Bank. The most common method of collecting money is for individual factories, plants, and collective farms to hold a one-day "work shift for peace." Individuals participating in such work shifts then "donate" their day's wages to the fund. In fact, such "donations" usually represent levies imposed by the central authorities on the individual local affiliates.

On the 25th anniversary of the Peace Fund, chairman Karpov told the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* (No. 18, 1986) that "many contributions [to the fund] come from other countries, from our compatriots living abroad and from foreign nationals." He said that the fund finances "mass public organizations," such as the Soviet Peace Committee, the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation (the Soviet affiliate of the so-called International Committee on European Security and Cooperation; see Appendix G), and other Soviet affiliates of international front groups. Karpov acknowledged that the Soviet

Peace Fund maintains "business contacts" with foreign "peace funds" but did not identify them.

Former Peace Fund chairman Boris Polevoi also admitted to Soviet funding of "international democratic organizations working for peace," the Soviet euphemism for the international fronts (*20th Century and Peace*, No. 4, April 1980). *Moscow News* (No. 19, 1981) reported that the fund helps finance some of the WPC's "large public initiatives." The October 1973 World Congress of Peace Forces, staged in Moscow and organized jointly by the Soviet Peace Committee and the WPC, was almost completely financed by the Peace Fund, according to the WPC's monthly bulletin *Peace Courier* (November 1973). The fund backed the WPC-sponsored "week of action for a ban on nuclear weapons" in the U.S.S.R. in late 1985, according to a fund statement distributed by TASS (August 5, 1985).

During a WPC organizational session in Sofia, Bulgaria, in April 1986, a special working group met to find ways to increase financial contributions from Western WPC affiliates to the WPC's Helsinki headquarters, a responsibility traditionally assumed by the Peace Fund. This was one of several public relations measures undertaken at Soviet behest by the WPC in the presence of Western participants to demonstrate that not all WPC operating expenses come from Moscow.

Over the years, the Soviets have gone to great lengths to portray the Peace Fund, like the Soviet Peace Committee, as a public organization. Some Soviet officials have, however, publicly acknowledged that the Peace Fund takes its cues from the CPSU. Fund chairman Karpov, in an interview with *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (April 26, 1986), said that it is under the guidance of the party and that its "principal directions," i.e., the development and expansion of the antiwar and antiimperialist movements, were based on the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. He also said that money collected by the fund is allocated to support the work of 16 Soviet public organizations<sup>8</sup> that do "everything in their power" to foster solidarity among "peace-loving forces."

## Other Peace Committee Ties to the WPC

The Soviet Peace Committee serves as the WPC's *eminence grise*. Through direct organizational ties, the Soviet Peace Committee funds and structures the WPC's yearly activities and determines the content, focus, and priorities of its anti-Western campaigns, most of which are given prominent coverage by the Soviet Peace Committee's monthly journal. For example, the chairman of the Peace Committee traditionally is a

member of the WPC's decision-making Presidential Committee, attending and steering its most sensitive strategy deliberations. The International Department deputy chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov is on the WPC presidium. Many Soviet Peace Committee members simultaneously are WPC members (see Appendix F).

About two years ago, former Soviet Peace Committee chairman Zhukov discussed the Soviet Peace Committee-WPC relationship in *International Affairs* (July 1985). He admitted that the Soviet Peace Committee and its counterparts in Eastern Europe "actively participated" under the WPC aegis and were doing "all in [their] power to enhance" its role. Zhukov also praised the work of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF, a front headed by WPC president Romesh Chandra and sharing the same WPC street address in Helsinki). He acknowledged Soviet funding of the ILFPF when he asserted that the Peace Committee would "go on making its constructive contribution" to the "preparation" and "staging" of ILFPF meetings.

Although Moscow's commitment to the WPC and its affiliates has not wavered, in recent years the CPSU has lowered the WPC's profile as its effectiveness as a Soviet front has diminished. In March 1983, the Soviet foreign affairs monthly journal *International Affairs* complained that "many national peace organizations and movements" in the West "avoid establishing ties of an organizational nature with the WPC." The failure of the WPC's 14th congress in Copenhagen, October 15-19, 1986—largely due to controversy over communist domination of the event—was instrumental in its decline.

A WPC strategy session on April 24-27 in Sofia, Bulgaria, preceded the Copenhagen congress. Zhukov called the session a "dynamic, businesslike, critical, and impartial" set of discussions at which the WPC was called upon to "radically change" its "style of work, denounce formalism and complacency outright and adopt a new approach to cooperation with all antiwar movements." Zhukov later criticized unidentified "peace campaigners" attending the April meeting for their "lack of experience" in politics, their "dim notions" of international affairs, and their inability to determine "who is responsible" for the arms race (*New Times*, No. 20, 1986). During the session, he imposed new organizational changes on the WPC in a traditional, heavyhanded manner, even though such changes were intended to create an image of the organization acceptable to noncommunist activists.

ID officials responsible for liaison with foreign peace groups probably were not pleased with the Copenhagen congress. Published Soviet accounts prior to the congress indicated that Soviet

organizers expected disagreement at the gathering. *New Times* (No. 42, 1986), for example, anticipated debate on such "sharp and contradictory problems" as human rights and the invasion of Afghanistan and admitted that preparatory meetings were "by no means easy," requiring "big efforts, great patience, and... political tact." In the aftermath of the congress, *New Times* (No. 43, 1986) made the unprecedented admission of violence at a Soviet front-sponsored event, reporting that "Danish activists" pulled the "thugs" (a reference to non-communist activists who raised the issue of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) off the stage and "kicked them out" of the assembly hall.

In a subsequent interview with *New Times* (No. 45, 1986), Zhukov publicly admonished pacifist groups that advocated the equal-responsibility thesis at the session: "Some participants" wanted to make the renunciation of nuclear weapons conditional on the "settlement of issues that have nothing to do with the substance of the matter.... They keep citing a thesis which... leads to the demand to change the social system in the socialist countries.... This is a dangerous line." No written resolutions or communiqués were adopted because of concern that noncommunist activists would demand that criticism of Soviet policies appear in the text. Zhukov's explanation: The session did not produce a final document because "to draft a final document, we would have had to set up a drafting commission. It would work through the night, thrashing out a formula. The result would be a long paper with which the commission would be pleased. But what next?"

Soviet television coverage of the WPC congress was sparse and provided contrasting images of the event. For example, on October 18, the Moscow evening news program "Vremya" carried an interview with Borovik—described positively in the report as one of several Soviet "experts" at the October 11-12, 1986 U.S.-Soviet summit at Reykjavik, Iceland. Borovik told the correspondent that radically "new thinking" in the peace movement was necessary and praised the "great" work of the WPC congress. The following evening "Vremya" replayed a videotape showing fistfights in the assembly hall; about four hours later, TASS disseminated an interview with Zhukov, who admitted that "certain forces" staged "acts of hooliganism... bunches of hooligans broke into the assembly hall and led things to blows."

## Recent Trends in the Soviet "Peace Movement"

Moscow has decided not only to lower the profile of the WPC but also to place the Soviet Peace Committee in a more prominent position. Soviet

Peace Committee organizational sessions since the end of 1986 and a "peace forum" hosted in Moscow in February 1987 indicate the beginning of Moscow's tactical shift to an ostensibly less ideological approach in its dealings with Western peace and antiwar groups. These meetings have set the stage for both a more activist Soviet Peace Committee program and for what Moscow hopes will be the start of "new thinking" among noncommunist pacifist movements and a period of anti-U.S. cooperation.

### A Soviet Peace Committee Plenary

On December 31, 1986, the Soviet Peace Committee and the Soviet Peace Fund held an unusual joint plenary session in Moscow to assess Soviet participation in the International Year of Peace (in which the Copenhagen congress was a central element) and outline the Peace Committee's future tasks. In his keynote address, Zhukov declared that the Soviet Peace Committee had been forced to acquire a much more "diversified character" as a result of the situation taking shape in the global antiwar movement. He asserted that the time had come for serious restructuring of the Peace Committee if it were to engage in activities outside the aegis of the World Peace Council and establish ties with Western mass movements that "ignore" the Helsinki-based front (see Appendix H). Although it is not clear whether Zhukov was aware that his impending removal as Soviet Peace Committee chief was part of this "restructuring," he evidently was laying the foundation for a more accommodating facade to be promoted by his successor.

Zhukov indicated that in the future the Soviet Peace Committee would rely more heavily on its commissions to "promote direct contacts" with "scientists, physicians, cultural personalities, sportsmen, and retired military leaders." In this context, Zhukov mentioned that the Peace Committee was "striving to expand cooperation with business community centers that are capable in some measure of exerting a restraining influence on the Western ruling circles."

Zhukov added that although the climate for Soviet Peace Committee discussions with these groups had improved, "very essential differences" still separated them. Expounding on themes heard at the April 1986 WPC session, Zhukov recommended "adjustments" to the Peace Committee's work, urging its personnel to "learn to listen better and perceive everything rational and useful they are told, even if this be criticism; they should engage in substantive and polite polemics." In this context, Zhukov stated that "workers and peasants" were at times more convincing in exchanges with Westerners than were the most

experienced Soviet Peace Committee activists (*20th Century and Peace*, No. 2, 1987).

### The Moscow Peace Forum

A Soviet-sponsored international forum, "For a Nuclear Free World, for the Survival of Humanity," was staged February 14-16, 1987, in Moscow. *Pravda* (February 14) reported that almost 1,000 people of different political, ideological, and religious views had come to attend the conclave, hailed by the Soviets as an example of Moscow's "new political thinking" and billed by Soviet radio and television commentators as a "fresh impetus" to the peace and antinuclear struggle.

The day the session opened, Soviet media gave no indication of Soviet Peace Committee involvement in the forum's planning or organization; TASS reported only that the gathering had been called "on the initiative of Soviet cultural figures." Yevgeniy Velikhov, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Scientists against the Nuclear Threat—another party-controlled organization whose activities specifically are aimed at Western scientists—subsequently declared that the forum had been arranged "on the initiative of a group of scientists," according to *Izvestiya* (February 17, 1987). That same day, Soviet Peace Committee vice-president Primakov told Radio Moscow that various Soviet working groups—composed of political scientists (including Primakov), religious figures, scientists, and others—were established before the forum; they individually contacted their professional counterparts abroad to invite them to Moscow.

In the days leading up to the forum, Soviet officials went to considerable lengths to stress the open and spontaneous nature of the gathering. At the same time, they betrayed concern that disagreement—about the source of the nuclear threat, who was to blame for the arms race, and the "orientation" of the peace movement—would surface. For example, TASS foreign news chief Vitaliy Chukseyev told a Radio Moscow news program on February 13 that "interesting, acute, and most probably difficult dialogue" could be expected at the gathering. The following day *Pravda* anticipated "possible debates" at the session and asserted that the "adoption of resolutions or joint communiqués" was not envisaged. (As noted, the organizers of the WPC's Copenhagen congress last October similarly failed to adopt written resolutions or communiqués.)

Representatives of some of the traditional Soviet-backed international fronts attended the session. ID chief Dobrynin met on February 15 with the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament," a front described by TASS as a "Western public group." (Some of the generals have written articles in *New*

*Times* and in other Soviet journals critical of the U.S. and NATO but not of Soviet policies.) Christian Peace Conference secretary general Lubomir Mirejovsky attended the forum (*Rude Pravo*, February 21), as did CPC vice-president Paulos Mar Gregorios (also a WPC vice president).<sup>9</sup>

In his address to the gathering on February 16, Gorbachev called the forum a "true embodiment of world public opinion" but urged participants to form a "correct opinion" about Soviet foreign policy. He downplayed the notion that there was "a Soviet threat to peace and freedom." In a reference to the October 15, 1986 sham Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, he told the assembled audience that the U.S.S.R. had "brought back six regiments" from the country.<sup>10</sup> Finally, bowing to non-communist pacifist groups in Europe, Gorbachev declared that the U.S.S.R. would "readily respond" to proposals made by other "public movements."

Although the Soviets sought to put the best face on the Moscow forum, indications surfaced of debate and disagreement:

—At a news conference called to assess the results of the forum, Velikhov declined to give an appraisal of the forum: "Many important opinions were voiced, and I will not sum them up. It seems to me many very important and interesting opinions were voiced. ...[I]n the beginning, we had a number of ideas—this came about spontaneously—so we simply couldn't resist this. There arose a spontaneous desire to discuss...acute issues..." (Radio Moscow, February 16, 1987)

—Radio Moscow commentator Vladimir Pozner admitted that participants at the gathering "openly and candidly exchanged ideas, argued and debated." He castigated the Western press for alternately labeling the forum "propaganda" and a "Soviet ploy" and declared that the session would have received more attention had it been staged in the U.S. (Radio Moscow, February 17).

—In an article in the *Morning Star* (organ of the Moscow-controlled faction of the British Communist Party, February 26, 1987), CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Peace Committee member Georgiy Arbatov admitted that the Soviet sponsors of the forum "did not expect that the participants would discuss Soviet foreign policy." The forum's task, wrote Arbatov, was "to continue East-West dialogue at a broad public level"; he complained that "quite often contradictory views were expressed." *Moscow News* (No. 10, March 19, 1987) reported that West European participants

requested the formation of a human rights committee before the forum got under way.

On February 25, shortly before Zhukov's removal from the Soviet Peace Committee chairmanship, Gorbachev addressed the 18th Soviet trade union congress in Moscow. He indicated different tactical and ideological approaches were taken by noncommunist participants on what Moscow euphemistically refers to as "questions of war and peace" (i.e., who is to blame for the arms race) and that these were the source of much of the discord at the peace forum. Moreover, he implied that Soviet peace activists had not adequately bridged the ideological gulfs separating them from grassroots pacifist groups in the West:

The forum has been an important event in international life, a barometer, I would say, of the mood of public opinion on the planet.... There were indeed very heated disputes on how to move in this direction, how this or that problem should be resolved and there were essential differences in the approach to them. (TASS, February 25, 1987)

## Zhukov's Removal

Zhukov's advocacy of a doctrinaire ideological line during the five years he served as Soviet Peace Committee chairman proved to be a public relations disaster, exacerbating precisely those criticisms of the U.S.S.R. which he sought to prevent, generating extensive Western criticism of the Peace Committee, and, despite the conciliatory tone of his December 31, 1986, address, ultimately undermining his effectiveness as Peace Committee chairman.

On March 6, 1987, TASS reported that a Soviet Peace Committee presidium session had been held that day to discuss "practical tasks in the immediate period." According to TASS, Zhukov had been "released" from his duties as chairman; the presidium expressed gratitude to him for his "great contribution" to the development of the Soviet peace movement. TASS reported that Genrikh Borovik had been named to replace Zhukov; Anatoliy Dobrynin took part in the session, underscoring International Department interest in establishing the Soviet Peace Committee's credibility internationally.<sup>11</sup>

## The Accession of Genrikh Borovik

The appointment of Borovik as Soviet Peace Committee chief was a tactical move designed to demonstrate to Western organizations Moscow's genuine commitment to dialogue and flexibility in its relations with Western pacifist groups.

Borovik is well qualified to head the Soviet Peace Committee. He is an English-speaking graduate of the Moscow Institute of International

Relations, a well-traveled correspondent, a veteran propagandist, editor in chief of *Theater* magazine, and secretary of the board of the U.S.S.R. Writers' Union. He also is a member of the board of the Soviet Copyright Agency, whose chairman, Nikolay Chetverikov, was expelled from France in April 1983 along with 46 other Soviet officials for espionage.<sup>12</sup> The CPSU believes that his ability to demonstrate flexibility with foreigners will help generate interest in the Soviet Peace Committee as a legitimate peace organization. His defense of such controversial issues as human rights violations in the U.S.S.R. and the September 1983 Soviet shutdown of a Korean airliner suggests a willingness to engage in polemics with individuals and groups critical of Soviet policies.

Since Borovik's appointment, the Soviet Peace Committee has been in the forefront of a skillful Soviet public relations effort to promote Moscow's "new thinking" and push arms control initiatives, primarily through well-publicized meetings with prominent Westerners. For example, the Soviet Peace Committee recently organized a Soviet-West German meeting of political, social, science, and business officials for two days of talks (TASS, March 28, 1987). On March 30, a Peace Committee delegation called on British Prime Minister Thatcher, then in Moscow to meet with Gorbachev, to attack British support for U.S. defense policies and criticize the "scarcity of truthful information" in Great Britain about the U.S.S.R. (*Izvestiya*, March 30, 1987). And in late April, the "Retired Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament," identified by TASS as a "public group attached to" the Soviet Peace Committee, met in Vienna with its Western counterpart organization, "Generals for Peace and Disarmament" (TASS, April 29, May 4, 1987). The Western organization, formed in 1981, has held gatherings regularly in Vienna since 1984; a future meeting is planned for 1988 to discuss "alternative" security arrangements.

## Conclusion

For the past five years, the Soviet Peace Committee has sought international recognition as a genuine peace organization. The Peace Committee's importance to Moscow as a front for the presentation of Soviet policies has grown as the credibility of the World Peace Council has declined. The failure of the WPC's 14th peace congress in Copenhagen in October 1986 and the controversy generated by communist domination of the event were important catalysts to Moscow's rehabilitation of the Soviet Peace Committee.

Zhukov's advocacy of a doctrinaire ideological line during his five-year tenure generated extensive

Western criticism of the Soviet Peace Committee. At the end of his term, Zhukov pointed out the necessity for restructuring the Soviet Peace Committee in order to establish ties with Western peace movements outside the aegis of the World Peace Council. To this end, he indicated that the Soviet Peace Committee would rely more heavily upon its own commissions in the future.

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> See "Soviet Active Measures: The World Peace Council," *Foreign Affairs Note*, U.S. Department of State, April 1985.

<sup>2</sup> At a March 11, 1984 meeting in London, for example, Soviet Peace Committee delegates in the United Kingdom at the invitation of a Quaker group were "forcibly" challenged about official Soviet harassment of independent peace activists in the U.S.S.R., according to the London *Guardian*. The Soviet Peace Committee representatives replied that the arrests of the activists had "always led to criminal charges" and that no one had been detained simply "because of their beliefs." More recently, *New Times* (No. 11, 1986) accused Dutch Interchurch Peace Council officials of "looking for malcontents" in the Soviet Union and "pompously [holding] some of them up as 'the true peace movement' in the U.S.S.R.."

<sup>3</sup> When the Soviets speak of the Soviet Peace Committee as a "mass" or "public" organization, the implication is that it is not bound by CPSU rules and regulations and that it may pursue its policies independent of party directives. CPSU statutes make it clear, however, that this is not the case: "At congresses, conferences, and meetings convened by administrative, trade union cooperative, and other workers' mass organizations, and also in the electoral organs of these organizations where there are at least three party members, party groups will be organized. *The task of these groups will be the comprehensive increase of influence of the party and of the conduct of its policy among the nonparty members, the strengthening of party and state discipline, the struggle against bureaucratism, and verification of party and soviet directives. . . . Party groups must strictly and unswervingly follow the decisions of leading party organs on all questions.*" (From Section 9, "Party Groups in Nonparty Organizations," of the CPSU Statutes, adopted by a CPSU Central Committee plenum on August 4, 1961, and revised by the 24th CPSU Congress, April 9, 1971. Revised and readopted at the 27th CPSU Congress, February/March 1986. Emphases added.)

<sup>4</sup> The equal-responsibility doctrine also has affected Soviet relations with certain nonruling communist parties (i.e., the Italian and Japanese) critical of Soviet policies in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. Leading Soviet theoreticians and ideologists have criticized these and other parties for their reluctance to join in the U.S.S.R.'s "struggle for peace" and for their failure to recognize the significance of large and newly activated antiwar groups. To some extent, these same officials also have attributed the weakening of the international communist movement to a failure among these communist parties to counter effectively the notion of equal responsibility. Recently, Soviet journals have made reference to the seventh Comintern Congress (July-August 1935), at which the "popular front" strategy was developed. The strategy was to be a reminder to communist parties that collaboration with sometime opponents in the face of the "imperialist" threat was more important than polemics over strategy and tactics. To this end, the Soviets and their allies have been promoting a meeting of the world's communist parties to develop a common approach to what the Soviets refer to as "issues of war and peace." Romanian President Ceausescu, in an address on May 13, 1987, to a

gathering of Soviet-bloc Central Committee secretaries in Bucharest, called for such a meeting (*Scinteia*, May 14); his proposal was promptly rejected by Italian Communist Party international affairs chief Antonio Rubbi, who called it "not only untimely but clearly inadequate" (Rome ANSA, May 16, 1987).

<sup>5</sup> The Soviet Peace Committee works on behalf of the CPSU International Department, which directs the activities of pro-Soviet communist parties, international front groups (as well as their local affiliates), and so-called national liberation movements. The ID also maintains liaison with noncommunist groups and parties. Headed by Anatoliy Dobrynin, the ID plays a prominent role in Soviet active measures activities in coordination with the Committee for State Security (KGB). Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the ID and a specialist in European communist parties, occupies a central position in the Soviet active measures apparatus.

<sup>6</sup> For more Soviet-supplied information on the Soviet Peace Committee, see *Pravda*, November 30, 1982; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 26, 1982; and *New Times*, No. 24, 1982.

<sup>7</sup> Zhukov is a member of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Parliamentary Group, and a deputy chairman of the U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Friendship Society. He continues to write for the CPSU daily *Pravda*.

<sup>8</sup> These public organizations include the Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations, Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and

African Countries, Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Latin American Peoples, Soviet Committee of War Veterans, and Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

<sup>9</sup> For more information, see *Foreign Affairs Note*, "Soviet Active Measures: The Christian Peace Conference," U.S. Department of State, May 1985.

<sup>10</sup> The "withdrawal" of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan on October 15, 1986, just three weeks before the annual UN General Assembly vote on the Soviet occupation, was a deliberate deception intended to manipulate international perceptions of Soviet policy on a sensitive political and military issue. This deception is detailed in Chapter VII.

<sup>11</sup> As if to underscore the necessity for Zhukov's March 6 removal from the Soviet Peace Committee chairmanship, *Pravda* ran a lead editorial on March 7 urging that party cadre selected for leading posts on party committees and other bodies have the "best professional, ideological, and moral qualities." The editorial warned against "comrades" who "try to do too much at once," "see nothing through to the end," and "embark on the path of violating the requirements of the party statutes, the Leninist work style, and the norms of our life."

<sup>12</sup> Chetverikov discussed the functions of the Copyright Agency in *New Times* (No. 30, 1986); he stressed it was "particularly important" for the agency to "expose the aggressive policies and myths created by bourgeois propaganda."



## Appendix A

### Moscow's View of the Peace Movement

Authoritative Soviet writings and speeches make clear that the global peace movement is a decisive element in what Moscow sees as the overall balance of international political, military, ideological, and social forces and that it is a powerful source of opposition to Western policies. Gorbachev expressed his views clearly on this subject during the course of several CPSU Central Committee plenums staged to discuss preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress (Moscow, February-March 1986).

For example, soon after he became General Secretary, Gorbachev told one such gathering (April 23, 1985) that peace-loving forces were uniting "ever more closely" and praised the role of antiwar and antinuclear movements, as well as that of "progressive, democratic detachments"—Moscow's euphemism for the Soviet-backed front groups (*Pravda*, April 24, 1985). His sentiment was echoed subsequently by KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov who, in a report to the annual Great October Socialist Revolution celebration in the Kremlin on November 6, 1985, praised both the antiwar movement, "unprecedented in its scope and mass character"—"public organizations" for actively supporting the peace struggle (*Pravda*, November 7, 1985).

Calls for pursuit of a pro-peace, "popular front" strategy were reiterated at the 27th CPSU Congress in Moscow (February-March, 1986). In his CPSU Central Committee political report to the session, Gorbachev made several references to the need for unity in the antiwar movement and urged cooperation between noncommunist peace activists and Soviet peace organizations. He declared that the cause of socialism was advanced by the "growth of the new massive democratic movement[s] of our time, including the antiwar and antinuclear movement."

He expanded this idea by singling out the "rise of mass democratic and antiwar movements" as a "powerful counterweight to the aggressive policies of imperialism" (*Pravda*, February 26, 1986). The CPSU program adopted at the congress further emphasized Soviet views on the role of the peace movements in the "struggle for peace," declaring that the "antiwar movements of the broadest peoples' masses on all continents" had become a "long-term and influential factor of public life" (*Pravda*, March 7, 1986).\*

In April 1986, then-Soviet Peace Committee Chairman Zhukov explained in International Affairs that the role of antiwar movements was stressed in the program because it had a "significant effect on global developments." Zhukov underscored the importance Moscow attached to the movements when he noted that the traditional three "main forces" of "international development" (traditionally referred to in Soviet ideological writings as the "world revolutionary process")—the socialist countries, the international communist movement, and the developing countries—had been joined by a "fourth force," the "international democratic peace movement," including religious organizations and pacifist groups uniting scientists and physicians.

\* The language enshrined as party doctrine in the new party program approved at the 27th CPSU Congress was the result of long and difficult negotiations and debate directly involving the top party leadership. The need to revise and update the last party program, approved under Nikita Khrushchev in 1961, provided the impetus for the new draft. The CPSU has rewritten the party program only three times since the founding of the party in 1903.

## Appendix B

### Soviet Subversion of the Peace Movement

#### Expulsions

In October 1981, Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB case officer working under the guise of Soviet Embassy second secretary in Copenhagen, was expelled from Denmark. He had arranged through a local KGB agent of influence to have some 150 Danish artists sign an "appeal" for a Nordic nuclear-weapons free zone. He also had supplied funds to have the appeal placed as an advertisement in a number of local newspapers. Merkulov often visited the headquarters of the Danish Committee for European Security and Cooperation, an affiliate of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (see Appendix G).

In another highly publicized case, on April 29, 1983, Switzerland closed the U.S.S.R.'s Bern-based Novosti (APN) press bureau and expelled its director, Alexi Dumov, for the "political and ideological indoctrination" of members of the Swiss peace movement and for planning anti-U.S. street demonstrations.\*

#### Visa Denials

On February 11, 1983, the Danish press reported that Alexander Kislov—identified as an instructor at the U.S.A.-Canada Institute in Moscow and a member of the Soviet Peace Committee—was denied an entry visa to visit Denmark. He was to have addressed 23 peace meetings throughout the country from February 19 through March 6, 1983. Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was quoted as saying that "the refusal to grant the visa is based on a concrete assessment of the person in question, and it is not the first time that we have refused to grant him an entry visa to Denmark." \*\*

\* For more information, see U.S. Department of State *Foreign Affairs Note*, "Expulsions of Soviet Officials, 1986," January 1987. Soviet Peace Committee chairman Borovik is a prominent Novosti political commentator.

\*\* In June 1986, Kislov was promoted to deputy director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations, headed by Soviet Peace Committee first vice-president Primakov.

## Appendix C

### Profile of Genrikh Borovik

Genrikh Borovik, age 56, is a native of the Belorussian Republic and an English-speaking graduate of the Moscow Institute of International Relations. From 1965 until 1982, he served as a Novosti reporter, alternating between Novosti's editorial board in Moscow and its New York bureau. Since 1982, Borovik has remained in Moscow as a Novosti political commentator. He was identified during a recent London libel trial as a former agent during the 1960s in the Tenth Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, responsible for recruiting foreign journalists.\* Borovik has retained close ties to the KGB through his brother-in-law, Vladimir Kruchkov, head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, which is responsible for all Soviet intelligence activities abroad.



Borovik takes a hard line on a range of international issues; a harsh xenophobia has consistently characterized his print and television commentary. Since 1980, he has leveled numerous personal attacks on U.S. officials. On occasion, he has censured the U.S. press and film industry for "distortions" of Soviet policies and has defended such controversial issues as the September 1983 Soviet shutdown of a Korean airliner.\*\* Borovik scripted a television program, aired in the U.S.S.R. in January 1983, on the "crimes" of the CIA and in September 1986 conducted a lengthy interview on Soviet TV with American defector Edward Lee Howard, a media event that certainly had the KGB's approval. Speaking to an All-Union ideological conference in Moscow (December 10-11, 1984), Borovik urged "greater ideological aggressiveness" to counter Western "misperceptions" of Soviet policies.\*\*\*

Moscow television (March 18) screened a videotaped report by Borovik, who had returned from a mid-March, 1987 visit to Afghanistan to report on the war and to interview Afghan Communist Party leader Najibullah. Speaking "on behalf" of the Soviet Peace Committee, he blamed the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan on the U.S. and asked "writers, journalists, and scientists, actors, directors, and religious figures" to "put pressure" on the U.S. Government to stop the war in Afghanistan.

\* Details of Borovik's intelligence connections were revealed in testimony during a recent eight-week trial in London's High Court. A libel suit we brought against *The Economist* magazine's *Foreign Report* newsletter by Greece's most popular daily newspaper, *To Ethnos*, because the *Foreign Report* accused it of being a Soviet propaganda mouthpiece. See the *Wall Street Journal*, April 15, 1987, p. 35, and *The Economist*, April 18, 1987, pp. 19-22. For details on KGB organization see *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents*, John Barron, Readers Digest Press, 1974, pp. 95-126.

\*\* See his review of a book by Konstantin Chernenko defending Soviet human rights policies (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 9, 1981); criticism of U.S. policy toward Poland (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, December 23, 1981); attacks on President Reagan (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, February 28, 1982; *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, March 7, 1982); and his criticism of U.S. newspapers, television and radio stations for spreading "anti-Soviet propaganda" (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, December 22, 1985).

\*\*\* See *The Perfection of Developed Socialism and the Ideological Work of the Party in Light of the Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June 1983 Plenum; Materials From a Moscow 10-11 December 1984 All-Union Scientific Practical Conference*, edited by former CPSU propaganda secretary Boris Stukalin, *Politicheskaya Literatura*, Moscow, 1984.

## Appendix D

### A Sampling of Soviet Peace Committee Activity

#### 1982: The Swedish Peace March

In July, Moscow granted permission for 300 independent Scandinavian peace activists to stage a march across the northern U.S.S.R. As part of the march, the Soviet Peace Committee organized a rally on July 28 at the Khatyn war memorial near Minsk in Belorussia. According to the Copenhagen daily *Berlingske Tidende* (July 29, 1982), one-third of the Scandinavian marchers refused to participate because of the similarity of the name Khatyn to that of the village of Katyn near Smolensk, where thousands of Polish officers were believed to have been executed by the Soviets in 1940.

When the rally took place despite the Nordic visitors' protests, a representative of the Swedish Christian Peace Movement raised the Katyn issue publicly. Zhukov, the principal Soviet official present, was described as "infuriated." He reportedly seized the microphone from the activist, announced that the executions had been carried out by the Nazis, and asserted that anybody who insisted on reviving the issue was using "Goebbels propaganda" to conduct "psychological warfare" against the Soviet Union. Some marchers complained that their public statements had been altered in the Soviet press to eliminate criticism of Moscow and add an anti-U.S. tone.

#### 1982-83: The Zhukov Letter

In an effort to blunt subsequent communist and noncommunist criticism of Soviet policies, Zhukov met in October 1982 in Moscow with Western organizers of the second annual European Disarmament Conference—a pan-European peace gathering then scheduled to be held May 9-15, 1983, in West Berlin (sponsored by the committee for European Nuclear Disarmament—END), in which Moscow was considering participating. The session apparently was stormy and led Zhukov in early 1983 to send a highly critical letter to the organizers; copies of it were sent to hundreds of other European peace activists. The letter revealed that during their meeting in Moscow, the conference organizers had refused to accede to Zhukov's request to make criticism of NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployments the sole focus of the session (see excerpts below).

END was criticized further for supporting the "equal responsibility" concept and for favoring ties with unofficial dissident peace movements in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. In the end, the Soviet Peace Committee and the World Peace Council boycotted the convention, and unofficial Soviet-bloc peace activists were not allowed to attend.\*

\* Soviet intransigence on the issue of cooperation with noncommunist activists critical of Soviet policies apparently had a domestic impact. During officially organized peace protests in the U.S.S.R. during 1983-84, "differences" and "a number of problems" emerged among the participants, particularly concerning the "forms of the movement, organizing methods, and search for new ways of antimilitarist propaganda." These problems were "by no means easy to solve," according to Pyotr Fedoseyev (*20th Century and Peace*, No. 2, 1985).

#### 1984: The Third European Disarmament Conference

Unlike the 1983 conference in West Berlin, Soviet Peace Committee and WPC representatives attended this gathering, staged July 17-21 in Perugia, Italy. Approximately 1,500 independent activists attended the conclave, which opened with a demonstration protesting the denial by communist authorities of exit visas to 59 "unofficial" Soviet and East European activists who were invited to Perugia (59 seats were left symbolically empty).

Two days into the convention, an Soviet Peace Committee press conference was interrupted by outbreaks of "shouting, bursts of laughter, and protests," according to the *Milan Corriere Della Sera* (July 20). Soviet Peace Committee delegate Grigoriy Lokshin's explanation of the origins and positions of the Soviet Peace Committee (a "totally independent and democratically elected" movement) was greeted with boos. Sylin, in reply to persistent questions as to why the Soviet Peace Committee approved of Soviet SS-20 counter-deployments and had never criticized Soviet policies, said there were no differences between the Soviet Government and the people. "Public opinion and

official opinion are the same in our society," he said to laughter. "They are always the same. We have ways of establishing this link." (*New York Times*, July 20)

## Excerpts From the Zhukov Letter, January 1983

"...1983 is the year in which deployment of American missiles in Western Europe is to commence. For this reason, we think, this year will be an especially responsible and in a sense crucial period in the struggle against this threat to peace and European security.

"At the same time, one must not overlook the fact that the adversaries of the forces of peace have intensified their activities by leaps and bounds. They are making every effort to neutralize the peace movement, to lead it astray and to guide its membership in wrong directions. Until now, the peace activists in East and West—independent of their inclinations, their movements and the organizations they represent—have always discarded their ideological differences whenever it was a matter of closing ranks in the interest of peace and disarmament. It is easy to imagine how much these joint actions would lose in the way of effectiveness, if splits and discords were to arise within the peace movements as a result of these differences.

"In this connection, discussions initiated by individuals and groups are a cause for concern. In the final analysis, their aim is to split the peace movement throughout the world so as to transform the forums of the peace activists into arenas of open ideological controversy and to replace the most important task which unites all mankind—that of preventing nuclear war—by a debate about issues which have nothing to do with this task.

"The leaders of the Russell Foundation and of the movement for European nuclear disarmament are...continuing to hold to their premise of 'equal responsibility.' We are firmly convinced of the fact that this premise serves to mislead and thereby to weaken and undermine the peace movement and that it is aimed at justifying the aggressive, militaristic policies of the United States and of NATO.

"When asked about the participation of the peace committees of the socialist countries, the representatives of the West Berlin working group made it abundantly clear that this issue could to all intents and purposes not be resolved within the framework of the liaison committee. How then do they propose to initiate an East-West dialogue at the conference? They have told us that they plan to extend personal invitations to some personages of their own choosing in the socialist countries as 'private individuals' and to extend mere observer status to them. This proves to us that the conference organizers are afraid of genuine opponents and that they therefore wish to exclude the legitimate popular representatives of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries so as to be better able to conduct anti-socialist propaganda.

"We feel that the thrust of the conference as envisaged by the organizers and the way it is being prepared tend to make a true and promising European dialogue impossible—one that would promote joint action by the forces of peace and that would be so badly needed in the present unsettled state of international affairs. On the contrary—this can only act as an incentive to the 'cold warriors' to sow discord among the anti-war activists in Europe so as to halt their advance. It is self-evident that we will not participate in this questionable enterprise." (*Tageszeitung*, January 4, 1983)

## Excerpts From the END Reply to the Zhukov Letter (1/83)

"In his letter, Mr. Yuriy Zhukov, the president of the Soviet peace committee, accuses us of aiming to confuse, demobilize and undermine the anti-war movement and to justify the aggressive, militaristic policies of the United States and of NATO.

"The Berlin conference will bring together most, if not all, of the independent peace movements and we must insist on their having a right to follow their own agenda without having to ask other groups for permission which are beholden to one of the parties concerned. Of course all peace movements will wish to speak with representatives of the Soviet and East European peace movements even though they will be supporting the policies of their respective governments. Mr. Zhukov says we are 'afraid of genuine opponents appearing' at our meetings. But he has already received an invitation to the Berlin conference on the same basis as all the other peace movements which supported the original call for European nuclear disarmament in April 1980. Speaking for the Russell Foundation: We would welcome a debate with Mr. Zhukov in any appropriate forum or would also exchange views with him in writing." (Ken Coates, Liaison committee secretary, *Tageszeitung*, January 4, 1983)

## Appendix E

### Targeting Scientists

The Scientific Council on Research on the Problems of Peace and Disarmament (SCRPPD) was created in 1979. It is financed by the Soviet Peace Committee—with the cooperation of the State Committee for Science and Technology and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences—for the "scientific elaboration of the questions of peace and the antiwar movement," according to Zhukov.\*

The SCRPPD today is one of several Soviet domestic organizations designed to facilitate contact between Soviet scientists and their professional counterparts in the West as well as to attract the latter to Soviet-sponsored conferences. Like the Soviet Peace Committee, these organizations are controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and receive their guidance from it as well as from subsidiary bodies responsible for influencing mass social movements in the West. These groups support the World Federation of Scientific Workers, another Soviet-backed front with headquarters in London and Paris.

Headed by U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences vice president Pyotr Fedoseyev,\*\* the SCRPPD publishes and disseminates foreign-language books and pamphlets on controversial political and military subjects. These "studies," published in Russian, English, French, German, and Spanish, invariably draw on what the Soviets label "objective, scientific analysis" to discredit the equal-responsibility doctrine and "scientifically substantiate" that the United States and NATO countries are solely responsible for the world's tensions. Soviet Peace Fund secretary T. Grigoryev admitted that fund support enables the SCRPPD to produce "antiwar movies, posters and badges" as well as books and brochures on "antiwar topics" (*Argumenty i fakty*, No. 15, April 8, 1986).

The series' editorial board includes Georgiy Arbatov, Nikolay Blokhin, Yevgeniy Primakov, Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, and Aleksandr Yakovlev, all of whom have strong connections to the CPSU (Yakovlev is CPSU propaganda secretary), the Soviet Peace Committee, and/or various Soviet international front organizations, including the WPC.

\* From a January 23, 1985, speech by Zhukov to an Soviet Peace Committee All-Union Conference of Peace Champions (*20th Century and Peace*, No. 3, 1985).

\*\* Fedoseyev is a prominent academician, first vice-president for social sciences at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, and a board member of the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Science and Technology. He has campaigned actively to dissuade scientists abroad from criticizing Soviet policies. See *20th Century and Peace*, No. 2, 1985.

The SCRPPD's publications activity recently has come under criticism. *Kommunist* No. 16, 1986, noted the absence of an "efficient schedule" for SCRPPD publications, declared some to be "excessively academic and meaningless, repetitive and stylistically dull. . . . Readers have a right to expect of such a highly skilled and prestigious group of authors more original materials, substantiated conclusions and daring forecasts."

## Appendix F

### Selected Soviet Peace Committee Members\*

#### President

*Genrikh A. Borovik.* Novosti journalist; editor in chief of *Theater* magazine; secretary of the board of the U.S.S.R. Writers' Union; member of the board of the Soviet Copyright Agency; WPC first vice-president.

#### First Vice Presidents

*Yevgeniy M. Primakov.* Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations; WPC vice-president.

*Vladimir N. Orel.* Academician; head of a section in the International Department; former first secretary at the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Prague (1969-73).

#### Vice-Presidents

*Anatoliy A. Anan'yev.* Editor in Chief, *October* magazine; WPC member.

*Alida-Viya F. Artmane.* Actress; People's Artist of the U.S.S.R.; member, Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation; WPC member.

*Viktor V. Dementsev.* CPSU Central Committee candidate member; chairman of the board, U.S.S.R. State Bank.

*Yevgeniy A. Dolmatovskiy.* Professor at the Gorky Literature Institute; WPC member.

*Aleksandr T. Gonchar.* CPSU Central Committee candidate member; president, Ukrainian Peace Committee; WPC member.

*Igor O. Gorbachev.* Artistic Director, Leningrad Pushkin Theater; People's Artist of the U.S.S.R.; WPC member.

*Alla G. Masevich.* Deputy chairman, U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Society; WPC member.

*Vikenty A. Matveyev.* Journalist; deputy chairman, U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Society; WPC member.

*Pavel A. Naumov.* Deputy chairman, U.S.S.R. Journalists' Union.\*\*

*Mirgiyas A. Zaidov.* Chairman, Uzbek Republic committee for labor and social affairs; president, Uzbek peace committee; Uzbek Supreme Soviet deputy; WPC member.

*Vitaliy V. Zhurkin.* Deputy chairman, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences U.S.A./Canada Institute; WPC member.

\* The names on this list were derived from various Soviet and WPC publications and should not be considered complete.

\*\* Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former deputy general secretary of the U.S.S.R. Journalists' Union who defected to the United Kingdom in 1980, recently identified the union as a KGB-run operation. See *The Economist*, April 18, 1987, pp. 19-22.

#### Other Presidium Members

*Georgiy A. Arbatov.* Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences U.S.A./Canada Institute and a WPC member; CPSU Central Committee member.

*Alevtina V. Fedulova.* Soviet Peace Committee executive secretary; WPC member.

*Anatoliy Y. Karpov.* President, Soviet Peace Fund.

*Izzat N. Klychev.* President of the Turkmen Peace Committee; U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet deputy; WPC member.

*Vitaliy G. Korionov.* Journalist.

*Zinaida M. Kruglova.* CPSU Central Committee member; chairperson, Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries; WPC member.

*Vladimir N. Kudryavtsev.* Deputy chairman of the Soviet Sociological Association; Presidium member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; director of the Academy's State and Law Institute; WPC member.

*Vladimir P. Maslin.* First vice-president, Soviet Peace Fund; deputy chairman, Znaniye [Knowledge] Society; chairman, U.S.S.R.-Laos Society; WPC member.

*Stepan A. Shalayev.* Chairman of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; CPSU Central Committee member; Supreme Soviet member; WPC member.

*Tair F. Tairov.* Professor; U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations; WPC Secretariat member.

*Valentina V. Tereshkova.* Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Committee of Soviet Women; former cosmonaut; CPSU Central Committee member; Supreme Soviet member; WPC member.

*Timur T. Timofeyev.* Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences International Labor Institute; vice-chairman of the Scientific Council on Research of Problems of Peace and Disarmament; member, Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

#### Other Members

*Andrey A. Kokoshin.* Deputy Director, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences U.S.A./Canada Institute; vice-president, Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against Nuclear War; WPC member.

*I. E. Maloshenko.* Secretary, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences U.S.A./Canada Institute; WPC member.

## Appendix G

### The International Committee for European Security and Cooperation

The ICESC, headquartered in Brussels, was formed in 1968, purportedly to promote the work of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It staged its first large "public" assembly four years later, June 2-5, 1972, in Brussels, just after an "expanded session" of the WPC Presidential Committee (May 24-25, also in Brussels).

Some 1,000 delegates from 28 countries attended, the majority from Eastern Europe. The WPC was represented by its president, Indian Communist Party member Romesh Chandra, plus four other WPC Presidential Committee members, as well as two WPC secretaries. Most of the other Soviet-backed fronts were represented at the initial ICESC assembly, including the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions, the Budapest-based World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Prague-based International Union of Students, the East Berlin-based Women's International Democratic Federation, the Paris/London-based World Federation of Scientific Workers, and the Prague-based

International Organization of Journalists. A WPC message sent to the assembly expressed "full support" and looked forward to "continued and growing cooperation with all organizations and individuals interested in promoting European security and cooperation, in the work which must assuredly follow this great assembly."

The ICESC has approximately 31 affiliates located in East and West European countries, as well as in the United States, U.S.S.R., Canada, and West Berlin. According to a 1979 ICESC brochure, the purpose of the organization is to "inform large areas of the public" about "everything connected with the CSCE's cause, the process of detente, and the extension of peaceful coexistence between states of Europe with different social and economic systems." To achieve this goal, the ICESC "coordinates the action of its own national committees, circles, and forums, as well as other gatherings of public opinion. . . ."

ICESC national affiliates are believed to work closely with their locally based WPC counterparts. An article in *International Affairs* (June 1983) listed the ICESC along with the WPC, World Federation of Trade Unions, International Organization of Journalists, and other fronts as yet another organization that "convincingly demonstrates the growing role of the public peace forces in Europe opposing the militarist designs of the U.S. and NATO." Moreover, as of 1982, at least 16 ICESC affiliates were known to include members who belonged simultaneously to their national WPC branches. "Dual membership" cases at that time were found in Belgium, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Today, at least two Soviet members of the Moscow-based Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation (SCESC), headed by CPSU Central Committee member Lev Tolkunov, simultaneously are members of the Soviet Peace Committee.

Five years ago, ID first deputy chief Vadim Zagladin inadvertently acknowledged that the U.S.S.R., through the Soviet Peace Fund, finances the work of the ICESC's affiliates. In an interview with the Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung* (May 21, 1982), he discussed Moscow's view of the European peace movement and explained how Soviet peace activities mesh with those in Europe:

We highly appreciate the [European] peace movement as an expression of the people's will to prevent war. We understand this and we would like to support this cause and this will. . . . We also have a mass peace movement, but it expresses itself in other forms. . . . Our young people are now writing letters to Brussels, to the NATO organizations. Over 6 million youths have written such letters. Although May 9 was an official holiday, several working brigades came to work and collected all the money they had earned for the Soviet Peace Fund.

In response to the interviewer's question "What did they do with the money?" Zagladin stated:

You have several peace committees for European security. They are printing newspapers, and all Soviet participants in peace demonstrations here in Vienna, Amsterdam or Brussels are being paid with the money from this fund.

Last year, Soviet Peace Fund chairman Anatoliy Karpov told *New Times* (No. 18, 1986) that the fund finances the SCESC.

## Appendix H

### The Question of Soviet Peace Committee Legitimacy

SCRPPD chairman Fedoseyev, writing in the journal *World Economy and International Relations* (February 1985), blamed the Soviet Peace Committee's alienation on skepticism in the West about the Soviet Peace Committee's legitimacy. Fedoseyev expressed irritation that discussion in the West had turned increasingly to the question of which peace organizations in the East represented "real" antiwar movements and which did not; which could be considered "good and independent" and which should be considered "bad and official." He criticized "certain subversive forces" in the Western antiwar movement for seeking to legitimize unofficial Soviet peace activists, an act that constituted what Fedoseyev called "undermining the socialist system from within." Fedoseyev urged Western pacifists to perceive the sources of the growing threat of war "correctly" and urged them to overcome "prejudices and incorrect ideas" about the Soviet Peace Committee.

Five months later, then-Soviet Peace Committee chairman Zhukov accused antiwar activists in Europe of acting in a "freewheeling and disassociated fashion without coordination" and admitted that in the past it was at times impossible for Soviet Peace Committee officials to carry out actions jointly with them (*International Affairs*, July 1985).

A subsequent article by Zhukov (*International Affairs*, April 1986) discussed: the Soviet Peace Committee's inability to establish working relationships with "inexperienced, amorphous and poorly organized" antiwar groups in the West who were "infected with the virus of anti-Sovietism"; education of peace activists who misinterpret Soviet policies because they either are poorly informed or are afraid of being labeled Soviet agents; and the withdrawal of pro-Soviet peace organizations, tainted because of their association with the WPC, from the antiwar struggle.



## Chapter IV

# Recent Anti-American Forgeries

Forged documents continue to be used by the Soviets and others to disrupt and undercut U.S. policies, sow suspicion about U.S. intentions, and undermine U.S. international relations. This paper examines six recent forgeries.<sup>1</sup> Each possesses features—including blatant distortions of fact, linguistic and textual inconsistencies, and error in format—similar and complementary to other forged documents believed manufactured by the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Authorship of at least one forgery can be traced directly to the Soviet bloc. The phony documents are:

- A bogus National Security Council (NSC) memorandum detailing alleged global U.S. foreign policy strategy for the period 1985-88, noting, in particular, alleged U.S. pursuit of a "first-strike" nuclear capability;

- A purported statement on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger at a "confidential" Department of Defense meeting falsely said to have taken place November 25, 1983;

- A forged letter to U.S. Senator David Durenberger from a United States Information Agency (USIA) official prescribing a USIA campaign to exaggerate the negative European media coverage of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident;

- A fake Zairian national intelligence service memorandum linking U.S. Embassy personnel in Zaire to four commando training camps for dissidents from Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Sudan, and Uganda;

- A bogus U.S. State Department cable informing U.S. officials that the Turkish Cypriots intended to issue a unilateral declaration of independence (they did so on November 15, 1983), implying advance notice of the declaration; and

- A forged memorandum from President Reagan to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency urging the establishment of "Inter-American Permanent Peace Forces."

Although the six recently surfaced forgeries appear targeted at specific foreign audiences and interest groups, they share one consistent underlying theme: The U.S. will carry out foreign political, military, and economic activities in

complete disregard of foreign public opinion and often at the expense of its allies around the world.

## Background

Forgeries are an effective means of spreading disinformation. Even when careful analysis exposes the forgery, refutation of a document not only fails to generate as much interest as the forgery itself but also rarely offsets the damage done by the initial surfacing of the document.

Several factors increase the likelihood that a forgery will enjoy some degree of credibility. One of the most important is that forgeries are often built around actual—and generally controversial—current events or issues (two fabricated documents examined below were intended to exacerbate debate over SDI, for example). Other forgeries are designed to reinforce popular prejudices and misconceptions and are targeted at an audience predisposed to believe them.

Not all forgeries are intended for broad public dissemination. The "silent" forgery—an unpublicized fabrication aimed at a specific foreign government official, for example—can be especially damaging because the victim may never know of its existence and therefore is unable to refute it.

Even though the source of most forgeries cannot be absolutely determined, content analysis in many cases has revealed that they serve Soviet or Soviet-bloc interests. Among the best evidence available to the U.S. Government that the Soviet Union is a source of forgeries are statements of numerous Soviet-bloc intelligence operatives who have defected to the West. They have detailed how the U.S.S.R. and its allies use forgeries to discredit the policies of Western governments.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet media receptivity to stories based on forgeries may be another indicator of Soviet complicity. Repetition of spurious or falsely attributed information is a well-known Soviet propaganda technique; Moscow may refer repeatedly to the initial forgery without mentioning that it already has been exposed as a fabrication. If the Soviet story is then picked up by the Western wire services and replayed in other media, the initial damage can be greatly multiplied.

## The "NSC Policy Paper"

This forgery purports to outline global U.S. foreign political and military strategy between 1985 and 1988. "Strategic domination" over the Soviet Union—in which development of SDI is alleged to play a central role—is depicted as the over-arching goal under which other U.S. objectives (for example, the "integration" of Swiss, Austrian, and Swedish national resources into the NATO framework and the "neutralization" of local discussions concerning nuclear-free zones) are subsumed.

Significantly, the forgery lacks any identifying symbols or classification markings; each page of such a document, if genuine, would have been highly classified. The paper's format is simple and direct: a region-by-region breakdown (the U.S.S.R., Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific, China, the Middle East, and Africa). Misrepresentation and distortion are carefully blended in a manner designed to offend governments and peoples in those areas.

Because it is so detailed and comprehensive in scope, the document seems designed to lend credibility to numerous misrepresentations of U.S. policy that have surfaced since the late 1950s in other forgeries in various parts of the world. It also reinforces many themes carried over the years in Soviet and Soviet-bloc propaganda and promoted by Soviet-sponsored front organizations. Its topical breadth and relative professionalism increase the chances that the entire forgery or parts thereof may reappear in other regions of the world, even though the U.S. Government has repudiated it.

A portion of the forgery surfaced in the Nigerian weekly *African Guardian*, June 5, 1986. It was first publicly identified as a fabrication at a State Department press conference on August 29, 1986.

## The "Weinberger Report"

This fabrication purports to be a statement on SDI made by Defense Secretary Weinberger at an unidentified "confidential" Pentagon meeting November 25, 1983. In fact, the Secretary neither made such a speech nor did he ever make the statements attributed to him. No such meeting ever took place. According to the document (which contains no classification markings and is not presented in a normal format for a U.S. Government document), military "measures" adopted by the United States since 1981 are said to have laid a firm foundation for achieving "prevalence over the Soviet Union" (a misuse of the word prevalence, if "superiority" was intended) and allegedly will prevent the development of

"unfavorable tendencies" within the NATO Alliance.

Moreover, SDI is portrayed as an "offensive" system that will give the U.S. "incontestable superiority" and the ability to "threaten the Soviet Union with a knock-out blow."<sup>3</sup> In one paragraph in the document, the Secretary implies that the U.S.S.R. has not been engaged in its own space-based strategic defense system; in fact, Weinberger, the President, and other U.S. spokesmen have pointed out repeatedly that Soviet scientists have been at work on such a project since 1968.<sup>4</sup>

The Weinberger forgery seems designed to persuade European public opinion that the objectives behind U.S. development of a space-based strategic defense system are to allow the U.S. to gain military superiority over the U.S.S.R. and to dominate its NATO Allies. Both themes also are evident in the fake NSC policy paper discussed above, suggesting that the two forgeries may have been intended to reinforce one another.

The document originally was given to a West German journalist who asked U.S. officials to verify its authenticity. U.S. Ambassador to Bonn Richard Burt first publicized the forgery July 29, 1986 in an interview with the West German daily *Bild Zeitung*.

## USIA "Letter" to Senator Durenberger

The fabricated letter, which lacks any classification markings, outlines a purported USIA plan to disseminate rumors about events in the Soviet Union in the wake of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This forgery is detailed in the chapter in this volume on "Soviet Active Measures in the United States." The forgery suggests that "our associates in European information media" spread exaggerated reports alleging that the number of victims be estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000.

This forgery is designed to cause damage to public perceptions of the U.S. in two regards: it seeks to demonstrate to European audiences an alleged U.S. intent to manipulate European media and public opinion; and, it attempts to discredit the United States by displaying apparent U.S. willingness, only one day after the accident was reported by TASS, to make false and exaggerated claims about the extent of the nuclear disaster. This served to "verify" Soviet charges following the accident of U.S. designs to defame the U.S.S.R.<sup>5</sup>

The forgery surfaced in Washington, DC in August, 1986 and was reported as a forgery in the *Washington Post* on August 19. In this case, the origin of the forgery is traceable to the Soviet bloc.

The letterhead and signature block of the forgery were taken from an authentic copy of a letter, having nothing to do with Chernobyl, written by a USIA official. This copy of a letter had been made available to a Czechoslovak diplomat after being uniquely marked. When the forgery surfaced in August 1986, it carried the unique marking, making it clear that the exemplar for the forgery was the letter that had been provided to the Czechoslovak diplomat. The diplomat later admitted sending the letter he had been given to Prague.

## "Intelligence Service Memorandum"

This forgery purports to be a Zairian national intelligence service memorandum from Zairian intelligence chief Telinderame Zabua to Zairian President Mobutu's special adviser. The bogus memo reports on the status of four commando training camps for dissidents from Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Sudan, and Uganda and notes that three U.S. Embassy personnel plan to visit the bases in the near future. The apparent purpose of the document is to implicate the United States and Zaire in efforts to undermine other African countries and to focus negative attention on Zaire's relations with the United States.

The forgery was carefully prepared, and there are no distinct flaws in the format or text. Some key discrepancies label the document a forgery, however. The most important is the use of the agency title "National Intelligence Service," a designation that was changed in 1983 to "National Documentation Agency." This was two full years before the alleged intelligence memo was signed. Also significant is the fact that the supposed signatory, Telindepame Zabua, who was posted in Moscow at the time he allegedly signed the document, did not return to Zaire until 1986.

The forgery first appeared in the independent news magazine *African Concord* (April 28, 1987). The article in which it appeared was written well and appears authoritative. The winter/spring 1987 issue of the U.S. left-wing magazine *Breakthrough* also did an article based on the forgery. The latter article included a picture of the fake memorandum.

## "State Department Cable"

This forgery is purportedly the text of a U.S. Department of State cable dated November 10, 1983. It informs U.S. officials that the Turkish Cypriots will soon issue a unilateral declaration of independence (they did so on November 15, 1983). In the forgery, the U.S. Ambassador is instructed to

condemn the declaration of independence and call for a just solution to the Cyprus issue. He also is asked for his opinion on the consequences of the Turkish Cypriot action, and the cable notes that the new "self-declared state" could serve as an alternative to Greece should Greece decide to leave NATO and close U.S. bases on its territory. The Embassy is instructed, given "the global U.S. interests in the area," to maintain good relations with the "Denktash regime." (Rauf Denktash is the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.) Only the text of the bogus cable has surfaced; no actual copy has ever appeared.

The purpose of this forgery apparently is to attempt to show that the United States knew in advance of Turkish Cypriot intentions to establish an independent country and, while hypocritically condemning the action, was in fact interested in the new state as a possible site for a military base.

The text of the purported cable was published by the Athens daily *I Proti* on April 6, 1987. Although the source of the forgery is unknown, *I Proti* is owned and managed by the pro-Moscow Communist Party of Greece. The forgery surfaced:

- In the wake of the recent Aegean crisis between Greece and Turkey over seabed claims;
- One day after the Greek Communist Party daily *Rizopastis* published an interview with the Soviet Ambassador to Greece, Viktor Stukalin, who declared Soviet support for Greece in the Aegean crisis, noted Moscow's "altruistic" interest in settling the Cyprus issue, and expressed Soviet concern over "continued interventions" by "certain states" in Greece's internal affairs;
- Approximately two weeks before a conference on "Cyprus and World Peace," staged in Sofia April 21-23. The conference was opened by Indian Communist Party member Romesh Chandra, then president of the World Peace Council, a well-known Soviet front group. Chandra was described by the Bulgarian news agency as president of the "International Committee of Solidarity with Cyprus." The conference's final communique endorsed the U.S.S.R.'s January 20, 1986, Cyprus proposals and criticized Turkey's "ruling circles," which, with U.S. "support," were said to be increasing the Turkish military presence on the island.

The U.S. Embassy in Athens denounced the forgery as soon as it surfaced. As a result, it received little attention outside of the leftist media. The Embassy response to the story prompted *I Proti* and other leftist papers to accuse the Embassy of "unacceptable intervention" in "attacking" the Greek press. The leftist papers called for editorial support, but none was forthcoming other than from the leftist-controlled press.



## "Memorandum" From President Reagan

This forgery purports to be a March 10, 1983 memorandum from President Reagan to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the CIA. The forgery, playing to the nationalism and anti-U.S. sentiment of the intended audience, calls for establishing an "Inter-American Permanent Peace Force" to be used in the event U.S. interests in Latin America are threatened by "Soviet or Cuban expansionism or other antagonistic influences."

The forgery appears to be printed on White House stationery and the signature is an actual copy of the President's. There are, however, some errors in syntax, as well as errors in format that would be obvious only to anyone familiar with U.S. Government communications. Overall, the forgery is prepared well and could seem credible to the non-expert.

The document was made available anonymously to officials in a Latin American country. The United States was approached regarding the document's authenticity and quickly exposed the forgery.

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> This paper incorporates material previously published by the U.S. Department of State. See "Recent Anti-American Forgeries" (November, 1986) and "Recent Anti-American Forgeries: An Update" (July, 1987), both in the *Foreign Affairs Note* series. Copies may be obtained from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC, 20520.

<sup>2</sup> See Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game* (Ballantine: 1972); *Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive* (House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Government Printing Office: 1980); and, *Soviet Active Measures* (House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Government Printing Office: 1982). See also "Soviet Active Measures: Focus on Forgeries" (April 1983) in the *Foreign Affairs Note* series.

<sup>3</sup> An interview with then-CPSU General Secretary Yuri Andropov published in *Pravda* March 27, 1983, contains the first profile of the Soviet line on SDI: SDI is not defensive but rather part of a U.S. effort to acquire a nuclear first strike, and second, SDI damages prospects for arms control and "open(s) the floodgates of a runaway arms race." Moscow's anti-SDI propaganda campaign based on these two themes has since burgeoned and has received significant support from Soviet front organizations—principally, the World Peace Council (WPC). Recently, for example, a WPC Presidential Committee meeting staged November 30–December 2 1985, in Stockholm appealed to the world public to campaign against the "U.S. Star Wars plan" (*Neues Deutschland*, December 2, 4, 1985). On April 10 1986, the WPC published a 25-page brochure which outlined WPC objectives and referred to SDI as an "attack weapon" that would "accelerate the arms race." See *The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative*, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, August 1986, for more information.

<sup>4</sup> According to an article in the London *Financial Times*, October 16, 1986, "secret internal Soviet documents" obtained by the French Government as long ago as 1979 indicated that the Soviets were "combing the West" for technology to incorporate into development of ground-, air-, and space-based lasers. According to the *Times*, the documents speak of programs, in some cases run directly by "defense-related ministries," to produce "an effective anti-missile defense for our country." The secret documents reportedly were delivered to the French counter-intelligence service between spring 1981 and autumn 1982 by a senior KGB official, codenamed "Farewell," who worked in the KGB's Directorate "T" (science and technology), according to the London daily. See *Le Point* (Paris), January 6 and 13, 1986, for more information on "Farewell." Also, see *Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update*, U.S. Government Printing Office: September 1985, for a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet effort to acquire Western technology illegally and legally for its weapons and military equipment projects.

<sup>5</sup> For example, veteran Soviet political commentator Aleksandr Bovin alleged in the May 14 *Izvestiya* that the "tactless and crude discussions and statements" made in the West about the Chernobyl accident were designed to "provoke hostility" toward the Soviet Union. That same evening, CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev, in a television speech to the Soviet people on the Chernobyl accident, charged that the NATO countries, particularly the U.S., had seized on Chernobyl as a "pretext" to "defame" and "sow mistrust and suspicion" toward the Soviet Union and "distract the attention of the world public" from Soviet disarmament proposals.

## Chapter V

# The U.S.S.R.'s AIDS Disinformation Campaign

### Overview

In October 1985, the Soviet Union mounted an extensive campaign to convince the world that the AIDS virus (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome virus, or HIV-I) had been "manufactured" as a result of genetic engineering experiments conducted at Fort Detrick, Maryland, allegedly to develop new biological weapons. The charge that the AIDS virus could have been created artificially has been rejected by internationally renowned medical and scientific experts. This paper outlines the Soviet disinformation campaign and discusses the technical reasons why the Soviet accusations are false.

One of the most striking aspects of the campaign is the fact that eminent members of the Soviet health community consistently have supplied factual information on AIDS, stressing the natural origins of the disease and attempting to inform the Soviet public about its dangers. This stands in stark contrast to the distortions appearing elsewhere in Soviet media and indicates that Soviet statements on AIDS are being handled at two different official levels, each with differing objectives.

Disinformation alleging the "manufacture" of the AIDS virus first appeared in mid-1983 in a publication established by the Soviets in India for propaganda purposes (see Appendix A). It has since been published in or broadcast by Soviet media—on at least 32 occasions between January and June 1987—as part of Moscow's broader efforts to:

- Discredit the United States and generate anti-American sentiment abroad;
- Reinforce longstanding false Soviet propaganda charges of U.S. biological warfare activities and counter U.S. reports of Soviet violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention;<sup>1</sup>
- Undermine U.S. defense arrangements with allied countries and create pressures for the removal of U.S. military facilities overseas by linking the spread of AIDS to the presence of U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed abroad; and
- Discourage contacts with Americans (including tourists, diplomats, and businesspeople)

by demonstrating to Soviet citizens that "American imperialism" is responsible for a frightening disease that has made its way into the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.<sup>2</sup>

To lend scientific credence to its disinformation campaign, Moscow has quoted extensively from a report written by a retired East German biophysicist, Professor Jacob Segal (the report names as coauthors Segal's wife, Dr. Lilli Segal, and Dr. Ronald Dehmlow, both of East Berlin's Humboldt University). In that document, Segal attempts to demonstrate through "circumstantial evidence" that the AIDS virus was artificially synthesized at Fort Detrick in 1977 from two existing, naturally occurring viruses, VISNA and HTLV-I. Segal recently told a Moscow weekly that there was no "direct evidence" to support his claim.

The Segal theory repeatedly has been dismissed by leading Western and Soviet AIDS experts, including Dr. Luc Montagnier, director of the Paris-based Pasteur Institute's AIDS research program, and Dr. Viktor Zhdanov, the U.S.S.R.'s top AIDS expert and chief of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences Ivanovskiy Institute of Virology.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, Segal's allegations continue to circulate, primarily in Soviet, South Asian and African media.

There is no scientific foundation to Segal's "theory." The two viruses—VISNA and HTLV-I—which Segal claims were manipulated to create HIV-I share several structural properties. This enables scientists to group these viruses together as a family taxonomically. However, it is crucial to note that these viruses are biologically distinct, infecting different types of cells in different species of mammals. The genetic structure of different HIV-I isolates (individual virus particles with defined genetic makeups) corresponds to neither VISNA nor HTLV-I, particularly in the "envelope" gene. This is significant because the envelope gene defines the host species that can be infected and, in this case, facilitates the entry of the virus into humans. For these reasons, it is impossible to cut and splice portions of these two diverse retroviruses—VISNA and HTLV-I—and generate the AIDS virus as Segal claims.

Moreover, the viruses cited by Segal were not cloned and sequenced (their DNA extracted and

genetic structures determined and analyzed) until the early 1980s. This was nearly two decades after serum samples, later tested and found to contain antibody to HIV-I, were taken and well after the first reported detection of HIV-I in humans. <sup>4</sup> Scientists have never succeeded in engineering any virus without a preexisting DNA blueprint. (See Appendix B.)

Partly as a result of the U.S.S.R.'s disinformation efforts, the origin of the AIDS virus has become a controversial and politicized subject. The one issue scientists and medical experts do agree on, however, is that the virus is of natural origin. This was reaffirmed at a May 1987 high-level session of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva, in which Soviet experts participated, that urged international cooperation in fighting the disease. <sup>5</sup>

## The Origin of the AIDS Disinformation Campaign

According to the Soviets, the Indian daily newspaper *Patriot* was the original source of the charges alleging that the United States "manufactured" the AIDS virus. <sup>6</sup> A check of the *Patriot* indicated that those charges were contained in a purported letter to the editor of *Patriot*. The letter—whose existence has not been confirmed—was datelined New York and allegedly was supplied by a "well-known American scientist and anthropologist" who wished to "remain anonymous." It charged that the "deadly mysterious disease" (AIDS) was "believed to be the result of the Pentagon's experiments to develop new and dangerous biological weapons," and it implicated scientists from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia. The scientists were said to have been sent to Africa and Latin America to identify "highly pathogenic viruses" not found in Asia or Europe; the information they collected was "analyzed" at the CDC and Fort Detrick. The letter described this as the "most likely course of events" that led to the "discovery" of the AIDS virus.

The *Patriot* item appeared just as AIDS was beginning to attract the attention of the international scientific and medical communities and as a piece of disinformation, seemed intended to exacerbate anti-American sentiment in the developing world by linking the United States with what was then an unexplored public health problem. Interestingly, the *Patriot* article reiterated and alluded to longstanding Soviet charges of U.S. biological warfare activities, unrelated to the AIDS issue, that had appeared earlier in Soviet media. <sup>7</sup> (See Appendix A for more information about *Patriot*.)

## Soviet Media Pick Up the Campaign

Twenty-seven months after the publication of the letter in *Patriot*, the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, an elite cultural organ of the U.S.S.R. Writer's Union, published an article by Valentin Zapevalov entitled "Panic in the West or What is Hidden Behind the Sensation About AIDS" (October 30, 1985). The article claimed "to trace the history of AIDS and to assemble all the facts, even those that appear unimportant." Zapevalov acknowledged that he obtained most of his information from what he called the "well-respected Indian newspaper *Patriot*." Indeed, he repeated several charges almost verbatim from the pro-Soviet daily, including the assertion that "specialists at Fort Detrick," together with CDC scientists, had created the "mysterious" AIDS virus, which he, like the *Patriot*, labeled a new type of "biological weapon" (see Appendix C for information on the types of AIDS research being conducted at Fort Detrick). However, Zapevalov failed to note the original source of the charges—an anonymous letter—and the date of the publication in which he claimed it surfaced, thereby making it seem as though the *Patriot's* "revelations" had just appeared. <sup>8</sup>

After the appearance of Zapevalov's article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi met with the editor of *Patriot* and asked if such a letter had ever appeared in his publication. The editor said he could not recall having published anything on the subject that Soviet media were attributing to his paper. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi circulated this information, which was reported in newspapers in India, Bangladesh, and Brazil. Interestingly, the U.S. Embassy then received a letter from the Soviet Embassy in Bangladesh that supplied the information that the *Patriot* editor had been unable to give: July 1983 was the date the AIDS disinformation story appeared in *Patriot*.

## Similarities to Earlier Soviet Charges

Zapevalov's October 1985 article drew on propaganda themes dating back to the Korean war. For example, he implied that U.S. "creation" of the AIDS virus was yet another, albeit a more heinous and far-reaching, example of U.S. biological warfare activity in violation of existing arms control agreements.

Zapevalov's claims reinforced similar Soviet propaganda charges issued in the wake of a February 1, 1985, U.S. report that found that the

Soviet Union maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention<sup>9</sup> (see Appendix D). For example:

—Radio Moscow (March 10, 1985) accused the United States of “pushing ahead with preparation for bacteriological warfare,” citing alleged “secret Pentagon documents” from 20 years earlier;

—A Radio Moscow broadcast in English to Africa (June 10, 1985) accused the CIA of spreading dengue fever bacteria in Cuba and helping South Africa develop an “ethnic weapon” that affects only “nonwhite people”;

—On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (June 16, 1985) accused the United States of using toxic substances to develop a “superweapon” that would ensure “world hegemony”; TASS repeated the story later that day;

—TASS (August 12, 1985) repeated allegations by three British scientists who, in a 1984 book, were said to have charged the United States with “seeking various loopholes” in the 1972 Biological Warfare Convention by “creating highly pathogenic organisms. . . under the flag of medical research for protective purposes.”

—Finally, one day before publication of Zapevalov’s article, Radio Moscow (October 29, 1985) attacked a “sinister” Pentagon report detailing Soviet development of chemical weapons. The next day, Radio Moscow’s world service replayed Zapevalov’s *Literaturnaya Gazeta* charges.

Although the AIDS disinformation may have begun as an offshoot of Soviet charges of U.S. chemical and biological warfare activity, by mid-1986 it had evolved into a full-fledged disinformation campaign in its own right. A flurry of articles surfaced in the Soviet central press from April through November 1986; they alleged that the AIDS virus was engineered in a Pentagon laboratory, were replayed worldwide by TASS and Novosti, and appeared in scores of sympathetic as well as unsuspecting newspapers. (See Appendix E.)

## Purveyor of the Disinformation: Professor Jacob Segal

To provide a scientific foundation for their charge that AIDS was manmade, the Soviets have drawn on the testimony of Professor Jacob Segal, a 76-year-old East German biophysicist who retired several years ago from East Berlin’s Humboldt University.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the early and middle stages of the disinformation campaign, Soviet-bloc media repeatedly misidentified Segal as a French national, perhaps in an effort to downplay his ties to

the G.D.R. Segal, who resides in East Berlin but claims to have graduated from the Sorbonne in 1940, has been repeatedly misidentified as a French researcher, most recently in the Soviet youth newspaper *Sovyetskaya Molodezh* (June 3, 1987).

Segal is the self-proclaimed author of a report entitled “AIDS—Its Nature and Origin” (also known as the “Segal Report”), a 52-page document whose coauthors are identified as Dr. Lilli Segal, Segal’s wife, a retired Humboldt University researcher and professor of epidemiology, and Dr. Ronald Dehmlow, a member of Humboldt University’s Chemistry Department. The report is believed to have surfaced initially in September 1986, at the time of the eighth summit of the Nonaligned Movement, in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Throughout the report, Segal carefully hedges his claims concerning the manmade origins and spread of the AIDS virus with warnings that his “hypothesis” is based upon “assumptions” and a “chain of circumstantial evidence.”

## Why the Disinformation Is Untrue

The crux of the disinformation campaign is that the HIV-I (AIDS) virus was “engineered” through the artificial synthesis of VISNA virus (a retrovirus causing a complex disease syndrome in sheep) and HTLV-I (a human retrovirus causing a rare leukemia). This is neither true nor possible. Leading scientists and health officials throughout the world agree that the AIDS virus could not have been created by man. The two primary reasons are:

1. The two viruses—HTLV-I and Visna—which the Soviets say were combined to make the AIDS virus are biologically distinct: one infects only man, the other, only sheep. This biological distinction prevents them from being “spliced together” to make a new virus. Even if they could have been recombined, they would have to be first cloned and sequenced. These technical processes were not accomplished with the HTLV-I and VISNA viruses until 1983 and 1985, respectively.

2. Additionally, tests of blood samples taken from persons living in Africa show that the AIDS virus has existed in human populations there since at least 1956, more than twenty years before the Soviets say the United States “created” it at Fort Detrick. Moreover, leading experts around the world believe that the AIDS virus has existed in nature for thousands of years.

One of the most convincing statements made about the natural origins of the AIDS virus was by Dr. Viktor Zhdanov, director of the Ivanovskiy Institute of Virology in Moscow and the U.S.S.R.’s top AIDS expert. On October 4, 1986, Dr. Zhdanov

told a TASS correspondent, "Despite different points of view on the origin of AIDS, one thing is indubitable: an AIDS virus has not been obtained artificially." Below is a more lengthy explanation of why the AIDS disinformation is untrue.

The two viruses which the Segal Report claims were manipulated to create HIV-I share several structural properties. This enables scientists to group those viruses together as a family taxonomically. However, those viruses are biologically distinct, infecting different types of cells in different species of mammals (sheep and humans, respectively). Moreover, the genetic structure of different HIV-I isolates is precisely known at the sequence (DNA) level; these correspond to neither VISNA nor HTLV-I, particularly in the envelope gene. This is significant because this gene defines the host species that can be infected and, in this case, facilitates the entry of viruses into humans. Therefore, it is impossible to cut and splice portions of these two diverse retroviruses—VISNA and HTLV-I—and generate the AIDS virus as Segal claims. (See Appendix B.)

Implicit in Soviet disinformation story is man's ability to "create" a virus—one that will survive in nature, like the AIDS virus—in the absence of a specific, preexisting DNA blueprint. This also is not possible: viruses cannot be genetically recombined without first being cloned and sequenced. The HTLV-I and VISNA viruses were first cloned in 1983 and sequenced in 1983 and 1985, respectively, several years after Segal claims they were manipulated to "create" HIV-I. HIV-I in turn was first cloned in 1984, and in January 1985 was reported to have been sequenced.

These were the first reports on the molecular clonings of these viruses, coming nearly two decades after serum samples—later tested and found to contain antibody to HIV-I—were taken and several years after the first reported detection of HIV-I in humans (see footnote 4).

## What the Experts Say

As noted above, the AIDS virus was not created by man. In addition to disclaimers by U.S. and World Health Organization officials, scientists and medical experts from around the world repeatedly have discounted the disinformation. They include:

—Dr. Valentin Pokrovskiy, former director of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health Institute of Epidemiology and recently elected President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences. In a discussion of the origin of the AIDS virus with the Hungarian weekly magazine *Kepes* (May 2, 1987), he said "I don't think it came from military experiments, I think it was naturally caused."

—Dr. Luc Montagnier, director of the Paris-based Pasteur Institute's AIDS research program, who, responding to a question about the Segal hypothesis, told the French-language magazine *Jeune Afrique* (March 18, 1987) that it was "not serious to even raise the hypothesis." On May 30, 1987, Montagnier told the Finnish Communist Party daily *Kansan Uutiset* that the origins of the virus "could not be artificial."

—Dr. Niels Soennichsen, Humboldt University professor and director of the Dermatology Clinic and Polyclinic at the Charite Hospital in East Berlin, who told the Hamburg magazine *Der Spiegel* (Vol. 41, No. 11, March 9, 1987): "Segal's comment is nothing but a hypothesis, and not a very original one at that. Others before him have claimed the same. If you open Meyer's Dictionary under the term 'hypothesis' you can read: hypothesis is an opinion unproven by facts. That is my comment."

—Dr. Meinrad Koch, a West Berlin AIDS expert, who told the West Berlin daily *Tageszeitung* (February 28, 1987) that Segal's theory was "utter nonsense... an evil pseudoscientific political concoction." Citing the results of Western research, Koch systematically discounted each of Segal's arguments, including his claim that the AIDS virus resulted from hybridization of HTLV-I and VISNA viruses.

—Professor Jean Claude Cherman of the Paris-based Pasteur Institute, who told the Czechoslovak Communist Party daily *Rude Pravo* (November 29, 1986) that the AIDS virus was "too complex to have been prepared by man."

—Dr. Saroj Khaparde, Indian Minister of State for Health, who told the Indian Parliament on November 26, 1986, that there was no definite evidence that the AIDS virus was the result of "biological warfare experiments" (*Hindustan Times*, November 27, 1986).

—Professor Arsene Burny, Department of Biology at the University of Brussels, who told the Brazilian newspaper *Veja* (November 3, 1986) that Segal's theory was "ridiculous because it has no scientific basis whatsoever."

In a recent article in *Moscow News* (No. 17, April 26, 1987, p. 10), even Segal acknowledged the lack of "direct evidence" for his hypothesis, even though he continued to endorse it:

... As for the Fort Detrick case, there is no direct evidence. No participants in the tests are known, not a single expert among those who conducted the experiments has ever mentioned anything pertaining to the work, neither has any document been made public. Legally speaking, there is only indirect evidence, but indirect evidence may also be considered valid. My wife and I ... remain relatively alone on the point of the AIDS virus being a product of an abortive experiment carried out at a laboratory to develop biological warfare means. ... (Emphasis added.)

## What Has Dr. Viktor Zhdanov Said?

The published views of Soviet scientists on AIDS contrast starkly with the disinformation appearing in Soviet media. Academician Viktor M. Zhdanov, director of the Ivanovskiy Institute of Virology in Moscow and the Soviet Union's top AIDS expert, has declared not only that the etiology of the AIDS virus is uncertain but that no evidence exists that it was "artificially synthesized."

In December 1985, 5 weeks after *Literaturnaya Gazeta* first alleged AIDS was engineered in a U.S. laboratory, Zhdanov, in an interview with the CPSU Central Committee's cultural publication *Sovyetskaya Kultura* (December 7), hypothesized that AIDS was native to central Africa, where he thinks it may have existed for "many hundreds... if not thousands of years." He declared that it would be incorrect to consider AIDS a recent phenomenon and noted that several clinicians in the U.S.S.R. had recalled patients with symptoms identical to those produced by AIDS but "simply did not know how to diagnose it."

In a subsequent interview with *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (May 7, 1986), Zhdanov downplayed the possibility that the outbreak and spread of AIDS was part of a plot: "Providing a simple answer to the question concerning the original source of the AIDS pathogen is very difficult... as studies testify, the virus itself might have existed in nature for a long time."

At the Second International Conference on AIDS in Paris (June 23-25, 1986), Zhdanov reported that the first Soviet victim of the disease was a 14-year-old girl, diagnosed in September 1984; Soviet specialists had linked the case to blood transfusions she had received in 1975. Dr. Zhdanov also was reported to have said that data collected by his Institute showed that AIDS existed in the U.S.S.R. before 1974 (3 years before Segal claims the AIDS virus was "manufactured"). Asked by a reporter whether the United States had developed the AIDS virus, Zhdanov replied: "That is a ridiculous question. Perhaps it was the Martians" (Reuters, AP, and UPI, June 25, 1986).<sup>11</sup>

On October 4, 1986, Dr. Zhdanov told a TASS correspondent: "Despite different points of view on the origin of AIDS, one thing is indubitable: an AIDS virus has not been obtained artificially" (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 27, 1986).

Most recently, Dr. Zhdanov provided his views on the natural origins of the AIDS virus in an interview with the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times*:

*New Times*. "There has been much debate in the press, especially in the world press, on the origins of AIDS. What is your view?"

*Dr. Zhdanov*. "Indeed, the most diverse views are expressed. I must say with regret that these were mostly the views of non-specialists. ...The AIDS virus appeared naturally and seems to be undergoing rapid evolution. Only the following is reliably known so far: two varieties of the virus have been discovered in Africa and a similar disease among monkeys has also been found there."

*New Times*. "You mentioned a natural, evolutionary origin of the virus. Would you explain?"

*Dr. Zhdanov*. "In my opinion, viruses are autonomous genetic structures of cellular origin, that is, they are noncellular forms of life existing alongside the cellular ones. And if that is true, there also exists an ecological probability of their independent origin. At the dawn of civilization, when humans roamed the earth in small groups, they "got" their diseases mostly from the environment. But now the almost five-billion-strong and crowded population of the world has in effect become a reservoir in which various viruses can originate. Note the way AIDS is passed on. Besides blood transfusion (this is the artificial way), it is passed on by the most "reliable" method—sexual intercourse. In other words, evolution has utilized mankind's existing ecology." (*New Times*, #25, June 29, 1987, pp. 30-32.)

## Replay of Segal's Claims

Segal's allegations, nevertheless, have received prominent play in Soviet, communist, and other media. For example, the Soviet newspaper *Sovyetskaya Rossiya* (November 2, 1986), citing the "opinion" of the "French scientist J. Segal," claimed that the United States was creating "new types" of bacteriological weapons in violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; this arms control theme was to reappear with greater prominence in the first months of 1987 (see below).

Segal's allegations also have surfaced in Africa. About the time of the Nonaligned Movement summit in Harare in the summer of 1986, a "book review" of the Segal report, entitled "AIDS: U.S.A Home-Made Evil; Not Imported From Africa," which also misidentified the Segals as French nationals, appeared in the Zimbabwean magazine *Social Change and Development* (No. 14, 1986). The book review had no byline. While repeating Segal's claims, it cast doubt on whether his conclusions would be accepted, declaring that "time will tell" if his findings would be "scientifically substantiated." This review subsequently appeared in the Ugandan *Weekly Topic* (January 21, 1987) as well as in other African media.

The following month, Segal's "hypothesis" was the subject of an interview he gave to Kunhanandan Nair, an East Berlin-based European correspondent for the pro-Soviet Indian publication *Blitz* (February 7, 1987).<sup>12</sup> *Blitz*

entitled that interview "AIDS—A U.S. Military Monster: Yankee Business, Not Monkey Business."

The verbatim text of the *Blitz* interview recently surfaced in Kenya and Senegal. The Nairobi *Sunday Times* (June 21, 1987) ran the full text; an identical interview later surfaced in the Senegalese monthly *Le Devoir* (July 1987) under the title "AIDS: Professor Claims Yankee Business, Not Monkey Business." (In neither case was a byline or a date supplied, suggesting an effort to disassociate *Blitz* editor Nair from the replay of the material and to make it appear as though the interview had just been conducted.) The Segal interview was supplied to both the *Sunday Times* and *Le Devoir* by the All-Africa Press Service, a Nairobi-based news organization affiliated with the Africa Church Information Service (ACIS), also headquartered in Nairobi.<sup>13</sup>

## Tracing the Story's Dissemination

The global spread of the AIDS disinformation demonstrates how a sensationalized distortion of a controversial issue can travel quickly across national boundaries, lose the link to its original source, and continue to mislead new audiences even though its arguments have been effectively rebutted elsewhere.

On October 26, 1986, for example, the London *Sunday Express* ran an interview with Jacob Segal in which he alleged that the virus was "created" at Fort Detrick as a result of "laboratory experiments." Segal's arguments were quickly refuted by articles in the *London Times* (October 31, 1986) and the *Sunday Telegraph* (November 9, 1986).

Nevertheless, on November 14, 1986, the Spanish magazine *Interview* published an article on AIDS that picked up excerpts from the *Sunday Express* interview with Segal.

On February 1, 1987, the Argentine daily *Diario Popular* carried an article citing the AIDS disinformation story; one of its journalists had lifted the disinformation from the *Interview* article of November 14, 1986. (*Diario Popular* subsequently published a retraction on February 7.)

On or about February 7, TASS picked up the *Diario Popular* story; TASS attributed the disinformation to the *Diario Popular*, making that paper appear as the original source of the disinformation.

On February 7, the Nigerian *Concord* carried the text of that TASS item, datelined Buenos Aires, reporting the claims appearing in the *Diario Popular*; the same day, the Khartoum Sudan News Agency summary also ran the same TASS item.

## How a Story Is Spread

To disseminate the false charges, the Soviets have taken advantage of the limited availability of Western news services in the developing world. Many African, Asian, and Latin American newspapers, unable to afford access to Western satellite-feeds, usually have little problem obtaining "news," such as the disinformation about AIDS, from Soviet-bloc services with which they have contracts. TASS has bureaus in 66 countries in the developing world; Novosti, 47.

More important, some Third World newspapers—such as the New Delhi *Patriot*—wittingly publish Soviet-supplied stories in return for cash payments. In other cases the Soviets pay local journalists to place materials in their newspapers. Once a false story is planted in *Patriot*, for example, TASS may pick it up, identify it as having first appeared in *Patriot*, and then disseminate it globally with a New Delhi dateline. Newspapers having access to TASS may then reprint the TASS item, with or without identifying the source as TASS or the *Patriot*.

## Appearances in 1987

Moscow stepped up its disinformation campaign this year, repeating and embellishing allegations published throughout 1986 and adding distinct arms control themes as the 15th anniversary of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention approached. The Soviet charges have appeared on at least thirty-two occasions this year in Soviet print and broadcast media and have been replayed around the world by a host of leftist and Soviet front publications (see Appendix E).

For example, an article in the January-February 1987 issue of the British Peace Assembly's *Newsletter* (Vol. 3, No. 1) devoted to disarmament issues revived the AIDS disinformation charges, linking the proliferation of the AIDS virus to alleged U.S. biological warfare activities and a failure of the 1972 convention to impose restrictions banning "offensive biological warfare research." The article, written by Gordon Schaffer,<sup>14</sup> London correspondent for the New Delhi *Patriot* and a long-time member of the World Peace Council (WPC, a Soviet front organization), was published simultaneously—but not verbatim—in the WPC's monthly *Peace Courier* (January 1987). Various versions of the article, either quoting or paraphrasing it (and not always identifying Schaffer as the author), subsequently surfaced around the world. It appeared principally in leftist/communist media publications in Bolivia, Grenada, Pakistan, New Zealand, Malta, India, and Nigeria. Excerpts also appeared in the non-



communist Indonesian and Philippine press. Interestingly, Schaffer declared that the anonymous letter to the editor of *Patriot* initiating the AIDS disinformation campaign was published in the *Patriot* July 4, 1984, not July 16, 1983 as *Literaturnaya Gazeta* previously claimed a month earlier. The July 4, 1984 date also appeared in the WPC *Peace Courier* reprint but was omitted from some of the spinoff articles that subsequently surfaced in communist media. A check of *Patriot* indicated that no such story was published in that newspaper July 4, 1984.

Also in January 1987, the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* (No. 2, 1987) carried an interview with Professor Yuriy Rychkov, chief of the human genetics laboratory at the Nikolai Vavilov General Genetics Institute in the U.S.S.R.. Rychkov repeated false Soviet propaganda charges that the U.S. was seeking to develop so called ethnic weapons that would harm people only in the developing world. Rychkov also accused the Pentagon of gene splicing to develop a DNA molecule "which can control human behavior and mind" and did not rule out the possibility that the AIDS virus had been "engineered" through gene manipulation. Rychkov's interview, picked up by TASS on January 10, appeared in the pro-Soviet *Patriot* on January 14.

On March 30, TASS ran a story about an article in the *Novosti Military Review* entitled "AIDS: The Genesis of the Danger" that repeated the AIDS disinformation charges and alleged that U.S. "creation" of the virus constituted a violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The TASS item surfaced one day before a meeting in Geneva of scientific/technical delegations from signatory country members to the convention and three weeks after the release of a presidential report on March 10, 1987, on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including the 1972 convention.<sup>15</sup> The author, Professor Pyotr Nikolayev, cited the conclusions of "researchers" (whom TASS failed to identify) to support claims that the U.S. Army tested the AIDS virus on human subjects at Fort Detrick. That same day, the Associated Press disseminated a wire item datelined Moscow that contained a factual description of the original TASS dispatch, and references to the Nikolayev article soon appeared internationally in the communist and noncommunist media in Bolivia, Burkina, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Finland, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, and Pakistan.<sup>16</sup>

On April 10, the Soviet Defense Ministry daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* published an article specifically linking the "creation" of the AIDS virus at Fort Detrick to U.S. disregard for international arms control conventions. The article, pegged to the 15th anniversary of the signing of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, alleged that the 1969

conversion of the Army bacteriological laboratories at Fort Detrick into an oncological (cancer research) center was a "deception." Like the Nikolayev article 11 days earlier, it cited the opinions of "a number of authoritative scientists" to back up its claims that the laboratories "constructed" the AIDS virus.

The disinformation also has appeared in several unlikely Soviet newspapers. For example, the Moscow newspaper *Lesnaya Promyshlennost*—the organ of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of the Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry—on May 12, 1987, published a lengthy article on AIDS that linked the AIDS virus to "secret work" at Fort Detrick. The article noted that this information first surfaced in the "Indian press" but failed to identify the date or name of the Indian publication.

## U.S. Military Bases Alleged To Be a Source of AIDS

In an effort to undermine U.S. defense arrangements with allied countries, create pressures for the removal of U.S. military facilities overseas, and further exploit anti-U.S. sentiment, Moscow has warned countries in Europe and the Near and Far East that U.S. military personnel stationed at U.S. military facilities pose a public health danger to local populations. For example, the Soviet newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (January 23, 1987) asserted that in Western Europe, "the most AIDS cases are registered in the places where U.S. troops are stationed." TASS (February 12, 1987) reported "panic" in Japan and that local businesses were "closing their doors" to U.S. military personnel; a subsequent TASS report (February 17, 1987) alleged that they were "notorious for their loose morals" and were spreading AIDS in South Korea. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (March 15, 1987) attributed the spread of AIDS in the Philippines to the presence of U.S. military personnel in that country.<sup>17</sup> Local communist and government-controlled newspapers in Latin America (Nicaragua and Panama, for example) have picked up the charges as well, blaming U.S. soldiers for the spread of AIDS in the region.

Similar radio reports have been beamed to Turkey and areas in Africa where U.S. naval vessels make port calls. For example, an April 1986 Radio Moscow broadcast in English warned of the danger of AIDS-infected U.S. military personnel from ships and airbases visiting Mombasa, Kenya.

A similar Radio Moscow broadcast in early April 1987 falsely reported that the U.S. was deliberately spreading AIDS in southern Zaire in order to test a new biological weapon (this allegation also was picked up by TASS; see below).



Recently, a bogus leaflet and forged press release surfaced in Berlin; the fabricated documents seemed intended to associate the AIDS epidemic with the U.S. military. The leaflet, offering free AIDS testing at the U.S. Army hospital in Berlin to all members of a new Berlin-American friendship group, appeared in Berlin and West Germany on May 20. The U.S. Mission in Berlin issued a press statement on May 22 exposing the leaflet campaign. Several days later, a forged press release on Berlin Senate press office stationery surfaced, in which Berlin Health Senator Fink was purported to have announced that the U.S. Army Hospital was unable to treat civilian AIDS cases because it was overflowing with its own AIDS victims.

The Senate press office on May 29 notified all local newspaper editors that the press release was a forgery. Only the West Berlin Communist Party daily *Die Wahrheit* (May 30, 1987), reported the appearance of the forgery. (An indicator of the origin of the German-language forgeries was the use of the standard G.D.R. and Eastern-bloc reference to the city, "West Berlin" as one word, to connote a city separate from the GDR capital.)

Because the AIDS virus is prevalent in the general population, it is no surprise that some U.S. soldiers have either been exposed to it or actually have developed the disease. However, U.S. military bases do not pose an AIDS threat to host countries. To prevent the spread of AIDS either in or by the military, the Department of Defense has a program to identify military personnel who have been exposed to the virus and to assure that they do not serve abroad. All applicants for military service are being screened for AIDS, and those who have been exposed are not being accepted.

## New Twists on the Original AIDS Canard

Over the last several months, *Patriot's* original allegations have undergone various transformations. New twists also have been spread by Soviet media, sometimes after first having appeared in sympathetic third-country newspapers. For example:

— An unattributed, London-dated article in the Indian Telegu-language daily *Andhra Bhoomi* (November 26, 1986) falsely linked the AIDS virus to a pesticide produced by Union Carbide, which owned the plant where the 1982 Bhopal chemical disaster occurred.

— A TASS dispatch (April 6, 1987), datelined Accra, repeated an allegation appearing in the Ghanaian daily *Mirror* (April 4, 1987) falsely charging that U.S. medical personnel were carrying out "intensive experiments" with the AIDS virus

and other "biowarfare weapons" in Zaire, Argentina, and Pakistan; the *Mirror* story did not cite a source for its information. Radio Moscow on April 6 broadcast the substance of the *Mirror's* story to Southern Africa, while the TASS item was published in the Soviet daily *Leningradskaya Pravda* on April 7. Cuba's Prensa Latina news service (May 17, 1987) repeated the charge that the U.S. and France have chosen Zaire as a "testing ground" for AIDS experiments.

— On April 18, 1987, an Interpress (IPS) wire service item, datelined Lima, alleged that a Peruvian scientist had contracted AIDS while working at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California; the article further claimed that Livermore "exposes" its employees to the virus without informing them. The Cuban Communist Party daily *Granma* (April 20, 1987) published the IPS item, as did the Guyana *Chronicle* (April 22, 1987). Livermore reports that there is no evidence that the Peruvian scientists had ever worked at, or visited, the Laboratory.

— The *Patriot* (June 7, 1987) wrongly accused the U.S. Defense Department of conducting experiments in Africa to determine the "depopulating effect" of AIDS in strategically important segments of the continent. Kenya was cited as being of particular interest because of U.S. naval ship visits and the strategic importance of the Mombasa seaport; Zaire, because of its minerals and strategic location. This theme was picked up by Nicaragua's *El Nuevo Diario* (July 6, 1987) which ran an article alleging that AIDS is a "bacteriological weapon" used by the United States to "halt the growth" of Latin American and Asian populations. (The item acknowledged that the source of the charges—purportedly a Mexican "medical specialist"—failed to "elaborate on the sources of his information.") Lima's Marxist daily *La Voz* (July 12, 1987) ran a similar report, citing the research of the "French scientists . . . Jacob and Lilli Segal" to support charges of U.S. development of "ethnic weapons."

## Soviet Domestic Concern About AIDS

Aside from Moscow's desire to undermine the U.S. image abroad, concern about the spread of the AIDS virus within the U.S.S.R. may be partially motivating the Soviet disinformation effort. Faced with a domestic AIDS problem that Soviet authorities have only recently acknowledged, Moscow may be attempting to redirect domestic fears about a public health problem that has so far been primarily associated with the U.S. In the process, Soviet propagandists are encouraging xenophobic sentiment by underscoring the possible

harmful results of contact with foreigners and blaming "American imperialism" for AIDS. 18

The first Soviet admission that AIDS cases had been detected in the U.S.S.R. appeared in *Sovetskaya Kultura* (December 7, 1985), just 5 weeks after the initial *Literaturnaya Gazeta* allegations. 19 Claiming that the number of cases in the U.S.S.R. "could be counted on the fingers of one hand," Dr. Zhdanov hypothesized in the article that the disease first appeared in Central Africa and might be related to a virus found in monkeys.

Despite public declarations by leading Soviet epidemiologists that there is "no danger" of AIDS "spreading on a mass scale" in the U.S.S.R. (TASS, June 10, 1987), Soviet authorities have taken extensive public health and information measures to combat the domestic spread of the disease. Some Soviet specialists believe that the general public in the U.S.S.R. has what U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences President Valentin Prokrovskiy recently described as a "a false or incomplete idea" about AIDS (*Stroitel'naya Gazeta*, May 6, 1987).

In early February 1987, Dr. Zhdanov briefed top secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) about the need to be prepared to deal with the spread of AIDS (*New York Times*, February 6, 1987); the briefing was not mentioned in the Soviet press. U.S.S.R. Health Ministry deputy chief for quarantinable infections I. D. Drynov subsequently told *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (February 20, 1987) that the Soviet health administration was increasing production of disposable syringes and needles. Soviet health ministry medical biotechnology chief and top state public health physician Georgiy Khlyabich informed *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (February 27, 1987) that some 40 Soviet scientific institutions were involved in AIDS research. Dr. Zhdanov told a March 1987 Soviet health ministry press conference that health kits were being produced and a "network" of AIDS diagnostic laboratories developed, and that a "number of other measures" to "erect a reliable barrier" to the disease were being undertaken (TASS, March 27, 1987). Currently, the U.S.S.R. is preparing legislation that will require foreigners entering the country to be tested for the AIDS virus (Radio Moscow, May 29, 1987).

In recent months, the Soviets have set up AIDS telephone hotlines, stepped-up public information efforts, and opened 45 AIDS diagnostic laboratories; 300 such labs are expected to be operating by July 1988. Blood banks throughout the U.S.S.R. are being checked for the virus, and blood tests are being given to foreign students and others wishing to study in the U.S.S.R. (TASS, June 9, 1987). Widescale testing of high-risk individuals in Moscow—50,000 thus far—also has been undertaken (TASS, June 10, 1987). At least one

Soviet citizen has been identified as having been infected with AIDS while serving a "tour of duty" abroad; he was wrongly diagnosed by Soviet physicians in the early 1980s when little was known about the disease, according to TASS (June 9, 10, 1987). TASS reported that he infected 14 people, all of whom have been located and warned by Soviet authorities about "criminal responsibility" for spreading the disease.

While adopting measures to deal with the spread of the disease, however, the Soviets have continued their disinformation campaign. The Kiev newspaper *Radyanska Ukraina* (June 10, 1987) published an article by a Novosti correspondent identified as Sadakov entitled "AIDS: Will the Secret of its Origin be Revealed?" Citing the "newspaper *Patriot*" (again, no date or country of origin was provided), the article repeated the disinformation linking the AIDS virus to a U.S. military laboratory. *Rabochaya Gazeta* (June 10, 1987), organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, published a similar article. (See Appendix E for a listing of appearances of the disinformation in Soviet media.)

The Soviets also seem to be shifting blame for the spread of the disease in the U.S.S.R. onto African exchange students residing there (the Soviets and their Eastern-bloc allies have extensive training programs and scholarships for African students). Earlier this year, two Soviet militiamen (who normally guard foreign diplomatic institutions) walked into the U.S. Embassy's main entrance to alert Embassy officials that an African student who intended that day to apply for an American visa was a known carrier of AIDS. 20

## U.S. Actions To Counter the Disinformation

Because of the far-reaching implications of the AIDS disinformation campaign on U.S. diplomacy and relations with allies and friends around the world, the U.S. Government has sought aggressively to counter the false Soviet charges by making available to media and foreign government representatives as much factual information on the Soviet campaign and on AIDS as possible. The Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services have taken the lead in this effort. 21

When the AIDS charges first surfaced in the Soviet press, then-U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman sent letters of protest to the editors of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Appendix F); his letters were neither published nor answered.

Ambassadors and public affairs officers at U.S. embassies around the world have written letters to

and met with the editors of papers that have published the disinformation. In many cases, the editors indicated they did not intend to discredit the United States; often they said they were unaware that the disinformation originated in communist media, and they sometimes admitted that the disinformation stories had appeared in their publications unbeknownst to them. In many instances, retractions and factual material exposing the Soviet disinformation campaign were subsequently published. Even communist papers have occasionally published retractions. For example, the Moroccan Communist Party daily *Al Bayane* carried the disinformation April 2, 1987; on April 18 it printed the full text of an article refuting the disinformation. (See Appendix G for examples of Soviet criticism of these U.S. efforts.)

Finally, the U.S. Government has approached the Soviets through diplomatic channels. For example, the U.S. delegation to the eighth session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Health Committee (Washington, DC, April 14-16, 1987), headed by Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary Robert Windom and U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, MD, advised Soviet delegates of strong U.S. displeasure over the Soviet-inspired campaign and the use of a grave international public health problem for base propaganda purposes. U.S. delegates urged Soviet scientists to have their government endorse the international scientific community's view that the AIDS virus is of natural origin. They were advised that direct U.S.-Soviet collaboration on AIDS research would be impossible as long as the disinformation campaign continues.<sup>22</sup>

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> "Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements," Special Report No. 163, U.S. Department of State, March 1987, p. 2. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gasses and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices as well as use of bacteriological methods of warfare. The 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It imposes the same obligation in relation to weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The U.S. Government is in total compliance with these conventions.

<sup>2</sup> According to the most recently available Soviet statistics, 37 AIDS cases have been registered in the U.S.S.R., 30 of them foreigners who have since been deported (TASS, June 10, 1987). Information made available by East European media indicates that in Bulgaria, 22 HIV carriers have been identified (*Zemedelsko Zname*, May 8, 1987); Czechoslovakia, 44 HIV carriers, and 6 cases of AIDS registered (*Mlada Front*, #20, May 23, 1987); East Germany, 14 HIV carriers identified (ADN, February 11, 1987); Hungary, 134 HIV carriers (Budapest radio, June 23, 1987); Poland, "over 20" HIV carriers (Warsaw radio, March 27, 1987); Romania, 15 HIV carriers, two of whom have

died of AIDS (*Muncitorul Sanitar*, May 26, 1987). Official information supplied by Yugoslavia indicates that 531 HIV carriers have been identified, 11 of whom have developed AIDS and six of whom have died (*Politika*, May 31, 1987 and *Borba*, June 22, 1987). These countries are all adopting extensive public health and information measures to combat the spread of the virus and alert local populations to its dangers. (Information drawn from foreign-language sources has been supplied by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.)

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Zhdanov, a member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences since 1960 and a virologist by profession, is a leading expert on influenza and viral hepatitis. He is director of the Ivanovskiy Virology Institute in Moscow, one of many regional centers of AIDS research around the world designated by WHO. Dr. Zhdanov was the first Soviet scientist to acknowledge that individuals in the U.S.S.R. had contracted the AIDS virus (December 7, 1985). He attended the 3d International Conference on AIDS, June 1-5, 1987, in Washington, DC. See 3d International Conference on AIDS, *Abstracts Volume*, pp. 11, 126, and 170 for information on papers written and coauthored by Dr. Zhdanov and presented to the gathering.

<sup>4</sup> Drs. Donald Hicks and Jane Getchel of the Centers for Disease Control Virology Laboratory in Atlanta, Georgia, in mid-1985 isolated an HIV-I virus in a 1976 serum specimen from Africa. More recently, Dr. Andrew Nahmias of Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, in early 1986 reported the presence of HIV-I antibody in an African serum that was taken in 1956. The first reported cases of HIV-I infection in the United States occurred in 1979.

<sup>5</sup> The 40th World Health Assembly, the supreme decision-making body of the World Health Organization, met May 4-15, 1987 in Geneva; the U.S.S.R., along with 165 other member country delegations, unanimously adopted resolution WHA 40-26, entitled "Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of AIDS." The second preambular paragraph of that resolution declared that AIDS was "caused by one or more naturally occurring retroviruses of undetermined geographical origin" and that it had "assumed pandemic proportions affecting all regions of the world." (See Appendix B for more information on the origins of the AIDS virus.) Dr. Zhdanov told the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* (#25, June 29, 1987) that Soviet proposals for combating AIDS were incorporated in the WHO resolution.

<sup>6</sup> *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (No. 47, November 19, 1986, p. 9) reproduced a copy of what it claimed was a page of the newspaper *Patriot* where the AIDS disinformation story was published. The reproduced page is dated simply Sunday, July 17; no year is indicated. However, an unsigned article accompanying the reproduced picture claimed the letter ran in *Patriot* July 16, 1983. Moreover, the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* article fails to identify *Patriot* as an Indian publication. In response to inquiries, the *Patriot* editor declared that his newspaper published no such letter. The editor subsequently retracted this statement (see below) but supplied no evidence confirming the actual existence of a letter.

<sup>7</sup> For example, the letter repeated false charges that the CIA had established a laboratory in Lahore, Pakistan, to breed "mosquitoes and other insects" that "could spread dangerous diseases such as the yellow fever, the dengue fever, American Saint Louis encephalitis and others" and that the U.S. engaged in biological warfare activities at Fort Detrick, Maryland. These charges are similar to those appearing months earlier in the Soviet papers *Pravda* (February 10, 1983) and *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (April 8, 1983). They appear to have been replayed as part of a broader Soviet response to a November 1982 State Department report that detailed Soviet use of chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in violation of both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. See "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update," U.S. Department of State, *Special*

Report No. 104, November 1982. (See Appendix D for more information on the Soviet biological warfare program.)

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman subsequently sent a letter of protest (November 15, 1985) to the editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Aleksandr Chakovskiy, calling attention to the fact that Zapevalov failed to note the date and source (an "anonymous letter") of his information. Ambassador Hartman's letter—the text of which may be found in Appendix F—was not published.

<sup>9</sup> See "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements," U.S. Department of State, *Special Report No. 122*, February 1, 1985. See also "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements," U.S. Department of State, *Special Report No. 136*, December 1985, which confirmed and strengthened the conclusions contained in the February 1, 1985, report.

<sup>10</sup> In order to bolster their disinformation charges, the Soviets also have selectively cited the opinions of the extremely small number of Western doctors, who, like Segal, believe that the AIDS virus may have been manmade. These views are not endorsed by the international medical and scientific communities. Segal and the coauthors of his report are the only ones consistently to have singled out Fort Detrick as the location where the AIDS virus allegedly was "manufactured."

<sup>11</sup> Zhdanov also noted that among the 10,000 people tested by his institute, 12 had been discovered to have AIDS (Reuters, June 25, 1986). They included "local residents" (Soviet citizens) as well as African and Asian immigrants. (TASS waited until July 1 to report Zhdanov's remarks and did not include any of those reported above. TASS only reported his comments that "It still remains unexplained how the viruses evolve and how they make their way into a human organism. Suggestions concerning the artificial synthesis of these viruses have not been confirmed either.") Eight months later, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov, speaking February 12, 1987 to Western reporters, also asserted that there was no hard evidence from Soviet scientists that the AIDS virus had been created artificially. However, Gerasimov contradicted Zhdanov's earlier claims regarding the number of Soviet AIDS cases. Declaring that "social preconditions" for the widescale spread of AIDS did not exist in the U.S.S.R., he stated that a total of 20 AIDS cases had been diagnosed there, all of them among foreigners (TASS, February 12, 1987). More recently, TASS (June 10, 1987) reported that 37 AIDS cases had been registered in the U.S.S.R., 30 of them foreigners who have since been deported; U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences President Valentin Pokrovskiy has identified these 30 as "foreign students" (see footnote 19 below).

<sup>12</sup> Nair is the author of *The Devil and His Dart*, a purported expose of alleged CIA activities in the developing world, published late last year. In testimony to the U.S. Congress in 1959, Soviet defector Aleksandr Yuirevich Kasnakaheyev identified *Blitz* as a newspaper used by Soviet intelligence to plant false stories. See *Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Internal Security*, December 14, 1959, Washington, DC, page 17.

<sup>13</sup> The Africa Church Information Service (ACIS) was founded in January, 1979 as a "joint project" of the All Africa Conference of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Association for Christian Communication, and the World Council of Churches. It aims to "help African peoples, nations and churches to communicate better among themselves and with the wider world" and to "assist in redressing the serious imbalance in the flow of information between developed nations and Africa." The All-Africa Press Service, formed in April 1979,

is a weekly service of news and features from all parts of Africa "maintained" by the ACIS. (*Yearbook of International Organizations*, 22nd edition, July 1985, KG Saur Verlag, Poesenbacher Strabe 26, D-8000 Munchen 71, West Germany, p. F8317, entry F8355.)

<sup>14</sup> A London-based journalist, Gordon Schaffer is a well-known purveyor of pro-Soviet propaganda and disinformation. He is active in the Stalinist wing of the British Communist Party, a recipient of the U.S.S.R.'s Lenin Peace Prize (October 6, 1965) and has maintained a close association over the years with the WPC; he also is a member of WPC's decisionmaking Presidential Committee and Vice-President of the British Peace Assembly (BPA, the British affiliate of the WPC).

<sup>15</sup> See "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements," U.S. Department of State, *Special Report No. 163*, March 1987, for an unclassified transcript of the President's report; the report noted that the Soviet biological warfare program may now include investigation of new classes of agents.

<sup>16</sup> In their rush to disseminate the Nikolayev article, Soviet officials at the Novosti bureau in Nicosia, Cyprus, included an English-language version in an April 3, 1987, weekly compilation of articles from the Soviet press. All other articles included in the weekly were translated into Greek.

<sup>17</sup> See also Radio Moscow (January 30 and March 31, 1987); Radio Peace and Progress (November 29, 1985); TASS (November 5, 1986; February 16 and March 14, 1987); *Izvestiya* (January 25 and March 9, 1987); *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (January 23, 1987).

<sup>18</sup> For example, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (May 7, 1986) warned specifically against contact with Americans.

<sup>19</sup> At the April 1985 International Conference on AIDS in Atlanta, a Soviet study was presented suggesting that Soviet experts had not detected AIDS in the U.S.S.R.. Dr. Rakhim M. Khaitov, deputy director of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health Institute of Immunology in Moscow, in a paper entitled "Search of AIDS Cases in Secondary Immunodeficiency Patients in the U.S.S.R.," reported the results of a study in which 500 persons, suffering from illnesses that could possibly have been AIDS related, were identified; a subgroup of 10 patients was selected and studied in more detail using immunologic tests. The findings were not suggestive of AIDS. (It is unclear whether antibody testing for the virus was used in Dr. Khaitov's study.) For an abstract of Dr. Khaitov's paper, see *Official Program, International Conference on AIDS, April 14-17, 1985, Atlanta*, p. 36. Five months earlier, Dr. Zhdanov told Radio Moscow (November 29, 1984) that although no AIDS cases had been registered in the U.S.S.R., Soviet officials were investigating "all cases that arouse suspicion."

<sup>20</sup> Valentin Pokrovskiy, recently elected president of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences, told the May 6, 1987, Soviet building industry newspaper *Stroitel'naya Gazeta* that 30 "foreign students" residing in the U.S.S.R. had been diagnosed as AIDS carriers. They have been deported from the U.S.S.R., according to TASS (June 10, 1987).

<sup>21</sup> For more information on the U.S. contribution to international efforts to combat AIDS, see *Confronting AIDS: Directions for Public Health, Health Care and Research*, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences; National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1986, pp. 274-277.

<sup>22</sup> For a more complete description of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Health Committee session, see *HHS News*, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C., April 17, 1987.

## Appendix A

### A Note on the Patriot

The New Delhi *Patriot* is a pro-Soviet daily with a circulation of about 35,000. It has long served as a vehicle for Soviet disinformation. According to Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former KGB officer who defected to the West in 1980, the *Patriot* was set up by the KGB in 1962 "in order to publish disinformation."\*

Official Soviet media frequently cite stories appearing in the *Patriot* that the Soviets originally placed in the newspaper, sometimes as articles, sometimes as paid advertisements, from which the *Patriot* derives a substantial share of its revenues.

In 1983, for example, *Patriot* published the so-called Kirkpatrick Plan for the "balkanization" of India (January 25, 26, and 28); the "plan" itself was a forgery. *Patriot* has promoted numerous other disinformation themes, including stories alleging U.S. attempts to assassinate former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and U.S. support for Sikh terrorists.

\* Details concerning the origins of the *Patriot* emerged during an 8-week trial in London's High Court of a libel suit brought against *The Economist* magazine's *Foreign Report* newsletter by Greece's most popular daily newspaper, *To Ethnos*, which the *Foreign Report* accused of being a Soviet propaganda mouthpiece. See *The Economist*, April 18, 1987, pp. 19-22. Excerpts from Dzhirkvelov's testimony were published in *Disinformation: Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast*, Summer 1987.

## Appendix B

### What We Know About AIDS <sup>1</sup>

HIV-I (the AIDS virus) is structurally and genetically related to a group of retroviruses, called lentiviruses, that are found in domestic farm animals, including sheep, goats, and horses; more recently, they also have been found in monkeys and cattle. VISNA virus was the first lentivirus discovered (c. 1932) and isolated.<sup>2</sup> Since that time two other well known lentiviruses, equine infectious anemia virus and caprine arthritis encephalitis virus, were discovered and characterized. These viruses are sometimes euphemistically called "slow viruses" because of the relatively long delay (2 years or more on average) in the onset of debilitating symptoms after infection. Although the diseases caused by each lentivirus species may differ greatly, some similarities in disease state and biology may be found (e.g., they infect cells of the immune system and cause encephalopathy).

The lentiviruses, like other retroviruses (some of which cause cancer), are RNA<sup>3</sup> viruses that replicate in the host cell via a DNA<sup>4</sup> intermediate. The RNA (or DNA) genome<sup>5</sup> contains three major structural genes called gag, pol, and env (or envelope) and a few smaller but significant coding regions. The gag gene is situated at the 5 prime (first in order of place) most end of the genome and codes<sup>6</sup> for the core proteins of the virus. The pol gene is situated intermediate to the gag and envelope genes and codes for the enzyme reverse transcriptase<sup>7</sup> which is unique to all retroviruses.

The envelope gene is found at the 3 prime most end of the genome. The envelope gene codes for the exterior protein shell, which defines the host species that can be infected and helps the virus bind to its target cell. The envelope gene appears to be the least conserved of the three major genes mentioned.

Although these lentiviruses, including its human cousin the AIDS virus (HIV-I), are genetically related, they have considerably diverged at the DNA level. That is, they all may

have all come from a common ancestor (probably thousands of years ago) and, at present, they still show some significant homology<sup>8</sup> but have changed enough at the DNA level to enable one to distinguish them by analyzing their DNA sequences.<sup>9</sup>

In fact, similar comparisons can distinguish them from the more distantly related oncogenic (cancer causing) retroviruses. The DNA sequence for the human oncogenic retrovirus, HTLV-I, and the lentiviruses (HIV-I and VISNA virus of sheep) genomes are known. By comparing them it is apparent that HIV-I is more closely related to VISNA virus than it is to HTLV-I or to any other oncogenic retrovirus. Moreover, the greatest homology, as expected, is found in the pol gene. Sequence comparisons of the envelope genes of HIV-I and VISNA virus clearly show that even though common characteristic sequences can be found, the DNA (and amino acid) sequences are so greatly diverged that they are readily distinguishable.

It would have been impossible to have recently substituted all or part of the envelope gene of VISNA virus for that of HTLV-I in order to make HIV-I and still not be able to identify it. In addition, the envelope genes of these viruses are so species-specific in binding that VISNA virus is not capable of infecting human cells, nor is HIV-I capable of infecting sheep cells. Furthermore, HIV-I contains an additional coding sequence overlapping the 3 prime end of its envelope, called the 3 prime orf, whose function is unknown. The 3 prime orf is not present in HTLV-I or VISNA virus. This is yet another distinguishing feature that shows that HIV-I is not a chimeric<sup>10</sup> of HTLV-I and VISNA virus.

HTLV-I was first cloned<sup>11</sup> in the United States in early 1983 in the laboratory of Dr. Robert Gallo, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda. The first sequencing of HTLV-I was reported in June 1983, in the laboratory of Dr. Motoharu Seki et. al., Department of Viral Oncology, Cancer Institute, Kami-Ikebukuro, Toshima-Ku, Tokyo, Japan. VISNA virus was first cloned in 1983 by Janice Clements in the laboratory of Dr. Opendra Narayan at the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. VISNA was sequenced in 1985 in the laboratory of Pierre Sonigo et al., France.

HIV-I was cloned in the laboratory of Dr. Gallo in 1984. Another AIDS virus known as LAV was cloned in the laboratory of Dr. Luc Montangier, also in 1984. These were the first molecular clonings of the AIDS virus, carried out to understand its structure as well as to develop vaccines for it. The sequences of both HIV-I and LAV were reported in January 1985.

These were the first reports on the molecular clonings of these viruses, and they came nearly two decades after serum samples, later tested and found to contain antibody to HIV-I, were taken.

<sup>1</sup> The information contained in this Appendix was provided to the U.S. Department of State by Dr. Matthew Allen Gonda, Laboratory of Cell and Molecular Structure, Program Resources, Inc., NCI-Frederick Cancer Research Facility, PO Box B, Frederick, Maryland 21701. For further information, see Matthew Allen Gonda, "The Natural History of AIDS," *Natural History*, Vol. 95, May 1986, pp. 78-81; Robert C. Gallo, "The First Human Retrovirus," *Scientific American*, December 1986; "The AIDS Virus," *Scientific American*, January 1987. Also, see *Confronting AIDS: Directions for Public Health, Health Care and Research*, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences; National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1986, for bibliographies of scientific and medical papers discussing various aspects of the AIDS virus. The definitive resource for information on genetic engineering techniques and methodology is *Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory Manual*, Thoman Maniatis, Cold Spring Harbor, New York, 1982.

<sup>2</sup> Isolate: to separate from another substance so as to obtain pure or in a free state.

<sup>3</sup> RNA (ribonucleic acid): any of various nucleic acids that contain ribose and uracil as structural components and are associated with the control of cellular chemical activities.

<sup>4</sup> DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid): any of the various nucleic acids that are localized especially in cell nuclei and are the molecular basis of heredity in many organisms.

<sup>5</sup> Genome: one haploid set of chromosomes with the genes they contain.

<sup>6</sup> Code: to specify the genetic code.

<sup>7</sup> Reverse transcriptase: the enzyme which makes the identical DNA copy of the RNA genome after infecting the cell; it is the coding sequence most conserved (i.e., maintained constant during a process of chemical change) in the evolution of retroviruses and upon which evolutionary relationships are mainly, but not entirely, defined.

<sup>8</sup> Homology: likeness in structure between parts of different organisms due to evolutionary differentiation from the same or a corresponding part of a remote ancestor.

<sup>9</sup> Sequence: genetic code; to determine the sequence of chemical constituents.

<sup>10</sup> Genetic Chimera: an individual, organ, or part consisting of tissues of diverse genetic constitution.

<sup>11</sup> Clone: an individual grown from a single somatic cell of its parent and genetically identical to it; a segment of DNA representing all or part of the viral genome needed to produce a virus.

## Appendix C

### Fort Detrick

Fort Detrick is a military compound that today rents space to various military and civilian governmental agencies as well as private research organizations engaged in cancer and defensive medical research (aimed at developing vaccines for biological warfare agents). Two independent governmental organizations situated on the Fort Detrick compound—one military, the other civilian—are conducting research to find a cure for AIDS. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (U.S.AMRIID) is conducting an antiviral drug development effort that includes the evaluation of ribavirin, a compound with proven anti-viral effectiveness, for efficacy against the AIDS virus. U.S.AMRIID's entire research program is unclassified and all information is appropriately reported in medical literature. The National Cancer Institute, Frederick Cancer Research facility (NCI-FCRF), an internationally recognized institution for interdisciplinary research on cancer, its causes, biology, diagnosis, and treatment, also is located there.

Aside from conducting research on countering and preventing AIDS, NCI-FCRF scientists produce HIV-1, samples of which are supplied through the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, to medical experts all around the world, for research aimed at finding a cure for the virus. In late 1986, at the request of visiting Soviet virologists, the CDC provided the U.S.S.R. with HIV-1 samples for the Soviet AIDS research program.<sup>1</sup> Production of HIV-1 began at NCI-FCRF in May 1984, shortly after Dr. Robert Gallo of the National Institutes of Health discovered the virus.

From 1943 to 1969, Fort Detrick was the U.S. Army's biological warfare research and development center. However, no offensive biological warfare research has been conducted at Fort Detrick since 1969. Then, the facilities formerly used for biological warfare research were turned over to research on cancer and research for defenses against biological warfare the latter emphasizing the search for vaccines against, and antidotes for, diseases such as chikungunya, anthrax and Rift Valley fever.

The United States is party to two international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons but not the development, production, possession, or transfer of such weapons. Most major states party to the protocol, including the United States, have recorded reservations retaining a right to retaliate in kind if such weapons are used against them.

The U.S. also is a party to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This Convention bans development, production, stockpiling, or possession and transfer of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes" and also the weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The U.S. is in full compliance with both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* (#25, June 29, 1987) acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. Institute of Virology "borrowed the first AIDS pathogene from abroad" to enable Soviet experts to study the virus. *New Times* did not specify the date, however.

## Appendix D

### The Soviet Biological Warfare Program<sup>1</sup>

One reason Moscow has promoted the AIDS disinformation—and in recent months given the false charges an arms control twist—may be its attempt to distract international attention away from its own offensive biological warfare program, which the United States and others have monitored for decades.

A number of Soviet installations capable of producing disease agents and toxins on a large scale and of placing them in munitions and delivery/dissemination systems have been identified. These installations were established by the Ministry of Defense and are under its control. One such facility, in Sverdlovsk, has had a long history of biological warfare research, development, and production, with emphasis on the causative agent of anthrax. In early April 1979, an accidental release from that facility of anthrax-causing substances caused many casualties and very likely a high death rate among exposed Sverdlovsk citizens. At the time the Soviets admitted only to some public health problems, which they said were caused by the illegal sale of anthrax-contaminated meat. Soviet leaders have never acknowledged that the Sverdlovsk facility is a biological warfare facility.

In addition to anthrax, the Soviets are believed to have developed tularemia, plague, and cholera for biological warfare purposes, as well as botulinum toxin, enterotoxin, and mycotoxins.

<sup>1</sup> For more information, see *Soviet Military Power*, 1987, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Appendix E <sup>1</sup>Appearances of the  
Disinformation  
Internationally: 1983-86

1983

India

1985

Brazil, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, India, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, U.K., U.S.S.R.

1986

Antigua, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Mauritania, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Tanzania, U.K., U.S.S.R., Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

<sup>1</sup> The following lists incorporate information that the U.S. Government has been able to monitor and collect as of July 10, 1987.Appearances of the Disinformation Internationally:  
January-July 1987

Country	City	Source	Date
Egypt	Cairo	<i>Al-Ahrar</i>	January 5
Peru	Lima	<i>Extra</i>	January 8
India	Calcutta	<i>Aajkaal</i>	January 8
Jamaica	Kingston	<i>Daily Gleaner</i>	Early January
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Za Rubezhom</i>	January 9-15
Bulgaria	Sofia	<i>Narodna Armiya</i>	January 12
Yugoslavia	Belgrade	<i>Politika Ekspres</i>	January 14, 15
Uganda	Kampala	<i>Weekly Topic</i>	January 14, 21
Ghana	Accra	<i>Ghanaian Times</i>	January 16
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Sovyetskaya Rossiya</i>	January 23
India	New Delhi	<i>Patriot</i>	January 23-26
Greece	Athens	<i>Rizopastis</i>	January 25
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Izvestiya</i>	January 25
Barbados	Bridgetown	<i>Daily Nation</i>	January 26
Argentina	Buenos Aires	<i>Diario Popular</i>	February 1
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>New Times</i>	February, #2
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	TASS	February 7
Sudan	Khartoum	SUNA News Agency	February 7
Bangladesh	Dhaka	<i>Daily News</i>	February 8
U.S.S.R.	Kiev	<i>Pravda Ukrainy</i>	February 14
Pakistan	Lahore	<i>Viewpoint</i>	February 17
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Sovyetskaya Rossiya</i>	February 18
	West Berlin	<i>Tageszeitung</i>	February 18
Costa Rica	San Jose	<i>Libertad</i>	February 20-26
Kuwait	Kuwait	<i>Al-Watan</i>	February 20
Cameroon	Douala	<i>Le Mont Cameroun</i>	February 23
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Literaturnaya Gazeta</i>	February 25
Argentina	Buenos Aires	<i>La Semana</i>	February 25
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Izvestiya</i>	February 28
Albania	Tiran	<i>Bashkimi</i>	March 2
Senegal	Dakar	<i>Le Soleil</i>	March 10
Philippines	Manila	<i>Manila Times</i>	March 17
Panama	Panama City	<i>Critica</i>	March 17
Brazil	Rio de Janero	<i>Jornal do Brasil</i>	March 18
Belgium	Liege	<i>La Wallonie</i>	March 19
Libya	Tripoli	Tripoli television	March 20
Congo	Brazzaville	<i>Mweti</i>	March 23
Grenada	Grenada	<i>Indies Times</i>	March 24
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Za Rubezhom</i>	March 27
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	Novosti Military Review	March 30
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	TASS	March 30
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Selskaya Zhizn</i>	March 31
Bulgaria	Sofia	<i>Zemedelsko Zname</i>	March 31
Malta	Valletta	<i>Ziminijenta</i>	March



Country	City	Source	Date
Finland	Helsinki	<i>Kansan Uutiset</i>	April 1
Jordan	Amman	<i>Ad-Dustour</i>	April 2
Morocco	Rabat	<i>Al Bayane</i>	April 2
Costa Rica	San Jose	<i>Libertad</i>	April 3-9
Uruguay	Montevideo	<i>La Hora</i>	April 3
Ghana	Accra	<i>The Mirror</i>	April 4
Mauritius	Port Louis	<i>Sunday Star</i>	April 5
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	TASS	April 6
U.S.S.R.	Leningrad	<i>Leningradskaya Pravda</i>	April 7
Cyprus	Nicosia	Novosti	April 8
Burkina	Ouagadougou	<i>Sidwaya</i>	April 8
Pakistan	Peshawar	<i>Frontier Report</i>	April 8
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Krasnaya Zvezda</i>	April 10
Bolivia	La Paz	<i>Aqui</i>	April 11
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Izvestiya</i>	April 14
Iraq	Baghdad	<i>Sainik Samachar</i>	April 14
Bulgaria	Sofia	<i>Narodna Armiya</i>	April 15
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	Novosti	April 17
Zimbabwe	Harare	<i>Herald</i>	April 17
Indonesia	Jakarta	<i>Observer</i>	April 18
Bangladesh	Dhaka	<i>The Tide</i>	April 19
Cuba	Havana	<i>Granma</i>	April 20
New Zealand	Wellington	<i>NZ Tribune</i>	April 22
Guyana	Georgetown	<i>Chronicle</i>	April 22
Chile	Santiago	<i>Fortin Mapocho</i>	April 23
Philippines	Manila	<i>Manila Journal</i>	April 23
Qatar	Doha	<i>Al Arab</i>	April 23
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Moscow News</i>	April 26
Costa Rica	San Jose	<i>Libertad</i>	May 1-7
Ecuador	Quito	National television	May 8
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Lesnaya Promyshlennost</i>	May 12
Finland	Helsinki	<i>Kansan Uutiset</i>	May 12
Bolivia	La Paz	<i>Jornada</i>	May 21
Greece	Athens	Athens News Agency	May 22
Bulgaria	Sofia	<i>Orbita</i>	May 23
U.S.S.R.	Moscow	<i>Sovyetskaya Molodezh</i>	June 3
India	New Delhi	<i>Patriot</i>	June 7
Cuba	Havana	<i>Granma</i>	June 8
U.S.S.R.	Kiev	<i>Rabochaya Gazeta</i>	June 10
U.S.S.R.	Kiev	<i>Radyanska Ukraina</i>	June 10
U.S.S.R.	Vilnius	<i>Sovyetskaya Litva</i>	June 12
Kenya	Nairobi	<i>Sunday Times</i>	June 21
Mexico	Mexico City	<i>Excelsior</i>	June 23
Senegal	Dakar	<i>Le Devoir</i>	July
Nigeria	Lagos	<i>The Standard</i>	July 2, 3
Nicaragua	Managua	<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	July 6
Sudan	Khartoum	SUNA	July 10
Peru	Lima	<i>La Voz</i>	July 12

## Appearances of the Disinformation in Soviet Media:

### October 1985-June 1987

#### Soviet Print/Wire Service Media

<i>Literaturnaya Gazeta</i>	October 30, 1985
<i>Sovyetskaya Rossiya</i>	April 27, 1986
<i>Literaturnaya Gazeta</i>	May 7, 1986
<i>Sovyetskaya Rossiya</i>	June 8, 1986
TASS	June 8, 1986

<i>Pravda</i>	June 14, 1986
<i>Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya</i>	June 14, 1986
<i>Kommunist (Tbilisi)</i>	September 19, 1986
TASS	October 30, 1986
<i>Pravda</i>	October 31, 1986
<i>Sovyetskaya Rossiya</i>	November 2, 1986
TASS	November 13, 1986
Novosti	November 19, 1986
<i>Za Rubezhom</i>	January 9-15, 1987
<i>Sovyetskaya Rossiya</i>	January 23, 1987
<i>Izvestiya</i>	January 25, 1987
<i>New Times</i>	February 2, 1987
TASS	February 7, 1987



<i>Pravda Ukrainy</i>	February 14, 1987
<i>Sovetskaya Rossiya</i>	February 18, 1987
<i>Literaturnaya Gazeta</i>	February 25, 1987
<i>Izvestiya</i>	February 28, 1987
<i>Za Rubezhom</i>	March 27-April 2, 1987
<i>Novosti Military Review</i>	March 30, 1987
TASS	March 30, 1987
<i>Selskaya Zhizn</i>	March 31, 1987
TASS	April 6, 1987
<i>Leningradskaya Pravda</i>	April 7, 1987
<i>Krasnaya Zvezda</i>	April 10, 1987
<i>Izvestiya</i>	April 14, 1987
<i>Novosti</i>	April 17, 1987
<i>Moscow News</i>	April 26, 1987
<i>Lesnaya Promyshlennost</i>	May 12, 1987
<i>Sovetskaya Molodezh</i>	June 3, 1987
<i>Rabochaya Gazeta</i>	June 10, 1987
<i>Radyanska Ukraina</i>	June 10, 1987
<i>Sovetskaya Litva</i>	June 12, 1987

### Soviet Radio Broadcasts/Television

Radio Moscow World Service	October 30, 1985
Radio Moscow Peace and Progress	November 29, 1985
Radio Moscow to Turkey	December 2, 1985
Radio Moscow World Service	December 26, 1985
Radio Moscow Peace and Progress	September 22, 1986
Radio Moscow Peace and Progress	November 13, 1986
Radio Moscow Peace and Progress	December 13, 1986
Moscow Television	December 25, 1986
Radio Moscow to China	January 16, 1987
Radio Moscow to Italy	January 27, 1987
Radio Moscow to China	January 31, 1987
Radio Moscow to China	February 28, 1987
Moscow Television	April 2, 1987
Radio Moscow to Czechoslovakia	April 2, 1987
Radio Moscow to Southern Africa	April 6, 1987
Radio Moscow to Iran	April 23, 1987

## Appendix F

### U.S. Ambassador Hartman's Letters to Mr. Aleksandr Borisovich Chakovskiy, Editor in Chief, Literaturnaya Gazeta

November 15, 1985

Dear Mr. Chakovskiy:

I am sure that many thoughtful Soviet readers shared my sense of surprise and revulsion at an article in the October 30 edition of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. The article, titled "Panic in the West or What Is Hidden Behind the Sensation About AIDS," included the allegation that the worldwide AIDS epidemic resulted from U.S. Army research into the human immunity system. In attempting to buttress this fantastic charge, the author drew heavily upon an article which allegedly appeared in the Indian publication, the *Patriot*. Mr. Zapevalov did not, however, provide the date or issue number of the *Patriot* in which this article allegedly appeared.

In an effort to get to the bottom of what appears to have been a deliberate deception of your readers, we directly queried the editor of the *Patriot* as to whether such an article actually appeared in his journal. After a check of the *Patriot* archives, the editor, Mr. R. K. Misra, has told us that he could not find any article in his newspaper that made the AIDS allegation. I am sure that you will agree with me that any serious journal has an obligation to ensure that whenever material is used from another source, it is accurately reported and fully cited. It now seems obvious that Mr. Zapevalov's article does not meet either of these fundamental criteria of responsible journalism.

Beyond this point of journalistic ethics, it is inconceivable that anyone who had done serious research into the AIDS problem could make the irresponsible and totally baseless charge contained in this article. Even a cursory review of the facts of the AIDS epidemic would have revealed that this disease has a complex epidemiological history and worldwide geographical distribution. Moreover, in the regions of the world hardest hit by the epidemic—Central Africa, Haiti, the United States, and Western Europe—different segments of the population appear to be the most severely affected. Serious medical research on this disease is going forward in the United States, the Soviet Union and many other countries. This intense worldwide research effort has not, however, turned up a single shred of credible evidence to support an alleged link between the AIDS epidemic and U.S. military research. I can only conclude that Mr. Zapevalov's charge was a transparent effort to deceive his readers and manipulate genuine popular concern about a dread disease for propaganda purposes.

Unfortunately, the responsibility for this affair does not rest on Mr. Zapevalov alone. Obviously, a journal of the prominence of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* has an obligation to its readers to ensure that its articles do not deliberately misrepresent the truth. In this connection, I noted that the new edition of the draft CPSU Party Program states that "the party and the Soviet state will cooperate with other countries in tackling global problems" including "eradication of dangerous diseases." When articles

such as the one in question appear in the Soviet media, careful readers are entitled to question the seriousness of the Soviet Union's commitment to international efforts to eliminate dread diseases such as AIDS.

I request that this communication be published as a letter-to-the-editor.

Sincerely,

Arthur A. Hartman

June 25, 1986

Dear Mr. Chakovskiy:

It is with a sense of sorrow and disappointment that I am again forced to write to you in regard to the bizarre treatment of the subject of AIDS in your newspaper—this time in a May 7 article, which repeats the absurd claim that AIDS is a chemical warfare agent developed by the CIA and the Pentagon. These assertions are as reprehensible as they are false. One would think that a journal representing itself as intellectual would make every effort to ensure articles are carefully researched and scientifically accurate. Yet the anonymous member of your staff who edited the offensive article in question seems to be ignorant even of Soviet scientists' views on AIDS. For example, Academician Viktor M. Zhdanov, known the world over as an eminent immunologist, stated in the December 7 edition of *Sovyetskaya Kultura* that evidence indicates the disease originated in Central Africa, that it may be related to a similar virus found in monkeys, and that it may have existed for several hundred or even several thousand years, or may have evolved from another virus. In the April 1986 issue of *Priroda*, A. L. Liozner of the Institute of Immunology, and A. F. Bykovskiy of the Gamaleya Epidemiology and Microbiology Institute conclude that there are serious bases for considering that the disease has existed in Africa for a long time. As I have pointed out to you before, serious scientific research has found that AIDS affects different segments of the population in different regions of the world. This research, in which the Soviet Union is taking part, has never uncovered a single bit of evidence to support the assertion that U.S. Government agencies are somehow responsible for creation and dissemination of the disease. I can only conclude, based on a reading of the many objectionable articles appearing in your newspaper in the past several months, that these are nothing more than a blatant and repugnant attempt to sow hatred and fear of Americans among the Soviet

population and to abuse a medical tragedy affecting people all over the world, including in the Soviet Union, for base propaganda purposes. In light of the protests of Soviet public figures over Western press coverage of the Chernobyl disaster, and constant complaints by the same persons about Western portrayals of Soviet citizens, such behavior on your part seems strange, to say the least.

I request that this letter be published as a letter-to-the-editor.

Sincerely,

Arthur A. Hartman

(NOTE: Ambassador Hartman sent a similar letter June 25, 1986, to Mr. Valentin Vasil'Yevich Chikin, Editor-in-Chief, *Sovyetskaya Rossiya*, where the AIDS disinformation charges appeared April 27 and June 8, 1986.)

## Appendix G

### Soviet Interference in U.S. Efforts To Expose the Campaign

The Soviets have interfered with efforts by U.S. Embassy officials to set the record straight and expose the Soviet disinformation campaign. For example, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on December 3, 1986, castigated the Brazilian newspaper *Estado do Sao Paulo*, which earlier in the year had run a retraction following its publication of the AIDS disinformation story.

The Soviets have also interfered in Africa. The Brazzaville (Congo) daily *Mweti* (March 23, 1987) published an article citing the Segal hypothesis that the AIDS virus was created at Fort Detrick, Maryland; *Mweti* subsequently published a letter from the U.S. Ambassador to the Congo, protesting the false charges and supplying information exposing the disinformation effort. Moscow's Novosti news agency then disseminated a report, dated April 17 and datelined Brazzaville, criticizing the U.S. Ambassador's letter to *Mweti*, calling on the West to put an end to the "anti-African campaign," and repeating the charges that the virus was created in U.S. military laboratories.



## Chapter VI

# Soviet Disinformation on Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW)

The United States is party to two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons: the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol of 1925) which prohibits the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons; and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC). The latter bans development, production, stockpiling, or possession and transfer of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes." It also bans the weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins.

Despite the fact that the U.S. has strictly adhered to these agreements, Moscow and its allies have sought to identify the United States as a violator of the BWC and to portray the United States as ruthlessly pursuing offensive chemical and biological weapons (CBW) research. In part, the campaign may be designed to distract world attention from the U.S.S.R.'s CBW activities (see appendix). This campaign has entailed false allegations that the U.S. has:

- produced the AIDS virus as a result of biological warfare experiments;
- provided the Afghan resistance with CBW;
- cooperated with South Africa and/or Israel in developing a so-called ethnic weapon; and
- caused outbreaks of deadly diseases worldwide.

As in other disinformation campaigns, these charges have appeared in a variety of media worldwide but especially in Soviet and Soviet bloc newspapers. In turn, these allegations have been developed as press placements in several newspapers in Third World countries where the Soviets have good access.

Last September, for example, the "unofficial" Soviet Radio Peace and Progress assailed the United States for "pushing through its work on the creation of bacteriological arms . . . in violation of

international conventions." In an April 1987 TASS interview, Veniamin Votyakov, a Soviet member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, repeated the charge in a plea to physicians worldwide to "do their utmost for disrupting the horrifying plans of preparing a chemical and biological war designed by the U.S. military."

A major component of the disinformation about alleged U.S. CBW activities concerns Fort Detrick, Maryland.<sup>1</sup> For example, Fort Detrick has been cited by the Soviets and their allies as the birthplace of AIDS.

Some of the Soviet disinformation themes that have circulated recently are described below. Two key points are pertinent to all of them: the Soviet Union is directly involved in purveying the disinformation, and its repetition in media throughout the world lends credibility to the stories.

## Afghanistan

Moscow and Kabul both published CBW disinformation throughout the past year. The foremost theme of this disinformation was the accusation that the U.S. supplied chemical weapons to the mujahidin. For example, the Soviet daily newspaper *Pravda* (December 2, 1986) asserted that "counter-revolutionary gangs" in Afghanistan were using chemical grenades marked "Made in the United States." At a press conference staged by the Kabul government in September 1986, the Afghans displayed chemical weapons and training manuals which they alleged had been manufactured in the U.S. and captured from the insurgents by the Afghan Army. To ensure widespread publicity for this false story, Soviet and Afghan media gave it extensive coverage on three separate days.

This disinformation theme also has appeared in non-Soviet press. In mid-October 1986, the Indian wire service, United News of India (UNI), published accusations by Soviet General Nikolai Chervov, chief spokesman of the Defense Ministry, that U.S. chemical weapons were being used in Afghanistan;

the UNI item was picked up by India's pro-Soviet as well as mainstream press.

Appearances in non-leftist press are particularly important to the viability of a Soviet disinformation campaign. A conservative daily newspaper in Helsinki, *Uusi Suomi*, carried the chemical warfare disinformation on June 26, 1987. It cited a report from Moscow: "More than 200 American-made chemical mines were found recently at Surobi in Kabul Province, TASS said Thursday, quoting Afghan Army Colonel Mohammad Khashem. The Afghan Chief of Staff... said that French, West German and Egyptian-made chemicals had also been found in Afghanistan."

On June 24, 1986, the Lahore, Pakistan daily *Nawa-I-Waqt* carried a Moscow-dated item alleging that the mujahidin were being given chemical weapons training in Pakistan by American advisers. The Soviets took this theme one step further by claiming in a September 28 TASS report that Pakistan-based U.S. instructors were accompanying the insurgents inside Afghanistan to provide advice on chemical warfare. All of the charges are false.

Probably as a response to U.S. allegations of Soviet violations of chemical and biological agreements, the U.S.S.R. periodically has published charges that the U.S. has fabricated evidence of Soviet use of CBW in Afghanistan. The Soviet and Afghan presses frequently have run stories alleging that the U.S. instructs the mujahidin to use their "American-made" chemical weapons in such a way as to lay the blame on Soviet and Afghan troops. For example, the Soviet Defense Ministry daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* (September 30, 1986) claimed that the U.S., in order to obtain evidence of Soviet complicity in CBW use, ordered the mujahidin to "send to Peshawar [Pakistan] photographs of the people, animals, and plants they had poisoned and samples of water and soil from contaminated areas."

## Korea and Vietnam

In a campaign similar to that of the alleged U.S. CBW activity in Afghanistan, Moscow and its allies continue to accuse the U.S. of having waged CBW during the Korean and Vietnam wars. These allegations often are cited as "evidence" to support disinformation about alleged present or future U.S. CBW activity. For example, an August 1986 North Korean press article titled "In Pursuit of Chemical Warfare" declared: "It is no secret that the U.S. imperialists committed the heinous bestiality of massacring our people with biological and chemical weapons during the Korean War. Even now the U.S. imperialists are introducing numerous chemical weapons into South Korea and conducting

military exercises in preparations for chemical warfare in this area."

In February 1987, prior to the start of joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises, the North Koreans charged that the effects of an alleged epidemic of hemorrhagic fever, which "broke out in South Korea in 1950 in consequence of the germ warfare of the U.S. imperialists," still lingered.

In October 1986, while discussing the need for a chemical weapons ban and assailing U.S. CBW policy,<sup>2</sup> Soviet media charged that the U.S. Army during the Vietnam war acquired great experience in conducting chemical warfare. (Radio Moscow International Service, October 3, 1986). Shortly thereafter, the Soviet monthly journal *International Life* (October 10) and *Pravda* (October 27) repeated old charges of U.S. use of chemical warfare during the Vietnam war. These charges coincided with the U.S. release in October of a Pentagon report detailing Soviet development of chemical weapons.

## Diseases

During the past year, a number of false stories surfaced in Soviet, bloc, and Third World presses alleging U.S. responsibility for the outbreak of a variety of deadly diseases throughout the world. Some of the accusations were crude and, to a sophisticated reader, unbelievable. Many were replays of themes from previous years. For example:

- The U.S.S.R.'s Radio Peace and Progress alleged on September 22, 1986, that "Pentagon bacteriologists are provoking epidemics, hemorrhagic fever in Korea, dengue in Cuba, viral encephalitis in Nicaragua, and conjunctivitis in El Salvador."
- The September 17, 1986, edition of *Krasnaya Zvezda* charged that the "epidemic of 'dengue' fever which affected thousands of Cubans in 1981 was the result of a subversive U.S. operation." Cuban President Castro first leveled this false charge in July 1981, and it has since been replayed by Cuban and Soviet media.
- On December 13, 1986, Soviet Radio Peace and Progress asserted that in Lahore, Pakistan, "American experts conduct research on developing new types of bacteriological weaponry, including those causing grave mental disorders. Local residents meanwhile are being used as guinea pigs by researchers at the Lahore center, with over 500 residents of Lahore who suffer from yellow fever, jaundice, and mental disorders falling victim to criminal experiments." The same broadcast

resurfaced false charges that "Lahore has become the center for breeding particularly dangerous species of mosquitos to be used against the population in Afghanistan." A Soviet commentator, Iona Andronov, originated the "killer mosquito" story in a February 1982 article in the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*.

- The Prague *Tribuna*, in Czech (No 19, 1987) carried an article titled, "Where the Death Bacteria Are Being Cultivated." It listed purported examples of U.S. bacteriological weapons, including a poisonous mushroom causing fever outbreaks, particularly among black people. It accused the U.S. Army of spreading smallpox at Washington National Airport in 1964-65, and repeated old allegations about attacks on Cuba, including blame for a plague that destroyed the Cuban sugar crop.

## Ethnic Weapon

In 1986-87, the U.S.S.R. continued its dis-information campaign alleging that the U.S. was involved in research on a biological weapon designed to kill individuals of a particular ethnic group or race. The charges varied, depending on the intended audience. For example, in Africa, the U.S. purportedly was working with South Africa to develop a weapon that kills only blacks; in the Middle East, it was said to be working with Israel to make a weapon effective only against Arabs. These false charges have appeared since at least 1980, when they appeared in *People's World*, a U.S. Communist Party newspaper.

TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow, and Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress featured the "ethnic weapon" story repeatedly during the 1980s. A partial listing of Soviet stories and broadcasts on this subject follows, to provide a sense of the continuity and persistence of Soviet endorsement of these themes:

**August 13, 1984:** TASS charged that the U.S. and South Africa were developing "carefully selected pathogenic viruses which are practically harmless to whites and mortally dangerous to Africans, Asians, and 'coloreds'." It also alleged that Israel was involved and that viruses were being tested "on Africans in prisons of the apartheid state and on Arab prisoners in Israeli jails."

**April 2, 1985:** The Soviet daily newspaper *Selskaya Zhizn* repeated allegations about South African and Israeli cooperation on an ethnic weapon.

**July 13, 1985:** Radio Moscow domestic service in Russian characterized the CIA and the Pentagon as "the initiators of the development of so-called ethnic weapons."

**October 8, 1985:** The U.S. Embassy in Ghana reported that a recent issue of the *People's Daily Graphic* had featured an article charging U.S., Israeli, and South African research on ethnic weapons, which it attributed to "Soviet sources."

**November 15, 1985:** TASS cited "reports in the press about the development of so-called ethnic weapons in laboratories in the Republic of South Africa and the U.S.A."

**December 27, 1985:** The Soviet newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* carried a TASS item citing a report in the Malagasy newspaper *Carrefour* that the U.S. and South Africa were secretly working on an ethnic weapon. The TASS report mentioned a letter from a Dr. Tyner, director of the division of neuropsychiatry of Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, to a Defense Department official. The letter, a forgery, alleged U.S.-South African cooperation in drugs to be used in "special conditions."

**January 30, 1986:** Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in an anonymous report alleged U.S.-South African research on "ethnic weapons."

**February 5, 1986:** Radio Moscow in Zulu to southern Africa broadcast a report that "Lately there has been growing talk in Africa of the presence of biological weapons in South Africa that can discriminate on the basis of race. These are meant to selectively kill the black race and leave out the white race. Such diabolical weapons are being researched and manufactured with the aid of the United States."

**February 1986:** Novosti cited a Senegalese newspaper, *Takusaan*, alleging U.S. and South African research on "ethnic weapons." The report was published with a Novosti byline by the local writer Garba Inuwa in the February 12 issue of *New Nigerian* and the February 10 issue of *Nigeria Voice*. It charged "American and South African scientists are doing joint research on so-called ethnic weapons designed to kill only blacks."

**February 18, 1986:** Radio Moscow ran a two-minute report alleging South African research on ethnic weapons.

**September 27, 1986:** An article by an author who frequently uses Novosti as a source appeared in the Nigerian newspaper *The Voice*. He reiterated charges of Israeli and South African research on ethnic weapons. At the same time, according to the U.S. Embassy in Lagos, Novosti was distributing to Nigerian newspapers a story titled, "Death at the

Cellular Level: United States and South Africa Develop Ethnic Weapons," by N.U. Pogodi.

**November 18, 1986:** Radio Moscow in English reported that South Africa had developed selected biological warfare that could eliminate blacks without harming whites.

**January 10, 1987:** TASS reported on an interview given to the Soviet magazine *New Times* by Professor Yuri Rychkov of the General Genetics Institute, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. The TASS account gave the impression that Rychkov was very concerned about alleged plans to create an "ethnic weapon." But a comparison of the *New Times* interview with the TASS account shows that several times TASS incorrectly portrayed information contained in questions asked to Rychkov as comments that Rychkov had made. For example, TASS said, "He [Professor Rychkov] notes that the South African army has a unit of biological warfare which studies the possibility of developing viruses and other microorganisms affecting only Africans." But, in the actual interview in *New Times*, it was the interviewer who said this, not Rychkov.

On June 5, 1987, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Charles Wick, protested the ethnic weapon disinformation in a meeting with Novosti director Valentin Falin. The meeting was cut short when Falin asserted that the accusations were true.

Less than one week later, in an interview printed in *Moscow News*, a joint publication of Novosti press agency and the Soviet friendship societies, Falin reiterated the Soviet claims, saying, "It is no secret that the United States has been working on various 'exotic' weapons, including the so-called ethnic ones. These are biological and chemical agents with selective action against people of different races, populating the same areas yet having different genetic susceptibility or vulnerability to these agents. Such facts are widely known, too. Take the report, circulated back in 1974, by Dr. Hammerschlag, an expert of the National Medical Center in Duarte, California, which he delivered at the symposium held in Los Angeles by the American Chemical Society, and the materials published in the journal *Abstracts on Hygiene* (Number 55, 1980)." (sic)

In actuality, Hammerschlag's work refuted allegations that the U.S. had conducted research on an "ethnic weapon." Hammerschlag concluded—in a report, "Chemical Weapons and U.S. Public Policy," published by the American Chemical Society—that "we have no 'story'; no hard evidence that ethnic weapons are or even have been under consideration by the Department of Defense."

## Implications

Moscow's CBW disinformation campaign illustrates two key elements of Soviet strategy: repetition of even the most unbelievable stories pays off in the long run, and even if a disinformation theme has little or no immediate impact on its target audience, it can be replayed or surfaced at an opportune time in the future. Indeed, Moscow seems to have reaped some benefits from this approach. For example, in mid-April 1987 an official Indian armed forces journal, *Sainik Samachar*, published a story under the headline, "The Diabolical Chemical Warfare." This article repeated the false charges spread by the U.S.S.R. that AIDS was developed at Fort Detrick, that the U.S. started a dengue fever epidemic in Cuba, and that the U.S. experimented with chemical and biological weapons in Vietnam, Korea, Laos, and Cambodia.

At a U.S. Department of State-sponsored seminar on "Disinformation, the Media, and Foreign Policy" (May 1987), journalists representing newspapers in Latin America and Africa discussed the impact of such stories on readers in their regions. They noted that they themselves had seen disinformation regarding U.S. involvement with biological and chemical weapons in their regional newspapers. Their consensus was that most readers—particularly those who are not well educated or widely traveled—would believe the stories.

Although no public opinion data are available to gauge the extent to which CBW-related disinformation has had an effect, it is apparent that the U.S.S.R. finds the campaign useful enough to continue to devote resources to it. Also, the fact that non-leftist media occasionally repeat the stories demonstrates the extent to which they are becoming "acceptable."

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> Fort Detrick is discussed in detail in Chapter V, Appendix C. From 1943 to 1969, Fort Detrick was the U.S. Army's biological warfare research and development center. No offensive biological warfare research has been conducted there since 1969, when the facilities were turned over to research on cancer and on defenses against biological warfare.

<sup>2</sup> Soviet criticism of U.S. policies focuses, in part, on the U.S. decision to begin production of binary chemical weapons in 1987. The U.S. is currently in the process of destroying old, less stable stockpiles of chemical weapons. The U.S. continues to abide by the Geneva Protocol, which bans use, not possession, of chemical weapons. The U.S. has pledged that it will not use chemical weapons first, but will possess them for deterrence.

## Appendix

### Soviet CBW Activities

The Soviet disinformation campaign alleging illegal and extensive U.S. CBW activities may, in part, be aimed at diverting attention from massive and, in some instances, illegal Soviet activity in this area. The U.S.S.R. has "the most extensive chemical warfare (CW) capability in the world," according to the 1987 U.S. Department of Defense publication *Soviet Military Power*. This report says that "The types of chemical agents that the Soviets could be expected to employ in war . . . include the following:

- "nerve agents (sarin, soman, and a V-series agent);
- "blister agents (mustard, lewisite, and a mixture of the two);
- "a choking agent (phosgene); and
- "one other agent not specifically identified that causes unconsciousness for an hour or more and has been widely reported as being used in Afghanistan."

Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are parties to the 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, which bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of biological agents or toxins except for small quantities for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes, and the means of delivery for biological agents or toxins. The U.S. is in full compliance with the BWC.

The President's March 10, 1987, report on "Soviet Non-

compliance with Arms Control Agreements" concludes, however, that "the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligations" under the CBW. The 1987 edition of *Soviet Military Power* says that "In addition to anthrax, we believe the Soviets have developed tularemia, plague, and cholera for biological warfare (BW) purposes, as well as botulinum toxin, enterotoxin, and mycotoxins." The report details a suspected BW accident in April 1979 at a Soviet military facility (the Microbiology and Virology Institute) in the city of Sverdlovsk. The U.S. Government analysis of the incident concludes that:

- While bulk quantities of anthrax spores in dry form were probably being prepared, a pressurized system most likely exploded.
- As much as 10 kilograms of dry anthrax spores were released from the Institute.
- Within two weeks, a significant number of deaths occurred. Reports surfaced that hundreds of Soviet citizens died from anthrax inhalation within 7 to 10 days of the outbreak. Other reports stated that in subsequent weeks, 1,000 or more cases may have developed.
- Heavy military involvement, military casualties immediately after the accident, total military control within two weeks, and rooftop spraying of decontaminating solutions from aircraft are not consistent with public health measures for dealing with anthrax acquired by eating bad meat, which is the official Soviet explanation for the outbreak of anthrax.





## Chapter VII

## The Soviet Propaganda and Active Measures Campaign on Afghanistan

The Soviet Union, from the onset of its intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, has conducted a broad campaign to undermine international support for the Afghan resistance (the mujahidin) and to minimize criticism of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. As in Moscow's other efforts to influence international perceptions of controversial issues, this Soviet program has blended diplomacy (particularly in the negotiations in Geneva), propaganda, and active measures, and is targeted at a host of foreign opinionmakers and international organizations.

The active measures and propaganda associated with the campaign employ multiple themes designed to influence the opinions and perceptions of key foreign audiences. Some of these themes are discussed in this chapter, and examples of the specific active measures—principally disinformation—undertaken to exploit them are provided.

### Theme 1: "We Were Invited"

This theme—that the U.S.S.R. entered Afghanistan at the invitation of the sovereign Afghan leadership—was initiated immediately after the Soviet invasion. Although no longer central to the propaganda campaign, it is still evident, particularly in Soviet public diplomacy initiatives in the Third World.

The U.S.S.R. continues to portray the presence of its military forces in Afghanistan in terms of legitimate "fraternal assistance" which is limited in time, scope, and purpose. In a 1980 interview with the West German newspaper *Die Zeit*, Babrak Karmal, the pro-Soviet Afghan installed to head the regime in Kabul after the invasion, indicated that the Soviets came "in response to an official and legal invitation." Karmal issued his invitation while he was in the Soviet Union. Two Soviet publications, *The Truth About Afghanistan* and *Afghanistan Today*, cite Soviet "military assistance" as valid and in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation (signed in 1978) and Article 51 of the UN Charter,

which provides for collective and individual self-defense.

After more than seven years of continuous presence in Afghanistan—now involving a force of 116,000—Moscow still asserts that Soviet forces remain only at Kabul's behest. Moscow and Kabul argue that the decision to withdraw Soviet forces is a bilateral matter. The Soviets concede that "arrangements" for the eventual Soviet withdrawal may be discussed in the Geneva process, but that the decision ultimately rests with Moscow and Kabul.

### Theme 2: "Outside Interference Prolongs the Problem"

A related theme intended to justify the Soviet military presence is alleged external interference by Pakistan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—all at the instigation of the United States. For example, a June 28, 1987, TASS report claimed that Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) army units had seized from the mujahidin large quantities of French 82mm and 40mm chemical mines as well as chemical weapons produced in Egypt and FRG.

Criticism of France, such as the DRA protest of the French Foreign Minister's "irresponsible and provocative assertions" in support of the mujahidin, usually is reserved for domestic Afghan audiences. France, according to a Kabul radio broadcast on May 11, 1987, "like other imperialist and reactionary countries . . . is interested, through a so-called screen of democracy, in a continuation of war and bloodshed in the DRA, and in maintaining a conflict situation." The "external forces of imperialism" and their "accomplices" are said to include the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Japan, F.R.G., U.K., Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, according to a February 1986 issue of the Soviet publication *Agitator Tadzhikistana*.

Foreign media reports supportive of this propaganda line are regularly cited by the Soviets to establish its credibility and legitimacy. For example, the Soviet dailies *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and

*Trud* in February 1986 cited such an article appearing in a leftist Egyptian publication, *al-Ahali*; the author of the item had visited Afghanistan at Kabul's invitation and reported the "truth" about the country—that life was proceeding normally on the whole, but was hindered by U.S. and other interference.

### **Theme 3: "The United States Does Not Want Peace in Afghanistan"**

Closely related to the "outside interference" theme is the claim that Washington is unwilling to entertain any thought of compromise and that U.S. policy is to fight the Soviets "to the last Afghan." Further, Moscow wishes to create the perception that Washington controls Pakistani foreign policy and will veto any compromise that does not support U.S. "neo-globalist" aims. DRA Foreign Minister Wakil, in an interview with *Pravda* (March 19, 1987), contended that the Geneva talks could have been concluded if only Pakistan had been flexible, and asserted that U.S. "anti-Afghan policy" remained the chief obstacle to success.

### **Theme 4: "The Mujahidin Are Bandits"**

Moscow's media campaign to portray the mujahidin as CIA-financed criminals, saboteurs, and murderers is intended to undermine domestic and international support for the resistance movement and portray Soviet forces as a stabilizing factor in the country. In order to distract attention from Western reports of Soviet and Afghan atrocities, Soviet media occasionally claim that the mujahidin dress in Soviet Army uniforms and stage massacres which are filmed for Western television (*Izvestiya*, January 14, 1986; *Pravda*, February 15, 1986).

Soviet news stories, often repeated in other countries' media after being carried by TASS or Radio Moscow, portray the resistance as anti-Islamic. During a recent interview with Western journalists, DRA leader Najibullah cited the destruction of 25 mosques as evidence of the counter-revolutionaries' anti-Islamic orientation. In *Afghanistan Today*, the resistance is identified as "fanatics disguised as Islam's defenders" who murder patriotic clergy and destroy mosques.

The Soviet media often cite stories from the Press Trust of India (PTI). The U.S. Government has learned from defectors that many PTI reports are Soviet-planted disinformation. For example,

Radio Moscow referred to a PTI item (published in the Indian paper *Hagat*) which reported that 1,500 U.S. advisers, 300 of whom were said to be CIA agents, were providing chemical weapons training to members of the Pakistan-based Afghan resistance. A story in the Indian evening paper, *News Today* (April 10, 1986) claimed that Sikh terrorists were being trained in the same CIA-sponsored camps.

Distorted and fabricated reports also appear in Pakistani media. Agents of the Kabul government have infiltrated the refugee camps in Pakistan, planted bombs throughout Pakistan, and conducted other terrorist operations. Soviet-sponsored articles then appear locally, blaming the violence on refugees in order to generate hostility toward the refugee population.

Moscow also expends considerable effort to portray U.S. support for the mujahidin as "state-sponsored terrorism." The increase in Soviet military aircraft losses in Afghanistan has prompted a new wave of bogus accounts of mujahidin terrorism. The downing of a transport aircraft was retold in the Hungarian News Agency's English-language *Daily News*. Identifying an Associated Press report (datelined Islamabad) as the source, the Hungarian daily recounted the shootdown of a "civilian" airliner. In fact, it was a Soviet-supplied military transport aircraft on a military mission.

### **Theme 5: Najibullah: "We Are Not Communists"**

In a recent interview with *Die Zeit*, DRA leader Najibullah vehemently denied he was a communist and stated that "Afghanistan is not now, nor has it ever been communist." He further described himself as a "son of my Muslim people," although last year he prided himself on being a "son of Lenin" upon assuming, in May 1986, the leadership of the People's Democratic (communist) Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

Regime efforts to portray Najibullah as pro-Islam have been stepped up over the past year. The regime is now fronted by an acting chief of state, Haji Mohammed Chamkani, who uses the Mecca pilgrimage honorific *Haji* before his name. The regime media regularly extol the government's support for Islam, and the leadership attempts visibly to demonstrate its Islamic credentials. For example, three leaders—Karmal, Keshtmad, and Najibullah—participated in *Eid-al Adha* (Feast of Sacrifice) in Kabul's central mosque in August 1986. In February 1987, at the inauguration of the Islamic Studies Research Center at Kabul University, Najibullah emphasized the role of "patriotic clergy" in building a "progressive"

Afghanistan. Additionally, a Ministry of Islamic Affairs has been formed.

The Kabul regime widely publicizes its subsidies to religious institutions. It does not mention that they are paid out of the institutions' own endowments, which were seized by the state. It also institutionalizes the "patriotic clergy" and centrally controls the actions of these influential opinion-leaders. Entry to the colleges of religious jurisprudence and Islamic learning is strictly controlled by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowment and the Council of Ulema and Religious Leaders, both controlled by and responsible to the PDPA.

To prove to the world that it is Islamic, not communist, the Kabul government is seeking reinstatement in the 44-member Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). In early July 1987, the Afghan Foreign Minister invited the Secretary General of the OIC to talk with Afghan clergy, see the Islamic Research Center, and discuss Kabul's participation in the OIC.

A propaganda pamphlet—almost certainly produced by the U.S.S.R.—titled "Islam and Liberation Struggle" was distributed in Burma in 1986. Its message: Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was undertaken in defense of Islam and against reactionary, imperialist-sponsored Muslim elements. The United States is portrayed as anti-Islam; readers are warned of danger to Islam in Palestine, Jerusalem, and Lebanon, where "Muslims are being killed with American weapons."

Moscow is unlikely to allow Islamic institutions to increase their role in Kabul's political activity without close controls. The recent law on political parties is indicative of Moscow's approach. Radio Kabul (July 4, 1987) reported that the Revolutionary Council had adopted a law allowing new political parties—but only those that would agree to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union. This, in addition to the requirement that the new parties would have to support a nonaligned Afghanistan and "the consolidation of the historic friendship with the Soviet Union" (*Washington Post*, July 6, 1987).

The themes cited above are a mixture of propaganda and outright distortion. Some of the examples mentioned—such as brochure on Islam, which is probably Soviet in origin—constitute active measures. Others are not so clearly identifiable as deceptive, but better fall in the category of propaganda reflecting Moscow's vision or version of reality.

Below are examples of major Soviet and DRA deception activities designed to manipulate public opinion. All were initiated after General Secretary Gorbachev came to power.

## Deception: The Sham Withdrawal

The most flagrant attempt to deceive the West was the October 1986 sham withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan. This active measure, which coincided with the annual UN debate and vote on the Soviet occupation, underscored the U.S.S.R.'s intention not to degrade the military effectiveness of Soviet forces already actively engaged.

In his televised speech from Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, Gorbachev announced:

Before the end of 1986, six regiments—one tank regiment, two motorized rifle regiments, and three antiaircraft regiments—will be returned from Afghanistan to the homeland, with their authorized equipment and arms. These units will return to the areas of permanent deployment in the Soviet Union and in such a way that all those who are interested can verify this.

The withdrawal began with fanfare on October 15 and was completed by the end of the month. Soviet military spokesmen insisted that the units withdrawn had been in Afghanistan for years. In fact, this was not the case. The withdrawn units were as follows:

1. **Three air defense regiments, constituting half of the promised withdrawal package.** This component illustrates the limited significance of the original Soviet proposal: Such units play no military role against the mujahidin, who have no air force.

2. **The only tank regiment in Afghanistan, stationed at Shindand.** This regiment had been severely understrength. In an effort to bring it to full strength for the withdrawal ceremonies, the U.S.S.R. sent additional tanks into Afghanistan in September and October. During the withdrawal ceremonies, Western correspondents noted that the vehicles paraded as part of this departing regiment showed few signs of wear and that the Soviet soldiers associated with the unit claimed never to have seen any mujahidin. In short, it was a trick.

3. **Two motorized rifle regiments, the only true potentially combat-necessary troops.** This was another trick. These troops were brought into Afghanistan shortly after the Vladivostok speech solely to be withdrawn with public fanfare and without ever having been used against the mujahidin. The newly introduced motorized rifle regiments had markedly different equipment from that of the regiments they temporarily displaced at Shindand and Kunduz. Specifically, the units included truck-mounted infantry with towed artillery, whereas standard equipment for motorized rifle regiments in Afghanistan includes

armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery.

After these two truck-mounted regiments were withdrawn, the motorized rifle regiments previously stationed at Shindand and Kunduz were returned to their respective garrisons. In effect, all motorized rifle regiments that were in Afghanistan on the day of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech remained in Afghanistan after the alleged withdrawal.

The October 1986 withdrawal was not the first incident in which the Soviets had sought to deceive the West with staged force reductions. In 1980, for example, Moscow announced a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan weeks before the Moscow Olympics. These troops, some 5,000, were not suited for the Afghan terrain and counter guerrilla operations. Even as the unwanted forces were being withdrawn, new and more useful units were being introduced.

## Deception: The Cease-Fire and Refugee-Return

In mid-December 1986, the Soviet leadership received virtually the entire Afghan leadership for four days of meetings in Moscow. This was the first such visit in six years. Several weeks later, Najibullah announced plans for a unilateral cease-fire and a proposal for a coalition government. Within days of this announcement, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and International Department chief Dobrynin led the highest ranking Soviet delegation to Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion.

In an authoritative TASS report issued at the close of the visit, Moscow announced that the Soviet leadership totally approved of Kabul's initiatives. Shevardnadze added that Gorbachev had personally dispatched the Soviet delegation as part of the campaign to generate momentum and to display Moscow's desire for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. The main points of the "national reconciliation" <sup>1</sup> as proposed by Najibullah include:

- Implementing a cease-fire;
- Refraining from armed struggle and bloodshed in resolving Afghan questions, now and in the future;
- Maintaining just representation in the political structure and economic life of Afghanistan;

- Granting general amnesty and refraining from prosecution based on past political activity;
- Protecting and consolidating national, historical, and cultural traditions; and
- Respecting and observing the sacred religion of Islam.

Apparently, the amnesty was used to increase the number of available fighting men. Many of the soldiers who deserted the Kabul ranks during June and July fighting have reported that they were released from prison and immediately pressed into the army.

A news report in the Pakistani English-language daily *The Muslim* (January 6, 1987) alleged that three former Afghan officials were in Kabul the same time as Shevardnadze and Dobrynin to discuss participation in the proposed national reconciliation process. The bogus story was picked up the following day by All India Radio, which identified the visitors as former Afghan Ambassador to India Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, former Afghan Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Yusuf, and former Afghan Minister of Justice and UN representative Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi.

Tabibi, who in fact resigned his diplomatic post in protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, publicly denounced the fraudulent account of the visit and insisted he had "not visited Kabul or participated in any negotiations with the communist authorities." Yusuf and Pazhwak also publicly denied the story.

This disinformation ploy was carefully timed to give substance to the sense of seriousness of Moscow's initiative, to minimize anticipated criticism of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan at the then-upcoming Islamic summit in Kuwait, and to generate a false sense of positive momentum for the February 1987 round of Geneva negotiations between Kabul and Islamabad. At the regional level, the purpose was to sow discord among the mujahidin political parties in Peshawar and to encourage refugees to return to Afghanistan.

Last May, a Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman reported on the progress of the national reconciliation effort. He claimed that 1,300 national reconciliation commissions had already been established, and 949 villages "peacefully liberated."

In concert with the cease-fire and national reconciliation initiatives, Kabul has used deception to convince international public opinion that Afghan refugees are eager to return and that, when given the opportunity of the cease-fire, many are doing so. Kabul media, for example, claimed on July 6 and 7, 1987, that more than 60,000 refugees had returned to Afghanistan in response to the

national reconciliation campaign. These claims, however, are highly exaggerated.

In February 1987, an Afghan television crew in Kabul delayed a scheduled Afghan airline flight to film a faked return of Afghan refugees from India. The "returnees" actually were Kabul citizens pretending to be refugees. The film was then aired on German television to lend credibility to and generate international support for the reconciliation initiative. To explain the limited numbers of refugees returning home, Kabul claims that Pakistan and Iran forcibly block many seeking to return.

In an appeal to entice refugees to return and to persuade the mujahidin to lay down their arms, Kabul also has announced an amnesty for prisoners and "misled patriots." The Soviet and Afghan media regularly report the release of thousands of prisoners. One such prisoner release, on February 7, 1987, was arranged to ensure maximum media coverage. In addition to three Western journalists, Soviet and Czechoslovak correspondents were on hand.

Although the DRA regime has announced that 1,300 prisoners have been released, Western journalists estimate the numbers to be in the range of 650-800. The regime implies this is a wide-ranging amnesty program for "estranged brothers," but upon closer examination, the prisoner releases and amnesty program specifically exclude mujahidin, who by definition are "professional murderers, spies, saboteurs," and not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. The prisoner amnesty program in fact applies to only a limited number of candidates who fall into one or more of the following categories: <sup>2</sup>

- Over 60 years of age;
- Female;
- Under 18 at the time of commission of the crime;
- Incurable illnesses;
- A sentence of five years or less; and
- A sentence of seven years, of which four have been served.

## Deception: Forgeries

The Soviets and the DRA Government have published forged letters attributed to the mujahidin. For example, two pamphlets containing forgeries were published in 1984: "Chemical Weapons: Who Resorts to Its Use?" and "Armed Intervention and Other Forms of Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Both pamphlets purport to have

been printed in Kabul, but the latter one, which is much more professionally typeset, probably was printed in the U.S.S.R. The forgeries cited in the pamphlets falsely claim that chemical weapons have been used by the mujahidin.

One forged letter bearing the letterhead of the Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan resistance group says: "I'm sending to you the chemical substances, which had been requested earlier. You should hand the chemicals over to the person, who had been introduced earlier, as soon as possible, to be used according to the previous plan in envisaged places."

Another forged letter purports to be from Sayed Ahmad Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan resistance group. It says: "The poisoning chemical substances sent to you must be used very carefully, i.e., the time of usage during the operation must be chosen carefully not to harm the mujahidin, and in the case of unproper [sic] weather conditions, it is better to leave the place of operation. Afterwards, send all the poisoned people to Peshawar as soon as possible for the propaganda purposes."

These letters are fairly crude, in some cases using incorrect words for common Afghan terms. For example, in one forgery, the word *artish* was used for "army," which is proper usage in Iran or Soviet Tajikistan, but not in Afghanistan. In addition, the same typewriter was used for letters supposedly written by different resistance groups.

## Conclusion

It is difficult to assess the precise impact and effectiveness of Moscow's deception initiatives in support of its military campaign in Afghanistan. Many people throughout the world remain skeptical of Soviet motives in Afghanistan. The continuing occupation remains a sore point in the U.S.S.R.'s dealings with Third World nations, members of its own bloc, and Western peace groups.

A recent United States Information Agency survey of the world press found that Third World media continue to express condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. West European, Australian, and Canadian media consider Moscow's willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan a test of Soviet sincerity and credibility in other areas, including arms control. <sup>3</sup>

It should be noted, however, that despite seven years of waging a brutal, high-technology war against a less developed, nonthreatening neighbor—a war that has drive one quarter of Afghanistan's population into exile—the U.S.S.R. at the most recent Nonaligned Conference again escaped condemnation for its actions. It is safe to assume that the International Department of the

Central Committee will continue energetically to pursue what it must regard as a reasonably successful active measures campaign on Afghanistan.

release of prisoners, an amnesty, and economic assistance for returning refugees.

<sup>2</sup> "Text of Najibullah News Conference of January 18, 1987," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, South Asia, Volume VIII, January 21, 1987.

<sup>3</sup> United States Information Agency, Foreign Media Analysis, "World Press Says If Gorbachev Is Serious About Peace He Must Withdraw From Afghanistan" (July 8, 1987).

## Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> The plan is virtually identical to the reconciliation program launched under Babrak Karmal. In 1985, Karmal promised a government composed of all political groups, the

## Chapter VIII

# Soviet Relations in Latin America

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first is a report on the results of a conference on Soviet activities in Latin America. The conference, sponsored by the Department of State on May 7, 1987, brought together nine scholars to discuss the entire range of the U.S.S.R.'s interaction in the region. The report provides a useful context for the second section, a discussion of Soviet cultural and information activities in Latin America. The second section was not a product of the conference.

Neither section focuses on propaganda or active measures, but rather on legitimate international relations. This chapter is included in this report to describe—using the example of one region, Latin America—the backdrop of diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities against which Soviet influence activities take place. The interaction between these legitimate international relations and the deception activities that constitute active measures may be subtle. For example, a student scholarship program for study in the Soviet bloc is in the first, legitimate category. If that program is then used to prepare agents of influence, for example, it encroaches on the realm of active measures. Likewise, international radio broadcasting is an acceptable means of disseminating information and propaganda; its use to spread disinformation, however, ties it to active measures.

The views expressed in the first section of this chapter are those of the conference participants and do not necessarily reflect Department of State positions or policies. The conference participants were: Cole Blasier, University of Pittsburgh; Juan del Aguila, Emory University; Robert Evanson, University of Missouri, Kansas City; David Jordan, University of Virginia; Bruce McColm, Freedom House; Eusebio Mujal-Leon, Georgetown University; William Richardson, Wichita State University; Jiri Valenta, University of Miami; and Robert Wesson, The Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

## Section I: Diplomatic and Economic Interactions

In the past two decades the Soviet Union has increased its diplomatic, economic, cultural, and political activities in Latin America. Although the area remains a low-level priority for Moscow vis-a-vis the rest of the Third World, Latin America is viewed as an arena for competition with the U.S. Soviet interest in Latin America is due primarily to the region's political and strategic importance to the U.S. The priority of Latin America on the Soviet agenda may change; during late 1986-early 1987, rumors have circulated of a Latin American visit this year or next by General Secretary Gorbachev.

The Soviets follow two approaches to political relations with Latin America: state-to-state, involving the pursuit of "normal" diplomatic and economic ties with non-Marxist governments; and party-to-party, aimed at developing ties with the region's communist regimes, parties, and leftist groups. In 1960, the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic relations with only five countries in the region. Today, it has relations with 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries and engages in some economic activity with nearly all countries in the region. Communist party relations have been strongest with Marxist Cuba and Nicaragua where Soviet influence has been most significant.

The Soviets have expanded trade relations in Latin America partly by taking advantage of U.S. barriers to certain imports. U.S. quotas are one reason for recent increased Soviet purchases of sugar from Guyana and Caribbean countries. The U.S.S.R. now buys from Nicaragua bananas and other products no longer salable in the United States. Argentine President Alfonsin has said that unless the West opens its doors to increased exports, his country will be forced to trade more with the socialist bloc.

Trade relations have served to expand Soviet presence in Latin America, but have been costly to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets imported approximately three times what they have exported to the region.



As it has in the Middle East and Africa, the U.S.S.R. has sought to extend influence through the supply of weapons and military advisers. To date, military relations have been established only with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru. Most military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua is given on a grant basis. Cuba has received \$9 billion in assistance since 1960. Soviet sales and assistance to Peru since 1973 are valued at about \$1.5 billion. Peru is currently deeply in debt to the U.S.S.R.

The foundation of Soviet cultural relations with Latin America is exchange visits and scholarships for study in the U.S.S.R. The number of scholarships offered to Central Americans to pursue post-secondary degree programs increased sixfold from 1979 to 1983. Corresponding figures for scholarships provided by the U.S. Government to Latin Americans remained relatively low and constant for the same time period.

Despite its multifaceted presence in Latin America, the U.S.S.R.'s success in expanding influence has been limited. U.S. influence remains strong and widespread. Recently both U.S. and Soviet interests have been served by the return in many Latin American countries to constitutional government and civilian rule.

### Soviet Views of Latin America

Throughout the 19th century, Russian scientists and travelers visited many Latin American countries. By the 1890s the Russian Empire had established official and economic relations with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. After the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet diplomats, trade representatives, and political advisers were sent to Latin America to extend those earlier relations, establish a Soviet presence, and set up local communist parties.

Soviet attention to and relations with Latin America have fluctuated among countries and over time. The Mexican Communist Party was founded in 1919, and in 1924 Mexico became the first country in the Western Hemisphere to exchange ambassadors with the U.S.S.R. Disagreements between the two countries in the Comintern, however, led to a break in relations in 1930, a major setback for the Soviets with the Latin American country they knew best at that time. It was not until the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941 and the subsequent anti-fascist military alliance of World War II that relations with Mexico and several other Latin American countries were restored. In the postwar period, the Cold War strained many of the newly established diplomatic relationships. However, Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina maintained relations with the U.S.S.R.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American studies began to be emphasized in the U.S.S.R. In

1961, after Castro's success in Cuba, Soviet interest was whetted, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences established an Institute on Latin America to train scholars and to provide guidance to policymakers.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets concentrated on diplomatic, commercial, and cultural contacts. They encouraged exchange visits ranging from ballet troupes to government officials, set up Soviet reading rooms, and offered scholarships. The Soviet leadership scaled back support for revolutionary activities in countries where conditions did not appear favorable for radical change. Attention was directed instead to improving relations with such "progressive" forces as Allende's Popular Unity government in Chile.

More recently, the Soviets have been encouraged by the success of revolutionary forces in Nicaragua and the ability of the "united fronts" to bring together in political coalitions communist and noncommunist radicals in countries as different as El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay. The Soviet Union probably perceives a weakening of the inter-American security system caused by: a decline of U.S. influence in the region; the Falklands/Malvinas War; a stronger sense of Latin American nationalism; and the emergence of such regional powers as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The Soviets interpret these events as a shift in the correlation of forces in their favor.

Soviet approaches to the region have been evolving over the past two decades. Although they have viewed most of Latin America as not ripe for revolutionary change, the Soviets have tried to take advantage of opportunities as they have arisen. In addition to state-to-state relationships based on diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties, the U.S.S.R. has pursued party-to-party relations. Although the U.S.S.R. will readily exploit such conditions as those that led to leftist Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, the Soviets' relations with the "new democracies" suggest they recognize there is much to gain from official state-to-state relations.

### State-to-State Relations

The Soviet Union seeks to establish diplomatic, economic, cultural, and political relations with as many Latin American nations as possible. Through these ties, the U.S.S.R. exploits, whenever possible, deeply rooted Latin American resentment toward the United States. It plays to Latin American nationalism by encouraging self-assertiveness on the world stage, demands for better export prices, restriction of multinational corporations (MNCs), nationalization of MNC holdings, and refusal to repay debt. The Soviets also seek support for their positions on such broad themes as peace, disarmament, the militarization of outer space, debt

relief, and independence vis-a-vis the U.S. The goal is weakening of Latin ties with the U.S.

The 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries that have diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. are Mexico, Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and all of South America except for Chile and Paraguay. Despite these broadscale relations, no Soviet leader has visited the Latin American mainland. It is now rumored that Gorbachev may soon visit, perhaps in early 1988.

In October 1986, Raul Alfonsin became the first Argentine President to travel to the U.S.S.R. Also in October, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze traveled to Mexico, the first Latin American country other than Cuba to be visited by a Soviet foreign minister. In January 1987, Shevardnadze met in Moscow with ambassadors from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay as members of the Contadora and support groups to express Soviet backing for the peace effort in Central America. Soon after, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov traveled to Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay. A Brazilian official reported in May, 1987 that Shevardnadze would pay an official visit to Brazil in October.

## Economic Relations

Trade has been a key factor in extending Soviet influence. The U.S.S.R. will trade with almost any country, regardless of politics. For example, in 1964, trade relations with Brazil continued despite the onset of anticommunist military rule.

After the Cuban revolution, the U.S.S.R. picked up the slack in Cuban exports created by the loss of U.S. markets for sugar and other products. Since that time the number of Soviet trading partners in the region has increased steadily. For more than 15 years, the U.S.S.R. has traded with 8 of the 12 South American countries, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. The U.S.S.R.'s top Latin American trading partners are Cuba, Argentina, and Brazil.

As a result of the 1980 partial grain embargo imposed upon the U.S.S.R. by the United States, the Soviets became Argentina's biggest customer in the early 1980s, purchasing 80 percent of Argentine grain exports in 1982. Despite subsequent declines, sales in 1985 still exceeded \$1.5 billion. Trade fell in 1986, leaving the Soviets far down the list of Argentine trading partners. A recent agreement between the two commits them to high levels of trade through 1990.

Soviet imports from Brazil, primarily foodstuffs, iron ore, and pig iron, rose from \$226 million in 1979 to \$864 million in 1983. In 1985, the figure declined to \$495 million as a result of a drop in overall Soviet food orders and Soviet disinclination

to import from Brazil given its extreme bilateral balance-of-trade deficit.

Brazilian imports from the U.S.S.R., primarily oil, amounted to \$91 million in 1985. Attracted by Brazil's large domestic market, the Soviets have been pressing hard to sell manufactured goods. In November 1985, the U.S.S.R. and Brazil signed a \$1.5 billion trade agreement designed to triple the 1985 level of trade between the two countries.

In addition to trade, the U.S.S.R. has offered technical assistance, for example, to build smelters for the metal industries in Bolivia and for construction—especially hydroelectric—projects in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. The U.S.S.R. imports much of its tin from Bolivia and exports machinery, equipment, and technology. Trade between the two countries has fluctuated owing to changes in Soviet tin requirements and inconsistency in Bolivian production, but Soviet investment in upgrading Bolivia's mining sector indicates the relationship will persist. The Soviets have offered technological assistance in oil and natural gas, copper smelting, iron and steel heavy industry, and transportation—areas that could lead to Soviet sales of machinery and equipment.

The Soviets will also build two textile factories in Chihuahua, Mexico. In turn, Mexico has expressed interest in the joint manufacture of tractors, will send workers to the U.S.S.R. for training, and will sell steel products, pipes, and oil drilling equipment for Soviet industry.

Soviet trade with Mexico in the 1970s averaged about \$9 million dollars yearly. This figure rose in the 1980s to \$24 million, still a small amount. In 1983, the two countries formed a Joint Commission for Economic Trade and Coordination.

The Soviet share of Latin American trade remains small, totaling around 4 percent; the United States accounts for 40 percent of the region's trade.

But although their share of Latin American trade is small, the Soviets import three times as much as they export. This is caused by several factors: the availability of substitute sources for Latin American imports, an anticommunist sentiment in many countries, the lack of complementarity between local economies and the Soviet economy, and a general Latin American conviction that Soviet products are inferior.

To balance trade, the Soviets have sent delegations to expand markets for Soviet products and for joint development projects that guarantee use of Soviet equipment. Countertrade agreements with Argentina and Brazil—with which the Soviet deficits are largest—now require the trading partner to purchase a specific amount of Soviet goods or to include Soviet-manufactured products as a certain percentage of the partner's total purchases.

Soviet military sales to Latin America have steadily grown: \$0.6 billion in 1973-76, \$2.1 billion in 1977-1980, and \$3.6 billion in 1981-84. These arms shipments went to just a few countries: Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, and Grenada.

From 1974 through 1978, Peru received 65 percent of its total arms purchases from the U.S.S.R. It also was buying heavy equipment and selling nonferrous metals, wool, and foodstuffs in return. Despite the return of civilian rule in Peru in 1980, and the subsequent decline in Peruvian-Soviet trade, Soviet sales to the Peruvian military have continued. An estimated 3,000 Peruvian military personnel had been trained in the U.S.S.R. as of 1985, and currently there are about 115 Soviet military advisers in Peru. This Soviet-Peruvian military relationship has survived several changes of regime in Lima and likely will persist.

### Cultural Relations

The U.S.S.R. has offered thousands of scholarships and other forms of assistance to Latin American students and professionals, primarily in the scientific and technical fields. The total number of students in the U.S.S.R. from Latin America and the Caribbean more than doubled between 1979 and 1985, from 2,900 to 7,600. Many others study in East European countries (3,000 in 1983) and in Cuba (6,400 in 1984).

The Soviet Union also has sought to extend influence through interactions with the media, relying on official Soviet agencies (TASS and Novosti) as well as Cuban (Prensa Latina). In March 1987, an agreement was signed between the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the private Argentine television company Channel 9. The Soviets are to send to Argentina feature programs which will be broadcast throughout the country and distributed to 20 countries in Latin America. A tentative agreement was also made between the U.S.S.R. and the state company Argentina Televisora Color to exchange feature, news, and musical programs, especially to highlight the Soviet national holiday of November 7 and the Argentine national holiday of May 25. Both Argentine companies expressed interest in receiving satellite broadcasts of the "Vremya" news program.

### Special Relationships With Cuba and Nicaragua

The U.S.S.R.'s closest ally in Latin America, Cuba, is dependent upon Soviet economic support for survival. Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba exceeds \$4 billion annually or about \$10 million per day. Cuba runs a large trade deficit with the U.S.S.R.; its debt to the U.S.S.R. and other

bloc countries exceeds \$22 billion. In addition, Cuba owes Western banks and governments about \$3.42 billion in hard currency and \$85 million in commercial credits.

The Soviet Union and East European countries shelter the Cuban economy from the fluctuations of the world market by purchasing sugar and nickel at fixed prices. The U.S.S.R. sells oil to Cuba at bargain prices, enabling Cuba to resell some at a profit on the world market. In 1985 Cuba earned about half its hard currency from the resale of Soviet oil. In addition, Cuba benefits from generous credits that enable it to continue running a trade deficit with the bloc: In 1985 Cuba reported that trade credits from the U.S.S.R. for the period 1986-90 would increase by 50 percent over those of the previous five years.

Cuban imports from the U.S.S.R. in 1985 amounted to \$6,448 million, and exports to the U.S.S.R. totaled \$5,374 million. In comparison, the U.S.S.R.'s total trade with Brazil amounted to \$586 million, and with Argentina to \$1,365 million—mostly grain. Member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) accounted for 90 percent of Cuban imports and 85 percent of exports in 1985.

Because of the fall in world oil and sugar prices, Cuba's hard-currency earnings are down dramatically. In December 1986, Castro announced that in 1987 Cuba would be purchasing from the West less than half the level of 1986 imports, or about \$600 million. Cuba has made up these losses by trading more and more with CEMA countries, primarily the U.S.S.R. Thus, during the 1970s when sugar prices were high, Cuba purchased nearly one-third of its imports from the West. By 1986, that share was down to 15 percent; it probably will fall below 10 percent in 1987. Cuban officials admitted in 1986 that CEMA states made up more than 85 percent of Cuban trade. Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet bloc has made the country a reliable ally of the U.S.S.R. and has helped give the Soviets extensive influence in the management and direction of Cuba's affairs.

In return for their extensive economic assistance, the Soviets have acquired a major military asset in the Western Hemisphere. Soviet arms shipments and military assistance have made the Cuban military the best equipped in Latin America. Soviet military aid to Cuba increased dramatically in the 1980s. Over the last two decades, \$9 billion worth of Soviet military equipment has been delivered to Cuba free of charge. Nearly 60 percent arrived since 1980. As of 1985, about 2,800 Soviet military advisers and 7,000 civilian advisers were stationed in Cuba. In addition, at Lourdes, near Havana, the Soviets operate a major intelligence-gathering facility capable of monitoring U.S. communications. This is

the Soviets' most sophisticated such facility outside their territory.

The Soviets can act through Cuba to extend their influence, and at the same time deflect criticism for direct involvement in the region. The Cubans generally are more effective than the Soviets in dealing with other Latin Americans. Cuban military facilities reportedly have trained at least 20,000 persons from nearly all Latin American countries in guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics. Cuba also has supported armed violence in Central America. In 1980, Castro played a major role in uniting the five factions in Nicaragua into a single revolutionary organization.

A party-to-party agreement between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua has been in effect since 1980. President Daniel Ortega has made several official visits to Moscow; Soviet and other communist party delegations visit Nicaragua regularly. Lately, however, the Soviets reportedly have been dismayed by the Sandinistas' inability to run an efficient and organized government. The Soviet leadership has been unwilling to commit aid to the extent of that given to Cuba. Soviet bloc aid to Nicaragua in 1986 was estimated at \$835 million: \$300 million was economic aid; the rest, military assistance. As with Cuba, the Sandinista government probably would collapse without Soviet support.

The CEMA share of Nicaraguan imports rose from zero in 1980 to 26 percent in 1984. CEMA's share of Nicaraguan exports went from 3 percent to 6 percent in the same period. The U.S.S.R. has become the major supplier of oil and other necessities. According to statistics for 1985, Nicaragua's imports from the U.S.S.R. totaled \$39 million, with exports to the U.S.S.R. at \$10 million. In 1986, the Soviets provided \$300 million in economic aid.

Soviet military aid to Nicaragua rose from \$6 million in 1980 to \$250 million in 1984, dropped to \$115 million in 1985, and jumped to \$580 million in 1986. In 1986, the estimated number of Soviet military advisers in Nicaragua was between 50 and 70, while there were an estimated 2,000-2,500 Soviet-subsidized Cuban military advisers. Soviet advisers generally are engaged in technical assistance, not direct military operations. East German and Cuban advisers are active in military intelligence and the security organization.

The Soviets also are helping to develop the economic infrastructure of Nicaragua. In coming months, work is to begin on an extensive irrigation system for 70,000 acres in the central plains and on a new water system for Managua. Continuing projects include Bulgarian construction of a deep-water port at El Bluff on the Atlantic coast and a food cannery in the Sebaco Valley, north of

Managua. Aeroflot now has scheduled flights to Managua.

Moscow has targeted the communist parties and labor movements of Latin America as further means of extending influence and securing support for foreign policy objectives. Following the directives of the 26th and 27th CPSU congresses, many Latin American communist parties were encouraged to strengthen ties with the region's social democratic parties, particularly in Peru and Argentina.

The Soviets have been proceeding carefully in expanding and exploiting ties with Latin American communist parties and leftist groups. They want to avoid offending most presiding governments by supporting local communists too strongly. The Soviets, in many cases, have more to gain in dealing with local governments than with local parties and must be careful not to undermine local communist parties by making the latter's dependency too obvious. Cuba often takes the U.S.S.R.'s place in overtly supporting local parties, allowing the Soviets to remain at one remove.

Today many Latin American communist parties are in the political mainstream of their countries, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia. They have played by the democratic rules now in place in most South American countries. But they have neither renounced their rhetorical commitment to world revolution nor their support for Soviet policies.

The Soviets, however, have not been concerned with actively directing the Latin American communist parties. Visits of party officials this spring were relatively low key. Secretary General of the Argentine Communist Party (PCA), Athos Fava, met with Gorbachev in Moscow in March. In discussing relations, Gorbachev reportedly said to Fava, "It is impossible for the Soviets to give advice on how the PCA should act or for the PCA to advise the CPSU; each party knows its situation better than anyone else."

In May, a CPSU delegation visited Colombia at the invitation of the Colombian Communist Party. In early June another delegation attended the ninth Peruvian Communist Party Congress. Discussions during both these visits focused primarily on the process of restructuring currently under way in the U.S.S.R.

Chile has been an exception to Moscow's general approach to the region. The U.S.S.R. does not have diplomatic relations with Chile. The Chilean Communist Party, operating underground, has worked with other banned leftist groups to overthrow the regime of Augusto Pinochet.

The Soviet leadership also is courting Latin American trade unions. During the CPSU delegation's May visit to Colombia, it met with members of the Colombian Unitary Central of

Workers. Trade union conferences sponsored by the Soviet-backed World Federation of Trade Unions represent another means of extending contacts to regional unions.

## Section II: Soviet Cultural and Information Activities

The Soviet Union seeks to expand its influence, particularly in the Third World, through cultural and information (C&I) activities. Such activities include sponsoring performing arts and sports presentations, providing scholarship programs for study in the U.S.S.R., distributing inexpensive books, and providing media programming. In recent years, Soviet C&I activities have increased in Latin America.

Radio Moscow broadcasts exclusively to Latin America 103 hours per week in six languages. TASS provides information to local news media organizations in about a dozen Latin American countries. At the same time the Soviets are making long-term investments in the region by offering scholarships to Latin American youth to study in the U.S.S.R.

Cultural presentations are one of the most successful C&I programs. In 1985, the U.S.S.R. sent world-class musicians and dancers to perform in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Panama. The Soviets also have made efforts to establish and expand cultural centers and libraries, for example in Argentina and Uruguay.

It is no surprise that the Soviets have been the most successful in influencing countries already favorably disposed to the U.S.S.R. and activists of the political left. Another audience with which the Soviets have made significant progress is young people and students.

### Key Targets and Surrogates

The Soviets often have relied on Cuba as a surrogate to disseminate propaganda and disinformation. This not only allows the Soviets a lower profile but also exploits the cultural affinity of other Latin states with Cuba. Primary targets have been: Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.

In Nicaragua, for example, Cuban teachers, musicians, poets, writers, and journalists make frequent visits. East European press agencies provide articles to the local press. Perhaps most important of all in terms of long-term investment, however, is the fact that in 1985 more than 2,500 Nicaraguan students were awarded scholarships to study in the Soviet bloc.

In Mexico, Cuba places articles in Marxist-oriented newspapers and circulates pro-Soviet newspapers and books. Cuban, Nicaraguan, and East German wire services also provide material to the Mexican media. Further C&I activities include programs sponsored by Mexican-Cuban friendship societies, cultural presentations, and educational exchange programs.

Aside from the primary targets, Cuba has helped to advance Soviet foreign policy in Barbados, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Cuba provides news services through local bureaus of Prensa Latina, publishes magazines in several languages, and reaches an even larger audience through radio broadcasts on Radio Havana and Radio Venceremos.

Nicaragua, in addition to being a target of Soviet-Cuban efforts, has occasionally itself acted as a surrogate. Nicaraguan television often airs Cuban programs, and the Cuban Prensa Latina consistently provides material to the Nicaraguan News Agency (ANN). In Honduras, the Nicaraguan Embassy has provided TASS articles and pro-Soviet material to leftist groups and the local press. In the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua has cooperated with the local communist party to advance Soviet policy. The number of students participating in an exchange program between Nicaragua and the State University of Guadalajara in Mexico increased significantly in 1985.

### Soviet Education Programs

One of the most successful and important C&I efforts is the extensive educational "exchange" program offering an opportunity to study in the U.S.S.R. at the undergraduate and graduate levels. The largest numbers of students participating in the program in 1985 came from Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. These scholarships usually are subsidized entirely by the U.S.S.R. at a high cost. Technically, they do not constitute a true exchange program, as Soviets do not study in Latin American countries.

The Soviets also have established an exchange program for professors. Soviet professors have taught in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Latin American professors, especially from Mexico and Nicaragua, have traveled to the U.S.S.R.—mostly to study and do research, seldom to teach.

Research conducted on the views of Panamanians who studied abroad have demonstrated that the majority were favorably impressed by their host countries. When questioned about views on U.S. foreign policies, the bloc returnees were more critical than those who studied in the United States or Panama. They were

opposed particularly to U.S. assistance to the Government of El Salvador and to the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. Those who studied in the United States and those who remained in Panama were more supportive of U.S. positions.

On questions concerning the role of Cuba in Central America, more than two-thirds of returnees from the United States and three-quarters of those locally educated saw Cuba as a threat to the stability and peace of other countries. Half of the bloc returnees agreed with this position. One-fifth of bloc returnees saw Cuba as a positive influence in the region, but very few of U.S. returnees and those educated in Panama agreed. When questioned about Soviet surrogates in the region, substantial majorities of U.S. returnees and locally educated students identified Cuba and Nicaragua as surrogates. For returning bloc students, approximately half saw Nicaragua as dominated by the U.S.S.R.

Two-thirds of those who studied in the Soviet bloc received scholarships, while only one-third of those who studied in the U.S. received assistance. Three in ten of the bloc-educated students identified a scholarship as a factor in studying abroad; very few of those who studied in the United States mentioned financial assistance. In addition, those who studied in the bloc tended to stay for longer periods of time—the majority stay at least five years—while most U.S. returnees stayed four years or less. Also, students in the Soviet bloc were more likely to receive language training upon arrival in the host country than were those who were educated in the United States.

## The Case of Nicaragua

The Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua displaced the Somoza government in July 1979. Prior to this date no Soviet cultural or informational activities had been permitted. The Sandinistas began talks with the U.S.S.R. and by late 1980 a series of agreements had been signed covering exhibits, education (100 scholarships for study in the U.S.S.R. were offered), culture, and news (e.g., a news-photo exchange agreement between TASS and Nicaraguan news agency ANN).

In 1981, an agreement was signed covering exchange of television and radio materials, and a number of Soviet cultural events took place—visits by the Zhok dance group, a Ukrainian folk group, the Kiev ballet, and a Soviet violinist, among others. A Soviet film festival took place. In the same year a Soviet book exposition was held, and by 1982 Soviet and other Marxist-Leninist books were

being widely distributed. They were sold at reasonable prices, and were available in newsstands, supermarkets, and "people's bookstores" as well as through the traditional bookstore outlets. In 1981 the Association for Friendship with Socialist countries was founded in Nicaragua.

In the following four years, Soviet C&I activities grew and cultural agreements were signed with a number of bloc countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, Romania). The Soviet Minister of Culture and his Nicaraguan counterpart exchanged visits. The Moscow Circus came, the Bolshoi Ballet opened the National Theater in Managua, and numerous other cultural events were held. Hundreds of Nicaraguan students arrived in Eastern Europe, both on long- and short-term grants. The Association for Friendship with Socialist Countries promoted exchanges of student groups with Hungary and Poland and a visit by the Nicaraguan-Vietnamese Friendship Society to Vietnam. The Nicaraguan Peace Committee (affiliated with the World Peace Council) encouraged international visitors to travel to Nicaragua.

By the end of 1987, some 3,000 students will have gone to communist countries on full scholarships, according to the Nicaraguan Council of Higher Education. About 650 students between the ages of 12 and 25 each year. In Nicaragua itself, teachers from the U.S.S.R. and Cuba are heavily involved in technical and vocational training, and there are Soviet professors at both major universities. Nicaraguan education depends heavily on Cuban, Soviet, and Eastern German materials.

In terms of news control, Soviet news sources continue to be widely used, and the Sandinista government has a near monopoly on news dissemination. The Soviet Embassy has at least two press and cultural officers. TASS and *New Times* magazine each have at least one representative and Novosti press agency at least three (all Soviet nationals).

Soviet C&I activities have had a great impact in Nicaragua. By focusing heavily on education—the distribution of books, lectures by Soviet professors, and participation in the extensive exchange program—the U.S.S.R. is building long-term understanding and familiarity with Soviet ideology and culture. Soviet C&I activities are now substantially consolidated; they are an integral part of daily life in Nicaragua. Soviet books, films, news, educational exchanges, and cultural events leave their daily imprint on Nicaraguans.



## Chapter IX

# Soviet Active Measures in Africa

During the past year, Moscow's active measures campaigns in Africa tried to depict the United States as:

- Responsible for the development and spread of the AIDS virus;
- Cooperating with South Africa in the manufacture of a biological "ethnic" weapon that would kill only black people;
- Attempting to destabilize black African governments;
- Subverting African and other Third World journalists; and
- Attempting to disrupt the Nonaligned Movement's 1986 summit in Harare.

Print media in several African countries, especially the pro-Moscow press in Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia, helped to spread anti-U.S. disinformation. In addition, Angola, Ethiopia, and Ghana maintained a steady stream of pro-Soviet and anti-U.S. radio broadcasting to complement Moscow's already extensive daily broadcast coverage of the continent in as many as eight languages.

## AIDS

Although Moscow's AIDS disinformation campaign has been worldwide in scope and effect, its major focus and impact have been in Africa. The campaign in Africa took off in mid-1986 with "letters to the editor" from a small leftist group, the Patriotic Youth Movement of Nigeria. The letters appeared in several publications: Kampala's July 1, 1986, edition of the government-run newspaper *New Vision*; the July 16 edition of Dakar's *Afrique Nouvelle*; and the July 20 edition of the Nairobi *Nation*. Among the charges appearing in *Afrique Nouvelle*, a French-language weekly magazine published under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church, was the allegation that: "According to an authorized scientific source, the AIDS virus was developed in the research center of Fort Detrick (U.S.A) where it was grown at the same time as other viruses to be used in biological weapons. It was then tested on drug addicts and homosexuals."

In late August, 1986—at the time of the NAM summit in Harare—a lengthy study by three East

Germans (Jakob Segal, Lilli Segal, and Ronald Dehmlow) appeared. This study, filled with scientific jargon impressive to the average reader, alleged that the U.S. was responsible for the AIDS virus and that it was using AIDS as a racial weapon against Africa.

First described in the August 24, 1986, Harare *Sunday Mail*, the fabrication circulated widely among attendees of the eighth NAM summit which was then starting in Zimbabwe. In succeeding weeks, newspapers in Ghana and Tanzania, with the help of Novosti and TASS personnel, repeatedly published Dehmlow's and the Segals' allegations. Papers in Zambia, Nigeria, and other countries have recycled the story periodically, and media in more than a dozen other African countries have carried the story at least once.

Adding new twists, the *Ghanaian Times*—frequently the starting point of stories which are then replayed by the Soviets worldwide—on January 14, 1987, falsely reported that the U.S. planned to test the AIDS virus on Africans. This disinformation has appeared repeatedly. An April 6, 1987, Moscow Radio broadcast to southern Africa falsely reported U.S. testing of the AIDS virus in southern Zaire, allegedly in support of biological warfare research.

## The Ethnic Weapon

During the past year, Moscow has continued to repeat false allegations that the U.S. is involved in helping South Africa produce a biological "ethnic" weapon that would kill only blacks. Several examples of Soviet repetition of the disinformation on ethnic weapons are listed in Chapter VI.

## Destabilization

Although the U.S.S.R. cannot be conclusively proved to be the origin of stories which allege that the U.S. is attempting to destabilize African governments, it certainly plays a prominent role in spreading such disinformation. For example, according to an April 23, 1986, Radio Mozambique report, the U.S. Department of Defense and the CIA



were providing military assistance to RENAMO, the Mozambican National Resistance. The report also charged that the U.S. was planning to cancel aid to the Mozambican Government. Employing a frequently used technique, the Soviets may have provided the story originally to the Ghana *Mirror*, where it appeared on March 29. TASS subsequently replayed it and Mozambique then picked up the story. It was widely accepted by Mozambicans despite U.S. denials.

Similarly, during February and March, several Nigerian newspapers including *The Standard* (March 2, 1987)—using Novosti material—alleged U.S. support for subversive radio stations in southern Africa. This theme had previously received media attention in April 1986 when Harare Domestic Radio Service reported that the Zimbabwe Minister of Information, Nathan Shamuyarira, accused the U.S. of providing funds and personnel to support the clandestine South African-run Radio Truth. Apparently borrowing from Soviet claims published earlier in 1986, Shamuyarira also charged the U.S. with conducting a worldwide operation to control media.

Ghana's news media often run stories that appear to be Soviet-generated disinformation. When Mozambican President Machel died in a October 19, 1986, airplane crash on South African soil, Ghana's domestic radio service accused the U.S. of being an accomplice of Pretoria in murdering Machel. In the first few weeks after his death, media in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and other Third World countries picked up the claim that Machel was the victim of an imperialist conspiracy involving the U.S. Soviet media were active in repeating these charges. Although an international board of inquiry concluded that errors and negligence by the Soviet pilot and crew were to blame (*Washington Post*, July 10, 1987), it is doubtful that this finding will affect the disinformation campaign.

Forgeries have been used to build suspicion that the U.S. is attempting to destabilize African governments. One forged document of probable Soviet origin, titled "U.S. Strategy in Foreign Policy 1985-1988," was published in the Nigerian magazine *The African Guardian* on June 5, 1986. The document purported to be a secret U.S. foreign policy paper describing the need to establish a U.S. military presence in various parts of Africa, including the Horn and East Africa. Additionally, the paper delineated alleged U.S. desires to perpetuate apartheid in southern Africa.

Another forgery, which purported to be an official document of the Government of Zaire, surfaced in the *African Concord* of Lagos, Nigeria, on April 28, 1987. The document, officially denounced by Zaire as a forgery, discusses training

campes to be set up for dissidents from neighboring countries. The CIA and U.S. Embassy personnel are accused of being directly involved in this activity. The U.S. Department of State on June 2, 1987, gave a press briefing to inform the media of the bogus document.

## The Anti-Journalists Campaign

By several means, including attacks on the U.S. Information Agency and charges of "Western-imperialist" control of news services, Moscow perennially has sought to sustain suspicion of Western media throughout the Third World. On January 24, 1986, Moscow Radio charged the CIA with a conspiracy to recruit journalists, missionaries, scientists, and teachers.

Anti-journalist packages were anonymously mailed to a number of newspapers in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These packages, sent during February, were entitled "Africa in Danger." They contained anti-U.S. propaganda excerpts from the newsletter *Covert Action* and the Soviet magazine *New Times*, and a list of names of more than 100 people in 16 countries who were accused of being in the pay of the CIA. More than 80 of the people—subsequently named in the Ghana *Free Press* and Cameroon *Outlook*—were African and most were journalists.

Subsequent to its publication of the names and associated accusations, the *Free Press* reversed its position and protested the charges against those Ghanaians listed. The campaign against the journalists faded away soon afterward, but claims of U.S. attempts to control the African media—such as an article directed against the U.S. Information Service in Nigeria which appeared in the Nigerian daily *The Standard* of March 24, 1987—continue.

## A Campaign Against the NAM Summit

A disinformation campaign was initiated to accuse the U.S. of interference in the NAM summit which took place in 1986 in Harare, Zimbabwe. Below is a chronology of disinformation on this subject, much of which either originated in or was steadily repeated by Soviet media. It is important to keep in mind that the Indian publications *Blitz* and *Patriot*, as well as the Ghanaian press, are often the source of Soviet-sponsored disinformation. In fact, a Soviet defector to the West has detailed how the U.S.S.R. established the *Patriot* in 1962 to serve as a Soviet foreign policy tool in India.

Date	Newspaper/Agency	Disinformation
4/25/86	TASS, Moscow TV	U.S. Ambassador to the UN Vernon Walters "openly threatened" the Nonaligned Movement.
5/17/86	<i>Patriot</i> , India	The United States, acting through the South African racist regime, may try to sabotage the eighth nonaligned summit.
6/2/86	Moscow Radio Peace and Progress	Western media have begun a campaign to split the NAM.
6/5/86	Radio Moscow in English	The U.S. and South Africa have a plan to foil the NAM summit. An Indian newspaper reports that the CIA is providing money for subversion.
6/7/86	Hanoi International	Indian press claims the U.S. is scheming to sabotage the NAM summit.
6/8/86	Radio Moscow in Mandarin	The imperialists are using the Cambodian issue to sabotage the NAM summit.
6/13/86	Moscow Radio Peace and Progress	The U.S. and South Africa seek to undermine the NAM summit. African National Congress representative and Indian press say that South African raid on Zimbabwe and U.S. attack on Libya are part of neoglobalist policy.
6/21/86	<i>Blitz</i> , India	Reliable reports predict a major disruption of the forthcoming NAM summit. More than \$20 million has been allotted by the U.S. and South African intelligence agencies. Measures are expected to include a heavy media blitz, a few fake terrorist attacks, and a series of provocations which would cause chaos at the time of the summit.
7/7/86	Moscow Radio Peace and Progress	The CIA is stepping up subversion of the NAM summit, as can be seen by reports in the <i>India Telegraph</i> on U.S. arms deliveries to Pakistan and the <i>Far Eastern Economic Review</i> on U.S. pressure to split the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
7/11/86	Radio Moscow in English	Indian newspaper reports that NATO intelligence organizations allocated \$200 million to wreck the NAM summit.
7/12/86	Radio Moscow in Burmese	The U.S. is supporting Khmer exiles to create tension within ASEAN and other countries and is stepping up anti-Pakistan activities as the NAM summit approaches.
7/13/86	Radio Moscow in Persian	The Zimbabwe Democratic Society of Lawyers claims that reactionary powers have started attacks against the NAM to destroy its unity.
7/15/86	Moscow Radio Peace and Progress	Indian paper alleges that the CIA allocated funds to sabotage the Harare summit. The U.S.S.R. always demonstrates its good will toward the movement while the U.S. tries to sabotage it; Third World countries should draw their own conclusions from this.

Date	Newspaper/Agency	Disinformation
7/22/86	Radio Moscow in Bengali	The U.S. is trying to subvert the NAM summit by continuing the arms race, especially the "star wars" program.
7/28/86	Angola Radio in Portuguese	U.S. secret services allocated \$15 million to sabotage the NAM summit. The U.S. ordered attacks on Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia harbor to disrupt the conference and has additional plans to invade Angola and the Frontline States before July 30.
7/30/86	Pyongyang KCNA in English	The CIA is craftily and maliciously scheming to tear asunder the summit by allocating \$20 million to instigate reactionaries.
7/31/86	Pyongyang Domestic Radio	The CIA has disbursed \$20 million to destroy the summit. The U.S. maligns the Zimbabwe Government and threatens NAM members in an effort to destroy nonaligned unity.
7/31/86	Pyongyang Domestic Radio	Report denounces the Reagan administration for maneuvers against the NAM summit.
8/86	Nicaraguan News Agency	The U.S. is seeking to disrupt the NAM general assembly meeting in Harare.
8/1/86	Pyongyang KCNA in English	The CIA allots \$20 million to frustrate the NAM summit.
8/1/86	Pyongyang Domestic Radio	Nepalese weekly has disclosed that the CIA has disbursed \$20 million to destroy the summit.
8/2/86	Hanoi Domestic Radio	Zimbabwe's Information Minister condemned the CIA for plotting to sabotage the summit.
8/2/86	Kabul Bakhtar in English	Indian press reports that the CIA allocated \$20 million to undermine the summit.
8/11/86	Radio Moscow in English	The CIA and South Africa are trying to sabotage the summit and are interfering with the internal affairs of nonaligned countries.
8/18/86	<i>Ghanaian Times</i>	The CIA has contributed \$20 million to frustrate the summit by sponsoring South Africa's subversive acts against Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and other Frontline States.
8/20/86	<i>People's Daily Graphic</i> , Ghana	The news that the CIA is actively planning to disrupt the summit has not come as a surprise. Member countries know about the nefarious activities, maneuvers, and manipulations with which the CIA is associated. The CIA has already pumped as much as \$20 million into the plan.

Date	Newspaper/Agency	Disinformation
8/20/86	<i>Patriot</i> , India	Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe says colonial masters in his region do not look favorably at the U.S.S.R. because of the assistance it has given to liberation movements. There has been no interference by the U.S.S.R. in the region. The same cannot be said of the U.S..
8/21/86	TASS in English	The CIA has allocated \$20 million for terrorist actions aimed at torpedoing the summit in Harare, according to the Ghanaian newspaper <i>People's Daily Graphic</i> .
8/22/86	<i>Rude Pravo</i> , Czechoslovakia	The CIA has worked out a plan to wreck the summit.
8/22/86	<i>Kansan Uutiset</i> , Finland	The CIA has given \$20 million to sabotage the summit, according to the Ghanaian Government's <i>People's Daily Graphic</i> .
8/23/86	<i>Blitz</i> , India	The U.S. has stepped up its diplomatic activities to dampen the enthusiasm of the Harare summit. The U.S. has suspended \$13.5 million in aid in reprisal for the Zimbabwe Government's stringent criticism of the Reagan administration's complicity with the racist regime of South Africa.
8/25/86	<i>New Nigerian</i>	TASS reports that the CIA has allocated about \$26 million for operations aimed at "heightening tensions" at the summit by staging acts of sabotage and subversion. South Africa would be used as a springboard for carrying out the plan.
8/26/86	Moscow News in English	The CIA has allocated \$20 million for terrorist activities aimed at torpedoing the summit, according to the Ghanaian newspaper <i>People's Daily Graphic</i> .
8/27/86	<i>Patriot</i> , India	Editor of the <i>Covert Action Information Bulletin</i> , a journal on CIA activities, said that the West may attempt to create distractions during the summit to reduce coverage of the meeting.
8/27/86	<i>Xinhua</i> , Beijing	The North Korean <i>Nodong Sinmun</i> said the U.S. is trying to drive a wedge in the Nonaligned Movement and spark conflict among NAM member countries.
8/27/86	Havana Radio	The U.S. is trying to increase tensions in Africa a few hours before the opening of the summit. Washington is ready to launch an attack on Libya.
8/28/86	Moscow International in Arabic	The closer to the opening of the nonaligned summit the greater the activities of the forces that want to undermine the conference or influence its anti-imperialist course. It is not unlikely that Washington's new provocations at the Libyan border are intended to intimidate developing countries.

Date	Newspaper/Agency	Disinformation
8/28/86	<i>Ghanaian Times</i>	The NAM is under attack. Aside from the direct aggression against Libya, the campaign includes U.S. military, political, and financial support for armed antigovernment groupings in Angola, Nicaragua, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan.
8/30/86	<i>Blitz</i> , India	The summit is in danger. The U.S., which remains unreconciled to what is called the "NAM package of immorality," is worried about the Harare declaration on South Africa which will indict the U.S., UK, and West Germany.
9/1/86	<i>Amrita Bazar Patrika</i> , India	The U.S. plans to attack Libya again—would it be a far-fetched inference that the real target of the White House's wrath is the NAM?
9/4/86	Press Trust of India	The U.S. cuts off economic aid to Zimbabwe because the U.S. is against the NAM.
9/4/86	<i>The Times of India</i>	The U.S. cuts off aid to Zimbabwe; the U.S. has made no secret of unhappiness with NAM positions on major issues.
9/4/86	<i>The Daily</i> , India	In an acid reaction to NAM criticism of U.S. policies against the Third World, the U.S. cut off American aid to Zimbabwe. Sources said that the State Department was studying speeches of other heads of state to determine what punishment should be meted out to them for their critical remarks.
9/6/86	<i>News Today</i> , India	It is of some sinister significance that the hijacking of the Pan Am plane at Karachi has taken place just when the summit is drawing to a close—within hours of the Libyan leader's mounting of a fierce attack on the U.S., alluding to the spread of fire under the American fleet everywhere.
9/6/86	<i>Blitz</i> , India	The summit convenes under the shadow of the enemy just across Zimbabwe's borders and amid heavy pressure on the participating delegates exerted by the U.S. Since the last summit the U.S. has spearheaded more than 50 actions against the nations of the developing world.
9/6/86	<i>Amrita Bazar Patrika</i> , India	Implicit in the U.S. decision to cut off economic aid to Zimbabwe is a design to bring home the decision to those NAM countries who do not toe the U.S. line that they are not entitled to American economic aid.
9/10/86	<i>Eenadu</i> , India	Did President Reagan want to show the Pan Am hijacking as a cause for another attack on Libya? Did he plan to break up the unity of the NAM? Was the attack a last-minute move of the CIA to weaken the goals of the NAM?

Date	Newspaper/Agency	Disinformation
9/10/86	<i>Blitz</i> , India	Reliable sources say that more than \$20 million has been allotted to U.S. and South African intelligence agencies to conduct fake terrorist attacks and a series of provocations which would cause chaos at the summit.
9/11/86	<i>Indian Express</i>	Intelligence reports had been received that the seizure of the Pan Am plane was part of a conspiracy to discredit the summit.
9/14/86	Soviet TV	Soviet commentator describes the history of U.S. attempts to put economic pressure on NAM members, as outlined in the book titled <i>Conspiracy Against the Nonaligned Movement</i> by Govind Narain Srivastava, an Indian writer. disinformation, and other active measures—

This chronology is not complete; several of these stories were repeated by multiple media in NAM member countries. While the disinformation appeared mostly in communist, Soviet, and Soviet-influenced media, it did have wide circulation among the target audience—the Third World.

## Implications

Cultivating favorable media environments in such traditionally pro-Western countries as

Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire will probably continue to be a Soviet priority. The high level of forgeries, disinformation, and other active measures—as well as propaganda—that Moscow directed toward African audiences during the past year will almost certainly continue. Moscow is aware that a steady repetition of allegations—no matter how crude—of U.S. racism, militarism, and imperialism will, in the long run, improve its position at the expense of the United States. The tactic has worked elsewhere; it can work in Africa.



## Chapter X

# Soviet Active Measures in the United States

Soviet active measures undertaken in the United States include forged documents, disinformation, use of the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA), and a network of Soviet-controlled front groups. These activities are very often undertaken in conjunction with public relations efforts involving propaganda and information activities.

It is important to note that the highest level of the Soviet Government—the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC, CPSU)—ultimately approves the major themes of Soviet foreign policy, propaganda, and active measures. The latter are the province of the International Department (CC, CPSU); the KGB and the Ideology, Propaganda & Culture Department (CC, CPSU) are also involved.

During 1986 and early 1987, the Soviet Union restructured but did not reduce its vast active measures apparatus in Moscow (discussed in greater detail in Chapter I). This restructuring involved two personnel changes with important implications for active measures in the U.S. and the West. Alexander Yakovlev, Soviet Ambassador to Canada from 1973 to 1983, was promoted to full member of the Politburo in June 1987 and now heads the Ideology, Propaganda and Culture Department. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. from 1962 to 1986, now heads the reorganized International Department as CPSU secretary in charge of foreign affairs. Both Yakovlev and Dobrynin, having lived and worked in the West for many years, have in-depth understanding of the culture and governments of the U.S. and Canada. Now they have overall responsibility for two of the organizations that sponsored the active measures discussed in this chapter.

## Forgeries

We know from defector reporting that the U.S.S.R. and its allies circulate forged documents—usually purporting to be speeches, letters, or policy statements by U.S. officials—containing disinformation. One such forgery, mailed anonymously in August 1986 to *The*

*Washington Post* and *U.S. News and World Report*, purports to be a letter from United States Information Agency (USIA) official Herbert Romerstein to U.S. Senator David F. Durenberger, former chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The "USIA forgery," dated April 29, 1986, described an alleged USIA campaign to spread reports that the Chernobyl disaster had claimed 2,000-3,000 victims. (The U.S.S.R. has said that 31 persons died and at least 200 others were made sick by the Chernobyl accident.) Inflated death statistics did appear in news reports following the Chernobyl disaster; they stemmed from speculation by the media and members of the scientific and medical communities in the absence of official news from the U.S.S.R.. USIA made no effort to exploit the confusion. Romerstein did not send a letter to Durenberger, nor did Durenberger's office receive such a letter.

Analysis of the USIA forgery reveals some of the techniques used in producing it. The USIA letterhead and the signature block on the forgery were taken from a genuine letter Romerstein had written to U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Robert Schweitzer. In September 1985 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Soviet forgeries, Romerstein offered to provide a copy of his letter to Schweitzer for congressional publication. Subsequently, the press attache of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, Vaclav Zluva, requested a copy of Romerstein's unclassified letter to Schweitzer. Romerstein agreed, but uniquely marked the one he gave Zluva.

When the forgery addressed to Durenberger from Romerstein surfaced in the United States, it was obvious that the Romerstein/Schweitzer letter had been the exemplar; the unique markings gave it away. When Romerstein confronted Zluva with the forgery, Zluva denied being involved in its preparation but admitted sending a copy of the Schweitzer letter supplied by Romerstein to Prague. Prague officials probably sent the Schweitzer letter to Moscow. Moscow, or perhaps Prague, then used the letter as the exemplar for the Chernobyl forgery.



The forgery technique used on the Romerstein letter—that is, photocopying a genuine letterhead and signature onto a document that contains a bogus text—is common among Soviet and bloc forgeries. It facilitates preparation of the forged document and increases its credibility to the unknowing.

Several other forgeries believed to be Soviet or bloc in origin have surfaced in the United States during the past year. Some of these are discussed in Chapter IV.

## Front Groups in the United States

One of the most important Soviet active measures in the United States is the use of front groups—particularly the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF) and the United States Peace Council (USPC). These organizations are largely financed and controlled by the Soviet Union, and their activities are principally directed against the policies of the United States and other NATO countries. They attempt to obscure ties with the U.S.S.R. to avoid having to register with the U.S. Government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and to maintain a facade of independence.

NCASF, originally formed in 1943 by the CPUSA, currently consists of approximately 25 active chapters in the United States. Plans call for at least one chapter in each of the 50 states.

Soviet direction of NCASF is channeled through the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries (SOD), under the authority of the International Department. Soviet representatives of SOD, who are in regular contact with NCASF officials, direct some NCASF activities in support of Soviet active measures campaigns. Certain KGB agents are assigned to maintain contact with key NCASF officials.

The publicly stated purpose of NCASF is to promote friendship and understanding between Soviets and Americans through cultural, educational, and travel exchange programs. While these goals may be met, NCASF also provides the Soviets with an excellent conduit to promote active measures campaigns, meet with influential Americans, spot and assess Americans for recruitment, and influence organizations within the U.S. peace movement. Additionally, NCASF-sponsored "Goodwill Tours" enable KGB personnel to travel to various American cities where they previously had limited access or to travel in areas closed to Soviet diplomats in the U.S.

During 1986, NCASF sponsored a number of Soviet visitors who supported existing active

measures operations. Two such events, designed to influence the nuclear disarmament movement, were the Mississippi Peace Cruise and the signing of the People's Peace Appeal at the United Nations.

The Mississippi Peace Cruise, which took place in the summer of 1986, was an eight-day steamboat cruise from St. Paul, Minnesota, to St. Louis, Missouri. It was modeled on seven previous Soviet peace cruises down the Volga River in which Americans participated. The Soviet Peace Committee (also called the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace) carefully selected the Soviet participants. Although the Peace Appeal was portrayed by the cruise organizers as having been drafted while on the cruise, several individuals, including retired Soviet Lt. Gen. Mikhail Milshteyn, had drafted the People's Peace Appeal several months earlier in Moscow.

The deception regarding when, where, and by whom the appeal was drafted, coupled with its intent to manipulate U.S. public opinion, distinguishes the appeal from simple propaganda and makes it an active measure. Likewise, the fact that the cruise was conceived by the Kremlin, staged with Soviet support, and involved Soviet front-group activity—all the while purporting to be a genuine grassroots "people's" movement—marks it as an active measure.

The U.S. Peace Council, founded in November 1979, is another important Soviet front which attempts to affect Americans' views on defense and disarmament topics—and which played a role in formulating the People's Peace Appeal. This is the U.S. affiliate of the World Peace Council (WPC), the largest and most active Soviet international front organization, which has affiliates in approximately 140 countries.

Key leadership positions in the USPC have always been held by trusted CPUSA members who carefully guide the organization along Soviet lines. Robert Prince, founding member of the USPC, is the United States representative on the Secretariat of the WPC in Helsinki, Finland. Prince replaced Karen Talbot, who returned to the U.S. to become the WPC representative at the United Nations in New York. After she returned to the United States in 1986, Talbot was elected to the USPC's Executive Board. Other high-level leaders of the USPC also regularly travel from the United States to attend WPC meetings around the world.

The USPC has consistently worked to promote the causes of the WPC and has regularly supported the policies of the Soviet Union. Because the USPC increasingly suffers from being exposed as a Soviet front, it has become less open about its Soviet affiliations. Early USPC letterheads openly listed affiliation to the WPC; a 1985 letterhead no longer does.

One of the important functions of the USPC is mobilization of U.S. peace groups behind an effort to identify the U.S. as the primary impetus behind the arms race, and to criticize key U.S. defense policies. For example, leaders of the USPC were instrumental in forming the Religious Circles Committee, an effort initiated by the Soviet Peace Committee to involve U.S. religious organizations in activities of the USPC. By establishing contact with churches and other religious organizations, the USPC is attempting to tap the very large body of U.S. citizens genuinely concerned about the arms race and the potential for nuclear war. What these groups do not know is that the USPC will, through them, work to absolve the U.S.S.R. of responsibility and to defeat domestically U.S. arms control and defense initiatives.

## **Influence on the U.S. Peace Movement**

The U.S.S.R. continues to devote manpower and resources in overt and covert attempts to influence the arms control and disarmament movement in the United States. The KGB has covertly requested its contacts in the peace and nuclear disarmament movements to continue to report on meetings, participate in upcoming conferences, and obtain information on individuals who are active within the movement. Several KGB officers currently assigned to the United States have been in regular contact with the leaders of such Soviet-controlled organizations as the CPUSA, USPC, and NCASF.

The CPUSA has historically been one of the most loyal, pro-Soviet communist parties in the world and has received substantial financial support from the Soviet Union. Although relatively small and politically weak, the CPUSA continues systematically to promote Soviet views on arms control proposals and the peace movement through its overt publications and party operations. The CPUSA also operates a small network of its own front organizations in the United States.

Since the late 1970s, the International Department has provided direction to international communist front organizations and their U.S. affiliates concerning the issues of arms control and disarmament. The Soviets have urged these organizations to mount campaigns against the neutron bomb, NATO theater nuclear force modernization, U.S. defense polices, and more recently the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The CPUSA has sponsored and participated in demonstrations and rallies, formed coalitions with other peace organizations, and sponsored seminars and workshops to promote Soviet policies and goals within the U.S. peace movement.

The CPUSA has, in turn, directed its own front organizations to support Soviet arms control and disarmament initiatives. The FBI has determined that there are several groups in which CPUSA members have leadership roles or take an active part. Some of these groups are spinoffs from traditional CPUSA fronts; some deal with arms control and peace. These organizations are often more effective than the CPUSA in reaching and forming coalitions with other organizations, because they are not always easily identified as CPUSA-controlled or even as pro-Soviet organizations.

In response to Moscow's direction, CPUSA and NCASF have issued national directives to mobilize opposition to SDI. Local chapters of these organizations have initiated programs to:

- support USPC efforts to halt SDI research and promote a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing through circulation of literature and petitions;
- initiate telephone-calling and letter-writing campaigns to congressional representatives and to President Reagan calling for an end to SDI.

Additionally, the CPUSA and its various front organizations have been instructed to form coalitions with other peace organizations and to sponsor workshops, seminars, and demonstrations.

The use of front groups—particularly “fronts of fronts,” or groups closely affiliated with actual fronts, but which are not themselves fronts—makes it difficult to provide unclassified examples of Moscow's efforts to influence the U.S. peace movement. The following description of a recent influence activity indicates the complexity of the process.

A 55-member Danish peace delegation—called “Next Stop Nevada”—toured the U.S. in April 1987. It visited several cities and met with peace activists. Members of the group spoke at schools and civic gatherings, gaining significant coverage in small-to-medium size newspapers and on local television. The group also met with UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar and some U.S. legislators. The purpose of the tour, which culminated in demonstrations at the Nevada Test Site, was to generate opposition to U.S. nuclear testing and support for the Soviet-proposed moratorium.

At first glance, the Danish peace delegation appeared to be a relatively broad-based group. In its pretrip publicity, the group claimed representation from the Social Democratic Party, Socialist People's Party, and Radical Liberal Youth organizations as well as from various labor union groups. According to the Copenhagen publication *Information*, a dozen members of the Danish

Parliament and the mayor of Copenhagen had sent letters of support to the group.

What is less obvious is the origins of the initiative and the relationship of the organizers to the Soviet-directed World Peace Council and the Danish Communist Party:

- Discussions were held at the October 1986 WPC congress in Copenhagen to create a campaign against nuclear tests and SDI that would include travel of youth groups to the Nevada desert to protest U.S. nuclear testing. The November-December 1986 issue of the WPC's *Peace Courier* states that one of the results of the congress was "a proposal to send an international peace guard to the Nevada desert."
- The Danish "Unge for Fred" (Youth for Peace)—which actively participated in the WPC congress—organized the "Next Stop Nevada" campaign. According to the March 31 issue of the Danish communist newspaper *Land og Folk*, a spokesman for "Next Stop Nevada" said, "Half a year ago we had the idea, and now we're making the journey. We started as 'Unge for Fred,' and today we have a broad youth peace movement behind us."
- The Danish Communist Party has provided much of the political base behind the initiative. According to the January-February 1987 issue of the Russian-language publication *The Working Class and the Contemporary World*, the Danish Communist Youth Union was among the initiators of local "Youth for Peace" groups. In addition, 15 members of the "Next Stop Nevada" delegation belong to the Danish Communist Party or the Communist Youth organization.

On the surface, this campaign is either a simple propaganda exercise and/or a joining of peace groups from various parts of the world. A closer look, however, reveals an initiative of a Soviet front, the WPC, implemented with the support of the Danish Communist Party. It is this hidden element of deception and manipulation that distinguishes the campaign as an active measure.

Another major campaign targeting the U.S. peace movement is the People's Appeal for Peace. It centers on a petition designed to garner public opinion support in favor of current Soviet defense and disarmament priorities and to exert pressure on U.S. Government officials to effect changes that are favorable to Moscow.

The principal control and direction for this campaign come from the Soviet Peace Committee (Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace) in the U.S.S.R. This organization has utilized the NCASF

and the USPC in support of the Peace Appeal. An important fact, unknown to many endorsers and signers of the Peace Appeal, is that the document was actually drafted in Moscow by high-level Soviet officials, not by members of the U.S. peace movement or independent Soviet peace activists.

To those unfamiliar with U.S. defense and disarmament proposals, the petition is not in any obvious sense an anti-U.S. document. It contains simplistic statements that, on the surface, are appealing. A brief analysis of why the People's Peace Appeal is in the interests of the U.S.S.R. and not of the U.S. is contained in the appendix to this chapter.

Although the Peace Appeal did not receive much support from various U.S. organizations in 1986, thus far it has in 1987 received the endorsement of several large national organizations, religious groups, trade unions, and elected officials. In February 1987, NCASF claimed to have received a total of more than 200,000 signatures.

The People's Peace Appeal is perhaps the best example of a political influence operation run by front organizations in the U.S. and directed by the Soviet Peace Committee in Moscow. Some of these front organizations have already been directed to send photocopies of the signatures collected for the People's Peace Appeal to U.S. Congressmen. The CPUSA and some international Soviet front organizations with affiliated chapters in the U.S. have asked their members to send preaddressed postcards to the President of the United States and to Members of Congress.

## Influence on Labor Organizations in the United States

The Soviet Union for many years has attempted to mobilize labor organizations and trade unions in the U.S. to support Soviet foreign policy on peace and disarmament issues. The CPUSA and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) traditionally have been the main Soviet fronts that attempt to influence U.S. labor.

WFTU, currently headquartered in Prague, Czechoslovakia, is a pro-Soviet international trade union organization claiming a membership of more than 300 million. Of this number, 130 million members are from the U.S.S.R. and about 90 percent from communist-controlled countries. WFTU is controlled and directed by the International Department of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), which in turn is directed by the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Since coming under communist control in 1949, WFTU has been a major Soviet propaganda agency.

The Labor Research Association (LRA), founded by the CPUSA in 1927, is the U.S. component of the WFTU. Its self-stated goal is "to provide publications, research materials, and educational programs for U.S. labor and trade unions." LRA is headquartered in New York City and employs at least four full-time employees.

One of LRA's main functions is to publish a monthly news-letter called "Economic Notes" which portrays the Soviet viewpoint on current U.S. economic conditions and labor matters. Copies of the newsletter are sent to many labor organizations throughout the U.S.

LRA receives its direction from the Labor Department of the CPUSA and has an Advisory Board of Directors comprised of 13 individuals, most of whom are CPUSA members. As a result, LRA espouses the official line of the CPUSA.

During 1986, LRA was actively involved in the peace and disarmament movement. It endorsed peace events and published on such topics as "economic conversion." This argument holds that U.S. defense spending should be converted to spending on social programs, a major theme in Soviet propaganda as well.

LRA receives some of its funding from the CPUSA. Finances are also raised through donations, subscriptions to "Economic Notes," and labor seminars conducted by LRA officials. All contributions to LRA are tax-deductible and it is listed as a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization.

On June 3, 1986, CPUSA started publishing a new daily newspaper called the *People's Daily World* (PDW) to replace the *Daily World*, CPUSA's East Coast paper, and the *People's World*, CPUSA's West Coast paper. The PDW is published by Long View Publishing Company and is printed in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. On May 8, 1986, the PDW stated that the initial print run of the PDW was more than 250,000 copies. Articles in the PDW remain strongly pro-Soviet.

U.S. labor unions do not actively support the WFTU. Consequently, the CPUSA and its front organizations conduct many activities on behalf of WFTU in the U.S. CPUSA national headquarters continues to task its districts to focus on the infiltration of labor and trade unions. CPUSA members have been able to join the locals of some trade unions.

Local CPUSA districts have been active in creating new political organizations which are involved in labor matters. In 1973, the CPUSA, Wisconsin District, was instrumental in creating an organization called the Labor Farm Party (LFP). This organization was basically dormant until the 1986 election year, when it ran a slate of candidates for public office. A long-time CPUSA member in Wisconsin ran on the LFP ticket as a candidate for an office in Milwaukee County. Other CPUSA

leaders in Wisconsin have commented that LFP is challenging the legitimate labor movement by running its own candidates for political office.

## Influence Through Soviet Religious Organizations

The U.S.S.R. is very interested in influencing U.S. churches and religious organizations and their leaders. This campaign represents Soviet awareness that such institutions are important factors in the formation of public opinion in the U.S. The primary Soviet objective is to generate opposition to U.S. military spending for new weapons systems, specifically SDI, and to influence religious opinion against U.S. defense policies.

The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) is a major Soviet-backed international front organization that has, since its founding in 1958, sought to influence opinion within church-related groups on a variety of topics. The CPC has its headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and always has been directed by a prominent Soviet or East European theologian or religious figure. It works closely with Soviet "official" religious organizations in support of the Kremlin's foreign policies.

The CPC coordinates its activities with the World Peace Council. One method of assuring a close working relationship between the organizations is overlap of personnel. For example, the current president of the CPC, Bishop Karoly Toth of Hungary, is also a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council.

The U.S. affiliate to the CPC, Christians Associated for Relationships with Eastern Europe (CAREE), carefully follows CPC directives. As part of the Soviet-directed effort to make contact with and influence religious groups, CAREE has increasing contacts with the National Council of Churches and other U.S. religious organizations.

One of the obstacles to effective Soviet influence of U.S. religious communities is widespread knowledge about the U.S.S.R.'s persecution of its own religious groups. To counter this, Moscow has initiated a campaign to convince the world that there is religious freedom in the Soviet Union. Several organizations are actively involved in this campaign, including the:

- Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church,
- Foreign Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchate,
- U.S.S.R. Council for Religious Affairs, and
- U.S.S.R. All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian-Baptists.

The most significant and largest religious body in the Soviet Union is the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. Although Soviet control over this religious organization is documented in Chapter II of this document, it is important to note here that only politically loyal church leaders and administrators—who are willing to represent official Soviet policies—reach positions of authority and are allowed to travel abroad.

The Foreign Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchate is the agency responsible for all relations the Russian Orthodox Church has with the Soviet Peace Committee, the Christian Peace Conference, and other Soviet front organizations. It also coordinates activities with the USPC's Religious Circles Committee, the World Council of Churches, the U.S. National Council of Churches, and other religious organizations outside the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. Council for Religious Affairs is responsible for maintaining overall control of church-state relations in the U.S.S.R.. It is also active in attempting to influence U.S. religious groups' perceptions of religious freedom in the U.S.S.R. and of Soviet defense and disarmament policies. For example, during October 1986, Konstantin M. Kharchev, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, visited Minneapolis, Minnesota, and participated in a three-day conference on religious tolerance. Kharchev stated at the conference that the situation in the U.S.S.R. had improved and true religious freedom now existed as long as its practice did not challenge the CPSU or the Soviet Government. In addition to arguing that there is religious freedom in the U.S.S.R., he handed out an 11-page paper, in English, which argued the official Soviet stance on nuclear disarmament.

The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian-Baptists (AUCECB) is officially recognized by the Soviet Government and is registered with the State Committee for Religious Affairs. It is composed of only those Baptist and Pentecostal congregations whose leaders collaborate with Soviet authorities on both the national and local level and should not be confused with the "unregistered" dissident Baptists and other Christians who are persecuted by the same Soviet authorities.

Moscow utilizes the AUCECB in its contacts with evangelical and fundamentalist Christians in the U.S. to improve its image abroad and promote Soviet foreign policy goals. The AUCECB has its own International Department, which is the largest and best funded section in AUCECB headquarters, and conducts extensive propaganda activities on behalf of the U.S.S.R.. The AUCECB is also a constituent organization of the Soviet Peace

Committee's Special Commission for Contacts With Foreign Religious Circles and With the Christian Peace Conference.

Three high-level AUCECB officials—Alexey Bichkov, Alexi Stoyan, and Anatoly Sokolov—are actively involved in CPC activities and frequently visit the U.S. at the invitation of such Soviet front organizations as NCASF and CAREE. They are fluent in English and act as spokesmen for the Kremlin. Occasionally they attend meetings of various Baptist groups in the U.S., using the opportunity to spread propaganda and disinformation about religious freedom in the Soviet Union.

The USPC, the U.S. affiliate of the WPC, also contributes to Soviet efforts to influence and manipulate the American religious community by actively establishing and promoting a Religious Circles Committee. This organization was formed in 1985 at the request of the Soviet Peace Committee to involve U.S. church members in more USPC activities and to improve the USPC's legitimacy in the eyes of the church community. The USPC named one of its top leaders as the Religious Circles Coordinator.

## Conclusion

Soviet active measures in the U.S. are designed to influence public opinion and perceptions of Soviet foreign policy goals—particularly defense-related goals. These include defeat of SDI, promotion of a comprehensive test ban, and a nuclear freeze. The active measures tools include forgeries and other disinformation, such front organizations as NCASF and USPC, penetration and use of labor organizations, and use of the CPUSA.

These Soviet active measures are artfully coupled with propaganda campaigns and, to some extent, intelligence operations. Recent Soviet active measures are more subtle than past efforts. The use of "fronts of fronts," for example, insulates the activities of U.S.-based organizations and helps obfuscate the financing and direction provided by Moscow.

Coupled with its efforts to denigrate the U.S. image, Moscow has sought to burnish its own. An effort—essentially a disinformation campaign—to convince the world that freedom of religion now exists in the U.S.S.R. is central to improving the Soviet image. With this improvement, Moscow knows, comes an enhanced capability credibly to address and influence U.S. religious organizations.

In conclusion, Moscow's active measures efforts have become more sophisticated and subtle. This trend can be expected to continue. The top personnel in charge of propaganda and active

measures are well-versed in Western culture and society. Their understanding will certainly enhance the Soviet capabilities to influence

Western audiences. The most important reason that such measures can be expected to continue, however, is the fact that they have met with a fair degree of success.

## Appendix

### The People's Peace Appeal

The United States Campaign for a People's Peace Treaty and the Soviet Peace Committee undertook a joint project to collect millions of signatures in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on a peace petition—the People's Appeal for Peace. The petition is endorsed and supported by several organizations, including front groups discussed elsewhere in this report—the Christian Peace Conference, the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, and the U.S. Peace Council. The text of the petition is as follows:

Whereas the nuclear arms race brings the world closer to war, and both President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachev have declared, "Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought," and

Whereas the destructive power of nuclear weapons makes war suicidal and war is no longer a means of settling international disputes, and

Whereas strict observance of existing arms control agreements (such as SALT II and ABM) and new practical steps to limit and reverse the arms race are urgently required, and

Whereas development and deployment of space-based weapons would be a mortally dangerous escalation of the arms race,

Now, therefore, We the people of the United States and the Soviet Union, in order to advance peaceful relations between our peoples and improve the security of our countries and of the peoples of the entire world urge

- A verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban.
- A freeze, phased reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
- A transfer of resources from military to human needs
- An increase of people to people contact.

The U.S. Government fully supports the tenet that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. Peace, however, is not best pursued, nor can it hope to be achieved, through sloganeering and political manipulation of issues which intimately involve the security of East and West. We can further peace only by maintaining an effective deterrent against aggression while pursuing vigorously arms control agreements which reduce the risk of war by enhancing strategic stability at the lowest possible level of arms.

The U.S. Government has the following positions with regard to key elements of the petition:

- **The Soviet Union has not complied with SALT II.**

In May 1986 the President concluded that the Soviets had made no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of their non-compliance and that the Soviets were continuing their unwarranted and unprecedented buildup of strategic forces. In light of this situation, the President determined that the U.S. must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT II agreement, which was undermined by Soviet non-compliance, was never ratified, and, by its own terms, would have expired had it been ratified.

- **The U.S. advocates strict observance of arms control obligations.**

If arms control treaties are to contribute to world peace and reduce the risk of war, signatories must comply fully with all obligations incurred under such treaties. The U.S. is in full compliance with all its arms control obligations; the Soviet Union

is not. The U.S. has made available to the public reports detailing Soviet violations of its arms control commitments.

- **The U.S. advocates development of defense against ballistic missiles to reduce reliance on mutually assured destruction.**

The Soviets were the first to militarize space by deploying the first ICBMs, which travel through space, and by developing and deploying the world's only operational anti-satellite weapon. The U.S. SDI program is strictly defensive in nature; most technologies under investigation are not capable of penetrating the earth's atmosphere and would not be effective as offensive weapons. To increase Soviet confidence in the defensive nature of SDI, the U.S. has proposed an "open laboratories" initiative which would enable inspection teams from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to visit facilities in both countries where strategic defense research is being undertaken to determine first-hand the nature of the research.

- **A comprehensive nuclear test ban is a long-term objective of the U.S.**

As long as the U.S. and its allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression, some nuclear testing is required, as permitted by existing treaties. The U.S. is committed to seeking agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations that could strengthen security for all nations. To this end, the President has proposed a practical, step-by-step process which could lead to a program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons.

- **The U.S. advocates reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.**

The United States has destroyed all biological weapons, tabled a comprehensive treaty for the elimination of chemical weapons, and undertaken concerted efforts to achieve arms control agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons. The U.S. has presented practical draft treaties which call for the elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons as well as deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. The U.S. seeks equitable and effectively verifiable agreements with the Soviets which will reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides and create greater stability and reduce the risk of war. A freeze on these weapons would only preserve existing Soviet advantages and reduce incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously the reduction or elimination of these weapons.

- **The U.S. advocates fulfilling human needs as well as security needs.**

The U.S. has made and is continuing to make the largest contribution in history to the improvement of life for people throughout the world. These efforts promote economic growth globally and help ensure that all people have access to water, food, basic health services, and education. The U.S. also provides military equipment and technology to allies and friends to help maintain their defense capabilities, thus promoting global peace and stability.

- **The U.S. supports increased people-to-people contact.**

People-to-people contact can best be accomplished by freedom of travel and the ability of citizens to speak freely to one another. Such contacts are also facilitated by freedom of the press, of religion, and of association. The U.S., by its actions, has proven its commitment to people-to-people contact.

## Chapter XI

# Conclusion

The Soviet effort to manipulate the opinions and perceptions of leaders and publics throughout the world is highly orchestrated and effective. It has resulted in the widespread, unjustified belief throughout the world that the United States is engaged in such nefarious activities as the creation and purposeful dissemination of the AIDS virus, use of chemical weapons, and assassination of leaders.

One of the most important counters to these deceptive influence operations is to expose Soviet methods. Remarks by two former KGB agents who defected to the West are particularly enlightening on this subject.

Stanislav Levchenko and Ilya Dzhirkvelov were KGB agents directly involved in active measures operations prior to their defections. Dzhirkvelov, a former lieutenant colonel in the KGB, worked in the Soviet special services from 1945 to 1980, when he received political asylum in United Kingdom. Levchenko worked officially as a correspondent for the Soviet journal *Novaya Vremya* in Tokyo. Espionage, disinformation, and active measures against Western diplomats, journalists, and students were part of their responsibilities.

An interview with Levchenko and Dzhirkvelov was published in the article "Soviet Espionage and Disinformation" in the February 20, 1987 issue of *Russkaya Mysl*, a Parisian emigre weekly. Excerpts from the interview by Pierre Henk follow.

**Russkaya Mysl (RM):** Based on your experience, what can you tell us about whether it is easy to trick the West?

**Levchenko:** The Soviet Union has been tricking the West for almost 70 years. There is in the West a "factor of elementary naivete" and, of course, the Soviet Union and the Soviet leaders in any case are well aware of this and have used it for many years. Without any doubt, both in Europe and the United States there are still a significant number of people who remain naive.

But I think that the number of people who are completely naive is gradually diminishing thanks to situations including those in connection with the Soviet Union itself. For example, when the Korean airliner was shot down and all the passengers perished, the Soviet Union lost much in the eyes of public opinion in the West. Then there was everything concerning the events at Chernobyl: the catastrophe itself and the fact that the Soviet Government in the course of three days not only was not able to evacuate the people from the dangerous zone but also, in principle, deceived the people of the country. When this information reached the West, of course, it negatively reflected on the reputation of the Soviet leadership. And

even more importantly, the number of people in the West who are beginning to understand that the Soviet Union is first of all a militaristic power is growing.

**RM:** What about the failures of disinformation?

**Levchenko:** In the past two years a fairly large number of Soviet forgeries have been caught. It has been known to everyone that these were done by the Soviet service for document disinformation and this, of course, reflects badly on the prestige of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps it would be correct to note that the Soviet Union is losing its positions in certain large organizations of peace supporters in Europe and the United States. It is happening, as I already noted, that a fairly large number of people are beginning to understand that namely military goals to a significant degree determine the whole policy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, many people who remain participants in peace organizations are beginning to protest, let's say, the growth of expenditures for defense not only in the United States of America. A majority of the European peace movements criticize the Soviet Union at least as sharply as the U.S. This is already a defeat for the Soviet Union inasmuch as (it is even difficult to understand how they succeeded but it really was so) from the 50's to the beginning of the 70's the European peace movement had an obviously anti-American direction. Now it is changing.

**RM:** Does it seem to you that the West is learning to defend itself from disinformation and is doing this more successfully now than previously?

**Levchenko:** Without a doubt, more and more governments and political and social organizations in the West recognize that there are such Soviet active measures and disinformation. A fairly significant number of books have been published on this theme and, in general, there is an improvement. In the West they are aware that the problem exists and they are beginning to understand what kind of methods the Soviet Union uses in this sphere. These are positive shifts but, of course, this is only a beginning.

**RM:** How many people work in the sphere of disinformation in APN, the state security, and so forth?

**Levchenko:** APN is a large organization, where approximately 8,000 people work. But more than 250,000 people serve the KGB, although in the intelligence service, of course, there are fewer. Then there is Moscow Radio and Progress Publishers. This is a large machine. In Moscow alone, according to my count, approximately 15,000 people work permanently in the sphere of disinformation (I have in mind not propaganda, but only disinformation).

**RM:** What can you tell us about the brochure "CIA Insider," which contains a list of journalists who supposedly work for the CIA?

**Levchenko:** This is a KGB forgery. One such brochure was printed somewhere in Switzerland about 10 years ago. It is



possible that there are new editions, but where they are printed has no significance because the KGB is always able to find a place, paper, and a small printing press which will print anything. Without a doubt this is a KGB forgery. The lists of journalists are compiled, in my opinion, in Moscow, in the KGB.

**RM:** How do you explain that there are many serious mistakes in the last names?

**Levchenko:** The KGB does not always work perfectly. They also make mistakes.

**RM:** Did the people who worked for you in Japan do it for money or because they were blackmailed, or out of conviction?

**Levchenko:** Half worked for money and half worked for money and sympathy toward the Soviet Union. But money, of course, always was present. It binds a person. People get accustomed to money, even ideological supporters of the Soviet Union.

**RM:** That means a lot of money is needed?

**Levchenko:** The KGB always has enough. However, in principle, the KGB saves money, does not squander it left and right. They pay depending on the degree of a person's usefulness and also how much he needs—from 150 to several thousand dollars a month. Everything changes in each specific situation. But, in general, they have enough money, regardless of any difficulties in the Soviet economy. The Politburo always allots sufficient money to the KGB for supporting their agent networks.

**Dzhirkvelov:** You can read about my decision to go to the West in the book which came out this year. I was never connected with a foreign intelligence service, but my whole life worked against foreign intelligence. I was really a journalist, like you, and now, as you see, I am giving an interview, although formerly I myself did the interviews. I was connected with journalism in the course of practically 20 years—as a real journalist and, as they say, "under cover."

But I want to tell you about the work of the security organs of the Soviet Union against journalists. I worked in the First Main Directorate—the foreign intelligence service. I also worked in the Second Main Directorate. This is the largest directorate of the KGB, which carries out counterintelligence work against foreigners and Soviet citizens connected with foreigners.

My work in the Second Main Directorate coincided with the organization of a special section for work against foreign journalists. This was at first a small group of the Second Main Directorate, approximately 10 people, headed by Col. Norman Borodin. He was the son of Mikhail Borodin, a man close to Lenin (he was shot in '48). Thus, then it was a small group but now it is the 10th section of the Second Main Directorate, one of the most powerful and largest. Until recently it was headed by my former friend, Maj. Gen. Vyzheslav Kevakov.

Our task in relation to foreign representatives, either diplomats or journalists, consisted of the following. First of all, of course, we had detailed information on each foreigner arriving in the Soviet Union. We received this information from archive material and from our agents overseas. We were always interested in the past and present of an arriving journalist, his views, his hobbies, relations with his family and with women, wine, money, etc., that is, anything that could be used with him during his time of work [in the U.S.S.R.]. I myself personally worked with foreign journalists—Americans, Germans, and French.

Our basic goal was to determine what we were able to do with one or another journalist. First of all, of course, we pursued the goal of recruiting him but this was not always successful. Therefore our second goal was to establish trustworthy, good relations with him in order to use him for our purposes in the Soviet Union—disinformation and other active measures. And furthermore, if we knew that a journalist was inclined toward anti-Sovietism and negatively disposed toward Soviet policy, he was compromised. For this we used our agents, including journalists and nonjournalists.

The third task was intended for each group of foreigners, whether in the embassies or among representatives, businessmen, or journalists—people, whom we were able to expel from the Soviet Union, accusing them of espionage when necessary. For this they use an agent who would give confidential information to a journalist who then gradually gets used to receiving this information. We often advise our agents to suggest to Western journalists that they not meet openly, but to hand over the material in some other way so that the foreigners get the impression that this is an especially valuable "channel." A very recent example of this is that of the American journalist Danilov—this is an elementary operation in compromising [someone].

The Soviet leadership excellently understands that journalists are people who create public opinion in the West and are able to be used as agents of influence—not directly, but in some kind of indirect way, because there are two types of agents of influence. The first is when a journalist or a businessman or some kind of political figure is recruited. The second is when he is used unconsciously; when they deliver to him material or information favorable to the Soviet Union. I am speaking completely responsibly, because I myself delivered such information to American, French, or German journalists and they used it successfully, for the benefit of Soviet propaganda. It was not a lie. It was well prepared disinformation.

We did not limit our work only to journalists inside the country. We tried to use them overseas, as agents of influence who were able to place in their newspapers (or through journalist-friends with other publications) material which was favorable to the Soviet side. I have many examples, but I will give you one. In 1974, when the elections for French President were coming up, at a meeting of the Central Committee, at which I was present, department chief and Central Committee secretary Ponomarev said that we should make all possible efforts so that Mitterrand was not elected. These are not empty words. I will not name the newspapers and publications which we used, but we used two large French newspapers and three newspapers outside of Paris with publication of materials extolling Giscard d'Estaing as a close comrade-in-arms of De Gaulle and a man striving for peace. I cannot say how much this material helped Giscard d'Estaing's election as President, but the fact itself is important. It surprised us, of course, that the Central Committee of our Communist Party was against the socialists and for the bourgeois party. Ponomarev explained to us (without our questions) that any bourgeois politician was much more useful than any social-democrat or socialist. We used newspapers not only in France, but also large newspapers in the United States, Italy, Japan, and Germany.

As a rule, Soviet services do not use leftist or communist newspapers. The basic task is to use so-called neutral or right-wing publications.

**RM:** What kind of connections do Soviet journalists have with the KGB?

**Dzhirkvelov:** It's necessary to divide journalists into two categories: first, journalists-internationalists, who work overseas as correspondents for TASS, APN, *Izvestiya* and other newspapers. They are actively used by the Soviet intelligence service. APN-Novosti Press Agency—is used by the Committee for State Security and by the Main Intelligence Directorate, that is, military intelligence. They used such newspapers as *Trud* and *Novoye Vremya* (this journal is in fact affiliated with the KGB). *Izvestiya* is used less and *Pravda* relatively rarely, although there are KGB employees among the *Pravda* correspondents. Regarding those who work inside the country, practically all Soviet journalists connected with foreign journalists working in Moscow to one degree or another cooperate with the KGB.

**RM:** How many people, on the average, watch Western journalists, especially those who meet with Soviet citizens or travel in the provinces?

**Dzhirkvelov:** The KGB receives information about each journalist and knows approximately, and sometimes exactly, his political views and sometimes knows even his intentions. Proceeding from this, they decide how actively they need to watch him. It is not true that external surveillance of each foreigner goes on 24 hours a day. This is not only physically but practically impossible. External surveillance is set up when the KGB knows that a journalist intends to meet with someone or travel somewhere. Then a minimum of 16-17 people participate in external surveillance, as well as a minimum of 10-12 cars of various makes and colors.

This is a very expensive and complicated operation. Therefore, basic surveillance of foreign journalists is carried out through agents among Soviet people whom they "place under" foreigners. Those journalists who do not speak Russian have secretaries and translators and these are also, as they say, sources. Lets say that if a journalist tells the press department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that he wants to visit Kiev, Tbilisi, and Karaganda, he will be placed under surveillance for 24 hours. Not one contact with Soviet people will pass unnoticed. The Committees of State Security of the republics are more aggressive than the KGB in Moscow because they do not see foreigners as often. It is impossible to meet without being noticed with citizens in

Georgia, Estonia, or Latvia. In Moscow it is simpler to receive information or to speak with an interesting person. I would add that Gorbachev's position on these matters is more severe than even Andropov's position. Regarding the directorate for serving the diplomatic corps (UPDK), at its head, as a rule, is someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His deputy is an employee of the KGB. The UPDK works in Soviet counterintelligence. Not one Soviet citizen is able to begin work in a foreign embassy or representation [office]—whether as a charwoman or a translator—without KGB permission. And they all cooperate.

Not one chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can decide one question without the agreement of the Second Main Directorate. During my time, the head of the press department (before Zamyatin) was Kharlamov. He was a member of the board and I was first deputy secretary of the Union of Journalists. I had very good relations with Kharlamov. Not one question about a journalist's trip, a change of apartment, about anything similar could be decided without the agreement of the Second Main Directorate. Unlike in the West, there cannot be any antagonism between Soviet organizations. There is a strict rule: We do our common duty and thanks to our common duty there can be no contradictions. When Zamyatin became general director of TASS I returned from overseas and was named responsible publisher of TASS. I was present when the KGB called him and told him that the KGB was interested in having its own people as correspondents in Madrid and Portugal. Zamyatin agreed. He occupies a high position, he was able to refuse, but it never entered his mind. Everyone does his duty.

Of course, I will add, that I do not want to support the opinion of some emigres who consider that one out of every four emigres is a KGB agent. Only a nonprofessional, who does not know what an agent network is and how to work with it, can say this. One cannot forget that the history of the Cheka, the NKVD and now the KGB is full of examples about the corruption of emigres who are already in the West, and they are corrupted from the U.S.S.R. That is how the first emigres were corrupted. For example, with the help of the Russian singer Vertinskiy, the Russian emigres in Harbin were corrupted. Naturally, Soviet intelligence participated in all these actions.

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