

VIA HAND CARRIED
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EZZA-149

TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE

14 OCT 1956

TO Headquarters

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FROM Chief of Station, [REDACTED]

DOCUMENT NO. 155712

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS (S) C

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 8-1-06

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 8-1-86

REVIEWER: 100368

1956 OCT 16 PM 5:33

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operations
SPECIFIC [REDACTED] (Mission 1115)

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1. Mission 1115 was flown [REDACTED] October 1956 in [REDACTED]. Special equipment consisted of [REDACTED]. Duration of the flight was five hours and thirty-four minutes. Take-off was as scheduled. No problems were encountered in launching the mission.

2. L-8 HS 731, shutter tension spring broke after thirty-four exposures. Preliminary reports from local group indicate that V-7 and R-6 were excellent through-out. L-8 was excellent for the first thirty-four exposures. There is no indication of fogging or frosting. This is the fourth broken spring that has occurred and each break has been at the same relative position on the spring, directly below the hook on the first coil of the spring. Further, the design of each break has been identical, i.e., an "L" shaped break. The first theory was a double wind on the spring caused by the improper functioning of the latch. This I disagree with, as it would indicate such on the exposure. My theory is that when the spring is manufactured, heat is applied to form the hook, and in re-tempering the spring the part directly below the hook does not get the proper treatment, resulting in weakness in this area. Magnafluxing the spring has proven unsatisfactory. Instead each spring is periodically examined under a microscope; although this method is not a positive fix, it is a precaution and has resulted in the discovery of one of the four defective springs. Conclusion: Recommend this theory be further investigated at the plant and that a more stringent test or inspection be initiated to ascertain that each spring meets the specifications.

3. No problems were encountered in the briefing or de-briefing of this mission.

4. The route was clear for the entire route south of the Alps. On both the outgoing and incoming legs light low clouds were encountered just north of the Alps, gradually increasing to an overcast condition as it approached Wiesbaden. The pilot was on course throughout the flight. From the viewpoint of maintaining the planned course line, this was probably the most successful flight flown to date. The quality of the tracker film was generally good, although the

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last fifty feet were badly obscured with "sun streaks". This was due to the extreme low angle of the sun at the close of the flight. Plotting time for this mission was one hour and fifty minutes.

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5. Reference [REDACTED] All indicated [REDACTED] was cleared and urgency existed to accomplish mission on 12 October. Therefore I feel [REDACTED] 5171 was unnecessary criticism. Project Headquarters commo has been reluctant to use patch under similar conditions. However, in future subject messages will be dispatched Operational Immediate through commo patch. Again I must point out the original notification was not received under the times specified in Operations Order 4-56. This must be adhered to if we are to comply with all existing directives in dispatching [REDACTED] messages.

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6. [REDACTED] is to be highly commended for this mission. His take-off was an instrument take-off with one half mile visibility and ceiling. The landing was a standard GCA approach with one half to three fourths mile visibility and 300 foot ceiling. [REDACTED] was the only alternate with better visibility conditions and had [REDACTED] not been able to land at [REDACTED] he was directed to land at [REDACTED]. Ground crew and equipment was standing by to proceed to [REDACTED] in this event.

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7. It is recommended that the Operations Order 2-56 and all Operations Policy letters be reviewed by Project Headquarters and revised to better direct the operations of the field units. This is particularly true after [REDACTED] has completed their move to [REDACTED]. Specifically: Operations Policy letter number 10 should be re-written to delineate the procedures and responsibilities of [REDACTED] in handling the take from [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] has moved. Operations Policy letter number 11 requires the same review to outline responsibility and procedures for the Elint Tapes. This is especially true now that USAFE is getting copies of both the film and the tapes; Operations Policy letter 14 should be modified where applicable.

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