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0 4 DEC 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director for Intelligence	
FROM:	Director of Global Issues	25)
SUBJECT:	6 November 1984 Meeting with Ambassador Diana Dougan Coordinator for International Communication and Information Policy	*
•	Department of State	25)
international temperature whether private of communications satisfies about the future geostationary or communications is among other subjective Orion issue	Dr Dougan is responsible for a broad range of ecommunications issues including the question of companies such as Orion could enter the international atellite business. She also works on negotiations use of the high frequency radio spectrum and the oit. She travels extensively, discussing sues, most recently to Japan to discuss Intelsat ects. I have attached highlighted cables dealing with (Tab A) and Ambassador Dougan's talks in Japan	0.50
(Tab B).		25>
State's position Company to provide in the issue and discussions precent the President aut	1984, Ambassador Dougan sought your support for concerning the proposal of the Orion Satellite de transatlantic service. CIA had no Agency equities did not take an active role in the interagency eding the President's Orion decision. On 28 November thorized Orion and other private firms to negotiate provide specific transatlantic services.	25)
3. OGI works	s extensively with Ambassador Dougan. We meet with and are in touch with her staff almost every day.	20,
		25 X 1
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		25)
		20,

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	25X1
Thile we are not able to respond to all of Ambassador Dougan's	
requests for support, we have devoted the majority of our analysts' sime to supporting her office.	25X1
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ttachments:	

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As Stated

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OGI/ISID/IO/	(4 Dec 84)
Distribution: Original and 1 - addressed 1 - DDA 1 - DDCI 1 - DDI 1 - NIO, Hall 1 - D/OGI 1 - C/ISID 1 - C/IO	

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TAB A

C1S

PAGE 0001

124 (STXX) *11/28/84* *08:17:01.8.9* MSGNO ZCZC 13:15:03Z (ST) CONFIDENTIAL INFO: NMON, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, ODPW-W, OGI/EC/CM, ACTION: NONE OGI/GD/ERA, OOE/EI/PS, OSWR/TTC, PAGE-E (), RF, FILE, COMMO/RB, CR/F, CRES/IG, D/FBIS-2, DSD/DEB, NCECF, NCPM, OC/ED-2, OC/FILE, OSWR/CIG, QA/STATE, SSD/SMB, SSD/STAB, SWO, (18/W) ----- 25X1 84 5809028 SCO NC 5809028 TOR: 280923Z <>>NOV 84<><> <> OO RUEAIIB ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH OO RUEHC DE RUEHC #0510 3330906 ZNY CCCCC ZZH <> 0 280353Z <><>NOV 84<><> FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000 IMMEDIATE BT EZ1: CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 350510 EZ2: TOKYO FOR AMBASSADOR <><>DOUGAN<><> CORRECTEDCOPY (TEXT - PARA 3, LINE 28) ORIGINALLY PROCESSED AS CDS#5807200 E.O. 12356: N/A <> TAGS: ECPS, <><>INTELSAT<><> SUBJECT: <><>INTELSAT<>>> PRESS RELEASE AND DRAFT QS AND AS <> PLEASE DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR <><>DOUGAN<><> AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. <> 1. PER AMBASSADOR <><>DOUGAN<><>'S REQUEST, THE FOLLOWING ARE THE <> PRESS RELEASE AND DRAFT QS AND AS ON <><>INTELSAT<>><>: 2. DRAFT WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE RELEASE PRESIDENT REAGAN TODAY MADE THE DETERMINATION THAT SEPARATE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THIS DECISION PERMITS THE OPERATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OUTSIDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ORGANIZATION_(<><>INTELSAT<><>), AND CLEARS THE WAY FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (FCC) OF FIVE PENDING APPLICATIONS. IN MAKING THE DETERMINATION, THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND COMMERCE TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA TO INSURE THAT FCC DECISIONS ON SEPARATE SYSTEMS ARE CONSONANT WITH U.S. INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

CONFIDENTIA

IN A JOINT LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL

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COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ AND SECRETARY OF COMMERCE MALCOLM BALDRIGE ARE NOTIFYING THE FCC THAT ANY NEW SYSTEMS AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS DETERMINATION 1) MUST BE RESTRICTED TO PROVIDING SERVICES THROUGH THE SALE OR LONG-TERM LEASE OF TRANSPONDERS OR SPACE SEGMENT CAPACITY FOR COMMUNICATIONS NOT INTERCONNECTED WITH PUBLIC-SWITCHED MESSAGE NETWORKS (EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCY RESTORATION SERVICE); AND 2) THAT ONE OR MORE FOREIGN AUTHORITIES MUST AUTHORIZE USE OF THE SYSTEM AND ENTER INTO CONSULTATION PROCEDURES WITH THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE TERMS OF THE <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT TO ENSURE TECHNICAL

- COMPATIBILITY AND TO AVOID SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC HARM TO
- <> THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF <><>INTELSAT<><>. OF THE FIVE APPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SERVICE PENDING BEFORE THE FCC, FOUR PROPOSE TRANS-ATLANTIC SERVICES IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES THE U.S. AND SOUTH AMERICA, AND SERVICE BETWEEN SOUTH AMERICA AND SPAIN. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT SEPARATE SYSTEMS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET AND STIMULATE HIGHER OVERALL LEVELS OF COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC BY DEVELOPING INNOVATIVE AND CUSTOMIZED SERVICES FOR THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY.
- <> SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS OUTSIDE OF <><>INTELSAT<><> WERE
- <> PROVIDED FOR IN THE ORIGINAL <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT AND SEVERAL OF THEM ARE ALREADY IN EXISTENCE. THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SATELLITE ORGANIZATION (INMARSAT), ARABSAT, AND EUTELSAT PROVIDE SERVICE ON A REGIONAL OR GLOBAL BASIS, AND DOMESTIC SATELLITES, INCLUDING SEVERAL AMERICAN SATELLITES AND THE INDONESIAN PALAPA SATELLITE, PROVIDE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES BETWEEN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
 - QS AND AS AS FOLLOWS:
- ISN'T THE UNITED STATES UNDERMINING THE <><>INTELSAT<><> Q. GLOBAL SYSTEM BY AUTHORIZING COMPETITION ON THE MOST LUCRATIVE AND HIGHLY-USED ROUTES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC? THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION DOES NOT STATE THAT ANY INDIVIDUAL APPLICATION FOR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS WILL BE APPROVED. DOES SAY THAT SUCH SYSTEMS ARE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. THIS MEETS A DOMESTIC REQUIREMENT OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962. THE APPLICATIONS MUST ALSO BE AUTHORIZED BY THE FCC AND MEET THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THE LETTER OF SECRETARIES BALDRIGE AND SHULTZ TO FCC CHAIRMAN FOWLER, NAMELY
- CONSULTATION UNDER <><>INTELSAT<><> PROCEDURES AND A FOREIGN PARTNER WILLING TO AUTHORIZE THE OTHER END OF THE SERVICE AND JOIN THE U.S. IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. FURTHER, PRIVATE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO COMPETE
- WITH <><>INTELSAT<>><>'S PRINCIPAL BUSINESS, PROVIDING CONFIDENTIA

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- INTERNATIONAL INTERCONNECTION FOR PUBLIC SWITCHED NETWORKS. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WAS NOT ONLY AWARE OF
- THE OBLIGATION TO CONSULT WITH <><>INTELSAT<>>>, BUT ALSO COMMITTED TO THE POLICY OF AVOIDING SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC
- <> HARM TO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF <><>INTELSAT<>>>. WE WILL NOT
- PREJUDGE THE <><>INTELSAT<><> CONSULTATION PROCESS, BUT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT INITIATE CONSULTATION ON ANY SYSTEM IF IT BELIEVED IT WOULD CAUSE SIGNIFICANT
- <> ECONOMIC HARM TO THE <><>INTELSAT<><> GLOBAL SYSTEM.
- <> Q. WON'T THESE SATELLITE SYSTEMS SIPHON OFF <><>INTELSAT<><> PROFITS ON THE TRANS-ATLANTIC ROUTES, THEREBY FORCING.
- <> <><\INTELSAT<><> TO LOWER RATES FOR TRANS-ATLANTIC TRAFFIC IN ORDER TO COMPETE WITH THE NEW SYSTEMS?
- A. THERE SHOULD BE NO EFFECT ON <><>INTELSAT<>>> RATES FOR SERVICES THROUGH PUBLIC SWITCHED NETWORKS. MANY OF THE SERVICES PROPOSED BY THE PRIVATE SYSTEMS -- SALE OR LEASE OF TRANSPONDERS TO PRIVATE USERS, DEDICATED TV TRANSMISSIONS, OR OTHER INNOVATIVE SERVICES -- ARE NOT
- NOW AVAILABLE FROM <><>INTELSAT<><>. SOME LARGE USERS MAY
- SWITCH FROM <><>INTELSAT<><> TO THEIR PRIVATELY-OWNED OR LEASED TRANSPONDERS FOR THEIR OWN COMMUNICATION NEEDS, BUT THE VAST BULK OF THE BUSINESS WILL BE NEW. EXPERIENCE ALSO TELLS US THAT THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS LEADS TO INCREASED COMMUNICATION OF ALL KINDS.
- <> Q. WON'T THIS NEW COMPETITION FORCE <><>INTELSAT<>>> TO RAISE ITS RATES ON SERVICE TO UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; RATES WHICH ARE NOW BEING SUBSIDIZED BY PROFITS FROM THE TRANS-ATLANTIC TRAFFIC?
- A. SINCE WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN

 <> <>>INTELSAT<><>'S TRANS-ATLANTIC TRAFFIC, THERE SHOULD BE NO
 EFFECT ON ANY CROSS SUBSIDIES TO THEIR MARKETS. WHILE
 CROSS-SUBSIDIES HAVE BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED, WE HAVE NO
 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT THIS IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN
- <> SETTING RATES. <><>INTELSAT<>><> TARIFFS ARE, OF COURSE, UNIFORM
 AND AFFECT ALL USERS ALIKE.
 - Q. IF THERE IS A MARKET FOR NEW SERVICES, WHY ISN'T
- <> <><INTELSAT<><> PROVIDING THEM? ISN'T IT TRUE THAT THEY HAVE EXCESS SATELLITE TRANSPONDER CAPACITY?
- <> A. <><INTELSAT<><>'S PRIMARY MISSION IS TO PROVIDE A BASIC GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEM. IT IS JUSTIFIED IN RISKING ITS CAPITAL IN THE PURSUIT OF THAT MISSION AND HAS EXCEEDED ALL ORIGINAL ESTIMATES OF TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUCCESS IN DOING SO. IT IS NOT
- SO CLEAR THAT <><>INTELSAT<><> SHOULD RISK THE CAPITAL IT DERIVES FROM BOTH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY SHAREHOLDERS, ITS SIGNATORIES, TO INTRODUCE HIGH CAPITAL COST SERVICES TO AN UNCERTAIN MARKET OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS IN A FEW DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. SOME OF THESE SERVICES ARE NOT IN FACT PROSPERING IN THE U.S. AND IT MAY TAKE YEARS TO BUILD INTERNATIONAL MARKETS. IF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS WILLING TO TAKE THIS RISK AND IS SUCCESSFUL IN DEVELOPING NEW MARKETS, THERE IS NO

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- <> REASON WHY <><>INTELSAT<><> MAY NOT SEEK TO SHARE IN THEM TO THE
- EXTENT ALLOWED IN THE <><>INTELSAT<>>> AGREEMENT. IF, IN FACT, THERE IS NO MARKET FOR PRIVATE SYSTEMS, THEY OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE UNSUCCESSFUL, BUT THAT IS THE RISK OF THE PRIVATE INVESTORS.
 - Q. WHAT KINDS OF SERVICES ARE THESE NEW SATELLITE SYSTEMS GOING TO PROVIDE THAT ARE NOT ALREADY BEING PROVIDED?
 - A. THERE ARE NOW FIVE APPLICATIONS BEFORE THE FCC WHICH DESCRIBE IN DETAIL THE PROPOSED SERVICES AND HOW THEY
- OIFFER FROM, AND DO NOT COMPETE WITH, <><>INTELSAT<><>
 OFFERINGS. THESE APPLICATIONS ARE ON THE PUBLIC RECORD
 AND YOU MAY WANT TO LOOK AT THEM. BASICALLY, THEY
 PROPOSE SALE OR LEASE OF TRANSPONDERS FOR PRIVATE LINE
 SERVICES AND LARGE SCALE TV TRANSMISSIONS.
 - Q. WHAT EVIDENCE IS THERE THAT THERE IS A MARKET FOR NEW SERVICES?
 - A. YOU WOULD NOT HAVE PROPOSALS FOR COSTLY SYSTEMS UNLESS THE APPLICANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT A MARKET EXISTS OR COULD BE DEVELOPED FOR THEIR SERVICES. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONSIDERED WHETHER U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST WOULD BE SERVED BY PERMITTING PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS TO OFFER NEW INNOVATIVE SERVICES TO AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS USERS UNDER
- CONDITIONS THAT WOULD PROTECT <><>INTELSAT<><> FROM SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC HARM TO ITS GLOBAL SYSTEM.
 - Q. WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN IT SAYS IN THE GUIDELINES TO THE FCC THAT THE NEW SATELLITE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE CONNECTED TO THE PUBLIC-SWITCHED MESSAGE NETWORKS?

 A. OWNERS OR RENTERS OF THE TRANSPONDERS WOULD NOT BE
 - A. OWNERS OR RENTERS OF THE TRANSPONDERS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONNECT THEIR SYSTEM WITH THE PUBLIC TELEPHONE SYSTEM IN THE U.S. EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCY RESTORATION SERVICES.
 - Q. WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO JOIN
- THE U.S. IN REQUESTING <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT TO COMPETITIVE SYSTEMS?
 - A. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT QUERIED OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO JOIN THE U.S. IN ARTICLE XIV(D) NON-BINDING CONSULTATIONS FOR NON-INTELSAT SYSTEMS. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILTY OF THE APPLICANTS TO OBTAIN APPROVAL OF THEIR SYSTEMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.
- <> Q. CAN <><>INTELSAT<><> BLOCK THESE NEW SYSTEMS?
- <> A. <>>INTELSAT<>>> CONSULTATIONS UNDER ARTICLE XIV(D) ARE NON-BINDING: MEMBERS ARE NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED TO ACCEPT
- <> <><>INTELSAT<><> RECOMMENDATIONS ON NEW SYSTEMS. THE U.S. WILL,
- <> OF COURSE, CONSULT IN GOOD FAITH WITH <><>INTELSAT<>>> TO ENSURE TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY AND TO AVOID SIGNIFICANT
- <> ECONOMIC HARM TO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF <><>INTELSAT<><>. THE
- CONSULTATION REQUIRED UNDER THE <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT WILL BE ON INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.
 - Q. WHO DETERMINES WHAT CONSTITUTES "SIGNIFICANT

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T TABLE

ECONOMIC HARM?"

- A. THE COUNTRIES WHICH REQUEST ARTICLE XIV(D)
 CONSULTATIONS PROVIDE ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION TO
- <> <><INTELSAT<><> REGARDING THE ISSUE OF SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC
- <> HARM TO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF <><>INTELSAT<><>. THE <><>INTELSAT<><>
 ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER
- CONSIDERING THE PROPOSAL AND THE ADVICE OF THE <><>INTELSAT<>>> BOARD OF GOVERNORS. IN THE ASSEMBLY, EACH COUNTRY HAS ONE VOTE.
- <> Q. HASN'T THE <><>INTELSAT<>>> SECRETARIAT PROPOSED NEW CRITERIA ON ECONOMIC HARM THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY BAR ALMOST ALL NEW SYSTEMS?
 - A. SINCE ARTICLE XIV(D) CONSULTATION IS NON-BINDING.
- <> <><INTELSAT<><> RECOMMENDATIONS CANNOT BAR NEW SYSTEMS. THE
- <> <><INTELSAT<><> SECRETARIAT HAS PROPOSED NEW CRITERIA ON ECONOMIC HARM WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. Q. WHAT DOES THE U.S. INTEND TO DO ABOUT THOSE PROPOSED CRITERIA?
 - A. THE U.S. WILL OPPOSE THEIR ADOPTION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT OUR DISAGREEMENTS GO BEYOND THE ECONOMIC HARM
- CRITERIA. THE <><>INTELSAT<><> DOCUMENTS, TAKEN TOGETHER, RAISE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS.
- <> Q. CAN THEY BE ADOPTED BY <><>INTELSAT<>><> OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES?
 - A. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT OTHER MEMBERS SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CRITERIA AND THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ADOPTED IN THEIR PRESENT FORM.
 - Q. IF THEY WERE ADOPTED WHAT WOULD THE U.S. DO ABOUT
- <> ITS MEMBERSHIP IN <><>INTELSAT<>>>?
 - A. THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. WAS FUNDAMENTAL IN THE
- <> ESTABLISHMENT OF <><>INTELSAT<><>. WE, AS MUCH AS ANYONE,
- ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONTRIBUTION THAT <><>INTELSAT<><> HAS MADE TO WORLD-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS AND THEREFORE TO WORLD PEACE. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE NEW CRITERIA WILL NOT BE ADOPTED IN THEIR PRESENT FORM. IF THEY ARE, AND IF THEIR OPERATION ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S., THEN, OF COURSE, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS.
 - Q. WHAT ARE THE FIVE COMPANIES THAT HAVE APPLIED FOR PERMISSION TO ESTABLISH SATELLITE SERVICES IN
- <> COMPETITION WITH <><>INTELSAT<><>?
 - A. ORION SATELLITE CORPORATION (3/83)
 - INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE, INCORPORATED (8/83)
 - RCA AMERICOM (3/84)
 - CYGNUS SATELLITE CORPORATION (3/84)
 - PAN AMERICAN SATELLITE CORPORATION (5/84)
 - Q. WHY HAS IT TAKEN THE PRESIDENT SO LONG TO REACH A ECISION ON THE NEW SATELLITE SERVICES? DIDN'T THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND COMMERCE SEND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE QUESTION SEVERAL MONTHS AGO?
 - A. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION THAT HAD TO

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- ACCOMMODATE POLICY OBJECTIVES OF PRESERVING THE VIABILITY OF <><>INTELSAT<>><> AND ENCOURAGING INNOVATIVE NEW INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES WHICH THE PRIVATE SECTOR APPEARS WILLING TO PROVIDE. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON THE DETAILS OF SUCH A DECISION ARE NATURAL AND IT TOOK TIME TO ACHIEVE A UNANIMITY OF VIEWS. COMPARISON WITH OTHER IMPORTANT DECISIONS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR TAKEN BY CONGRESS, THE REGULATORY AGENCY, AND THE COURTS, IT DID NOT TAKE UNDUE TIME.
 - Q. WERE THERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ON WHAT THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION OUGHT TO BE?
 - A. WE BELIEVE THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION, AS MADE, MEETS THE NEEDS OF THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. ANY DIFFERENCES AMONG AGENCIES RECOMMENDING THE PRESIDENTIAL ACTION HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.
 - Q. WHAT HAPPENS TO THE PROPOSALS BEFORE THE FCC NOW THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE HIS DETERMINATION? A. THE FCC MUST REACH ITS OWN DECISION AS TO WHETHER ANY OR ALL OF THE PROPOSALS MEET FCC CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL. IF THE COMMISSION DETERMINES ITS CRITERIA OF PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE, AND NECESSITY HAVE BEEN MET, IT WILL GRANT CONDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND REFER THE MATTER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. AFTER THE U.S.
- <> HAS PRESENTED THE PROPOSAL TO <><>INTELSAT<><> FOR ARTICLE
- <> XIV(D) CONSULTATION, VARIOUS ORGANS OF <><>INTELSAT<><> WILL CONSIDER IT AND FORWARD THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
- <><>INTELSAT<>><> ASSEMBLY. THE FCC WOULD GIVE FINAL
- <> AUTHORIZATION ONLY AFTER THE <><>INTELSAT<>><> CONSULTATION PROCESS HAS BEEN CONCLUDED.
 - Q. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAVE COMPLAINED TO THE U.S. ABOUT THIS NEW POLICY. WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE DONE SO?
 - A. A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAVE SENT DIPLOMATIC NOTES AND LETTERS EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT THE U.S. WOULD PERMIT NON-INTELSAT SYSTEMS. WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT OTHER
- <><>INTELSAT<>><> MEMBERS WILL CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION AND THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING IT NOW THAT THE DECISION HAS BEEN MADE.
 - Q. WHAT WERE THEIR OBJECTIONS?
 - THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION ON THE VIABILITY OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF
- <><>INTELSAT<><>.
 - Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER COMMUNICATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS
- <> COMPETING WITH <><>INTELSAT<><>?
 - A. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF REGIONAL SYSTEMS THAT HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED, OR PLANNED, INCLUDING EUTELSAT. ARABSAT, AND THE INDONESIAN PALAPA SYSTEM. INTERSPUTNIK
- IS A RUSSIAN SYSTEM DESIGNED TO COMPETE WITH <><>INTELSAT<><> GLOBALLY. SOME DOMESTIC SYSTEMS, INCLUDING OUR OWN. PROVIDE A LIMITED SERVICE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. CONFIDENTIA

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INMARSAT PROVIDES A GLOBAL MARITIME SERVICE, AND HAS ALSO PROVIDED SOME LIMITED MOBILE TERRESTRIAL SERVICES. Q. ARE THERE ANY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS PLANNED BY OTHER COUNTRIES THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF?

- THERE ARE EXISTING NATIONAL SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE EASILY EXPANDED TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES. INCLUDING TRANS-ATLANTIC SERVICES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE AT THIS TIME THAT INTERNATIONAL SERVICES ARE BEING PLANNED.
- ISN'T THE U.S. SIMPLY TRYING TO IMPOSE ITS OWN IDEOLOGICAL PREFERENCE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS BY EXTENDING ITS DEREGULATORY STANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA?
- THE U.S., FOR THE FIRST TIME, WAS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER DOMESTIC PRIVATE SECTOR PROPOSALS TO PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION SATELLITE SERVICES. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO HAVE SUCH SYSTEMS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THIS WAS A DOMESTIC DECISION AND PLACES NO OBLIGATIONS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO AGREE TO PERMIT THESE SYSTEMS TO SERVICE THEIR COUNTRIES. THE TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT THAT LED TO THE U.S. DECISION DOES APPLY TO OTHER COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, AND WE BELIEVE THIS MAY LEAD OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE SAME CONCLUSIONS WE REACHED.
- ISN'T THE U.S. DECISION TO AUTHORIZE SEPARATE SATELLITE SYSTEMS LIKELY TO LEAD TO CHAOS IN THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET?
- A. NO. <><>INTELSAT<>><>'S BASE IS PRESERVED. IN OUR VIEW, THE DECISION COULD LEAD TO COMPETITION IN PROVIDING NEW SERVICES WHICH OUR EXPERIENCE TELLS US WILL BENEFIT CONSUMERS AND HASTEN TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT. Q. WHAT IMPACT WILL THE TWO PRIVATE PROPOSALS TO INSTALL TRANS-ATLANTIC FIBER OPTIC CABLES HAVE ON
- <> <><>INTELSAT<><> AND ON THE PRIVATE SATELLITE SYSTEMS? A. FIBER OPTIC CABLES WILL BE STRONG COMPETITORS TO SATELLITES, BUT JUST AS THE SATELLITES DID NOT MAKE LAND AND CABLE SYSTEMS OBSOLETE, WE DO NOT THINK FIBER OPTICS WILL MEAN THE END OF COMMUNICATION SATELLITES. WE EXPECT THE MARKET TO GROW AS TECHNOLOGY INCREASES CAPACITY AND PERMITS NEW SERVICES. SATELLITES WILL RETAIN CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, AND, AS THE COST AND SIZE OF GROUND STATIONS DECLINE, SATELLITES WILL DIRECTLY SERVICE MANY NEW CUSTOMERS.
 - Q. WILL THE FCC APPROVE THOSE SYSTEMS?
 - A. ONLY IF THEY MEET FCC CRITERIA. SHULTZ

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TAB B PAGE

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23 (FBXX)
              *11/28/84* *12:17:04.1.0*
    ZCZC 17:14:51Z (FB)
    UNCLASSIFIED
    RTTUZYUW RUHJFBA8237 3331624 MTMS-UUAA--RUEBHAA.
    R 280851Z NOV 84
    FM FBIS OKINAWA JA
    TO AIG 4583
    RUADJNA/AFOSI DIST 46 YOKOTA AB JA//IVOA//
    RUAJMAB/FOSIF WESTPAC KAMI SEYA JA
    RUCEAAA/HQ NORAD CHEYENNE MTN COMPLEX CO//J-31S//
    RUCEAAM/HQ NORAD INTEL CEN CHEYENNE MTN CMPLX CO//J20//
    RUCHNVM/NASA JOHNSON SPACE CEN HOUSTON TX
    RUCIAEA/FTD/SDO WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
    RUEANAT/NASA HQ WASH DC
    RUEBJLA/NAVSPASUR DAHLGREN VA
    RUEVHFN/NASA LANGLEY FLD HAMPTON VA
    RUWLSOH/NASA JET PROPULSION LAB PASADENA CA
    RUWLSNJ/NASA/ARC MOFFETT FLD CA
    RUWOHEA/NASA GSFC GREENBELT MD
    RUWOHEA/SMITHSONIAN CAMBRIDGE MA
    RUWTNOA/HQ SPACE CMD PETERSON AFB CO//XPX ATTN MOEN//
    RUDOMKD/FBIS LONDON UK//TAPE//
    RUEBFGA/VOA WASHINGTON DC
    RUETIAA/FT GEO G MEADE MD
    ACCT FBOW-EWDK
    EZ1:
    UNCLAS 4C/BBC TAB
    ATTN MEASHAM, FRANCIS/OFFORD
    COPY TO ED, MOD
    SUBJ
   JAPAN SEEKS FLEXIBILITY IN <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT
   OW280851
    TOKYO KYODO IN ENGLISH 0743 GMT 28 NOV 84
    ((TEXT)) TOKYO, NOV. 28 KYODO -- JAPAN TOLD THE UNITED STATES
   WEDNESDAY IT DOES NOT WANT TO BE BOUND ''100 PERCENT'' BY THE
<> <><INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT FOR SATELLITE OPERATIONS.
    A JAPANESE DELEGATION TO A TWO-DAY MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL
   COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION WITH THE UNITED STATES TUESDAY
   AND WEDNESDAY VOICED CONCERN OVER THE PRESENT AGREEMENT OF
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OF SIX APPLICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE LAUNCHING OF SATELLITE BY BYPASSING THE <><>INTELSAT<><> ACCORD, A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAID.

THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND AN AMERICAN GROUP

THE ISSUE CAME UP IN CONNECTION WITH A U.S. EXPLANATION

(<><>INTELSAT<><>).

THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ORGANIZATION

HEADED BY DIANA DOUGAN THEN SHIFTED TO THE DEGREE OF THE <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT'S FLEXIBILITY, HE SAID AFTER THE MEETING AT THE UNCLASSIFIED

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MINISTRY.

''IT IS A HOT ISSUE,'' A MINISTRY SOURCE SAID. ''WE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE WITH FEAR AND EXPECTATION'' OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON SATELLITES.

''JAPAN DOES NOT WANT TO BE BOUND 100 PERCENT BY THE

<> <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT, '' THE SOURCE SAID.

THE SOURCE SAID THE U.S. DELEGATION LIMITED ITS EXPLANATION

TO INTERPRETATION OF THE <><>INTELSAT<><> AGREEMENT WITHOUT STATING FUTURE POLICY.

AMBASSADOR DOUGAN, COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION POLICY, MET WITH OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE AGENCY FOR CULTURAL AFFAIRS, FOR ''AN INFORMAL EXCHANGE'' OF OPINIONS.

THE ENVOY SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY HELD SIMILAR TALKS WITH BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, CANADA AND MEXICO.

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAID WASHINGTON APPEARS MAINLY CONCERNED ABOUT MOVES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO POLITICIZE ISSUES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU), THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO) AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD).

THE OFFICIAL SAID TOKYO HAS NO OBJECTION TO A U.S. PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A COMMON STAND ON ''POLITICAL DEMANDS'' OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CONCERNING ITU.

THE DOUGAN DELEGATION HINTED THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO CONTINUE ITS INVOLVEMENT IN UNESCO'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS (IPDC) DESPITE ITS PLANNED WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO, ACCORDING TO THE JAPANESE OFFICIAL. THE AMERICAN DELEGATES ALSO EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR JAPAN'S PROJECT TO STUDY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND INFORMATIZATION ((AS RECEIVED)), THE OFFICIAL ADDED. THE TWO COUNTRIES ALSO DISCUSSED THE ITU TREATY AND WAYS TO REVISE IT AND WHETHER IT SHOULD BE CHANGED TO A CHARTER. (ENDALL) 280743 TSAO KY 28/1629Z NOV

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