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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: U-2 Program

The diminishing number of operationally available U-2 aircraft has been a subject of continuous review for the past two years. Although the loss of four aircraft during the first six months of this year has not significantly influenced the overall aircraft attrition rate (see Tab 1), it has impacted seriously on the operational capability.

On the basis of the past ten years of experience, the current world situation, and the expectations of world developments over the foreseeable future, it is reasonable to expect continuing requirements for U-2 photographic reconnaissance in a number of different areas of the world (see Tab 2). Our present U-2 inventory will provide a reasonably adequate capability to accomplish the required missions for 1½ to 2 years. To do so, however, very close management control of the assets to provide efficient operational utilization will be required. Beyond the two-year time period, we do not expect, because of the anticipated attrition rate, to have sufficient aircraft to conduct the expected operational missions.

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The present U-2 assets are:

1. Assigned to CIA 6
2. Assigned to SAC 8
- ① 3. Being Modified 2
4. Assigned to AFSC 4 (These aircraft are

in various test configurations rather than operational configurations. Two aircraft are of the two-seat configuration.)

Due to the limited number of operational aircraft, we have investigated the feasibility and desirability of bringing all aircraft under one operational management while still maintaining both CIA and SAC programs. There are serious constraints which militate against such a management arrangement. For example, due to the difference in operational environments, the CIA and SAC aircraft are not identical in basic payload and defensive systems configurations. Also, serious problems would arise in the command and control and security aspects of that arrangement because of the overt and clandestine requirements.

② There are, however, actions which can be taken to optimize utilization of the operational aircraft. Some of these actions have been taken. Thus we are presently modifying the SAC airplanes (see Tab 3) to the U-2C configuration (with the J-75 engine installation) to permit the exchange of aircraft between CIA and SAC when their respective assets are insufficient to meet operational requirements. Additional measures in aircraft modifications are being accomplished

which will provide a maximum interchangeability of these assets with improved flight safety.

Because our total U-2 inventory is quite low even with a capability for maximum interchangeability of aircraft between CIA and SAC, it is prudent to review the operational requirements and to determine the allocation of aircraft consistent with these requirements and available assets. CIA has two primary missions: [redacted]

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[redacted] overflight coverage of COMOR targets in China and North Korea and maintaining a dual staging capability at Edwards AFB for world wide deployments as required. This dual staging capability requirement includes the ability to operate the U-2 from aircraft carriers. To accomplish these missions, CIA has six U-2s (one of which is on bailment to Lockheed for a continuing test and product improvement program), and 14 pilots [redacted]

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The SAC missions include the coverage of COMOR targets in Cuba; DIA, COMOR, and COMUSMACV targets in Southeast Asia; alert commitments for worldwide deployment; back-up of the Air Weather Service air sampling missions; and training of all new pilots [redacted] being introduced into the U-2 program. SAC has eight available aircraft and 24 to 26 pilots to fulfill these missions.

③

As the result of a review of the mission requirements and available assets, the following comments are relevant:

25X1 1. SAC now has a minimum practical number (eight) of aircraft available for mission accomplishment. Two of these are [redacted] for coverage of Southeast Asia in response to both theatre and Washington Headquarters requirements; one is maintained in operational readiness at Barksdale AFB and is used for coverage of Cuba in response to national requirements. The remaining five are at Davis Monthan AFB and are employed for rotation of aircraft in South Vietnam, support of Air Weather Service, air sampling missions, and for the training of new pilots being introduced into the program as well as for the maintenance of proficiency of the SAC pilots assigned to the program.


2. CIA does not now possess an adequate aircraft inventory to maintain the entire [redacted] as well as the dual staging capability at Edwards. [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] One of the aircraft at Edwards is assigned to Lockheed for testing which is relevant to the improvement of both the CIA and SAC programs. There are three aircraft at Edwards which not only must be responsive to the requirement for dual staging capability, but also for use in continuing proficiency of

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the CIA pilots [redacted] In the past, there has not been a demand to exercise dual staging. To be able to accomplish this would require a minimum of four aircraft at Edwards. In view of the present low inventory of U-2s, it would seem essential to recognize history and to reconsider whether the requirement for a second staging capability is valid. If such reconsideration proves the requirement to be valid, we must recognize that the capability does not exist with our present assets. Furthermore, consideration



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(4) The Air Force Systems Command's four U-2's are a source for adding to the inventory for operational reconnaissance. AFSC has four U-2's engaged in high altitude test and research programs (see Tab 4). While it is recognized that these research programs play a significant role in the long range development of future systems, the need to augment the operational forces to the minimal acceptable level must be given priority. To provide AFSC the opportunity for program planning and maximum utilization of the test vehicles, transfer of the U-2's should be done on a scheduled basis rather than acquired at random to compensate for operational losses.

One of the four aircraft from AFSC should be turned over for modifications immediately. A second aircraft may be required at the end of the current modification line if attrition losses so dictate. It is anticipated that these aircraft can be replaced in two to three years with the U-2C's if a U-2R is built. The U-2C will provide improved performance characteristics over the U-2A's and, hence, increase the test capability at that time.

3. The present low inventory of U-2's, the anticipated need for the use of this aircraft, a continuation of present requirements, the possibility of new requirements in various parts of the world, and the increased hostility of certain operational environments strongly indicate the need for additional procurement now. Growth in the enemy's air defense suggests that any newly procured aircraft must have a better performance and better survival potential. The Lockheed U-2R proposal offers the desired product improvement design and probably reaches the maximum performance envelope we can hope to obtain in a subsonic vehicle. If a decision is made to go ahead with the buy, the amount and the rate of procurement will have to be determined by a careful examination of available funds. This is the subject of a separate paper to be developed AFDR AFICCS in coordination with CIA and AFICCS. The determination of how to use the U-2R's as they come out of production and also how to employ the remaining inventory

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of U-2C's are questions which need not be addressed at this time and can, in fact, be better addressed some months hence.

Conclusions.

The diminishing inventory of operationally available U-2 aircraft requires the following re-adjustments and procedures:

1. The assignment of an additional airplane to CIA to bring the complement

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2. A reconsideration of the requirement for dual staging capability by CIA at Edwards. History suggests that this requirement may be excessive, or if it is not, the present inventory cannot support it.

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4. CIA and ~~AFSC-S~~ are already making every effort to insure the interchangeability of SAC and CIA aircraft through close consultation prior to making modifications designed to improve safety and survivability. This is important and should be continued.

5. One (perhaps two) of the U-2's assigned to AFSC will be required in the operational units within the next year.

- ⑥ 6. A new U-2 buy should be initiated immediately.

Recommendation.

That the foregoing conclusions be approved.

U-2 ATTRITION

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT LOST</u>	<u>ATTRITION RATE</u>
1955	0	0.00
1956	4	2.83
1957	5	3.73
1958	4	3.81
1959	0	2.94
1960	2	2.87
1961	2	2.65
1962	4	2.83
1963	2	2.73
1964	5	2.97
1965	3	2.98
1966 (thru 30 June)	4	3.21


U-2 ATTRITION

(w/ HERO LOSSES FOR
REMAINDER OF YEAR)

AIRCRAFT/YEAR

0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67



Extract from NRO Paper to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board Submitted on February 4, 1966.

On the basis of the past nine years of experience, the current world situation, and the expectations of world developments over the foreseeable future (two-to-three years), it is reasonable to expect continuing requirements for U-2 photographic reconnaissance under a number of different areas of the world. These requirements can be grouped into three general categories:

(a) Strategic covert reconnaissance of areas not heavily defended by surface-to-air missiles. Included in this category are certain areas of Communist China, the Sino-Indian border,

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(b) Prompt coverage of crisis situations where defenses permit. Included in this category are situations previously

experienced in areas such as Cyprus, India-Pakistan, and Cuba. Included in the crisis management program is the capability to monitor the course of developments on a frequent basis with rapid exploitation of the collected photographic intelligence.

(c) In support of tactical reconnaissance in situations such as Laos and North Vietnam where the U-2 can be used to get the basic photographic coverage, keep abreast of developments, and provide intelligence support ^{supplementing} ~~implementing~~ reconnaissance conducted by friendly forces actually engaged in tactical operations.

Through long experience, the U-2 has proven to be an economical means to obtain high resolution photographic reconnaissance on a prompt basis. Because of the aircraft altitude and range performance capabilities, it can, in certain situations, permit sufficient flexibility in flight planning to accommodate U.S. political restraints while still achieving the objective. In addition, the range of the aircraft and the flexibility of the ground support system, make it possible to conduct orderly reconnaissance on relatively short notice and with a minimum of political difficulties.

U-2 MODIFICATION SCHEDULE

	FY 66			FY 67						FY 68													
	CY 1966						CY 1967																
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N
1.	[]																						
2.	[]																						
3.			[]																				
4.				[]																			
5.					[]																		
6.							[(a)]																
7.								[]															
8.									[]														
9.										[]													
10.											[]												
11.												[]											
12.													[(a) (b)]										
(a) AFSC aircraft (b) If required to offset attrition																							