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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 November 1988

Mr. Morris Leibman
Sidley & Austin
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Dear Maury,

Thanks for your note. I was on the West Coast for several days. I returned your call, but we were unable to make connections. I enclose a copy of both my speech to the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Director's recent speech to the World Affairs Council here in Washington.

We have no real mailing list for speeches that we give so that they reach people automatically. I will try to be more attentive and send you copies of speeches by either of us that you might find of interest.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosures:
As Stated

Good to talk to you today!

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY

BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1988

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Mr. Robert M. Gates
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I tried to reach you last week and left word.
You have not put me on the list of speeches for you and
Judge Webster. Please send me copies of the recent
ones which I understand have been very relevant.

Warm regards.


Sincerely,


Morris I. Leibman


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Mr. Robert M. Gates
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505



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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

November 1, 1988

Mr. Leo Cherne
Research Institute of America, Inc.
90 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10011-7696

Dear Leo:

Thanks very much for your kind note. I enclose a copy of the full text. You will see that it is very similar to what you have seen in the past but was updated to include some more recent economic information and my views on the outcome of the Party Plenum.

Thanks again for your comments. Coming from you they are especially welcome.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:
As Stated

STAT

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2 November 1988

WCK
NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

We will meet with Evan Hineman tomorrow morning to discuss Pete Aldridge's most recent letter on changes in the NRO. He proposes to create a central planning staff cutting across Programs A, B and C (which I think we should support) and also says he plans to bring the Air Force element of the NRO (Program A) from Los Angeles to Washington. Evan is uncertain whether this means just a planning function at this point or the whole thing. He is gathering more information about what Pete really means in the memo and will be prepared to fill us in tomorrow morning.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Any such move would be fairly disruptive. There would be no objection, I suppose, to Pete carrying out some detailed planning along these lines, but I still believe the final decision -- because of cost and disruption -- should be made by his successor who will oversee implementation. This may not be worth arguing with Pete over since no real move could take place within 90 days anyway.

In sum, Evan will give us an update tomorrow morning but I am inclined to agree with Jim Hirsch and Ed Heinz that you need not make an issue of this at this point. (I think it would, however, be worth reviewing briefly with Frank on Friday morning.)

RJG
Robert M. Gates

Wate
11/22

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7 November 1988

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

In response to your note on the attached, I have two recommendations. First, you might dictate a short note of appreciation to General Heinz for the completion of the study and its comprehensiveness and quality.

Second, I think you might do a brief memorandum to all members of NFIB addressing two of the recommendations of the study. Drawing on pages 19 and 20, and referring to the post-mortem, your note might highlight the conclusions of the post-mortem along the following lines:

- The need for intelligence analysts to keep in mind a range of possible explanations for evidence, and especially not to dismiss "low probability/high impact" hypotheses from continued consideration. Further, when evidence supports these low probability/high impact possibilities is received, follow-up or special tasking of collectors should be part of this continued consideration.
- The need to take into account problems that can arise at working levels in the Community when especially sensitive intelligence reporting is given restricted dissemination. Given the automated process for dissemination of our information to large numbers of addressees, on occasion it is necessary to impose restrictions on this wide dissemination because of significant foreign policy considerations. We need to develop procedures for doing this that are known in advance to all of the members of the Community and will ensure that such elements of the Community with a need to know receive at least one copy of the sensitive intelligence information. I (DCI) am asking LtGen Heinz to oversee the development of these procedures.

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Robert M. Gates

~~SECRET~~

Cl By Signer
DECL OADR

*If you want to do this,
I'd be glad to draw up a
draft for you.*

We briefed the policy makers on this.
Should I acknowledge or take action on
the report? What about the
recommendations?

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November 1988

The President-Elect
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President-Elect:

I have asked that the enclosed notebook be prepared to provide you and the Vice President-elect a concise overview of current national security issues. I want to highlight four developments that probably will require U.S. action between now and early spring and three developments of grave but longer range concern for which you also should be prepared. I've tabbed those sections of the notebook that provide additional background.

First, among the near term issues, [redacted] the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters [redacted]

[redacted]

Second, Noriega will see the interval between now and January 20 or the advent of your Administration as the ideal time to seek a deal under which he will leave office in exchange for personal guarantees and the lifting of sanctions against Panama.

[redacted]

Fourth, the Iranians are likely to try to develop a secret but more formal dialogue with the United States -- a dialogue Tehran presumably would see as leading to a hostage deal similar to the ones already worked out with France and Germany. [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

C1 By Signer
DECL OADR

Of the broader developments, I am deeply concerned first by the increasingly dangerous situation in the Middle East. The Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and, now, the advent of the new Likud coalition government in Tel Aviv are raising the level of Arab-Israeli tension and hardening policies on all sides. A militarily strong and politically resurgent Iraq will return its attention to the struggle against Israel. The acquisition by Syria and Iraq of lethal chemical weapons and the means to deliver them is extremely destabilizing.

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Additionally, we will soon face a broad Soviet political offensive in East Asia. A Sino-Soviet Summit and a restoration in party-to-party relations are likely over the next year. We expect other new initiatives involving Japan, the Philippines, and the South Pacific.

Finally, political, social and economic discontent in Eastern Europe -- not to mention ethnic minority areas of the USSR -- is reaching a very high level. I believe your Administration immediately should begin to consider possible responses to an outbreak of serious and possibly violent popular unrest that, in my opinion, could occur with little warning.

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Over the next weeks, we will keep you fully informed of new developments in the above areas. Naturally, we stand ready to provide additional briefings or information on these or any other issues at your convenience.

Respectfully yours,

William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure:
As Stated

TOP SECRET

Cl By Signer
DECL OADR

ER 88-4175/1

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

November 8, 1988

Mr. R. T. McNamar
Conover & McNamar, Inc.
1888 Century Park East, Suite 1900
Los Angeles, California 90067

Dear Tim:

It was a real pleasure to get your letter. I'm sure we miss you more than you miss Washington.

I am happy to send you two unclassified publications issued recently on the Soviet economy. I hope you find them of interest.

I would like to take you up on your suggestion to get together the next time you are in Washington. I would be delighted to host you out here for either breakfast or lunch. Just let me know when you will be coming.

Again, it was good to hear from you.

Regards,

[Redacted Signature]

Robert M. Gates

Enclosures:
SOV 88-10068
SOV 88-10043U

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**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Revisiting Soviet Economic Performance Under *Glasnost*: Implications for CIA Estimates

*SOV 88-10068
September 1988*



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

USSR: Sharply Higher Budget Deficits Threaten *Perestroyka*

A Research Paper

*SOV 88-10043U
September 1988*

ER 88-4175X

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November 3, 1988

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I recently read in The New York Times that the Agency's report "Revisiting Soviet Economic Performance Under Glasnost" is unclassified on either subject. I miss my NID!

As you will recall, I have a continuing interest in the Soviet Union's economic performance and world oil markets. Accordingly, I would very much appreciate it if you would ask someone to send me a copy of the report and anything else that is unclassified.

The next time I am in Washington, I will see if you are available for breakfast or lunch.

Best personal regards,



R. T. McNamar

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

9 November 1988

TO: George A. Carver, Jr.
Center for Strategic & International
Studies

Per your request.

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COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

November 16, 1988

Dr. Irwin M. Stelzer
Director, Energy and Environmental Policy Center
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Dr. Stelzer:

Enclosed is a copy of the remarks the Deputy Director gave at the American Association for the Advancement of Science on the 14th of October. I hope you find them of interest.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Office of the Deputy Director

Enclosure:
As Stated

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11

NOV 16 1988



IRWIN M. STELZER
DIRECTOR
(617) 495-1432

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY • JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
79 JOHN F. KENNEDY STREET • CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

November 11, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Would you be good enough to send me a copy of the talk you recently gave on the probability of success of perestroika. I believe it was delivered at a symposium sponsored by the Association for the Advancement of Science.

By way of modest reciprocation, I am enclosing a piece I did on that subject for The American Spectator.

Sincerely,

Irwin M. Stelzer

IMS:ed
Enclosure

THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA



GORBY'S CASH GRAB

Mikhail Gorbachev is willing to let Ronald Reagan take the credit for such progress as there was at the Moscow summit; all he wants in return is cash.

That the Soviet economy is in serious trouble there can be no doubt. Gorbachev himself has conceded that the Soviet Union is suffering from "economic failures," "slowing economic growth," "a shortage of goods," and that its economy is one in which "the consumer found himself totally at the mercy of the producer." And the mess is getting steadily worse. Abel Aganbegyan, his chief economic adviser (chairman of the Commission for the Study of Productive Forces and Resources, and head of the economics section of the Soviet Academy of Sciences), says that in 1981-85 "there was practically no economic growth." Per capita income actually declined. Since January 1986, when the new five-year plan was launched, growth is reported to have been about 2 percent per year; that's half of the plan's target rate. One expert on the Soviet economy says that perestroika is "beginning to look like a disaster."

This comes as no surprise to anyone even vaguely familiar with the history of failed efforts by a succession of Soviet rulers to get the country's economy moving. Lenin was himself the first "reformer": his New Economic Policy (NEP) was inaugurated in 1921 in response to widespread unrest among the starving peasants. It included many of the features we now associate with Gorbachev's perestroika—greater reliance on markets, joint ventures between the Soviet state and foreign capitalists, encouragement of cooperatives. But it most definitely did not include a permanent abandonment of authoritarian, central direction of the

Irwin M. Stelzer, TAS's monthly business correspondent, is director of the Energy and Environmental Policy Center of the John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, and an American correspondent for the London Sunday Times.

economy. As Lenin pointed out, "We are retreating . . . in order . . . to take a running start and make a bigger leap forward." The essence of NEP, in Theodore Draper's words, "was to use capitalists . . . against capitalism, to use capitalism against itself. . . . This was the rationale for inviting foreign capitalism into Soviet Russia in the form of mixed enterprises and economic concessions."

The NEP didn't long survive Lenin, and the improvements it brought in economic performance were soon swamped by Stalinism and World War II. Four subsequent efforts at reform—by Khrushchev (1957), Kosygin (1965), and Brezhnev (1973 and 1979)—all "proved disappointing," according to Ed Hewitt, author of the just-published *Reforming the Soviet Economy*.¹

And now we have perestroika. I say "we" because without Western help its already-slim chances of success would be reduced to zero. Gorbachev needs foreign businessmen to invest in his country's factories, so that he can have goods to export and to sell to the Soviet workers he hopes will now work harder (they won't, unless they can buy something with the incentive wages they will receive); he needs hard-currency loans to finance the purchase of state-of-the-art Western machinery and capital goods; and he needs Western technology, especially computers.

The factory investment will have to be in the form of joint ventures with the Soviet state (only one of the ways in which perestroika borrows from NEP), and on stiff terms. The share of foreign capital may not exceed 49 percent. The manager of the enterprise must be a Soviet citizen. Profits will be taxed at a rate of 30 percent, with an additional 20 percent taken if they are transferred abroad. Most important—and contrary to the impression created by press reports about the opening of mobile pizza parlors and McDon-

¹Brookings Institution, \$36.95; \$16.95 paper.

ald's—the areas in which foreigners will be permitted to invest are those chosen by the Soviet government for their strategic importance to its economy and security. Capitalists willing to serve the purposes of the Soviet state are welcome; others need not apply.

Vladimir Kamentsey, deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers responsible for foreign trade, is quite specific in identifying the areas in which the Soviet Union will allow large-scale joint ventures: oil and gas production, instrument making, automotive construction, medical equipment (seen as a potential export market and hard-currency earner), and farm equipment. To this list Aganbegyan adds chemicals.

American business is rushing to oblige. Although only some forty-six joint ventures worth only \$30 million have been concluded since the beginning of 1987 (the figure comes from Ivan Ivanov, the number-two Soviet foreign trade official), more are in the works, some 300 if the Soviets are to be believed. Their long-time favorite industrialist, Occidental's Armand Hammer, has announced a number of big new oil and petrochemical projects, including a plastics facility in Western Siberia, this to be financed by a new multi-national chemical consortium. (Hammer also signed an agreement to build the Soviet Union's first golf course.) And the newly formed American Trade Consortium, which numbers among its members RJR Nabisco, Ford, Eastman Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, Chevron, and Archer Daniels Midland, expects at least a dozen joint ventures.

In addition, the Soviet Union plans to step up its own investment, particularly in machine building and metal working. There are three ways Gorbachev can finance this. He can divert resources from his country's enormous arms program and costly foreign adventures. He can forcibly raise the rate of domestic savings by cutting workers' already miserable consumption levels. Or he can borrow from foreign capitalists.

by Irwin M. Stelzer

The first of these solutions is a real option only if the West continues to reduce its own defense establishment, something it is under no economic compulsion to do. Unlike the USSR, we can afford guns and butter. The second—reducing workers' living standards—is risky: there are already rumblings of discontent at the below-Third World living standards experienced by most Soviets.

So borrow Gorbachev must. And can. The Soviet Union has already increased its debt to the West from \$15 billion in 1983 to twice that level. What has Western financiers drooling is that this may be only the beginning. A leading Soviet economist, Nikolai Shmelev, estimated in a recent article in *Moscow News* that the Soviet Union could, over the next few years, safely borrow \$35-\$50 billion to support perestroika.

Western bankers are eager to finance this strengthening of the Soviet economy. In January, the Soviets tested the waters with their first-ever trip to Western bond markets; they sold an issue totaling SFr100 million (\$71 million) with ease—it was sold out in just four days. And they plan soon to sell a DM500 million (\$294 million) issue carrying something like a 7 percent interest rate; Dresdner Bank and three other West German banks will be the lead managers.

Indeed, the Germans are the most active in beating the Russian bushes for business. But others are not far behind. Britain's Lloyds has lead-managed four Euromarket financings for Soviet institutions in recent years; Barclay's has set up a trade-finance subsidiary; and NatWest and Morgan Grenfell have Moscow representatives looking for deals. Even Michael Milken, the Drexel Burnham partner who created the junk-bond market, is interested. He suggested to Gorbachev that resource-rich Russia issue bonds backed by gold or oil.

There are, of course, skeptics—some of whom remember the Bolsheviks' repudiation of the \$75 million debt run up by the czars, and others of whom won't play until the Soviets publish suf-

ficient financial information to permit them and the rating agencies to appraise the so-called Red Notes. But most observers expect a steady increase in Soviet borrowing, with a dollar-denominated bond issue in London later this year and, the political climate permitting, a "Gorbibond" issue in the U.S. thereafter.

While two of Gorbachev's desires are being met—more joint ventures, some Western financing—his third wish, access to Western technology, is being thwarted, at least for now, by the United States. Most members of the seventeen-nation Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) want to relax restrictions on the export of high-technology products to the Soviet Union, but the U.S. has held out. The betting is, however, that the jovial atmosphere of the Moscow summit and the departure of hard-line Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger will soften the American position. Pressure for such relaxation is coming primarily from the French and West Germans, and order-hungry computer manufacturers of all nations.

The real question is whether the West should oblige Gorbachev, and, if so, on what terms. At the moment, the Soviet Union is spending about twice as much of its shriveled GNP on arms as the U.S. Indeed, it was the inability of the Soviet economy to match Reagan's defense build-up that brought the USSR to the disarmament bargaining table, forced it to withdraw from Afghanistan, and is compelling it to reduce support of client states such as Cuba. Without foreign financing of his perestroika, Gorbachev will be under even greater pressure to make concessions on arms control in order to lighten his military burdens.

Fortunately, sober observers have begun to question the wisdom of President Reagan's statement to a group of Soviet students that "nothing will please my heart more than . . . to see a growing, exporting, exuberant Soviet Union." Lord Carrington, the departing NATO secretary general, speaking at the NATO Council's spring meeting, warned that "the Soviet . . . military machine is still, so far, operating at exactly the same level as it was in the days before perestroika and glasnost." Colin Powell, Reagan's national security

adviser, also cautioned the West not to help the USSR modernize its economy until there is hard evidence that it had cut defense expenditures. And Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, hardly a hard-liner, had this reaction to the summit's rosy glow: "If the end result is that . . . the Soviet Union modernizes its industrial and technological base, and if sometime in the 1990s it . . . can produce enormous quantities of weapons even more effectively than it does today, then we will have made an enormous miscalculation."

Clearly, Gorbachev understands that a stronger Soviet economy means a stronger military machine. Hewitt is on target when he points out, "Gorbachev knows full well that military and economic capabilities are intertwined. . . . For Gorbachev, a dramatic improvement in Soviet economic performance is not only good politics; it is an important component of his approach to Soviet national security."

But the West's capitalists are blinded by the prospects for huge profits. Charles Hugel, the president of Combustion Engineering—which hopes to participate in perhaps \$20 billion worth of chemical plants in Siberia—has be-



gun to speak out for the repeal of the Jackson-Vanick amendment. That legislation, which ties preferential trade status for the Soviet Union to its emigration policies, is an increasing source of irritation to Gorbachev, and an increasing inconvenience to American firms who want to do business with his country. Those firms will undoubtedly also oppose Senator James McClure's effort to make the Soviets pay with political concessions for the cash and technology they so badly need. McClure would link trade concessions not only to the Soviet Union's willingness to let its imprisoned Jewish population emigrate, but to its compliance with the Helsinki agreement on human rights.

"They really need Western help and they're reaching out for it," Hugel recently told reporters. He and others in the world's business and financial community have apparently forgotten Lenin's frank admission that cooperation with capitalists is to be pursued only so long as it contributes to their eventual destruction. Forgotten, too, is the simple fact that poorer, backward countries are, after all, less dangerous adversaries than richer, advanced ones. □

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Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505



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IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

22 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DCI Administrative Staff

SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DDCI for Representational Purposes

12

Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of the United States Government is authorized under the policy set forth in (Official Reception and Representational Expenses) for the following functions:

STAT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Organizational Affiliation</u>
88.10.05	Robert M. Gates (host) Ambassador Sy Weiss	DDCI SY Associates
88.10.17	Robert M. Gates (host) The Hon. Rich Armitage	DDCI Asst. Sec. of Def (ISA)
88.10.28	Robert M. Gates (host) Ambassador Richard Helms	DDCI Former DCI

STAT

O/DDCI

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
88-4337/1

November 22, 1988

Mr. Paul Seabury

[Redacted]

Dear Paul:

I apologize for taking so long to respond to your letter of early October, with which you enclosed your paper on "Secret War".

I finally was able to read the paper recently and found it most interesting and useful. I suppose one of the reasons I found it so was the degree to which it parallels my own thinking on some of these issues. At the risk of testing your patience, I in turn have enclosed the texts of two speeches germane to your topic. The first, "War By Another Name," I delivered two years ago in California. The second on current developments in the Soviet Union I delivered to the American Association for the Advancement of Science Conference here in Washington last month. I hope you find them of interest.

I am able to offer you some reassurance and information on the Agency's analysis on the problem of Soviet proxy operations. You will be gratified to know that during my watch as DDI we established a Foreign Subversion and Instability Center with several dozen analysts that addresses the question of Soviet and surrogate subversive activities primarily in the Third World. It also deals with front groups and other similar types of operations. Best of all, as it is not located in a regional office, it looks across the globe and is able to discern patterns both in subversion and instability that I find insightful and useful. In short, I think we are making good progress on these kinds of problems.

Again, many thanks for your letter and accompanying paper.

Regards,

[Redacted Signature]

Robert M. Gates

Enclosures:
As Stated

DDCI/RMGates/de [Redacted]
DISTRIBUTION: (w/incoming)
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - DDCI Chrono

13

War By Another Name

An Address to the Commonwealth Club of California
by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986

The most divisive and controversial part of American foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments, to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote economic development and democracy.

Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence, establish strategically located client Communist states, and to gain access to strategic resources.

But while we may debate strategy and how to respond, the facts of Soviet involvement in major Third World conflicts are undeniable. Consider two very painful memories:

- It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stalin personally, played a central role in prompting North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, the cause of our

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

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Executive Reply

88-4337X

PAUL SEABURY



STAT

Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.


Dear Bob:

I am enclosing a paper which I presented last week in Washington at the U.S. Institute of Peace for a conference on "secret war".


I became intrigued by the problem of Soviet proxy operations during my time on PFIAB, when I began to surmise that the Agency was not doing too good a job of analysis on the subject. I hope that this defect has been remedied!

I hope you find the paper interesting.

Best regards,


7 October 1988

ps - won esp. at pp 57-67.



SECRET/PROXY WAR

by Paul Seabury

This meeting, dealing with the nature and future of "secret war," is timely, coming as it does when, to some observers, "peace is breaking out all over." A few weeks ago, the cover of The Economist featured an idyllic beach scene: paternal, lanky Uncle Sam stretched out in a beach chair in a state of blissful contentment; in the foreground (or foresand!) a group of jolly kids besporting themselves with shovels making little sandcastles: Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterand, Helmut Kohl, Mikhail Gorbachev, Deng-Shao Peng, and Noburu. The Economist's cover slogan is arresting: "Oh, what a peaceful world." A picture is better than a thousand words, as the saying goes, and disputes the currently fashionable thesis of Professor Kennedy as to America's imminent decline and fall.

The evidence put forth for this world-view, to be sure, is comforting to all who are concerned with peace. The Afghan war, it seems, may be coming to an end, as Soviet forces continue their slow march home. A cease-fire has brought the long, murderous war between Iraq and Iran to an end, at least for the time being. Negotiations over the fate of Cambodia seem to be making progress. Negotiations over Namibia and Angola (Castro to the contrary) seem to portend the withdrawal

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

23 November 1988

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1800 K Street, Northwest, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Zbig:

Attached is the material FBIS had available
from the Soviet press on the Kuropaty massacre.

I hope it is useful to you.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Att: As Stated

Distribution:

0- Addressee

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

14

STAT



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

November 18, 1988

Dear Bob:

Could someone on your staff, if it is not too much trouble, dig up for me all that has been published in the Soviet Union on the Kuropaty massacre. This seems to me to be a fascinating case study in Soviet history, with enormous implications for the present. I have been following it marginally, but I am sure much more on this is available, since the matter has been described in the Soviet mass media, although not much on the national level.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Zbigniew Brzezinski' in a cursive, stylized script.

Zbigniew Brzezinski


Dr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/10 :
CIA-RDP89G00720R000300130001-3


CSIS

Center for Strategic & International Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Suite 400/Washington, DC 20006

Brzezinski



Dr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505



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CIA-RDP89G00720R000300130001-3

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Articles on the Kuropaty Massacre

FROM: Acting Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service	EXTENSION 	NO. FBIS-0260-88
		DATE 22 November 1988

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Executive Assistant to the DDCI 7E12 Headquarters		23	(73)	John: Attached are the articles on the Kuropaty massacre we could find. All articles noted here were translated or transcribed by FBIS. In general, we would say that the Soviets have treated the story fairly openly, carrying pieces in several of their major papers as well as in the popular English language <u>Moscow News</u> . As best we know, the story "broke" in the USSR with the publication of an item in the Belorussian literary magazine <u>Literatura i Mastatstva</u> ,
2.				<p>the item was reprinted in a Polish literary magazine, a translation of which is included here. Hope this helps. Questions about this package or about the story in general can be raised with our senior Soviet analyst, on </p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 80px; margin-top: 10px;"></div>
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COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 2 -- 'TWO VIEWS' ON MINSK CEMETERY CLASH

TEXT:

((EDITORIAL REPORT)) MOSCOW KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA IN RUSSIAN 13 NOVEMBER 1988 CARRIES A FEATURE ON PAGE 4 UNDER THE HEADING "DAY OF CONFLICT; LESSONS FROM EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION IN WHICH TRADITION CLASHED WITH ARROGANCE."

THE FEATURE OPENS WITH A LETTER FROM WRITER VIKTOR KOZKO, LENIN KOMSOMOL PRIZEWINNER UNDER THE SUBTITLE "LETTER TO THE EDITOR," WHICH READS:

"FOR SOME 2 WEEKS BEFORE 30 OCTOBER -- MEMORIAL DAY -- THE NEWSPAPERS WERE FULL OF SENSATIONALIST ITEMS. ALAS, THE INTELLIGENTSIA, CULTURAL WORKERS, AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE THREE CREATIVE UNIONS (OF WRITERS, ARTISTS, AND CINEMA WORKERS) WHICH WERE THE FOUNDERS OF THE REPUBLIC'S HISTORICAL EDUCATION SOCIETY IN MEMORY OF THE VICTIMS OF STALINISM -- THE 'MARTIROLOG BELARUSI' -- WERE REALLY PERSECUTED. IN WORKER AUDITORIUMS AND THE NEWSPAPERS THEY WERE DESCRIBED AS NOTHING BUT A GROUP OF IMPOSTORS AND SCUM AND, IN THE BEST TRADITIONS OF THE ERA OF STAGNATION, THE QUESTION WAS REPEATEDLY ASKED: WHO ARE THEY SPONGING OFF? SO A WEDGE WAS DRIVEN BETWEEN THE CREATIVE INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE WORKING CLASS. THUS THE PROVOCATION -- THERE IS NO OTHER WORD I CAN CHOOSE -- WAS NURTURED AND BROUGHT TO A HEAD.

"IT HAPPENED ON 30 OCTOBER. AT 1340 HOURS THE REPUBLIC'S CHARMING MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, COMRADE PISKAREV, APPEARED BEFORE THE PEOPLE OF MINSK ON THEIR TELEVISION SCREENS IN THE PROGRAM 'MEETING FOR YOU.' THE MINISTER SYMPATHIZED WITH AND

FELT SORRY FOR V. RASPUTIN: WELL, WHY SHOULD HE SQUANDER HIS TALENTS ON JOURNALISM RATHER THAN WRITE NOVELS? THEN HE READ A POEM BY R. GAMZATOV, THE FAMOUS ONE, ABOUT THE ROAD AND THE HORSE -- WHO SHOULD BE BLAMED IF THE HORSE STUMBLES?

"AT THE SAME TIME, 1340 HOURS, Z. POZNYAK, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIETY MENTIONED ABOVE, WAS ARRESTED BY A GROUP OF CIVILIANS ON THE WAY TO THE MOSKOVSKOYE CEMETERY. THIS CAUSED A REAL SENSE OF OUTRAGE AMONG THE OTHERS IN THE PROCESSION BUT DID NOT STOP THEM FROM CONTINUING ON THEIR WAY TO THE MOSKOVSKOYE CEMETERY. THEY WERE WALKING ALONG THE SIDEWALK WITH FLOWERS IN THEIR ARMS, STRICTLY OBSERVING THE TRAFFIC LIGHTS. ALTHOUGH MEMORIAL DAY -- 'DZYADY' -- AND ANY RALLIES IN THIS CONNECTION HAD BEEN CANCELED BY THE CITY AUTHORITIES, PEOPLE WERE GOING NEVERTHELESS TO LAY FLOWERS ON THE GRAVES OF THEIR FRIENDS AND RELATIVES AND OF TWO PEOPLE WHOSE NAMES ARE DEAR TO ALL BELORUSSIANS -- P.M. MASHEROV AND THE WRITER V. KOROTKEVICH.

"BY 1400 HOURS THERE WERE ALREADY SEVERAL THOUSAND PEOPLE AT THE MOSKOVSKOYE CEMETERY. THERE WERE ALSO A LOT OF MILITIAMEN. THERE, AT THE CEMETERY, I FIRST SAW SOVIET WATER CANNONS AND ENORMOUS BLACK MARIAS WITH BARRED WINDOWS.

"THE ENTRANCE TO THE CEMETERY WAS SEALED OFF BY MILITIA CADETS AND THEY WERE NOT LETTING ANYONE THROUGH AT ALL. THE SCULPTOR A. ANIKEYCHIK, THE CREATOR OF THE MEMORIALS TO MASHEROV AND KOROTKEVICH, WAS NOT ALLOWED THROUGH WITH FLOWERS; LIKE MANY OTHERS, HE HAD NOT COME TO TAKE PART IN ANY RALLY, HE JUST WANTED TO VISIT THE GRAVES OF HIS NEAREST AND DEAREST.

"BUT EVERYTHING STILL SEEMED QUITE CALM, EVEN GOOD-HUMORED. THE LIEUTENANT COLONEL REPRESENTING THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CITY MILITIA ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCED THROUGH A MEGAPHONE TO THOSE PRESENT THAT WE LIVE IN A RULE-OF-LAW STATE. BUT THEN, LINKING ARMS, THE MILITIA CADETS BORE DOWN ON THE PEOPLE.

"HERE PEOPLE SHOWED SIMPLY AMAZING SELF-RESTRAINT. I DID NOT HEAR ANY SHOUTED INSULTS, ONLY CRIES OF BEWILDERMENT: 'COMRADES, WHAT ON EARTH ARE YOU DOING?| YOU WILL FEEL ONLY SHAME TOMORROW|'

"A YOUNG MAN WAS LIFTED UP ABOVE PEOPLE'S HEADS. HE SHOUTED: 'TO KUROPATY, COMRADES|'

"BROKEN UP, THE CROWD MOVED IN ALL DIRECTIONS. THE MAN IN MILITIA UNIFORM WITH THE MEGAPHONE ADVISED PEOPLE TO GO ABOUT THEIR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OR SIMPLY MOVE A LITTLE FURTHER AWAY FROM THE CEMETERY -- INTO THE FIELDS AND THE FOREST, TO BREATHE A BIT OF FRESH AIR.

"I WAS AT THE CEMETERY FOR AROUND 20 MINUTES. THEN, JOINING THE CONVOY OF MILITIA VEHICLES, I FOLLOWED. THE CAVALCADE CAME TO A HALT IN KUROPATY. THE KUROPATY HILLS THEMSELVES -- THE PLACE WHERE THE VICTIMS OF STALIN'S REPRESSIONS WERE SHOT AND BURIED -- WERE CORDONED OFF BY SEVERAL RANKS OF MILITIAMEN READY TO ARREST ANYONE....

"THERE IS, HOWEVER, ONE LESSON IN THIS STORY THAT WE LEARNED FROM THIS TERRIBLE DAY, 30 OCTOBER.

"TODAY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ONE PERSON ALONE TO DECIDE ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE EXACTLY WHAT TRADITIONS THE PEOPLE CAN HAVE| I REMEMBER THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE WAR. MY FATHER HAD STILL NOT COME BACK FROM THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. BUT A MEAL APPEARED AT MY GRANDMOTHER'S HOUSE -- OATMEAL KISSEL, I THINK. I ASKED HER

WHAT WE WERE CELEBRATING, WHAT HAD HAPPENED. 'IT IS DZYADY TODAY,' SHE REPLIED. THAT IS HOW PEOPLE LIVED THEN. BUT HOW DO WE LIVE NOW? SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BELORUSSIA WAS SHAKEN BY THIS INFORMATION: IN ONE SETTLEMENT THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAD OPENED A DANCE FLOOR ON THE SITE OF THE FORMER FRATERNAL GRAVE OF SERVICEMEN WHO HAD DIED IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR....

"NO, REMEMBERING AND PRAYING FOR THOSE WHO GAVE YOU LIFE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A TRADITION AND A CUSTOM OF THE PEOPLE'S MORAL HEALTH. THIS WAS PROVEN BY 30 OCTOBER: IT WAS THE POPULATION THAT WENT TO THE RALLY AND THE PEOPLE THAT LEFT IT. THIS IS THE MAIN LESSON TO BE LEARNED FROM 30 OCTOBER."

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 *****/

REF: PM1511142188 MOSCOW KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 13 NOV///FROM 30 OCTOBER."

TEXT:

((EDITORIAL REPORT)) THE LETTER IS FOLLOWED BY AN "OFFICIAL OPINION" FROM MAJOR GENERAL OF MILITIA K.M. PLATONOV, BELORUSSIAN SSR DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (THE FIRST PARAGRAPH IS AN EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION):

"OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT ASKED MAJOR GENERAL OF MILITIA K.M. PLATONOV, BELORUSSIAN SSR DEPUTY INTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER, TO COMMENT ON THE EVENTS OF 30 OCTOBER.

"THE RALLY AT THE MOSCOW CEMETERY ON 30 OCTOBER WAS AGAINST THE LAW, BECAUSE IT HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE MINSK GORISPOLKOM; CITIZENS HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THIS IN ADVANCE THROUGH THE NEWSPAPER VECHERNIY MINSK. THE LAW IS THE LAW -- IT IS BINDING ON EVERYONE.

"HOWEVER, WE WERE INFORMED THE DAY BEFORE THE EVENT THAT MEMBERS OF THE 'TYTEYSHIYA' INFORMAL YOUTH ASSOCIATION WERE MAILING INVITATIONS AND POSTING UP ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE RALLY AT THE CEMETERY. ON 28 OCTOBER WE HAD ARRESTED A STUDENT FROM THE MINSK THEATER ARTS INSTITUTE WHO HAD BEEN URGING PEOPLE IN THE STREET TO TAKE PART IN THE UNAUTHORIZED RALLY. ON 29 OCTOBER, WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE IS THE KOMSOMOL'S BIRTHDAY, DURING A MEETING WITH WRITERS AT THE WRITERS' CENTER, ALL PARENTS PRESENT WERE INVITED TO COME ALONG TO THE VERY SAME RALLY AND BRING THEIR CHILDREN.

"NATURALLY, IN THIS SITUATION WE WERE FORCED TO TAKE ADVANCE MEASURES TO PROTECT PUBLIC ORDER. THESE MEASURES WERE TAKEN. AFTER ALL, A CROWD DID GATHER AT THE MOSKOVSKOYE CEMETERY. AND THE MILITIA IS OBLIGED TO CONTROL THE SITUATION.

"((CORRESPONDENT)) DID THE PEOPLE PRESENT COMMIT ANY ACTS AGAINST THE LAW?

"((PLATONOV)) OF COURSE THEY DID. FIRST OF ALL, THEY SHOUTED ANTI-SOVIET SLOGANS: 'SOVIETS WITHOUT COMMUNISTS!' AND 'BELORUSSIA DESERVES A BETTER FATE THAN TO BE A FEED TROUGH FOR MOSCOW'; AND INSULTS WERE SHOUTED IN OUR DIRECTION -- 'STALINISTS, MURDERERS!' THE MILITIA WAS PROVOKED INTO USING FORCE, PEOPLE SPAT IN THEIR FACES, STOOD IN THE WAY OF THEIR VEHICLES, AND CALLED FOR THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL FRONT.

"WHAT ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND BY THIS TITLE? IF IT MEANS THE KIND OF DEMONSTRATIONS THAT TOOK PLACE ON 30 OCTOBER, THEN BELORUSSIA REALLY DOES NOT NEED A NATIONAL FRONT. ESPECIALLY AS THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC IS STABLE AND THE GOVERNMENT

IS FOLLOWING A COURSE OF RESTRUCTURING IN A MODERN, EFFICIENT WAY.

"((CORRESPONDENT)) WERE SPECIAL MEANS EMPLOYED TO ARREST PEOPLE: TRUNCHEONS, TEAR GAS, WATER CANNON?

"((PLATONOV)) NO, THEY WERE NOT. BUT THERE WERE CASES WHERE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS ILLEGAL ACTION WERE ARRESTED. A TOTAL OF 72 CRIME REPORTS WERE MADE OUT. WITHIN 3 HOURS, AFTER EACH ONE HAD BEEN INDIVIDUALLY QUESTIONED, ALL WERE RELEASED. I WILL ALSO ADD THIS: AFTER THESE MEASURES HAD BEEN TAKEN, NO ONE HAD RECOURSE TO THE COURTS, THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, OR PUBLIC HEALTH BODIES. THIS SHOWS THAT THE MILITIA CONDUCTED ITSELF WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW...."

FINALLY, THE NEWSPAPER'S OWN CORRESPONDENT O. YEGOROVA SUMS UP THE EVENTS IN A REPORT DATED MINSK UNDER THE SUBTITLE "OUR CORRESPONDENT'S COMMENTARY":

"SO, TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE SAME EVENT.

"WHAT IS THE TRUTH? WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED IN THE CITY IN WHICH THERE IS SUCH A 'STABLE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION'? TRUE, REAL DEMOCRACY HAS NOTHING IN COMMON WITH ANARCHY. OUR FREEDOMS MUST NOT ONLY BE GUARANTEED -- THEY MUST ALSO BE PROTECTED. THAT IS BEYOND QUESTION. BUT MANY PEOPLE LIVING IN MINSK WERE NOT VERY CONVINCED BY THE APPARENT MOTIVES FOR THE BAN ON THE REQUIEM RALLY: 'THE LACK OF A TRADITION IN THE CITY OF MARKING MEMORIAL DAY AND THE FACT THAT THE GORISPOLKOM IS CURRENTLY STUDYING PUBLIC OPINION ON THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A DATE FOR AN ANNUAL MEMORIAL DAY....'

"COULD THE CITY LEADERS HAVE ACTED MORE WISELY? AFTER ALL, THEY ALSO OFFENDED PEOPLE WHO HAD ABSOLUTELY NO THOUGHT OF GOING TO ANY RALLY. NOT COULD -- SHOULD. ESPECIALLY AS THEY DID NOT HAVE TO LOOK FAR FOR AN EXAMPLE. IN NEIGHBORING POLAND, FOR EXAMPLE, MEMORIAL DAY HAS RECENTLY BEEN CELEBRATED BY THE WHOLE COUNTRY AND EVEN HERE IN BELORUSSIA, IN GRODNO, FOR EXAMPLE, EVERYONE REACHED A REASONABLE COMPROMISE, ALTHOUGH EVEN THERE AT FIRST THERE WERE FEARS ABOUT CROWDS OF PEOPLE GATHERING ON MEMORIAL DAY.

"WE ARE SURE THAT THE CITY AUTHORITIES ARE CERTAINLY NOT OPPOSED TO THE REVIVAL OF POPULAR TRADITIONS. THERE IS ALWAYS A CERTAIN DEGREE OF RISK IN ANY MASS MEETING. BUT HOW, ON WHAT BASIS ARE YOU TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION? ONLY BY FOLLOWING THE DICTATES OF COMMON SENSE AND ON THE BASIS OF A THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOCIAL CLIMATE AND THE ABILITY TO PREDICT A SITUATION. HASTY BANS MOST OFTEN OCCUR WHERE THERE IS A GULF BETWEEN OFFICIALS AND ORDINARY PEOPLE. THAT IS WHEN YOU GET RUMORS, SUSPICION, AND EXCESSIVE VIGILANCE. THEN, THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ARE MADE RESPONSIBLE FOR 'ANTI-SOVIETISM' AND ISOLATED EXTREMIST STATEMENTS.

"LEARNING DEMOCRACY TODAY IS NO EASY TASK BUT IT IS A VITAL NECESSITY -- FOR THOSE WHO ATTEND RALLIES AND THOSE WHO DECIDE THEIR FATE. WE NEED MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MUTUAL STANDARDS. IF WE CAN ATTAIN BOTH TOGETHER, AS ONE, RESTRUCTURING WILL WIN THROUGH. IF NOT -- WE COULD RUIN ANY IDEA, EVEN THE MOST LOFTY AND JUST."

ADMIN

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJ: 'FRONT' MEMBER WARNS AGAINST ANTI-REFORM FORCES

SOURCE: MOSCOW MOSCOW NEWS IN ENGLISH NO. 45, 6 NOV 88 P 13

TEXT:

//((INTERVIEW WITH WRITER VASIL BYKOV BY LEONID MILOSLAVSKIY: "BELORUSSIAN INITIATIVE" -- DATE, PLACE NOT GIVEN; FIRST PARAGRAPH IS EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION))

((TEXT)) SPEAKING ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BELORUSSIA, WRITER ALES ADAMOVICH RECALLED VENDEE, A PROVINCE IN FRANCE, WHICH RESISTED THE 1989 REVOLUTION ("OGONEK", NO. 39). THE BELORUSSIAN PRESS RESPONDED WITH AN ARTICLE CALLING ADAMOVICH INCOMPETENT AND POORLY INFORMED. A FEW DAYS LATER THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF MARTIROLOG, A SOCIETY TO COMMEMORATE THE VICTIMS OF STALINISM, DECIDED TO SET UP AN INITIATIVE GROUP OF BELORUSSIA'S POPULAR FRONT. THIS STEP BY THE CREATIVE INTELLECTUALS GENERATED NEW PUBLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS. THE IDEOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO MARTIROLOG'S INITIATIVE ARE AN ALARMING SUGGESTION THAT PERESTROIKA IN BELORUSSIA IS BRAKING, SAYS NATIVE WRITER VASIL BYKOV, MARTIROLOG BOARD MEMBER AND PARTICIPANT IN THE POPULAR FRONT INITIATIVE GROUP. PUBLISHING THE FOLLOWING INTERVIEW WITH BYKOV, "MN" STANDS READY TO PRINT OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW.

MN: VASIL VLADIMIROVICH, UNTIL NOW THE COUNTRY KNEW VERY LITTLE ABOUT INFORMAL MOVEMENTS IN BELORUSSIA. FROM PUBLICATIONS IN "VECHEVNYI MINSK" (EVENING MINSK), WE NOW KNOW THAT BELORUSSIANS OPPOSE THE "ANTI'POPULAR POPULAR FRONT". ITS INITIATORS ARE CALLED EXTREMISTS, WHILE THE BELORUSSIAN YOUTH FROM THE TOLOKA SOCIETY ARE LABELED

NATIONALISTS. MANY PEOPLE COMPARE THE ARTICLE ABOUT TOLOKA WITH CRUSHING PREWAR JOURNALISM. BUT THE ARTICLE ALSO CONTAINS FACTS, DOESN'T IT?

VASIL BYKOV: IF YOU HAVE NOTICED, THERE ARE FEW FACTS AND EVEN THOSE, IN MY OPINION, ARE DUBIOUS. MAINLY THEY ARE ARGUMENTS. TOLOKA SUPPORTERS' EFFORTS TO REVIVE THE BELORUSSIAN COAT-OF-ARMS AND THE FLAG ARE CALLED NATIONALISTIC ONLY BECAUSE SOMEWHERE ABROAD THESE SYMBOLS ARE USED TO RALLY BELORUSSIAN EMIGRANTS. SIMILAR ACCUSATIONS ARE AIMED AT ANY ATTEMPT TO RESTORE BELORUSSIAN CULTURE WHICH HAS BEEN DEGENERATING FOR DECADES. THESE TENDENCIES ARE NOT NEW IN THE REPUBLIC. BUT WHEN, IN THE FOURTH YEAR OF PERESTROIKA, THE PRESS STARTS OPENLY FIGHTING ETHNIC SELF-AWARENESS...THAT'S SAD. EVEN IF THE TOLOKA PROGRAMMES COULDN'T DO WITHOUT EXCESSES, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BALTIC REPUBLICS SHOWS THAT THE MOST COMPLICATED ISSUES CAN BE SOLVED REASONABLY AFTER SOBER DISCUSSION. BY THE WAY, THIS ARTICLE ISN'T JUST A SIGN OF THE PAST. ONE OF ITS FIVE SIGNERS, A. FILIMONOV, DOCTOR OF SCIENCE (HISTORY), IS NOTORIOUS FOR THE SUBJECT OF HIS CANDIDATE'S THESIS: "LAVRENTIY PAVLOVICH BENYA -- LOYAL FRIEND OF THE GREAT STALIN..."

MN: BUT MANY PEOPLE AGREE WITH THESE AUTHORS AND SEE THE MAIN DANGER IN THE POPULAR FRONT....

VASIL BYKOV: YOU KNOW HOW THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE POPULAR FRONT WAS ORGANIZED WITH THE UNOFFICIAL SOVREMENNIK CLUB? THE PARTY COMMITTEES OF ENTERPRISES GATHERED ABOUT 900 PEOPLE AT THE POLITICAL EDUCATION CENTRE TO REBUFF THE "ENEMIES OF PERESTROIKA". AMONG THE ENEMIES WERE THE FAMOUS BELORUSSIAN WRITER ADAMOVICH AND KOROTICH, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF OGONEK, WHO ALLEGEDLY CAME FROM MOSCOW SPECIALLY TO MAKE TROUBLE. ADAMOVICH WAS DESCRIBED AS TEL-AVIV'S HIRELING, GETTING DOLLARS FROM THERE TO MAINTAIN TWO FLATS - IN MOSCOW AND IN MINSK - AND TO BRIBE PARTY AUTHORITIES... "THE ENEMIES OF PERESTROIKA" DIDN'T COME (AND SHOULD NOT HAVE), BUT THEY WERE REBUFFED.

I DON'T KNOW WHAT OUR POPULAR FRONT WILL BE LIKE OR WHETHER IT WILL GET OFF THE GROUND. BUT I THINK THAT SUCH A RESPONSE FROM OUR "IDEOLOGISTS" TO A PROGRESSIVE IDEA WILL CONVINCEN MANY WAVERERS OF THE NEED TO FIGHT THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STAGNATION. R. BUZUK, REPRESENTATIVE OF BELORUSSIA'S COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WAS AT THE MARTIROLOG MEETING. HE TRIED TO UPSET THE VOTING WHEN THE BOARD WAS BEING ELECTED, DEMANDED THAT HE BE GIVEN THE FLOOR. AFTER THE VOTING, WHEN BUZUK WAS GIVEN THE FLOOR, IT TURNED OUT HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY.

MN: I WAS TOLD THAT YOU THEN TOOK THE MICROPHONE AND SAID, POINTING TO BUZUK: "THIS IS WHAT WE MUST FIGHT!" WHAT, IN YOUR OPINION, IS HOLDING PERESTROIKA BACK IN BELORUSSIA?

VASIL BYKOV: I WOULDN'T LIKE TO THINK THAT BUZUK'S WORK METHODS AND POLITICAL VIEWS ARE TYPICAL OF BELORUSSIA'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE. BUT AMONG THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES THERE ARE STILL QUITE A FEW PEOPLE WHO THINK PERESTROIKA WILL BE

HURT BY A REVIVAL OF ETHNIC CULTURE. IN FACT, OUR PEOPLE, WHO HAVE HALF-FORGOTTEN THEIR PRIDE, HAVE YET ONE MORE PROBLEM, ONE MORE PAIN - STALINIST REPRESSIONS. IT SEEMS STRANGE AND HORRIBLE TO ME THAT TODAY THERE ARE SOME WHO WANT TO CONCEAL FROM THE PEOPLE THEIR PAST WHICH HAS FOR SO MANY YEARS LAIN IN KUROPATY GRAVES. WHO NEEDS ALL THIS? WHO NEEDED THE CROWDED MEETING IN MEMORY OF THE KUROPATY VICTIMS, WHICH INCIDENTALLY WAS ADDRESSED BY PARTY FUNCTIONARIES, WAS LATER DECLARED ILLEGAL - AND ITS ORGANIZERS FINED? I RECALL THAT ONE OF THE DELEGATES AT THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE SAID: "WE ARE STRUGGLING FOR PERESTROKA, BUT WHAT ARE THOSE BAWLERS AT THE MEETINGS STRUGGLING FOR?" MANY PEOPLE CONSIDER THEMSELVES AUTHORS OF PERESTROIKA WHILE DENYING OTHERS THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE. UNLESS WE UNDERSTAND THAT EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO HIS OWN VIEW, THAT ALL IDEAS AT MEETINGS, JUST AS THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES, HAVE BEEN ENGENDERED BY PERESTROIKA, CONFLICTS ARE INEVITABLE. FOR OUR PEOPLE THE MEMORY OF VICTIMS IS AN IDEA WHICH CAN UNITE US IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PERESTROIKA, FOR THE TERROR OF STALINISM NEVER TO BE REPEATED AGAIN. AND THE FACT THAT SUCH AN ASSOCIATION IN OUR COUNTRY IS DECLARED ILLEGAL IN ADVANCE IS TANTAMOUNT TO DEFENDING STALINISM BEHIND PERESTROIKA SLOGANS.

MN: YOU'RE SPEAKING ABOUT A NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION. BUT THE POPULAR FRONT IS OPPOSED (AT LEAST IN THE PRESS) BY WORKERS AND ORDINARY CITIZENS.

VASIL BYKOV: UNFORTUNATELY, NOT EVERYONE IN OUR COUNTRY HAS LEARNED TO THINK INDEPENDENTLY. NOT EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS THAT IN ORDER TO CRITICIZE SOMETHING, IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW WHAT THAT SOMETHING IS ABOUT. FOR TOO LONG PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TAUGHT TO LIVE ACCORDING TO A GENERAL PLAN, TO THINK IN TIME WITH SLOGANS, TO TALK AND TO KEEP SILENT BY TURNS. THEREFORE, MANY PEOPLE TODAY, IN ORDER TO PROTEST, DO NOT HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION - THE VIEW OF THE STAFF FUNCTIONARY FROM "THE IDEOLOGICAL COMMISSION OF THE MICRODISTRICT" IS ENOUGH TO ELIMINATE IN THE SOULS OF PEOPLE EVERYTHING PUT THERE BY THE BOOKS OF ADAMOVICH AND TO DECLARE ADAMOVICH AN "ENEMY OF PERESTROIKA"....

THE SITUATION IS ALARMING. WE MUST DO EVERYTHING FOR BELORUSSIA NOT TO BECOME THE VENDEE OF PERESTROIKA.

ADMIN

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJ: WEEKLY WORKING FOR 'FOREIGN FOES,' READER CLAIMS
SOURCE: MOSCOW MOSCOW NEWS IN ENGLISH NO. 45, 6 NOV 88 P 2
TEXT:

(((READER'S LETTER FROM THE "LETTERS TO THE EDITOR"
COLUMN: "ONLY CAPITALIST AGENTS STAND TO GAIN. OPEN LETTER
TO YEGOR YAKOVLEV, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF 'MOSCOW NEWS'"))

((TEXT)) WITH INDIGNATION AND BITTERNESS I HAVE OBSERVED
OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS HOW YOUR NEWSPAPER HAS BEEN
TURNING INCREASINGLY INTO AN ORGAN WORKING NOT FOR SOCIALISM
AND OUR MOTHERLAND, BUT FOR OUR FOREIGN FOES. FROM ISSUE TO
ISSUE YOUR NEWSPAPER PRINTS MATERIAL ABUSING AND SPITTING
UPON OUR COUNTRY, ITS HISTORY AND PAST. BRANDISHING THE
FLAG OF REPRESSIONS, YOU HAVE BEEN TRYING TO USE THEM TO
OVERSHADOW THE ENTIRE HEROIC PAST OF OUR COUNTRY, PORTRAYING
THEM AS THE MAIN ASPECT OF THE PREWAR AND POSTWAR PERIODS.
OUR PEOPLE'S HEROISM IN BUILDING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALISM (I EMPHASIZE: SOCIALISM) IN OUR
COUNTRY IS BEING OBSCURED. OF COURSE, THE REPRESSIONS
AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE PREWAR AND
POSTWAR YEARS ARE A GREAT TRAGEDY AND PAIN FOR OUR WHOLE
PEOPLE AND COUNTRY. THEY WERE CARRIED OUT ON ORDERS FROM
THE TOP ECHEOLONS OF THE RULING BODY, NOT CONTROLLED BY THE
PEOPLE. BUT THE SHADOW OF THE REPRESSIONS FELL UPON ALL
OUR PEOPLE, UPON OUR ENTIRE SYSTEM AND UPON THE WHOLE
COUNTRY. THE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF REPRESSIONS HAVE TO BE
REHABILITATED. BUT, TO RAISE SUCH A HULLABALOO AROUND THE
REPRESSIONS, TO PUT OUR TRAGEDY ON DISPLAY FOR OUR FOES TO
SEE AND ENJOY IS BOTH UNSEEMLY AND CRIMINAL. WHATEVER
LITTLE BITS BOURGEOIS AGENTS PROCURED BEFORE TO DENIGRATE

OUR MOTHERLAND IN THE EYES OF THEIR PEOPLE, YOU TREATY THEM
TO WHOLESALE THROUGH YOUR PAPER. HOW WOULD YOU, YEGOR
YAKOVLEV, FEEL IF YOUR FAMILY AFFAIRS AND SECRETS WERE READ
OUT FOR YOUR NEIGHBOURS AND OTHER STRANGERS TO ENJOY? EVEN
THOUGH IT MIGHT BE THE TRUTH ABOUT YOUR FAMILY AFFAIRS, YOU
WOULD NOT REJOICE AT IT. YOU, YEGOR YAKOVLEV, ARE BY FAR
NOT A FIRST-CLASS JOURNALIST, BUT YOU ARE A BRILLIANT
MEDIOCRITY, AND YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO POSSESS AN INTELLECT
ENABLING YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT DENIGRATING OUR COUNTRY'S
PAST IN A NEWSPAPER BY PARADING BEFORE THE ENEMIES DATA
DETRIMENTAL TO THE COUNTRY'S PRESTIGE IS UNWORTHY BOTH OF A
SOVIET NEWSPAPER AND OF A SOVIET JOURNALIST. IT WAS WITH A
FEELING OF DISGUST THAT I READ IN YOUR PAPER OF OCTOBER 9,
1988, THE ARTICLE ENTITLED "KUROPATY". WITH WHAT DELIGHT
YOU RELISH THE DETAILS OF OUR PEOPLE'S EXECUTION NEAR MINSK:
HOW PEOPLE WERE SHOT THROUGH THE BACK OF THEIR HEAD, FROM
UNDER THE SKULL OR THROUGH THE SIDE. WHO NEEDS THESE
DETAILS? AFTER ALL, YOU PROVIDE THE FOES WITH MATERIAL FOR
EDUCATING THEIR PEOPLE IN THE FEELING OF DISGUST FOR OUR
COUNTRY AND HOSTILITY FOR SOCIALISM AS A SYSTEM. I FEEL
ASHAMED AND HURT BY YOUR NEWSPAPER AND BY YOU, YEGOR
YAKOVLEV, AS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THIS NEWSPAPER.

RESPECTFULLY, BUTIVCHENKO ALEKSEY FEDOROVICH, VETERAN OF
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, D.SC. (MILITARY SCIENCES),
PROFESSOR
ADMIN

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 3 -- YEVTUSHENKO ON COMMEMORATING PURGES

SOURCE: MOSCOW LITERATURNAYA GAZETA IN RUSSIAN 2 NOV 88 P 2

TEXT:

//((YEVGENIY YEVTUSHENKO LETTER CARRIED AS PART OF "PULSE-88"
FEATURE: "HELP 'MEMORIAL'" -- FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE
INTRODUCTION))

((TEXT)) WHAT HAPPENED OVER THE 2 DAYS OF 29-30 OCTOBER IN
MOSCOW'S CENTRAL HOUSE OF CINEMATOGRAPHY WORKERS WAS IN ITSELF
YET ANOTHER INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF OF THE CHANGES -- IN DEED AND NOT
JUST IN WORDS -- THAT ARE NOW UNDER WAY IN THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL
LIFE. WE RECALL -- AND IT SEEMS ONLY A SHORT WHILE AGO -- HOW
SIGNATURES WERE COLLECTED IN STREETS AND SQUARES IN SUPPORT OF THE
IDEA OF CREATING A MEMORIAL PERPETUATING THE MEMORY OF THE VICTIMS
OF STALIN'S REPRESSIONS.

THE MOVEMENT TO ERECT A MONUMENT GAINED SUPPORT AT THE 19TH
PARTY CONFERENCE. ACCOUNT NO. 700454 WAS OPENED, AND IT
IMMEDIATELY STARTED RECEIVING VOLUNTARY DONATIONS FROM CITIZENS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS.

THE "MEMORIAL" PUBLIC COUNCIL WAS FORMED, AND ACADEMICIAN
A. SAKHAROV WAS ELECTED ITS HONORARY CHAIRMAN. THE ACTION GROUP
WAS JOINED BY THE PUBLIC COUNCIL AND THE FOUNDER MEMBERS OF THE NEW
ALL-UNION VOLUNTARY HISTORICAL EDUCATION SOCIETY -- THE
CREATIVE UNIONS OF CINEMATOGRAPHY WORKERS, ARCHITECTS, THEATER
WORKERS, ARTISTS, AND DESIGNERS, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, AND
OGONEK -- AND THEY EMBARKED ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS NOBLE
IDEA. MEANWHILE PREPARATORY WORK WAS BEING DONE TO ORGANIZE A

COMPETITION FOR THE CONCEPT AND PLAN OF THE FUTURE MEMORIAL COMPLEX, AND ALSO TO COLLECT DOCUMENTS AND MEMOIRS. AND NOW A MEETING HAS BEEN HELD TO PREPARE FOR THE CONSTITUENT CONFERENCE OF THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY.

WHAT SHOULD "MEMORIAL" BE LIKE? WHAT SORT OF MEMORIAL COMPLEX SHOULD BE ERECTED? HOW TO PROVIDE SWIFTER AND MORE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO FORMER PRISONERS AND THEIR RELATIVES, WHO NEED IT SO URGENTLY? THESE AND MANY OTHER QUESTIONS WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING. ITS PARTICIPANTS TOOK A FIRM STANCE AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY SOME INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH THE NOTORIOUS "DEMOCRATIC UNION" TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SACRED CAUSE OF "MEMORIAL" IN PURSUIT OF THEIR OWN UNSEEMLY GOALS.

IT WAS DECIDED TO CONVENE THE CONSTITUENT CONFERENCE OF THE "MEMORIAL" ALL-UNION VOLUNTARY HISTORICAL EDUCATION SOCIETY IN MOSCOW 17-18 DECEMBER. IT WILL FINALLY DETERMINE THE FUTURE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION'S TASKS AND FORMS OF WORK.

ALMOST EVERY FAMILY IN OUR COUNTRY HAD AT LEAST ONE OF ITS MEMBERS KILLED OR WOUNDED DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE FASCISTS. ALMOST EVERY FAMILY IN OUR COUNTRY HAD AT LEAST ONE OF ITS MEMBERS KILLED, ARRESTED, EXILED, OR WOUNDED THROUGH ALL SORTS OF HUMILIATIONS DURING THE WAR WAGED AGAINST OUR OWN PEOPLE BY THOSE WHO SPOKE IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE.

AND EVEN IF THERE ARE SOME FAMILIES UNAFFECTED BY EITHER OF THESE TWO WARS, SURELY OUR MULTINATIONAL PEOPLE ARE A UNITED FAMILY, AND SURELY OUR MEMORY SHOULD MOURN OUR SHARED FAMILY LOSSES? TO MOURN THE VICTIMS OF JUST ONE OF THESE ACCURSED WARS WOULD BE AS CRIMINALLY UNNATURAL AS IT WOULD BE TO ALLOW COMPASSION TO BE FELT BY JUST ONE-HALF OF ONE'S HEART WHILE FORCIBLY CLAMPING THE ARTERY FEEDING THE OTHER HALF.

OUR PEOPLE'S WAR AGAINST THE FASCISTS LASTED 4 YEARS AND, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL DATA, WE LOST 20 MILLION LIVES, THE UNOFFICIAL FIGURE BEING EVEN HIGHER.

THE WAR WAGED AGAINST THE PEOPLE BY THOSE WHO SPOKE IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE LASTED FOR DECADES, AND NOBODY HAS YET ACCURATELY CALCULATED HOW MANY MILLIONS OF LIVES WE LOST.

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 *****/

REF: PM1011163188 MOSCOW LITERATURNAYA GAZETA RUSSIAN 2
NOV///LIVES WE LOST.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) THERE IS A THEORY THAT THE REPRESSIONS WERE SUPPOSEDLY A HARSH NECESSITY AND THAT OTHERWISE WE WOULD NOT HAVE WITHSTOOD THE CLASH WITH FASCISM. BUT THIS THEORY IS BASED EITHER ON HISTORICAL IGNORANCE OR ON HISTORICAL CYNICISM. HOW CAN ANYONE PERCEIVE THE PREWAR DESTRUCTION OF THE PEOPLE AS PREPARATION TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE FROM DESTRUCTION?

HERE ARE FIGURES FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL TODORSKIY ABOUT THE BLOODLETTING AMONG RED ARMY COMMAND CADRES BEFORE THE WAR: THE REPRESSIONS ACCOUNTED FOR 3 OUT OF 5 MARSHALS, 3 OUT OF 5 ARMY COMMANDERS FIRST RANK, ALL 10 ARMY COMMANDERS SECOND RANK, 50 OUT OF 57 CORPS COMMANDERS, 154 OUT OF 186 DIVISION COMMANDERS, ALL 16 ARMY COMMISSARS FIRST AND SECOND RANK, 25 OUT OF 28 CORPS COMMISSARS, 58 OUT OF 64 DIVISION COMMISSARS, AND 401 OUT OF 456 COLONELS.

THERE WERE ALSO LIEUTENANTS AND PRIVATES WHO WERE INTERNED FIRST IN HITLER'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS, AND THEN IN STALIN'S. EVEN WHEN THEY ESCAPED FROM HITLER'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND FOUGHT AGAINST FASCISM WITH THE ITALIAN OR FRENCH PARTISANS, THIS DID NOT PREVENT THEM FROM BEING CLASSED AS "TRAITORS." WE ARE AWKWARDLY AND HALTINGLY LEARNING THE BASIC TRUTHS OF HISTORICAL MEMORY, LEAVING BLEEDING OPEN WOUNDS WHERE WE HAVE TORN OFF THE BRAIN-CONSTRAINING CAMELSKIN BELTS OF MANKURTY ((ALLUSION TO PEOPLE IN AYTMATOV NOVEL WHO ARE DEPRIVED OF THEIR MEMORY BY INVADERS WHO TIE BELTS AROUND THEIR HEADS -- FBIS)).

WE ARE BEGINNING TO HONOR THE MEMORY OF OUTSTANDING REVOLUTIONARIES, MILITARY LEADERS, SCIENTISTS, AND WRITERS WHO PERISHED IN PRISON CELLARS OR BEHIND BARBED WIRE. NAMES THAT WERE FAMOUS IN THE PAST AND WERE ONLY WHISPERED FOR SO MANY YEARS, CAN AGAIN BE HEARD ALOUD. BUT THE PEOPLE'S CONSCIENCE AND THE PEOPLE'S TALENT ARE NOT THE EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE OF THE FAMOUS. IT IS OUR DUTY TO HONOR THE MEMORY OF THE DEAD INNOCENT GRAIN GROWERS, WORKERS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS, TEACHERS, AND PEOPLE OF ALL PROFESSIONS, NATIONALITIES, AND RELIGIONS, EACH OF WHOM REPRESENTS A FRAGMENT OF THE ASSASSINATED PEOPLE'S CONSCIENCE AND PEOPLE'S TALENT.

IN ALL CORNERS OF THE COUNTRY THERE ARE FLICKERING ETERNAL FLAMES WHICH WERE LIT IN MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DIED IN THE WAR AGAINST FASCISM.

IN ALL CORNERS OF THE COUNTRY, BY THE PEOPLE'S WILL, THERE MUST BE MEMORIALS COMMEMORATING THE VICTIMS OF REPRESSIONS, LIKE ETERNAL FLAMES CAST IN STONE. HALFHEARTED REMEMBRANCE LEADS TO HALFHEARTED CONSCIENCE.

THERE CAN BE NO RESTRUCTURING WITHOUT THE RESTRUCTURING OF MEMORY.

THEREFORE HELP "MEMORIAL"!

TO THIS DAY, CHILDREN ON THE BANKS OF KOLYMA RIVER SOMETIMES CARRY BERRIES INSIDE HUMAN SKULLS THEY HAVE FOUND, AND SMILE IN THEIR INNOCENT IGNORANCE.

HOW ARE WE NOW TO DECIPHER THE CODE SIGNS "B-13," "V-41," AND "YA-178" ON THE NAMELESS RICKETY PEGS AND SMALL BOARDS IN THE TAYGA? HOW ARE WE TO MAKE OUT THE SIGN WRITTEN IN INDELIBLE PENCIL ON SOME PLYWOOD TAG TIED TO AN EMACIATED BARE FOOT WHEN THE TUNDRA'S PERMAFROST YIELDS ONE MORE OF ITS TERRIBLE SECRETS IN SPRINGTIME?

BELORUSSIAN PEASANTS IN KUROPATY LOOK IN TERROR AT THE DITCH FILLED WITH HUMAN SKELETONS AS WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION IN THE TRIAL OF HISTORY.

MUSCOVITES SHUDDER ON LEARNING THAT THE KALITNIKOVSKOYE CEMETERY IN THE VERY HEART OF MOSCOW HAS ITS OWN TERRIBLE SECRET DITCH, MOSCOW'S BABIY YAR, WHERE NAKED BODIES WERE BROUGHT IN CARTS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT DURING THE THIRTIES, WITH RAGS STOPPING THE TWO BULLET HOLES IN THEIR HEADS.

OUR MORAL LAW -- "NOBODY HAS BEEN FORGOTTEN AND NOTHING HAS BEEN FORGOTTEN" -- MUST APPLY TO BOTH OF THESE TERRIBLE WARS, THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AND THE WAR AGAINST OUR OWN PEOPLE.

THE MEMORY WE POSSESS TODAY ACCOMMODATES NEITHER THE TEARS, NOR THE BLOOD, NOR THE HOPES. NOT BEING ARMED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORY, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES DISARMED WHEN WE FACE UP TO HISTORY.

HISTORY CANNOT BE ESCAPED BY MEANS OF MONUMENTS, NOT EVEN THE MOST BEAUTIFUL ONES. THE BEST MONUMENT IS MEMORY. WE TAKE THE TERM "MEMORIAL" TO INCLUDE THE AIR OF HISTORICAL MEMORY AROUND THE MONUMENTS THEMSELVES. THE MEMORIALS ARE CONCEIVED BY US NOT ONLY AS ARCHITECTURAL COMPLEXES BUT ALSO AS SPIRITUAL COMPLEXES, AS LIBRARIES OF FACTS AND TRIBUNES OF PUBLIC THOUGHT.

THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY MUST BECOME THE ORGANIZER OF THE RESTRUCTURING OF MEMORY, A CAUSE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE, A UNIVERSAL CAUSE. THE RECREATION OF THE PEOPLE'S MEMORY IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE PEOPLE'S HELP.

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 003 *****/

REF: PM1011163188 MOSCOW LITERATURNAYA GAZETA RUSSIAN 2
NOV///THE PEOPLE'S HELP.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) THEREFORE HELP "MEMORIAL" |

THE RUSTY BARBED WIRE OF THE FORMER CAMPS, LYING IN WAIT IN THE BRUSHWOOD, IS A VIPER THAN CAN STILL CAUSE A DEADLY BITE. THE POISON CONTAINED IN THE BARBS OF THE CAMP WIRE HAS CONTAMINATED THOSE WHO PERCEIVE THE PATH INTO THE FUTURE AS LEADING NOT THROUGH DEMOCRACY BUT THROUGH FORCIBLE SUBORDINATION, NOT THROUGH PLURALISM BUT THROUGH CONVEYER-BELT UNIFORMITY. THIS CAMP WIRE ENTANGLED SO MANY TALENTED SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF ALL NATIONALITIES IN OUR MOTHERLAND -- PEASANTS, PROLETARIANS, MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA, PARTY MEMBERS, NONPARTY PEOPLE, CLERICS, AND SIMPLE BELIEVERS. WHO KNOWS, HAD THEY REMAINED ALIVE MAYBE DEMOCRACY AND GLASNOST WOULD HAVE DEVELOPED NATURALLY AS FAR BACK AS THE TWENTIES, AND THEN THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO MANY CRIMES, THE WAR AGAINST FASCISM WOULD HAVE BEEN WON MUCH EARLIER, AND MAYBE THE FASCISTS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CAPTURE POWER BY REFERENCE TO WORLDWIDE "RED TERROR" AND THE ENTIRE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE WORLD COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. OUR FUTURE WAS STOLEN FOR SEVERAL DECADES. WE MUST KNOW HOW THIS HAPPENED SO THAT OUR FUTURE CAN NEVER AGAIN BE STOLEN. THE STUDY OF THE PAST IS THE SALVATION OF THE FUTURE, THE GUARANTEE OF THE FUTURE. THE TASK OF "MEMORIAL" IS TO STUDY THE PAST NOT FOR THE SAKE OF ACCURATE RECORDS BUT FOR THE SAKE OF ACCURACY IN MAPPING OUT FUTURE PROSPECTS, FOR THE SAKE OF ENSURING THAT THE TRAGEDY THAT BEFELL OUR RECENT FOREBEARS DOES NOT RECUR TO BEFALL OUR IMMEDIATE OR DISTANT OFFSPRING.

THEREFORE HELP "MEMORIAL" |

FOLLOWING THE TRAGIC YEARS WHEN CONSCIENCE, JUSTICE, AND TRUTH WERE LOCKED BEHIND BARS, IT IS NECESSARY TO MORALLY SENTENCE STALINISM TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AS AN ANTI-PEOPLE PHENOMENON. THIS IS NOT SO MUCH A MATTER OF STALIN'S ACTUAL PERSONALITY OR HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES, IT IS A MATTER OF STALINISM. ITS RESULT HAS BEEN PARADOXICALLY TRAGIC -- THE STATE AND MAN, CLASS INTERESTS AND UNIVERSAL INTERESTS HAVE ALL SUFFERED THROUGH IT. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRAMPLING OF DEMOCRACY IN THE PAST MEANS ENSURING THE PROTECTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE FUTURE. THE MEMORIAL IN MOSCOW MUST BE AN ALL-UNION LECTURE AND RESEARCH CENTER WHERE THE MORALITY OF THE PRESENT IS ELABORATED AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE FUTURE ON THE BASIS OF VERIFIED FACTS OF THE PAST. RESEARCH ACTIVITY MUST NOT FOLLOW THE BIASED LINE OF BRINGING ONLY NEGATIVE FACTS TO LIGHT AND DELIBERATELY SENSATIONALIZING THE HORRORS. WE MUST MAKE PUBLIC NOT

ONLY THE CRIMES AND BETRAYALS BUT ALSO THE COURAGE OF RESISTANCE, THE FEAT OF MERCY, AND THE SPIRITUAL HYGIENE OF NONPARTICIPATION. IT WAS IN THOSE TERRIBLE YEARS THAT MANY GREAT BOOKS WERE WRITTEN AND MANY REMARKABLE TECHNICAL IDEAS WERE PUT FORWARD. BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST NOT USE THE TALENTED AND HONEST WORK OF MANY PEOPLE IN THOSE YEARS TO JUSTIFY THE SELF-GENOCIDE THAT WAS BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCTED.

THE TASKS OF THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY LACK ALL VENGEFULNESS. WE ARE NOT ADVOCATING THE PHYSICAL PERSECUTION OF THOSE WHO WERE IN SOME WAY OR ANOTHER INVOLVED IN STALINISM'S BLOODY CRIMES. WE DEEM IT PROFOUNDLY IMMORAL TO GROUNDLESSLY ACCUSE PEOPLE WHO ARE STILL ALIVE OR ARE ALREADY DEAD. BUT IF THERE IS IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF GUILT BEFORE THE TRIAL OF HISTORY, THEN LET THE SOCIAL PUNISHMENT TAKE THE FORM OF PUBLISHING THE TRUTH ABOUT SPECIFIC CRIMES COMMITTED BY SPECIFIC PEOPLE, ACCOMPLICES IN THE WAR WAGED AGAINST OUR OWN PEOPLE. THE COVERUP OF THE TRUTH ABOUT CRIMES CONTAINS A POTENTIAL DANGER THAT THEY MIGHT RECUR.

THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY MUST BECOME ONE OF THE CENTERS FOR MOST ACTIVE ASSISTANCE TO RESTRUCTURING, GLASNOST, NEW THINKING, AND DEMOCRACY.

THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY WILL STRENGTHEN INTERETHNIC TIES BETWEEN OUR COUNTRY'S FRATERNAL PEOPLES, BECAUSE NOTHING BONDS AS FIRMLY AS SHARED SUFFERING.

THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY HOPES THAT IT WILL RECEIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT BECAUSE OUR SOCIETY'S DEMOCRATIZATION AND COMPLETE DE-STALINIZATION OFFER ONE OF THE MAIN HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE SAKE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN PEOPLES.

THEREFORE HELP "MEMORIAL" |

THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY GRATEFULLY ACCEPTS DONATIONS FOR THE ERECTION OF A MEMORIAL COMPLEX TO THE VICTIMS OF REPRESSIONS (ACCOUNT NO. 700454).

THE "MEMORIAL" SOCIETY AWAITS ANY DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL AND SUGGESTIONS FROM YOU, ADDRESSED TO: 125319 MOSCOW, NO. 2 CHERNYAKHOVSKIY STREET.

ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC COUNCIL,

((SIGNED)) YEVG. YEVTUSHENKO

ADMIN

COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 3 -- STALIN SLANDER SUIT REJECTED
REF: PM1805152688 AND ADD MOSCOW SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
RUSSIAN 19 MAY -- ADAMOVICH WARNS OF ANTIRESTRUCTURING
SOURCE: MOSCOW IZVESTIYA IN RUSSIAN 23 SEP 88 MORNING
EDITION P 6

TEXT:

//((PAVEL GUTIONTOV ARTICLE: "ACTION NO. 17 IN DEFENSE OF
COMRADE STALIN DISMISSED BY THE RAYON COURT" -- WORDS WITHIN
SLANTLINES PRINTED IN BOLDFACE))

((TEXT)) THE ACTION WAS FILED BY IVAN TIMOFEYEVICH
SHEKHOVTSOV, FORMER PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OFFICIAL NOW RETIRED ON
PENSION AND RESIDENT OF KHARKOV. HE TOOK WRITER ALES ADAMOVICH
TO COURT, ACCUSING HIM OF INSULTING I.V. STALIN'S HONOR AND
DIGNITY AND ALSO HIS, I.T. SHEKHOVTSOV'S, HONOR AND DIGNITY.
THAT WAS THE 17TH ACTION FILED BY SHEKHOVTSOV AGAINST A WIDE RANGE
OF PRESS ORGANS AND THEIR WRITERS. THE PREVIOUS 16 WERE NOT
REFERRED FOR TRIAL SINCE THEY EXCLUSIVELY CONCERNED ONLY STALIN
(SOMEONE WHO, IN SHEKHOVTSOV'S WORDS, "CANNOT PERSONALLY EXPLAIN
AND JUSTIFY HIMSELF"), BUT THE FORMER PROSECUTOR PERCEIVED ELEMENTS
OF PERSONAL INSULT IN ADAMOVICH'S ARTICLE PUBLISHED BY SOVETSKAYA
KULTURA 19 MAY THIS YEAR.

THE POINT IS THAT THE WRITER CITED HIS LETTER TO VASIL BYKOV,
WHOM SHEKHOVTSOV HAD TAKEN TO TASK FOR AN ARTICLE IN IZVESTIYA
WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, CONTAINED INSULTING ATTACKS AGAINST THE
LEADER ((STALIN -- FBIS)), ADVISING HIM TO IMMEDIATELY SEND TO
IZVESTIYA A LETTER SAYING THAT HE HAD "REVISED HIS POSITIONS."

BYKOV FAILED TO REVISE HIS POSITIONS, BUT THE LETTER WAS READ BY ADAMOVICH, WHO, WITHOUT ACTUALLY NAMING THE WRITER, DEEMED IT PERMISSIBLE TO QUOTE THE FOLLOWING LINES FROM IT:

"A STALWART JURIST FROM STALIN'S TIME WRITES: 'YOU SAY: "VAVILOV WAS TORTURED..." BUT THE POINT IS THAT, UNDER THE LAW, THE USE OF TORTURE AND OTHER ILLEGAL METHODS CAN BE CONSIDERED GROUNDS FOR QUASHING A SENTENCE ONLY IF THE PERSONS WHO USED THESE METHODS HAVE THEMSELVES BEEN SENTENCED. SO, WAS INVESTIGATOR KHVAT, WHO IS ALLEGED TO HAVE TORTURED VAVILOV, INVESTIGATED?.."

"DO YOU HEAR," ADAMOVICH COMMENTED, "THE TRIUMPHANT DEFENDER OF BUTCHERS, GLOATING OVER WHAT IS, FRANKLY, OUR LIBERALISM? AHA, IN THE SIXTIES THEY LET THE BUTCHERS EVADE THE COURTS AND HIDE BEHIND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS... WELL, TOUGH| IT IS NOT YOUR VERDICTS, BUT OURS THAT REMAIN IN FORCE|.. WHEN YOU READ THINGS LIKE THAT, YOU GROAN AS IF YOU HAD TOOTHACHE, BUT WHAT THEN, HOW CAN YOU REPLY IF IT IS NOT A PERSON FACING YOU, BUT A BRICK WALL..."

SHEKHOVTSOV HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO HIS OWN LETTER BEING QUOTED. BUT HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE TERM "TRIUMPHANT DEFENDER OF BUTCHERS" AND DEMANDED PROOF THAT THOSE WHOSE DEFENSE HE HAS UNDERTAKEN WERE INDEED BUTCHERS. AND, AS YOU CAN EASILY UNDERSTAND, LIEUTENANT KHVAT WAS NO MORE THAN AN EXCUSE FOR A CONVERSATION ON A MUCH BROADER TOPIC.

IN ESSENCE, IT CONCERNED THE JUDICIAL ACQUITTAL OF STALINISM.

I WAS INVITED TO ATTEND THE TRIAL BY DANIIL GRANIN, WHO HAD COME TO MOSCOW ON BUSINESS OF HIS OWN AND HAD PUT SOME OF IT OFF SO AS TO BE ABLE TO ATTEND THIS TRIAL. THE HALL WAS CHOCKABLOCK, THERE WERE NO EMPTY SEATS AND SOME PEOPLE WERE EVEN STANDING. TELEVISION AND MOVIE CAMERAS WERE SHOOTING AWAY, AND DOCTORS OF SCIENCES V. POLIKARPOV, A. MISHIN, AND S. SHEBOLDAYEV AND CURRENT AFFAIRS WRITER YU. KARYAKIN WERE AMONG THE WITNESSES SUMMONED...

WHAT POSITIONS WERE TAKEN BY THE SIDES IN THIS TRIAL?

SHEKHOVTSOV DEMANDED AN END TO THE PRESS CENSURING OF THE "PERIOD IN OUR HISTORY WHEN THE PARTY AND STATE WERE HEADED BY COMRADE I.V. STALIN." ALSO THAT MATERIAL ON TOPICS CONCERNING REHABILITATION BE WRITTEN ONLY BY "PERSONS VESTED WITH THE NECESSARY POWERS."

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 *****/

REF: PM2709080188 MOSCOW IZVESTIYA RUSSIAN 23 SEP///THE NECESSARY POWERS."

TEXT:

((TEXT)) ADAMOVICH DECLARED THAT "WE WILL NOT WAIT FOR JURISTS FROM THE STALIN SCHOOL TO GIVE US PERMISSION TO EXAMINE THESE THINGS IN THE WAY OUR MORAL SENSE DICTATES."

BY WAY OF EVIDENCE, SHEKHOVTSOV CITED NEWSPAPERS "FROM THE PERIOD 1935-1948." THE RESPONDENTS (THE SOVETSKAYA KULTURA EDITORIAL BOARD IN ADDITION TO ADAMOVICH) CITED THE ASSESSMENTS MADE IN THE REPORT TO THE FESTIVE SESSION DEVOTED TO THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET POWER AND A RECENT INTERVIEW GIVEN TO PRAVDA BY M.S. SOLOMENTSEV, MEMBER OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO.

SHEKHOVTSOV CLAIMED THAT SINCE THERE HAD BEEN NO TRIAL OF THOSE WHO INSPIRED THE TERROR, IT IS ILLEGAL TO CALL THEM BUTCHERS AND EVEN TO ACCUSE THEM OF CRIMES. THE RESPONDENTS COUNTERCLAIMED:

SURELY WE ARE ENTITLED TO DESCRIBE MALYUTA SKURATOV ((CHIEF OF SECRET POLICE UNDER IVAN THE TERRIBLE -- FBIS)) AS A BUTCHER AND TAMERLANE AS A BLOODY TYRANT. YET NO COURT PASSED A VERDICT ON EITHER OF THEM, AND NOW IT IS HARDLY FEASIBLE TO GIVE EACH ONE OF THEM THE FLOOR TO JUSTIFY THEMSELVES...

ALL THIS COULD EASILY BE LAUGHED OFF: "COME ON, YOU GUYS, WE'RE GETTING READY TO CELEBRATE OUR MILLENNIUM!" BUT BEHIND THIS ACTION STANDS A TERRIBLE PHENOMENON WHICH IS BY NO MEANS BURIED IN THE PAST. STALINISM IS STILL ALIVE, AND SWEEPING IT OUT OF OUR PRESENT MEANS MORE THAN JUST TAKING THE GENERALISSIMO'S PHOTOGRAPH OFF A BUS WINDSHIELD. STALINISM IS A WAY OF THINKING WHICH SPARES NO THOUGHT FOR MAN...

BUT WHY "RAKE UP THE PAST"? WHY NOT FORGET IT LIKE A BAD NIGHTMARE? WHY REOPEN OLD WOUNDS?

IN ORDER TO PREVENT THESE WOUNDS GOING SEPTIC. IN ORDER TO REALLY CONSIGN THE PAST TO /THE PAST./ IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE SOLE PROPER MEANING OF THE TERMS "GOOD" AND "EVIL" -- BECAUSE, INCIDENTALLY, THE DISTORTION OF THEIR ACTUAL MEANING UNDER STALIN PLAYED BY NO MEANS THE LEAST ROLE IN THE SPROUTING OF DUPLICITY IN BREZHNEV'S ERA.

THE TRAGEDY OF STALINSHCHINA CONCERNS MORE THAN THE PURPOSEFUL DESTRUCTION OF THE PICK AND PRIDE OF THE COUNTRY -- IT MERCILESSLY PERVERTED THE MINDS OF THE SURVIVORS. DURING A BREAK BETWEEN COURT SESSIONS, SOMEONE ASKED SHEKHOVTSOV: "TELL US THEN, DID STALIN DO ANYTHING GOOD FOR YOU PERSONALLY?" IVAN TIMOFEYEVICH REPLIED: "HE DID!" AND HE NARRATED THE FOLLOWING STORY VERBATIM.

BACK IN 1929, HIS FAMILY WAS DEKULAKIZED BY VIRTUE OF A RURAL SOVIET DECISION. AT 3 YEARS OF AGE, HE WAS THE OLDEST OF THREE CHILDREN. WHILE ON BOARD THE SPECIAL TRAIN, HIS MOTHER USED TO WRAP THE WET DIAPERS AROUND HER OWN BODY TO DRY THEM... THE YOUNGEST DIED... BUT RIGHT AFTER STALIN'S ARTICLE "GIDDY WITH SUCCESS" HIS FAMILY WAS BROUGHT BACK...

PRECISELY SO: THE RURAL SOVIET SENT THEM TO EXILE, STALIN BROUGHT THEM BACK...

IVAN TIMOFEYEVICH SHOULD BE PITIED. BUT HE PERSONALLY HAS NO PITY FOR ANYONE. FOLLOWING THE ARTICLE ABOUT RASKOLNIKOV PUBLISHED BY OGONEK LAST YEAR, SHEKHOVTSOV ASKED THE MOSCOW PROSECUTOR TO INSTITUTE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ITS AUTHOR, V. POLIKARPOV, "FOR DISSEMINATING IN PRINT DELIBERATELY FALSE FABRICATIONS DEFAMING THE SOVIET STATE AND SOCIAL SYSTEM..." THE JUSTIFICATION OF HIS REQUEST TOOK SIX WRITTEN PAGES. AS IN THE GOOD OLD DAYS...

NOW HE DEMANDS INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF THAT REPRESSIONS ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE AND THAT STALIN WAS ACTUALLY GUILTY OF THEM. FINE, FACTS WERE ALSO CITED AT THE TRIAL.

THERE WAS MENTION OF A RECENT ARTICLE IN IZVESTIYA ABOUT THE TRAGEDY OF KUROPATY, AN OBSCURE AND TINY PLACE NEAR MINSK WHERE REPRESSED PEOPLE WERE SHOT EN MASSE IN THE LATE THIRTIES. THE BELORUSSIAN PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE HAS LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE, AND THE NEWSPAPER CITED EXCERPTS FROM EYEWITNESS TESTIMONIES BY LOCAL RESIDENTS...

"HAVE YOU READ ABOUT KUROPATY?", SHEKHOVTSOV WAS ASKED IN COURT.

"AND DID YOU KNOW THAT THIS IZVESTIYA ARTICLE WAS IMMEDIATELY REPORTED BY VOA?", SHEKHOVTSOV ANSWERED THE QUESTION BY ANOTHER

QUESTION...

ORIGINALS OF THE SO-CALLED "SHOW TRIALS" HAVE BEEN PRESERVED, WITH EVERY PAGE LISTING BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF THE EXPOSED "ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE" FOLLOWED BY A "SUMMARY OF THE CASE" OUTLINED IN A FEW LINES. THERE ARE THREE SIGNATURES UNDERNEATH: VYSHINSKIY, ULRIKH, AND YEZHOV. ALL THAT WAS LEFT FOR STALIN TO DO WAS TO PUT A FIGURE IN THE CORNER OF THE PAGE -- "1" (EXECUTION BY FIRING SQUAD) OR "2" (10 YEARS IN CAMP). THE DESTINY OF THOSE LEFT UNTOUCHED BY STALIN'S PENCIL WAS INDEED DECIDED WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE, BUT ALONG VERY SIMILAR LINES...

/***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 003 *****/

REF: PM2709080188 MOSCOW IZVESTIYA RUSSIAN 23 SEP///VERY
SIMILAR LINES...

TEXT:

((TEXT)) DOCTOR OF HISTORICAL SCIENCES V. POLIKARPOV, TESTIFYING AS WITNESS BEFORE THE COURT, CITED A FIGURE: IN 1937-1938 ALONE STALIN SIGNED 393 LISTS CONTAINING THE NAMES OF HUNDREDS UPON HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. AND THEN HE SAID, TURNING TO SHEKHOVTSOV: "IF YOU REALLY WERE A HISTORIAN, AS YOU CLAIM, YOU MUST KNOW THAT THE EXPERT STUDY WHICH YOU AS A JURIST DEMAND BE CONDUCTED WAS CONDUCTED EVEN BEFORE THE 20TH CONGRESS, AND ITS DEDUCTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS -- BASED ON A MOST THOROUGH STUDY OF DOCUMENTS -- ARE KNOWN ALL OVER THE WORLD..."

"ARE YOU NOW IN A POSITION TO SHOW ME THE ORIGINALS OF THESE DOCUMENTS?", SHEKHOVTSOV ASKED...

OF COURSE, IVAN TIMOFEYEVICH SHEKHOVTSOV, A JURIST AND UPHOLDER OF THE LAW, KNOWS AND INSISTS THAT NO CITIZEN CAN BE CALLED A CRIMINAL UNLESS HE HAS BEEN TRIED. BUT HE NONETHELESS DEMANDS:

"LET THEM NAME A SPECIFIC IVANOV, PETROV, OR SIDOROV WHO WAS PERSONALLY EXTERMINATED BY STALIN|"

INDEED, HE IS RIGHT HERE. LET US NAME (AND WE NOT ONLY CAN BUT MUST DO THIS|) INDIVIDUALLY ALL THE VICTIMS OF THE TERROR AND THE ORGANIZERS OF THE TERROR -- THOSE WHO PREPARED AND THOSE WHO SIGNED THE "EXTERMINATION LISTS," AND THOSE WHO CARRIED OUT THE UNLAWFUL "SENTENCES." WE MUST DO THIS NOW, EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT BE LATE. AND IT IS MORE THAN JUST A MATTER OF RESTORING SIMPLE HISTORICAL JUSTICE, EVEN THOUGH THIS IS, OF COURSE, HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT.

I WOULD LIKE TO CITE -- MAINLY VERBATIM -- PART OF THE COURT SPEECH BY WRITER ALES ADAMOVICH, RESPONDENT IN THE ACTION ABOUT INSULTING THE HONOR AND DIGNITY OF STALIN AND A STALINIST:

"NEITHER I NOR MY FAMILY (MOTHER, FATHER, AND BROTHER) SUFFERED DIRECTLY IN STALIN'S REPRESSIONS, THERE IS NO PERSONAL INJURY INVOLVED. NONETHELESS, I CONSIDER MYSELF ONE OF THE VICTIMS AND AM PREPARED TO FILE MY OWN 'ACTION' AGAINST STALIN AND HIS DEFENDERS.

"IT WAS HE, STALIN, WHO RUINED MY COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURE BY 'DEPEASANTIZING' IT AND I, INHABITANT OF AN AREA ACCOUNTING FOR ONE-SIXTH OF THE PLANET, AM INCAPABLE OF FEEDING MYSELF. NOT ONLY DID HE 'DEPEASANTIZE' THE COUNTRY, HE ALSO DEPRIVED IT OF FOOD SCIENTISTS LIKE NIKOLAY VAVILOV, KILLING THEM THROUGH THE AGENCY OF BUTCHER-INVESTIGATORS AND BUTCHER-PROSECUTORS LIKE KHVAT AND VYSHINSKIY.

"IT WAS HE, STALIN, WHO KILLED OFF A SIZABLE PROPORTION OF MY PEOPLE.

"IT WAS HE WHO MADE PEOPLE LOOK SUSPICIOUSLY AT THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS FOR DECADES ON END: COULD HE BE AN INFORMER?.. HE THUS FRAGMENTED US, DEPRIVED US OF THE SENSE OF RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER, AND THUS OF OUR OWN SELF-RESPECT.

"IT WAS STALIN WHO, THROUGH HIS POLICY OF REPRESSIONS, ALMOST LEFT ME TO THE MERCY OF FASCISM (AND IN FACT DID LEAVE 80 MILLION) AND AFTERWARD TREATED US (INCLUDING PARTISANS AND UNDERGROUND FIGHTERS) AS TRAITORS: THEY LIVED IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY|

"AND FINALLY IT WAS HE, STALIN, WHO DISCREDITED SOCIALISM...

"THERE IT IS, MY FAR FROM COMPLETE CASE AGAINST STALIN, AND THEREFORE AGAINST HIS DEFENDERS..."

...MOSCOW'S SVERDLOVSKIY RAYON PEOPLE'S COURT DECIDED TO DISMISS I.T. SHEKHOVTSOV'S ACTION. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT AND PRINCIPLED DECISION, THOUGH THE FORMER DEPUTY PROSECUTOR IS, OF COURSE, ENTITLED TO APPEAL AGAINST IT. BUT NO MATTER WHAT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES MIGHT DO, STALIN AND STALINISM HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENTENCED BY A /SUPREME/ COURT WHOSE SENTENCE IS FINAL AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL. THIS IS THE SENTENCE BY HISTORY, AND THIS SENTENCE IS ALREADY LEGALLY IN FORCE.

ADMIN

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJ: BELORUSSIAN THIRTIES' SHOOTINGS INVESTIGATED

SOURCE: MOSCOW IZVESTIYA IN RUSSIAN 12 SEP 88 MORNING

EDITION P 4

TEXT:

//((REPORT BY M. SHIMANSKIY: "TRAGEDY IN KUROPATY: WHO WAS SHOT HERE?"))

((TEXT)) AS WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED (IZVESTIYA NO. 241) THE BELORUSSIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS CREATED A GOVERNMENT COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATHS OF THE PEOPLE WHOSE REMAINS HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN THE KUROPATY FOREST NEAR MINSK. THE INVESTIGATION GROUP OF THE REPUBLIC'S PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMISSION THE RESULTS OF THE INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES.

V. SOBOLEV, CHIEF OF THE INVESTIGATION SECTION, AND YA. BROLISHS, INVESTIGATOR FOR ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT CASES, TOLD YOUR IZVESTIYA CORRESPONDENT THAT 80 INHABITANTS OF THE VILLAGES OF TSNA, ZABOLOTYE, DROZDOVO, AND OTHERS WERE QUESTIONED.

N. KARZHVICH, BORN 1919: "IN 1937 THEY BEGAN TO ERECT A FENCE IN THIS FOREST. THE FENCE WAS ABOUT 3 METERS HIGH. THE APPROACH ROAD WAS FROM THE DIRECTION OF MINSK. THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS KEPT CONSTANT GUARD OVER THE TERRITORY. THEY USUALLY BROUGHT PEOPLE HERE IN THE EVENING, AFTER 1700-1800 HOURS. THEY SHOT THEM IMMEDIATELY. I DID NOT GO THERE OFTEN, MY PARENTS WOULD NOT LET ME. WHEN I DID APPROACH I LOOKED THROUGH A HOLE IN THE FENCE. PEOPLE WERE PUT IN A LINE ABOVE SOME HOLES. ON ONE OCCASION MY FATHER AND I DROVE BY THIS PLACE IN A CART. A HOLE ABOUT 5 METERS LONG WAS FULL OF BODIES. THEY WERE COVERED ONLY

WITH BRANCHES.

O. BOROVSKAYA, BORN 1927: "OF THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THAT FOREST I CAN SAY THE FOLLOWING: SHOUTS AND GROANS COULD BE HEARD FROM THE FOREST. PEOPLE SHOUTED: 'WHY US?' AND SHOTS WERE ALSO HEARD. AT FIRST THE SHOOTING WAS DURING THE DAY AND AT NIGHT. THIS ALL HAPPENED IN 1937-1938 AND THEN CONTINUED RIGHT UP TO THE WAR ITSELF. LATER IT WAS USUALLY EVERY COUPLE OF DAYS OR SO. WOMEN'S VOICES WERE ALSO HEARD.

"IN THE SUMMER OF 1938 WE CHILDREN WERE ONCE OUT PICKING BERRIES. WE CROPT IN THROUGH A TRENCH UNDER THE FENCE. THE TRUCKS BEGAN TO ARRIVE. THERE WAS NOWHERE TO GO SO I HID UNDER A FIR TREE. A COVERED TRUCK FOLLOWED A PASSENGER CAR. THERE WERE BARS ON THE BODY OF THE TRUCK. MEN DRESSED IN GRAY CIVILIAN SUITS AND BAREHEADED GOT OUT OF THE PASSENGER CAR. THE MEN LED PEOPLE OUT OF THE TRUCK. THEIR HANDS WERE TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS. THEY BEGAN TO SHOOT THEM. THE PEOPLE CRIED: "OH, GOD, WHY US?"

D. TOVSTIK, BORN 1911: "IT WAS A YEAR OR TWO BEFORE THE WAR, THAT IS IN 1939 OR 1940. ONE SUMMER'S DAY WE WERE REAPING CORN NEAR THIS FOREST. A TRUCK WITH AN OPEN CHASSIS APPROACHED US ALONG THE ROAD. MEN IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING WERE SITTING IN IT. THE TRUCK WENT INSIDE THE FENCE. WE DECIDED TO TAKE A LOOK AND APPROACHED THE FENCE, REMOVED THE BOARDS, AND SAW THE MEN DIGGING A HOLE. THEN THEY LEFT. SOON AFTER THAT A TRUCK WITH A BLACK CABIN PASSED THROUGH THE FENCE INTO THE FOREST. AND SHOTS AND SHOUTING WERE HEARD IMMEDIATELY. THEN THE TRUCK LEFT. WE WENT TO LOOK. WHEN WE HAD CRAWLED UNDER THE FENCE WE SAW THE HOLE HAD BEEN COVERED WITH FRESH SAND, WHICH WAS MOVING."

N. POTERSHUK, BORN 1929: "EVERYONE IN OUR VILLAGE AT THE TIME KNEW ABOUT THE SHOOTINGS BECAUSE SHOTS WERE HEARD FROM THE FOREST ALMOST EVERY DAY. NONE OF THE LOCAL INHABITANTS KNEW WHO WAS BEING SHOT -- THEY WERE FRIGHTENED TO TALK ABOUT IT, EVEN AMONG THEMSELVES. I REMEMBER HOW ONCE A FRIEND AND I NONETHELESS DECIDED TO TAKE A LOOK AT WHAT WAS HAPPENING THERE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FENCE. THIS WAS IN APPROXIMATELY 1939. WE APPROACHED THE FENCE TOWARD EVENING. I SAW AND WELL REMEMBER HOW SOME 40 METERS FROM WHERE WE WERE SITTING ABOUT 8 MEN WERE DIGGING A HOLE. WHEN THEY HAD DUG THE HOLE THEY WERE PUT IN A TRUCK AND DRIVEN AWAY. WE RAN TO THE GRAVEL ROAD AND WAITED. SOON TRUCKS APPEARED, ONE COVERED, THE OTHERS ORDINARY TRUCKS WITH HIGH SIDES. THESE TRUCKS CONTAINED ONLY MEN, THEY WERE DRIVEN FROM THE TRUCKS BY MEN IN MILITARY UNIFORM AND PUSHED TOWARD THE HOLE. THEN SHOTS WERE HEARD."

"WE ARE CONTINUING THE QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES," YA. BROLISHS SAID. "WE ARE ALSO TO CARRY OUT AND TO OBTAIN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FORENSIC, CRIMINAL, AND OTHER EXPERT REPORTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN COMMISSIONED. WHEN WE HAVE ALL THE CONCLUSIONS, WE WILL ANALYZE THEM CAREFULLY AND COMPARE THEM WITH THE WITNESSES' EVIDENCE AND ONLY AFTER THAT WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO DRAW OBJECTIVE AND RELIABLE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EVENTS IN KUROPATY."

V. KONDRATYEV, FIRST DEPUTY PROSECUTOR OF THE BELORUSSIAN SSR, IS DIRECTLY SUPERVISING THE INVESTIGATION.

"I WANT TO APPEAL THROUGH IZVESTIYA," HE SAID, "TO ALL THOSE WHO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE EVENTS IN KUROPATY TO TELL THIS TO THE BELORUSSIAN PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE."

ADMIN

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJ: COMMISSION PROBES ORIGINS OF UNMARKED GRAVES

SOURCE: MOSCOW IZVESTIYA IN RUSSIAN 28 AUG 88 MORNING
EDITION P 2

TEXT:

//((REPORT BY IZVESTIYA OWN CORRESPONDENT M. SHIMANSKIY UNDER THE RUBRIC "GLASNOST VERSUS RUMORS": "WHOSE REMAINS LIE IN THE FOREST NEAR MINSK"))

((TEXT)) MINSK -- TODAY THE NAME KUROPATY IS OFTEN HEARD IN BELORUSSIA, AND IS BECOMING SURROUNDED BY DIVERSE RUMORS. MANY ANONYMOUS GRAVES HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED HERE.

KUROPATY IS A FOREST TRACT ON THE NORTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF MINSK. THE "ZELENY LUG" RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT HAS SPREAD RIGHT UP TO IT. OLD-TIMERS CONFIRM THAT FROM 1937 TO 1941 SHOTS WERE HEARD EVERY DAY AND EVERY NIGHT IN THE WOOD.

RECENTLY WHEN A GAS LINE TRENCH WAS LAID ONE OF THE GRAVES WAS DISTURBED. BONES, 15 BULLET-RIDDEN HUMAN SKULLS AND THE REMAINS OF 20 PAIRS OF SHOES WERE FOUND IN IT. THE SUPPOSITION WAS VOICED THAT DURING STALIN'S TIME MASS EXECUTIONS TOOK PLACE IN THE KUROPATY WOOD.

THE BELORUSSIAN SSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SET UP A GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION WHICH WAS INSTRUCTED TO FIND OUT WHOSE REMAINS LIE IN KUROPATY AND WHAT HAPPENED HERE AT THE END OF THE 1930'S AND THE BEGINNING OF THE 1940'S. I MET WITH G. TARNAVSKIY, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION AND BELORUSSIAN SSR PROSECUTOR.

"WE CAN WELL UNDERSTAND PUBLIC CONCERN IN CONNECTION WITH THE MASS GRAVES DISCOVERED IN KUROPATY," HE SAID. "OUR COMMISSION HAS STARTED WORK. IT IS HEADED BY N. MAZAY, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLIC'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. IT INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT, PARTY, AND SOVIET ORGANS AND THE PUBLIC. HERO OF SOCIALIST LABOR AND WRITER VASIL BYKOV, USSR PEOPLE'S ARTIST MIKHAIL SAVITSKIY, AND HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION MARIYA OSIPOVA ARE AMONG THEM. SPECIALISTS BEGAN TO WORK IN THE ARCHIVES BUT MANY DOCUMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH BELORUSSIA'S OCCUPATION DURING THE WAR YEARS WERE NOT KEPT.

EXCAVATIONS ARE ALSO UNDER WAY. HUMAN REMAINS AND VARIOUS OBJECTS HAVE ALSO BEEN DISCOVERED: CLOTHING, FOOTWEAR, COMBS AND EYEGASSES... ALL THESE ARE BEING HANDED OVER TO THE INSTITUTE OF FORENSIC EXAMINATION FOR INVESTIGATION. THERE ARE HOLES IN SOME SKULLS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO BULLET HOLES. BUT THE EXPERT EXAMINATION WILL ANSWER THIS QUESTION PRECISELY."

"HAS IT BEEN ESTABLISHED WHEN THESE PEOPLE WERE BURIED IN KUROPATY?"

"IT IS STILL IMPOSSIBLE TO ANSWER THIS PRECISELY. ACCORDING TO WITNESSES' STORIES, THIS WAS AT THE END OF THE 1930'S AND THE BEGINNING OF THE 1940'S. BUT THE FINAL CONCLUSION CAN ONLY BE MADE AFTER THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETED. EXPERT EXAMINATION WILL DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED IN KUROPATY AND WHEN, WHO IS BURIED HERE AND WHAT AGE AND SEX THESE PEOPLE WERE. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE EVENTS IN KUROPATY MUST BE TOLD.

BUT THE DIFFICULTY OF OUR INVESTIGATION LIES IN THE FACT THAT DURING THE LAST WAR THE NAZIS CARRIED OUT MASS EXECUTIONS OF THE PEACEFUL POPULATION THROUGHOUT BELORUSSIAN TERRITORY, AND KILLED POWS IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS, INCLUDING IN THE MINSK VICINITY. CITIZENS FROM OTHER OCCUPIED STATES WERE ALSO BROUGHT HERE TO BE EXECUTED. FOR THIS REASON HASTY CONCLUSIONS SHOULD NOT BE MADE. HASTY CONCLUSIONS NOT FOUNDED ON TRUSTWORTHY INFORMATION ONLY GIVE RISE TO RUMORS AND CONJECTURES, AND ROUSE EMOTIONS. AS SOON AS THE COMMISSION HAS PRECISE, VERIFIED DATA AT ITS DISPOSAL, THESE WILL ALL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION CONTINUES ITS WORK.

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HR 88-4459

23 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Attached IC Staff Paper: Promulgation of A Consumers Guide to Intelligence

1. The DCI and I have several problems with the attached Consumer's Guide:

- Who is it for? It is far too long to be read by any policymaker at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or above.
- It is so replete with different organizations, kinds of publications and names that it would be more confusing than helpful to someone who is completely new. At the end, the policymaker would not know whether he needed all of the documents listed or which of all the different organizations listed he should contact for help.

2. More specifically:

- On page 3, it refers to the Senior Interagency Group on Intelligence (SIG-I). There is a high likelihood that this group will go out of existence and be replaced by a similar structure but with a different name. The interagency organization structure under the NSC has changed with virtually every change of Presidents and a guide to a structure that existed to the previous administration seems almost certain to be out of date very soon.
- On page 9, paragraph 4, the section on "Research Intelligence" talks about INR but no other element of the Community. Why was INR selected and why do we treat only the State Department in this respect and not the Defense Department, CIA or other agencies.

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR

~~SECRET~~

26

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-- Page 24, paragraph 1 on "Strategic Warning Notice," states "When time is of the essence, the NIO for Warning may issue such notices directly to the President and the NSC, with concurrent (my emphasis) dissemination to the DCI and the Principals of the National Foreign Intelligence Board." This is news to us and the idea of the NIO for Warning issuing notices directly to the President and the NSC is not acceptable. This must be changed.

-- The "directory" listed in Section VII, beginning on page 27, lists in detail a number of CIA people and their telephone numbers while listing only a single individual for virtually every other intelligence organization. More to the point, neither the DCI nor DDCI are mentioned anywhere. This is an open invitation for tasking directly into the offices of the DDI without the DDI, the DCI or DDCI having the faintest idea what is going on. If the pattern of the other agencies is followed, only Kerr's office number would be listed. At a minimum, I think this change should be made.

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3. Again, it is not clear who the audience is and what makes us think that the exhaustive listing of major products will be anything other than confusing or that the directory is anything other than an invitation to chaos in tasking.

25X1
4. If we are going to do something like this, it seems to us that the main text should be no more than 5-10 pages long with perhaps some annexes on major consumers, definitions of classifications, products of each agency and a directory of principal contact points. However, the text should be built around the notion that the DCI is the President's principal intelligence advisor and that all intelligence contributions to the National Security Council structure -- meaning the statutory members of the NSC, its staff and the President and Vice President -- are the responsibility of the DCI. Then we should focus on the role of the National Intelligence Council for longer range studies or estimates and Community views, and CIA's responsibilities for current intelligence and those whom the DCI designates to represent him in policy meetings as the focal point for tasking. In short, in carrying out DCI responsibilities, all agencies are not equal; CIA is central for the current intelligence and policy support role and the National Intelligence Council is his principal arm for longer range issues and estimates. This is where policymakers should be sent in this document for tasking so that we keep control of the process. The handbook can tell them that the other


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agencies exist and that these agencies will support departmental intelligence requirements whether in DoD, State or elsewhere. However, we should convey that the tasking and requirements process is much leaner and better focused for national level intelligence support than this paper would suggest. This paper is an organizational variant of the old Chinese slogan "Let a thousand flowers bloom." That's not appropriate.

25X1

25X1



Robert M. Gates

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:

0-D/ICS
1-Chmm/IPC
~~1-DDCI~~
1-ER

SECRET

15 November 1988

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Attached IC Staff Paper: Promulgation of
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SECRET

CL By Signer
DECL OADR

-- Page 24, paragraph 1 on "Strategic Warning Notice," states "When time is of the essence, the NIO for Warning may issue such notices directly to the President and the NSC, with concurrent (my emphasis) dissemination to the DCI and the principals of the National Foreign Intelligence Board." This is news to me and the idea of the NIO for Warning being able to issue notices directly to the President and the NSC strikes me as wholly unacceptable. In my view, this must be changed.

-- The "directory" listed in Section VII, beginning on page 27, lists in detail a number of CIA people and their telephone numbers while listing only a single individual for virtually every other intelligence organization. More to the point, neither you nor I are mentioned anywhere. This strikes me as an open invitation for tasking directly into the offices of the DDI without the DDI, the DCI or DDCI having the faintest idea what is going on. If the pattern of the other agencies is followed, only Kerr's office number would be listed. At a minimum, I think this change should be made.

25X1

3. All in all, with the exception of the above points, I have no specific complaints with this paper. Again, however, it is not clear to me who the audience is and what makes us think that the exhaustive listing of major products will be anything other than confusing or that the directory is anything other than an invitation to chaos in tasking.

25X1

4. If we are going to do something like this, it seems to me that the main text should be no more than 5-10 pages long with perhaps some annexes on major consumers, definitions of national classifications, products of each agency and a directory of principal contact points. However, I believe that somehow the text should be built around the notion that the DCI is the President's principal intelligence advisor and that all intelligence contributions to the National Security Council structure -- meaning the statutory members of the NSC, its staff and the President and Vice President -- are the responsibility of the DCI. I would then focus on the role of the National Intelligence Council for longer range studies, CIA's responsibilities for current intelligence in the NID and PDB and those whom you designate to represent you in policy meetings as the focal point for tasking. In short, in carrying out your responsibilities, all agencies are not equal; CIA is central for the current intelligence and policy support role and the National Intelligence Council is your arm for longer range issues. This is where policymakers should be sent in this document for tasking so that you keep control of the

process. The handbook can tell them that the other agencies exist and that these agencies will support departmental intelligence requirements whether in DoD, State or elsewhere. However, we should convey that the tasking and requirements process is much leaner and better focused for national level intelligence support than this paper would suggest. This paper is an organizational variant of the the old Chinese slogan "Let a thousand flowers bloom." That's not appropriate.

25X1
25X1



Robert M. Gates

[Redacted]
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Producers Council
Washington, D.C. 20505

IPC 7916/88
9 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Intelligence Producers Council (IPC)

25X1 FROM: [Redacted]
Chief, Intelligence Producers Council Staff (IPCS)

SUBJECT: Promulgation of A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence

25X1 1. Action Requested: That you sign the "Foreword" of A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence: (What It Is and Where to Find It). [Redacted]

25X1 2. Background. Over the years, senior consumers of intelligence have complained about not knowing how to make contact with appropriate elements within the Intelligence Community in order to lay on requirements or to obtain answers to particular questions. Many of those policymakers who participated in the 1988 Consumers Survey confirmed the fact that consumer access to the Intelligence Community is still hampered by a lack of knowledge about how the Community is organized and how to get in touch with the right people within it. [Redacted]

25X1 3. In recognition of these problems, the Intelligence Producers Council (IPC) Staff has prepared the attached Consumer's Guide. This document, already circulated in draft form to the members of the IPC and to other elements within the Intelligence Community, now incorporates the changes recommended by the reviewing officials. [Redacted]

25X1 4. In addition to its primary purpose, the document has been designed to be included with the materials that may be passed to the Transition Team. Moreover, you may also wish to make copies available to newly appointed policymakers within the Bush administration. We also see utility in this document as an introductory guide for new professionals within the Intelligence Community, and we have already received numerous requests for copies from within the Community. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

CL BY: SIGNER
DECL: OADR

25X1 [Redacted]

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


IPC 7916/88

SUBJECT: Promulgation of A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence

5. Recommendation: That you sign the attached Foreword, thereby permitting us to publish and promulgate the new Consumer's Guide.

25X1
25X1



Attachment:
Consumers Guide



SECRET

25X1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: DDCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: Chief, IPC Staff		
ROOM NO. STAT BW09	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 344 REPLACES FORM 36-8

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A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO INTELLIGENCE
(What It Is and Where to Find It)

Prepared by the Intelligence Producers Council
for the Director of Central Intelligence

25X1

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
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ANNEX 3



Intelligence Community Staff



* Provides substantive advice and support

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25X1

ANNEX 4

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN
VICE CHAIRMAN

Fritz W. Ermarth
David D. Gries

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

Dr. Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

MGEN David W. Einsel, Jr.; USA RET
National Intelligence Officer at Large

William R. Kotapish
National Intelligence Officer for Counternarcotics

Andre J. LeGallo
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

Deane E. Hoffmann
National Intelligence Officer for Economics

Marten H. A. Van Heuven
National Intelligence Officer for Europe


Murat Natirboff
National Intelligence Officer for Foreign Denial
and Intelligence Activities

MGEN Larry D. Budge, USA
National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose
Forces

Martin W. Roeber
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

John O'Donnell
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and
South Asia

Dr. Julian C. Nall
National Intelligence Officer for Science and
Technology



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25X1

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Dr. Lawrence K. Gershwin
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

Robert E. Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning



25X1

SECRET



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SECRET

ANNEX 5

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN
STAFF CHIEF

25X11

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL

Mr. Mark M. Lowenthal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Functional
Analysis and Research/INR
Department of State

647-1038

Major General Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency

373-4855

RADM Charles F. Clark, USN
Deputy Director for Operations
National Security Agency

25X1

RADM Thomas A. Brooks, USN
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

695-3944

BGEN James D. Beans, USMC
Director of Intelligence
Commandant of the Marine Corps

694-2443

LTG Sidney T. Weinstein, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

695-3033

MGEN C. Norman Wood, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force

695-5613

Mr. E. Raymond Platig
Director, INR/LAR
Department of State

632-2025

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25X1

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Dr. Fritz Ermarth
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Central Intelligence Agency



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Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

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Deputy Director, Requirements and Evaluation
Intelligence Community Staff

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ANNEX 7

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs	Dr. Wynfred Joshua	695-0074
Strategic Programs Research and Development	Joseph C. Ardinger	695-0243
At-Large	Dr. John J. Dziak	695-0256
General Purpose Forces	James P. Peak	697-3107
East Asia and Pacific	John J. Sloan	695-0257
Middle East and South Asia	Walter P. Lang	695-0198
Africa	William G. Thom	695-0279
Latin America	COL James V. Coniglio, USA	695-0246
Global Affairs	Robert F. Dorr	695-7837
Staff Officer	Gertrude M. Hall	695-0256

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25X1

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



COMMAND ELEMENT

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR (DD)


EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (ED)

SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR (SEA)

APPROVED

Leonard H. Perrots

Leonard H. Perrots
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director



--- Administration and Logistics

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~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

PAO 88-0399

23 November 1988

DDCI:

RE: Speaking Invitation
Institute of Interamerican Studies
University of Miami
Coral Gables, Florida
17 February 1989

STAT The Director of the University of Miami Institute of Interamerican Studies, Jaime Suchlicki, has invited you to be the luncheon keynote speaker at a seminar on "The Role of Intelligence in National Security" in Coral Gables on 17 February 1989. Academic Coordinator [redacted] will be one of the speakers at the seminar, along with the Senior Staff Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Thomas Lattimer, and members of the Miami Graduate School faculty.

STAT According to your notation on the letter, you would like to decline this invitation. Attached is a letter of regret for your signature.

[redacted signature box]

Bill Baker

17

STAT DCI/PAO/WMB [redacted]

Distribution:

- Orig. - Addressee *WBS*
- 1 - ER
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - D/PAO
- 1 - PAO Registry
- 1 - PAO Ames
- 1 - MED (Subject)
- 1 - Jean

DCI
EXEC
REG

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

Central Intelligence Agency

PAO 0399/1 88



Washington, D. C. 20505

Dr. Jaime Suchlicki
Director
Institute of Interamerican Studies
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami
P.O. Box 248123
Coral Gables, Florida 33124


Dear Dr. Suchlicki:

Thank you for your invitation to be the luncheon keynote speaker at Miami University's seminar on "The Role of Intelligence in National Security" in February. As much as I would like to be with your group, I cannot make a commitment at this time and must decline. However, the Agency will be well represented by as one of the participants.

I wish you a very successful program.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



November 3, 1988

Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
4f39 Headquarters Building
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

We are organizing a seminar on "The Role of Intelligence in National Security" at the University of Miami on February 17, 1988. The seminar will highlight the role of intelligence in our society and the importance of the Agency as the central focus of that role. Participants will include members of the academic community as well as Arthur Hulick, Academic Coordinator from the Agency's Public Affairs office. See enclosed program.

We would like very much for you to be our luncheon keynote speaker. The audience will consist of faculty and students as well as members of the business community and the media. We would like you to discuss a topic related to the theme of intelligence and national security.

If you could join us, we would be honored with your presence.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jaime Suchlicki".

Jaime Suchlicki
Director

JS/ys

Enclosures

Institute of Interamerican Studies
Graduate School of International Studies
P.O. Box 248123 (305) 284-6868
Coral Gables, Florida 33124

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

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
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Date

Remarks To # 7: Your recommendations please.

STAT



Executive Secretary

30 Nov 88

Date

3637 (10-81)

ER 88-4479

29 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Support for the DCI

25X1 1. In meetings with the DO divisions and most recently with two representatives from NE, I have described several ways in which the DO could provide better support for the DCI in his capacity as senior intelligence advisor to the President. One such way would be current, timely information from the field, both substantive views and atmospheric. I believe it would be useful for the DCI to have the option of beginning his briefings of the President or at NSC meetings by noting that he has been in touch with our Chief of Station in a country (or our COSS in a region) and reporting not only the latest information but also local atmospheric. Too often the DCI has many facts but lacks in his briefing materials a sense of urgency and of current information from the field. [redacted]

25X1 2. What is the point of having secure communications equipment (both telephone and cable) and not using it to support the DCI at these meetings? The DCI ought to be armed with the latest views or report from our Chiefs of Station when he walks in to a meeting or to see the President. This will require the closest coordination between the Executive Secretary, the EA/DCI and the Office of the DDO. The reports from the field, whether in an ops format or as an [redacted] need not be long -- just up to the minute, anecdotal and atmospheric, and with whatever insights or thoughts the COS has. It also is an opportunity for greater exposure for our COSS and their unique contributions in these forums. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]
Robert M. Gates

cc: DCI

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Cl By Signer
DECL OADR

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15	D/PERS				
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18	D/OGI		X		
19	NIO/USSR		X		
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SUSPENSE _____

Date

Remarks

To 5 & 9: (Para 5 suggests conference for late Feb or early March 1989).

STAT



Executive Secretary

30 Nov 88

Date

3637 (10-81)



~~SECRET~~

ER 88-4480

29 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Alternative Soviet Futures

25X1 1. A problem we have acknowledged is how often Gorbachev has surprised us with the range and scope of his proposals for change in the Soviet system. With respect to perestroika, at least in terms of pronouncements, we have often been behind the power curve and reacted to events.

25X1 2. I think we need to take an initiative to get in front of what Gorbachev is doing. This will involve imagination, creativity and speculation but only by trying to look down the road some distance can we then work our way back to develop criteria or indicators of the future direction of events.

25X1 3. I think that we should sponsor a conference on the Soviet Future that would involve commissioning perhaps eight, ten or even a dozen papers by diverse scholars on the outside that would spin out alternative futures for the Soviet Union. For example, one might describe how the Soviet Union would unravel as a result of ethnic disputes and conflict and trouble from the periphery inward. Another might spin out how a successful perestroika program might develop over time and how the country might move in that direction. There are other scenarios that one could identify as one looked ahead anywhere from five to fifteen or twenty years. The focus would not be on the likelihood of such a scenario coming to pass but to consider how it might happen.

4. The events in the Soviet Union already so far surpass what we would have imagined in 1985 and our responses have been so reactive, I am convinced it is essential for us to undertake a new effort that could result in a stimulating conference. More importantly, it could provide us with papers of

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C1 By Signer
DECL OADR

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alternative futures that would allow us to backtrack, developing what looked to be plausible indicators or criteria for determining whether the Soviet Union is moving down one or another of these paths. You also should involve OGI to ensure exploitation of its work on instability, associated indicators, methodologies, and also a fresh non-expert perspective. Further, I think we should try to involve people other than the usual outside suspects -- people we know well. How about Nick Eberstadt at AEI, Janos Kernal at Harvard, Bela Balassa of Johns Hopkins, etc.?

25X1

5. I think we should do this soon. I would like to have you jointly undertake this project with a view to holding the conference in late February or early March. I think the first task is to identify, in consultation perhaps with outsiders, the alternative scenarios to be written and then seeing if we can get those commissioned and completed.

25X1

6. If you would like to discuss this further or have any concerns or suggestions, let's get together. Otherwise, I would hope we could proceed as quickly as possible.

25X1

25X1

Robert M. Gates

DCI
cc: D/SOVA
D/OGI
NIO/USSR

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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SUSPENSE 15 Dec 88
Date

Remarks

STAT

[Redacted Signature Box]



30 Nov 88
Date

3637 (10-81)

ER 88-4478

29 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: COS Political Intelligence

25X1 1. As I have mentioned before, there is a need to develop in the DO incentives that will prompt COS's periodically to send to Headquarters the political atmospherics in their host country. Just as most political reporting in this country is based on gossip, rumor and inside knowledge -- usually not documents -- so too our COS's develop a goldmine of information almost inadvertently through their contact with sources other than those normally touched by the US Embassy, the insights of their agents (apart from whatever specific information they may be reporting), and the gossip and rumor that float freely virtually through every capital in the world. [redacted]

25X1 2. There may be a way for COS's or their officers to be encouraged every few weeks to pull such anecdotal and atmospheric information together and send it to Headquarters for DI and DO use. The reliability of the information is far less important than the fact it is circulating and is heard/believed by the locals. I know this makes COS's uneasy, but the risks would be minimized by clearly identifying rumor and gossip. Such information is the bread and butter of political reporting -- just like political jokes; without it, we in Headquarters have only the notes, not the rhythm of what is going on. State once did this in Airgrams, but rarely now -- and, anyway, our people usually have a better and broader array of contacts. [redacted]

25X1 3. As past experience demonstrates, this will never happen without some incentive -- without such reports counting as disseminated reports or some other mechanism that makes it worth the while of COS's or case officers to take the time to do this. We've talked about this for several years. [redacted] sent me, several weeks ago, some reporting along these lines but compared to the overall efforts of the DO it was not even a trickle. I would like to see this kind of reporting done with some regularity and for a system of incentives to be developed. [redacted]

25X1 25X1 4. I would like to have from you by 15 December a proposed cable or cables to the field implementing the above and laying out for the stations what incentives there will be for them in being responsive. [redacted]

[redacted]
Robert M. Gates

cc: DCI

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Cl By Signer
DECL OADR

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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STAT _____

Executive Secretary
30 Nov 88
Date

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